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Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change is the third part 
of the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) — Climate Change 2013 / 2014 — and was 
prepared by its Working Group III. The volume provides a comprehen-
sive and transparent assessment of relevant options for mitigating 
climate change through limiting or preventing greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions, as well as activities that reduce their concentrations in the 
atmosphere. 
This report highlights that despite a growing number of mitigation 
policies, GHG emission growth has accelerated over the last decade. 
The evidence from hundreds of new mitigation scenarios suggests 
that stabilizing temperature increase within the 21st century requires 
a fundamental departure from business-as-usual. At the same time, it 
shows that a variety of emission pathways exists where the tempera-
ture  increase can be limited to below 2 °C relative to pre-industrial 
level. But this goal is associated with considerable technological, eco-
nomic and institutional challenges. A delay in mitigation efforts or the 
limited availability of low carbon technologies further increases these 
challenges. Less ambitious mitigation goals such as 2.5 °C or 3 °C 
involve similar challenges, but on a slower timescale. Complementing 
these insights, the report provides a comprehensive assessment of the 
technical and behavioural mitigation options available in the energy, 
transport, buildings, industry and land-use sectors and evaluates policy 
options across governance levels from the local to the international 
scale.
The findings in this report have considerably enhanced our understand-
ing of the range of mitigation pathways available and their underlying 
technological, economic and institutional requirements. The timing of 
this report is thus critical, as it can provide crucial information for the 
negotiators responsible for concluding a new agreement under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2015. 
The report therefore demands the urgent attention of both policymak-
ers and the general public.
As an intergovernmental body jointly established in 1988 by the 
World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP), the IPCC has successfully provided 
policymakers with the most authoritative and objective scientific and 
technical assessments, which are clearly policy relevant without being 
policy prescriptive. Beginning in 1990, this series of IPCC Assessment 
Reports, Special Reports, Technical Papers, Methodology Reports and 
other products have become standard works of reference.
This Working Group III assessment was made possible thanks to the 
commitment and dedication of many hundreds of experts, represent-
ing a wide range of regions and scientific disciplines. WMO and UNEP 
are proud that so many of the experts belong to their communities and 
networks.
We express our deep gratitude to all authors, review editors and expert 
reviewers for devoting their knowledge, expertise and time. We would 
like to thank the staff of the Working Group III Technical Support Unit 
and the IPCC Secretariat for their dedication.
We are also thankful to the governments that supported their scien-
tists’ participation in developing this report and that contributed to 
the IPCC Trust Fund to provide for the essential participation of experts 
from developing countries and countries with economies in transition.
We would like to express our appreciation to the government of 
Italy for hosting the scoping meeting for the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment 
Report, to the governments of Republic of Korea, New Zealand and 
Ethiopia as well as the University of Vigo and the Economics for Energy 
Research Centre in Spain for hosting drafting sessions of the Working 
Group III contribution and to the government of Germany for host-
ing the Twelfth Session of Working Group III in Berlin for approval of 
the Working Group III Report. In addition, we would like to thank the 
governments of India, Peru, Ghana, the United States and Germany for 
hosting the AR5 Expert meetings in Calcutta, Lima, Accra, Washington 
D. C., and Potsdam, respectively. The generous financial support by the 
government of Germany, and the logistical support by the Potsdam 
Institute for Climate Impact Research (Germany), enabled the effec-
tive operation of the Working Group III Technical Support Unit. This is 
gratefully acknowledged.
We would particularly like to thank Dr. Rajendra Pachauri, Chairman 
of the IPCC, for his direction and guidance of the IPCC and we express 
our deep gratitude to Professor Ottmar Edenhofer, Dr. Ramon Pichs-
Madruga, and Dr. Youba Sokona, the Co-Chairs of Working Group III for 
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The Working Group III contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report 
(AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) pro-
vides a comprehensive and transparent assessment of the scientific lit-
erature on climate change mitigation. It builds upon the Working Group 
III contribution to the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) in 2007, 
the Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change 
Mitigation (SRREN) in 2011 and previous reports and incorporates 
subsequent new findings and research. The report assesses mitigation 
options at different levels of governance and in different economic sec-
tors. It evaluates the societal implications of different mitigation poli-
cies, but does not recommend any particular option for mitigation.
Approach to the assessment
The Working Group III contribution to the AR5 explores the solution 
space of climate change mitigation drawing on experience and expec-
tations for the future. This exploration is based on a comprehensive 
and transparent assessment of the scientific, technical, and socio-eco-
nomic literature on the mitigation of climate change. 
The intent of the report is to facilitate an integrated and inclusive 
deliberation of alternative climate policy goals and the different pos-
sible means to achieve them (e. g., technologies, policies, institutional 
settings). It does so through informing the policymakers and general 
public about the practical implications of alternative policy options, 
i. e., their associated costs and benefits, risks and trade-offs.
During the AR5 cycle, the role of the Working Group III scientists was 
akin to that of a cartographer: they mapped out different pathways 
within the solution space and assessed potential practical consequences 
and trade-offs; at the same time, they clearly marked implicit value 
assumptions and uncertainties. Consequently, this report may now be 
used by policymakers like a map for navigating the widely unknown ter-
ritory of climate policy. Instead of providing recommendations for how 
to solve the complex policy problems, the report offers relevant informa-
tion that enables policymakers to assess alternative mitigation options. 
There are four major pillars to this cartography exercise:
Exploration of alternative climate policy goals: The report lays out 
the technological, economic and institutional requirements for stabiliz-
ing global mean temperature increases at different levels. It informs 
decision makers about the costs and benefits, risks and opportunities 
of these, acknowledging the fact that often more than one path can 
lead to a given policy goal. 
Transparency over value judgments: The decision which mitigation 
path to take is influenced by a series of sometimes disputed norma-
tive choices which relate to the long-term stabilization goal itself, the 
weighing of other social priorities and the policies for achieving the 
goal.  Facts are often inextricably interlinked with values and there is 
no purely scientific resolution of value dissent. What an assessment 
can do to support a rational public debate about value conflicts is to 
make implicit value judgments and ethical viewpoints as transparent 
as possible. Moreover, controversial policy goals and related ethical 
standpoints should be discussed in the context of the required means 
to reach these goals, in particular their possible consequences and 
side-effects. The potential for adverse side-effects of mitigation actions 
therefore requires an iterative assessment approach.
Multiple objectives in the context of sustainable development 
and equity: A comprehensive exploration of the solution space in the 
field of climate change mitigation recognizes that mitigation itself will 
only be one objective among others for decision makers. Decision mak-
ers may be interested in pursuing a broader concept of well-being. This 
broader concept also involves the sharing of limited resources within 
and across countries as well as across generations. Climate change 
mitigation is discussed here as a multi-objective problem embedded in 
a broader sustainable development and equity context. 
Risk management: Climate change mitigation can be framed as 
a risk management exercise. It may provide large opportunities to 
humankind, but will also be associated with risks and uncertainties. 
Some of those may be of a fundamental nature and cannot be easily 
reduced or managed. It is therefore a basic requirement for a scientific 
assessment to communicate these uncertainties, wherever possible, 
both in their quantitative and qualitative dimension. 
Scope of the report
During the process of scoping and approving the outline of the Work-
ing Group III contribution to the AR5, the IPCC focused on those 
aspects of the current understanding of the science of climate change 
mitigation that were judged to be most relevant to policymakers.
Working Group III included an extended framing section to provide 
full transparency over the concepts and methods used throughout the 
report, highlighting their underlying value judgments. This includes an 
improved treatment of risks and risk perception, uncertainties, ethical 
questions as well as sustainable development.
The exploration of the solution space for climate change mitigation 
starts from a new set of baseline and mitigation scenarios. The entire 
scenario set for the first time provides fully consistent information on 
radiative forcing and temperature in broad agreement with the infor-
mation provided in the Working Group I contribution to the AR5. The 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change requested 







goal as well as a potential 1.5 °C goal. Compared to the AR4 the 
report therefore assesses a large number of low stabilization scenarios 
broadly consistent with the 2 °C goal. It includes policy scenarios that 
investigate the impacts of delayed and fragmented international miti-
gation efforts and of restricted mitigation technologies portfolios on 
achieving specific mitigation goals and associated costs.
The WGIII contribution to the AR5 features several new elements. A full 
chapter is devoted to human settlements and infrastructures. Gover-
nance structures for the design of mitigation policies are discussed on 
the global, regional, national and sub-national level. The report closes 
with a novel chapter about investment needs and finance.
Structure of the report
The Working Group III contribution to the Fifth Assessment report is 
comprised of four parts:
Part I: Introduction (Chapter 1) 
Part II: Framing Issues (Chapters 2 – 4) 
Part III: Pathways for Mitigating Climate Change (Chapters 5 – 12) 
Part IV:  Assessment of Policies, Institutions and Finance (Chapters 
13 – 16)
Part I provides an introduction to the Working Group III contribution 
and sets the stage for the subsequent chapters. It describes the ‘Lessons 
learned since AR4’ and the ‘New challenges for AR5’. It gives a brief over-
view of ‘Historical, current and future trends’ regarding GHG emissions 
and discusses the issues involved in climate change response policies 
including the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC (Article 2) and the human 
dimensions of climate change (including sustainable development).
Part II deals with framing issues that provide transparency over method-
ological foundations and underlying concepts including the relevant value 
judgments for the detailed assessment of climate change mitigation poli-
cies and measures in the subsequent parts. Each chapter addresses key 
overarching issues (Chapter 2: Integrated Risk and Uncertainty Assess-
ment of Climate Change Response Policies; Chapter 3: Social, Economic 
and Ethical Concepts and Methods; Chapter 4: Sustainable Development 
and Equity) and acts as a reference point for subsequent chapters. 
Part III provides an integrated assessment of possible mitigation path-
ways and the respective sectoral contributions and implications. It 
combines cross-sectoral and sectoral information on long-term miti-
gation pathways and short- to mid-term mitigation options in major 
economic sectors. Chapter 5 (Drivers, Trends and Mitigation) provides 
the context for the subsequent chapters by outlining global trends in 
stocks and flows of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and short-lived climate 
pollutants by means of different accounting methods that provide 
complementary perspectives on the past. It also discusses emissions 
drivers, which informs the assessment of how GHG emissions have 
historically developed. Chapter 6 (Assessing Transformation Pathways) 
analyses 1200 new scenarios generated by 31 modelling teams around 
the world to explore the economic, technological and institutional 
prerequisites and implications of mitigation pathways with different 
levels of ambition. The sectoral chapters (Chapter 7 – 11) and Chapter 
12 (Human Settlements, Infrastructure and Spatial Planning) provide 
information on the different mitigation options across energy systems, 
transport, buildings, industry, agriculture, forestry and other land use 
as well as options specific to human settlements and infrastructure, 
including the possible co-benefits, adverse side-effects and costs that 
may be associated with each of these options. Pathways described in 
Chapter 6 are discussed in a sector-specific context.
Part IV assesses policies across governance scales. Beginning with inter-
national cooperation (Chapter 13), it proceeds to the regional (Chap-
ter 14), national and sub-national levels Chapter 15) before concluding 
with a chapter that assesses cross-cutting investment and financing 
issues (Chapter  16). It reviews experience with climate change miti-
gation policies — both the policies themselves and the interactions 
among policies across sectors and scales — to provide insights to poli-
cymakers on the structure of policies which best fulfill evaluation crite-
ria such as environmental and economic effectiveness, and others.
The assessment process
This Working Group III contribution to the AR5 represents the com-
bined efforts of hundreds of leading experts in the field of climate 
change mitigation and has been prepared in accordance with the rules 
and procedures established by the IPCC. A scoping meeting for the 
AR5 was held in July 2009 and the outlines for the contributions of the 
three Working Groups were approved at the 31st Session of the Panel 
in November 2009. Governments and IPCC observer organizations 
nominated experts for the author teams. The team of 235 Coordinating 
Lead Authors and Lead Authors plus 38 Review Editors selected by the 
Working Group III Bureau, was accepted at the 41st Session of the IPCC 
Bureau in May 2010. More than 170 Contributing Authors provided 
draft text and information to the author teams at their request. Drafts 
prepared by the authors were subject to two rounds of formal review 
and revision followed by a final round of government comments on the 
Summary for Policymakers. More than  38,000 written comments were 
submitted by more than 800 expert reviewers and 37 governments. 
The Review Editors for each chapter monitored the review process to 
ensure that all substantive review comments received appropriate con-
sideration. The Summary for Policymakers was approved line-by-line 
and the underlying chapters were then accepted at the 12th Session of 
IPCC Working Group III from 7 – 11 April 2014 in Berlin.
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The Working Group III contribution to the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) assesses literature on the scientific, 
technological, environmental, economic and social aspects of mitigation of climate change. It builds upon the Working 
Group III contribution to the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), the Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources 
and Climate Change Mitigation (SRREN) and previous reports and incorporates subsequent new findings and research. 
The report also assesses mitigation options at different levels of governance and in different economic sectors, and the 
societal implications of different mitigation policies, but does not recommend any particular option for mitigation.
This Summary for Policymakers (SPM) follows the structure of the Working Group III report. The narrative is supported 
by a series of highlighted conclusions which, taken together, provide a concise summary. The basis for the SPM can be 
found in the chapter sections of the underlying report and in the Technical Summary (TS). References to these are given 
in square brackets.
The degree of certainty in findings in this assessment, as in the reports of all three Working Groups, is based on the 
author teams’ evaluations of underlying scientific understanding and is expressed as a qualitative level of confidence 
(from very low to very high) and, when possible, probabilistically with a quantified likelihood (from exceptionally unlikely 
to virtually certain). Confidence in the validity of a finding is based on the type, amount, quality, and consistency of 
evidence (e. g., data, mechanistic understanding, theory, models, expert judgment) and the degree of agreement.1 
Probabilistic estimates of quantified measures of uncertainty in a finding are based on statistical analysis of observations 
or model results, or both, and expert judgment.2 Where appropriate, findings are also formulated as statements of fact 
without using uncertainty qualifiers. Within paragraphs of this summary, the confidence, evidence, and agreement terms 
given for a bolded finding apply to subsequent statements in the paragraph, unless additional terms are provided.
Approaches to climate change mitigation
Mitigation is a human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases. Mitiga-
tion, together with adaptation to climate change, contributes to the objective expressed in Article 2 of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC):
The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may 
adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt natu-
rally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to 
proceed in a sustainable manner.
Climate policies can be informed by the findings of science, and systematic methods from other disciplines. [1.2, 2.4, 2.5, 
Box 3.1]
1 The following summary terms are used to describe the available evidence: limited, medium, or robust; and for the degree of agreement: low, 
medium, or high. A level of confidence is expressed using five qualifiers: very low, low, medium, high, and very high, and typeset in italics, e. g., 
medium confidence. For a given evidence and agreement statement, different confidence levels can be assigned, but increasing levels of evidence 
and degrees of agreement are correlated with increasing confidence. For more details, please refer to the guidance note for Lead Authors of the 
IPCC Fifth Assessment Report on consistent treatment of uncertainties.
2 The following terms have been used to indicate the assessed likelihood of an outcome or a result: virtually certain 99 – 100 % probability, very 
likely 90 – 100 %, likely 66 – 100 %, about as likely as not 33 – 66 %, unlikely 0 – 33 %, very unlikely 0 – 10 %, exceptionally unlikely 0 – 1 %. Addi-
tional terms (more likely than not > 50 – 100 %, and more unlikely than likely 0 – < 50 %) may also be used when appropriate. Assessed likelihood 






Sustainable development and equity provide a basis for assessing climate policies and highlight the need for 
addressing the risks of climate change.3 Limiting the effects of climate change is necessary to achieve sustainable 
development and equity, including poverty eradication. At the same time, some mitigation efforts could undermine action 
on the right to promote sustainable development, and on the achievement of poverty eradication and equity. Conse-
quently, a comprehensive assessment of climate policies involves going beyond a focus on mitigation and adaptation 
policies alone to examine development pathways more broadly, along with their determinants. [4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.8]
Effective mitigation will not be achieved if individual agents advance their own interests independently. 
Climate change has the characteristics of a collective action problem at the global scale, because most greenhouse 
gases (GHGs) accumulate over time and mix globally, and emissions by any agent (e. g., individual, community, company, 
country) affect other agents.4 International cooperation is therefore required to effectively mitigate GHG emissions and 
address other climate change issues [1.2.4, 2.6.4, 3.2, 4.2, 13.2, 13.3]. Furthermore, research and development in support 
of mitigation creates knowledge spillovers. International cooperation can play a constructive role in the development, dif-
fusion and transfer of knowledge and environmentally sound technologies [1.4.4, 3.11.6, 11.8, 13.9, 14.4.3].
Issues of equity, justice, and fairness arise with respect to mitigation and adaptation.5 Countries’ past and 
future contributions to the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere are different, and countries also face varying chal-
lenges and circumstances, and have different capacities to address mitigation and adaptation. The evidence suggests that 
outcomes seen as equitable can lead to more effective cooperation. [3.10, 4.2.2, 4.6.2]
Many areas of climate policy-making involve value judgements and ethical considerations. These areas range 
from the question of how much mitigation is needed to prevent dangerous interference with the climate system to 
choices among specific policies for mitigation or adaptation [3.1, 3.2]. Social, economic and ethical analyses may be 
used to inform value judgements and may take into account values of various sorts, including human wellbeing, cultural 
values and non-human values [3.4, 3.10].
Among other methods, economic evaluation is commonly used to inform climate policy design. Practical tools 
for economic assessment include cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, multi-criteria analysis and expected 
utility theory [2.5]. The limitations of these tools are well-documented [3.5]. Ethical theories based on social welfare 
functions imply that distributional weights, which take account of the different value of money to different people, should 
be applied to monetary measures of benefits and harms [3.6.1, Box TS.2]. Whereas distributional weighting has not 
frequently been applied for comparing the effects of climate policies on different people at a single time, it is standard 
practice, in the form of discounting, for comparing the effects at different times [3.6.2].
Climate policy intersects with other societal goals creating the possibility of co-benefits or adverse side-
effects. These intersections, if well-managed, can strengthen the basis for undertaking climate action. Mitiga-
tion and adaptation can positively or negatively influence the achievement of other societal goals, such as those related 
to human health, food security, biodiversity, local environmental quality, energy access, livelihoods, and equitable sus-
tainable development; and vice versa, policies toward other societal goals can influence the achievement of mitigation 
and adaptation objectives [4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.8]. These influences can be substantial, although sometimes difficult 
to quantify, especially in welfare terms [3.6.3]. This multi-objective perspective is important in part because it helps to 
identify areas where support for policies that advance multiple goals will be robust [1.2.1, 4.2, 4.8, 6.6.1].
3 See WGII AR5 SPM.
4 In the social sciences this is referred to as a ‘global commons problem‘. As this expression is used in the social sciences, it has no specific implica-
tions for legal arrangements or for particular criteria regarding effort-sharing.




Climate policy may be informed by a consideration of a diverse array of risks and uncertainties, some of 
which are difficult to measure, notably events that are of low probability but which would have a significant 
impact if they occur. Since AR4, the scientific literature has examined risks related to climate change, adaptation, 
and mitigation strategies. Accurately estimating the benefits of mitigation takes into account the full range of possible 
impacts of climate change, including those with high consequences but a low probability of occurrence. The benefits of 
mitigation may otherwise be underestimated (high confidence) [2.5, 2.6, Box 3.9]. The choice of mitigation actions is also 
influenced by uncertainties in many socio-economic variables, including the rate of economic growth and the evolution 
of technology (high confidence) [2.6, 6.3].
The design of climate policy is influenced by how individuals and organizations perceive risks and uncertain-
ties and take them into account. People often utilize simplified decision rules such as a preference for the status quo. 
Individuals and organizations differ in their degree of risk aversion and the relative importance placed on near-term 
versus long-term ramifications of specific actions [2.4]. With the help of formal methods, policy design can be improved 
by taking into account risks and uncertainties in natural, socio-economic, and technological systems as well as decision 
processes, perceptions, values and wealth [2.5].
Trends in stocks and flows of greenhouse gases  
and their drivers
Total anthropogenic GHG emissions have continued to increase over 1970 to 2010 with larger absolute decadal 
increases toward the end of this period (high confidence). Despite a growing number of climate change mitigation poli-
cies, annual GHG emissions grew on average by 1.0 gigatonne carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2eq) (2.2 %) per year from 
2000 to 2010 compared to 0.4 GtCO2eq (1.3 %) per year from 1970 to 2000 (Figure SPM.1).6,7 Total anthropogenic GHG 
emissions were the highest in human history from 2000 to 2010 and reached 49 (±4.5) GtCO2eq / yr in 2010. The global 
economic crisis 2007 / 2008 only temporarily reduced emissions. [1.3, 5.2, 13.3, 15.2.2, Box TS.5, Figure 15.1]
CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes contributed about 78 % of the total GHG 
emission increase from 1970 to 2010, with a similar percentage contribution for the period 2000 – 2010 
(high confidence). Fossil fuel-related CO2 emissions reached 32 (±2.7) GtCO2 / yr, in 2010, and grew further by about 
3 % between 2010 and 2011 and by about 1 – 2 % between 2011 and 2012. Of the 49 (±4.5) GtCO2eq / yr in total 
 anthropogenic GHG emissions in 2010, CO2 remains the major anthropogenic GHG accounting for 76 % (38 ± 3.8 
GtCO2eq / yr) of total anthropogenic GHG emissions in 2010. 16 % (7.8 ± 1.6 GtCO2eq / yr) come from methane (CH4), 6.2 % 
(3.1 ± 1.9 GtCO2eq / yr) from nitrous oxide (N2O), and 2.0 % (1.0 ± 0.2 GtCO2eq / yr) from fluorinated gases ( Figure SPM.1). 
Annually, since 1970, about 25 % of anthropogenic GHG emissions have been in the form of non-CO2 gases.8 [1.2, 5.2]
6 Throughout the SPM, emissions of GHGs are weighed by Global Warming Potentials with a 100-year time horizon (GWP100) from the IPCC Second 
Assessment Report. All metrics have limitations and uncertainties in assessing consequences of different emissions. [3.9.6, Box TS.5,  
Annex II.9, WGI SPM]
7 In this SPM, uncertainty in historic GHG emission data is reported using 90 % uncertainty intervals unless otherwise stated. GHG emission levels 
are rounded to two significant digits throughout this document; as a consequence, small differences in sums due to rounding may occur. 
8 In this report, data on non-CO2 GHGs, including fluorinated gases, are taken from the EDGAR database (Annex II.9), which covers substances 





About half of cumulative anthropogenic CO2 emissions between 1750 and 2010 have occurred in the last 40 
years (high confidence). In 1970, cumulative CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion, cement production and flaring 
since 1750 were 420 ± 35 GtCO2; in 2010, that cumulative total had tripled to 1300 ± 110 GtCO2. Cumulative CO2 emissions 
from Forestry and Other Land Use (FOLU)9 since 1750 increased from 490 ± 180 GtCO2 in 1970 to 680 ± 300 GtCO2 in 2010. 
[5.2]
Annual anthropogenic GHG emissions have increased by 10 GtCO2eq between 2000 and 2010, with this 
increase directly coming from energy supply (47 %), industry (30 %), transport (11 %) and buildings (3 %) 
sectors (medium confidence). Accounting for indirect emissions raises the contributions of the buildings and 
industry sectors (high confidence). Since 2000, GHG emissions have been growing in all sectors, except AFOLU. Of the 
49 (±4.5) GtCO2eq emissions in 2010, 35 % (17 GtCO2eq) of GHG emissions were released in the energy supply sector, 
9 Forestry and Other Land Use (FOLU)—also referred to as LULUCF (Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry)—is the subset of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) emissions and removals of GHGs related to direct human-induced land use, land-use change and forestry 
activities excluding agricultural emissions and removals (see WGIII AR5 Glossary).
Figure SPM.1 | Total annual anthropogenic GHG emissions (GtCO2eq / yr) by groups of gases 1970 – 2010: CO2 from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes; CO2 from 
Forestry and Other Land Use (FOLU); methane (CH4); nitrous oxide (N2O); fluorinated gases8 covered under the Kyoto Protocol (F-gases). At the right side of the figure GHG emis-
sions in 2010 are shown again broken down into these components with the associated uncertainties (90 % confidence interval) indicated by the error bars. Total anthropogenic 
GHG emissions uncertainties are derived from the individual gas estimates as described in Chapter 5 [5.2.3.6]. Global CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion are known within 
8 % uncertainty (90 % confidence interval). CO2 emissions from FOLU have very large uncertainties attached in the order of ± 50 %. Uncertainty for global emissions of CH4, N2O 
and the F-gases has been estimated as 20 %, 60 % and 20 %, respectively. 2010 was the most recent year for which emission statistics on all gases as well as assessment of 
uncertainties were essentially complete at the time of data cut-off for this report. Emissions are converted into CO2-equivalents based on GWP1006 from the IPCC Second Assessment 
Report. The emission data from FOLU represents land-based CO2 emissions from forest fires, peat fires and peat decay that approximate to net CO2 flux from FOLU as described in 






































































24 % (12 GtCO2eq, net emissions) in AFOLU, 21 % (10 GtCO2eq) in industry, 14 % (7.0 GtCO2eq) in transport and 6.4 % 
(3.2 GtCO2eq) in buildings. When emissions from electricity and heat production are attributed to the sectors that use 
the final energy (i. e. indirect emissions), the shares of the industry and buildings sectors in global GHG emissions are 
increased to 31 % and 19 %7, respectively (Figure SPM.2). [7.3, 8.2, 9.2, 10.3, 11.2]
Globally, economic and population growth continue to be the most important drivers of increases in CO2 
emissions from fossil fuel combustion. The contribution of population growth between 2000 and 2010 
remained roughly identical to the previous three decades, while the contribution of economic growth has 
risen sharply (high confidence). Between 2000 and 2010, both drivers outpaced emission reductions from improve-
ments in energy intensity (Figure SPM.3). Increased use of coal relative to other energy sources has reversed the 
long-standing trend of gradual decarbonization of the world’s energy supply. [1.3, 5.3, 7.2, 14.3, TS.2.2]
Without additional efforts to reduce GHG emissions beyond those in place today, emissions growth is 
expected to persist driven by growth in global population and economic activities. Baseline scenarios, those 
without additional mitigation, result in global mean surface temperature increases in 2100 from 3.7 °C to 
4.8 °C compared to pre-industrial levels10 (range based on median climate response; the range is 2.5 °C to 
7.8 °C when including climate uncertainty, see Table SPM.1)11 (high confidence). The emission scenarios collected for 
this assessment represent full radiative forcing including GHGs, tropospheric ozone, aerosols and albedo change. Baseline 
scenarios (scenarios without explicit additional efforts to constrain emissions) exceed 450 parts per million (ppm) CO2eq 
by 2030 and reach CO2eq concentration levels between 750 and more than 1300 ppm CO2eq by 2100. This is similar to 
the range in atmospheric concentration levels between the RCP 6.0 and RCP 8.5 pathways in 2100.12 For comparison, the 
CO2eq concentration in 2011 is estimated to be 430 ppm (uncertainty range 340 – 520 ppm).13 [6.3, Box TS.6; WGI Figure 
SPM.5, WGI 8.5, WGI 12.3]
10 Based on the longest global surface temperature dataset available, the observed change between the average of the period 1850 – 1900 and of 
the AR5 reference period (1986 – 2005) is 0.61 °C (5 – 95 % confidence interval: 0.55 – 0.67 °C) [WGI SPM.E], which is used here as an approxi-
mation of the change in global mean surface temperature since pre-industrial times, referred to as the period before 1750.
11 The climate uncertainty reflects the 5th to 95th percentile of climate model calculations described in Table SPM.1.
12 For the purpose of this assessment, roughly 300 baseline scenarios and 900 mitigation scenarios were collected through an open call from 
integrated modelling teams around the world. These scenarios are complementary to the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs, see 
WGIII AR5 Glossary). The RCPs are identified by their approximate total radiative forcing in year 2100 relative to 1750: 2.6 Watts per square meter 
(W / m2) for RCP2.6, 4.5 W / m2 for RCP4.5, 6.0 W / m2 for RCP6.0, and 8.5 W / m2 for RCP8.5. The scenarios collected for this assessment span a 
slightly broader range of concentrations in the year 2100 than the four RCPs.
13 This is based on the assessment of total anthropogenic radiative forcing for 2011 relative to 1750 in WGI, i. e. 2.3 W / m2, uncertainty range 1.1 to 
3.3 W / m2. [WGI Figure SPM.5, WGI 8.5, WGI 12.3]
Figure SPM.2 | Total anthropogenic GHG emissions (GtCO2eq / yr) by economic sectors. Inner circle shows direct GHG emission shares (in % of total anthropogenic GHG emissions) 
of five economic sectors in 2010. Pull-out shows how indirect CO2 emission shares (in % of total anthropogenic GHG emissions) from electricity and heat production are attributed 
to sectors of final energy use. ‘Other Energy’ refers to all GHG emission sources in the energy sector as defined in Annex II other than electricity and heat production [A.II.9.1]. The 
emissions data from Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) includes land-based CO2 emissions from forest fires, peat fires and peat decay that approximate to net CO2 
flux from the Forestry and Other Land Use (FOLU) sub-sector as described in Chapter 11 of this report. Emissions are converted into CO2-equivalents based on GWP1006 from the 
IPCC Second Assessment Report. Sector definitions are provided in Annex II.9. [Figure 1.3a, Figure TS.3 upper panel]
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Figure SPM.3 | Decomposition of the change in total annual CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion by decade and four driving factors: population, income (GDP) per capita, 
energy intensity of GDP and carbon intensity of energy. The bar segments show the changes associated with each factor alone, holding the respective other factors constant. Total 
emissions changes are indicated by a triangle. The change in emissions over each decade is measured in gigatonnes of CO2 per year [GtCO2 / yr]; income is converted into common 
units using purchasing power parities. [Figure 1.7]
















































24 % (12 GtCO2eq, net emissions) in AFOLU, 21 % (10 GtCO2eq) in industry, 14 % (7.0 GtCO2eq) in transport and 6.4 % 
(3.2 GtCO2eq) in buildings. When emissions from electricity and heat production are attributed to the sectors that use 
the final energy (i. e. indirect emissions), the shares of the industry and buildings sectors in global GHG emissions are 
increased to 31 % and 19 %7, respectively (Figure SPM.2). [7.3, 8.2, 9.2, 10.3, 11.2]
Globally, economic and population growth continue to be the most important drivers of increases in CO2 
emissions from fossil fuel combustion. The contribution of population growth between 2000 and 2010 
remained roughly identical to the previous three decades, while the contribution of economic growth has 
risen sharply (high confidence). Between 2000 and 2010, both drivers outpaced emission reductions from improve-
ments in energy intensity (Figure SPM.3). Increased use of coal relative to other energy sources has reversed the 
long-standing trend of gradual decarbonization of the world’s energy supply. [1.3, 5.3, 7.2, 14.3, TS.2.2]
Without additional efforts to reduce GHG emissions beyond those in place today, emissions growth is 
expected to persist driven by growth in global population and economic activities. Baseline scenarios, those 
without additional mitigation, result in global mean surface temperature increases in 2100 from 3.7 °C to 
4.8 °C compared to pre-industrial levels10 (range based on median climate response; the range is 2.5 °C to 
7.8 °C when including climate uncertainty, see Table SPM.1)11 (high confidence). The emission scenarios collected for 
this assessment represent full radiative forcing including GHGs, tropospheric ozone, aerosols and albedo change. Baseline 
scenarios (scenarios without explicit additional efforts to constrain emissions) exceed 450 parts per million (ppm) CO2eq 
by 2030 and reach CO2eq concentration levels between 750 and more than 1300 ppm CO2eq by 2100. This is similar to 
the range in atmospheric concentration levels between the RCP 6.0 and RCP 8.5 pathways in 2100.12 For comparison, the 
CO2eq concentration in 2011 is estimated to be 430 ppm (uncertainty range 340 – 520 ppm).13 [6.3, Box TS.6; WGI Figure 
SPM.5, WGI 8.5, WGI 12.3]
10 Based on the longest global surface temperature dataset available, the observed change between the average of the period 1850 – 1900 and of 
the AR5 reference period (1986 – 2005) is 0.61 °C (5 – 95 % confidence interval: 0.55 – 0.67 °C) [WGI SPM.E], which is used here as an approxi-
mation of the change in global mean surface temperature since pre-industrial times, referred to as the period before 1750.
11 The climate uncertainty reflects the 5th to 95th percentile of climate model calculations described in Table SPM.1.
12 For the purpose of this assessment, roughly 300 baseline scenarios and 900 mitigation scenarios were collected through an open call from 
integrated modelling teams around the world. These scenarios are complementary to the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs, see 
WGIII AR5 Glossary). The RCPs are identified by their approximate total radiative forcing in year 2100 relative to 1750: 2.6 Watts per square meter 
(W / m2) for RCP2.6, 4.5 W / m2 for RCP4.5, 6.0 W / m2 for RCP6.0, and 8.5 W / m2 for RCP8.5. The scenarios collected for this assessment span a 
slightly broader range of concentrations in the year 2100 than the four RCPs.
13 This is based on the assessment of total anthropogenic radiative forcing for 2011 relative to 1750 in WGI, i. e. 2.3 W / m2, uncertainty range 1.1 to 
3.3 W / m2. [WGI Figure SPM.5, WGI 8.5, WGI 12.3]
Figure SPM.2 | Total anthropogenic GHG emissions (GtCO2eq / yr) by economic sectors. Inner circle shows direct GHG emission shares (in % of total anthropogenic GHG emissions) 
of five economic sectors in 2010. Pull-out shows how indirect CO2 emission shares (in % of total anthropogenic GHG emissions) from electricity and heat production are attributed 
to sectors of final energy use. ‘Other Energy’ refers to all GHG emission sources in the energy sector as defined in Annex II other than electricity and heat production [A.II.9.1]. The 
emissions data from Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) includes land-based CO2 emissions from forest fires, peat fires and peat decay that approximate to net CO2 
flux from the Forestry and Other Land Use (FOLU) sub-sector as described in Chapter 11 of this report. Emissions are converted into CO2-equivalents based on GWP1006 from the 
IPCC Second Assessment Report. Sector definitions are provided in Annex II.9. [Figure 1.3a, Figure TS.3 upper panel]
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Figure SPM.3 | Decomposition of the change in total annual CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion by decade and four driving factors: population, income (GDP) per capita, 
energy intensity of GDP and carbon intensity of energy. The bar segments show the changes associated with each factor alone, holding the respective other factors constant. Total 
emissions changes are indicated by a triangle. The change in emissions over each decade is measured in gigatonnes of CO2 per year [GtCO2 / yr]; income is converted into common 
units using purchasing power parities. [Figure 1.7]
















































Mitigation pathways and measures in the context  
of sustainable development
Long-term mitigation pathways
There are multiple scenarios with a range of technological and behavioral options, with different characteristics 
and implications for sustainable development, that are consistent with different levels of mitigation. For this 
assessment, about 900 mitigation scenarios have been collected in a database based on published integrated models.14 This 
range spans atmospheric concentration levels in 2100 from 430 ppm CO2eq to above 720 ppm CO2eq, which is comparable 
to the 2100 forcing levels between RCP 2.6 and RCP 6.0. Scenarios outside this range were also assessed including some 
scenarios with concentrations in 2100 below 430 ppm CO2eq (for a discussion of these scenarios see below). The mitigation 
scenarios involve a wide range of technological, socioeconomic, and institutional trajectories, but uncertainties and model 
limitations exist and developments outside this range are possible (Figure SPM.4, upper panel).  
[6.1, 6.2, 6.3, TS.3.1, Box TS.6]
Mitigation scenarios in which it is likely that the temperature change caused by anthropogenic GHG emis-
sions can be kept to less than 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels are characterized by atmospheric concen-
trations in 2100 of about 450 ppm CO2eq (high confidence). Mitigation scenarios reaching concentration levels of 
about 500 ppm CO2eq by 2100 are more likely than not to limit temperature change to less than 2 °C relative to 
pre-industrial levels, unless they temporarily ‘overshoot’ concentration levels of roughly 530 ppm CO2eq before 2100, in 
which case they are about as likely as not to achieve that goal.15 Scenarios that reach 530 to 650 ppm CO2eq concentra-
tions by 2100 are more unlikely than likely to keep temperature change below 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels. 
Scenarios that exceed about 650 ppm CO2eq by 2100 are unlikely to limit temperature change to below 2 °C relative to 
pre-industrial levels. Mitigation scenarios in which temperature increase is more likely than not to be less than 1.5 °C 
relative to pre-industrial levels by 2100 are characterized by concentrations in 2100 of below 430 ppm CO2eq. Tempera-
ture peaks during the century and then declines in these scenarios. Probability statements regarding other levels of 
temperature change can be made with reference to Table SPM.1. [6.3, Box TS.6]
Scenarios reaching atmospheric concentration levels of about 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100 (consistent with a 
likely chance to keep temperature change below 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels) include substantial cuts 
in anthropogenic GHG emissions by mid-century through large-scale changes in energy systems and poten-
tially land use (high confidence). Scenarios reaching these concentrations by 2100 are characterized by lower global 
GHG emissions in 2050 than in 2010, 40 % to 70 % lower globally,16 and emissions levels near zero GtCO2eq or below in 
14 The long-term scenarios assessed in WGIII were generated primarily by large-scale, integrated models that project many key characteristics of 
mitigation pathways to mid-century and beyond. These models link many important human systems (e. g., energy, agriculture and land use, 
economy) with physical processes associated with climate change (e. g., the carbon cycle). The models approximate cost-effective solutions that 
minimize the aggregate economic costs of achieving mitigation outcomes, unless they are specifically constrained to behave otherwise. They are 
simplified, stylized representations of highly-complex, real-world processes, and the scenarios they produce are based on uncertain projections 
about key events and drivers over often century-long timescales. Simplifications and differences in assumptions are the reason why output gen-
erated from different models, or versions of the same model, can differ, and projections from all models can differ considerably from the reality 
that unfolds. [Box TS.7, 6.2]
15 Mitigation scenarios, including those reaching 2100 concentrations as high as or higher than about 550 ppm CO2eq, can temporarily ‘overshoot’ 
atmospheric CO2eq concentration levels before descending to lower levels later. Such concentration overshoot involves less mitigation in the near 
term with more rapid and deeper emissions reductions in the long run. Overshoot increases the probability of exceeding any given temperature 
goal. [6.3, Table SPM.1]
16 This range differs from the range provided for a similar concentration category in AR4 (50 % – 85 % lower than 2000 for CO2 only). Reasons for 
this difference include that this report has assessed a substantially larger number of scenarios than in AR4 and looks at all GHGs. In addition, a 
large proportion of the new scenarios include Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) technologies (see below). Other factors include the use of 2100 
concentration levels instead of stabilization levels and the shift in reference year from 2000 to 2010. Scenarios with higher emissions in 2050 are 
characterized by a greater reliance on CDR technologies beyond mid-century.
SPM.4
SPM.4.1
Figure SPM.4 | Pathways of global GHG emissions (GtCO2eq / yr) in baseline and mitigation scenarios for different long-term concentration levels (upper panel) [Figure 6.7] and 
associated upscaling requirements of low-carbon energy (% of primary energy) for 2030, 2050 and 2100 compared to 2010 levels in mitigation scenarios (lower panel) [Figure 
7.16]. The lower panel excludes scenarios with limited technology availability and exogenous carbon price trajectories. For definitions of CO2-equivalent emissions and CO2-equiva-
lent concentrations see the WGIII AR5 Glossary.































































































































Mitigation pathways and measures in the context  
of sustainable development
Long-term mitigation pathways
There are multiple scenarios with a range of technological and behavioral options, with different characteristics 
and implications for sustainable development, that are consistent with different levels of mitigation. For this 
assessment, about 900 mitigation scenarios have been collected in a database based on published integrated models.14 This 
range spans atmospheric concentration levels in 2100 from 430 ppm CO2eq to above 720 ppm CO2eq, which is comparable 
to the 2100 forcing levels between RCP 2.6 and RCP 6.0. Scenarios outside this range were also assessed including some 
scenarios with concentrations in 2100 below 430 ppm CO2eq (for a discussion of these scenarios see below). The mitigation 
scenarios involve a wide range of technological, socioeconomic, and institutional trajectories, but uncertainties and model 
limitations exist and developments outside this range are possible (Figure SPM.4, upper panel).  
[6.1, 6.2, 6.3, TS.3.1, Box TS.6]
Mitigation scenarios in which it is likely that the temperature change caused by anthropogenic GHG emis-
sions can be kept to less than 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels are characterized by atmospheric concen-
trations in 2100 of about 450 ppm CO2eq (high confidence). Mitigation scenarios reaching concentration levels of 
about 500 ppm CO2eq by 2100 are more likely than not to limit temperature change to less than 2 °C relative to 
pre-industrial levels, unless they temporarily ‘overshoot’ concentration levels of roughly 530 ppm CO2eq before 2100, in 
which case they are about as likely as not to achieve that goal.15 Scenarios that reach 530 to 650 ppm CO2eq concentra-
tions by 2100 are more unlikely than likely to keep temperature change below 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels. 
Scenarios that exceed about 650 ppm CO2eq by 2100 are unlikely to limit temperature change to below 2 °C relative to 
pre-industrial levels. Mitigation scenarios in which temperature increase is more likely than not to be less than 1.5 °C 
relative to pre-industrial levels by 2100 are characterized by concentrations in 2100 of below 430 ppm CO2eq. Tempera-
ture peaks during the century and then declines in these scenarios. Probability statements regarding other levels of 
temperature change can be made with reference to Table SPM.1. [6.3, Box TS.6]
Scenarios reaching atmospheric concentration levels of about 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100 (consistent with a 
likely chance to keep temperature change below 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels) include substantial cuts 
in anthropogenic GHG emissions by mid-century through large-scale changes in energy systems and poten-
tially land use (high confidence). Scenarios reaching these concentrations by 2100 are characterized by lower global 
GHG emissions in 2050 than in 2010, 40 % to 70 % lower globally,16 and emissions levels near zero GtCO2eq or below in 
14 The long-term scenarios assessed in WGIII were generated primarily by large-scale, integrated models that project many key characteristics of 
mitigation pathways to mid-century and beyond. These models link many important human systems (e. g., energy, agriculture and land use, 
economy) with physical processes associated with climate change (e. g., the carbon cycle). The models approximate cost-effective solutions that 
minimize the aggregate economic costs of achieving mitigation outcomes, unless they are specifically constrained to behave otherwise. They are 
simplified, stylized representations of highly-complex, real-world processes, and the scenarios they produce are based on uncertain projections 
about key events and drivers over often century-long timescales. Simplifications and differences in assumptions are the reason why output gen-
erated from different models, or versions of the same model, can differ, and projections from all models can differ considerably from the reality 
that unfolds. [Box TS.7, 6.2]
15 Mitigation scenarios, including those reaching 2100 concentrations as high as or higher than about 550 ppm CO2eq, can temporarily ‘overshoot’ 
atmospheric CO2eq concentration levels before descending to lower levels later. Such concentration overshoot involves less mitigation in the near 
term with more rapid and deeper emissions reductions in the long run. Overshoot increases the probability of exceeding any given temperature 
goal. [6.3, Table SPM.1]
16 This range differs from the range provided for a similar concentration category in AR4 (50 % – 85 % lower than 2000 for CO2 only). Reasons for 
this difference include that this report has assessed a substantially larger number of scenarios than in AR4 and looks at all GHGs. In addition, a 
large proportion of the new scenarios include Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) technologies (see below). Other factors include the use of 2100 
concentration levels instead of stabilization levels and the shift in reference year from 2000 to 2010. Scenarios with higher emissions in 2050 are 
characterized by a greater reliance on CDR technologies beyond mid-century.
SPM.4
SPM.4.1
Figure SPM.4 | Pathways of global GHG emissions (GtCO2eq / yr) in baseline and mitigation scenarios for different long-term concentration levels (upper panel) [Figure 6.7] and 
associated upscaling requirements of low-carbon energy (% of primary energy) for 2030, 2050 and 2100 compared to 2010 levels in mitigation scenarios (lower panel) [Figure 
7.16]. The lower panel excludes scenarios with limited technology availability and exogenous carbon price trajectories. For definitions of CO2-equivalent emissions and CO2-equiva-
lent concentrations see the WGIII AR5 Glossary.































































































































2100. In scenarios reaching about 500 ppm CO2eq by 2100, 2050 emissions levels are 25 % to 55 % lower than in 2010 
globally. In scenarios reaching about 550 ppm CO2eq, emissions in 2050 are from 5 % above 2010 levels to 45 % below 
2010 levels globally (Table SPM.1). At the global level, scenarios reaching about 450 ppm CO2eq are also characterized 
by more rapid improvements in energy efficiency and a tripling to nearly a quadrupling of the share of zero- and low-
carbon energy supply from renewables, nuclear energy and fossil energy with carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS), 
or bioenergy with CCS (BECCS) by the year 2050 (Figure SPM.4, lower panel). These scenarios describe a wide range of 
changes in land use, reflecting different assumptions about the scale of bioenergy production, afforestation, and reduced 
deforestation. All of these emissions, energy, and land-use changes vary across regions.17 Scenarios reaching higher 
concentrations include similar changes, but on a slower timescale. On the other hand, scenarios reaching lower concen-
trations require these changes on a faster timescale. [6.3, 7.11]
Mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 ppm CO2eq in 2100 typically involve temporary overshoot of 
atmospheric concentrations, as do many scenarios reaching about 500 ppm to about 550 ppm CO2eq in 2100. 
Depending on the level of the overshoot, overshoot scenarios typically rely on the availability and wide-
spread deployment of BECCS and afforestation in the second half of the century. The availability and scale of 
these and other Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) technologies and methods are uncertain and CDR technolo-
gies and methods are, to varying degrees, associated with challenges and risks (high confidence) (see Section 
SPM.4.2).18 CDR is also prevalent in many scenarios without overshoot to compensate for residual emissions from sectors 
where mitigation is more expensive. There is uncertainty about the potential for large-scale deployment of BECCS, large-
scale afforestation, and other CDR technologies and methods. [2.6, 6.3, 6.9.1, Figure 6.7, 7.11, 11.13]
Estimated global GHG emissions levels in 2020 based on the Cancún Pledges are not consistent with cost-
effective long-term mitigation trajectories that are at least about as likely as not to limit temperature 
change to 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels (2100 concentrations of about 450 to about 500 ppm CO2eq), 
but they do not preclude the option to meet that goal (high confidence). Meeting this goal would require further 
substantial reductions beyond 2020. The Cancún Pledges are broadly consistent with cost-effective scenarios that are 
likely to keep temperature change below 3 °C relative to preindustrial levels. [6.4, 13.13, Figure TS.11]
Delaying mitigation efforts beyond those in place today through 2030 is estimated to substantially increase 
the difficulty of the transition to low longer-term emissions levels and narrow the range of options consis-
tent with maintaining temperature change below 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels (high confidence). Cost-
effective mitigation scenarios that make it at least about as likely as not that temperature change will remain below 2 °C 
relative to pre-industrial levels (2100 concentrations of about 450 to about 500 ppm CO2eq) are typically characterized 
by annual GHG emissions in 2030 of roughly between 30 GtCO2eq and 50 GtCO2eq (Figure SPM.5, left panel). Scenarios 
with annual GHG emissions above 55 GtCO2eq in 2030 are characterized by substantially higher rates of emissions 
reductions from 2030 to 2050 (Figure SPM.5, middle panel); much more rapid scale-up of low-carbon energy over this 
period (Figure SPM.5, right panel); a larger reliance on CDR technologies in the long-term; and higher transitional and 
long-term economic impacts (Table SPM.2, orange segment). Due to these increased mitigation challenges, many models 
with annual 2030 GHG emissions higher than 55 GtCO2eq could not produce scenarios reaching atmospheric concentra-
tion levels that make it about as likely as not that temperature change will remain below 2 °C relative to pre-industrial 
levels. [6.4, 7.11, Figures TS.11, TS.13]
17 At the national level, change is considered most effective when it reflects country and local visions and approaches to achieving sustainable 
development according to national circumstances and priorities. [6.4, 11.8.4, WGII SPM]
18 According to WGI, CDR methods have biogeochemical and technological limitations to their potential on the global scale. There is insufficient 
knowledge to quantify how much CO2 emissions could be partially offset by CDR on a century timescale. CDR methods carry side-effects and 




Table SPM.1 | Key characteristics of the scenarios collected and assessed for WGIII AR5. For all parameters, the 10th to 90th percentile of the scenarios is shown.1, 2 [Table 6.3] 
CO2eq 
Concentrations 









Cumulative CO2  
emissions3 [GtCO2]
Change in CO2eq emissions 
compared to 2010 in [%]4
Temperature change (relative to 1850 – 1900)5, 6




Likelihood of staying below temperature 
level over the 21st century8
1.5 °C 2.0 °C 3.0 °C 4.0 °C
< 430 Only a limited number of individual model studies have explored levels below 430 ppm CO2eq
450  
(430 – 480)
Total range1, 10 RCP2.6 550 – 1300 630 – 1180 − 72 to − 41 − 118 to − 78









No overshoot of 
530 ppm CO2eq
860 – 1180 960 – 1430 − 57 to − 42 − 107 to − 73







1130 – 1530 990 – 1550 − 55 to − 25 − 114 to − 90






No overshoot of 
580 ppm CO2eq
1070 – 1460 1240 – 2240 − 47 to − 19 − 81 to − 59






1420 – 1750 1170 – 2100 − 16 to 7 − 183 to − 86
2.1 – 2.3 
(1.4 – 3.6)
(580 – 650) Total range
RCP4.5
1260 – 1640 1870 – 2440 − 38 to 24 − 134 to − 50
2.3 – 2.6 
(1.5 – 4.2)
(650 – 720) Total range 1310 – 1750 2570 – 3340 − 11 to 17 − 54 to − 21





(720 – 1000) Total range RCP6.0 1570 – 1940 3620 – 4990 18 to 54 − 7 to 72





> 1000 Total range RCP8.5 1840 – 2310 5350 – 7010 52 to 95 74 to 178





1 The ‘total range’ for the 430 – 480 ppm CO2eq scenarios corresponds to the range of the 10th – 90th percentile of the subcategory of these scenarios shown in Table 6.3. 
2  Baseline scenarios (see SPM.3) fall into the > 1000 and 720 – 1000 ppm CO2eq categories. The latter category also includes mitigation scenarios. The baseline scenarios in the latter 
category reach a temperature change of 2.5 – 5.8 °C above preindustrial in 2100. Together with the baseline scenarios in the > 1000 ppm CO2eq category, this leads to an overall 2100 
temperature range of 2.5 – 7.8 °C (range based on median climate response: 3.7 – 4.8 °C) for baseline scenarios across both concentration categories.
3  For comparison of the cumulative CO2 emissions estimates assessed here with those presented in WGI, an amount of 515 [445 – 585] GtC (1890 [1630 – 2150] GtCO2), was 
already emitted by 2011 since 1870 [Section WGI 12.5]. Note that cumulative emissions are presented here for different periods of time (2011 – 2050 and 2011 – 2100) while 
cumulative emissions in WGI are presented as total compatible emissions for the RCPs (2012 – 2100) or for total compatible emissions for remaining below a given tempera-
ture target with a given likelihood [WGI Table SPM.3, WGI SPM.E.8].
4  The global 2010 emissions are 31 % above the 1990 emissions (consistent with the historic GHG emission estimates presented in this report). CO2eq emissions include the 
basket of Kyoto gases (CO2, CH4, N2O as well as F-gases).
5  The assessment in WGIII involves a large number of scenarios published in the scientific literature and is thus not limited to the RCPs. To evaluate the CO2eq concentration 
and climate implications of these scenarios, the MAGICC model was used in a probabilistic mode (see Annex II). For a comparison between MAGICC model results and 
the outcomes of the models used in WGI, see Sections WGI 12.4.1.2 and WGI 12.4.8 and 6.3.2.6. Reasons for differences with WGI SPM Table.2 include the difference in 
reference year (1986 – 2005 vs. 1850 – 1900 here), difference in reporting year (2081 – 2100 vs 2100 here), set-up of simulation (CMIP5 concentration driven versus MAGICC 
emission-driven here), and the wider set of scenarios (RCPs versus the full set of scenarios in the WGIII AR5 scenario database here). 
6  Temperature change is reported for the year 2100, which is not directly comparable to the equilibrium warming reported in WGIII AR4 [Table 3.5, Chapter 3]. For the 2100 
temperature estimates, the transient climate response (TCR) is the most relevant system property. The assumed 90 % range of the TCR for MAGICC is 1.2 – 2.6 °C (median 
1.8 °C). This compares to the 90 % range of TCR between 1.2 – 2.4 °C for CMIP5 [WGI 9.7] and an assessed likely range of 1 – 2.5 °C from multiple lines of evidence reported 
in the WGI AR5 [Box 12.2 in Section 12.5].
7  Temperature change in 2100 is provided for a median estimate of the MAGICC calculations, which illustrates differences between the emissions pathways of the scenarios 
in each category. The range of temperature change in the parentheses includes in addition the carbon cycle and climate system uncertainties as represented by the MAGICC 
model [see 6.3.2.6 for further details]. The temperature data compared to the 1850 – 1900 reference year was calculated by taking all projected warming relative to 
1986 – 2005, and adding 0.61 °C for 1986 – 2005 compared to 1850 – 1900, based on HadCRUT4 [see WGI Table SPM.2]. 
8  The assessment in this table is based on the probabilities calculated for the full ensemble of scenarios in WGIII using MAGICC and the assessment in WGI of the uncertainty 
of the temperature projections not covered by climate models. The statements are therefore consistent with the statements in WGI, which are based on the CMIP5 runs of the 
RCPs and the assessed uncertainties. Hence, the likelihood statements reflect different lines of evidence from both WGs. This WGI method was also applied for scenarios with 
intermediate concentration levels where no CMIP5 runs are available. The likelihood statements are indicative only [6.3], and follow broadly the terms used by the WGI SPM 
for temperature projections: likely 66 – 100 %, more likely than not > 50 – 100 %, about as likely as not 33 – 66 %, and unlikely 0 – 33 %. In addition the term more unlikely 
than likely 0–< 50 % is used.
9  The CO2-equivalent concentration includes the forcing of all GHGs including halogenated gases and tropospheric ozone, as well as aerosols and albedo change (calculated on 
the basis of the total forcing from a simple carbon cycle / climate model, MAGICC).
10 T he vast majority of scenarios in this category overshoot the category boundary of 480 ppm CO2eq concentrations.
11  For scenarios in this category no CMIP5 run [WGI Chapter 12, Table 12.3] as well as no MAGICC realization [6.3] stays below the respective temperature level. Still, an 
unlikely assignment is given to reflect uncertainties that might not be reflected by the current climate models. 
12  Scenarios in the 580 – 650 ppm CO2eq category include both overshoot scenarios and scenarios that do not exceed the concentration level at the high end of the category 
(like RCP4.5). The latter type of scenarios, in general, have an assessed probability of more unlikely than likely to stay below the 2 °C temperature level, while the former are 




Estimates of the aggregate economic costs of mitigation vary widely and are highly sensitive to model design 
and assumptions as well as the specification of scenarios, including the characterization of technologies and 
the timing of mitigation (high confidence). Scenarios in which all countries of the world begin mitigation immediately, 
there is a single global carbon price, and all key technologies are available, have been used as a cost-effective benchmark 
for estimating macroeconomic mitigation costs (Table SPM.2, yellow segments). Under these assumptions, mitigation 
scenarios that reach atmospheric concentrations of about 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100 entail losses in global consumption—
not including benefits of reduced climate change as well as co-benefits and adverse side-effects of mitigation19—of 1 % to 
4 % (median: 1.7 %) in 2030, 2 % to 6 % (median: 3.4 %) in 2050, and 3 % to 11 % (median: 4.8 %) in 2100 relative to 
consumption in baseline scenarios that grows anywhere from 300 % to more than 900 % over the century. These numbers 
19 The total economic effect at different temperature levels would include mitigation costs, co-benefits of mitigation, adverse side-effects of mitiga-
tion, adaptation costs and climate damages. Mitigation cost and climate damage estimates at any given temperature level cannot be compared 
to evaluate the costs and benefits of mitigation. Rather, the consideration of economic costs and benefits of mitigation should include the reduc-
tion of climate damages relative to the case of unabated climate change.
Figure SPM.5 | The implications of different 2030 GHG emissions levels (left panel) for the rate of CO2 emissions reductions from 2030 to 2050 (middle panel) and low-carbon 
energy upscaling from 2030 to 2050 and 2100 (right panel) in mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 to about 500 (430 – 530) ppm CO2eq concentrations by 2100. The scenarios 
are grouped according to different emissions levels by 2030 (coloured in different shades of green). The left panel shows the pathways of GHG emissions (GtCO2eq / yr) leading to 
these 2030 levels. The black bar shows the estimated uncertainty range of GHG emissions implied by the Cancún Pledges. The middle panel denotes the average annual CO2 emis-
sions reduction rates for the period 2030 – 2050. It compares the median and interquartile range across scenarios from recent intermodel comparisons with explicit 2030 interim 
goals to the range of scenarios in the Scenario Database for WGIII AR5. Annual rates of historical emissions change between 1900 – 2010 (sustained over a period of 20 years) and 
average annual emissions change between 2000 – 2010 are shown in grey. The arrows in the right panel show the magnitude of zero and low-carbon energy supply up-scaling 
from 2030 to 2050 subject to different 2030 GHG emissions levels. Zero- and low-carbon energy supply includes renewables, nuclear energy, fossil energy with carbon dioxide cap-
ture and storage (CCS), and bioenergy with CCS (BECCS). Note: Only scenarios that apply the full, unconstrained mitigation technology portfolio of the underlying models (default 
technology assumption) are shown. Scenarios with large net negative global emissions (> 20 GtCO2 / yr), scenarios with exogenous carbon price assumptions, and scenarios with 
2010 emissions significantly outside the historical range are excluded. The right-hand panel includes only 68 scenarios, because three of the 71 scenarios shown in the figure do not 
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Estimates of the aggregate economic costs of mitigation vary widely and are highly sensitive to model design 
and assumptions as well as the specification of scenarios, including the characterization of technologies and 
the timing of mitigation (high confidence). Scenarios in which all countries of the world begin mitigation immediately, 
there is a single global carbon price, and all key technologies are available, have been used as a cost-effective benchmark 
for estimating macroeconomic mitigation costs (Table SPM.2, yellow segments). Under these assumptions, mitigation 
scenarios that reach atmospheric concentrations of about 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100 entail losses in global consumption—
not including benefits of reduced climate change as well as co-benefits and adverse side-effects of mitigation19—of 1 % to 
4 % (median: 1.7 %) in 2030, 2 % to 6 % (median: 3.4 %) in 2050, and 3 % to 11 % (median: 4.8 %) in 2100 relative to 
consumption in baseline scenarios that grows anywhere from 300 % to more than 900 % over the century. These numbers 
19 The total economic effect at different temperature levels would include mitigation costs, co-benefits of mitigation, adverse side-effects of mitiga-
tion, adaptation costs and climate damages. Mitigation cost and climate damage estimates at any given temperature level cannot be compared 
to evaluate the costs and benefits of mitigation. Rather, the consideration of economic costs and benefits of mitigation should include the reduc-
tion of climate damages relative to the case of unabated climate change.
Figure SPM.5 | The implications of different 2030 GHG emissions levels (left panel) for the rate of CO2 emissions reductions from 2030 to 2050 (middle panel) and low-carbon 
energy upscaling from 2030 to 2050 and 2100 (right panel) in mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 to about 500 (430 – 530) ppm CO2eq concentrations by 2100. The scenarios 
are grouped according to different emissions levels by 2030 (coloured in different shades of green). The left panel shows the pathways of GHG emissions (GtCO2eq / yr) leading to 
these 2030 levels. The black bar shows the estimated uncertainty range of GHG emissions implied by the Cancún Pledges. The middle panel denotes the average annual CO2 emis-
sions reduction rates for the period 2030 – 2050. It compares the median and interquartile range across scenarios from recent intermodel comparisons with explicit 2030 interim 
goals to the range of scenarios in the Scenario Database for WGIII AR5. Annual rates of historical emissions change between 1900 – 2010 (sustained over a period of 20 years) and 
average annual emissions change between 2000 – 2010 are shown in grey. The arrows in the right panel show the magnitude of zero and low-carbon energy supply up-scaling 
from 2030 to 2050 subject to different 2030 GHG emissions levels. Zero- and low-carbon energy supply includes renewables, nuclear energy, fossil energy with carbon dioxide cap-
ture and storage (CCS), and bioenergy with CCS (BECCS). Note: Only scenarios that apply the full, unconstrained mitigation technology portfolio of the underlying models (default 
technology assumption) are shown. Scenarios with large net negative global emissions (> 20 GtCO2 / yr), scenarios with exogenous carbon price assumptions, and scenarios with 
2010 emissions significantly outside the historical range are excluded. The right-hand panel includes only 68 scenarios, because three of the 71 scenarios shown in the figure do not 
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Table SPM.2 | Global mitigation costs in cost-effective scenarios1 and estimated cost increases due to assumed limited availability of specific technologies and delayed additional 
mitigation. Cost estimates shown in this table do not consider the benefits of reduced climate change as well as co-benefits and adverse side-effects of mitigation. The yellow col-
umns show consumption losses in the years 2030, 2050, and 2100 and annualized consumption growth reductions over the century in cost-effective scenarios relative to a baseline 
development without climate policy. The grey columns show the percentage increase in discounted costs2 over the century, relative to cost-effective scenarios, in scenarios in which 
technology is constrained relative to default technology assumptions.3 The orange columns show the increase in mitigation costs over the periods 2030 – 2050 and 2050 – 2100, 
relative to scenarios with immediate mitigation, due to delayed additional mitigation through 2030.4 These scenarios with delayed additional mitigation are grouped by emission 
levels of less or more than 55 GtCO2eq in 2030, and two concentration ranges in 2100 (430 – 530 ppm CO2eq and 530 – 650 ppm CO2eq). In all figures, the median of the scenario 
set is shown without parentheses, the range between the 16th and 84th percentile of the scenario set is shown in the parentheses, and the number of scenarios in the set is shown 
in square brackets.5 [Figures TS.12, TS.13, 6.21, 6.24, 6.25, Annex II.10] 
Consumption losses in cost-effective scenarios1 Increase in total discounted mitigation costs in 
scenarios with limited availability of technologies
Increase in medium- and long-term mitigation costs 
due to delayed additional mitigation until 2030 








[% increase in total discounted mitigation costs 
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(29 – 297) 
[N: 4]
7 
(4 – 18) 
[N: 8]
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(2 – 29) 
[N: 8]
64 
(44 – 78) 
[N: 8] 28 
(14 – 50) 
[N: 34]
15 
(5 – 59) 
44 
(2 – 78) 
[N: 29]
37 
(16 – 82) 
500 (480 – 530)
1.7 








N / A N / A N / A N / A
550 (530 – 580)
0.6 









(18 – 78) 
[N: 11]
13 
(2 – 23) 
[N: 10]
8 
(5 – 15) 
[N: 10]
18 
(4 – 66) 
[N: 12] 3 
(− 5 – 16) 
[N: 14]
4 
(− 4 – 11) 
15 
(3 – 32) 
[N: 10]
16 
(5 – 24) 
580 – 650 
0.3 








N / A N / A N / A N / A
1 Cost-effective scenarios assume immediate mitigation in all countries and a single global carbon price, and impose no additional limitations on technology relative to the 
models’ default technology assumptions.
2 Percentage increase of net present value of consumption losses in percent of baseline consumption (for scenarios from general equilibrium models) and abatement costs in 
percent of baseline GDP (for scenarios from partial equilibrium models) for the period 2015 – 2100, discounted at 5 % per year.
3 No CCS: CCS is not included in these scenarios. Nuclear phase out: No addition of nuclear power plants beyond those under construction, and operation of existing plants 
until the end of their lifetime. Limited Solar / Wind: a maximum of 20 % global electricity generation from solar and wind power in any year of these scenarios. Limited Bioen-
ergy: a maximum of 100 EJ / yr modern bioenergy supply globally (modern bioenergy used for heat, power, combinations, and industry was around 18 EJ / yr in 2008 [11.13.5]).
4 Percentage increase of total undiscounted mitigation costs for the periods 2030 – 2050 and 2050 – 2100.
5 The range is determined by the central scenarios encompassing the 16th and 84th percentile of the scenario set. Only scenarios with a time horizon until 2100 are included. 
Some models that are included in the cost ranges for concentration levels above 530 ppm CO2eq in 2100 could not produce associated scenarios for concentration levels 




health and ecosystems associated with major cuts in air pollutant emissions (Figure SPM.6) are particularly high where 
currently legislated and planned air pollution controls are weak. There is a wide range of co-benefits and adverse 
side-effects for additional objectives other than air quality and energy security. Overall, the potential for co-benefits of 
energy end-use measures outweighs the potential for adverse side-effects, whereas the evidence suggests this may not 
be the case for all energy supply and AFOLU measures. [WGIII 4.8, 5.7, 6.3.6, 6.6, 7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 10.8, 11.7, 11.13.6, 12.8, 
Figure TS.14, Table 6.7, Tables TS.3–TS.7; WGII 11.9]
There is a wide range of possible adverse side-effects as well as co-benefits and spillovers from climate 
policy that have not been well-quantified (high confidence). Whether or not side-effects materialize, and to what 
extent side-effects materialize, will be case- and site-specific, as they will depend on local circumstances and the scale, 
scope, and pace of implementation. Important examples include biodiversity conservation, water availability, food 
security, income distribution, efficiency of the taxation system, labour supply and employment, urban sprawl, and the 
sustainability of the growth of developing countries. [Box TS.11]
Mitigation efforts and associated costs vary between countries in mitigation scenarios. The distribution of 
costs across countries can differ from the distribution of the actions themselves (high confidence). In globally 
cost-effective scenarios, the majority of mitigation efforts takes place in countries with the highest future emissions in 
baseline scenarios. Some studies exploring particular effort-sharing frameworks, under the assumption of a global carbon 
market, have estimated substantial global financial flows associated with mitigation for scenarios leading to 2100 atmo-
spheric concentrations of about 450 to about 550 ppm CO2eq. [4.6, 6.3.6, 13.4.2.4; Box 3.5; Table 6.4; Figures 6.9, 6.27, 
6.28, 6.29]
Mitigation policy could devalue fossil fuel assets and reduce revenues for fossil fuel exporters, but differ-
ences between regions and fuels exist (high confidence). Most mitigation scenarios are associated with reduced 
revenues from coal and oil trade for major exporters (high confidence). The effect of mitigation on natural gas export 
revenues is more uncertain, with some studies showing possible benefits for export revenues in the medium term until 
about 2050 (medium confidence). The availability of CCS would reduce the adverse effect of mitigation on the value of 
fossil fuel assets (medium confidence). [6.3.6, 6.6, 14.4.2]
Sectoral and cross-sectoral mitigation pathways and measures 
Cross-sectoral mitigation pathways and measures
In baseline scenarios, GHG emissions are projected to grow in all sectors, except for net CO2 emissions in 
the AFOLU sector21 (robust evidence, medium agreement). Energy supply sector emissions are expected to continue 
to be the major source of GHG emissions, ultimately accounting for the significant increases in indirect emissions from 
electricity use in the buildings and industry sectors. In baseline scenarios, while non-CO2 GHG agricultural emissions are 
projected to increase, net CO2 emissions from the AFOLU sector decline over time, with some models projecting a net sink 
towards the end of the century (Figure SPM.7).22 [6.3.1.4, 6.8, Figure TS.15]
21 Net AFOLU CO2 emissions include emissions and removals of CO2 from the AFOLU sector, including land under forestry and, in some assessments, 
CO2 sinks in agricultural soils.
22 A majority of the Earth System Models assessed in WGI project a continued land carbon uptake under all RCPs through to 2100, but some 
models simulate a land carbon loss due to the combined effect of climate change and land-use change. [WGI SPM.E.7, WGI 6.4]
Figure SPM.6 | Air pollutant emission levels for black carbon (BC) and sulfur dioxide (SO2) in 2050 relative to 2005 (0=2005 levels). Baseline scenarios without additional efforts 
to reduce GHG emissions beyond those in place today are compared to scenarios with stringent mitigation policies, which are consistent with reaching about 450 to about 500 
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correspond to an annualized reduction of consumption growth by 0.04 to 0.14 (median: 0.06) percentage points over the 
century relative to annualized consumption growth in the baseline that is between 1.6 % and 3 % per year. Estimates at 
the high end of these cost ranges are from models that are relatively inflexible to achieve the deep emissions reductions 
required in the long run to meet these goals and / or include assumptions about market imperfections that would raise 
costs. Under the absence or limited availability of technologies, mitigation costs can increase substantially depending on 
the technology considered (Table SPM.2, grey segment). Delaying additional mitigation further increases mitigation costs 
in the medium- to long-term (Table SPM.2, orange segment). Many models could not achieve atmospheric concentration 
levels of about 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100 if additional mitigation is considerably delayed or under limited availability of key 
technologies, such as bioenergy, CCS, and their combination (BECCS). [6.3]
Only a limited number of studies have explored scenarios that are more likely than not to bring temperature 
change back to below 1.5 °C by 2100 relative to pre-industrial levels; these scenarios bring atmospheric 
concentrations to below 430 ppm CO2eq by 2100 (high confidence). Assessing this goal is currently difficult because 
no multi-model studies have explored these scenarios. Scenarios associated with the limited number of published studies 
exploring this goal are characterized by (1) immediate mitigation action; (2) the rapid upscaling of the full portfolio of 
mitigation technologies; and (3) development along a low-energy demand trajectory.20 [6.3, 7.11] 
Mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 to about 500 ppm CO2eq by 2100 show reduced costs for achieving 
air quality and energy security objectives, with significant co-benefits for human health, ecosystem impacts, 
and sufficiency of resources and resilience of the energy system; these scenarios did not quantify other 
co-benefits or adverse side-effects (medium confidence). These mitigation scenarios show improvements in terms of 
the sufficiency of resources to meet national energy demand as well as the resilience of energy supply, resulting in 
energy systems that are less vulnerable to price volatility and supply disruptions. The benefits from reduced impacts to 
20 In these scenarios, the cumulative CO2 emissions range between 680 and 800 GtCO2 for the period 2011 – 2050 and between 90 and 310 GtCO2 
for the period 2011 – 2100. Global CO2eq emissions in 2050 are between 70 and 95 % below 2010 emissions, and they are between 110 and 




health and ecosystems associated with major cuts in air pollutant emissions (Figure SPM.6) are particularly high where 
currently legislated and planned air pollution controls are weak. There is a wide range of co-benefits and adverse 
side-effects for additional objectives other than air quality and energy security. Overall, the potential for co-benefits of 
energy end-use measures outweighs the potential for adverse side-effects, whereas the evidence suggests this may not 
be the case for all energy supply and AFOLU measures. [WGIII 4.8, 5.7, 6.3.6, 6.6, 7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 10.8, 11.7, 11.13.6, 12.8, 
Figure TS.14, Table 6.7, Tables TS.3–TS.7; WGII 11.9]
There is a wide range of possible adverse side-effects as well as co-benefits and spillovers from climate 
policy that have not been well-quantified (high confidence). Whether or not side-effects materialize, and to what 
extent side-effects materialize, will be case- and site-specific, as they will depend on local circumstances and the scale, 
scope, and pace of implementation. Important examples include biodiversity conservation, water availability, food 
security, income distribution, efficiency of the taxation system, labour supply and employment, urban sprawl, and the 
sustainability of the growth of developing countries. [Box TS.11]
Mitigation efforts and associated costs vary between countries in mitigation scenarios. The distribution of 
costs across countries can differ from the distribution of the actions themselves (high confidence). In globally 
cost-effective scenarios, the majority of mitigation efforts takes place in countries with the highest future emissions in 
baseline scenarios. Some studies exploring particular effort-sharing frameworks, under the assumption of a global carbon 
market, have estimated substantial global financial flows associated with mitigation for scenarios leading to 2100 atmo-
spheric concentrations of about 450 to about 550 ppm CO2eq. [4.6, 6.3.6, 13.4.2.4; Box 3.5; Table 6.4; Figures 6.9, 6.27, 
6.28, 6.29]
Mitigation policy could devalue fossil fuel assets and reduce revenues for fossil fuel exporters, but differ-
ences between regions and fuels exist (high confidence). Most mitigation scenarios are associated with reduced 
revenues from coal and oil trade for major exporters (high confidence). The effect of mitigation on natural gas export 
revenues is more uncertain, with some studies showing possible benefits for export revenues in the medium term until 
about 2050 (medium confidence). The availability of CCS would reduce the adverse effect of mitigation on the value of 
fossil fuel assets (medium confidence). [6.3.6, 6.6, 14.4.2]
Sectoral and cross-sectoral mitigation pathways and measures 
Cross-sectoral mitigation pathways and measures
In baseline scenarios, GHG emissions are projected to grow in all sectors, except for net CO2 emissions in 
the AFOLU sector21 (robust evidence, medium agreement). Energy supply sector emissions are expected to continue 
to be the major source of GHG emissions, ultimately accounting for the significant increases in indirect emissions from 
electricity use in the buildings and industry sectors. In baseline scenarios, while non-CO2 GHG agricultural emissions are 
projected to increase, net CO2 emissions from the AFOLU sector decline over time, with some models projecting a net sink 
towards the end of the century (Figure SPM.7).22 [6.3.1.4, 6.8, Figure TS.15]
21 Net AFOLU CO2 emissions include emissions and removals of CO2 from the AFOLU sector, including land under forestry and, in some assessments, 
CO2 sinks in agricultural soils.
22 A majority of the Earth System Models assessed in WGI project a continued land carbon uptake under all RCPs through to 2100, but some 
models simulate a land carbon loss due to the combined effect of climate change and land-use change. [WGI SPM.E.7, WGI 6.4]
Figure SPM.6 | Air pollutant emission levels for black carbon (BC) and sulfur dioxide (SO2) in 2050 relative to 2005 (0=2005 levels). Baseline scenarios without additional efforts 
to reduce GHG emissions beyond those in place today are compared to scenarios with stringent mitigation policies, which are consistent with reaching about 450 to about 500 
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Infrastructure developments and long-lived products that lock societies into GHG-intensive emissions 
pathways may be difficult or very costly to change, reinforcing the importance of early action for ambitious 
mitigation (robust evidence, high agreement). This lock-in risk is compounded by the lifetime of the infrastructure, by 
the difference in emissions associated with alternatives, and the magnitude of the investment cost. As a result, lock-in 
related to infrastructure and spatial planning is the most difficult to reduce. However, materials, products and infrastruc-
ture with long lifetimes and low lifecycle emissions can facilitate a transition to low-emission pathways while also reduc-
ing emissions through lower levels of material use. [5.6.3, 6.3.6.4, 9.4, 10.4, 12.3, 12.4]
There are strong interdependencies in mitigation scenarios between the pace of introducing mitigation 
measures in energy supply and energy end-use and developments in the AFOLU sector (high confidence). The 
distribution of the mitigation effort across sectors is strongly influenced by the availability and performance of BECCS 
and large scale afforestation (Figure SPM.7). This is particularly the case in scenarios reaching CO2eq concentrations of 
about 450 ppm by 2100. Well-designed systemic and cross-sectoral mitigation strategies are more cost-effective in 
cutting emissions than a focus on individual technologies and sectors. At the energy system level these include reduc-
tions in the GHG emission intensity of the energy supply sector, a switch to low-carbon energy carriers (including 
low-carbon electricity) and reductions in energy demand in the end-use sectors without compromising development 
(Figure SPM.8). [6.3.5, 6.4, 6.8, 7.11, Table TS.2]
Mitigation scenarios reaching around 450 ppm CO2eq concentrations by 2100 show large-scale global 
changes in the energy supply sector (robust evidence, high agreement). In these selected scenarios, global CO2 emis-
sions from the energy supply sector are projected to decline over the next decades and are characterized by reductions of 
90 % or more below 2010 levels between 2040 and 2070. Emissions in many of these scenarios are projected to decline 
to below zero thereafter. [6.3.4, 6.8, 7.1, 7.11]
Figure SPM.7 | Direct emissions of CO2 by sector and total non-CO2 GHGs (Kyoto gases) across sectors in baseline (left panel) and mitigation scenarios that reach around 450 
(430 – 480) ppm CO2eq with CCS (middle panel) and without CCS (right panel). The numbers at the bottom of the graphs refer to the number of scenarios included in the range 
which differs across sectors and time due to different sectoral resolution and time horizon of models. Note that many models cannot reach about 450 ppm CO2eq concentration by 
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450 ppm CO2eq with CCSBaselines 450 ppm CO2eq without CCS
Figure SPM.8 | Final energy demand reduction relative to baseline (upper row) and low-carbon energy carrier shares in final energy (lower row) in the transport, buildings, and 
industry sectors by 2030 and 2050 in scenarios from two different CO2eq concentration categories compared to sectoral studies assessed in Chapters 8 – 10. The demand reductions 
shown by these scenarios do not compromise development. Low-carbon energy carriers include electricity, hydrogen and liquid biofuels in transport, electricity in buildings and 
electricity, heat, hydrogen and bioenergy in industry. The numbers at the bottom of the graphs refer to the number of scenarios included in the ranges which differ across sectors 
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Infrastructure developments and long-lived products that lock societies into GHG-intensive emissions 
pathways may be difficult or very costly to change, reinforcing the importance of early action for ambitious 
mitigation (robust evidence, high agreement). This lock-in risk is compounded by the lifetime of the infrastructure, by 
the difference in emissions associated with alternatives, and the magnitude of the investment cost. As a result, lock-in 
related to infrastructure and spatial planning is the most difficult to reduce. However, materials, products and infrastruc-
ture with long lifetimes and low lifecycle emissions can facilitate a transition to low-emission pathways while also reduc-
ing emissions through lower levels of material use. [5.6.3, 6.3.6.4, 9.4, 10.4, 12.3, 12.4]
There are strong interdependencies in mitigation scenarios between the pace of introducing mitigation 
measures in energy supply and energy end-use and developments in the AFOLU sector (high confidence). The 
distribution of the mitigation effort across sectors is strongly influenced by the availability and performance of BECCS 
and large scale afforestation (Figure SPM.7). This is particularly the case in scenarios reaching CO2eq concentrations of 
about 450 ppm by 2100. Well-designed systemic and cross-sectoral mitigation strategies are more cost-effective in 
cutting emissions than a focus on individual technologies and sectors. At the energy system level these include reduc-
tions in the GHG emission intensity of the energy supply sector, a switch to low-carbon energy carriers (including 
low-carbon electricity) and reductions in energy demand in the end-use sectors without compromising development 
(Figure SPM.8). [6.3.5, 6.4, 6.8, 7.11, Table TS.2]
Mitigation scenarios reaching around 450 ppm CO2eq concentrations by 2100 show large-scale global 
changes in the energy supply sector (robust evidence, high agreement). In these selected scenarios, global CO2 emis-
sions from the energy supply sector are projected to decline over the next decades and are characterized by reductions of 
90 % or more below 2010 levels between 2040 and 2070. Emissions in many of these scenarios are projected to decline 
to below zero thereafter. [6.3.4, 6.8, 7.1, 7.11]
Figure SPM.7 | Direct emissions of CO2 by sector and total non-CO2 GHGs (Kyoto gases) across sectors in baseline (left panel) and mitigation scenarios that reach around 450 
(430 – 480) ppm CO2eq with CCS (middle panel) and without CCS (right panel). The numbers at the bottom of the graphs refer to the number of scenarios included in the range 
which differs across sectors and time due to different sectoral resolution and time horizon of models. Note that many models cannot reach about 450 ppm CO2eq concentration by 
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450 ppm CO2eq with CCSBaselines 450 ppm CO2eq without CCS
Figure SPM.8 | Final energy demand reduction relative to baseline (upper row) and low-carbon energy carrier shares in final energy (lower row) in the transport, buildings, and 
industry sectors by 2030 and 2050 in scenarios from two different CO2eq concentration categories compared to sectoral studies assessed in Chapters 8 – 10. The demand reductions 
shown by these scenarios do not compromise development. Low-carbon energy carriers include electricity, hydrogen and liquid biofuels in transport, electricity in buildings and 
electricity, heat, hydrogen and bioenergy in industry. The numbers at the bottom of the graphs refer to the number of scenarios included in the ranges which differ across sectors 
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Efficiency enhancements and behavioural changes, in order to reduce energy demand compared to base-
line scenarios without compromising development, are a key mitigation strategy in scenarios reaching 
atmospheric CO2eq concentrations of about 450 to about 500 ppm by 2100 (robust evidence, high agreement). 
Near-term reductions in energy demand are an important element of cost-effective mitigation strategies, provide more 
flexibility for reducing carbon intensity in the energy supply sector, hedge against related supply-side risks, avoid lock-in 
to carbon-intensive infrastructures, and are associated with important co-benefits. Both integrated and sectoral studies 
provide similar estimates for energy demand reductions in the transport, buildings and industry sectors for 2030 and 
2050 (Figure SPM.8). [6.3.4, 6.6, 6.8, 7.11, 8.9, 9.8, 10.10]
Behaviour, lifestyle and culture have a considerable influence on energy use and associated emissions, with 
high mitigation potential in some sectors, in particular when complementing technological and structural 
change23 (medium evidence, medium agreement). Emissions can be substantially lowered through changes in consump-
tion patterns (e. g., mobility demand and mode, energy use in households, choice of longer-lasting products) and dietary 
change and reduction in food wastes. A number of options including monetary and non-monetary incentives as well as 
information measures may facilitate behavioural changes. [6.8, 7.9, 8.3.5, 8.9, 9.2, 9.3, 9.10, Box 10.2, 10.4, 11.4, 12.4, 
12.6, 12.7, 15.3, 15.5, Table TS.2]
Energy supply
In the baseline scenarios assessed in AR5, direct CO2 emissions from the energy supply sector are projected 
to almost double or even triple by 2050 compared to the level of 14.4 GtCO2 / year in 2010, unless energy 
intensity improvements can be significantly accelerated beyond the historical development (medium evidence, 
medium agreement). In the last decade, the main contributors to emission growth were a growing energy demand and 
an increase of the share of coal in the global fuel mix. The availability of fossil fuels alone will not be sufficient to limit 
CO2eq concentration to levels such as 450 ppm, 550 ppm, or 650 ppm. (Figure SPM.7) [6.3.4, 7.2, 7.3, Figures 6.15, TS.15]
Decarbonizing (i. e. reducing the carbon intensity of) electricity generation is a key component of cost-
effective mitigation strategies in achieving low-stabilization levels (430 – 530 ppm CO2eq); in most integrated 
modelling scenarios, decarbonization happens more rapidly in electricity generation than in the industry, 
buildings, and transport sectors (medium evidence, high agreement) (Figure SPM.7). In the majority of low-stabiliza-
tion scenarios, the share of low-carbon electricity supply (comprising renewable energy (RE), nuclear and CCS) increases 
from the current share of approximately 30 % to more than 80 % by 2050, and fossil fuel power generation without CCS 
is phased out almost entirely by 2100 (Figure SPM. 7). [6.8, 7.11, Figures 7.14, TS.18]
Since AR4, many RE technologies have demonstrated substantial performance improvements and cost reduc-
tions, and a growing number of RE technologies have achieved a level of maturity to enable deployment at 
significant scale (robust evidence, high agreement). Regarding electricity generation alone, RE accounted for just over 
half of the new electricity-generating capacity added globally in 2012, led by growth in wind, hydro and solar power. 
However, many RE technologies still need direct and / or indirect support, if their market shares are to be significantly 
increased; RE technology policies have been successful in driving recent growth of RE. Challenges for integrating RE into 
energy systems and the associated costs vary by RE technology, regional circumstances, and the characteristics of the 
existing background energy system (medium evidence, medium agreement). [7.5.3, 7.6.1, 7.8.2, 7.12, Table 7.1]
Nuclear energy is a mature low-GHG emission source of baseload power, but its share of global electricity 
generation has been declining (since 1993). Nuclear energy could make an increasing contribution to low-
carbon energy supply, but a variety of barriers and risks exist (robust evidence, high agreement). Those include: 
23 Structural changes refer to systems transformations whereby some components are either replaced or potentially substituted by other compo-





operational risks, and the associated concerns, uranium mining risks, financial and regulatory risks, unresolved waste 
management issues, nuclear weapon proliferation concerns, and adverse public opinion (robust evidence, high agree-
ment). New fuel cycles and reactor technologies addressing some of these issues are being investigated and progress in 
research and development has been made concerning safety and waste disposal. [7.5.4, 7.8, 7.9, 7.12, Figure TS.19]
GHG emissions from energy supply can be reduced significantly by replacing current world average coal-fired 
power plants with modern, highly efficient natural gas combined-cycle power plants or combined heat and 
power plants, provided that natural gas is available and the fugitive emissions associated with extraction 
and supply are low or mitigated (robust evidence, high agreement). In mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 ppm 
CO2eq concentrations by 2100, natural gas power generation without CCS acts as a bridge technology, with deployment 
increasing before peaking and falling to below current levels by 2050 and declining further in the second half of the 
century (robust evidence, high agreement). [7.5.1, 7.8, 7.9, 7.11, 7.12]
Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) technologies could reduce the lifecycle GHG emissions of fos-
sil fuel power plants (medium evidence, medium agreement). While all components of integrated CCS systems exist 
and are in use today by the fossil fuel extraction and refining industry, CCS has not yet been applied at scale to a large, 
operational commercial fossil fuel power plant. CCS power plants could be seen in the market if this is incentivized by 
regulation and /or if they become competitive with their unabated counterparts, for instance, if the additional investment 
and operational costs, caused in part by efficiency reductions, are compensated by sufficiently high carbon prices (or 
direct financial support). For the large-scale future deployment of CCS, well-defined regulations concerning short- and 
long-term responsibilities for storage are needed as well as economic incentives. Barriers to large-scale deployment of 
CCS technologies include concerns about the operational safety and long-term integrity of CO2 storage as well as trans-
port risks. There is, however, a growing body of literature on how to ensure the integrity of CO2 wells, on the potential 
consequences of a pressure build-up within a geologic formation caused by CO2 storage (such as induced seismicity), 
and on the potential human health and environmental impacts from CO2 that migrates out of the primary injection zone 
(limited evidence, medium agreement). [7.5.5., 7.8, 7.9, 7.11, 7.12, 11.13]
Combining bioenergy with CCS (BECCS) offers the prospect of energy supply with large-scale net negative 
emissions which plays an important role in many low-stabilization scenarios, while it entails challenges and 
risks (limited evidence, medium agreement). These challenges and risks include those associated with the upstream 
large-scale provision of the biomass that is used in the CCS facility as well as those associated with the CCS technology 
itself. [7.5.5, 7.9, 11.13]
Energy end-use sectors
Transport
The transport sector accounted for 27 % of final energy use and 6.7 GtCO2 direct emissions in 2010, with 
baseline CO2 emissions projected to approximately double by 2050 (medium evidence, medium agreement). This 
growth in CO2 emissions from increasing global passenger and freight activity could partly offset future mitigation mea-
sures that include fuel carbon and energy intensity improvements, infrastructure development, behavioural change and 
comprehensive policy implementation (high confidence). Overall, reductions in total transport CO2 emissions of 15 – 40 % 
compared to baseline growth could be achieved in 2050 (medium evidence, medium agreement). (Figure SPM.7) [6.8, 
8.1, 8.2, 8.9, 8.10]
Technical and behavioural mitigation measures for all transport modes, plus new infrastructure and urban 
redevelopment investments, could reduce final energy demand in 2050 by around 40 % below the baseline, 
with the mitigation potential assessed to be higher than reported in the AR4 (robust evidence, medium agree-
ment). Projected energy efficiency and vehicle performance improvements range from 30 – 50 % in 2030 relative to 2010 





transit-oriented development, more compact urban form that supports cycling and walking, can all lead to modal shifts 
as can, in the longer term, urban redevelopment and investments in new infrastructure such as high-speed rail systems 
that reduce short-haul air travel demand (medium evidence, medium agreement). Such mitigation measures are chal-
lenging, have uncertain outcomes, and could reduce transport GHG emissions by 20 – 50 % in 2050 compared to baseline 
(limited evidence, low agreement). (Figure SPM.8 upper panel) [8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6, 8.7, 8.8, 8.9, 12.4, 12.5]
Strategies to reduce the carbon intensities of fuel and the rate of reducing carbon intensity are constrained by 
challenges associated with energy storage and the relatively low energy density of low-carbon transport fuels 
(medium confidence). Integrated and sectoral studies broadly agree that opportunities for switching to low-carbon fuels 
exist in the near term and will grow over time. Methane-based fuels are already increasing their share for road vehicles 
and waterborne craft. Electricity produced from low-carbon sources has near-term potential for electric rail and short- to 
medium-term potential as electric buses, light-duty and 2-wheel road vehicles are deployed. Hydrogen fuels from low-car-
bon sources constitute longer-term options. Commercially available liquid and gaseous biofuels already provide co-benefits 
together with mitigation options that can be increased by technology advances. Reducing transport emissions of particulate 
matter (including black carbon), tropospheric ozone and aerosol precursors (including NOx) can have human health and 
mitigation co-benefits in the short term (medium evidence, medium agreement). [8.2, 8.3, 11.13, Figure TS.20, right panel]
The cost-effectiveness of different carbon reduction measures in the transport sector varies significantly with 
vehicle type and transport mode (high confidence). The levelized costs of conserved carbon can be very low or nega-
tive for many short-term behavioural measures and efficiency improvements for light- and heavy-duty road vehicles and 
waterborne craft. In 2030, for some electric vehicles, aircraft and possibly high-speed rail, levelized costs could be more 
than USD100 / tCO2 avoided (limited evidence, medium agreement). [8.6, 8.8, 8.9, Figures TS.21, TS.22]
Regional differences influence the choice of transport mitigation options (high confidence). Institutional, legal, 
financial and cultural barriers constrain low-carbon technology uptake and behavioural change. Established infrastructure 
may limit the options for modal shift and lead to a greater reliance on advanced vehicle technologies; a slowing of growth 
in light-duty vehicle demand is already evident in some OECD countries. For all economies, especially those with high rates 
of urban growth, investment in public transport systems and low-carbon infrastructure can avoid lock-in to carbon-intensive 
modes. Prioritizing infrastructure for pedestrians and integrating non-motorized and transit services can create economic 
and social co-benefits in all regions (medium evidence, medium agreement). [8.4, 8.8, 8.9, 14.3, Table 8.3]
Mitigation strategies, when associated with non-climate policies at all government levels, can help decouple 
transport GHG emissions from economic growth in all regions (medium confidence). These strategies can help 
reduce travel demand, incentivise freight businesses to reduce the carbon intensity of their logistical systems and induce 
modal shifts, as well as provide co-benefits including improved access and mobility, better health and safety, greater 
energy security, and cost and time savings (medium evidence, high agreement). [8.7, 8.10]
Buildings 
In 2010, the buildings sector24 accounted for around 32 % final energy use and 8.8 GtCO2 emissions, including 
direct and indirect emissions, with energy demand projected to approximately double and CO2 emissions to 
increase by 50 – 150 % by mid-century in baseline scenarios (medium evidence, medium agreement). This energy 
demand growth results from improvements in wealth, lifestyle change, access to modern energy services and adequate 
housing, and urbanisation. There are significant lock-in risks associated with the long lifespans of buildings and related 
infrastructure, and these are especially important in regions with high construction rates (robust evidence, high agree-
ment). (Figure SPM.7) [9.4]





Recent advances in technologies, know-how and policies provide opportunities to stabilize or reduce global 
buildings sector energy use by mid-century (robust evidence, high agreement). For new buildings, the adoption of 
very low energy building codes is important and has progressed substantially since AR4. Retrofits form a key part of 
the mitigation strategy in countries with established building stocks, and reductions of heating / cooling energy use by 
50 – 90 % in individual buildings have been achieved. Recent large improvements in performance and costs make very 
low energy construction and retrofits economically attractive, sometimes even at net negative costs. [9.3]
Lifestyle, culture and behaviour significantly influence energy consumption in buildings (limited evidence, high 
agreement). A three- to five-fold difference in energy use has been shown for provision of similar building-related energy 
service levels in buildings. For developed countries, scenarios indicate that lifestyle and behavioural changes could reduce 
energy demand by up to 20 % in the short term and by up to 50 % of present levels by mid-century. In developing coun-
tries, integrating elements of traditional lifestyles into building practices and architecture could facilitate the provision of 
high levels of energy services with much lower energy inputs than baseline. [9.3]
Most mitigation options for buildings have considerable and diverse co-benefits in addition to energy cost 
savings (robust evidence, high agreement). These include improvements in energy security, health (such as from cleaner 
wood-burning cookstoves), environmental outcomes, workplace productivity, fuel poverty reductions and net employ-
ment gains. Studies which have monetized co-benefits often find that these exceed energy cost savings and possibly 
climate benefits (medium evidence, medium agreement). [9.6, 9.7, 3.6.3]
Strong barriers, such as split incentives (e. g., tenants and builders), fragmented markets and inadequate 
access to information and financing, hinder the market-based uptake of cost-effective opportunities. Barriers 
can be overcome by policy interventions addressing all stages of the building and appliance lifecycles (robust evidence, 
high agreement). [9.8, 9.10, 16, Box 3.10]
The development of portfolios of energy efficiency policies and their implementation has advanced consider-
ably since AR4. Building codes and appliance standards, if well designed and implemented, have been among 
the most environmentally and cost-effective instruments for emission reductions (robust evidence, high agree-
ment). In some developed countries they have contributed to a stabilization of, or reduction in, total energy demand for 
buildings. Substantially strengthening these codes, adopting them in further jurisdictions, and extending them to more 
building and appliance types, will be a key factor in reaching ambitious climate goals. [9.10, 2.6.5.3]
Industry 
In 2010, the industry sector accounted for around 28 % of final energy use, and 13 GtCO2 emissions, including 
direct and indirect emissions as well as process emissions, with emissions projected to increase by 50 – 150 % 
by 2050 in the baseline scenarios assessed in AR5, unless energy efficiency improvements are accelerated 
significantly (medium evidence, medium agreement). Emissions from industry accounted for just over 30 % of global 
GHG emissions in 2010 and are currently greater than emissions from either the buildings or transport end-use sectors. 
(Figures SPM.2, SPM.7) [10.3]
The energy intensity of the industry sector could be directly reduced by about 25 % compared to the current 
level through the wide-scale upgrading, replacement and deployment of best available technologies, par-
ticularly in countries where these are not in use and in non-energy intensive industries (high agreement, robust 
evidence). Additional energy intensity reductions of about 20 % may potentially be realized through innovation (limited 
evidence, medium agreement). Barriers to implementing energy efficiency relate largely to initial investment costs and 
lack of information. Information programmes are a prevalent approach for promoting energy efficiency, followed by 




Improvements in GHG emission efficiency and in the efficiency of material use, recycling and re-use of mate-
rials and products, and overall reductions in product demand (e. g., through a more intensive use of products) 
and service demand could, in addition to energy efficiency, help reduce GHG emissions below the baseline 
level in the industry sector (medium evidence, high agreement). Many emission-reducing options are cost-effective, 
profitable and associated with multiple co-benefits (better environmental compliance, health benefits etc.). In the long 
term, a shift to low-carbon electricity, new industrial processes, radical product innovations (e. g., alternatives to cement), 
or CCS (e. g., to mitigate process emissions) could contribute to significant GHG emission reductions. Lack of policy and 
experiences in material and product service efficiency are major barriers. [10.4, 10.7, 10.8, 10.11]
CO2 emissions dominate GHG emissions from industry, but there are also substantial mitigation opportuni-
ties for non-CO2 gases (robust evidence, high agreement). CH4, N2O and fluorinated gases from industry accounted for 
emissions of 0.9 GtCO2eq in 2010. Key mitigation opportunities include, e. g., the reduction of hydrofluorocarbon emissions 
by process optimization and refrigerant recovery, recycling and substitution, although there are barriers. [Tables 10.2, 10.7]
Systemic approaches and collaborative activities across companies and sectors can reduce energy and 
material consumption and thus GHG emissions (robust evidence, high agreement). The application of cross-cutting 
technologies (e. g., efficient motors) and measures (e. g., reducing air or steam leaks) in both large energy intensive indus-
tries and small and medium enterprises can improve process performance and plant efficiency cost-effectively. Coopera-
tion across companies (e. g., in industrial parks) and sectors could include the sharing of infrastructure, information, and 
waste heat utilization. [10.4, 10.5]
Important options for mitigation in waste management are waste reduction, followed by re-use, recycling 
and energy recovery (robust evidence, high agreement). Waste and wastewater accounted for 1.5 GtCO2eq in 2010. 
As the share of recycled or reused material is still low (e. g., globally, around 20 % of municipal solid waste is recycled), 
waste treatment technologies and recovering energy to reduce demand for fossil fuels can result in significant direct 
emission reductions from waste disposal. [10.4, 10.14]
Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) 
The AFOLU sector accounts for about a quarter (~10 – 12 GtCO2eq / yr) of net anthropogenic GHG emissions 
mainly from deforestation, agricultural emissions from soil and nutrient management and livestock (medium 
evidence, high agreement). Most recent estimates indicate a decline in AFOLU CO2 fluxes, largely due to decreasing 
deforestation rates and increased afforestation. However, the uncertainty in historical net AFOLU emissions is larger than 
for other sectors, and additional uncertainties in projected baseline net AFOLU emissions exist. Nonetheless, in the future, 
net annual baseline CO2 emissions from AFOLU are projected to decline, with net emissions potentially less than half the 
2010 level by 2050 and the possibility of the AFOLU sectors becoming a net CO2 sink before the end of century (medium 
evidence, high agreement). (Figure SPM. 7) [6.3.1.4, 11.2, Figure 6.5]
AFOLU plays a central role for food security and sustainable development. The most cost-effective mitiga-
tion options in forestry are afforestation, sustainable forest management and reducing deforestation, with 
large differences in their relative importance across regions. In agriculture, the most cost-effective mitiga-
tion options are cropland management, grazing land management, and restoration of organic soils (medium 
evidence, high agreement). The economic mitigation potential of supply-side measures is estimated to be 7.2 to 11 
GtCO2eq / year25 in 2030 for mitigation efforts consistent with carbon prices26 up to 100 USD / tCO2eq, about a third of 
which can be achieved at a < 20 USD / tCO2eq (medium evidence, medium agreement). There are potential barriers to 
25 Full range of all studies: 0.49 – 11 GtCO2eq / year
26 In many models that are used to assess the economic costs of mitigation, carbon price is used as a proxy to represent the level of effort in mitiga-





implementation of available mitigation options [11.7, 11.8]. Demand-side measures, such as changes in diet and reduc-
tions of losses in the food supply chain, have a significant, but uncertain, potential to reduce GHG emissions from food 
production (medium evidence, medium agreement). Estimates vary from roughly 0.76 – 8.6 GtCO2eq / yr by 2050 (limited 
evidence, medium agreement). [11.4, 11.6, Figure 11.14]
Policies governing agricultural practices and forest conservation and management are more effective when 
involving both mitigation and adaptation. Some mitigation options in the AFOLU sector (such as soil and forest 
carbon stocks) may be vulnerable to climate change (medium evidence, high agreement). When implemented sustain-
ably, activities to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+27 is an example designed to be 
sustainable) are cost-effective policy options for mitigating climate change, with potential economic, social and other 
environmental and adaptation co-benefits (e. g., conservation of biodiversity and water resources, and reducing soil ero-
sion) (limited evidence, medium agreement). [11.3.2, 11.10]
Bioenergy can play a critical role for mitigation, but there are issues to consider, such as the sustainability of 
practices and the efficiency of bioenergy systems (robust evidence, medium agreement) [11.4.4, Box 11.5, 11.13.6, 
11.13.7]. Barriers to large-scale deployment of bioenergy include concerns about GHG emissions from land, food security, 
water resources, biodiversity conservation and livelihoods. The scientific debate about the overall climate impact related 
to land-use competition effects of specific bioenergy pathways remains unresolved (robust evidence, high agreement). 
[11.4.4, 11.13] Bioenergy technologies are diverse and span a wide range of options and technology pathways. Evidence 
suggests that options with low lifecycle emissions (e. g., sugar cane, Miscanthus, fast growing tree species, and sustain-
able use of biomass residues), some already available, can reduce GHG emissions; outcomes are site-specific and rely 
on efficient integrated ‘biomass-to-bioenergy systems’, and sustainable land-use management and governance. In some 
regions, specific bioenergy options, such as improved cookstoves, and small-scale biogas and biopower production, could 
reduce GHG emissions and improve livelihoods and health in the context of sustainable development (medium evidence, 
medium agreement). [11.13]
Human settlements, infrastructure and spatial planning 
Urbanization is a global trend and is associated with increases in income, and higher urban incomes are cor-
related with higher consumption of energy and GHG emissions (medium evidence, high agreement). As of 2011, 
more than 52 % of the global population lives in urban areas. In 2006, urban areas accounted for 67 – 76 % of energy use 
and 71 – 76 % of energy-related CO2 emissions. By 2050, the urban population is expected to increase to 5.6 – 7.1 billion, 
or 64 – 69 % of world population. Cities in non-Annex I countries generally have higher levels of energy use compared to 
the national average, whereas cities in Annex I countries generally have lower energy use per capita than national aver-
ages (medium evidence, medium agreement). [12.2, 12.3]
The next two decades present a window of opportunity for mitigation in urban areas, as a large portion of 
the world’s urban areas will be developed during this period (limited evidence, high agreement). Accounting for 
trends in declining population densities, and continued economic and population growth, urban land cover is projected 
to expand by 56 – 310 % between 2000 and 2030. [12.2, 12.3, 12.4, 12.8]
Mitigation options in urban areas vary by urbanization trajectories and are expected to be most effective 
when policy instruments are bundled (robust evidence, high agreement). Infrastructure and urban form are strongly 
interlinked, and lock-in patterns of land use, transport choice, housing, and behaviour. Effective mitigation strategies 
involve packages of mutually reinforcing policies, including co-locating high residential with high employment densities, 





achieving high diversity and integration of land uses, increasing accessibility and investing in public transport and other 
demand management measures. [8.4, 12.3, 12.4, 12.5, 12.6]
The largest mitigation opportunities with respect to human settlements are in rapidly urbanizing areas where 
urban form and infrastructure are not locked in, but where there are often limited governance, technical, 
financial, and institutional capacities (robust evidence, high agreement). The bulk of urban growth is expected in 
small- to medium-size cities in developing countries. The feasibility of spatial planning instruments for climate change 
mitigation is highly dependent on a city’s financial and governance capability. [12.6, 12.7]
Thousands of cities are undertaking climate action plans, but their aggregate impact on urban emissions 
is uncertain (robust evidence, high agreement). There has been little systematic assessment on their implementation, 
the extent to which emission reduction targets are being achieved, or emissions reduced. Current climate action plans 
focus largely on energy efficiency. Fewer climate action plans consider land-use planning strategies and cross-sectoral 
measures to reduce sprawl and promote transit-oriented development28. [12.6, 12.7, 12.9]
Successful implementation of urban-scale climate change mitigation strategies can provide co-benefits 
(robust evidence, high agreement). Urban areas throughout the world continue to struggle with challenges, including 
ensuring access to energy, limiting air and water pollution, and maintaining employment opportunities and competitive-
ness. Action on urban-scale mitigation often depends on the ability to relate climate change mitigation efforts to local 
co-benefits (robust evidence, high agreement). [12.5, 12.6, 12.7, 12.8]
Mitigation policies and institutions 
Sectoral and national policies
Substantial reductions in emissions would require large changes in investment patterns. Mitigation scenarios 
in which policies stabilize atmospheric concentrations (without overshoot) in the range from 430 to 530 ppm CO2eq by 
2100 lead to substantial shifts in annual investment flows during the period 2010 – 2029 compared to baseline scenarios 
(Figure SPM.9). Over the next two decades (2010 to 2029), annual investment in conventional fossil fuel technologies 
associated with the electricity supply sector is projected to decline by about 30 (2 – 166) billion USD (median: − 20 % 
compared to 2010) while annual investment in low-carbon electricity supply (i. e., renewables, nuclear and electric-
ity generation with CCS) is projected to rise by about 147 (31 – 360) billion USD (median: + 100 % compared to 2010) 
(limited evidence, medium agreement). For comparison, global total annual investment in the energy system is presently 
about 1200 billion USD. In addition, annual incremental energy efficiency investments in transport, buildings and industry 
is projected to increase by about 336 (1 – 641) billion USD (limited evidence, medium agreement), frequently involving 
modernization of existing equipment. [13.11, 16.2.2]
There is no widely agreed definition of what constitutes climate finance, but estimates of the financial flows 
associated with climate change mitigation and adaptation are available. Published assessments of all current 
annual financial flows whose expected effect is to reduce net GHG emissions and / or to enhance resilience to climate 
change and climate variability show 343 to 385 billion USD per year globally (medium confidence) [Box TS.14]. Most of 
this goes to mitigation. Out of this, total public climate finance that flowed to developing countries is estimated to be 
between 35 and 49 billion USD / yr in 2011 and 2012 (medium confidence). Estimates of international private climate 






finance flowing to developing countries range from 10 to 72 billion USD / yr including foreign direct investment as equity 
and loans in the range of 10 to 37 billion USD / yr over the period of 2008 – 2011 (medium confidence). [16.2.2]
There has been a considerable increase in national and sub-national mitigation plans and strategies since AR4. 
In 2012, 67 % of global GHG emissions were subject to national legislation or strategies versus 45 % in 2007. However, 
there has not yet been a substantial deviation in global emissions from the past trend [Figure 1.3c]. These plans and 
strategies are in their early stages of development and implementation in many countries, making it difficult to assess their 
aggregate impact on future global emissions (medium evidence, high agreement). [14.3.4, 14.3.5, 15.1, 15.2]
Since AR4, there has been an increased focus on policies designed to integrate multiple objectives, increase 
co-benefits and reduce adverse side-effects (high confidence). Governments often explicitly reference co-benefits in 
climate and sectoral plans and strategies. The scientific literature has sought to assess the size of co-benefits (see Sec-
tion SPM.4.1) and the greater political feasibility and durability of policies that have large co-benefits and small adverse 
Figure SPM.9 | Change in annual investment flows from the average baseline level over the next two decades (2010 – 2029) for mitigation scenarios that stabilize concentrations 
within the range of approximately 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq by 2100. Investment changes are based on a limited number of model studies and model comparisons. Total electricity gen-
eration (leftmost column) is the sum of renewables, nuclear, power plants with CCS and fossil fuel power plants without CCS. The vertical bars indicate the range between minimum 
and maximum estimate; the horizontal bar indicates the median. Proximity to this median value does not imply higher likelihood because of the different degree of aggregation of 
model results, the low number of studies available and different assumptions in the different studies considered. The numbers in the bottom row show the total number of stud-



































































side-effects. [4.8, 5.7, 6.6, 13.2, 15.2] Despite the growing attention in policymaking and the scientific literature since AR4, 
the analytical and empirical underpinnings for understanding many of the interactive effects are under-developed [1.2, 
3.6.3, 4.2, 4.8, 5.7, 6.6].
Sector-specific policies have been more widely used than economy-wide policies (medium evidence, high agree-
ment). Although most economic theory suggests that economy-wide policies for the singular objective of mitigation 
would be more cost-effective than sector-specific policies, since AR4 a growing number of studies has demonstrated that 
administrative and political barriers may make economy-wide policies harder to design and implement than sector-spe-
cific policies. The latter may be better suited to address barriers or market failures specific to certain sectors, and may be 
bundled in packages of complementary policies. [6.3.6.5, 8.10, 9.10, 10.10, 15.2, 15.5, 15.8, 15.9]
Regulatory approaches and information measures are widely used, and are often environmentally effec-
tive (medium evidence, medium agreement). Examples of regulatory approaches include energy efficiency standards; 
examples of information programmes include labelling programmes that can help consumers make better-informed deci-
sions. While such approaches have often been found to have a net social benefit, the scientific literature is divided on the 
extent to which such policies can be implemented with negative private costs to firms and individuals. [Box 3.10, 15.5.5, 
15.5.6] There is general agreement that rebound effects exist, whereby higher efficiency can lead to lower energy prices 
and greater consumption, but there is low agreement in the literature on the magnitude [3.9.5, 5.7.2, 14.4.2, 15.5.4].
Since AR4, cap and trade systems for GHGs have been established in a number of countries and regions. Their 
short-run environmental effect has been limited as a result of loose caps or caps that have not proved to 
be constraining (limited evidence, medium agreement). This was related to factors such as the financial and economic 
crisis that reduced energy demand, new energy sources, interactions with other policies, and regulatory uncertainty. In 
principle, a cap and trade system can achieve mitigation in a cost-effective way; its implementation depends on national 
circumstances. Though earlier programmes relied almost exclusively on grandfathering (free allocation of permits), auc-
tioning permits is increasingly applied. If allowances are auctioned, revenues can be used to address other investments 
with a high social return, and / or reduce the tax and debt burden. [14.4.2, 15.5.3]
In some countries, tax-based policies specifically aimed at reducing GHG emissions—alongside technology 
and other policies—have helped to weaken the link between GHG emissions and GDP (high confidence). In 
a large group of countries, fuel taxes (although not necessarily designed for the purpose of mitigation) have effects 
that are akin to sectoral carbon taxes [Table 15.2]. The demand reduction in transport fuel associated with a 1 % price 
increase is 0.6 % to 0.8 % in the long run, although the short-run response is much smaller [15.5.2]. In some countries 
revenues are used to reduce other taxes and / or to provide transfers to low-income groups. This illustrates the general 
principle that mitigation policies that raise government revenue generally have lower social costs than approaches which 
do not. While it has previously been assumed that fuel taxes in the transport sector are regressive, there have been a 
number of other studies since AR4 that have shown them to be progressive, particularly in developing countries (medium 
evidence, medium agreement). [3.6.3, 14.4.2, 15.5.2]
The reduction of subsidies for GHG-related activities in various sectors can achieve emission reductions, 
depending on the social and economic context (high confidence). While subsidies can affect emissions in many sec-
tors, most of the recent literature has focused on subsidies for fossil fuels. Since AR4 a small but growing literature based 
on economy-wide models has projected that complete removal of subsidies for fossil fuels in all countries could result in 
reductions in global aggregate emissions by mid-century (medium evidence, medium agreement) [7.12, 13.13, 14.3.2, 
15.5.2]. Studies vary in methodology, the type and definition of subsidies and the time frame for phase out considered. In 
particular, the studies assess the impacts of complete removal of all fossil fuel subsidies without seeking to assess which 
subsidies are wasteful and inefficient, keeping in mind national circumstances. Although political economy barriers are 
substantial, some countries have reformed their tax and budget systems to reduce fuel subsidies. To help reduce possible 
adverse effects on lower-income groups who often spend a large fraction of their income on energy services, many gov-




Interactions between or among mitigation policies may be synergistic or may have no additive effect on 
reducing emissions (medium evidence, high agreement). For instance, a carbon tax can have an additive environmental 
effect to policies such as subsidies for the supply of RE. By contrast, if a cap and trade system has a binding cap (suffi-
ciently stringent to affect emission-related decisions), then other policies such as RE subsidies have no further impact on 
reducing emissions within the time period that the cap applies (although they may affect costs and possibly the viability 
of more stringent future targets) (medium evidence, high agreement). In either case, additional policies may be needed to 
address market failures relating to innovation and technology diffusion. [15.7]
Some mitigation policies raise the prices for some energy services and could hamper the ability of societ-
ies to expand access to modern energy services to underserved populations (low confidence). These potential 
adverse side-effects can be avoided with the adoption of complementary policies (medium confidence). Most 
notably, about 1.3 billion people worldwide do not have access to electricity and about 3 billion are dependent on tradi-
tional solid fuels for cooking and heating with severe adverse effects on health, ecosystems and development. Provid-
ing access to modern energy services is an important sustainable development objective. The costs of achieving nearly 
universal access to electricity and clean fuels for cooking and heating are projected to be between 72 and 95 billion USD 
per year until 2030 with minimal effects on GHG emissions (limited evidence, medium agreement). A transition away 
from the use of traditional biomass29 and the more efficient combustion of solid fuels reduce air pollutant emissions, such 
as sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), carbon monoxide (CO), and black carbon (BC), and thus yield large health 
benefits (high confidence). [4.3, 6.6, 7.9, 9.3, 9.7, 11.13.6, 16.8]
Technology policy complements other mitigation policies (high confidence). Technology policy includes techno logy-
push (e. g., publicly funded R&D) and demand-pull (e. g., governmental procurement programmes). Such policies address 
market failures related to innovation and technology diffusion. [3.11, 15.6] Technology support policies have promoted 
substantial innovation and diffusion of new technologies, but the cost-effectiveness of such policies is often difficult to 
assess [2.6.5, 7.12, 9.10]. Nevertheless, program evaluation data can provide empirical evidence on the relative effective-
ness of different policies and can assist with policy design [15.6.5].
In many countries, the private sector plays central roles in the processes that lead to emissions as well as to 
mitigation. Within appropriate enabling environments, the private sector, along with the public sector, can 
play an important role in financing mitigation (medium evidence, high agreement). The share of total mitigation 
finance from the private sector, acknowledging data limitations, is estimated to be on average between two-thirds and 
three-fourths on the global level (2010 – 2012) (limited evidence, medium agreement). In many countries, public finance 
interventions by governments and national and international development banks encourage climate investments by the 
private sector [16.2.1] and provide finance where private sector investment is limited. The quality of a country’s enabling 
environment includes the effectiveness of its institutions, regulations and guidelines regarding the private sector, security 
of property rights, credibility of policies and other factors that have a substantial impact on whether private firms invest 
in new technologies and infrastructures [16.3]. Dedicated policy instruments, for example, credit insurance, power 
purchase agreements and feed-in tariffs, concessional finance or rebates, provide an incentive for investment by lowering 
risks for private actors [16.4].





The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the main multilateral forum 
focused on addressing climate change, with nearly universal participation. Other institutions organized at differ-
ent levels of governance have resulted in diversifying international climate change cooperation. [13.3.1, 13.4.1.4, 13.5]
Existing and proposed international climate change cooperation arrangements vary in their focus and degree 
of centralization and coordination. They span: multilateral agreements, harmonized national policies and decentral-
ized but coordinated national policies, as well as regional and regionally-coordinated policies. [Figure TS.38, 13.4.1, 
13.13.2, 14.4]
The Kyoto Protocol offers lessons towards achieving the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC, particularly with 
respect to participation, implementation, flexibility mechanisms, and environmental effectiveness (medium 
evidence, low agreement). [5.3.3, 13.3.4, 13.7.2, 13.13.1.1, 13.13.1.2, 14.3.7.1, Table TS.9]
UNFCCC activities since 2007 have led to an increasing number of institutions and other arrangements for 
international climate change cooperation. [13.5.1.1, 13.13.1.3, 16.2.1]
Policy linkages among regional, national, and sub-national climate policies offer potential climate change 
mitigation and adaptation benefits (medium evidence, medium agreement). Linkages can be established between 
national policies, various instruments, and through regional cooperation. [13.3.1, 13.5.3, 13.6, 13.7, 13.13.2.3, 14.4, 
Figure 13.4]
Various regional initiatives between the national and global scales are either being developed or imple-
mented, but their impact on global mitigation has been limited to date (medium confidence). Many climate 
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TS.1 Introduction and framing
‘Mitigation’, in the context of climate change, is a human interven-
tion to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases 
(GHGs). One of the central messages from Working Groups I and II 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is that the 
consequences of unchecked climate change for humans and natural 
ecosystems are already apparent and increasing. The most vulnerable 
systems are already experiencing adverse effects. Past GHG emissions 
have already put the planet on a track for substantial further changes 
in climate, and while there are many uncertainties in factors such as 
the sensitivity of the climate system many scenarios lead to substantial 
climate impacts, including direct harms to human and ecological well-
being that exceed the ability of those systems to adapt fully.
Because mitigation is intended to reduce the harmful effects of climate 
change, it is part of a broader policy framework that also includes 
adaptation to climate impacts. Mitigation, together with adaptation to 
climate change, contributes to the objective expressed in Article 2 of 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) to stabilize “greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmo-
sphere at a level to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system […] within a time frame sufficient to allow 
ecosystems to adapt […] to ensure that food production is not threat-
ened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable 
manner”. However, Article 2 is hard to interpret, as concepts such as 
‘dangerous’ and ‘sustainable’ have different meanings in different 
decision contexts (see Box TS.1).1 Moreover, natural science is unable 
to predict precisely the response of the climate system to rising GHG 
1 Boxes throughout this summary provide background information on main research 
concepts and methods that were used to generate insight.
Box TS.1 | Many disciplines aid decision making on climate change
Something is dangerous if it leads to a significant risk of consider-
able harm. Judging whether human interference in the climate sys-
tem is dangerous therefore divides into two tasks. One is to esti-
mate the risk in material terms: what the material consequences of 
human interference might be and how likely they are. The other is 
to set a value on the risk: to judge how harmful it will be.
The first is a task for natural science, but the second is not [Section 
3.1]. As the Synthesis Report of AR4 states, “Determining what 
constitutes ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the cli-
mate system’ in relation to Article 2 of the UNFCCC involves value 
judgements”. Judgements of value (valuations) are called for, 
not just here, but at almost every turn in decision making about 
climate change [3.2]. For example, setting a target for mitigation 
involves judging the value of losses to people’s well-being in the 
future, and comparing it with the value of benefits enjoyed now. 
Choosing whether to site wind turbines on land or at sea requires 
a judgement of the value of landscape in comparison with the 
extra cost of marine turbines. To estimate the social cost of carbon 
is to value the harm that GHG emissions do [3.9.4].
Different values often conflict, and they are often hard to weigh 
against each other. Moreover, they often involve the conflicting 
interests of different people, and are subject to much debate and 
disagreement. Decision makers must therefore find ways to medi-
ate among different interests and values, and also among differing 
viewpoints about values. [3.4, 3.5]
Social sciences and humanities can contribute to this process by 
improving our understanding of values in ways that are illustrated 
in the boxes contained in this summary. The sciences of human 
and social behaviour — among them psychology, political science, 
sociology, and non-normative branches of economics — investi-
gate the values people have, how they change through time, how 
they can be influenced by political processes, and how the process 
of making decisions affects their acceptability. Other disciplines, 
including ethics (moral philosophy), decision theory, risk analysis, 
and the normative branch of economics, investigate, analyze, and 
clarify values themselves [2.5, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6]. These disciplines offer 
practical ways of measuring some values and trading off conflict-
ing interests. For example, the discipline of public health often 
measures health by means of ‘disability-adjusted life years’ [3.4.5]. 
Economics uses measures of social value that are generally based 
on monetary valuation but can take account of principles of 
distributive justice [3.6, 4.2, 4.7, 4.8]. These normative disciplines 
also offer practical decision-making tools, such as expected util-
ity theory, decision analysis, cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness 
analysis, and the structured use of expert judgment [2.5, 3.6, 3.7, 
3.9].
There is a further element to decision making. People and 
countries have rights and owe duties towards each other. 
These are matters of justice, equity, or fairness. They fall within 
the subject matter of moral and political philosophy, jurispru-
dence, and economics. For example, some have argued that 
countries owe restitution for the harms that result from their 
past GHG emissions, and it has been debated, on jurispruden-
tial and other grounds, whether restitution is owed only for 





concentrations nor fully understand the harm it will impose on indi-
viduals, societies, and ecosystems. Article 2 requires that societies bal-
ance a variety of considerations — some rooted in the impacts of cli-
mate change itself and others in the potential costs of mitigation and 
adaptation. The difficulty of that task is compounded by the need to 
develop a consensus on fundamental issues such as the level of risk 
that societies are willing to accept and impose on others, strategies for 
sharing costs, and how to balance the numerous tradeoffs that arise 
because mitigation intersects with many other goals of societies. Such 
issues are inherently value-laden and involve different actors who 
have varied interests and disparate decision-making power.
The Working Group III (WGIII) contribution to the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment 
Report (AR5) assesses literature on the scientific, technological, environ-
mental, economic and social aspects of mitigation of climate change. 
It builds upon the WGIII contribution to the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment 
Report (AR4), the Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Cli-
mate Change Mitigation (SRREN) and previous reports and incorporates 
subsequent new findings and research. Throughout, the focus is on the 
implications of its findings for policy, without being prescriptive about 
the particular policies that governments and other important partici-
pants in the policy process should adopt. In light of the IPCC’s mandate, 
authors in WGIII were guided by several principles when assembling this 
assessment: (1) to be explicit about mitigation options, (2) to be explicit 
about their costs and about their risks and opportunities vis-à-vis other 
development priorities, (3) and to be explicit about the underlying crite-
ria, concepts, and methods for evaluating alternative policies.
The remainder of this summary offers the main findings of this report.
The degree of certainty in findings, as in the reports of all three IPCC 
Working Groups, is based on the author teams’ evaluations of underly-
ing scientific understanding and is expressed as a qualitative level of 
confidence (from very low to very high) and, when possible, proba-
bilistically with a quantified likelihood (from exceptionally unlikely to 
virtually certain). Confidence in the validity of a finding is based on the 
type, amount, quality, and consistency of evidence (e. g., data, mecha-
nistic understanding, theory, models, expert judgment) and the degree 
of agreement. Probabilistic estimates of quantified measures of uncer-
tainty in a finding are based on statistical analysis of observations or 
model results, or both, and expert judgment.2 Where appropriate, find-
2 The following summary terms are used to describe the available evidence: limited, 
medium, or robust; and for the degree of agreement: low, medium, or high. A level 
of confidence is expressed using five qualifiers: very low, low, medium, high, and 
very high, and typeset in italics, e. g., medium confidence. For a given evidence and 
agreement statement, different confidence levels can be assigned, but increas-
ing levels of evidence and degrees of agreement are correlated with increasing 
confidence. The following terms have been used to indicate the assessed likeli-
hood of an outcome or a result: virtually certain 99 – 100 % probability, very likely 
90 – 100 %, likely 66 – 100 %, about as likely as not 33 – 66 %, unlikely 0 – 33 %, 
very unlikely 0 – 10 %, exceptionally unlikely 0 – 1 %. Additional terms (more likely 
than not > 50 – 100 %, and more unlikely than likely 0 –< 50 %) may also be used 
when appropriate. Assessed likelihood is typeset in italics, e. g., very likely. For 
more details, please refer to the Guidance Note for Lead Authors of the IPCC Fifth 
Assessment Report on Consistent Treatment of Uncertainties, available at http://
www.ipcc.ch/pdf/supporting-material/uncertainty-guidance-note.pdf.
ings are also formulated as statements of fact without using uncer-
tainty qualifiers. Within paragraphs of this summary, the confidence, 
evidence, and agreement terms given for a bolded finding apply to 
subsequent statements in the paragraph, unless additional terms are 
provided. References in [square brackets] indicate chapters, sections, 
figures, tables, and boxes where supporting evidence in the underlying 
report can be found.
This section continues with providing a framing of important con-
cepts and methods that help to contextualize the findings presented 
in subsequent sections. Section TS.2 presents evidence on past trends 
in stocks and flows of GHGs and the factors that drive emissions at the 
global, regional, and sectoral scales including economic growth, tech-
nology, or population changes. Section TS.3.1 provides findings from 
studies that analyze the technological, economic, and institutional 
requirements of long-term mitigation scenarios. Section TS.3.2 provides 
details on mitigation measures and policies that are used within and 
across different economic sectors and human settlements. Section TS.4 
summarizes insights on the interactions of mitigation policies between 
governance levels, economic sectors, and instrument types. 
Climate change is a global commons problem that implies the 
need for international cooperation in tandem with local, 
national, and regional policies on many distinct matters. Because 
the GHG emissions of any agent (individual, company, country) affect 
every other agent, an effective outcome will not be achieved if indi-
vidual agents advance their interests independently of others. Interna-
tional cooperation can contribute by defining and allocating rights and 
responsibilities with respect to the atmosphere [Sections 1.2.4, 3.1, 
4.2, 13.2.1]. Moreover, research and development (R&D) in support of 
mitigation is a public good, which means that international coopera-
tion can play a constructive role in the coordinated development and 
diffusion of technologies [1.4.4, 3.11, 13.9, 14.4.3]. This gives rise to 
separate needs for cooperation on R&D, opening up of markets, and 
the creation of incentives to encourage private firms to develop and 
deploy new technologies and households to adopt them.
International cooperation on climate change involves ethical 
considerations, including equitable effort-sharing. Countries have 
contributed differently to the build-up of GHG in the atmosphere, have 
varying capacities to contribute to mitigation and adaptation, and have 
different levels of vulnerability to climate impacts. Many less developed 
countries are exposed to the greatest impacts but have contributed least 
to the problem. Engaging countries in effective international cooperation 
may require strategies for sharing the costs and benefits of mitigation 
in ways that are perceived to be equitable [4.2]. Evidence suggests that 
perceived fairness can influence the level of cooperation among individ-
uals, and that finding may suggest that processes and outcomes seen as 
fair will lead to more international cooperation as well [3.10, 13.2.2.4]. 
Analysis contained in the literature of moral and political philosophy 
can contribute to resolving ethical questions raised by climate change 
[3.2, 3.3, 3.4]. These questions include how much overall mitigation is 
needed to avoid ‘dangerous interference with the climate system’ (Box 
Box TS.2 | Mitigation brings both market and non-market benefits to humanity
The impacts of mitigation consist in the reduction or elimination 
of some of the effects of climate change. Mitigation may improve 
people’s livelihood, their health, their access to food or clean water, 
the amenities of their lives, or the natural environment around them.
Mitigation can improve human well-being through both market 
and non-market effects. Market effects result from changes in 
market prices, in people’s revenues or net income, or in the quality 
or availability of market commodities. Non-market effects result 
from changes in the quality or availability of non-marketed goods 
such as health, quality of life, culture, environmental quality, 
natural ecosystems, wildlife, and aesthetic values. Each impact 
of climate change can generate both market and non-market 
damages. For example, a heat wave in a rural area may cause heat 
stress for exposed farm labourers, dry up a wetland that serves as 
a refuge for migratory birds, or kill some crops and damage others. 
Avoiding these damages is a benefit of mitigation. [3.9]
Economists often use monetary units to value the damage 
done by climate change and the benefits of mitigation. The 
monetized value of a benefit to a person is the amount of 
income the person would be willing to sacrifice in order to get 
it, or alternatively the amount she would be willing to accept 
as adequate compensation for not getting it. The monetized 
value of a harm is the amount of income she would be will-
ing to sacrifice in order to avoid it, or alternatively the amount 
she would be willing to accept as adequate compensation for 
suffering it. Economic measures seek to capture how strongly 
individuals care about one good or service relative to another, 
depending on their individual interests, outlook, and economic 
circumstances. [3.9]
Monetary units can be used in this way to measure costs and 
benefits that come at different times and to different people. But 
it cannot be presumed that a dollar to one person at one time 
can be treated as equivalent to a dollar to a different person or 
at a different time. Distributional weights may need to be applied 
between people [3.6.1], and discounting (see Box TS.10) may be 
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need for international cooperation in tandem with local, 
national, and regional policies on many distinct matters. Because 
the GHG emissions of any agent (individual, company, country) affect 
every other agent, an effective outcome will not be achieved if indi-
vidual agents advance their interests independently of others. Interna-
tional cooperation can contribute by defining and allocating rights and 
responsibilities with respect to the atmosphere [Sections 1.2.4, 3.1, 
4.2, 13.2.1]. Moreover, research and development (R&D) in support of 
mitigation is a public good, which means that international coopera-
tion can play a constructive role in the coordinated development and 
diffusion of technologies [1.4.4, 3.11, 13.9, 14.4.3]. This gives rise to 
separate needs for cooperation on R&D, opening up of markets, and 
the creation of incentives to encourage private firms to develop and 
deploy new technologies and households to adopt them.
International cooperation on climate change involves ethical 
considerations, including equitable effort-sharing. Countries have 
contributed differently to the build-up of GHG in the atmosphere, have 
varying capacities to contribute to mitigation and adaptation, and have 
different levels of vulnerability to climate impacts. Many less developed 
countries are exposed to the greatest impacts but have contributed least 
to the problem. Engaging countries in effective international cooperation 
may require strategies for sharing the costs and benefits of mitigation 
in ways that are perceived to be equitable [4.2]. Evidence suggests that 
perceived fairness can influence the level of cooperation among individ-
uals, and that finding may suggest that processes and outcomes seen as 
fair will lead to more international cooperation as well [3.10, 13.2.2.4]. 
Analysis contained in the literature of moral and political philosophy 
can contribute to resolving ethical questions raised by climate change 
[3.2, 3.3, 3.4]. These questions include how much overall mitigation is 
needed to avoid ‘dangerous interference with the climate system’ (Box 
Box TS.2 | Mitigation brings both market and non-market benefits to humanity
The impacts of mitigation consist in the reduction or elimination 
of some of the effects of climate change. Mitigation may improve 
people’s livelihood, their health, their access to food or clean water, 
the amenities of their lives, or the natural environment around them.
Mitigation can improve human well-being through both market 
and non-market effects. Market effects result from changes in 
market prices, in people’s revenues or net income, or in the quality 
or availability of market commodities. Non-market effects result 
from changes in the quality or availability of non-marketed goods 
such as health, quality of life, culture, environmental quality, 
natural ecosystems, wildlife, and aesthetic values. Each impact 
of climate change can generate both market and non-market 
damages. For example, a heat wave in a rural area may cause heat 
stress for exposed farm labourers, dry up a wetland that serves as 
a refuge for migratory birds, or kill some crops and damage others. 
Avoiding these damages is a benefit of mitigation. [3.9]
Economists often use monetary units to value the damage 
done by climate change and the benefits of mitigation. The 
monetized value of a benefit to a person is the amount of 
income the person would be willing to sacrifice in order to get 
it, or alternatively the amount she would be willing to accept 
as adequate compensation for not getting it. The monetized 
value of a harm is the amount of income she would be will-
ing to sacrifice in order to avoid it, or alternatively the amount 
she would be willing to accept as adequate compensation for 
suffering it. Economic measures seek to capture how strongly 
individuals care about one good or service relative to another, 
depending on their individual interests, outlook, and economic 
circumstances. [3.9]
Monetary units can be used in this way to measure costs and 
benefits that come at different times and to different people. But 
it cannot be presumed that a dollar to one person at one time 
can be treated as equivalent to a dollar to a different person or 
at a different time. Distributional weights may need to be applied 
between people [3.6.1], and discounting (see Box TS.10) may be 
appropriate between times. [3.6.2]
TS.1) [3.1], how the effort or cost of mitigating climate change should 
be shared among countries and between the present and future [3.3, 
3.6, 4.6], how to account for such factors as historical responsibility for 
GHG emissions [3.3, 4.6], and how to choose among alternative policies 
for mitigation and adaptation [3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7]. Ethical issues of well-
being, justice, fairness, and rights are all involved. Ethical analysis can 
identify the different ethical principles that underlie different viewpoints, 
and distinguish correct from incorrect ethical reasoning [3.3, 3.4].
Evaluation of mitigation options requires taking into account 
many different interests, perspectives, and challenges between 
and within societies. Mitigation engages many different agents, such 
as governments at different levels — regionally [14.1], nationally and 
locally [15.1], and through international agreements [13.1] — as well 
as households, firms, and other non-governmental actors. The intercon-
nections between different levels of decision making and among dif-
ferent actors affect the many goals that become linked with climate 
policy. Indeed, in many countries the policies that have (or could have) 
the largest impact on emissions are motivated not solely by concerns 
surrounding climate change. Of particular importance are the interac-
tions and perceived tensions between mitigation and development 
[4.1, 14.1]. Development involves many activities, such as enhancing 
access to modern energy services [7.9.1, 14.3.2, 16.8], the building of 
infrastructures [12.1], ensuring food security [11.1], and eradicating 
poverty [4.1]. Many of these activities can lead to higher emissions, 
if achieved by conventional means. Thus, the relationships between 
development and mitigation can lead to political and ethical conun-
drums, especially for developing countries, when mitigation is seen as 
exacerbating urgent development challenges and adversely affecting 
the current well-being of their populations [4.1]. These conundrums 
are examined throughout this report, including in special boxes high-
lighting the concerns of developing countries.
Economic evaluation can be useful for policy design and be 
given a foundation in ethics, provided appropriate distribu-
tional weights are applied. While the limitations of economics are 
widely documented [2.4, 3.5], economics nevertheless provides use-
ful tools for assessing the pros and cons of mitigation and adaptation 
options. Practical tools that can contribute to decision making include 
cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, multi-criteria analysis, 
expected utility theory, and methods of decision analysis [2.5, 3.7.2]. 
Economic valuation (see Box TS.2) can be given a foundation in ethics, 
provided distributional weights are applied that take proper account 
of the difference in the value of money to rich and poor people [3.6]. 
Few empirical applications of economic valuation to climate change 
have been well-founded in this respect [3.6.1]. The literature provides 
significant guidance on the social discount rate for consumption (see 
Box TS.10), which is in effect inter-temporal distributional weighting. It 
suggests that the social discount rate depends in a well-defined way 
primarily on the anticipated growth in per capita income and inequal-
ity aversion [3.6.2]. 
Most climate policies intersect with other societal goals, either 




or ‘adverse side-effects’. Since the publication of AR4, a substantial 
body of literature has emerged looking at how countries that engage 
in mitigation also address other goals, such as local environmental 
protection or energy security, as a ‘co-benefit’ and conversely [1.2.1, 
6.6.1, 4.8]. This multi-objective perspective is important because it 
helps to identify areas where political, administrative, stakeholder, and 
other support for policies that advance multiple goals will be robust. 
Moreover, in many societies the presence of multiple objectives may 
make it easier for governments to sustain the political support needed 
for mitigation [15.2.3]. Measuring the net effect on social welfare (see 
Box TS.11) requires examining the interaction between climate policies 
and pre-existing other policies [3.6.3, 6.3.6.5].
Mitigation efforts generate tradeoffs and synergies with other 
societal goals that can be evaluated in a sustainable develop-
ment framework. The many diverse goals that societies value are 
often called ‘sustainable development’. A comprehensive assessment 
of climate policy therefore involves going beyond a narrow focus on 
distinct mitigation and adaptation options and their specific co-bene-
fits and adverse side-effects. Instead it entails incorporating climate 
issues into the design of comprehensive strategies for equitable and 
sustainable development at regional, national, and local levels [4.2, 
4.5]. Maintaining and advancing human well-being, in particular over-
coming poverty and reducing inequalities in living standards, while 
avoiding unsustainable patterns of consumption and production, are 
fundamental aspects of equitable and sustainable development [4.4, 
4.6, 4.8]. Because these aspects are deeply rooted in how societies for-
mulate and implement economic and social policies generally, they are 
critical to the adoption of effective climate policy.
Variations in goals reflect, in part, the fact that humans perceive 
risks and opportunities differently. Individuals make their decisions 
based on different goals and objectives and use a variety of different 
methods in making choices between alternative options. These choices 
and their outcomes affect the ability of different societies to cooperate 
and coordinate. Some groups put greater emphasis on near-term eco-
nomic development and mitigation costs, while others focus more on 
the longer-term ramifications of climate change for prosperity. Some 
are highly risk averse while others are more tolerant of dangers. Some 
have more resources to adapt to climate change and others have 
fewer. Some focus on possible catastrophic events while others ignore 
extreme events as implausible. Some will be relative winners, and 
some relative losers from particular climate changes. Some have more 
political power to articulate their preferences and secure their interests 
and others have less. Since AR4, awareness has grown that such con-
siderations — long the domain of psychology, behavioural economics, 
political economy, and other disciplines — need to be taken into 
account in assessing climate policy (see Box TS.3). In addition to the 
different perceptions of climate change and its risks, a variety of norms 
can also affect what humans view as acceptable behaviour. Awareness 
has grown about how such norms spread through social networks and 
ultimately affect activities, behaviours and lifestyles, and thus develop-
ment pathways, which can have profound impacts on GHG emissions 
and mitigation policy. [1.4.2, 2.4, 3.8, 3.10, 4.3]
Box TS.4 | ‘Fat tails’: unlikely vs. likely outcomes in understanding the value of mitigation
What has become known as the ‘fat-tails’ problem relates to uncer-
tainty in the climate system and its implications for mitigation and 
adaptation policies. By assessing the chain of structural uncertain-
ties that affect the climate system, the resulting compound probabil-
ity distribution of possible economic damage may have a fat right 
tail. That means that the probability of damage does not decline 
with increasing temperature as quickly as the consequences rise.
The significance of fat tails can be illustrated for the distribution 
of temperature that will result from a doubling of atmospheric 
carbon dioxide (CO2) (climate sensitivity). IPCC Working Group 
I (WGI) estimates may be used to calibrate two possible dis-
tributions, one fat-tailed and one thin-tailed, that each have a 
median temperature change of 3 °C and a 15 % probability of a 
temperature change in excess of 4.5 °C. Although the probability 
of exceeding 4.5 °C is the same for both distributions, likelihood 
drops off much more slowly with increasing temperature for the 
fat-tailed compared to the thin-tailed distribution. For example, 
the probability of temperatures in excess of 8 °C is nearly ten 
times greater with the chosen fat-tailed distribution than with 
the thin-tailed distribution. If temperature changes are character-
ized by a fat tailed distribution, and events with large impact may 
occur at higher temperatures, then tail events can dominate the 
computation of expected damages from climate change.
In developing mitigation and adaptation policies, there is value in 
recognizing the higher likelihood of tail events and their con-
sequences. In fact, the nature of the probability distribution of 
temperature change can profoundly change how climate policy 
is framed and structured. Specifically, fatter tails increase the 
importance of tail events (such as 8 °C warming). While research 
attention and much policy discussion have focused on the most 
likely outcomes, it may be that those in the tail of the probability 
distribution are more important to consider. [2.5, 3.9.2]
Box TS.3 | Deliberative and intuitive thinking are inputs to effective risk management
When people — from individual voters to key decision makers in 
firms to senior government policymakers — make choices that 
involve risk and uncertainty, they rely on deliberative as well intui-
tive thought processes. Deliberative thinking is characterized by 
the use of a wide range of formal methods to evaluate alternative 
choices when probabilities are difficult to specify and / or outcomes 
are uncertain. They can enable decision makers to compare choices 
in a systematic manner by taking into account both short and 
long-term consequences. A strength of these methods is that they 
help avoid some of the well-known pitfalls of intuitive thinking, 
such as the tendency of decision makers to favour the status quo. 
A weakness of these deliberative decision aids is that they are 
often highly complex and require considerable time and attention.
Most analytically based literature, including reports such as this 
one, is based on the assumption that individuals undertake delib-
erative and systematic analyses in comparing options. However, 
when making mitigation and adaptation choices, people are also 
likely to engage in intuitive thinking. This kind of thinking has the 
advantage of requiring less extensive analysis than deliberative 
thinking. However, relying on one’s intuition may not lead one to 
characterize problems accurately when there is limited past expe-
rience. Climate change is a policy challenge in this regard since it 
involves large numbers of complex actions by many diverse actors, 
each with their own values, goals, and objectives. Individuals are 
likely to exhibit well-known patterns of intuitive thinking such 
as making choices related to risk and uncertainty on the basis 
of emotional reactions and the use of simplified rules that have 
been acquired by personal experience. Other tendencies include 
misjudging probabilities, focusing on short time horizons, and 
utilizing rules of thumb that selectively attend to subsets of goals 
and objectives. [2.4]
By recognizing that both deliberative and intuitive modes of deci-
sion making are prevalent in the real world, risk management pro-
grammes can be developed that achieve their desired impacts. For 
example, alternative frameworks that do not depend on precise 
specification of probabilities and outcomes can be considered in 





Effective climate policy involves building institutions and 
capacity for governance. While there is strong evidence that a tran-
sition to a sustainable and equitable path is technically feasible, chart-
ing an effective and viable course for climate change mitigation is not 
merely a technical exercise. It will involve myriad and sequential deci-
sions among states and civil society actors. Such a process benefits 
from the education and empowerment of diverse actors to participate 
in systems of decision making that are designed and implemented 
with procedural equity as a deliberate objective. This applies at the 
national as well as international levels, where effective governance 
relating to global common resources, in particular, is not yet mature. 
Any given approach has potential winners and losers. The political 
feasibility of that approach will depend strongly on the distribution of 
power, resources, and decision-making authority among the potential 
winners and losers. In a world characterized by profound disparities, 
procedurally equitable systems of engagement, decision making and 
governance may help enable a polity to come to equitable solutions to 
the sustainable development challenge. [4.3]
Effective risk management of climate change involves consider-
ing uncertainties in possible physical impacts as well as human 
and social responses. Climate change mitigation and adaptation is 
a risk management challenge that involves many different decision-
making levels and policy choices that interact in complex and often 
unpredictable ways. Risks and uncertainties arise in natural, social, and 
technological systems. As Box TS.3 explains, effective risk management 
strategies not only consider people’s values, and their intuitive decision 
processes but utilize formal models and decision aids for systemati-
cally addressing issues of risk and uncertainty [2.4, 2.5]. Research on 
other such complex and uncertainty-laden policy domains suggest the 
importance of adopting policies and measures that are robust across 
a variety of criteria and possible outcomes [2.5]. As detailed in Box 
TS.4, a special challenge arises with the growing evidence that cli-
mate change may result in extreme impacts whose trigger points 
and outcomes are shrouded in high levels of uncertainty [2.5, 3.9.2]. 
A risk management strategy for climate change will require integrat-
ing responses in mitigation with different time horizons, adaptation to 
an array of climate impacts, and even possible emergency responses 
such as ‘geoengineering’ in the face of extreme climate impacts [1.4.2, 
3.3.7, 6.9, 13.4.4]. In the face of potential extreme impacts, the ability 
to quickly offset warming could help limit some of the most extreme 
climate impacts although deploying these geoengineering systems 
could create many other risks (see Section TS.3.1.3). One of the cen-
tral challenges in developing a risk management strategy is to have it 
adaptive to new information and different governing institutions [2.5].
TS.2 Trends in stocks and 
flows of greenhouse 
gases and their drivers
This section summarizes historical GHG emissions trends and their 
underlying drivers. As in most of the underlying literature, all aggre-
gate GHG emissions estimates are converted to CO2-equivalents based 
on Global Warming Potentials with a 100-year time horizon (GWP100) 
(Box TS.5). The majority of changes in GHG emissions trends that are 
observed in this section are related to changes in drivers such as eco-
mulate and implement economic and social policies generally, they are 
critical to the adoption of effective climate policy.
Variations in goals reflect, in part, the fact that humans perceive 
risks and opportunities differently. Individuals make their decisions 
based on different goals and objectives and use a variety of different 
methods in making choices between alternative options. These choices 
and their outcomes affect the ability of different societies to cooperate 
and coordinate. Some groups put greater emphasis on near-term eco-
nomic development and mitigation costs, while others focus more on 
the longer-term ramifications of climate change for prosperity. Some 
are highly risk averse while others are more tolerant of dangers. Some 
have more resources to adapt to climate change and others have 
fewer. Some focus on possible catastrophic events while others ignore 
extreme events as implausible. Some will be relative winners, and 
some relative losers from particular climate changes. Some have more 
political power to articulate their preferences and secure their interests 
and others have less. Since AR4, awareness has grown that such con-
siderations — long the domain of psychology, behavioural economics, 
political economy, and other disciplines — need to be taken into 
account in assessing climate policy (see Box TS.3). In addition to the 
different perceptions of climate change and its risks, a variety of norms 
can also affect what humans view as acceptable behaviour. Awareness 
has grown about how such norms spread through social networks and 
ultimately affect activities, behaviours and lifestyles, and thus develop-
ment pathways, which can have profound impacts on GHG emissions 
and mitigation policy. [1.4.2, 2.4, 3.8, 3.10, 4.3]
Box TS.4 | ‘Fat tails’: unlikely vs. likely outcomes in understanding the value of mitigation
What has become known as the ‘fat-tails’ problem relates to uncer-
tainty in the climate system and its implications for mitigation and 
adaptation policies. By assessing the chain of structural uncertain-
ties that affect the climate system, the resulting compound probabil-
ity distribution of possible economic damage may have a fat right 
tail. That means that the probability of damage does not decline 
with increasing temperature as quickly as the consequences rise.
The significance of fat tails can be illustrated for the distribution 
of temperature that will result from a doubling of atmospheric 
carbon dioxide (CO2) (climate sensitivity). IPCC Working Group 
I (WGI) estimates may be used to calibrate two possible dis-
tributions, one fat-tailed and one thin-tailed, that each have a 
median temperature change of 3 °C and a 15 % probability of a 
temperature change in excess of 4.5 °C. Although the probability 
of exceeding 4.5 °C is the same for both distributions, likelihood 
drops off much more slowly with increasing temperature for the 
fat-tailed compared to the thin-tailed distribution. For example, 
the probability of temperatures in excess of 8 °C is nearly ten 
times greater with the chosen fat-tailed distribution than with 
the thin-tailed distribution. If temperature changes are character-
ized by a fat tailed distribution, and events with large impact may 
occur at higher temperatures, then tail events can dominate the 
computation of expected damages from climate change.
In developing mitigation and adaptation policies, there is value in 
recognizing the higher likelihood of tail events and their con-
sequences. In fact, the nature of the probability distribution of 
temperature change can profoundly change how climate policy 
is framed and structured. Specifically, fatter tails increase the 
importance of tail events (such as 8 °C warming). While research 
attention and much policy discussion have focused on the most 
likely outcomes, it may be that those in the tail of the probability 
distribution are more important to consider. [2.5, 3.9.2]
Box TS.3 | Deliberative and intuitive thinking are inputs to effective risk management
When people — from individual voters to key decision makers in 
firms to senior government policymakers — make choices that 
involve risk and uncertainty, they rely on deliberative as well intui-
tive thought processes. Deliberative thinking is characterized by 
the use of a wide range of formal methods to evaluate alternative 
choices when probabilities are difficult to specify and / or outcomes 
are uncertain. They can enable decision makers to compare choices 
in a systematic manner by taking into account both short and 
long-term consequences. A strength of these methods is that they 
help avoid some of the well-known pitfalls of intuitive thinking, 
such as the tendency of decision makers to favour the status quo. 
A weakness of these deliberative decision aids is that they are 
often highly complex and require considerable time and attention.
Most analytically based literature, including reports such as this 
one, is based on the assumption that individuals undertake delib-
erative and systematic analyses in comparing options. However, 
when making mitigation and adaptation choices, people are also 
likely to engage in intuitive thinking. This kind of thinking has the 
advantage of requiring less extensive analysis than deliberative 
thinking. However, relying on one’s intuition may not lead one to 
characterize problems accurately when there is limited past expe-
rience. Climate change is a policy challenge in this regard since it 
involves large numbers of complex actions by many diverse actors, 
each with their own values, goals, and objectives. Individuals are 
likely to exhibit well-known patterns of intuitive thinking such 
as making choices related to risk and uncertainty on the basis 
of emotional reactions and the use of simplified rules that have 
been acquired by personal experience. Other tendencies include 
misjudging probabilities, focusing on short time horizons, and 
utilizing rules of thumb that selectively attend to subsets of goals 
and objectives. [2.4]
By recognizing that both deliberative and intuitive modes of deci-
sion making are prevalent in the real world, risk management pro-
grammes can be developed that achieve their desired impacts. For 
example, alternative frameworks that do not depend on precise 
specification of probabilities and outcomes can be considered in 





nomic growth, technological change, human behaviour, or population 
growth. But there are also some smaller changes in GHG emissions 
estimates that are due to refinements in measurement concepts and 
methods that have happened since AR4. There is a growing body of 
literature on uncertainties in global GHG emissions data sets. This sec-
tion tries to make these uncertainties explicit and reports variations in 
estimates across global data sets wherever possible.
TS.2.1 Greenhouse gas emission trends
Total anthropogenic GHG emissions have risen more rapidly 
from 2000 to 2010 than in the previous three decades (high 
confidence). Total anthropogenic GHG emissions were the highest in 
human history from 2000 to 2010 and reached 49 (± 4.5) gigatonnes 
CO2-equivalents per year (GtCO2eq / yr) in 2010.3 Current trends are at 
the high end of levels that had been projected for this last decade. 
GHG emissions growth has occurred despite the presence of a wide 
array of multilateral institutions as well as national policies aimed at 
mitigation. From 2000 to 2010, GHG emissions grew on average by 
1.0  GtCO2eq (2.2 %) per year compared to 0.4 GtCO2eq (1.3 %) per 
year over the entire period from 1970 to 2000 (Figure TS.1). The global 
economic crisis 2007 / 2008 has only temporarily reduced GHG emis-
sions. [1.3, 5.2, 13.3, 15.2.2, Figure 15.1]
3 In this summary, uncertainty in historic GHG emissions data is reported using 
90 % uncertainty intervals unless otherwise stated. GHG emissions levels are 
rounded to two significant digits throughout this document; as a consequence, 
small differences in sums due to rounding may occur.
4 FOLU (Forestry and Other Land Use) — also referred to as LULUCF (Land Use, 
Land-Use Change, and Forestry) — is the subset of Agriculture, Forestry, and Other 
Land Use (AFOLU) emissions and removals of GHGs related to direct human-
induced land use, land-use change and forestry activities excluding agricultural 
emissions (see WGIII AR5 Glossary).
5 In this report, data on non-CO2 GHGs, including fluorinated gases, are taken from 
the EDGAR database (see Annex II.9), which covers substances included in the 
Kyoto Protocol in its first commitment period.
Figure TS.1 | Total annual anthropogenic GHG emissions (GtCO2eq / yr) by groups of gases 1970 – 2010: carbon dioxide (CO2) from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes; 
CO2 from Forestry and Other Land Use4 (FOLU); methane (CH4); nitrous oxide (N2O); fluorinated gases5 covered under the Kyoto Protocol (F-gases). At the right side of the figure, 
GHG emissions in 2010 are shown again broken down into these components with the associated uncertainties (90 % confidence interval) indicated by the error bars. Total anthro-
pogenic GHG emissions uncertainties are derived from the individual gas estimates as described in Chapter 5 [5.2.3.6]. Emissions are converted into CO2-equivalents based on 
Global Warming Potentials with a 100-year time horizon (GWP100) from the IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR). The emissions data from FOLU represents land-based CO2 emis-
sions from forest and peat fires and decay that approximate to the net CO2 flux from FOLU as described in Chapter 11 of this report. Average annual GHG emissions growth rates 










































































Figure TS.2 | Historical anthropogenic CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion, flaring, cement, and Forestry and Other Land Use (FOLU)4 in five major world regions: OECD-
1990 (blue); Economies in Transition (yellow); Asia (green); Latin America and Caribbean (red); Middle East and Africa (brown). Emissions are reported in gigatonnes of CO2 per 
year (Gt CO2/ yr). Left panels show regional CO2 emissions 1750 – 2010 from: (a) the sum of all CO2 sources (c+e); (c) fossil fuel combustion, flaring, and cement; and (e) FOLU. 
The right panels report regional contributions to cumulative CO2 emissions over selected time periods from: (b) the sum of all CO2 sources (d+f); (d) fossil fuel combustion, flaring 
and cement; and (f) FOLU. Error bars on panels (b), (d) and (f) give an indication of the uncertainty range (90 % confidence interval). See Annex II.2.2 for definitions of regions. 
[Figure 5.3]
Total Anthropogenic CO2 Emissions from Fossil Fuel Combustion, Flaring, Cement, as well as Forestry and Other Land Use (FOLU) 
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Figure TS.3 | Total anthropogenic GHG emissions (GtCO2 eq/yr) by economic sectors and country income groups. Upper panel: Circle shows direct GHG emission shares (in % of 
total anthropogenic GHG emissions) of five major economic sectors in 2010. Pull-out shows how indirect CO2 emission shares (in % of total anthropogenic GHG emissions) from 
electricity and heat production are attributed to sectors of final energy use. ‘Other Energy’ refers to all GHG emission sources in the energy sector other than electricity and heat 
production. Lower panel: Total anthropogenic GHG emissions in 1970, 1990 and 2010 by five major economic sectors and country income groups. ‘Bunkers’ refer to GHG emissions 
from international transportation and thus are not, under current accounting systems, allocated to any particular nation’s territory. The emissions data from Agriculture, Forestry and 
Other Land Use (AFOLU) includes land-based CO2 emissions from forest and peat fires and decay that approximate to the net CO2 flux from the Forestry and Other Land Use (FOLU) 
sub-sector as described in Chapter 11 of this report. Emissions are converted into CO2-equivalents based on Global Warming Potentials with a 100-year time horizon (GWP100) from 
the IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR). Assignment of countries to income groups is based on the World Bank income classification in 2013. For details see Annex II.2.3. Sector 
definitions are provided in Annex II.9.1. [Figure 1.3, Figure 1.6]
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CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and industrial pro-
cesses contributed about 78 % to the total GHG emissions 
increase from 1970 to 2010, with similar percentage contribu-
tion for the period 2000 – 2010 (high confidence). Fossil fuel-related 
CO2 emissions reached 32 (± 2.7) GtCO2 / yr in 2010 and grew further 
by about 3 % between 2010 and 2011 and by about 1 – 2 % between 
2011 and 2012. Since AR4, the shares of the major groups of GHG 
emissions have remained stable. Of the 49 (± 4.5) GtCO2eq / yr in total 
anthropogenic GHG emissions in 2010, CO2 remains the major GHG 
accounting for 76 % (38± 3.8 GtCO2eq / yr) of total anthropogenic GHG 
emissions. 16 % (7.8± 1.6 GtCO2eq / yr) come from methane (CH4), 
6.2 % (3.1± 1.9 GtCO2eq / yr) from nitrous oxide (N2O), and 2.0 % 
(1.0± 0.2 GtCO2eq / yr) from fluorinated gases (Figure TS.1).5 Using the 
most recent GWP100 values from the AR5 [WGI 8.7] global GHG emis-
sions totals would be slightly higher (52 GtCO2eq / yr) and non-CO2 
emission shares would be 20 % for CH4, 5.0 % for N2O and 2.2 % for 
F-gases. Emission shares are sensitive to the choice of emission metric 
and time horizon, but this has a small influence on global, long-term 
trends. If a shorter, 20-year time horizon were used, then the share 
of CO2 would decline to just over 50 % of total anthropogenic GHG 
emissions and short-lived gases would rise in relative importance. As 
detailed in Box TS.5, the choice of emission metric and time horizon 
involves explicit or implicit value judgements and depends on the pur-
pose of the analysis. [1.2, 3.9, 5.2]
Over the last four decades total cumulative CO2 emissions have 
increased by a factor of 2 from about 910 GtCO2 for the period 
1750 – 1970 to about 2000 GtCO2 for 1750 – 2010 (high confi-
dence). In 1970, the cumulative CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combus-
tion, cement production and flaring since 1750 was 420 (± 35) GtCO2; 
in 2010 that cumulative total had tripled to 1300 (± 110) GtCO2 (Fig-
ure TS.2). Cumulative CO2 emissions associated with FOLU4 since 1750 
increased from about 490 (± 180) GtCO2 in 1970 to approximately 680 
(± 300) GtCO2 in 2010. [5.2]
Regional patterns of GHG emissions are shifting along with 
changes in the world economy (high confidence). Since 2000, 
GHG emissions have been growing in all sectors, except Agriculture, 
Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU)4 where positive and negative 
emission changes are reported across different databases and uncer-
tainties in the data are high. More than 75 % of the 10 Gt increase in 
annual GHG emissions between 2000 and 2010 was emitted in the 
energy supply (47 %) and industry (30 %) sectors (see Annex II.9.I 
for sector definitions). 5.9 GtCO2eq of this sectoral increase occurred 
in upper-middle income countries,6 where the most rapid economic 
development and infrastructure expansion has taken place. GHG 
emissions growth in the other sectors has been more modest in abso-
lute (0.3 – 1.1 Gt CO2eq) as well as in relative terms (3 % – 11 %). [1.3, 
5.3, Figure 5.18]
6 When countries are assigned to income groups in this summary, the World Bank 
income classification for 2013 is used. For details see Annex II.2.3.
Figure TS.4 | Trends in GHG emissions by country income groups. Left panel: Total annual anthropogenic GHG emissions from 1970 to 2010 (GtCO2eq / yr). Middle panel: Trends in 
annual per capita mean and median GHG emissions from 1970 to 2010 (tCO2eq / cap/ yr). Right panel: Distribution of annual per capita GHG emissions in 2010 of countries within 
each country income group (tCO2 / cap/ yr). Mean values show the GHG emissions levels weighed by population. Median values describe GHG emissions levels per capita of the 
country at the 50th percentile of the distribution within each country income group. Emissions are converted into CO2-equivalents based on Global Warming Potentials with a 100-
year time horizon (GWP100) from the IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR). Assignment of countries to country income groups is based on the World Bank income classification in 












































































































Current GHG emission levels are dominated by contributions 
from the energy supply, AFOLU, and industry sectors; indus-
try and buildings gain considerably in importance if indirect 
emissions are accounted for (robust evidence, high agreement). 
Of the 49 (± 4.5) GtCO2eq emissions in 2010, 35 % (17 GtCO2eq) 
of GHG emissions were released in the energy supply sector, 24 % 
(12 GtCO2eq, net emissions) in AFOLU, 21 % (10 GtCO2eq) in indus-
try, 14 % (7.0 GtCO2eq) in transport, and 6.4 % (3.2 GtCO2eq) in 
buildings. When indirect emissions from electricity and heat produc-
tion are assigned to sectors of final energy use, the shares of the 
industry and buildings sectors in global GHG emissions grow to 31 % 
and 19 %,3 respectively (Figure TS.3 upper panel). [1.3, 7.3, 8.2, 9.2, 
10.3, 11.2]
Per capita GHG emissions in 2010 are highly unequal (high confi-
dence). In 2010, median per capita GHG emissions (1.4 tCO2eq / cap / yr) 
for the group of low-income countries are around nine times lower 
than median per capita GHG emissions (13 tCO2eq / cap / yr) of high-
income countries (Figure TS.4).6 For low-income countries, the largest 
part of GHG emissions comes from AFOLU; for high-income countries, 
GHG emissions are dominated by sources related to energy supply and 
industry (Figure TS.3 lower panel). There are substantial variations in 
per capita GHG emissions within country income groups with emis-
sions at the 90th percentile level more than double those at the 10th 
percentile level. Median per capita emissions better represent the 
typical country within a country income group comprised of heteroge-
neous members than mean per capita emissions. Mean per capita GHG 
emissions are different from median mainly in low-income countries 
as individual low-income countries have high per capita emissions due 
to large CO2 emissions from land-use change (Figure TS.4, right panel). 
[1.3, 5.2, 5.3] 
A growing share of total anthropogenic CO2 emissions is 
released in the manufacture of products that are traded across 
international borders (medium evidence, high agreement). Since 
AR4, several data sets have quantified the difference between tradi-
tional ‘territorial’ and ‘consumption-based’ emission estimates that 
assign all emission released in the global production of goods and 
services to the country of final consumption (Figure TS.5). A growing 
share of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion in middle income 
countries is released in the production of goods and services exported, 
notably from upper middle income countries to high income countries. 
Total annual industrial CO2 emissions from the non-Annex I group now 
exceed those of the Annex I group using territorial and consumption-
based accounting methods, but per-capita emissions are still markedly 
higher in the Annex I group. [1.3, 5.3]
Regardless of the perspective taken, the largest share of 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions is emitted by a small number 
of countries (high confidence). In 2010, 10 countries accounted for 
about 70 % of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and industrial 
processes. A similarly small number of countries emit the largest share 
of consumption-based CO2 emissions as well as cumulative CO2 emis-
sions going back to 1750. [1.3]
The upward trend in global fossil fuel related CO2 emissions is 
robust across databases and despite uncertainties (high confi-
dence). Global CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion are known 
within 8 % uncertainty. CO2 emissions related to FOLU have very large 
uncertainties attached in the order of 50 %. Uncertainty for global 
emissions of methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and the fluorinated 
gases has been estimated as 20 %, 60 %, and 20 %. Combining these 
values yields an illustrative total global GHG uncertainty estimate 
of about 10 % (Figure TS.1). Uncertainties can increase at finer spa-
tial scales and for specific sectors. Attributing GHG emissions to the 
country of final consumption increases uncertainties, but literature on 
this topic is just emerging. GHG emissions estimates in the AR4 were 
5 – 10 % higher than the estimates reported here, but lie within the 
estimated uncertainty range.3 [5.2]
Figure TS.5 | Total annual CO2 emissions (GtCO2 / yr) from fossil fuel combustion for 
country income groups attributed on the basis of territory (solid line) and final con-
sumption (dotted line). The shaded areas are the net CO2 trade balances (differences) 
between each of the four country income groups and the rest of the world. Blue shading 
indicates that the country income group is a net importer of embodied CO2 emissions, 
leading to consumption-based emission estimates that are higher than traditional ter-
ritorial emission estimates. Orange indicates the reverse situation — the country income 
group is a net exporter of embodied CO2 emissions. Assignment of countries to country 
income groups is based on the World Bank income classification in 2013. For details see 
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TS.2.2 Greenhouse gas emission drivers
This section examines the factors that have, historically, been associated 
with changes in GHG emissions levels. Typically, such analysis is based 
on a decomposition of total GHG emissions into various components 
such as growth in the economy (Gross Domestic Product (GDP) / capita), 
growth in the population (capita), the energy intensity needed per unit of 
economic output (energy / GDP) and the GHG emissions intensity of that 
energy (GHGs / energy). As a practical matter, due to data limitations and 
the fact that most GHG emissions take the form of CO2 from industry and 
energy, almost all this research focuses on CO2 from those sectors.
Globally, economic and population growth continue to be the 
most important drivers of increases in CO2 emissions from 
fossil fuel combustion. The contribution of population growth 
between 2000 and 2010 remained roughly identical to the 
previous three decades, while the contribution of economic 
growth has risen sharply (high confidence). Worldwide popula-
tion increased by 86 % between 1970 and 2010, from 3.7 to 6.9 
billion. Over the same period, income as measured through pro-
duction and/ or consumption per capita has grown by a factor of 
about two. The exact measurement of global economic growth is 
difficult because countries use different currencies and converting 
Box TS.5 | Emissions metrics depend on value judgements and contain wide uncertainties
Emission metrics provide ‘exchange rates’ for measuring 
the contributions of different GHGs to climate change. Such 
exchange rates serve a variety of purposes, including apportion-
ing mitigation efforts among several gases and aggregating 
emissions of a variety of GHGs. However, there is no metric that 
is both conceptually correct and practical to implement. Because 
of this, the choice of the appropriate metric depends on the 
application or policy at issue. [3.9.6]
GHGs differ in their physical characteristics. For example, per 
unit mass in the atmosphere, methane (CH4) causes a stronger 
instantaneous radiative forcing than CO2, but it remains in the 
atmosphere for a much shorter time. Thus, the time profiles of 
climate change brought about by different GHGs are different and 
consequential. Determining how emissions of different GHGs are 
compared for mitigation purposes involves comparing the result-
ing temporal profiles of climate change from each gas and making 
value judgments about the relative significance to humans of 
these profiles, which is a process fraught with uncertainty. [3.9.6; 
WGI 8.7]
A commonly used metric is the Global Warming Potential (GWP). 
It is defined as the accumulated radiative forcing within a specific 
time horizon (e. g., 100 years — GWP100), caused by emitting one 
kilogram of the gas, relative to that of the reference gas CO2. This 
metric is used to transform the effects of different GHG emissions 
to a common scale (CO2-equivalents).1 One strength of the GWP is 
1 In this summary, all quantities of GHG emissions are expressed in CO2-equiva-
lent (CO2eq) emissions that are calculated based on GWP100. Unless otherwise 
stated, GWP values for different gases are taken from IPCC Second Assess-
ment Report (SAR). Although GWP values have been updated several times 
since, the SAR values are widely used in policy settings, including the Kyoto 
Protocol, as well as in many national and international emission accounting 
systems. Modelling studies show that the changes in GWP100 values from 
SAR to AR4 have little impact on the optimal mitigation strategy at the global 
level. [6.3.2.5, Annex II.9.1]
that it can be calculated in a relatively transparent and straight-
forward manner. However, there are also limitations, including the 
requirement to use a specific time horizon, the focus on cumula-
tive forcing, and the insensitivity of the metric to the temporal 
profile of climate effects and its significance to humans. The choice 
of time horizon is particularly important for short-lived gases, 
notably methane: when computed with a shorter time horizon for 
GWP, their share in calculated total warming effect is larger and 
the mitigation strategy might change as a consequence. [1.2.5]
Many alternative metrics have been proposed in the scientific 
literature. All of them have advantages and disadvantages, and 
the choice of metric can make a large difference for the weights 
given to emissions from particular gases. For instance, methane’s 
GWP100 is 28 while its Global Temperature Change Potential 
(GTP), one alternative metric, is 4 for the same time horizon (AR5 
values, see WGI Section 8.7). In terms of aggregate mitigation 
costs alone, GWP100 may perform similarly to other metrics (such 
as the time-dependent Global Temperature Change Potential or 
the Global Cost Potential) of reaching a prescribed climate target; 
however, there may be significant differences in terms of the 
implied distribution of costs across sectors, regions, and over time. 
[3.9.6, 6.3.2.5]
An alternative to a single metric for all gases is to adopt a ‘multi-
basket’ approach in which gases are grouped according to their 
contributions to short and long term climate change. This may 
solve some problems associated with using a single metric, but 
the question remains of what relative importance to attach to 




individual national economic figures into global totals can be done 
in various ways. With rising population and economic output, emis-
sions of CO2 from fossil fuel combustion have risen as well. Over 
the last decade, the importance of economic growth as a driver of 
global CO2 emissions has risen sharply while population growth has 
remained roughly steady. Due to changes in technology, changes 
in the economic structure and the mix of energy sources as well 
as changes in other inputs such as capital and labour, the energy 
intensity of economic output has steadily declined worldwide. This 
decline has had an offsetting effect on global CO2 emissions that 
is nearly of the same magnitude as growth in population (Figure 
TS.6). There are only a few countries that combine economic growth 
and decreasing territorial CO2 emissions over longer periods of time. 
Such decoupling remains largely atypical, especially when consider-
ing consumption-based CO2 emissions. [1.3, 5.3]
Between 2000 and 2010, increased use of coal relative to other 
energy sources has reversed a long-standing pattern of gradual 
decarbonization of the world’s energy supply (high confidence). 
Increased use of coal, especially in developing Asia, is exacerbating 
the burden of energy-related GHG emissions (Figure TS.6). Estimates 
Box TS.6 | The use of scenarios in this report
Scenarios of how the future might evolve capture key factors of 
human development that influence GHG emissions and our ability 
to respond to climate change. Scenarios cover a range of plausible 
futures, because human development is determined by a myriad 
of factors including human decision making. Scenarios can be 
used to integrate knowledge about the drivers of GHG emissions, 
mitigation options, climate change, and climate impacts. 
One important element of scenarios is the projection of the level 
of human interference with the climate system. To this end, a set 
of four ‘representative concentration pathways’ (RCPs) has been 
developed. These RCPs reach radiative forcing levels of 2.6, 4.5, 
6.0, and 8.5 Watts per square meter (W / m2) (corresponding to 
concentrations of 450, 650, 850, and 1370 ppm CO2eq), respec-
tively, in 2100, covering the range of anthropogenic climate forc-
ing in the 21st century as reported in the literature. The four RCPs 
are the basis of a new set of climate change projections that have 
been assessed by WGI AR5. [WGI 6.4, WGI 12.4]
Scenarios of how the future develops without additional and 
explicit efforts to mitigate climate change (‘baseline scenarios’) 
and with the introduction of efforts to limit GHG emissions (‘miti-
gation scenarios’), respectively, generally include socio-economic 
projections in addition to emission, concentration, and climate 
change information. WGIII AR5 has assessed the full breadth of 
baseline and mitigation scenarios in the literature. To this end, it 
has collected a database of more than 1200 published mitigation 
and baseline scenarios. In most cases, the underlying socio-eco-
nomic projections reflect the modelling teams’ individual choices 
about how to conceptualize the future in the absence of climate 
policy. The baseline scenarios show a wide range of assump-
tions about economic growth (ranging from threefold to more 
than eightfold growth in per capita income by 2100), demand for 
energy (ranging from a 40 % to more than 80 % decline in energy 
intensity by 2100) and other factors, in particular the carbon 
intensity of energy. Assumptions about population are an excep-
tion: the vast majority of scenarios focus on the low to medium 
population range of nine to 10 billion people by 2100. Although 
the range of emissions pathways across baseline scenarios in the 
literature is broad, it may not represent the full potential range of 
possibilities (Figure TS.7). [6.3.1]
The concentration outcomes of the baseline and mitigation 
scenarios assessed by WGIII AR5 cover the full range of RCPs. 
However, they provide much more detail at the lower end, with 
many scenarios aiming at concentration levels in the range of 450, 
500, and 550 ppm CO2eq in 2100. The climate change projections 
of WGI based on RCPs, and the mitigation scenarios assessed 
by WGIII AR5 can be related to each other through the climate 
outcomes they imply. [6.2.1]
Figure TS.6 | Decomposition of the change in total annual CO2 emissions from fos-
sil fuel combustion by decade and four driving factors: population, income (GDP) per 
capita, energy intensity of GDP and carbon intensity of energy. Total emissions changes 
are indicated by a triangle. The change in emissions over each decade is measured in 
gigatonnes of CO2 per year (GtCO2/yr); income is converted into common units using 
purchasing power parities. [Figure 1.7]
















































indicate that coal and unconventional gas and oil resources are large; 
therefore reducing the carbon intensity of energy may not be primar-
ily driven by fossil resource scarcity, but rather by other driving forces 
such as changes in technology, values, and socio-political choices. [5.3, 
7.2, 7.3, 7.4; SRREN Figure 1.7]
Technological innovations, infrastructural choices, and behav-
iour affect GHG emissions through productivity growth, energy- 
and carbon-intensity and consumption patterns (medium con-
fidence). Technological innovation improves labour and resource 
productivity; it can support economic growth both with increasing 
and with decreasing GHG emissions. The direction and speed of tech-
nological change depends on policies.  Technology is also central to 
the choices of infrastructure and spatial organization, such as in cit-
ies, which can have long-lasting effects on GHG emissions. In addi-
tion, a wide array of attitudes, values, and norms can inform different 
lifestyles, consumption preferences, and technological choices  all of 
which, in turn, affect patterns of GHG emissions. [5.3, 5.5, 5.6, 12.3]
Without additional efforts to reduce GHG emissions beyond 
those in place today, emissions growth is expected to persist, 
driven by growth in global population and economic activities 
despite improvements in energy supply and end-use technolo-
gies (high confidence). Atmospheric concentrations in baseline sce-
narios collected for this assessment (scenarios without explicit addi-
tional efforts to reduce GHG emissions) exceed 450 parts per million 
Figure TS.7 | Global baseline projection ranges for four emissions driving factors. Scenarios harmonized with respect to a particular factor are depicted with individual lines. Other 
scenarios are depicted as a range with median emboldened; shading reflects interquartile range (darkest), 5th – 95th percentile range (lighter), and full range (lightest), excluding 
one indicated outlier in panel a). Scenarios are filtered by model and study for each indicator to include only unique projections. Model projections and historic data are normalized 
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(ppm) CO2eq by 2030.7 They reach CO2eq concentration levels from 
750 to more than 1300 ppm CO2eq by 2100 and result in projected 
global mean surface temperature increases in 2100 from 3.7 to 4.8 °C 
compared to pre-industrial levels8 (range based on median climate 
response; the range is 2.5 °C to 7.8 °C when including climate uncer-
tainty, see Table TS.1).9 The range of 2100 concentrations corresponds 
roughly to the range of CO2eq concentrations in the Representative 
Concentration Pathways (RCP) 6.0 and RCP8.5 pathways (see Box 
TS.6), with the majority of scenarios falling below the latter. For com-
parison, the CO2eq concentration in 2011 has been estimated to be 
430 ppm (uncertainty range 340 – 520 ppm).10 The literature does not 
systematically explore the full range of uncertainty surrounding devel-
opment pathways and possible evolution of key drivers such as popu-
lation, technology, and resources. Nonetheless, the scenarios strongly 
suggest that absent any explicit mitigation efforts, cumulative CO2 
emissions since 2010 will exceed 700 GtCO2 by 2030, 1,500 GtCO2 by 
2050, and potentially well over 4,000 GtCO2 by 2100. [6.3.1; WGI Fig-
ure SPM.5, WGI 8.5, WGI 12.3]
TS.3 Mitigation pathways and 
measures in the context of 
sustainable development
This section assesses the literature on mitigation pathways and mea-
sures in the context of sustainable development. Section TS 3.1 first 
examines the anthropogenic GHG emissions trajectories and potential 
temperature implications of mitigation pathways leading to a range 
of future atmospheric CO2eq concentrations. It then explores the tech-
nological, economic, and institutional requirements of these pathways 
along with their potential co-benefits and adverse side-effects. Section 
TS 3.2 examines mitigation options by sector and how they may inter-
act across sectors.
7 These CO2eq concentrations represent full radiative forcing, including GHGs, 
halogenated gases, tropospheric ozone, aerosols, mineral dust and albedo change.
8 Based on the longest global surface temperature dataset available, the observed 
change between the average of the period 1850 – 1900 and of the AR5 reference 
period (1986 – 2005) is 0.61 °C (5 – 95 % confidence interval: 0.55 to 0.67 °C) 
[WGI SPM.E], which is used here as an approximation of the change in global 
mean surface temperature since pre-industrial times, referred to as the period 
before 1750.
9 Provided estimates reflect the 10th to the 90th percentile of baseline scenarios 
collected for this assessment. The climate uncertainty reflects the 5th to 95th 
percentile of climate model calculations described in Table TS.1 for each scenario.
10 This is based on the assessment of total anthropogenic radiative forcing for 2011 
relative to 1750 in WGI AR5, i. e., 2.3 W m– 2, uncertainty range 1.1 to 3.3 W m– 2. 
[WGI Figure SPM.5, WGI 8.5, WGI 12.3]
TS.3.1 Mitigation pathways
TS.3.1.1 Understanding mitigation pathways in the 
context of multiple objectives
The world’s societies will need to both mitigate and adapt to cli-
mate change if it is to effectively avoid harmful climate impacts 
(robust evidence, high agreement). There are demonstrated examples 
of synergies between mitigation and adaptation [11.5.4, 12.8.1] in 
which the two strategies are complementary. More generally, the two 
strategies are related because increasing levels of mitigation imply less 
future need for adaptation. Although major efforts are now underway 
to incorporate impacts and adaptation into mitigation scenarios, inher-
ent difficulties associated with quantifying their interdependencies 
have limited their representation in models used to generate mitiga-
tion scenarios assessed in WGIII AR5 (Box TS.7). [2.6.3, 3.7.2.1, 6.3.3]
There is no single pathway to stabilize CO2eq concentrations at 
any level; instead, the literature points to a wide range of mitiga-
tion pathways that might meet any concentration level (high confi-
dence). Choices, whether deliberated or not, will determine which of these 
pathways is followed. These choices include, among other things, the 
emissions pathway to bring atmospheric CO2eq concentrations to a par-
ticular level, the degree to which concentrations temporarily exceed (over-
shoot) the long-term level, the technologies that are deployed to reduce 
emissions, the degree to which mitigation is coordinated across countries, 
the policy approaches used to achieve mitigation within and across coun-
tries, the treatment of land use, and the manner in which mitigation is 
meshed with other policy objectives such as sustainable development. 
A society’s development pathway — with its particular socioeconomic, 
institutional, political, cultural and technological features — enables and 
constrains the prospects for mitigation. At the national level, change is 
considered most effective when it reflects country and local visions and 
approaches to achieving sustainable development according to national 
circumstances and priorities. [4.2, 6.3 – 6.8, 11.8] 
Mitigation pathways can be distinguished from one another by 
a range of outcomes or requirements (high confidence). Decisions 
about mitigation pathways can be made by weighing the requirements 
of different pathways against each other. Although measures of aggre-
gate economic costs and benefits have often been put forward as key 
decision-making factors, they are far from the only outcomes that mat-
ter. Mitigation pathways inherently involve a range of synergies and 
tradeoffs connected with other policy objectives such as energy and 
food security, energy access, the distribution of economic impacts, 
local air quality, other environmental factors associated with different 
technological solutions, and economic competitiveness (Box TS.11). 
Many of these fall under the umbrella of sustainable development. 
In addition, requirements such as the rates of up-scaling of energy 
technologies or the rates of reductions in GHG emissions may provide 
important insights into the degree of challenge associated with meet-




TS.3.1.2 Short- and long-term requirements of mitigation 
pathways
Mitigation scenarios point to a range of technological and 
behavioral measures that could allow the world’s societies to 
follow GHG emissions pathways consistent with a range of dif-
ferent levels of mitigation (high confidence). As part of this assess-
ment, about 900 mitigation and 300 baseline scenarios have been 
collected from integrated modelling research groups around the world 
(Box TS.7). The mitigation scenarios span atmospheric concentration 
levels in 2100 from 430 ppm CO2eq to above 720 ppm CO2eq, which 
is roughly comparable to the 2100 forcing levels between the RCP2.6 
and RCP6.0 scenarios (Figure TS.8, left panel). Scenarios have been 
constructed to reach mitigation goals under very different assump-
tions about energy demands, international cooperation, technologies, 
the contributions of CO2 and other forcing agents to atmospheric 
CO2eq concentrations, and the degree to which concentrations tem-
porarily exceed the long-term goal (concentration overshoot, see Box 
TS.8). Other scenarios were also assessed, including some scenarios 
with concentrations in 2100 below 430 ppm CO2eq (for a discussion of 
these scenarios see below). [6.3]
Limiting atmospheric peak concentrations over the course of 
the century — not only reaching long-term concentration lev-
els — is critical for limiting transient temperature change (high 
confidence). Scenarios reaching concentration levels of about 500 ppm 
CO2eq by 2100 are more likely than not to limit temperature change 
to less than 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels, unless they temporar-
ily ‘overshoot’ concentration levels of roughly 530 ppm CO2eq before 
2100. In this case, they are about as likely as not to achieve that goal. 
The majority of scenarios reaching long-term concentrations of about 
450 ppm CO2eq in 2100 are likely to keep temperature change below 
2 °C over the course of the century relative to pre-industrial levels 
(Table TS.1, Box TS.8). Scenarios that reach 530 to 650 ppm CO2eq 
concentrations by 2100 are more unlikely than likely to keep tempera-
ture change below 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels. Scenarios that 
exceed about 650 ppm CO2eq by 2100 are unlikely to limit tempera-
ture change to below 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels. Mitigation 
Box TS.7 | Scenarios from integrated models can help to understand how actions affect outcomes 
in complex systems
The long-term scenarios assessed in this report were generated 
primarily by large-scale computer models, referred to here as 
‘integrated models’, because they attempt to represent many of 
the most important interactions among technologies, relevant 
human systems (e. g., energy, agriculture, the economic system), 
and associated GHG emissions in a single integrated framework. 
A subset of these models is referred to as ‘integrated assessment 
models’, or IAMs. IAMs include not only an integrated representa-
tion of human systems, but also of important physical processes 
associated with climate change, such as the carbon cycle, and 
sometimes representations of impacts from climate change. Some 
IAMs have the capability of endogenously balancing impacts 
with mitigation costs, though these models tend to be highly 
aggregated. Although aggregate models with representations 
of mitigation and damage costs can be very useful, the focus in 
this assessment is on integrated models with sufficient sectoral 
and geographic resolution to understand the evolution of key 
processes such as energy systems or land systems.
Scenarios from integrated models are invaluable to help under-
stand how possible actions or choices might lead to different 
future outcomes in these complex systems. They provide quan-
titative, long-term projections (conditional on our current state 
of knowledge) of many of the most important characteristics 
of mitigation pathways while accounting for many of the most 
important interactions between the various relevant human and 
natural systems. For example, they provide both regional and 
global information about emissions pathways, energy and land-
use transitions, and aggregate economic costs of mitigation.
At the same time, these integrated models have particular 
characteristics and limitations that should be considered when 
interpreting their results. Many integrated models are based 
on the rational choice paradigm for decision making, exclud-
ing the consideration of some behavioural factors. The models 
approximate cost-effective solutions that minimize the aggregate 
economic costs of achieving mitigation outcomes, unless they 
are specifically constrained to behave otherwise. Scenarios from 
these models capture only some of the dimensions of develop-
ment pathways that are relevant to mitigation options, often only 
minimally treating issues such as distributional impacts of mitiga-
tion actions and consistency with broader development goals. In 
addition, the models in this assessment do not effectively account 
for the interactions between mitigation, adaptation, and climate 
impacts. For these reasons, mitigation has been assessed indepen-
dently from climate impacts. Finally, and most fundamentally, inte-
grated models are simplified, stylized, numerical approaches for 
representing enormously complex physical and social systems, and 
scenarios from these models are based on uncertain projections 
about key events and drivers over often century-long timescales. 
Simplifications and differences in assumptions are the reason why 
output generated from different models — or versions of the same 
model — can differ, and projections from all models can differ 




scenarios in which temperature increase is more likely than not to be 
less than 1.5 °C relative to pre-industrial levels by 2100 are character-
ized by concentrations in 2100 of below 430 ppm CO2eq. Temperature 
peaks during the century and then declines in these scenarios. [6.3]
Mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 ppm CO2eq in 2100 
typically involve temporary overshoot of atmospheric concen-
trations, as do many scenarios reaching about 500 ppm or about 
550 ppm CO2eq in 2100 (high confidence). Concentration overshoot 
means that concentrations peak during the century before descend-
ing toward their 2100 levels. Overshoot involves less mitigation in the 
near term, but it also involves more rapid and deeper emissions reduc-
tions in the long run. The vast majority of scenarios reaching about 
450 ppm CO2eq in 2100 involve concentration overshoot, since most 
models cannot reach the immediate, near-term emissions reductions 
that would be necessary to avoid overshoot of these concentration 
levels. Many scenarios have been constructed to reach about 550 ppm 
CO2eq by 2100 without overshoot. 
Depending on the level of overshoot, many overshoot sce-
narios rely on the availability and widespread deployment of 
bioenergy with carbon dioxide capture and storage (BECCS) 
and / or afforestation in the second half of the century (high con-
fidence). These and other carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies 
and methods remove CO2 from the atmosphere (negative emissions). 
Scenarios with overshoot of greater than 0.4 W / m2 (>  35 – 50 ppm 
CO2eq concentration) typically deploy CDR technologies to an extent 
that net global CO2 emissions become negative in the second-half of 
the century (Figure TS.8, right panel). CDR is also prevalent in many 
scenarios without concentration overshoot to compensate for residual 
emissions from sectors where mitigation is more expensive. The avail-
ability and potential of BECCS, afforestation, and other CDR technolo-
gies and methods are uncertain and CDR technologies and methods 
are, to varying degrees, associated with challenges and risks. There is 
uncertainty about the potential for large-scale deployment of BECCS, 
large-scale afforestation, and other CDR technologies and methods. 
[6.3, 6.9]
Reaching atmospheric concentration levels of about 450 to about 
500 ppm CO2eq by 2100 will require substantial cuts in anthro-
pogenic GHG emissions by mid-century (high confidence). Scenarios 
reaching about 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100 are associated with GHG emis-
sions reductions of about 40 % to 70 % by 2050 compared to 2010 and 
emissions levels near zero GtCO2eq or below in 2100.11 Scenarios with 
GHG emissions reductions in 2050 at the lower end of this range are 
characterized by a greater reliance on CDR technologies beyond mid-
century. The majority of scenarios that reach about 500 ppm CO2eq in 
2100 without overshooting roughly 530 ppm CO2eq at any point during 
the century are associated with GHG emissions reductions of 40 % to 
55 % by 2050 compared to 2010 (Figure TS.8, left panel; Table TS.1). In 
contrast, in some scenarios in which concentrations rise to well above 
530 ppm CO2eq during the century before descending to concentrations 
below this level by 2100, emissions rise to as high as 20 % above 2010 
levels in 2050. However, these high-overshoot scenarios are character-
ized by negative global emissions of well over 20 GtCO2 per year in the 
second half of the century (Figure TS.8, right panel). Cumulative CO2 
11 This range differs from the range provided for a similar concentration category in 
AR4 (50 % to 85 % lower than 2000 for CO2 only). Reasons for this difference 
include that this report has assessed a substantially larger number of scenarios 
than in AR4 and looks at all GHGs. In addition, a large proportion of the new 
scenarios include Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) technologies and associated 
increases in concentration overshoot. Other factors include the use of 2100 con-
centration levels instead of stabilization levels and the shift in reference year from 
2000 to 2010.
Figure TS.8 | Development of total GHG emissions for different long-term concentration levels (left panel) and for scenarios reaching about 450 to about 500 (430 – 530) ppm 
CO2eq in 2100 with and without net negative CO2 emissions larger than 20 GtCO2 / yr (right panel). Ranges are given for the 10th – 90th percentile of scenarios. [Figure 6.7]
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emissions between 2011 and 2100 are 630 – 1180 GtCO2 in scenarios 
reaching about 450 ppm CO2eq in 2100; they are 960 – 1550 GtCO2 in 
scenarios reaching about 500 ppm CO2eq in 2100. The variation in cumu-
lative CO2 emissions across scenarios is due to differences in the contri-
bution of non-CO2 GHGs and other radiatively active substances as well 
as the timing of mitigation (Table TS.1). [6.3]
In order to reach atmospheric concentration levels of about 450 
to about 500 ppm CO2eq by 2100, the majority of mitigation 
relative to baseline emissions over the course of century will 
occur in the non-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries (high confidence). In scenarios that 
attempt to cost-effectively allocate emissions reductions across coun-
tries and over time, the total CO2eq emissions reductions from baseline 
emissions in non-OECD countries are greater than in OECD countries. 
This is, in large part, because baseline emissions from the non-OECD 
countries are projected to be larger than those from the OECD coun-
tries, but it also derives from higher carbon intensities in non-OECD 
countries and different terms of trade structures. In these scenarios, 
GHG emissions peak earlier in the OECD countries than in the non-
OECD countries. [6.3]
Reaching atmospheric concentration levels of about 450 to 
about 650 ppm CO2eq by 2100 will require large-scale changes 
to global and national energy systems over the coming decades 
(high confidence). Scenarios reaching atmospheric concentrations lev-
els of about 450 to about 500 ppm CO2eq by 2100 are characterized by 
a tripling to nearly a quadrupling of the global share of zero- and low-
carbon energy supply from renewables, nuclear energy, fossil energy 
with carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS), and bioenergy with 
CCS (BECCS), by the year 2050 relative to 2010 (about 17 %) (Figure 
TS.10, left panel). The increase in total global low-carbon energy sup-
Box TS.8 | Assessment of temperature change in the context of mitigation scenarios
Long-term climate goals have been expressed both in terms of 
concentrations and temperature. Article 2 of the UNFCCC calls 
for the need to ‘stabilize’ concentrations of GHGs. Stabilization of 
concentrations is generally understood to mean that the CO2eq 
concentration reaches a specific level and then remains at that level 
indefinitely until the global carbon and other cycles come into a new 
equilibrium. The notion of stabilization does not necessarily preclude 
the possibility that concentrations might exceed, or ‘overshoot’ 
the long-term goal before eventually stabilizing at that goal. The 
possibility of ‘overshoot’ has important implications for the required 
GHG emissions reductions to reach a long-term concentration level. 
Concentration overshoot involves less mitigation in the near term 
with more rapid and deeper emissions reductions in the long run. 
The temperature response of the concentration pathways assessed 
in this report focuses on transient temperature change over the 
course of the century. This is an important difference with WGIII 
AR4, which focused on the long-term equilibrium temperature 
response, a state that is reached millennia after the stabilization 
of concentrations. The temperature outcomes in this report are 
thus not directly comparable to those presented in the WGIII AR4 
assessment. One reason that this assessment focuses on transient 
temperature response is that it is less uncertain than the equilib-
rium response and correlates more strongly with GHG emissions 
in the near and medium term. An additional reason is that the 
mitigation pathways assessed in WGIII AR5 do not extend beyond 
2100 and are primarily designed to reach specific concentration 
goals for the year 2100. The majority of these pathways do not 
stabilize concentrations in 2100, which makes the assessment of 
the equilibrium temperature response ambiguous and dependent 
on assumptions about post-2100 emissions and concentrations.
Transient temperature goals might be defined in terms of the 
temperature in a specific year (e. g., 2100), or based on never 
exceeding a particular level. This report explores the implications 
of both types of goals. The assessment of temperature goals are 
complicated by the uncertainty that surrounds our understanding 
of key physical relationships in the earth system, most notably 
the relationship between concentrations and temperature. It is 
not possible to state definitively whether any long-term con-
centration pathway will limit either transient or equilibrium 
temperature change to below a specified level. It is only possible 
to express the temperature implications of particular concentra-
tion pathways in probabilistic terms, and such estimates will 
be dependent on the source of the probability distribution of 
different climate parameters and the climate model used for 
analysis. This report employs the MAGICC model and a distribu-
tion of climate parameters that results in temperature outcomes 
with dynamics similar to those from the Earth System Models 
assessed in WGI AR5. For each emissions scenario, a median 
transient temperature response is calculated to illustrate the 
variation of temperature due to different emissions pathways. 
In addition, a transient temperature range for each scenario is 
provided, reflecting the climate system uncertainties. Information 
regarding the full distribution of climate parameters was utilized 
for estimating the likelihood that the scenarios would limit tran-
sient temperature change to below specific levels (Table TS.1). 
Providing the combination of information about the plausible 
range of temperature outcomes as well as the likelihood of meet-
ing different targets is of critical importance for policymaking, 
since it facilitates the assessment of different climate objectives 




Table TS.1 | Key characteristics of the scenarios collected and assessed for WGIII AR5. For all parameters, the 10th to 90th percentile of the scenarios is shown.1, 2 [Table 6.3] 
CO2eq 
Concentrations 











Change in CO2eq emissions 
compared to 2010 in [%]4
Temperature change (relative to 1850 – 1900)5, 6




Likelihood of staying below temperature 
level over the 21st century8
1.5 °C 2.0 °C 3.0 °C 4.0 °C
< 430 Only a limited number of individual model studies have explored levels below 430 ppm CO2eq
450  
(430 – 480)
Total range1, 10 RCP2.6 550 – 1300 630 – 1180 − 72 to − 41 − 118 to − 78









No overshoot of 
530 ppm CO2eq
860 – 1180 960 – 1430 − 57 to − 42 − 107 to − 73







1130 – 1530 990 – 1550 − 55 to − 25 − 114 to − 90






No overshoot of 
580 ppm CO2eq
1070 – 1460 1240 – 2240 − 47 to − 19 − 81 to − 59






1420 – 1750 1170 – 2100 − 16 to 7 − 183 to − 86
2.1 – 2.3 
(1.4 – 3.6)
(580 – 650) Total range
RCP4.5
1260 – 1640 1870 – 2440 − 38 to 24 − 134 to − 50
2.3 – 2.6 
(1.5 – 4.2)
(650 – 720) Total range 1310 – 1750 2570 – 3340 − 11 to 17 − 54 to − 21





(720 – 1000)2 Total range RCP6.0 1570 – 1940 3620 – 4990 18 to 54 − 7 to 72





> 10002 Total range RCP8.5 1840 – 2310 5350 – 7010 52 to 95 74 to 178






1 The ‘total range’ for the 430 – 480 ppm CO2eq scenarios corresponds to the range of the 10th – 90th percentile of the subcategory of these scenarios shown in Table 6.3. 
2 Baseline scenarios (see TS.2.2) fall into the > 1000 and 720 – 1000 ppm CO2eq categories. The latter category also includes mitigation scenarios. The baseline scenarios in the 
latter category reach a temperature change of 2.5 – 5.8 °C above preindustrial in 2100. Together with the baseline scenarios in the > 1000 ppm CO2eq category, this leads to 
an overall 2100 temperature range of 2.5 – 7.8 °C (range based on median climate response: 3.7 – 4.8 °C) for baseline scenarios across both concentration categories.
3 For comparison of the cumulative CO2 emissions estimates assessed here with those presented in WGI AR5, an amount of 515 [445 – 585] GtC (1890 [1630 – 2150] GtCO2), 
was already emitted by 2011 since 1870 [WGI 12.5]. Note that cumulative CO2 emissions are presented here for different periods of time (2011 – 2050 and 2011 – 2100) 
while cumulative CO2 emissions in WGI AR5 are presented as total compatible emissions for the RCPs (2012 – 2100) or for total compatible emissions for remaining below a 
given temperature target with a given likelihood [WGI Table SPM.3, WGI SPM.E.8].      
4 The global 2010 emissions are 31 % above the 1990 emissions (consistent with the historic GHG emissions estimates presented in this report). CO2eq emissions include the 
basket of Kyoto gases (CO2, CH4, N2O as well as F-gases).
5 The assessment in WGIII AR5 involves a large number of scenarios published in the scientific literature and is thus not limited to the RCPs. To evaluate the CO2eq concen-
tration and climate implications of these scenarios, the MAGICC model was used in a probabilistic mode (see Annex II). For a comparison between MAGICC model results 
and the outcomes of the models used in WGI, see Sections WGI 12.4.1.2, WGI 12.4.8 and 6.3.2.6. Reasons for differences with WGI SPM Table.2 include the difference in 
reference year (1986 – 2005 vs. 1850 – 1900 here), difference in reporting year (2081 – 2100 vs 2100 here), set-up of simulation (CMIP5 concentration-driven versus MAGICC 
emission-driven here), and the wider set of scenarios (RCPs versus the full set of scenarios in the WGIII AR5 scenario database here). 
6 Temperature change is reported for the year 2100, which is not directly comparable to the equilibrium warming reported in WGIII AR4 [Table 3.5, Chapter 3; see also WGIII 
AR5 6.3.2]. For the 2100 temperature estimates, the transient climate response (TCR) is the most relevant system property. The assumed 90 % range of the TCR for MAGICC 
is 1.2 – 2.6 °C (median 1.8 °C). This compares to the 90 % range of TCR between 1.2 – 2.4 °C for CMIP5 [WGI 9.7] and an assessed likely range of 1 – 2.5 °C from multiple 
lines of evidence reported in the WGI AR5 [Box 12.2 in Section 12.5]. 
7 Temperature change in 2100 is provided for a median estimate of the MAGICC calculations, which illustrates differences between the emissions pathways of the scenarios 
in each category. The range of temperature change in the parentheses includes in addition the carbon cycle and climate system uncertainties as represented by the MAGICC 
model [see 6.3.2.6 for further details]. The temperature data compared to the 1850 – 1900 reference year was calculated by taking all projected warming relative to 
1986 – 2005, and adding 0.61 °C for 1986 – 2005 compared to 1850 – 1900, based on HadCRUT4 [see WGI Table SPM.2]. 
8 The assessment in this table is based on the probabilities calculated for the full ensemble of scenarios in WGIII AR5 using MAGICC and the assessment in WGI AR5 of the 
uncertainty of the temperature projections not covered by climate models. The statements are therefore consistent with the statements in WGI AR5, which are based on the 
CMIP5 runs of the RCPs and the assessed uncertainties. Hence, the likelihood statements reflect different lines of evidence from both WGs. This WGI method was also applied 
for scenarios with intermediate concentration levels where no CMIP5 runs are available. The likelihood statements are indicative only [6.3], and follow broadly the terms used 
by the WGI AR5 SPM for temperature projections: likely 66 – 100 %, more likely than not > 50 – 100 %, about as likely as not 33 – 66 %, and unlikely 0 – 33 %. In addition the 
term more unlikely than likely 0 – < 50 % is used.
9 The CO2-equivalent concentration includes the forcing of all GHGs including halogenated gases and tropospheric ozone, as well as aerosols and albedo change (calculated on 
the basis of the total forcing from a simple carbon cycle / climate model, MAGICC).
10 The vast majority of scenarios in this category overshoot the category boundary of 480 ppm CO2eq concentrations.
11  For scenarios in this category no CMIP5 run [WGI Chapter 12, Table 12.3] as well as no MAGICC realization [6.3] stays below the respective temperature level. Still, an 
unlikely assignment is given to reflect uncertainties that might not be reflected by the current climate models. 
12  Scenarios in the 580 – 650 ppm CO2eq category include both overshoot scenarios and scenarios that do not exceed the concentration level at the high end of the category 
(like RCP4.5). The latter type of scenarios, in general, have an assessed probability of more unlikely than likely to stay below the 2 °C temperature level, while the former are 




ply is from three-fold to seven-fold over this same period. Many mod-
els could not reach 2100 concentration levels of about 450 ppm CO2eq 
if the full suite of low-carbon technologies is not available. Studies 
indicate a large potential for energy demand reductions, but also indi-
cate that demand reductions on their own would not be sufficient to 
bring about the reductions needed to reach levels of about 650 ppm 
CO2eq or below by 2100. [6.3, 7.11]
Mitigation scenarios indicate a potentially critical role for land-
related mitigation measures and that a wide range of alter-
native land transformations may be consistent with similar 
concentration levels (medium confidence). Land-use dynamics in 
mitigation scenarios are heavily influenced by the production of bioen-
ergy and the degree to which afforestation is deployed as a negative-
emissions, or CDR option. They are, in addition, influenced by forces 
independent of mitigation such as agricultural productivity improve-
ments and increased demand for food. The range of land-use trans-
formations depicted in mitigation scenarios reflects a wide range of 
differing assumptions about the evolution of all of these forces. Many 
scenarios reflect strong increases in the degree of competition for land 
between food, feed, and energy uses. [6.3, 6.8, 11.4.2]
Delaying mitigation efforts beyond those in place today 
through 2030 will increase the challenges of, and reduce the 
options for, limiting atmospheric concentration levels from 
about 450 to about 500 ppm CO2eq by the end of the century 
(high confidence). Cost-effective mitigation scenarios leading to atmo-
spheric concentration levels of about 450 to about 500 ppm CO2eq at 
the end of the 21st century are typically characterized by annual GHG 
emissions in 2030 of roughly between 30 GtCO2eq and 50 GtCO2eq. 
Scenarios with emissions above 55 GtCO2eq in 2030 are character-
ized by substantially higher rates of emissions reductions from 2030 
to 2050 (median emissions reductions of about 6 % / yr as compared to 
just over 3 % / yr) (Figure TS.9, right panel); much more rapid scale-up of 
low-carbon energy over this period (more than a tripling compared to 
a doubling of the low-carbon energy share) (Figure TS.10, right panel); 
Figure TS.9 | The implications of different 2030 GHG emissions levels for the rate of CO2 emissions reductions from 2030 to 2050 in mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 to 
about 500 (430 – 530) ppm CO2eq concentrations by 2100. The scenarios are grouped according to different emissions levels by 2030 (coloured in different shades of green). The 
left panel shows the pathways of GHG emissions (GtCO2eq / yr) leading to these 2030 levels. The black bar shows the estimated uncertainty range of GHG emissions implied by the 
Cancún Pledges. Black dot with whiskers gives historic GHG emission levels and associated uncertainties in 2010 as reported in Figure TS.1. The right panel denotes the average 
annual CO2 emissions reduction rates for the period 2030 – 2050. It compares the median and interquartile range across scenarios from recent intermodel comparisons with explicit 
2030 interim goals to the range of scenarios in the Scenario Database for WGIII AR5. Annual rates of historical emissions change between 1900 – 2010 (sustained over a period 
of 20 years) and the average annual emissions change between 2000 – 2010 are shown in grey. Note: Scenarios with large net negative global emissions (> 20 GtCO2 / yr) are not 
included in the WGIII AR5 scenario range, but rather shown as independent points. Only scenarios that apply the full, unconstrained mitigation technology portfolio of the underlying 
models (default technology assumption) are shown. Scenarios with exogenous carbon price assumptions or other policies affecting the timing of mitigation (other than 2030 interim 
targets) as well as scenarios with 2010 emissions significantly outside the historical range are excluded. [Figure 6.32, 13.13.1.3]
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a larger reliance on CDR technologies in the long-term (Figure TS.8, 
right panel); and higher transitional and long term economic impacts 
(Table TS.2, orange segments, Figure TS.13, right panel). Due to these 
increased challenges, many models with 2030 GHG emissions in this 
range could not produce scenarios reaching atmospheric concentra-
tions levels of about 450 to about 500 ppm CO2eq in 2100. [6.4, 7.11]
Estimated global GHG emissions levels in 2020 based on the 
Cancún Pledges are not consistent with cost-effective long-
term mitigation trajectories that reach atmospheric concen-
trations levels of about 450 to about 500 ppm CO2eq by 2100, 
but they do not preclude the option to meet that goal (robust 
evidence, high agreement). The Cancún Pledges are broadly consis-
tent with cost-effective scenarios reaching about 550 ppm CO2eq to 
650 ppm CO2eq by 2100. Studies confirm that delaying mitigation 
through 2030 has a substantially larger influence on the subsequent 
challenges of mitigation than do delays through 2020 (Figures TS.9, 
TS.11). [6.4]
Only a limited number of studies have explored scenarios that 
are more likely than not to bring temperature change back to 
below 1.5 °C by 2100 relative to pre-industrial levels; these 
scenarios bring atmospheric concentrations to below 430 ppm 
CO2eq by 2100 (high confidence). Assessing this goal is currently dif-
ficult because no multi-model study has explored these scenarios. The 
limited number of published studies exploring this goal have produced 
associated scenarios that are characterized by (1) immediate mitiga-
tion; (2) the rapid up-scaling of the full portfolio of mitigation technol-
ogies; and (3) development along a low-energy demand trajectory.12 
[6.3, 7.11] 
TS.3.1.3 Costs, investments and burden sharing
Globally comprehensive and harmonized mitigation actions 
would result in significant economic benefits compared to frag-
mented approaches, but would require establishing effective 
institutions (high confidence). Economic analysis of mitigation scenar-
ios demonstrates that globally comprehensive and harmonized mitiga-
tion actions achieve mitigation at least aggregate economic cost, since 
they allow mitigation to be undertaken where and when it is least 
expensive (see Box TS.7, Box TS.9). Most of these mitigation scenarios 
assume a global carbon price, which reaches all sectors of the econ-
omy. Instruments with limited coverage of GHG emissions reductions 
among sectors and climate policy regimes with fragmented regional 
12 In these scenarios, the cumulative CO2 emissions range between 680 – 800 GtCO2 
for the period 2011 – 2050 and between 90 – 310 GtCO2 for the period 
2011 – 2100. Global CO2eq emissions in 2050 are between 70 – 95 % below 2010 
emissions, and they are between 110 – 120 % below 2010 emissions in 2100.
Figure TS.10 | The up-scaling of low-carbon energy in scenarios meeting different 2100 CO2eq concentration levels (left panel). The right panel shows the rate of up-scaling subject 
to different 2030 GHG emissions levels in mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 to about 500 (430 – 530) ppm CO2eq concentrations by 2100. Colored bars show the inter-
quartile range and white bars indicate the full range across the scenarios, excluding those with large, global net negative CO2 emissions (> 20 GtCO2 / yr). Scenarios with large net 
negative global emissions are shown as individual points. The arrows indicate the magnitude of zero- and low-carbon energy supply up-scaling from 2030 to 2050. Zero- and low-
carbon energy supply includes renewables, nuclear energy, fossil energy with carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS), and bioenergy with CCS (BECCS). Note: Only scenarios that 
apply the full, unconstrained mitigation technology portfolio of the underlying models (default technology assumption) are shown. Scenarios with exogenous carbon price assump-
tions are excluded in both panels. In the right panel, scenarios with policies affecting the timing of mitigation other than 2030 interim targets are also excluded. [Figure 7.16]
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Figure TS.11 | Near-term GHG emissions from mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 to about 500 (430 – 530) ppm CO2eq concentrations by 2100. The Figure includes only 
scenarios for which temperature exceedance probabilities were calculated. Individual model results are indicated with a data point when 2 °C exceedance probability is below 50 % 
as assessed by a simple carbon cycle/climate model (MAGICC). Colours refer to scenario classification in terms of whether net CO2 emissions become negative before 2100 (nega-
tive vs. no negative) and the timing of international participation in climate mitigation (immediate vs. delay until 2020 vs. delay until 2030). Number of reported individual results 
is shown in legend. The range of global GHG emissions in 2020 implied by the Cancún Pledges is based on analysis of alternative interpretations of national pledges. Note: In the 
WGIII AR5 scenario database, only four reported scenarios were produced based on delayed mitigation without net negative emissions while still lying below 530 ppm CO2eq by 
2100. They do not appear in the figure, because the model had insufficient coverage of non-gas species to enable a temperature calculation. Delay in these scenarios extended 
only to 2020, and their emissions fell in the same range as the ‘No Negative / Immediate’ category. Delay scenarios include both delayed global mitigation and fragmented action 
scenarios. [Figure 6.31, 13.13.1.3]
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action increase aggregate economic costs. These cost increases are 
higher at more ambitious levels of mitigation. [6.3.6]
Estimates of the aggregate economic costs of mitigation vary 
widely, but increase with stringency of mitigation (high confi-
dence). Most cost-effective scenarios collected for this assessment that 
are based on the assumptions that all countries of the world begin 
mitigation immediately, there is a single global carbon price applied to 
well-functioning markets, and key technologies are available, estimate 
that reaching about 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100 would entail global con-
sumption losses of 1 % to 4 % in 2030 (median: 1.7 %), 2 % to 6 % in 
2050 (median: 3.4 %), and 3 % to 11 % in 2100 (median: 4.8 %) relative 
to consumption in baseline scenarios (those without additional miti-
gation efforts) that grows anywhere from 300 % to more than 900 % 
between 2010 and 2100 (baseline consumption growth represents the 
full range of corresponding baseline scenarios; Figure TS.12; Table TS.2 
yellow segments). The consumption losses correspond to an annual 
average reduction of consumption growth by 0.06 to 0.2 percentage 
points from 2010 through 2030 (median: 0.09), 0.06 to 0.17 percentage 
points through 2050 (median: 0.09), and 0.04 to 0.14 percentage points 
over the century (median: 0.06). These numbers are relative to annual 
average consumption growth rates in baseline scenarios between 1.9 % 
and 3.8 % per year through 2050 and between 1.6 % and 3 % per year 
over the century (Table TS.2, yellow segments). These mitigation cost 
estimates do not consider the benefits of reduced climate change or 
co-benefits and adverse side-effects of mitigation (Box TS.9). Costs for 
maintaining concentrations in the range of 530 – 650 ppm CO2eq are 
estimated to be roughly one-third to two-thirds lower than for associ-
ated 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq scenarios. Cost estimates from scenarios can 
vary substantially across regions. Substantially higher cost estimates 
have been obtained based on assumptions about less idealized policy 
implementations and limits on technology availability as discussed 
below. Both higher and lower estimates have been obtained based on 
interactions with pre-existing distortions, non-climate market failures, 
or complementary policies. [6.3.6.2]
Delaying mitigation efforts beyond those in place today through 
2030 or beyond could substantially increase mitigation costs 
in the decades that follow and the second half of the century 
(high confidence). Although delays in mitigation by any major emitter 
will reduce near-term mitigation costs, they will also result in more 




decision makers to undertake a more rapid, deeper, and costlier future 
transformation of this infrastructure. Studies have found that aggre-
gate costs, and associated carbon prices, rise more rapidly to higher 
levels in scenarios with delayed mitigation compared to scenarios 
where mitigation is undertaken immediately. Recent modelling stud-
ies have found that delayed mitigation through 2030 can substantially 
increase the aggregate costs of meeting 2100 concentrations of about 
450 to about 500 ppm CO2eq, particularly in scenarios with emissions 
greater than 55 GtCO2eq in 2030. (Figure TS.13, right panel; Table TS.2, 
orange segments) [6.3.6.4]
The technological options available for mitigation greatly influ-
ence mitigation costs and the challenges of reaching atmo-
spheric concentration levels of about 450 to about 550 ppm 
CO2eq by 2100 (high confidence). Many models in recent model inter-
comparisons could not produce scenarios reaching atmospheric con-
centrations of about 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100 with broadly pessimistic 
assumptions about key mitigation technologies. In these studies, the 
character and availability of CCS and bioenergy were found to have a 
particularly important influence on the mitigation costs and the chal-
lenges of reaching concentration levels in this range. For those mod-
els that could produce such scenarios, pessimistic assumptions about 
these increased discounted global mitigation costs of reaching concen-
tration levels of about 450 and about 550 ppm CO2eq by the end of 
the century significantly, with the effect being larger for more strin-
gent mitigation scenarios (Figure TS.13, left panel; Table TS.2, grey seg-
ments). The studies also showed that reducing energy demand could 
potentially decrease mitigation costs significantly. [6.3.6.3]
The distribution of mitigation costs among different countries 
depends in part on the nature of effort-sharing frameworks 
and thus need not be the same as the distribution of mitiga-
tion efforts. Different effort-sharing frameworks draw upon 
different ethical principles (medium confidence). In cost-effective 
scenarios reaching concentrations of about 450 to about 550 ppm 
CO2eq in 2100, the majority of mitigation investments over the course 
Table TS.2 | Global mitigation costs in cost-effective scenarios1 and estimated cost increases due to assumed limited availability of specific technologies and delayed additional mit-
igation. Cost estimates shown in this table do not consider the benefits of reduced climate change as well as co-benefits and adverse side-effects of mitigation. The yellow columns 
show consumption losses (Figure TS.12, right panel) and annualized consumption growth reductions in cost-effective scenarios relative to a baseline development without climate 
policy. The grey columns show the percentage increase in discounted costs2 over the century, relative to cost-effective scenarios, in scenarios in which technology is constrained 
relative to default technology assumptions (Figure TS.13, left panel).3 The orange columns show the increase in mitigation costs over the periods 2030 – 2050 and 2050 – 2100, rela-
tive to scenarios with immediate mitigation, due to delayed additional mitigation through 2030 (see Figure TS.13, right panel).4 These scenarios with delayed additional mitigation 
are grouped by emission levels of less or more than 55 GtCO2eq in 2030, and two concentration ranges in 2100 (430 – 530 ppm CO2eq and 530 – 650 ppm CO2eq). In all figures, 
the median of the scenario set is shown without parentheses, the range between the 16th and 84th percentile of the scenario set is shown in the parentheses, and the number of 
scenarios in the set is shown in square brackets.5 [Figures TS.12, TS.13, 6.21, 6.24, 6.25, Annex II.10] 
Consumption losses in cost-effective scenarios1 
Increase in total discounted mitigation costs in 
scenarios with limited availability of technologies
Increase in medium- and long-term 
mitigation costs due to delayed 
additional mitigation until 2030 
[% reduction in consumption 
relative to baseline]
[percentage point reduction in 
annualized consumption growth rate]
[% increase in total discounted 
mitigation costs (2015 – 2100) relative 
to default technology assumptions]
[% increase in mitigation costs 
relative to immediate mitigation]
Concentration 



























450 (430 – 480) 
1.7 













(29 – 297) 
[N: 4]
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[N: 11]
13 
(2 – 23) 
[N: 10]
8 
(5 – 15) 
[N: 10]
18 
(4 – 66) 
[N: 12] 3 
(− 5 – 16) 
[N: 14]
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(− 4 – 11) 
15 
(3 – 32) 
[N: 10]
16 
(5 – 24) 
580 – 650 
0.3 












N / A N / A N / A N / A
Notes:
1 Cost-effective scenarios assume immediate mitigation in all countries and a single global carbon price. In this analysis, they also impose no additional limitations on technol-
ogy relative to the models’ default technology assumptions.
2 Percentage increase of net present value of consumption losses in percent of baseline consumption (for scenarios from general equilibrium models) and abatement costs in 
percent of baseline GDP (for scenarios from partial equilibrium models) for the period 2015 – 2100, discounted (see Box TS.10) at 5 % per year.
3 No CCS: CCS is not included in these scenarios. Nuclear phase out: No addition of nuclear power plants beyond those under construction, and operation of existing plants 
until the end of their lifetime. Limited Solar / Wind: a maximum of 20 % global electricity generation from solar and wind power in any year of these scenarios. Limited Bioen-
ergy: a maximum of 100 EJ / yr modern bioenergy supply globally (modern bioenergy used for heat, power, combinations, and industry was around 18 EJ / yr in 2008 [11.13.5]).
4 Percentage increase of total undiscounted mitigation costs for the periods 2030 – 2050 and 2050 – 2100.
5 The range is determined by the central scenarios encompassing the 16th and 84th percentile of the scenario set. Only scenarios with a time horizon until 2100 are included. 
Some models that are included in the cost ranges for concentration levels above 530 ppm CO2eq in 2100 could not produce associated scenarios for concentration levels 




Box TS.9 | The meaning of ‘mitigation cost’ in the context of mitigation scenarios
Mitigation costs represent one component of the change in 
human welfare from climate change mitigation. Mitigation costs 
are expressed in monetary terms and generally are estimated 
against baseline scenarios, which typically involve continued, and 
sometimes substantial, economic growth and no additional and 
explicit mitigation efforts [3.9.3, 6.3.6]. Because mitigation cost 
estimates focus only on direct market effects, they do not take 
into account the welfare value (if any) of co-benefits or adverse 
side-effects of mitigation actions (Box TS.11) [3.6.3]. Further, these 
costs do not capture the benefits of reducing climate impacts 
through mitigation (Box TS.2).
There are a wide variety of metrics of aggregate mitigation 
costs used by economists, measured in different ways or at 
different places in the economy, including changes in GDP, 
consumption losses, equivalent variation and compensating 
variation, and loss in consumer and producer surplus. Consump-
tion losses are often used as a metric because they emerge from 
many integrated models and they directly impact welfare. They 
can be expressed as a reduction in overall consumption relative 
to consumption in the corresponding baseline scenario in a 
given year or as a reduction of the average rate of consumption 
growth in the corresponding baseline scenario over a given time 
period. 
Mitigation costs need to be distinguished from emissions prices. 
Emissions prices measure the cost of an additional unit of emis-
sions reduction; that is, the marginal cost. In contrast, mitigation 
costs usually represent the total costs of all mitigation. In addition, 
emissions prices can interact with other policies and measures, such 
as regulatory policies directed at GHG reduction. If mitigation is 
achieved partly by these other measures, emissions prices may not 
reflect the actual costs of an additional unit of emissions reductions 
(depending on how additional emissions reductions are induced).
In general, estimates of global aggregate mitigation costs over 
the coming century from integrated models are based on largely 
stylized assumptions about both policy approaches and existing 
markets and policies, and these assumptions have an important 
influence on cost estimates. For example, cost-effective idealized 
implementation scenarios assume a uniform price on CO2 and 
other GHGs in every country and sector across the globe, and 
constitute the least cost approach in the idealized case of largely 
efficient markets without market failures other than the climate 
change externality. Most long-term, global scenarios do not 
account for the interactions between mitigation and pre-existing 
or new policies, market failures, and distortions. Climate policies 
can interact with existing policies to increase or reduce the actual 
cost of climate policies. [3.6.3.3, 6.3.6.5]
Figure TS.12 | Global carbon prices (left panel) and consumption losses (right panel) over time in cost-effective, idealized implementation scenarios. Consumption losses are 
expressed as the percentage reduction from consumption in the baseline. The number of scenarios included in the boxplots is indicated at the bottom of the panels. The 2030 num-
bers also apply to 2020 and 2050. The number of scenarios outside the figure range is noted at the top. Note: The figure shows only scenarios that reported consumption losses (a 
subset of models with full coverage of the economy) or carbon prices, respectively, to 2050 or 2100. Multiple scenarios from the same model with similar characteristics are only 
represented by a single scenario in the sample. [Figure 6.21]
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of century occur in the non-OECD countries. Some studies exploring 
particular effort-sharing frameworks, under the assumption of a global 
carbon market, estimate that the associated financial flows could be 
in the order of hundred billions of USD per year before mid-century to 
bring concentrations to between about 450 and about 500 ppm CO2eq 
in 2100. Most studies assume efficient mechanisms for international 
carbon markets, in which case economic theory and empirical research 
suggest that the choice of effort sharing allocations will not meaning-
fully affect the globally efficient levels of regional abatement or aggre-
gate global costs. Actual approaches to effort-sharing can deviate from 
this assumption. [3.3, 6.3.6.6, 13.4.2.4]
Geoengineering denotes two clusters of technologies that are 
quite distinct: carbon dioxide removal (CDR) and solar radia-
tion management (SRM). Mitigation scenarios assessed in AR5 
do not assume any geoengineering options beyond large-scale 
CDR due to afforestation and BECCS. CDR techniques include affor-
estation, using bioenergy along with CCS (BECCS), and enhancing 
uptake of CO2 by the oceans through iron fertilization or increasing 
alkalinity. Most terrestrial CDR techniques would require large-scale 
land-use changes and could involve local and regional risks, while 
maritime CDR may involve significant transboundary risks for ocean 
ecosystems, so that its deployment could pose additional challenges 
for cooperation between countries. With currently known technologies, 
CDR could not be deployed quickly on a large scale. SRM includes vari-
ous technologies to offset crudely some of the climatic effects of the 
build-up of GHGs in the atmosphere. It works by adjusting the planet’s 
heat balance through a small increase in the reflection of incoming 
sunlight such as by injecting particles or aerosol precursors in the 
upper atmosphere. SRM has attracted considerable attention, mainly 
Figure TS.13 | Left panel shows the relative increase in net present value mitigation costs (2015 – 2100, discounted at 5 % per year) from technology portfolio variations relative to 
a scenario with default technology assumptions. Scenario names on the horizontal axis indicate the technology variation relative to the default assumptions: No CCS = unavailabil-
ity of carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS); Nuclear phase out = No addition of nuclear power plants beyond those under construction; existing plants operated until the end 
of their lifetime; Limited Solar / Wind = a maximum of 20 % global electricity generation from solar and wind power in any year of these scenarios; Limited Bioenergy = a maximum 
of 100 exajoules per year (EJ / yr) modern bioenergy supply globally. [Figure 6.24] Right panel shows increase in long-term mitigation costs for the period 2050 – 2100 (sum over 
undiscounted costs) as a function of reduced near-term mitigation effort, expressed as the relative change between scenarios implementing mitigation immediately and those that 
correspond to delayed additional mitigation through 2020 or 2030 (referred to here as ‘mitigation gap’). The mitigation gap is defined as the difference in cumulative CO2 emis-
sions reductions until 2030 between the immediate and delayed additional mitigation scenarios. The bars in the lower right panel indicate the mitigation gap range where 75 % 
of scenarios with 2030 emissions above (dark blue) and below (red) 55 GtCO2, respectively, are found. Not all model simulations of delayed additional mitigation until 2030 could 
reach the lower concentration goals of about 450 or 500 (430 – 530) ppm CO2eq (for 2030 emissions above 55 GtCO2eq, 29 of 48 attempted simulations could reach the goal; for 
2030 emissions below 55 GtCO2eq, 34 of 51 attempted simulations could reach the goal). [Figure 6.25]
430-530 ppm CO2eq Obs.
530-650 ppm CO2eq Obs.




‡ Scenarios from two models reach concentration levels in 2100 that are slightly above the 430-480 ppm CO2eq category
† Scenarios from one model reach concentration levels in 2100 that are slightly below the 530-580 ppm CO2eq category
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because of the potential for rapid deployment in case of climate emer-
gency. The suggestion that deployment costs for individual technolo-
gies could potentially be low could result in new challenges for inter-
national cooperation because nations may be tempted to prematurely 
deploy unilaterally systems that are perceived to be inexpensive. Con-
sequently, SRM technologies raise questions about costs, risks, gover-
nance, and ethical implications of developing and deploying SRM, with 
special challenges emerging for international institutions, norms and 
other mechanisms that could coordinate research and restrain testing 
and deployment. [1.4, 3.3.7, 6.9, 13.4.4]
Knowledge about the possible beneficial or harmful effects of 
SRM is highly preliminary. SRM would have varying impacts on 
regional climate variables such as temperature and precipitation, and 
might result in substantial changes in the global hydrological cycle 
with uncertain regional effects, for example on monsoon precipita-
tion. Non-climate effects could include possible depletion of strato-
spheric ozone by stratospheric aerosol injections. A few studies have 
begun to examine climate and non-climate impacts of SRM, but there 
is very little agreement in the scientific community on the results or 
on whether the lack of knowledge requires additional research or 
eventually field testing of SRM-related technologies. [1.4, 3.3.7, 6.9, 
13.4.4]
TS.3.1.4 Implications of mitigation pathways for other 
objectives
Mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 to about 500 ppm 
CO2eq by 2100 show reduced costs for achieving energy secu-
rity and air quality objectives (medium confidence) (Figure TS.14, 
lower panel). The mitigation costs of most of the scenarios in this 
assessment do not consider the economic implications of the cost 
reductions for these other objectives (Box TS.9). There is a wide range 
of co-benefits and adverse side-effects other than air quality and 
energy security (Tables TS.4 – 8). The impact of mitigation on the over-
all costs for achieving many of these other objectives as well as the 
associated welfare implications are less well understood and have 
not been assessed thoroughly in the literature (Box TS.11). [3.6.3, 
4.8, 6.6]
Box TS.10 | Future goods should be discounted at an appropriate rate
Investments aimed at mitigating climate change will bear fruit 
far in the future, much of it more than 100 years from now. To 
decide whether a particular investment is worthwhile, its future 
benefits need to be weighed against its present costs. In doing 
this, economists do not normally take a quantity of commodities 
at one time as equal in value to the same quantity of the same 
commodities at a different time. They normally give less value 
to later commodities than to earlier ones. They ‘discount’ later 
commodities, that is to say. The rate at which the weight given to 
future goods diminishes through time is known as the ‘discount 
rate’ on commodities.
There are two types of discount rates used for different purposes. 
The market discount rate reflects the preferences of presently 
living people between present and future commodities. The social 
discount rate is used by society to compare benefits of present 
members of society with those not yet born. Because living people 
may be impatient, and because future people do not trade in 
the market, the market may not accurately reflect the value of 
commodities that will come to future people relative to those that 
come to present people. So the social discount rate may differ 
from the market rate. 
The chief reason for social discounting (favouring present people 
over future people) is that commodities have ‘diminishing 
marginal benefit’ and per capita income is expected to increase 
over time. Diminishing marginal benefit means that the value of 
extra commodities to society declines as people become better 
off. If economies continue to grow, people who live later in time 
will on average be better off — possess more commodities — than 
people who live earlier. The faster the growth and the greater the 
degree of diminishing marginal benefit, the greater should be the 
discount rate on commodities. If per capita growth is expected to 
be negative (as it is in some countries), the social discount rate 
may be negative.
Some authors have argued, in addition, that the present genera-
tion of people should give less weight to later people’s well-being 
just because they are more remote in time. This factor would add 
to the social discount rate on commodities.
The social discount rate is appropriate for evaluating mitigation 
projects that are financed by reducing current consumption. If a 
project is financed partly by ‘crowding out’ other investments, the 
benefits of those other investments are lost, and their loss must 
be counted as an opportunity cost of the mitigation project. If a 
mitigation project crowds out an exactly equal amount of other 
investment, then the only issue is whether or not the mitiga-
tion investment produces a greater return than the crowded-out 
investment. This can be tested by evaluating the mitigation 
investment using a discount rate equal to the return that would 
have been expected from the crowded out investment. If the 

























IPCC AR5 Scenario Ensemble
Impact of Climate Policy on Air Pollutant Emissions (Global, 2005-2050)

















































Shown in Top Right 
Panel















Global Energy Assessment Scenario Ensemble (n=624) 
Policy Costs of Achieving Different Objectives




























































Impact of Climate Policy on Energy Security
Energy Trade 
(Global, 2050)






















Figure TS.14 | Co-benefits of mitigation for energy security and air quality in scenarios with stringent climate policies reaching about 450 to about 500 (430 – 530) ppm CO2eq 
concentrations in 2100. Upper panels show co-benefits for different security indicators and air pollutant emissions. Lower panel shows related global policy costs of achieving the 
energy security, air quality, and mitigation objectives, either alone (w, x, y) or simultaneously (z). Integrated approaches that achieve these objectives simultaneously show the high-
est cost-effectiveness due to synergies (w + x + y > z). Policy costs are given as the increase in total energy system costs relative to a baseline scenario without additional efforts to 
reduce GHG emissions beyond those in place today. Costs are indicative and do not represent full uncertainty ranges. [Figure 6.33] 
Mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 to about 500 ppm 
CO2eq by 2100 show co-benefits for energy security objectives, 
enhancing the sufficiency of resources to meet national energy 
demand as well as the resilience of the energy system (medium 
confidence). These mitigation scenarios show improvements in terms 
of the diversity of energy sources and reduction of energy imports, 
resulting in energy systems that are less vulnerable to price volatility 
and supply disruptions (Figure TS.14, upper left panel). [6.3.6, 6.6, 7.9, 
8.7, 9.7, 10.8, 11.13.6, 12.8]
Mitigation policy could devalue fossil fuel assets and reduce 
revenues for fossil fuel exporters, but differences between 
regions and fuels exist (high confidence). Most mitigation scenarios 
are associated with reduced revenues from coal and oil trade for major 
exporters (high confidence). However, a limited number of studies find 
that mitigation policies could increase the relative competitiveness of 
conventional oil vis-à-vis more carbon-intensive unconventional oil 
and ‘coal-to-liquids’. The effect of mitigation on natural gas export rev-
enues is more uncertain, with some studies showing possible benefits 
for export revenues in the medium term until about 2050 (medium 
confidence). The availability of CCS would reduce the adverse effect 
of mitigation on the value of fossil fuel assets (medium confidence). 
[6.3.6, 6.6, 14.4.2]
Fragmented mitigation policy can provide incentives for emis-
sion-intensive economic activity to migrate away from a region 
that undertakes mitigation (medium confidence). Scenario studies 
have shown that such ‘carbon leakage’ rates of energy-related emis-
sions are relatively contained, often below 20 % of the emissions 
reductions. Leakage in land-use emissions could be substantial, though 
fewer studies have quantified it. While border tax adjustments are 
seen as enhancing the competitiveness of GHG- and trade-intensive 
industries within a climate policy regime, they can also entail welfare 
losses for non-participating, and particularly developing, countries. 
[5.4, 6.3, 13.8, 14.4]
Mitigation scenarios leading to atmospheric concentration lev-
els of about 450 to about 500 ppm CO2eq in 2100 are associated 
with significant co-benefits for air quality and related human 
health and ecosystem impacts. The benefits from major cuts in 
air pollutant emissions are particularly high where currently 
legislated and planned air pollution controls are weak (high con-
fidence). Stringent mitigation policies result in co-controls with major 
cuts in air pollutant emissions significantly below baseline scenarios 
(Figure TS.14, upper right panel). Co-benefits for health are particularly 
high in today’s developing world. The extent to which air pollution 
policies, targeting for example black carbon (BC), can mitigate climate 
change is uncertain. [5.7, 6.3, 6.6, 7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 10.8, 11.7, 11.13.6, 
12.8; WGII 11.9]
There is a wide range of possible adverse side-effects as well 
as co-benefits and spillovers from climate policy that have not 
been well-quantified (high confidence). Whether or not side-effects 
materialize, and to what extent side-effects materialize, will be case- 
and site-specific, as they will depend on local circumstances and the 
scale, scope, and pace of implementation. Important examples include 
biodiversity conservation, water availability, food security, income dis-
tribution, efficiency of the taxation system, labour supply and employ-
ment, urban sprawl, and the sustainability of the growth of developing 
countries. (Box TS.11)
Some mitigation policies raise the prices for some energy 
services and could hamper the ability of societies to expand 
access to modern energy services to underserved populations 
(low confidence). These potential adverse side-effects can be 
avoided with the adoption of complementary policies (medium 
confidence). Most notably, about 1.3 billion people worldwide do not 
have access to electricity and about 3 billion are dependent on tradi-
tional solid fuels for cooking and heating with severe adverse effects 
on health, ecosystems and development. Providing access to modern 
energy services is an important sustainable development objective. 
The costs of achieving nearly universal access to electricity and clean 
fuels for cooking and heating are projected to be between 72 to 95 
billion USD per year until 2030 with minimal effects on GHG emis-
sions (limited evidence, medium agreement). A transition away from 
the use of traditional biomass13 and the more efficient combustion of 
solid fuels reduce air pollutant emissions, such as sulfur dioxide (SO2), 
nitrogen oxides (NOx), carbon monoxide (CO), and black carbon (BC), 
and thus yield large health benefits (high confidence). [4.3, 6.6, 7.9, 
9.3, 9.7, 11.13.6, 16.8]
The effect of mitigation on water use depends on technologi-
cal choices and the portfolio of mitigation measures (high con-
fidence). While the switch from fossil energy to renewable energy like 
photovoltaic (PV) or wind can help reducing water use of the energy 
system, deployment of other renewables, such as some forms of hydro-
power, concentrated solar power (CSP), and bioenergy may have 
adverse effects on water use. [6.6, 7.9, 9.7, 10.8, 11.7, 11.13.6]
13 Traditional biomass refers to the biomass — fuelwood, charcoal, agricultural resi-
dues, and animal dung — used with the so-called traditional technologies such as 




Box TS.11 | Accounting for the co-benefits and adverse side-effects of mitigation
A government policy or a measure intended to achieve one objec-
tive (such as mitigation) will also affect other objectives (such as 
local air quality). To the extent these side-effects are positive, they 
can be deemed ‘co-benefits’; otherwise they are termed ‘adverse 
side-effects’. In this report, co-benefits and adverse side-effects 
are measured in non-monetary units. Determining the value of 
these effects to society is a separate issue. The effects of co-ben-
efits on social welfare are not evaluated in most studies, and one 
reason is that the value of a co-benefit depends on local circum-
stances and can be positive, zero, or even negative. For example, 
the value of the extra tonne of sulfur dioxide (SO2) reduction 
that occurs with mitigation depends greatly on the stringency 
of existing SO2 control policies: in the case of weak existing SO2 
policy, the value of SO2 reductions may be large, but in the case 
of stringent existing SO2 policy it may be near zero. If SO2 policy 
is too stringent, the value of the co-benefit may be negative 
(assuming SO2 policy is not adjusted). While climate policy affects 
non-climate objectives (Tables TS.4 – 8) other policies also affect 
climate change outcomes. [3.6.3, 4.8, 6.6, Glossary]
Mitigation can have many potential co-benefits and adverse 
side-effects, which makes comprehensive analysis difficult. The 
direct benefits of climate policy include, for example, intended 
effects on global mean surface temperature, sea level rise, agri-
cultural productivity, biodiversity, and health effects of global 
warming [WGII TS]. The co-benefits and adverse side-effects of 
climate policy could include effects on a partly overlapping set 
of objectives such as local air pollutant emissions reductions 
and related health and ecosystem impacts, biodiversity con-
servation, water availability, energy and food security, energy 
access, income distribution, efficiency of the taxation system, 
labour supply and employment, urban sprawl, and the sustain-
ability of the growth of developing countries [3.6, 4.8, 6.6, 
15.2].
All these side-effects are important, because a comprehensive 
evaluation of climate policy needs to account for benefits and 
costs related to other objectives. If overall social welfare is to 
be determined and quantified, this would require valuation 
methods and a consideration of pre-existing efforts to attain 
the many objectives. Valuation is made difficult by factors such 
as interaction between climate policies and pre-existing non-
climate policies, externalities, and non-competitive behaviour. 
[3.6.3]
Mitigation scenarios and sectoral studies show that overall the 
potential for co-benefits of energy end-use measures outweigh 
the potential adverse side-effects, whereas the evidence sug-
gests this may not be the case for all energy supply and AFOLU 
measures (high confidence). (Tables TS.4 – 8) [4.8, 5.7, 6.6, 7.9, 8.7, 
9.7, 10.8, 11.7, 11.13.6, 12.8]
TS.3.2 Sectoral and cross-sectoral mitigation 
measures
Anthropogenic GHG emissions result from a broad set of human 
activities, most notably those associated with energy supply and con-
sumption and with the use of land for food production and other 
purposes. A large proportion of emissions arise in urban areas. Miti-
gation options can be grouped into three broad sectors: (1) energy 
supply, (2) energy end-use sectors including transport, buildings, 
industry, and (3) AFOLU. Emissions from human settlements and 
infrastructures cut across these different sectors. Many mitigation 
options are linked. The precise set of mitigation actions taken in any 
sector will depend on a wide range of factors, including their relative 
economics, policy structures, normative values, and linkages to other 
policy objectives. The first section examines issues that cut across 
the sectors and the following subsections examine the sectors them-
selves. 
TS.3.2.1 Cross-sectoral mitigation pathways and 
measures
Without new mitigation policies GHG emissions are projected 
to grow in all sectors, except for net CO2 emissions in the 
AFOL U 14 sector (robust evidence, medium agreement). Energy sup-
ply sector emissions are expected to continue to be the major source 
of GHG emissions in baseline scenarios, ultimately accounting for the 
significant increases in indirect emissions from electricity use in the 
buildings and the industry sectors. Deforestation decreases in most of 
the baseline scenarios, which leads to a decline in net CO2 emissions 
from the AFOLU sector. In some scenarios the AFOLU sector changes 
from an emission source to a net emission sink towards the end of the 
century. (Figure TS.15) [6.3.1.4, 6.8]
Infrastructure developments and long-lived products that lock 
societies into GHG-intensive emissions pathways may be dif-
ficult or very costly to change, reinforcing the importance of 
early action for ambitious mitigation (robust evidence, high agree-
ment). This lock-in risk is compounded by the lifetime of the infrastruc-
ture, by the difference in emissions associated with alternatives, and 
14 Net AFOLU CO2 emissions include emissions and removals of CO2 from the AFOLU 





the magnitude of the investment cost. As a result, lock-in related to 
infrastructure and spatial planning is the most difficult to eliminate, 
and thus avoiding options that lock high emission patterns in perma-
nently is an important part of mitigation strategies in regions with rap-
idly developing infrastructure. In mature or established cities, options 
are constrained by existing urban forms and infrastructure, and limits 
on the potential for refurbishing or altering them. However, materials, 
products and infrastructure with long lifetimes and low lifecycle emis-
sions can ensure positive lock-in as well as avoid emissions through 
dematerialization (i. e., through reducing the total material inputs 
required to deliver a final service). [5.6.3, 6.3.6.4, 9.4, 10.4, 12.3, 12.4] 
Systemic and cross-sectoral approaches to mitigation are 
expected to be more cost-effective and more effective in cut-
ting emissions than sector-by-sector policies (medium confi-
dence). Cost-effective mitigation policies need to employ a system 
perspective in order to account for inter-dependencies among differ-
ent economic sectors and to maximize synergistic effects. Stabiliz-
ing atmospheric CO2eq concentrations at any level will ultimately 
require deep reductions in emissions and fundamental changes to 
both the end-use and supply-side of the energy system as well as 
changes in land-use practices and industrial processes. In addition, 
many low-carbon energy supply technologies (including CCS) and 
their infrastructural requirements face public acceptance issues lim-
iting their deployment. This applies also to the adoption of new tech-
nologies, and structural and behavioural change, in the energy end-
use sectors (robust evidence, high agreement) [7.9.4, 8.7, 9.3.10, 
9.8, 10.8, 11.3, 11.13]. Lack of acceptance may have implications 
not only for mitigation in that particular sector, but also for wider 
mitigation efforts. 
Integrated models identify three categories of energy system 
related mitigation measures: the decarbonization of the energy 
supply sector, final energy demand reductions, and the switch to 
low-carbon energy carriers, including electricity, in the energy 
end-use sectors (robust evidence, high agreement) [6.3.4, 6.8, 7.11]. 
The broad range of sectoral mitigation options available mainly relate 
to achieving reductions in GHG emissions intensity, energy intensity 
and changes in activity (Table TS.3) [7.5, 8.3, 8.4, 9.3, 10.4, 12.4]. Direct 
options in AFOLU involve storing carbon in terrestrial systems (for 
example, through afforestation) and providing bioenergy feedstocks 
[11.3, 11.13]. Options to reduce non-CO2 GHG emissions exist across 
all sectors, but most notably in agriculture, energy supply, and industry. 
Demand reductions in the energy end-use sectors, due to, e.g., 
efficiency enhancement and behavioural change, are a key miti-
Figure TS.15 | Direct (left panel) and direct and indirect emissions (right panel) of CO2 and non-CO2 GHGs across sectors in baseline scenarios. Non-CO2 GHGs are converted to 
CO2-equivalents based on Global Warming Potentials with a 100-year time horizon from the IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR) (see Box TS.5). Note that in the case of indirect 
emissions, only electricity generation emissions are allocated from energy supply to end-use sectors. In the left panel electricity sector emissions are shown (Electricity*) in addition 
to energy supply sector emissions which they are part of, to illustrate their large role on the energy supply side. The numbers at the bottom refer to the number of scenarios included 


























































































gation strategy and affect the scale of the mitigation challenge 
for the energy supply side (high confidence). Limiting energy demand: 
(1) increases policy choices by maintaining flexibility in the technology 
portfolio; (2) reduces the required pace for up-scaling low-carbon energy 
supply technologies and hedges against related supply-side risks (Fig-
ure TS.16); (3) avoids lock-in to new, or potentially premature retirement 
of, carbon-intensive infrastructures; (4) maximizes co-benefits for other 
policy objectives, since the potential for co-benefits of energy end-use 
measures outweighs the potential for adverse side-effects which may 
not be the case for all supply-side measures (see Tables TS.4 – 8); and 
(5) increases the cost-effectiveness of the transformation (as compared 
to mitigation strategies with higher levels of energy demand) (medium 
confidence). However, energy service demand reductions are unlikely in 
developing countries or for poorer population segments whose energy 
service levels are low or partially unmet. [6.3.4, 6.6, 7.11, 10.4]
Behaviour, lifestyle, and culture have a considerable influence 
on energy use and associated emissions, with a high mitigation 
potential in some sectors, in particular when complementing 
technological and structural change (medium evidence, medium 
agreement). Emissions can be substantially lowered through: changes 
in consumption patterns (e. g., mobility demand and mode, energy use 
in households, choice of longer-lasting products); dietary change and 
reduction in food wastes; and change of lifestyle (e. g., stabilizing / low-
ering consumption in some of the most developed countries, sharing 
economy and other behavioural changes affecting activity) (Table 
TS.3). [8.1, 8.9, 9.2, 9.3, Box 10.2, 10.4, 11.4, 12.4, 12.6, 12.7] 
Evidence from mitigation scenarios indicates that the decar-
bonization of energy supply is a key requirement for stabiliz-
ing atmospheric CO2eq concentrations below 580 ppm (robust 
evidence, high agreement). In most long-term mitigation scenarios not 
exceeding 580 ppm CO2eq by 2100, global energy supply is fully decar-
bonized at the end of the 21st century with many scenarios relying on 
a net removal of CO2 from the atmosphere. However, because exist-
ing supply systems are largely reliant on carbon-intensive fossil fuels, 
energy intensity reductions can equal or outweigh decarbonization of 
energy supply in the near term. In the buildings and industry sector, for 
example, efficiency improvements are an important strategy for reduc-
ing indirect emissions from electricity generation (Figure TS.15). In the 
long term, the reduction in electricity generation emissions is accom-
panied by an increase in the share of electricity in end uses (e. g., for 
Figure TS.16 | Influence of energy demand on the deployment of energy supply technologies in 2050 in mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 to about 500 (430 – 530) ppm 
CO2eq concentrations by 2100. Blue bars for ‘low energy demand’ show the deployment range of scenarios with limited growth of final energy of < 20 % in 2050 compared 
to 2010. Red bars show the deployment range of technologies in case of ‘high energy demand’ (> 20 % growth in 2050 compared to 2010). For each technology, the median, 
interquartile, and full deployment range is displayed. Notes: Scenarios assuming technology restrictions and scenarios with final energy in the base-year outside ± 5 % of 2010 
inventories are excluded. Ranges include results from many different integrated models. Multiple scenario results from the same model were averaged to avoid sampling biases; see 
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demand scenarios 
show higher levels 
of oil supply. 
In high energy demand scenarios, alternative liquid 
and hydrogen technologies are scaled up more 
rapidly. 
High energy demand scenarios show 
a more rapid up-scaling of CCS 
technologies but a more rapid phase-
out of unabated fossil fuel conversion 
technologies.
In high energy demand scenarios non-fossil electricity 




space and process heating, and potentially for some modes of trans-
port). Deep emissions reductions in transport are generally the last to 
emerge in integrated modelling studies because of the limited options 
to switch to low-carbon energy carriers compared to buildings and 
industry (Figure TS.17). [6.3.4, 6.8, 8.9, 9.8, 10.10, 7.11, Figure 6.17]
The availability of CDR technologies affects the size of the miti-
gation challenge for the energy end-use sectors (robust evidence, 
high agreement) [6.8, 7.11]. There are strong interdependencies in 
mitigation scenarios between the required pace of decarbonization of 
energy supply and end-use sectors. The more rapid decarbonization of 
supply generally provides more flexibility for the end-use sectors. How-
ever, barriers to decarbonizing the supply side, resulting for example 
from a limited availability of CCS to achieve negative emissions when 
combined with bioenergy, require a more rapid and pervasive decar-
bonisation of the energy end-use sectors in scenarios achieving low-
CO2eq concentration levels (Figure TS.17). The availability of mature 
large-scale biomass supply for energy, or carbon sequestration tech-
nologies in the AFOLU sector also provides flexibility for the develop-
ment of mitigation technologies in the energy supply and energy end-
use sectors [11.3] (limited evidence, medium agreement), though there 
may be adverse impacts on sustainable development. 
Spatial planning can contribute to managing the development 
of new infrastructure and increasing system-wide efficiencies 
across sectors (robust evidence, high agreement). Land use, transport 
choice, housing, and behaviour are strongly interlinked and shaped by 
infrastructure and urban form. Spatial and land-use planning, such as 
mixed-zoning, transport-oriented development, increasing density, and 
co-locating jobs and homes can contribute to mitigation across sectors 
by (1) reducing emissions from travel demand for both work and lei-
sure, and enabling non-motorized transport, (2) reducing floor space for 
housing, and hence (3) reducing overall direct and indirect energy use 
through efficient infrastructure supply. Compact and in-fill development 
of urban spaces and intelligent densification can save land for agricul-
ture and bioenergy and preserve land carbon stocks. [8.4, 9.10, 10.5, 
11.10, 12.2, 12.3] 
Interdependencies exist between adaptation and mitigation at 
the sectoral level and there are benefits from considering adap-
tation and mitigation in concert (medium evidence, high agree-
ment). Particular mitigation actions can affect sectoral climate vulner-
ability, both by influencing exposure to impacts and by altering the 
capacity to adapt to them [8.5, 11.5]. Other interdependencies include 
climate impacts on mitigation options, such as forest conservation or 
hydropower production [11.5.5, 7.7], as well as the effects of particular 
adaptation options, such as heating or cooling of buildings or estab-
lishing more diversified cropping systems in agriculture, on GHG emis-
sions and radiative forcing [11.5.4, 9.5]. There is a growing evidence 
base for such interdependencies in each sector, but there are substan-
tial knowledge gaps that prevent the generation of integrated results 
at the cross-sectoral level. 







Transport Buildings Industry Electricity Net
AFOLU
Non−CO2 Transport Buildings Industry Electricity Net
AFOLU
Non−CO2








































































Figure TS.17 | Direct emissions of CO2 and non-CO2 GHGs across sectors in mitigation scenarios that reach about 450 (430–480) ppm CO2eq concentrations in 2100 with using 
carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) (left panel) and without using CCS (right panel). The numbers at the bottom of the graphs refer to the number of scenarios included in the 
ranges that differ across sectors and time due to different sectoral resolutions and time horizons of models. White dots in the right panel refer to emissions of individual scenarios to 




Table TS.3 | Main sectoral mitigation measures categorized by key mitigation strategies (in bold) and associated sectoral indicators (highlighted in yellow) as discussed in 
Chapters 7 – 12.
GHG emissions 
intensity reduction
Energy intensity reduction by 
improving technical efficiency
Production and resource 
efficiency improvement













Emissions / secondary 
energy output
Energy input / energy output Embodied energy / energy output
–
Final energy use
Greater deployment of renewable 
energy (RE), nuclear energy, 
and (BE)CCS; fuel switching 
within the group of fossil fuels; 
reduction of fugitive (methane) 
emissions in the fossil fuel chain
Extraction, transport and 
conversion of fossil fuels; 
electricity / heat / fuel transmission, 
distribution, and storage; 
Combined Heat and Power (CHP) 
or cogeneration (see Buildings 
and Human Settlements)
Energy embodied in manufacturing 
of energy extraction, 
conversion, transmission and 
distribution technologies
Addressing integration needs Demand from end-use sectors 
for different energy carriers (see 









Emissions / final energy Final energy / transport service
–
Shares for each mode Total distance per year
Fuel carbon intensity 
(CO2eq / megajoule (MJ)): 
Fuel switching to low-carbon 
fuels e. g., electricity / hydrogen 
from low-carbon sources (see 
Energy); specific biofuels in 
various modes (see AFOLU)
Energy intensity 
(MJ / passenger-km, tonne-
km): Fuel-efficient engines and 
vehicle designs; more advanced 
propulsion systems and designs; 
use of lighter materials in vehicles
Embodied emissions during 
vehicle manufacture; material 
efficiency; and recycling of 
materials (see Industry); 
infrastructure lifecycle emissions 
(see Human Settlements)
Modal shifts from light-duty 
vehicles (LDVs) to public transit, 
cycling / walking, and from aviation 
and heavy-duty vehicles (HDVs) 
to rail; eco-driving; improved 
freight logistics; transport 
(infrastructure) planning
Journey avoidance; higher 
occupancy / loading rates; reduced 









Emissions / final energy Final energy / useful energy Embodied energy / 
operating energy
Useful energy / energy service Energy service demand 
Fuel carbon intensity 
(CO2eq / MJ): Building-
integrated RE technologies; fuel 
switching to low-carbon fuels, 
e. g., electricity (see Energy) 
Device efficiency: heating / 
cooling (high-performance boilers, 
ventilation, air-conditioning, 
heat pumps); water heating; 
cooking (advanced biomass 
stoves); lighting; appliances
Building lifetime; component, 
equipment, and appliance 
durability; low(er) energy and 
emission material choice for 
construction (see Industry)
Systemic efficiency: integrated 
design process; low / zero energy 
buildings; building automation 
and controls; urban planning; 
district heating / cooling and CHP; 
smart meters / grids; commissioning 
Behavioural change (e. g., 
thermostat setting, appliance use); 
lifestyle change (e. g., per capita 








Emissions / final energy Final energy / material production Material input / product output Product demand / service demand Service demand
Emissions intensity: Process 
emissions reductions; use of 
waste (e. g., municipal solid waste 
(MSW) / sewage sludge in cement 
kilns) and CCS in industry; HFCs 
replacement and leak repair; 
fuel switching among fossil fuels 
to low-carbon electricity (see 
Energy) or biomass (see AFOLU)
Energy efficiency / best 
available technologies: 
Efficient steam systems; 
furnace and boiler systems; 
electric motor (pumps, fans, 
air compressor, refrigerators, 
and material handling) and 
electronic control systems; (waste) 
heat exchanges; recycling
Material efficiency: 
Reducing yield losses; 
manufacturing / construction: 
process innovations, new design 
approaches, re-using old material 
(e. g., structural steel); product 
design (e. g., light weight car 
design); fly ash substituting clinker 
Product-service efficiency: 
More intensive use of products 
(e. g., car sharing, using products 
such as clothing for longer, new 
and more durable products)
Reduced demand for, e. g., 
products such as clothing; 
alternative forms of travel 
















Emissions / final energy Final energy / useful energy Material input in infrastructure Useful energy / energy service Service demand per capita
Integration of urban 
renewables; urban-scale fuel 
switching programmes
Cogeneration, heat cascading, 
waste to energy
Managed infrastructure supply; 
reduced primary material 
input for infrastructure
Compact urban form; increased 
accessibility; mixed land use
Increasing accessibility: 






























Supply-side improvements Demand-side measures
Emissions / area or unit product (conserved, restored) Animal / crop product consumption per capita
Emissions reduction: of methane (e. g., 
livestock management) and nitrous oxide 
(fertilizer and manure management) 
and prevention of emissions to the 
atmosphere by conserving existing carbon 
pools in soils or vegetation (reducing 
deforestation and forest degradation, fire 
prevention / control, agroforestry); reduced 
emissions intensity (GHG / unit product).
Sequestration: Increasing the 
size of existing carbon pools, 
thereby extracting CO2 from the 
atmosphere (e. g., afforestation, 
reforestation, integrated systems, 
carbon sequestration in soils)
Substitution: of biological 
products for fossil fuels or 
energy-intensive products, 
thereby reducing CO2 emissions, 
e. g., biomass co-firing / CHP (see 
Energy), biofuels (see Transport), 
biomass-based stoves, and 
insulation products (see Buildings)
Demand-side measures: Reducing losses 
and wastes of food; changes in human diets 
towards less emission-intensive products; 





The energy supply sector is the largest contributor to global 
GHG emissions (robust evidence, high agreement). Annual GHG emis-
sions from the global energy supply sector grew more rapidly between 
2000 and 2010 than in the previous decade; their growth accelerated 
from 1.7 % / yr from 1990 – 2000 to 3.1 % / yr from 2000 – 2010. The main 
contributors to this trend are an increasing demand for energy services 
and a growing share of coal in the global fuel mix. The energy supply 
sector, as defined in this report, comprises all energy extraction, con-
version, storage, transmission, and distribution processes that deliver 
final energy to the end-use sectors (industry, transport, buildings, agri-
culture and forestry). [7.2, 7.3]
In the baseline scenarios assessed in AR5, direct CO2 emissions 
from the energy supply sector increase from 14.4 GtCO2 / yr 
in 2010 to 24 – 33 GtCO2 / yr in 2050 (25 – 75th percentile; full 
range 15 – 42 GtCO2 / yr), with most of the baseline scenarios 
assessed in WGIII AR5 showing a significant increase (medium 
evidence, medium agreement) (Figure TS.15). The lower end of the 
full range is dominated by scenarios with a focus on energy inten-
sity improvements that go well beyond the observed improvements 
over the past 40 years. The availability of fossil fuels alone will not 
be sufficient to limit CO2eq concentration to levels such as 450 ppm, 
550 ppm, or 650 ppm. [6.3.4, 6.8, 7.11, Figure 6.15]
The energy supply sector offers a multitude of options to reduce 
GHG emissions (robust evidence, high agreement). These options 
include: energy efficiency improvements and fugitive emission reduc-
tions in fuel extraction as well as in energy conversion, transmission, 
and distribution systems; fossil fuel switching; and low-GHG energy 
supply technologies such as renewable energy (RE), nuclear power, and 
CCS (Table TS.3). [7.5, 7.8.1, 7.11]
The stabilization of GHG concentrations at low levels requires 
a fundamental transformation of the energy supply system, 
including the long-term phase-out of unabated fossil fuel con-
version technologies and their substitution by low-GHG alter-
natives (robust evidence, high agreement). Concentrations of CO2 in 
the atmosphere can only be stabilized if global (net) CO2 emissions 
peak and decline toward zero in the long term. Improving the energy 
efficiencies of fossil fuel power plants and / or the shift from coal to 
gas will not by themselves be sufficient to achieve this. Low-GHG 
energy supply technologies would be necessary if this goal were to be 
achieved (Figure TS.19). [7.5.1, 7.8.1, 7.11]
Decarbonizing (i. e., reducing the carbon intensity of) electric-
ity generation is a key component of cost-effective mitigation 
strategies in achieving low-stabilization levels (430 – 530 ppm 
CO2eq); in most integrated modelling scenarios, decarboniza-
tion happens more rapidly in electricity generation than in 
the buildings, transport, and industry sectors (medium evidence, 
high agreement) (Figure TS.17). In the majority of mitigation scenar-
ios reaching about 450 ppm CO2eq concentrations by 2100, the share 
of low-carbon electricity supply (comprising RE, nuclear, fossil fuels 
with CCS, and BECCS) increases from the current share of around 
30 % to more than 80 % by 2050, and fossil fuel power generation 
without CCS is phased out almost entirely by 2100 (Figures TS.17 and 
TS.18) [7.14].
Since AR4, many RE technologies have demonstrated substantial 
performance improvements and cost reductions, and a growing 
number of RE technologies have achieved a level of maturity 
to enable deployment at significant scale (robust evidence, high 
agreement). Some technologies are already economically competitive in 
various settings. Levelized costs of PV systems fell most substantially 
between 2009 and 2012, and a less extreme trend has been observed 
for many others RE technologies. Regarding electricity generation alone, 
RE accounted for just over half of the new electricity-generating capacity 
added globally in 2012, led by growth in wind, hydro, and solar power. 
Decentralized RE to meet rural energy needs has also increased, includ-
ing various modern and advanced traditional biomass options as well 
as small hydropower, PV, and wind. Nevertheless, many RE technologies 
still need direct support (e. g., feed-in tariffs (FITs), RE quota obligations, 
and tendering / bidding) and / or indirect support (e. g., sufficiently high 
carbon prices and the internalization of other externalities), if their mar-
ket shares are to be significantly increased. RE technology policies have 
been successful in driving the recent growth of RE. Additional enabling 
policies are needed to address their integration into future energy sys-
tems. (medium evidence, medium agreement) (Figure TS.19) [7.5.3, 
7.6.1, 7.8.2, 7.12, 11.13] 
The use of RE is often associated with co-benefits, including 
the reduction of air pollution, local employment opportunities, 
few severe accidents compared to some other energy supply 
technologies, as well as improved energy access and security 
(medium evidence, medium agreement) (Table TS.4). At the same time, 
however, some RE technologies can have technology and location-spe-
cific adverse side-effects, which can be reduced to a degree through 
appropriate technology selection, operational adjustments, and siting 
of facilities. [7.9] 
Infrastructure and integration challenges vary by RE technology 
and the characteristics of the existing energy system (medium 
evidence, medium agreement). Operating experience and studies of 
medium to high penetrations of RE indicate that integration issues can 
be managed with various technical and institutional tools. As RE pen-
etrations increase, such issues are more challenging, must be carefully 
considered in energy supply planning and operations to ensure reliable 
energy supply, and may result in higher costs. [7.6, 7.8.2] 
Nuclear energy is a mature low-GHG emission source of base-
load power, but its share of global electricity generation has 
been declining (since 1993). Nuclear energy could make an 
increasing contribution to low-carbon energy supply, but a 




ment) (Figure TS.19). Nuclear electricity accounted for 11 % of the 
world’s electricity generation in 2012, down from a high of 17 % in 
1993. Pricing the externalities of GHG emissions (carbon pricing) 
could improve the competitiveness of nuclear power plants. [7.2, 
7.5.4, 7.8.1, 7.12]
Barriers and risks associated with an increasing use of nuclear 
energy include operational risks and the associated safety 
concerns, uranium mining risks, financial and regulatory risks, 
unresolved waste management issues, nuclear weapon prolif-
eration concerns, and adverse public opinion (robust evidence, 
high agreement) (Table TS.4). New fuel cycles and reactor technologies 
addressing some of these issues are under development and progress 
has been made concerning safety and waste disposal. Investigation of 
mitigation scenarios not exceeding 580 ppm CO2eq has shown that 
excluding nuclear power from the available portfolio of technologies 
would result in only a slight increase in mitigation costs compared to 
the full technology portfolio (Figure TS.13). If other technologies, such 
as CCS, are constrained the role of nuclear power expands. [6.3.6, 
7.5.4, 7.8.2, 7.9, 7.11]
GHG emissions from energy supply can be reduced signifi-
cantly by replacing current world average coal-fired power 
plants with modern, highly efficient natural gas combined 
cycle power plants or combined heat and power (CHP) plants, 
provided that natural gas is available and the fugitive emis-
sions associated with its extraction and supply are low or mit-
igated (robust evidence, high agreement). In mitigation scenarios 
reaching about 450 ppm CO2eq concentrations by 2100, natural gas 
power generation without CCS typically acts as a bridge technology, 
with deployment increasing before peaking and falling to below 
current levels by 2050 and declining further in the second half of 
the century (robust evidence, high agreement). [7.5.1, 7.8, 7.9, 7.11, 
7.12]
Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) technologies could 
reduce the lifecycle GHG emissions of fossil fuel power plants 
(medium evidence, medium agreement). While all components of inte-
grated CCS systems exist and are in use today by the fossil fuel extrac-
tion and refining industry, CCS has not yet been applied at scale to 
a large, commercial fossil fuel power plant. CCS power plants could 
be seen in the market if they are required for fossil fuel facilities by 
regulation or if they become competitive with their unabated coun-
terparts, for instance, if the additional investment and operational 
costs faced by CCS plants, caused in part by efficiency reductions, are 
compensated by sufficiently high carbon prices (or direct financial sup-
port). Beyond economic incentives, well-defined regulations concern-
ing short- and long-term responsibilities for storage are essential for a 
large-scale future deployment of CCS. [7.5.5]
Barriers to large-scale deployment of CCS technologies include 
concerns about the operational safety and long-term integrity 
of CO2 storage, as well as risks related to transport and the 
required up-scaling of infrastructure (limited evidence, medium 
agreement) (Table TS.4). There is, however, a growing body of liter-
ature on how to ensure the integrity of CO2 wells, on the potential 
consequences of a CO2 pressure build-up within a geologic formation 
(such as induced seismicity), and on the potential human health and 
environmental impacts from CO2 that migrates out of the primary 
injection zone (limited evidence, medium agreement). [7.5.5, 7.9, 
7.11]
Combining bioenergy with CCS (BECCS) offers the prospect of 
energy supply with large-scale net negative emissions, which 
plays an important role in many low-stabilization scenarios, 
while it entails challenges and risks (limited evidence, medium 
agreement). Until 2050, bottom-up studies estimate the economic 
potential to be between 2 – 10 GtCO2 per year [11.13]. Some mitiga-
tion scenarios show higher deployment of BECCS towards the end of 
the century. Technological challenges and risks include those associ-
ated with the upstream provision of the biomass that is used in the 
CCS facility, as well as those associated with the CCS technology itself. 
Currently, no large-scale projects have been financed. [6.9, 7.5.5, 7.9, 
11.13]
Figure TS.18 | Share of low-carbon energy in total primary energy, electricity and liquid fuels supply sectors for the year 2050. Dashed horizontal lines show the low-carbon share 
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Figure TS.19 | Specific direct and lifecycle emissions (gCO2eq / kilowatt hour (kWh)) and levelized cost of electricity (LCOE in USD2010 / MWh) for various power-generating technolo-
gies (see Annex III.2 for data and assumptions and Annex II.3.1 and II.9.3 for methodological issues). The upper left graph shows global averages of specific direct CO2 emissions 
(gCO2 / kWh) of power generation in 2030 and 2050 for the set of about 450 to about 500 (430 – 530) ppm CO2eq scenarios that are contained in the WG III AR5 Scenario Database 
(see Annex II.10). The global average of specific direct CO2 emissions (gCO2 / kWh) of power generation in 2010 is shown as a vertical line. Note: The inter-comparability of LCOE is 
limited. For details on general methodological issues and interpretation see Annexes as mentioned above. CCS: CO2 capture and storage; IGCC: Integrated coal gasification com-
bined cycle; PC: Pulverized hard coal; PV: Photovoltaic; WACC: Weighted average cost of capital. [Figure 7.7]
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1 Assuming biomass feedstocks are dedicated energy plants and crop residues and 80-95% coal input.
2 Assuming feedstocks are dedicated energy plants and crop residues.
* Carbon price levied on direct emissions. Effects shown where significant.
3 Direct emissions of biomass power plants are not shown explicitly, but included in the lifecycle 
  emissions. Lifecycle emissions include albedo effect.
4 LCOE of nuclear include front and back-end fuel costs as well as decommissioning costs.
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Since AR4, emissions in the global transport sector have grown 
in spite of more efficient vehicles (road, rail, watercraft, and 
aircraft) and policies being adopted (robust evidence, high agree-
ment). Road transport dominates overall emissions but aviation could 
play an increasingly important role in total CO2 emissions in the future. 
[8.1, 8.3, 8.4]
The global transport sector accounted for 27 % of final energy 
use and 6.7 GtCO2 direct emissions in 2010, with baseline CO2 
emissions projected to increase to 9.3 – 12 GtCO2 / yr in 2050 
(25 – 75th percentile; full range 6.2 – 16 GtCO2 / yr); most of the 
baseline scenarios assessed in WGIII AR5 foresee a significant 
increase (medium evidence / medium agreement) (Figure TS.15). With-
out aggressive and sustained mitigation policies being implemented, 
transport sector emissions could increase faster than in the other 
energy end-use sectors and could lead to more than a doubling of CO2 
emissions by 2050. [6.8, 8.9, 8.10]
While the continuing growth in passenger and freight activity 
constitutes a challenge for future emission reductions, analyses 
of both sectoral and integrated studies suggest a higher mitiga-
tion potential in the transport sector than reported in the AR4 
(medium evidence, medium agreement). Transport energy demand 
per capita in developing and emerging economies is far lower than 
in OECD countries but is expected to increase at a much faster rate in 
the next decades due to rising incomes and the development of infra-
structure. Baseline scenarios thus show increases in transport energy 
demand from 2010 out to 2050 and beyond. However, sectoral and 
Table TS.4 | Overview of potential co-benefits (green arrows) and adverse side-effects (orange arrows) of the main mitigation measures in the energy supply sector; arrows pointing 
up / down denote a positive / negative effect on the respective objective or concern; a question mark (?) denotes an uncertain net effect. Co-benefits and adverse side-effects depend 
on local circumstances as well as on the implementation practice, pace, and scale. For possible upstream effects of biomass supply for bioenergy, see Table TS.8. For an assessment 
of macroeconomic, cross-sectoral effects associated with mitigation policies (e. g., on energy prices, consumption, growth, and trade), see e. g., Sections 3.9, 6.3.6, 13.2.2.3 and 
14.4.2. The uncertainty qualifiers in brackets denote the level of evidence and agreement on the respective effects (see TS.1). Abbreviations for evidence: l=limited, m=medium, 
r=robust; for agreement: l=low, m=medium, h=high. [Table 7.3]
Energy Supply
Effect on additional objectives / concerns







Energy security (reduced exposure 
to fuel price volatility) (m / m)
Local employment impact (but 
uncertain net effect) (l / m)
Legacy cost of waste and 







Health impact via 
Air pollution and coal 
mining accidents (m / h)
Nuclear accidents and waste 
treatment, uranium
mining and milling (m / l)





Ecosystem impact via 
Air pollution (m / h) and 
coal mining (l / h)
Nuclear accidents (m / m)
Proliferation 
risk (m / m)














Energy security (resource 
sufficiency, diversity in the 
near / medium term) (r / m)
Local employment impact (but 
uncertain net effect) (m / m)
Irrigation, flood control, 
navigation, water availability (for 
multipurpose use of reservoirs 
and regulated rivers) (m / h)
Extra measures to match demand 








Health impact via 
Air pollution (except 
bioenergy) (r / h)
Coal mining accidents (m / h)
Contribution to (off-grid) 
energy access (m / l)
Project-specific public acceptance 
concerns (e. g., visibility of wind) (l / m)
Threat of displacement (for 










Ecosystem impact via 
Air pollution (except 
bioenergy) (m / h)
Coal mining (l / h)
Habitat impact (for some 
hydro) (m / m)
Landscape and wildlife 
impact (for wind) m / m)
Water use (for wind and PV) (m / m)
Water use (for bioenergy, CSP, 
geothermal, and reservoir hydro) (m / h)
Higher use of critical 
metals for PV and 
direct drive wind 
turbines (r / m)
Fossil CCS 
replacing coal 
↑ ↑ Preservation vs. lock-in of 
human and physical capital in 






Risk of CO2 leakage (m / m)
Upstream supply-chain 
activities (m / h)
Safety concerns (CO2 storage 
and transport) (m / h)
↑ 
↑
Ecosystem impact via upstream 
supply-chain activities (m / m)
Water use (m / h)
Long-term 
monitoring of CO2 
storage (m / h)
BECCS 
replacing coal






↑ Energy security (potential to 
use gas in some cases) (l / h)
↓ 
↑
Health impact via reduced 
air pollution (m / m)
Occupational safety at 
coal mines (m / m)
↓ Ecosystem impact via reduced 




integrated mitigation scenarios indicate that energy demand reduc-
tions of 10 – 45 % are possible by 2050 relative to baseline (Figure 
TS.20, left panel) (medium evidence, medium agreement). [6.8.4, 8.9.1, 
8.9.4, 8.12, Figure 8.9.4]
A combination of low-carbon fuels, the uptake of improved 
vehicle and engine performance technologies, behavioural 
change leading to avoided journeys and modal shifts, invest-
ments in related infrastructure and changes in the built environ-
ment, together offer a high mitigation potential (high confidence) 
[8.3, 8.8]. Direct (tank-to-wheel) GHG emissions from passenger and 
freight transport can be reduced by: 
•	 using fuels with lower carbon intensities (CO2eq / megajoule (MJ));
•	 lowering vehicle energy intensities   
(MJ / passenger-km or MJ / tonne-km); 
•	 encouraging modal shift to lower-carbon passenger and freight 
transport systems coupled with investment in infrastructure and 
compact urban form; and
•	 avoiding journeys where possible (Table TS.3). 
Other short-term mitigation strategies include reducing black carbon 
(BC), aviation contrails, and nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions. [8.4]
Strategies to reduce the carbon intensities of fuel and the rate 
of reducing carbon intensity are constrained by challenges 
associated with energy storage and the relatively low energy 
density of low-carbon transport fuels; integrated and sectoral 
studies broadly agree that opportunities for fuel switching 
exist in the short term and will grow over time (medium evi-
dence, medium agreement) (Figure TS.20, right panel). Electric, hydro-
gen, and some biofuel technologies could help reduce the carbon 
intensity of fuels, but their total mitigation potentials are very uncer-
tain (medium evidence, medium agreement). Methane-based fuels 
are already increasing their share for road vehicles and waterborne 
craft. Electricity produced from low-carbon sources has near-term 
potential for electric rail and short- to medium-term potential as elec-
tric buses, light-duty and 2-wheel road vehicles are deployed. Hydro-
gen fuels from low-carbon sources constitute longer-term options. 
Commercially available liquid and gaseous biofuels already provide 
co-benefits together with mitigation options that can be increased 
by technology advances, particularly drop-in biofuels for aircraft. 
Reducing transport emissions of particulate matter (including BC), 
tropospheric ozone and aerosol precursors (including NOx) can have 
human health and mitigation co-benefits in the short term (medium 
evidence, medium agreement). Up to 2030, the majority of integrated 
studies expect a continued reliance on liquid and gaseous fuels, sup-
ported by an increase in the use of biofuels. During the second half 
of the century, many integrated studies also show substantial shares 
of electricity and / or hydrogen to fuel electric and fuel-cell light-duty 
vehicles (LDVs). [8.2, 8.3, 11.13]
Energy efficiency measures through improved vehicle and 
engine designs have the largest potential for emissions reduc-
        
Figure TS.20 | Final energy demand reduction relative to baseline (left panel) and development of final low-carbon energy carrier share in final energy (including electricity, hydro-
gen, and liquid biofuels; right panel) in transport by 2030 and 2050 in mitigation scenarios from three different CO2eq concentrations ranges shown in boxplots (see Section 6.3.2) 
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tions in the short term (high confidence). Potential energy efficiency 
and vehicle performance improvements range from 30 – 50 % relative 
to 2010 depending on transport mode and vehicle type (Figures TS.21, 
TS.22). Realizing this efficiency potential will depend on large invest-
ments by vehicle manufacturers, which may require strong incentives 
and regulatory policies in order to achieve GHG emissions reduction 
goals (medium evidence, medium agreement). [8.3, 8.6, 8.9, 8.10]
Shifts in transport mode and behaviour, impacted by new 
infrastructure and urban (re)development, can contribute to 
the reduction of transport emissions (medium evidence, low 
agreement). Over the medium term (up to 2030) to long term (to 
2050 and beyond), urban redevelopment and investments in new 
infrastructure, linked with integrated urban planning, transit-oriented 
development, and more compact urban form that supports cycling 
and walking can all lead to modal shifts. Such mitigation measures 
are challenging, have uncertain outcomes, and could reduce trans-
port GHG emissions by 20 – 50 % compared to baseline (limited evi-
dence, low agreement). Pricing strategies, when supported by pub-
lic acceptance initiatives and public and non-motorized transport 
infrastructures, can reduce travel demand, increase the demand for 
more efficient vehicles (e. g., where fuel economy standards exist) 
and induce a shift to low-carbon modes (medium evidence, medium 
agreement). While infrastructure investments may appear expensive 
at the margin, the case for sustainable urban planning and related 
policies is reinforced when co-benefits, such as improved health, 
accessibility, and resilience, are accounted for (Table TS.5). Busi-
ness initiatives to decarbonize freight transport have begun but will 
need further support from fiscal, regulatory, and advisory policies to 
encourage shifting from road to low-carbon modes such as rail or 
waterborne options where feasible, as well as improving logistics 
(Figure TS.22). [8.4, 8.5, 8.7, 8.8, 8.9, 8.10] 
Sectoral and integrated studies agree that substantial, sus-
tained, and directed policy interventions could limit transport 
emissions to be consistent with low concentration goals, but 
the societal mitigation costs (USD / tCO2eq avoided) remain 
uncertain (Figures TS.21, TS.22, TS.23). There is good potential to 
reduce emissions from LDVs and long-haul heavy-duty vehicles (HDVs) 
from both lower energy intensity vehicles and fuel switching, and the 
levelized costs of conserved carbon (LCCC) for efficiency improvements 
can be very low and negative (limited evidence, low agreement). Rail, 
buses, two-wheel motorbikes, and waterborne craft for freight already 
have relatively low emissions so their emissions reduction potential is 
limited. The mitigation cost of electric vehicles is currently high, espe-
cially if using grid electricity with a high emissions factor, but their 
LCCC are expected to decline by 2030. The emissions intensity of avia-
tion could decline by around 50 % in 2030 but the LCCC, although 
uncertain, are probably over USD  100 / tCO2eq. While it is expected 
that mitigation costs will decrease in the future, the magnitude of such 
reductions is uncertain. (limited evidence, low agreement) [8.6, 8.9]
Barriers to decarbonizing transport for all modes differ across 
regions but can be overcome, in part, through economic 
incentives (medium evidence, medium agreement). Financial, insti-
tutional, cultural, and legal barriers constrain low-carbon technol-
ogy uptake and behavioural change. They include the high invest-
ment costs needed to build low-emissions transport systems, the 
slow turnover of stock and infrastructure, and the limited impact of 
a carbon price on petroleum fuels that are already heavily taxed. 
Regional differences are likely due to cost and policy constraints. Oil 
price trends, price instruments on GHG emissions, and other mea-
sures such as road pricing and airport charges can provide strong 
economic incentives for consumers to adopt mitigation measures. 
[8.8]
There are regional differences in transport mitigation pathways 
with major opportunities to shape transport systems and infra-
structure around low-carbon options, particularly in develop-
ing and emerging countries where most future urban growth 
will occur (robust evidence, high agreement). Possible transforma-
tion pathways vary with region and country due to differences in the 
dynamics of motorization, age and type of vehicle fleets, existing infra-
structure, and urban development processes. Prioritizing infrastructure 
for pedestrians, integrating non-motorized and transit services, and 
managing excessive road speed for both urban and rural travellers can 
create economic and social co-benefits in all regions. For all econo-
mies, especially those with high rates of urban growth, investments 
in public transport systems and low-carbon infrastructure can avoid 
lock-in to carbon-intensive modes. Established infrastructure may limit 
the options for modal shift and lead to a greater reliance on advanced 
vehicle technologies; a slowing of growth in LDV demand is already 
evident in some OECD countries. (medium evidence, medium agree-
ment) [8.4, 8.9]
A range of strong and mutually supportive policies will be 
needed for the transport sector to decarbonize and for the 
co-benefits to be exploited (robust evidence, high agreement). 
Transport mitigation strategies associated with broader non-climate 
policies at all government levels can usually target several objec-
tives simultaneously to give lower travel costs, improved access and 
mobility, better health, greater energy security, improved safety, and 
increased time savings. Activity reduction measures have the largest 
potential to realize co-benefits. Realizing the co-benefits depends on 
the regional context in terms of economic, social, and political fea-
sibility as well as having access to appropriate and cost-effective 
advanced technologies (Table TS.5). (medium evidence, high agree-
ment) Since rebound effects can reduce the CO2 benefits of efficiency 
improvements and undermine a particular policy, a balanced package 
of policies, including pricing initiatives, could help to achieve stable 
price signals, avoid unintended outcomes, and improve access, mobil-
ity, productivity, safety, and health (medium evidence, medium agree-




Figure TS.21 | Indicative emissions intensity (tCO2eq / p-km) and levelized costs of conserved carbon (LCCC in USD2010 / tCO2eq saved) of selected passenger transport technologies. 
Variations in emissions intensities stem from variation in vehicle efficiencies and occupancy rates. Estimated LCCC for passenger road transport options are point estimates ± 100 
USD2010 / tCO2eq based on central estimates of input parameters that are very sensitive to assumptions (e. g., specific improvement in vehicle fuel economy to 2030, specific biofuel CO2eq 
intensity, vehicle costs, fuel prices). They are derived relative to different baselines (see legend for colour coding) and need to be interpreted accordingly. Estimates for 2030 are based 
on projections from recent studies, but remain inherently uncertain. LCCC for aviation are taken directly from the literature. Table 8.3 provides additional context (see Annex III.3 for data 
and assumptions on emissions intensities and cost calculations and Annex II.3.1 for methodological issues on levelized cost metrics). WACC: Weighted average cost of capital. [Table 8.3]
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Figure TS.22 | Indicative emissions intensity (tCO2eq / t-km) and levelized costs of conserved carbon (LCCC in USD2010 / tCO2eq saved) of selected freight transport technologies. 
Variations in emissions intensities largely stem from variation in vehicle efficiencies and load rates. Levelized costs of conserved carbon are taken directly from the literature and are 
very sensitive to assumptions (e. g., specific improvement in vehicle fuel economy to 2030, specific biofuel CO2eq intensity, vehicle costs, and fuel prices). They are expressed relative 
to current baseline technologies (see legend for colour coding) and need to be interpreted accordingly. Estimates for 2030 are based on projections from recent studies but remain 
inherently uncertain. Table 8.3 provides additional context (see Annex III.3 for data and assumptions on emissions intensities and cost calculations and Annex II.3.1 for method-
ological issues on levelized cost metrics). LNG: Liquefied natural gas; WACC: Weighted average cost of capital. [Table 8.3]
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Figure TS.23 | Direct global CO2 emissions from all passenger and freight transport are indexed relative to 2010 values for each scenario with integrated model studies grouped by 
CO2eq concentration levels by 2100, and sectoral studies grouped by baseline and policy categories. [Figure 8.9]












































Table TS.5 | Overview of potential co-benefits (green arrows) and adverse side-effects (orange arrows) of the main mitigation measures in the transport sector; arrows pointing 
up / down denote a positive / negative effect on the respective objective or concern; a question mark (?) denotes an uncertain net effect. Co-benefits and adverse side-effects depend 
on local circumstances as well as on implementation practice, pace and scale. For possible upstream effects of low-carbon electricity, see Table TS.4. For possible upstream effects 
of biomass supply, see Table TS.8. For an assessment of macroeconomic, cross-sectoral effects associated with mitigation policies (e. g., on energy prices, consumption, growth, 
and trade), see e. g., Sections 3.9, 6.3.6, 13.2.2.3 and 14.4.2. The uncertainty qualifiers in brackets denote the level of evidence and agreement on the respective effects (see TS.1). 
Abbreviations for evidence: l = limited, m = medium, r = robust; for agreement: l = low, m = medium, h = high. [Table 8.4]
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GHG emissions from the buildings secto r 15 have more than dou-
bled since 1970, accounting for 19 % of global GHG emissions 
in 2010, including indirect emissions from electricity genera-
tion. The share rises to 25 % if AFOLU emissions are excluded from the 
total. The buildings sector also accounted for 32 % of total global final 
energy use, approximately one-third of black carbon emissions, and an 
eighth to a third of F-gases, with significant uncertainty (medium evi-
dence, medium agreement). (Figure TS.3) [9.2]
Direct and indirect CO2 emissions from buildings are projected 
to increase from 8.8 GtCO2 / yr in 2010 to 13 – 17 GtCO2 / yr in 
2050 (25 – 75th percentile; full range 7.9 – 22 GtCO2 / yr) in base-
line scenarios; most of the baseline scenarios assessed in WGIII 
AR5 show a significant increase (medium evidence, medium agree-
ment) (Figure TS.15) [6.8]. The lower end of the full range is dominated 
by scenarios with a focus on energy intensity improvements that go 
well beyond the observed improvements over the past 40 years. With-
out further policies, final energy use of the buildings sector may grow 
from approximately 120 exajoules per year (EJ / yr) in 2010 to 270 EJ / yr 
in 2050 [9.9].
Significant lock-in risks arise from the long lifespans of build-
ings and related infrastructure (robust evidence, high agreement). 
If only currently planned policies are implemented, the final energy use 
in buildings that could be locked-in by 2050, compared to a scenario 
where today’s best practice buildings become the standard in newly 
built structures and retrofits, is equivalent to approximately 80 % of 
the final energy use of the buildings sector in 2005. [9.4]
Improvements in wealth, lifestyle change, the provision of 
access to modern energy services and adequate housing, and 
urbanization will drive the increases in building energy demand 
(robust evidence, high agreement). The manner in which those without 
access to adequate housing (about 0.8 billion people), modern energy 
carriers, and sufficient levels of energy services including clean cooking 
and heating (about 3 billion people) meet these needs will influence 
the development of building-related emissions. In addition, migration 
to cities, decreasing household size, increasing levels of wealth, and 
lifestyle changes, including increasing dwelling size and number and 
use of appliances, all contribute to considerable increases in building 
energy services demand. The substantial amount of new construction 
taking place in developing countries represents both a risk and oppor-
tunity from a mitigation perspective. [9.2, 9.4, 9.9]
Recent advances in technologies, know-how, and policies in the 
buildings sector, however, make it feasible that the global total 
sector final energy use stabilizes or even declines by mid-century 
(robust evidence, medium agreement). Recent advances in technology, 
15 The buildings sector covers the residential, commercial, public and services sectors; 
emissions from construction are accounted for in the industry sector.
design practices and know-how, coupled with behavioural changes, can 
achieve a two to ten-fold reduction in energy requirements of individual 
new buildings and a two to four-fold reduction for individual existing 
buildings largely cost-effectively or sometimes even at net negative 
costs (see Box TS.12) (robust evidence, high agreement). [9.6]
Advances since AR4 include the widespread demonstration 
worldwide of very low, or net zero energy buildings both in 
new construction and retrofits (robust evidence, high agreement). 
In some jurisdictions, these have already gained important market 
shares with, for instance, over 25 million m2 of building floorspace in 
Europe complying with the ‘Passivehouse’ standard in 2012. However, 
zero energy / carbon buildings may not always be the most cost-optimal 
solution, nor even be feasible in certain building types and locations. 
[9.3]
High-performance retrofits are key mitigation strategies in 
countries with existing building stocks, as buildings are very 
long-lived and a large fraction of 2050 developed country 
buildings already exists (robust evidence, high agreement). Reduc-
tions of heating / cooling energy use by 50 – 90 % have been achieved 
using best practices. Strong evidence shows that very low-energy con-
struction and retrofits can be economically attractive. [9.3]
With ambitious policies it is possible to keep global building 
energy use constant or significantly reduce it by mid-century 
compared to baseline scenarios which anticipate an increase of 
more than two-fold (medium evidence, medium agreement) (Figure 
TS.24). Detailed building sector studies indicate a larger energy sav-
ings potential by 2050 than do integrated studies. The former indicate 
a potential of up to 70 % of the baseline for heating and cooling only, 
and around 35 – 45 % for the whole sector. In general, deeper reduc-
tions are possible in thermal energy uses than in other energy services 
mainly relying on electricity. With respect to additional fuel switching 
as compared to baseline, both sectoral and integrated studies find 
modest opportunities. In general, both sectoral and integrated studies 
indicate that electricity will supply a growing share of building energy 
demand over the long term, especially if heating demand decreases 
due to a combination of efficiency gains, better architecture, and cli-
mate change. [6.8.4, 9.8.2, Figure 9.19]
The history of energy efficiency programmes in buildings shows 
that 25 – 30 % efficiency improvements have been available at 
costs substantially lower than those of marginal energy sup-
ply (robust evidence, high agreement). Technological progress enables 
the potential for cost-effective energy efficiency improvements to be 
maintained, despite continuously improving standards. There has been 
substantial progress in the adoption of voluntary and mandatory stan-
dards since AR4, including ambitious building codes and targets, vol-
untary construction standards, and appliance standards. At the same 
time, in both new and retrofitted buildings, as well as in appliances 
and information, communication and media technology equipment, 




Figure TS.24 | Final energy demand reduction relative to baseline (left panel) and development of final low-carbon energy carrier share in final energy (from electricity; right panel) 
in buildings by 2030 and 2050 in mitigation scenarios from three different CO2eq concentrations ranges shown in boxplots (see Section 6.3.2) compared to sectoral studies shown 
in shapes assessed in Chapter 9. Filled circles correspond to sectoral studies with full sectoral coverage while empty circles correspond to studies with only partial sectoral coverage 
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Box TS.12 | Negative private mitigation costs
A persistent issue in the analysis of mitigation options and costs 
is whether there are mitigation opportunities that are privately 
beneficial — generating private benefits that more than offset the 
costs of implementation — but which consumers and firms do 
not voluntarily undertake. There is some evidence of unrealized 
mitigation opportunities that would have negative private cost. 
Possible examples include investments in vehicles [8.1], lighting 
and heating technology in homes and commercial buildings [9.3], 
as well as industrial processes [10.1].
Examples of negative private costs imply that firms and indi-
viduals do not take opportunities to save money. This might be 
explained in a number of ways. One is that status-quo bias can 
inhibit the switch to new technologies or products [2.4, 3.10.1]. 
Another is that firms and individuals may focus on short-term 
goals and discount future costs and benefits sharply; consumers 
have been shown to do this when choosing energy conservation 
measures or investing in energy-efficient technologies [2.4.3, 
2.6.5.3, 3.10.1]. Risk aversion and ambiguity aversion may also 
account for this behaviour when outcomes are uncertain [2.4.3, 
3.10.1]. Other possible explanations include: insufficient informa-
tion on opportunities to conserve energy; asymmetric informa-
tion — for example, landlords may be unable to convey the value 
of energy efficiency improvements to renters; split incentives, 
where one party pays for an investment but another party reaps 
the benefits; and imperfect credit markets, which make it difficult 
or expensive to obtain finance for energy savings [3.10.1, 16.4]. 
Some engineering studies show a large potential for negative-cost 
mitigation. The extent to which such negative-cost opportunities 
can actually be realized remains a matter of contention in the 
literature. Empirical evidence is mixed. [Box 3.10]
reductions in thermal energy use in buildings are possible at costs 
lower than those of marginal energy supply, with the most cost-effec-
tive options including very high-performance new commercial build-
ings; the same holds for efficiency improvements in some appliances 
and cooking equipment. [9.5, 9.6, 9.9]
Lifestyle, culture, and other behavioural changes may lead 
to further large reductions in building and appliance energy 
requirements beyond those achievable through technologies 
and architecture. A three- to five-fold difference in energy use 




service levels in buildings. (limited evidence, high agreement) For 
developed countries, scenarios indicate that lifestyle and behavioural 
changes could reduce energy demand by up to 20 % in the short term 
and by up to 50 % of present levels by mid-century (medium evidence, 
medium agreement). There is a high risk that emerging countries 
follow the same path as developed economies in terms of building-
related architecture, lifestyle, and behaviour. But the literature sug-
gests that alternative development pathways exist that provide high 
levels of building services at much lower energy inputs, incorporating 
strategies such as learning from traditional lifestyles, architecture, and 
construction techniques. [9.3]
Most mitigation options in the building sector have consider-
able and diverse co-benefits (robust evidence, high agreement). 
These include, but are not limited to: energy security; less need for 
energy subsidies; health and environmental benefits (due to reduced 
indoor and outdoor air pollution); productivity and net employment 
gains; the alleviation of fuel poverty; reduced energy expenditures; 
increased value for building infrastructure; and improved comfort and 
services. (Table TS.6) [9.6, 9.7]
Especially strong barriers in this sector hinder the market-
based uptake of cost-effective technologies and practices; as 
a consequence, programmes and regulation are more effective 
than pricing instruments alone (robust evidence, high agreement). 
Barriers include imperfect information and lack of awareness, princi-
pal / agent problems and other split incentives, transaction costs, lack 
of access to financing, insufficient training in all construction-related 
trades, and cognitive / behavioural barriers. In developing countries, the 
large informal sector, energy subsidies, corruption, high implicit dis-
count rates, and insufficient service levels are further barriers. There-
fore, market forces alone are not expected to achieve the necessary 
transformation without external stimuli. Policy intervention addressing 
all stages of the building and appliance lifecycle and use, plus new 
business and financial models, are essential. [9.8, 9.10]
A large portfolio of building-specific energy efficiency poli-
cies was already highlighted in AR4, but further considerable 
advances in available instruments and their implementation 
have occurred since (robust evidence, high agreement). Evidence 
shows that many building energy efficiency policies worldwide have 
Table TS.6 | Overview of potential co-benefits (green arrows) and adverse side-effects (orange arrows) of the main mitigation measures in the buildings sector; arrows pointing 
up / down denote a positive / negative effect on the respective objective or concern. Co-benefits and adverse side-effects depend on local circumstances as well as on implementation 
practice, pace and scale. For possible upstream effects of fuel switching and RE, see Tables TS.4 and TS.8. For an assessment of macroeconomic, cross-sectoral effects associated with 
mitigation policies (e. g., on energy prices, consumption, growth, and trade), see e. g., Sections 3.9, 6.3.6, 13.2.2.3 and 14.4.2. The uncertainty qualifiers in brackets denote the level of 
evidence and agreement on the respective effects (see TS.1). Abbreviations for evidence: l = limited, m = medium, r = robust; for agreement: l = low, m = medium, h = high. [Table 9.7]
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already been saving GHG emissions at large negative costs. Among the 
most environmentally and cost-effective policies are regulatory instru-
ments such as building and appliance energy performance standards 
and labels, as well as public leadership programmes and procurement 
policies. Progress in building codes and appliance standards in some 
developed countries over the last decade have contributed to stabi-
lizing or even reducing total building energy use, despite growth in 
population, wealth, and corresponding energy service level demands. 
Developing countries have also been adopting different effective 
policies, most notably appliance standards. However, in order to reach 
ambitious climate goals, these standards need to be substantially 
strengthened and adopted in further jurisdictions, and to other build-
ing and appliance types. Due to larger capital requirements, financing 
instruments are essential both in developed and developing countries 
to achieve deep reductions in energy use. [9.10]
TS.3.2.5 Industry 
In 2010, the industry sector accounted for around 28 % of final 
energy use, and direct and indirect GHG emissions (the latter 
being associated with electricity consumption) are larger than 
the emissions from either the buildings or transport end-use 
sectors and represent just over 30 % of global GHG emissions 
in 2010 (the share rises to 40 % if AFOLU emissions are excluded 
from the total) (high confidence). Despite the declining share of indus-
try in global GDP, global industry and waste / wastewater GHG emis-
sions grew from 10 GtCO2eq in 1990 to 13 GtCO2eq in 2005 and to 
15 GtCO2eq in 2010 (of which waste / wastewater accounted for 
1.4 GtCO2eq). [10.3]
Carbon dioxide emissions from industry, including direct and 
indirect emissions as well as process emissions, are projected 
to increase from 13 GtCO2 / yr in 2010 to 20 – 24 GtCO2 / yr in 2050 
(25 – 75th percentile; full range 9.5 – 34 GtCO2 / yr) in baseline 
scenarios; most of the baseline scenarios assessed in WGIII AR5 
show a significant increase (medium evidence, medium agreement) 
(Figure TS.15) [6.8]. The lower end of the full range is dominated by 
scenarios with a focus on energy intensity improvements that go well 
beyond the observed improvements over the past 40 years. 
The wide-scale upgrading, replacement and deployment of best 
available technologies, particularly in countries where these are 
not in practice, and in non-energy intensive industries, could 
directly reduce the energy intensity of the industry sector by 
about 25 % compared to the current level (robust evidence, high 
agreement). Despite long-standing attention to energy efficiency in 
industry, many options for improved energy efficiency still remain. 
Through innovation, additional reductions of about 20 % in energy 
intensity may potentially be realized (limited evidence, medium agree-
Figure TS.25 | A schematic illustration of industrial activity over the supply chain. Options for mitigation in the industry sector are indicated by the circled numbers: (1) energy 
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Figure TS.26 | Final energy demand reduction relative to baseline (left panel) and development of final low-carbon energy carrier share in final energy (including electricity, heat, 
hydrogen, and bioenergy; right panel) in industry by 2030 and 2050 in mitigation scenarios from three different CO2eq concentration ranges shown in boxplots (see Section 6.3.2) 
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ment). Barriers to implementing energy efficiency relate largely to 
the initial investment costs and lack of information. Information pro-
grammes are a prevalent approach for promoting energy efficiency, 
followed by economic instruments, regulatory approaches, and volun-
tary actions. [10.4, 10.7, 10.9, 10.11]
An absolute reduction in emissions from the industry sector will 
require deployment of a broad set of mitigation options that 
go beyond energy efficiency measures (medium evidence, high 
agreement) [10.4, 10.7]. In the context of continued overall growth in 
industrial demand, substantial reductions from the sector will require 
parallel efforts to increase emissions efficiency (e. g., through fuel and 
feedstock switching or CCS); material use efficiency (e. g., less scrap, 
new product design); recycling and re-use of materials and products; 
product-service efficiency (e. g., more intensive use of products through 
car sharing, longer life for products); radical product innovations (e. g., 
alternatives to cement); as well as service demand reductions. Lack of 
policy and experiences in material and product-service efficiency are 
major barriers. (Table TS.3, Figure TS.25) [10.4, 10.7, 10.11] 
While detailed industry sector studies tend to be more conser-
vative than integrated studies, both identify possible industrial 
final energy demand savings of around 30 % by 2050 in mitiga-
tion scenarios not exceeding 650 ppm CO2eq by 2100 relative 
to baseline scenarios (medium evidence, medium agreement) (Fig-
ure TS.26). Integrated models in general treat the industry sector in a 
more aggregated fashion and mostly do not explicitly provide detailed 
sub-sectoral material flows, options for reducing material demand, 
and price-induced inter-input substitution possibilities. Due to the het-
erogeneous character of the industry sector, a coherent comparison 
between sectoral and integrated studies remains difficult. [6.8.4, 10.4, 
10.7, 10.10.1, Figure 10.14]
Mitigation in the industry sector can also be achieved by 
reducing material and fossil fuel demand by enhanced waste 
use, which concomitantly reduces direct GHG emissions from 
waste disposal (robust evidence, high agreement). The hierarchy 
of waste management places waste reduction at the top, followed 
by re-use, recycling, and energy recovery. As the share of recycled or 
reused material is still low, applying waste treatment technologies 
and recovering energy to reduce demand for fossil fuels can result in 
direct emission reductions from waste disposal. Globally, only about 
20 % of municipal solid waste (MSW) is recycled and about 14 % is 
treated with energy recovery while the rest is deposited in open dump-
sites or landfills. About 47 % of wastewater produced in the domestic 
and manufacturing sectors is still untreated. The largest cost range is 
for reducing GHG emissions from landfilling through the treatment 
of waste by anaerobic digestion. The costs range from negative (see 
Box TS.12) to very high. Advanced wastewater treatment technologies 
may enhance GHG emissions reduction in wastewater treatment but 
they are clustered among the higher cost options (medium evidence, 




Figure TS.27 | Indicative CO2 emission intensities for cement (upper panel) and steel (lower panel) production, as well as indicative levelized cost of conserved carbon (LCCC) 
shown for various production practices / technologies and for 450 ppm CO2eq scenarios of a limited selection of integrated models (for data and methodology, see Annex III). DRI: 
Direct reduced iron; EAF: Electric arc furnace. [Figures 10.7, 10.8]
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Electricity Supply Combined
Waste policy and regulation have largely influenced material 
consumption, but few policies have specifically pursued mate-
rial efficiency or product-service efficiency (robust evidence, high 
agreement) [10.11]. Barriers to improving material efficiency include 
lack of human and institutional capacities to encourage management 
decisions and public participation. Also, there is a lack of experience 
and often there are no clear incentives either for suppliers or consum-
ers to address improvements in material or product-service efficiency, 
or to reduce product demand. [10.9]
CO2 emissions dominate GHG emissions from industry, but there 




Figure TS.28 | Indicative global CO2eq emissions for chemicals production (upper panel) and indicative global CO2 emission intensities for paper production (lower panel) as well 
as indicative levelized cost of conserved carbon (LCCC) shown for various production practices / technologies and for 450 ppm CO2eq scenarios of a limited selection of integrated 
models (for data and methodology, see Annex III). [Figures 10.9, 10.10]
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(robust evidence, high agreement). Methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) 
and fluorinated gases (F-gases) from industry accounted for emissions of 
0.9 GtCO2eq in 2010. Key mitigation opportunities comprise, e. g., reduc-
tion of hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) emissions by leak repair, refrigerant 
recovery and recycling, and proper disposal and replacement by alter-
native refrigerants (ammonia, HC, CO2). N2O emissions from adipic and 
nitric acid production can be reduced through the implementation of 
thermal destruction and secondary catalysts. The reduction of non-CO2 
GHGs also faces numerous barriers. Lack of awareness, lack of economic 
incentives and lack of commercially available technologies (e. g., for HFC 
recycling and incineration) are typical examples. [Table 10.2, 10.7]
Systemic approaches and collaborative activities across compa-
nies (large energy-intensive industries and Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs)) and sectors can help to reduce GHG emis-
sions (robust evidence, high agreement). Cross-cutting technologies 
such as efficient motors, and cross-cutting measures such as reducing 
air or steam leaks, help to optimize performance of industrial processes 
and improve plant efficiency very often cost-effectively with both 
energy savings and emissions benefits. Industrial clusters also help 
to realize mitigation, particularly from SMEs. [10.4] Cooperation and 
cross-sectoral collaboration at different levels — for example, sharing 
of infrastructure, information, waste heat, cooling, etc. — may provide 
further mitigation potential in certain regions / industry types [10.5].
Several emission-reducing options in the industrial sector are 
cost-effective and profitable (medium evidence, medium agree-
ment). While options in cost ranges of 0 – 20 and 20 – 50 USD / tCO2eq 
and even below 0 USD / tCO2eq exist, achieving near-zero emissions 
intensity levels in the industry sector would require the additional real-
ization of long-term step-change options (e. g., CCS), which are asso-
ciated with higher levelized costs of conserved carbon (LCCC) in the 
range of 50 – 150 USD / tCO2eq. Similar cost estimates for implement-
ing material efficiency, product-service efficiency, and service demand 
reduction strategies are not available. With regard to long-term options, 
some sector-specific measures allow for significant reductions in spe-
cific GHG emissions but may not be applicable at scale, e. g., scrap-
based iron and steel production. Decarbonized electricity can play an 
important role in some subsectors (e. g., chemicals, pulp and paper, 
and aluminium), but will have limited impact in others (e. g., cement, 
iron and steel, waste). In general, mitigation costs vary regionally and 
depend on site-specific conditions. (Figures TS.27, TS.28, TS.29) [10.7]
Mitigation measures are often associated with co-benefits (robust 
evidence, high agreement). Co-benefits include enhanced competitive-
ness through cost-reductions, new business opportunities, better envi-
ronmental compliance, health benefits through better local air and water 
quality and better work conditions, and reduced waste, all of which pro-
vide multiple indirect private and social benefits (Table TS.7). [10.8]
There is no single policy that can address the full range of miti-
gation measures available for industry and overcome associ-
ated barriers. Unless barriers to mitigation in industry are resolved, 
the pace and extent of mitigation in industry will be limited and even 
profitable measures will remain untapped (robust evidence, high 
agreement). [10.9, 10.11]
Figure TS.29 | Indicative CO2eq emission intensities for waste (upper panel) and wastewater (lower panel) of various practices as well as indicative levelized cost of conserved 
carbon (for data and methodology, see Annex III). MSW: Municipal solid waste. [Figures 10.19 and 10.20]
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TS.3.2.6 Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use 
(AFOLU)
Since AR4, GHG emissions from the AFOLU sector have sta-
bilized but the share of total anthropogenic GHG emissions 
has decreased (robust evidence, high agreement). The average 
annual total GHG flux from the AFOLU sector was 10 – 12 GtCO2eq in 
2000 – 2010, with global emissions of 5.0 – 5.8 GtCO2eq / yr from agri-
culture on average and around 4.3 – 5.5 GtCO2eq / yr from forestry and 
other land uses. Non-CO2 emissions derive largely from agriculture, 
dominated by N2O emissions from agricultural soils and CH4 emissions 
from livestock enteric fermentation, manure management, and emis-
sions from rice paddies, totalling 5.0 – 5.8 GtCO2eq / yr in 2010 (robust 
evidence, high agreement). Over recent years, most estimates of FOLU 
CO2 fluxes indicate a decline in emissions, largely due to decreasing 
deforestation rates and increased afforestation (limited evidence, 
medium agreement). The absolute levels of emissions from deforesta-
tion and degradation have fallen from 1990 to 2010 (robust evidence, 
high agreement). Over the same time period, total emissions for high-
income countries decreased while those of low-income countries 
increased. In general, AFOLU emissions from high-income countries 
are dominated by agriculture activities while those from low-income 
countries are dominated by deforestation and degradation. [Figure 
1.3, 11.2]
Net annual baseline CO2 emissions from AFOLU are projected to 
decline over time with net emissions potentially less than half of 
the 2010 level by 2050, and the possibility of the AFOLU sector 
becoming a net sink before the end of century. However, the uncer-
tainty in historical net AFOLU emissions is larger than for other sectors, 
and additional uncertainties in projected baseline net AFOLU emissions 
exist. (medium evidence, high agreement) (Figure TS.15) [6.3.1.4, 6.8, 
Figure 6.5] As in AR4, most projections suggest declining annual net CO2 
emissions in the long run. In part, this is driven by technological change, 
as well as projected declining rates of agriculture area expansion related 
to the expected slowing in population growth. However, unlike AR4, 
none of the more recent scenarios projects growth in the near-term. 
There is also a somewhat larger range of variation later in the century, 
with some models projecting a stronger net sink starting in 2050 (lim-
ited evidence, medium agreement). There are few reported projections 
of baseline global land-related N2O and CH4 emissions and they indicate 
an increase over time. Cumulatively, land CH4 emissions are projected to 
be 44 – 53 % of total CH4 emissions through 2030, and 41 – 59 % through 
2100, and land N2O emissions 85 – 89 % and 85 – 90 %, respectively (lim-
ited evidence, medium agreement). [11.9]
Opportunities for mitigation in the AFOLU sector include sup-
ply- and demand-side mitigation options (robust evidence, high 
agreement). Supply-side measures involve reducing emissions arising 
Table TS.7 | Overview of potential co-benefits (green arrows) and adverse side-effects (orange arrows) of the main mitigation measures in the industry sector; arrows pointing 
up / down denote a positive / negative effect on the respective objective or concern. Co-benefits and adverse side-effects depend on local circumstances as well as on the implemen-
tation practice, pace and scale. For possible upstream effects of low-carbon energy supply (includes CCS), see Table TS.4. For possible upstream effects of biomass supply, see Table 
TS.8. For an assessment of macroeconomic, cross-sectoral, effects associated with mitigation policies (e. g., on energy prices, consumption, growth, and trade), see e. g., Sections 3.9, 
6.3.6, 13.2.2.3 and 14.4.2. The uncertainty qualifiers in brackets denote the level of evidence and agreement on the respective effects (see TS.1). Abbreviations for evidence: l = 
limited, m = medium, r = robust; for agreement: l = low, m = medium, h = high. [Table 10.5]
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from land-use change, in particular reducing deforestation, and land 
and livestock management, increasing carbon stocks by sequestration 
in soils and biomass, or the substitution of fossil fuels by biomass for 
energy production (Table TS.3). Further new supply-side technologies 
not assessed in AR4, such as biochar or wood products for energy-
intensive building materials, could contribute to the mitigation poten-
tial of the AFOLU sector, but there are still few studies upon which to 
make robust estimates. Demand-side measures include dietary change 
and waste reduction in the food supply chain. Increasing forestry and 
agricultural production without a commensurate increase in emissions 
(i. e., one component of sustainable intensification; Figure TS.30) also 
reduces emissions intensity (i. e., the GHG emissions per unit of prod-
uct), a mitigation mechanism largely unreported for AFOLU in AR4, 
which could reduce absolute emissions as long as production volumes 
do not increase. [11.3, 11.4]
Among supply-side measures, the most cost-effective forestry 
options are afforestation, sustainable forest management and 
reducing deforestation, with large differences in their relative 
importance across regions; in agriculture, low carbon prices16 
(20 USD / tCO2eq) favour cropland and grazing land manage-
ment and high carbon prices (100 USD / tCO2eq) favour restora-
tion of organic soils (medium evidence, medium agreement). When 
considering only studies that cover both forestry and agriculture and 
include agricultural soil carbon sequestration, the economic mitiga-
tion potential in the AFOLU sector is estimated to be 7.18 to 10.6 (full 
range of all studies: 0.49 – 10.6) GtCO2eq / yr in 2030 for mitigation 
efforts consistent with carbon prices up to 100 USD / tCO2eq, about 
a third of which can be achieved at < 20 USD / tCO2eq (medium evi-
dence, medium agreement). The range of global estimates at a given 
carbon price partly reflects uncertainty surrounding AFOLU mitigation 
16 In many models that are used to assess the economic costs of mitigation, carbon 
price is used as a proxy to represent the level of effort in mitigation policies (see 
Glossary).
potentials in the literature and the land-use assumptions of the sce-
narios considered. The ranges of estimates also reflect differences in 
the GHGs and options considered in the studies. A comparison of esti-
mates of economic mitigation potential in the AFOLU sector published 
since AR4 is shown in Figure TS.31. [11.6]
While demand-side measures are under-researched, changes 
in diet, reductions of losses in the food supply chain, and other 
measures have a significant, but uncertain, potential to reduce 
GHG emissions from food production (0.76 – 8.55 GtCO2eq / yr by 
2050) (Figure TS.31) (limited evidence, medium agreement). Barriers to 
implementation are substantial, and include concerns about jeopardizing 
health and well-being, and cultural and societal resistance to behavioural 
change. However, in countries with a high consumption of animal protein, 
co-benefits are reflected in positive health impacts resulting from changes 
in diet (robust evidence, high agreement). [11.4.3, 11.6, 11.7, 11.9]
The mitigation potential of AFOLU is highly dependent on 
broader factors related to land-use policy and patterns (medium 
evidence, high agreement). The many possible uses of land can com-
pete or work in synergy. The main barriers to mitigation are institu-
tional (lack of tenure and poor governance), accessibility to financ-
ing mechanisms, availability of land and water, and poverty. On the 
other hand, AFOLU mitigation options can promote innovation, and 
many technological supply-side mitigation options also increase agri-
cultural and silvicultural efficiency, and can reduce climate vulner-
ability by improving resilience. Multifunctional systems that allow the 
delivery of multiple services from land have the capacity to deliver to 
many policy goals in addition to mitigation, such as improving land 
tenure, the governance of natural resources, and equity [11.8] (lim-
ited evidence, high agreement). Recent frameworks, such as those for 
assessing environmental or ecosystem services, could provide tools for 
valuing the multiple synergies and tradeoffs that may arise from miti-
gation actions (Table TS.8) (medium evidence, medium agreement). 
[11.7, 11.8]
Figure TS.30 | GHG emissions intensities of selected major AFOLU commodities for decades 1960s – 2000s. (1) Cattle meat, defined as GHG (enteric fermentation + manure man-
agement of cattle, dairy and non-dairy) / meat produced; (2) pig meat, defined as GHG (enteric fermentation + manure management of swine, market and breeding) / meat produced; 
(3) chicken meat, defined as GHG (manure management of chickens) / meat produced; (4) milk, defined as GHG (enteric fermentation + manure management of cattle, dairy) / milk 
produced; (5) eggs, defined as GHG (manure management of chickens, layers) / egg produced; (6) rice, defined as GHG (rice cultivation) / rice produced; (7) cereals, defined as GHG 





























































Policies governing practices in agriculture as well as forest con-
servation and management need to account for the needs of 
both mitigation and adaptation (medium evidence, high agree-
ment). Some mitigation options in the AFOLU sector (such as soil and 
forest carbon stocks) may be vulnerable to climate change. Economic 
incentives (e. g., special credit lines for low-carbon agriculture, sustain-
able agriculture and forestry practices, tradable credits, payment for 
ecosystem services) and regulatory approaches (e. g., enforcement of 
environmental law to protect forest carbon stocks by reducing defor-
estation, set-aside policies, air and water pollution control reducing 
nitrate load and N2O emissions) have been effective in different cases. 
Investments in research, development, and diffusion (e. g., increase of 
resource use-efficiency (fertilizers), livestock improvement, better for-
estry management practices) could result in synergies between adap-
tation and mitigation. Successful cases of deforestation reduction in 
different regions are found to combine different policies such as land 
planning, regulatory approaches and economic incentives (limited evi-
dence, high agreement). [11.3.2, 11.10, 15.11]
Figure TS.31 | Estimates of economic mitigation potentials in the AFOLU sector published since AR4 (AR4 estimates shown for comparison, denoted by black arrows), includ-
ing bottom-up, sectoral studies, and top-down, multi-sector studies. Supply-side mitigation potentials are estimated for around 2030, ranging from 2025 to 2035, and are for 
agriculture, forestry or both sectors combined. Studies are aggregated for potentials up to ~20 USD / tCO2eq (actual range 1.64 – 21.45), up to ~50 USD / tCO2eq (actual range 
31.39 – 50.00), and up to ~100 USD / tCO2eq (actual range 70.0 – 120.91). Demand-side measures (shown on the right hand side of the figure) are for ~2050 and are not assessed 
at a specific carbon price, and should be regarded as technical potentials. Smith et al. (2013) values are the mean of the range. Not all studies consider the same measures or the 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
(REDD+)17 can be a very cost-effective policy option for mitigat-
ing climate change, if implemented in a sustainable manner (lim-
ited evidence, medium agreement). REDD+ includes: reducing emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation; conservation of forest carbon 
stocks; sustainable management of forests; and enhancement of forest 
carbon stocks. It could supply a large share of global abatement of emis-
sions from the AFOLU sector, especially through reducing deforestation 
in tropical regions, with potential economic, social and other environ-
mental co-benefits. To assure these co-benefits, the implementation of 
national REDD+ strategies would need to consider financing mecha-
nisms to local stakeholders, safeguards (such as land rights, conserva-
tion of biodiversity and other natural resources), and the appropriate 
scale and institutional capacity for monitoring and verification. [11.10]
Bioenergy can play a critical role for mitigation, but there are 
issues to consider, such as the sustainability of practices and 
the efficiency of bioenergy systems (robust evidence, medium 
17 UN Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
in developing countries, including conservation, sustainable management of forests 
and enhancement of forest carbon stocks.
agreement) [11.4.4, Box 11.5, 11.13.6, 11.13.7]. Barriers to large-
scale deployment of bioenergy include concerns about GHG emis-
sions from land, food security, water resources, biodiversity conserva-
tion and livelihoods. The scientific debate about the overall climate 
impact related to land-use competition effects of specific bioenergy 
pathways remains unresolved (robust evidence, high agreement). 
[11.4.4, 11.13] Bioenergy technologies are diverse and span a wide 
range of options and technology pathways. Evidence suggests that 
options with low lifecycle emissions (e. g., sugar cane, Miscanthus, 
fast growing tree species, and sustainable use of biomass residues), 
some already available, can reduce GHG emissions; outcomes are 
site-specific and rely on efficient integrated ‘biomass-to-bioenergy 
systems’, and sustainable land-use management and governance. 
In some regions, specific bioenergy options, such as improved cook-
stoves, and small-scale biogas and biopower production, could 
reduce GHG emissions and improve livelihoods and health in the con-
text of sustainable development (medium evidence, medium agree-
ment). [11.13]
Table TS.8 | Overview of potential co-benefits (green arrows) and adverse side-effects (orange arrows) of the main mitigation measures in the AFOLU sector; arrows pointing 
up / down denote a positive / negative effect on the respective objective or concern. These effects depend on the specific context (including bio-physic, institutional and socio-
economic aspects) as well as on the scale of implementation. For an assessment of macroeconomic, cross-sectoral effects associated with mitigation policies (e. g., on energy prices, 
consumption, growth, and trade), see e. g., Sections 3.9, 6.3.6, 13.2.2.3 and 14.4.2. The uncertainty qualifiers in brackets denote the level of evidence and agreement on the 
respective effects (see TS.1). Abbreviations for evidence: l = limited, m = medium, r = robust; for agreement: l  = low, m = medium, h = high. [Tables 11.9 and 11.12]
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TS.3.2.7 Human settlements, infrastructure, and spatial 
planning
Urbanization is a global trend transforming human settlements, 
societies, and energy use (robust evidence, high agreement). In 
1900, when the global population was 1.6 billion, only 13 % of the 
population, or some 200 million, lived in urban areas. As of 2011, more 
than 52 % of the world’s population — roughly 3.6 billion — lives in 
urban areas. By 2050, the urban population is expected to increase to 
5.6 – 7.1 billion, or 64 – 69 % of the world population. [12.2]
Urban areas account for more than half of global primary energy 
use and energy-related CO2 emissions (medium evidence, high 
agreement). The exact share of urban energy and GHG emissions varies 
with emission accounting frameworks and definitions. Taking account 
of direct and indirect emissions, urban areas account for 67 – 76 % of 
global energy use (central estimate) and 71 – 76 % of global energy-
related CO2 emissions. Taking account of direct emissions only, the 
urban share of emissions is 44 % (Figure TS.32). [12.2, 12.3] 
No single factor explains variations in per-capita emissions 
across cities, and there are significant differences in per capita 
GHG emissions between cities within a single country (robust 
evidence, high agreement). Urban GHG emissions are influenced by a 
variety of physical, economic and social factors, development levels, 
and urbanization histories specific to each city. Key influences on urban 
GHG emissions include income, population dynamics, urban form, loca-
tional factors, economic structure, and market failures. Per capita final 
energy use and CO2 emissions in cities of Annex I countries tend to be 
lower than national averages, in cities of non-Annex I countries they 
tend to be higher. [12.3]
The majority of infrastructure and urban areas have yet to be 
built (limited evidence, high agreement). Accounting for trends in 
declining population densities, and continued economic and popula-
tion growth, urban land cover is projected to expand by 56 – 310 % 
between 2000 and 2030. If the global population increases to 9.3 bil-
lion by 2050 and developing countries expand their built environment 
and infrastructure to current global average levels using available 
technology of today, the production of infrastructure materials alone 
would generate about 470 GtCO2 emissions. Currently, average per 
capita CO2 emissions embodied in the infrastructure of industrialized 
countries is five times larger than those in developing countries. [12.2, 
12.3]
Infrastructure and urban form are strongly interlinked, and 
lock in patterns of land use, transport choice, housing, and 
behaviour (medium evidence, high agreement). Urban form and 
infrastructure shape long-term land-use management, influence 
individual transport choice, housing, and behaviour, and affect the 
system-wide efficiency of a city. Once in place, urban form and 
infrastructure are difficult to change (Figure TS.33). [12.2, 12.3, 
12.4]
Mitigation options in urban areas vary by urbanization trajecto-
ries and are expected to be most effective when policy instru-
ments are bundled (robust evidence, high agreement). For rapidly 
developing cities, options include shaping their urbanization and 
infrastructure development towards more sustainable and low-carbon 
pathways. In mature or established cities, options are constrained by 
existing urban forms and infrastructure and the potential for refur-
bishing existing systems and infrastructures. Key mitigation strategies 
include co-locating high residential with high employment densities, 
Figure TS.32 | Estimated shares of direct (Scope 1) and indirect urban CO2 emissions in 
total emissions across world regions (GtCO2). Indirect emissions (Scope 2) allocate emis-
sions from thermal power plants to urban areas. CPA: Centrally Planned Asia and China; 
EEU: Central and Eastern Europe; FSU: Former Soviet Union; LAM: Latin America and 
Caribbean; MNA: Middle East and North Africa; NAM: North America; PAS: South-East 
Asia and Pacific; POECD: Pacific OECD; SAS: South Asia; SSA: Sub Saharan Africa; WEU: 
Western Europe. [12.2.2, Figure 12.4]
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achieving high diversity and integration of land uses, increasing acces-
sibility and investing in public transit and other supportive demand-
management measures (Figure TS.33). Bundling these strategies can 
reduce emissions in the short term and generate even higher emissions 
savings in the long term. [12.4, 12.5] 
The largest opportunities for future urban GHG emissions 
reduction might be in rapidly urbanizing countries where urban 
form and infrastructure are not locked-in but where there are 
often limited governance, technical, financial, and institutional 
capacities (robust evidence, high agreement). The bulk of future 
infrastructure and urban growth is expected in small- to medium-size 
cities in developing countries, where these capacities can be limited or 
weak. [12.4, 12.5, 12.6, 12.7]
Thousands of cities are undertaking climate action plans, but 
their aggregate impact on urban emissions is uncertain (robust 
evidence, high agreement). Local governments and institutions pos-
sess unique opportunities to engage in urban mitigation activities and 
local mitigation efforts have expanded rapidly. However, little system-
atic assessment exists regarding the overall extent to which cities are 
implementing mitigation policies and emissions reduction targets are 
being achieved, or emissions reduced. Climate action plans include a 
range of measures across sectors, largely focused on energy efficiency 
rather than broader land-use planning strategies and cross-sectoral 
measures to reduce sprawl and promote transit-oriented development 
(Figure TS.34). [12.6, 12.7, 12.9]
The feasibility of spatial planning instruments for climate 
change mitigation is highly dependent on a city’s financial and 
governance capability (robust evidence, high agreement). Drivers 
of urban GHG emissions are interrelated and can be addressed by a 
number of regulatory, management, and market-based instruments. 
Many of these instruments are applicable to cities in both developed 
and developing countries, but the degree to which they can be imple-
mented varies. In addition, each instrument varies in its potential to 
generate public revenues or require government expenditures, and the 
administrative scale at which it can be applied (Figure TS.35). A bun-
Figure TS.33 | Four key aspects of urban form and structure (density, land-use mix, connectivity, and accessibility), their vehicle kilometers travelled (VKT) elasticities, commonly 
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dling of instruments and a high level of coordination across institu-
tions can increase the likelihood of achieving emissions reductions and 
avoiding unintended outcomes. [12.6, 12.7]
For designing and implementing climate policies effectively, 
institutional arrangements, governance mechanisms, and 
financial resources should be aligned with the goals of reduc-
ing urban GHG emissions (high confidence). These goals will reflect 
the specific challenges facing individual cities and local governments. 
The following have been identified as key factors: (1) institutional 
arrangements that facilitate the integration of mitigation with other 
high-priority urban agendas; (2) a multilevel governance context that 
empowers cities to promote urban transformations; (3) spatial plan-
ning competencies and political will to support integrated land-use 
and transportation planning; and (4) sufficient financial flows and 
incentives to adequately support mitigation strategies. [12.6, 12.7]
Successful implementation of urban climate change mitigation 
strategies can provide co-benefits (robust evidence, high agree-
ment). Urban areas throughout the world continue to struggle with 
challenges, including ensuring access to energy, limiting air and water 
pollution, and maintaining employment opportunities and competi-
tiveness. Action on urban-scale mitigation often depends on the ability 
to relate climate change mitigation efforts to local co-benefits. The co-
benefits of local climate change mitigation can include public savings, 
air quality and associated health benefits, and productivity increases in 
urban centres, providing additional motivation for undertaking mitiga-
tion activities. [12.5, 12.6, 12.7, 12.8]
Figure TS.34 | Common mitigation measures in Climate Action Plans. [Figure 12.22]
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Figure TS.35 | Key spatial planning tools and effects on government revenues and expenditures across administrative scales. Figure shows four key spatial planning tools (coded in 
colours) and the scale of governance at which they are administered (x-axis) as well as how much public revenue or expenditure the government generates by implementing each 
instrument (y-axis). [Figure 12.20]
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TS.4 Mitigation policies 
and institutions
The previous section shows that since AR4 the scholarship on mitiga-
tion pathways has begun to consider in much more detail how a variety 
of real-world considerations — such as institutional and political con-
straints, uncertainty associated with climate change risks, the availabil-
ity of technologies and other factors — affect the kinds of policies and 
measures that are adopted. Those factors have important implications 
for the design, cost, and effectiveness of mitigation action. This sec-
tion focuses on how governments and other actors in the private and 
public sectors design, implement, and evaluate mitigation policies. It 
considers the ‘normative’ scientific research on how policies should 
be designed to meet particular criteria. It also considers research on 
how policies are actually designed and implemented  a field known as 
‘positive’ analysis. The discussion first characterizes fundamental con-
ceptual issues, and then presents a summary of the main findings from 
WGIII AR5 on local, national, and sectoral policies. Much of the practical 
policy effort since AR4 has occurred in these contexts. From there the 
summary looks at ever-higher levels of aggregation, ultimately ending 




TS.4.1 Policy design, behaviour and political 
economy
There are multiple criteria for evaluating policies. Policies are fre-
quently assessed according to four criteria [3.7.1, 13.2.2, 15.4.1]:
•	 Environmental effectiveness — whether policies achieve intended 
goals in reducing emissions or other pressures on the environment 
or in improving measured environmental quality.
•	 Economic effectiveness — the impact of policies on the overall 
economy. This criterion includes the concept of economic effi-
ciency, the principle of maximizing net economic benefits. Eco-
nomic welfare also includes the concept of cost-effectiveness, the 
principle of attaining a given level of environmental performance 
at lowest aggregate cost. 
•	 Distributional and social impacts — also known as ‘distributional 
equity,’ this criterion concerns the allocation of costs and benefits 
of policies to different groups and sectors within and across econo-
mies over time. It includes, often, a special focus on impacts on the 
least well-off members of societies within countries and around 
the world. 
•	 Institutional and political feasibility — whether policies can be 
implemented in light of available institutional capacity, the politi-
cal constraints that governments face, and other factors that are 
essential to making a policy viable.
All criteria can be applied with regard to the immediate ‘static’ impacts 
of policies and from a long-run ‘dynamic’ perspective that accounts for 
the many adjustments in the economic, social and political systems. 
Criteria may be mutually reinforcing, but there may also be conflicts 
or tradeoffs among them. Policies designed for maximum environmen-
tal effectiveness or economic performance may fare less well on other 
criteria, for example. Such tradeoffs arise at multiple levels of govern-
ing systems. For example, it may be necessary to design international 
agreements with flexibility so that it is feasible for a large number of 
diverse countries to accept them, but excessive flexibility may under-
mine incentives to invest in cost-effective long-term solutions.
Policymakers make use of many different policy instruments 
at the same time. Theory can provide some guidance on the norma-
tive advantages and disadvantages of alternative policy instruments 
in light of the criteria discussed above. The range of different policy 
instruments includes [3.8, 15.3]: 
•	 Economic incentives, such as taxes, tradable allowances, fines, and 
subsidies
•	 Direct regulatory approaches, such as technology or performance 
standards
•	 Information programmes, such as labelling and energy audits
•	 Government provision, for example of new technologies or in state 
enterprises
•	 Voluntary actions, initiated by governments, firms, and non-gov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs)
Since AR4, the inventory of research on these different instruments 
has grown, mostly with reference to experiences with policies adopted 
within particular sectors and countries as well as the many interactions 
between policies. One implication of that research has been that inter-
national agreements that aim to coordinate across countries reflect the 
practicalities on the particular policy choices of national governments 
and other jurisdictions. 
The diversity in policy goals and instruments highlights dif-
ferences in how sectors and countries are organized eco-
nomically and politically as well as the multi-level nature of 
mitigation. Since AR4, one theme of research in this area has been 
that the success of mitigation measures depends in part on the pres-
ence of institutions capable of designing and implementing regu-
latory policies and the willingness of respective publics to accept 
these policies. Many policies have effects, sometimes unanticipated, 
across multiple jurisdictions — across cities, regions and coun-
tries — because the economic effects of policies and the technologi-
cal options are not contained within a single jurisdiction. [13.2.2.3, 
14.1.3, 15.2, 15.9]
Interactions between policy instruments can be welfare-enhanc-
ing or welfare-degrading. The chances of welfare-enhancing inter-
actions are particularly high when policy instruments address multiple 
different market failures — for example, a subsidy or other policy instru-
ment aimed at boosting investment in R&D on less emission-intensive 
technologies can complement policies aimed at controlling emissions, 
as can regulatory intervention to support efficient improvement of end-
use energy efficiency. By contrast, welfare-degrading interactions are 
particularly likely when policies are designed to achieve identical goals. 
Narrowly targeted policies such as support for deployment (rather 
than R&D) of particular energy technologies that exist in tandem with 
broader economy-wide policies aimed at reducing emissions (for exam-
ple, a cap-and-trade emissions scheme) can have the effect of shifting 
the mitigation effort to particular sectors of the economy in ways that 
typically result in higher overall costs. [3.8.6, 15.7, 15.8]
There are a growing number of countries devising policies for 
adaptation, as well as mitigation, and there may be benefits 
to considering the two within a common policy framework 
(medium evidence, low agreement). However, there are divergent 
views on whether adding adaptation to mitigation measures in the 
policy portfolio encourages or discourages participation in interna-
tional cooperation [1.4.5, 13.3.3]. It is recognized that an integrated 
approach can be valuable, as there exist both synergies and tradeoffs 
[16.6].
Traditionally, policy design, implementation, and evaluation has 
focused on governments as central designers and implementers 
of policies, but new studies have emerged on government act-
ing in a coordinating role (medium confidence). In these cases, gov-
ernments themselves seek to advance voluntary approaches, especially 




the best choices of policy instruments and goals is not yet apparent. 
Examples include voluntary schemes that allow individuals and firms 
to purchase emission credits that offset the emissions associated with 
their own activities such as flying and driving. Since AR4, a substantial 
new literature has emerged to examine these schemes from positive 
and normative perspectives. [13.12, 15.5.7] 
The successful implementation of policy depends on many fac-
tors associated with human and institutional behaviour (very 
high confidence). One of the challenges in designing effective instru-
ments is that the activities that a policy is intended to affect — such as 
the choice of energy technologies and carriers and a wide array of agri-
cultural and forestry practices — are also influenced by social norms, 
decision-making rules, behavioural biases, and institutional processes 
[2.4, 3.10]. There are examples of policy instruments made more effec-
tive by taking these factors into account, such as in the case of financ-
ing mechanisms for household investments in energy efficiency and 
renewable energy that eliminate the need for up-front investment [2.4, 
2.6.5.3]. Additionally, the norms that guide acceptable practices could 
have profound impacts on the baselines against which policy interven-
tions are evaluated, either magnifying or reducing the required level of 
policy intervention [1.2.4, 4.3, 6.5.2].
Climate policy can encourage investment that may otherwise 
be suboptimal because of market imperfections (very high con-
fidence). Many of the options for energy efficiency as well as low-
carbon energy provision require high up-front investment that is often 
magnified by high-risk premiums associated with investments in new 
technologies. The relevant risks include those associated with future 
market conditions, regulatory actions, public acceptance, and technol-
ogy cost and performance. Dedicated financial instruments exist to 
lower these risks for private actors — for example, credit insurance, 
feed-in tariffs (FITs), concessional finance, or rebates [16.4]. The design 
of other mitigation policies can also incorporate elements to help 
reduce risks, such as a cap-and-trade regime that includes price floors 
and ceilings [2.6.5, 15.5, 15.6].
TS.4.2 Sectoral and national policies
There has been a considerable increase in national and sub-
national mitigation plans and strategies since AR4 (Figure TS.36). 
These plans and strategies are in their early stages of development 
and implementation in many countries, making it difficult to assess 
whether and how they will result in appropriate institutional and 
policy change, and therefore, their impact on future GHG emissions. 
However, to date these policies, taken together, have not yet achieved 
a substantial deviation in GHG emissions from the past trend. Theories 
of institutional change suggest they might play a role in shaping incen-
tives, political contexts, and policy paradigms in a way that encourages 
Figure TS.36 | National climate legislation and strategies in 2007 and 2012. Regions include NAI (Non Annex I countries — developing countries), AI (Annex I countries — devel-
oped countries), LAM (Latin America), MAF (Middle East and Africa), ASIA (Asia), EIT (Economies in Transition), OECD-1990; see Annex II.2 for more details. In this figure, climate 
legislation is defined as mitigation-focused legislation that goes beyond sectoral action alone. Climate strategy is defined as a non-legislative plan or framework aimed at mitigation 
that encompasses more than a small number of sectors, and that includes a coordinating body charged with implementation. International pledges are not included, nor are sub-
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GHG emissions reductions in the future [15.1, 15.2]. However, many 
baseline scenarios (i. e., those without additional mitigation policies) 
show concentrations that exceed 1000 ppm CO2eq by 2100, which is 
far from a concentration with a likely probability of maintaining tem-
perature increases below 2 °C this century. Mitigation scenarios sug-
gest that a wide range of environmentally effective policies could be 
enacted that would be consistent with such goals [6.3]. In practice, 
climate strategies and the policies that result are influenced by politi-
cal economy factors, sectoral considerations, and the potential for real-
izing co-benefits. In many countries, mitigation policies have also been 
actively pursued at state and local levels. [15.2, 15.5, 15.8]
Since AR4, there is growing political and analytical attention to 
co-benefits and adverse side-effects of climate policy on other 
objectives and vice versa that has resulted in an increased focus 
on policies designed to integrate multiple objectives (high confi-
dence). Co-benefits are often explicitly referenced in climate and sectoral 
plans and strategies and often enable enhanced political support [15.2]. 
However, the analytical and empirical underpinnings for many of these 
interactive effects, and particularly for the associated welfare impacts, 
are under-developed [1.2, 3.6.3, 4.2, 4.8, 6.6]. The scope for co-benefits 
is greater in low-income countries, where complementary policies for 
other objectives, such as air quality, are often weak [5.7, 6.6, 15.2].
The design of institutions affects the choice and feasibility of 
policy options as well as the sustainable financing of mitigation 
measures. Institutions designed to encourage participation by repre-
sentatives of new industries and technologies can facilitate transitions 
to low-GHG emissions pathways [15.2, 15.6]. Policies vary in the extent 
to which they require new institutional capabilities to be implemented. 
Carbon taxation, in most settings, can rely mainly on existing tax infra-
structure and is administratively easier to implement than many other 
alternatives such as cap-and-trade systems [15.5]. The extent of insti-
tutional innovation required for policies can be a factor in instrument 
choice, especially in developing countries.
Sector-specific policies have been more widely used than econ-
omy-wide, market-based policies (medium evidence, high agree-
ment). Although economic theory suggests that market-based, economy-
wide policies for the singular objective of mitigation would generally 
be more cost-effective than sector-specific policies, political economy 
considerations often make economy-wide policies harder to design and 
implement than sector-specific policies [15.2.3, 15.2.6, 15.5.1]. In some 
countries, emission trading and taxes have been enacted to address the 
market externalities associated with GHG emissions, and have contrib-
uted to the fulfilment of sector-specific GHG reduction goals (medium 
evidence, medium agreement) [7.12]. In the longer term, GHG pricing 
can support the adoption of low-GHG energy technologies. Even if 
economy-wide policies were implemented, sector-specific policies may 
be needed to overcome sectoral market failures. For example, building 
codes can require energy-efficient investments where private invest-
ments would otherwise not exist [9.10]. In transport, pricing policies 
that raise the cost of carbon-intensive forms of private transport are 
more effective when backed by public investment in viable alternatives 
[8.10]. Table TS.9 presents a range of sector-specific policies that have 
been implemented in practice. [15.1, 15.2, 15.5, 15.8, 15.9]
Carbon taxes have been implemented in some countries 
and — alongside technology and other policies — have contrib-
uted to decoupling of emissions from GDP (high confidence). Dif-
ferentiation by sector, which is quite common, reduces cost-effective-
ness that arises from the changes in production methods, consumption 
patterns, lifestyle shifts, and technology development, but it may 
increase political feasibility, or be preferred for reasons of competitive-
ness or distributional equity. In some countries, high carbon and fuel 
taxes have been made politically feasible by refunding revenues or by 
lowering other taxes in an environmental fiscal reform. Mitigation poli-
cies that raise government revenue (e. g., auctioned emission allow-
ances under a cap-and-trade system or emission taxes) generally have 
lower social costs than approaches that do not, but this depends on 
how the revenue is used [3.6.3]. [15.2, 15.5.2, 15.5.3]
Fuel taxes are an example of a sector-specific policy and are 
often originally put in place for objectives such as reve-
nue — they are not necessarily designed for the purpose of miti-
gation (high confidence). In Europe, where fuel taxes are highest, they 
have contributed to reductions in carbon emissions from the trans-
port sector of roughly 50 % for this group of countries. The short-run 
response to higher fuel prices is often small, but long-run price elas-
ticities are quite high, or roughly – 0.6 to – 0.8. This means that in the 
long run, 10 % higher fuel prices correlate with 7 % reduction in fuel 
use and emissions. In the transport sector, taxes have the advantage of 
being progressive or neutral in most countries and strongly progressive 
in low-income countries. [15.5.2]
Cap-and-trade systems for GHG emissions are being established 
in a growing number of countries and regions. Their environmen-
tal effect has so far been limited because caps have either been loose 
or have not yet been binding (limited evidence, medium agreement). 
There appears to have been a tradeoff between the political feasibil-
ity and environmental effectiveness of these programmes, as well as 
between political feasibility and distributional equity in the allocation 
of permits. Greater environmental effectiveness through a tighter cap 
may be combined with a price ceiling that improves political feasibility. 
[14.4.2, 15.5.3]
Different factors reduced the price of European Union Emissions 
Trading System (EU ETS) allowances below anticipated levels, 
thereby slowing investment in mitigation (high confidence). While 
the European Union demonstrated that a cross-border cap-and-trade 
system can work, the low price of EU ETS allowances in recent years 
provided insufficient incentives for significant additional investment in 
mitigation. The low price is related to unexpected depth and duration of 
the economic recession, uncertainty about the long-term reduction tar-
gets for GHG  emissions, import of credits from the Clean Development 




Table TS.9 | Sector policy instruments. The table brings together evidence on mitigation policy instruments discussed in Chapters 7 to 12. [Table 15.2]
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Box TS.13 | The rebound effect can reduce energy savings from technological improvement
Technological improvements in energy efficiency (EE) have direct 
effects on energy consumption and thus GHG emissions, but can 
cause other changes in consumption, production, and prices that 
will, in turn, affect GHG emissions. These changes are generally 
called ‘rebound’ or ‘takeback’ because in most cases they reduce 
the net energy or emissions reduction associated with the effi-
ciency improvement. The size of EE rebound is controversial, with 
some research papers suggesting little or no rebound and others 
concluding that it offsets most or all reductions from EE policies 
[3.9.5, 5.7.2].
Total EE rebound can be broken down into three distinct parts: 
substitution-effect, income-effect, and economy-wide effect 
[3.9.5]. In end-use consumption, substitution-effect rebound, or 
‘direct rebound’ assumes that a consumer will make more use 
of a device if it becomes more energy efficient because it will be 
cheaper to use. Income-effect rebound or ‘indirect rebound’, arises 
if the improvement in EE makes the consumer wealthier and leads 
her to consume additional products that require energy. Economy-
wide rebound refers to impacts beyond the behaviour of the entity 
benefiting directly from the EE improvement, such as the impact of 
EE on the price of energy.
Analogous rebound effects for EE improvements in production are 
substitution towards an input with improved energy efficiency, and 
substitution among products by consumers when an EE improve-
ment changes the relative prices of goods, as well as an income 
effect when an EE improvement lowers production costs and cre-
ates greater wealth.
Rebound is sometimes confused with the concept of carbon leak-
age, which often describes the incentive for emissions-intensive 
economic activity to migrate away from a region that restricts 
GHGs (or other pollutants) towards areas with fewer or no restric-
tions on such emissions [5.4.1, 14.4]. Energy efficiency rebound 
can occur regardless of the geographic scope of the adopted pol-
icy. As with leakage, however, the potential for significant rebound 
illustrates the importance of considering the full equilibrium effects 
of a mitigation policy [3.9.5, 15.5.4].
particularly related to the expansion of renewable energy as well as 
regulation on energy efficiency. It has proven to be politically difficult 
to address this problem by removing GHG emission permits temporar-
ily, tightening the cap, or providing a long-term mitigation goal. [14.4.2]
Adding a mitigation policy to another may not necessarily 
enhance mitigation. For instance, if a cap-and-trade system has a 
sufficiently stringent cap then other policies such as renewable sub-
sidies have no further impact on total GHG emissions (although they 
may affect costs and possibly the viability of more stringent future tar-
gets). If the cap is loose relative to other policies, it becomes ineffec-
tive. This is an example of a negative interaction between policy instru-
ments. Since other policies cannot be ‘added on’ to a cap-and-trade 
system, if it is to meet any particular target, a sufficiently low cap is 
necessary. A carbon tax, on the other hand, can have an additive envi-
ronmental effect to policies such as subsidies to renewables. [15.7]
Reduction of subsidies to fossil energy can achieve significant 
emission reductions at negative social cost (very high confidence). 
Although political economy barriers are substantial, many countries have 
reformed their tax and budget systems to reduce fuel subsidies that actu-
ally accrue to the relatively wealthy, and utilized lump-sum cash trans-
fers or other mechanisms that are more targeted to the poor. [15.5.3]
Direct regulatory approaches and information measures are 
widely used, and are often environmentally effective, though 
debate remains on the extent of their environmental impacts 
and cost-effectiveness (medium confidence). Examples of regula-
tory approaches include energy efficiency standards; examples of 
information programmes include labelling programmes that can help 
consumers make better-informed decisions. While such approaches 
often work at a net social benefit, the scientific literature is divided 
on whether such policies are implemented with negative private costs 
(see Box TS.12) to firms and individuals [3.9.3, 15.5.5, 15.5.6]. Since 
AR4 there has been continued investigation into the ‘rebound’ effects 
(see Box TS.13) that arise when higher efficiency leads to lower energy 
costs and greater consumption. There is general agreement that such 
rebound effects exist, but there is low agreement in the literature on 
the magnitude [3.9.5, 5.7.2, 15.5.4].
There is a distinct role for technology policy as a complement to 
other mitigation policies (high confidence). Properly implemented 
technology policies reduce the cost of achieving a given environmental 
target. Technology policy will be most effective when technology-push 
policies (e. g., publicly funded R&D) and demand-pull policies (e. g., 
governmental procurement programmes or performance regulations) 
are used in a complementary fashion. While technology-push and 
demand-pull policies are necessary, they are unlikely to be sufficient 
without complementary framework conditions. Managing social chal-
lenges of technology policy change may require innovations in policy 
and institutional design, including building integrated policies that 
make complementary use of market incentives, authority, and norms 
(medium confidence). Since AR4, a large number of countries and sub-




energy such as feed-in tariffs and renewable portfolio standards. These 
have promoted substantial diffusion and innovation of new energy 
technologies such as wind turbines and photovoltaic panels, but have 
raised questions about their economic efficiency, and introduced chal-
lenges for grid and market integration. [2.6.5, 7.12, 15.6.5]
Worldwide investment in research in support of mitigation is 
small relative to overall public research spending (medium con-
fidence). The effectiveness of research support will be greatest if it is 
increased slowly and steadily rather than dramatically or erratically. It is 
important that data collection for program evaluation is built into tech-
nology policy programmes, because there is limited empirical evidence 
on the relative effectiveness of different mechanisms for supporting the 
invention, innovation and diffusion of new technologies. [15.6.2, 15.6.5]
Government planning and provision can facilitate shifts to less 
energy- and GHG-intensive infrastructure and lifestyles (high 
confidence). This applies particularly when there are indivisibilities in 
the provision of infrastructure as in the energy sector [7.6] (e. g., for 
electricity transmission and distribution or district heating networks); 
in the transport sector [8.4] (e. g., for non-motorized or public trans-
port); and in urban planning [12.5]. The provision of adequate infra-
structure is important for behavioural change [15.5.6].
Successful voluntary agreements on mitigation between gov-
ernments and industries are characterized by a strong institu-
tional framework with capable industrial associations (medium 
confidence). The strengths of voluntary agreements are speed and flex-
ibility in phasing measures, and facilitation of barrier removal activi-
ties for energy efficiency and low-emission technologies. Regulatory 
threats, even though the threats are not always explicit, are also an 
important factor for firms to be motivated. There are few environmen-
tal impacts without a proper institutional framework. [15.5.7] 
TS.4.3 Development and regional cooperation
Regional cooperation offers substantial opportunities for mitiga-
tion due to geographic proximity, shared infrastructure and policy 
frameworks, trade, and cross-border investment that would be 
difficult for countries to implement in isolation (high confidence). 
Examples of possible regional cooperation policies include regionally-
linked development of renewable energy power pools, networks of natu-
ral gas supply infrastructure, and coordinated policies on forestry. [14.1]
At the same time, there is a mismatch between opportunities 
and capacities to undertake mitigation (medium confidence). The 
regions with the greatest potential to leapfrog to low-carbon devel-
opment trajectories are the poorest developing regions where there 
are few lock-in effects in terms of modern energy systems and urban-
ization patterns. However, these regions also have the lowest finan-
cial, technological, and institutional capacities to embark on such 
low-carbon development paths (Figure TS.37) and their cost of wait-
ing is high due to unmet energy and development needs. Emerging 
economies already have more lock-in effects but their rapid build-up of 
modern energy systems and urban settlements still offers substantial 
opportunities for low-carbon development. Their capacity to reorient 
themselves to low-carbon development strategies is higher, but also 
faces constraints in terms of finance, technology, and the high cost of 
delaying the installation of new energy capacity. Lastly, industrialized 
economies have the largest lock-in effects, but the highest capacities 
to reorient their energy, transport, and urbanizations systems towards 
low-carbon development. [14.1.3, 14.3.2]
Regional cooperation has, to date, only had a limited (positive) 
impact on mitigation (medium evidence, high agreement). Nonethe-
less, regional cooperation could play an enhanced role in promoting 
mitigation in the future, particularly if it explicitly incorporates miti-
gation objectives in trade, infrastructure and energy policies and pro-
motes direct mitigation action at the regional level. [14.4.2, 14.5]
Most literature suggests that climate-specific regional coopera-
tion agreements in areas of policy have not played an important 
role in addressing mitigation challenges to date (medium confi-
dence). This is largely related to the low level of regional integration and 
associated willingness to transfer sovereignty to supra-national regional 
bodies to enforce binding agreements on mitigation. [14.4.2, 14.4.3]
Climate-specific regional cooperation using binding regulation-
based approaches in areas of deep integration, such as EU direc-
tives on energy efficiency, renewable energy, and biofuels, have 
had some impact on mitigation objectives (medium confidence). 
Nonetheless, theoretical models and past experience suggest that 
there is substantial potential to increase the role of climate-specific 
regional cooperation agreements and associated instruments, includ-
ing economic instruments and regulatory instruments. In this context it 
is important to consider carbon leakage of such regional initiatives and 
ways to address it. [14.4.2, 14.4.1]
In addition, non-climate-related modes of regional coopera-
tion could have significant implications for mitigation, even if 
mitigation objectives are not a component (medium confidence). 
Regional cooperation with non-climate-related objectives but pos-
sible mitigation implications, such as trade agreements, cooperation 
on technology, and cooperation on infrastructure and energy, has to 
date also had negligible impacts on mitigation. Modest impacts have 
been found on the level of GHG emissions of members of regional 
preferential trade areas if these agreements are accompanied with 
environmental agreements. Creating synergies between adaptation 
and mitigation can increase the cost-effectiveness of climate change 
actions. Linking electricity and gas grids at the regional level has 
also had a modest impact on mitigation as it facilitated greater use 
of low-carbon and renewable technologies; there is substantial fur-




TS.4.4 International cooperation 
Climate change mitigation is a global commons problem that 
requires international cooperation, but since AR4, scholarship 
has emerged that emphasizes a more complex and multi-fac-
eted view of climate policy (very high confidence). Two character-
istics of climate change necessitate international cooperation: climate 
change is a global commons problem, and it is characterized by a high 
degree of heterogeneity in the origins of GHG emissions, mitigation 
opportunities, climate impacts, and capacity for mitigation and adapta-
tion [13.2.1.1]. Policymaking efforts to date have primarily focused on 
international cooperation as a task centrally focused on the coordina-
tion of national policies that would be adopted with the goal of miti-
gation. More recent policy developments suggest that there is a more 
complicated set of relationships between national, regional, and global 
policymaking, based on a multiplicity of goals, a recognition of policy 
co-benefits, and barriers to technological innovation and diffusion [1.2, 
6.6, 15.2]. A major challenge is assessing whether decentralized policy 
action is consistent with and can lead to total mitigation efforts that 
are effective, equitable, and efficient [6.1.2.1, 13.13].
Figure TS.37 | Economic and governance indicators affecting regional capacities to embrace mitigation policies. Regions include EAS (East Asia), EIT (Economies in Transition), LAM 
(Latin America and Caribbean), MNA (Middle East and North Africa), NAM (North America), POECD (Pacific Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)-1990 
members), PAS (South East Asia and Pacific), SAS (South Asia), SSA (sub-Saharan Africa), WEU (Western Europe), LDC (least-developed countries). Statistics refer to the year 2010 
or the most recent year available. Note: The lending interest rate refers to the average interest rate charged by banks to private sector clients for short- to medium-term financing 
needs. The governance index is a composite measure of governance indicators compiled from various sources, rescaled to a scale of 0 to 1, with 0 representing weakest governance 
and 1 representing strongest governance. [Figure 14.2]
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International cooperation on climate change has become more 
institutionally diverse over the past decade (very high confidence). 
Perceptions of fairness can facilitate cooperation by increasing the 
legitimacy of an agreement [3.10, 13.2.2.4]. UNFCCC remains a primary 
international forum for climate negotiations, but other institutions have 
emerged at multiple scales, namely: global, regional, national, and local 
[13.3.1, 13.4.1.4, 13.5]. This institutional diversity arises in part from 
the growing inclusion of climate change issues in other policy arenas 
(e. g., sustainable development, international trade, and human rights). 
These and other linkages create opportunities, potential co-benefits, or 
harms that have not yet been thoroughly examined. Issue linkage also 
creates the possibility for countries to experiment with different forums 
of cooperation (‘forum shopping’), which may increase negotiation 
costs and potentially distract from or dilute the performance of interna-
tional cooperation toward climate goals. [13.3, 13.4, 13.5] Finally, there 
has been an emergence of new transnational climate-related institu-
tions not centred on sovereign states (e. g., public-private partnerships, 
private sector governance initiatives, transnational NGO programmes, 
and city level initiatives) [13.3.1, 13.12].
Existing and proposed international climate agreements vary 
in the degree to which their authority is centralized. As illus-
trated in Figure TS.38, the range of centralized formalization spans 
strong multilateral agreements (such as the Kyoto Protocol targets), 
harmonized national policies (such as the Copenhagen / Cancún 
pledges), and decentralized but coordinated national policies (such 
as planned linkages of national and sub-national emissions trading 
schemes) [13.4.1, 13.4.3]. Four other design elements of international 
agreements have particular relevance: legal bindingness, goals and 
targets, flexible mechanisms, and equitable methods for effort-shar-
Figure TS.38 | Alternative forms of international cooperation. The figure represents a compilation of existing and possible forms of international cooperation, based upon a survey 
of published research, but is not intended to be exhaustive of existing or potential policy architectures, nor is it intended to be prescriptive. Examples in orange are existing agree-
ments. Examples in blue are structures for agreements proposed in the literature. The width of individual boxes indicates the range of possible degrees of centralization for a particu-
lar agreement. The degree of centralization indicates the authority an agreement confers on an international institution, not the process of negotiating the agreement. [Figure 13.2]
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Loose coordination of policies: examples include transnational city networks and Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs); 
R&D technology cooperation: examples include the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF), Global Methane Initiative (GMI), 
or Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP); Other international organization (IO) GHG regulation: 




Table TS.10 | Summary of performance assessments of existing and proposed forms of cooperation. Forms of cooperation are evaluated along the four evaluation criteria described 
in Sections 3.7.1 and 13.2.2. [Table 13.3]











UNFCCC Aggregate GHG emis-
sions in Annex I countries 
declined by 6.0 to 9.2 % 
below 1990 levels by 2000, 
a larger reduction than the 
apparent ‘aim’ of returning 
to 1990 levels by 2000.
Authorized joint fulfilment 
of commitments, multi-gas 
approach, sources and sinks, 
and domestic policy choice. 
Cost and benefit estimates 
depend on baseline, discount 
rate, participation, leak-
age, co-benefits, adverse 
effects, and other factors.
Commitments distinguish 
between Annex I (indus-
trialized) and non-Annex I 
countries. Principle of 
‘common but differentiated 
responsibility.’ Commitment 
to ‘equitable and appropriate 
contributions by each [party].’
Ratified (or equivalent) by 195 
countries and regional organi-
zations. Compliance depends 
on national communications.
The Kyoto Protocol (KP) Aggregate emissions in Annex I 
countries were reduced by 8.5 
to 13.6 % below 1990 levels by 
2011, more than the first com-
mitment period (CP1) collective 
reduction target of 5.2 %. Reduc-
tions occurred mainly in EITs; 
emissions; increased in some 
others. Incomplete participation 
in CP1 (even lower in CP2).
Cost-effectiveness improved 
by flexible mechanisms (Joint 
Implementation (JI), CDM, 
International Emissions 
Trading (IET)) and domestic 
policy choice. Cost and benefit 
estimates depend on baseline, 
discount rate, participation, 
leakage, co-benefits, adverse 
effects, and other factors.
Commitments distinguish 
between developed and 
developing countries, but 
dichotomous distinction 
correlates only partly (and 
decreasingly) with historical 
emissions trends and with 
changing economic circum-
stances. Intertemporal equity 
affected by short-term actions.
Ratified (or equivalent) by 
192 countries and regional 
organizations, but took 7 years 
to enter into force. Compli-
ance depends on national 
communications, plus KP 
compliance system. Later 
added approaches to enhance 
measurement, reporting, 
and verification (MRV).
The Kyoto Mechanisms About 1.4 billion tCO2eq 
credits under the CDM, 0.8 
billion under JI, and 0.2 bil-
lion under IET (through July 
2013). Additionality of CDM 
projects remains an issue but 
regulatory reform underway.
CDM mobilized low cost 
options, particularly indus-
trial gases, reducing costs. 
Underperformance of some 
project types. Some evidence 
that technology is transferred 
to non-Annex I countries.
Limited direct investment from 
Annex I countries. Domestic 
investment dominates, leading 
to concentration of CDM 
projects in few countries. 
Limited contributions to local 
sustainable development.
Helped enable political 
feasibility of Kyoto Protocol. 
Has multi-layered governance. 
Largest carbon markets to date. 




Pledges to limit emissions made 
by all major emitters under 
Cancun Agreements. Unlikely 
sufficient to limit temperature 
change to 2 °C. Depends on 
treatment of measures beyond 
current pledges for mitigation 
and finance. Durban Platform 
calls for new agreement 
by 2015, to take effect in 
2020, engaging all parties.
Efficiency not assessed. 
Cost-effectiveness might be 
improved by market-based 
policy instruments, inclusion of 
forestry sector, commitments 
by more nations than Annex I 
countries (as envisioned 
in Durban Platform).
Depends on sources of financ-
ing, particularly for actions 
of developing countries.
Cancún Conference of the 
Parties (COP) decision; 97 
countries made pledges of 
emission reduction targets 










G8 and MEF have recom-
mended emission reduction by 
all major emitters. G20 may 
spur GHG reductions by phas-
ing out of fossil fuel subsidies.
Action by all major emitters 
may reduce leakage and 
improve cost-effectiveness, if 
implemented using flexible 
mechanisms. Potential efficiency 
gains through subsidy removal. 
Too early to assess economic 
performance empirically.
Has not mobilized climate 
finance. Removing fuel 
subsidies would be progressive 
but have negative effects 
on oil-exporting countries 
and on those with very low 
incomes unless other help 
for the poorest is provided.
Lower participation of countries 
than UNFCCC, yet covers 70 % 
of global emissions. Opens 
possibility for forum-shopping, 







Spurred emission reductions 
through ODS phaseouts 
approximately 5 times the 
magnitude of Kyoto CP1 
targets. Contribution may 
be negated by high-GWP 
substitutes, though efforts to 
phase out HFCs are growing.
Cost-effectiveness supported 
by multi-gas approach. Some 
countries used market-based 
mechanisms to imple-
ment domestically.
Later compliance period for 
phaseouts by developing 
countries. Montreal Protocol 
Fund provided finance to 
developing countries.
Universal participation. 
but the timing of required 





Covers 0.13 billion tCO2eq, but 
certification remains an issue
Credit prices are het-
erogeneous, indicating 
market inefficiencies






ing [13.4.2]. Existing and proposed modes of international coopera-
tion are assessed in Table TS.10. [13.13]
The UNFCCC is currently the only international climate policy 
venue with broad legitimacy, due in part to its virtually univer-
sal membership (high confidence). The UNFCCC continues to evolve 
institutions and systems for governance of climate change. [13.2.2.4, 
13.3.1, 13.4.1.4, 13.5] 
Incentives for international cooperation can interact with other 
policies (medium confidence). Interactions between proposed and 
existing policies, which may be counterproductive, inconsequential, or 
beneficial, are difficult to predict, and have been understudied in the 
literature [13.2, 13.13, 15.7.4]. The game-theoretic literature on cli-
mate change agreements finds that self-enforcing agreements engage 
and maintain participation and compliance. Self-enforcement can be 
derived from national benefits due to direct climate benefits, co-bene-
fits of mitigation on other national objectives, technology transfer, and 
climate finance. [13.3.2]
Decreasing uncertainty concerning the costs and benefits of 
mitigation can reduce the willingness of states to make com-
mitments in forums of international cooperation (medium con-
fidence). In some cases, the reduction of uncertainty concerning the 
costs and benefits of mitigation can make international agreements 
less effective by creating a disincentive for states to participate [13.3.3, 
2.6.4.1]. A second dimension of uncertainty, that concerning whether 
the policies states implement will in fact achieve desired outcomes, 
can lessen the willingness of states to agree to commitments regard-
ing those outcomes [2.6.3].
International cooperation can stimulate public and private 
investment and the adoption of economic incentives and direct 
regulations that promote technological innovation (medium con-
fidence). Technology policy can help lower mitigation costs, thereby 
increasing incentives for participation and compliance with interna-
tional cooperative efforts, particularly in the long run. Equity issues can 
be affected by domestic intellectual property rights regimes, which can 
alter the rate of both technology transfer and the development of new 
technologies. [13.3, 13.9]
In the absence of — or as a complement to — a binding, interna-
tional agreement on climate change, policy linkages between 
and among existing and nascent international, regional, 
national, and sub-national climate policies offer potential cli-
mate change mitigation and adaptation benefits (medium confi-
dence). Direct and indirect linkages between and among sub-national, 
national, and regional carbon markets are being pursued to improve 
market efficiency. Linkage between carbon markets can be stimulated 
by competition between and among public and private governance 
regimes, accountability measures, and the desire to learn from pol-
icy experiments. Yet integrating climate policies raises a number of 
concerns about the performance of a system of linked legal rules and 
economic activities. [13.3.1, 13.5.3, 13.13.2.3] Prominent examples 
of linkages are among national and regional climate initiatives (e. g., 
planned linkage between the EU ETS and the Australian Emission 
Trading Scheme, international offsets planned for recognition by a 
number of jurisdictions), and national and regional climate initiatives 
with the Kyoto Protocol (e. g., the EU ETS is linked to international 
carbon markets through the project-based Kyoto Mechanisms) [13.6, 
13.7, Figure 13.4, 14.4.2].
International trade can promote or discourage international 
cooperation on climate change (high confidence). Developing 
constructive relationships between international trade and climate 
agreements involves considering how existing trade policies and rules 
















tion (deep) and par-
ticipation (broad).
More cost-effectivewith greater 
reliance on market mechanisms.
Multilateralism facilitates 
integrating distributional 
impacts into negotiations 
and may apply equity-based 
criteria as outlined in Ch. 4
Depends on number of 




Depends on net aggre-
gate change in ambition 
across countries resulting 
from harmonization.
More cost-effectivewith greater 
reliance on market mechanisms.
Depends on specific 
national policies
Depends on similarity of 
national policies; more similar 
may support harmonization but 







Effectiveness depends on 
quality of standards and 
credits across countries
Often (though not necessarily) 
refers to linkage of national 
cap-and-trade systems, in 
which case cost effective.
Depends on specific 
national policies
Depends on similar-
ity of national policies. 
National enforcement.
Effort (burden)  sharing 
arrangements





can be modified to be more climate-friendly; whether border adjust-
ment measures or other trade measures can be effective in meeting 
the goals of international climate policy, including participation in and 
compliance with climate agreements; or whether the UNFCCC, World 
Trade Organization (WTO), a hybrid of the two, or a new institution is 
the best forum for a trade-and-climate architecture. [13.8]
The Montreal Protocol, aimed at protecting the stratospheric 
ozone layer, achieved reductions in global GHG emissions (very 
high confidence). The Montreal Protocol set limits on emissions of 
ozone-depleting gases that are also potent GHGs, such as chlorofluo-
rocarbons (CFCs) and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs). Substitutes 
for those ozone-depleting gases (such as hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), 
which are not ozone-depleting) may also be potent GHGs. Lessons 
learned from the Montreal Protocol, for example about the effect of 
financial and technological transfers on broadening participation in 
an international environmental agreement, could be of value to the 
design of future international climate change agreements (see Table 
TS.10). [13.3.3, 13.3.4, 13.13.1.4] 
The Kyoto Protocol was the first binding step toward imple-
menting the principles and goals provided by the UNFCCC, but 
it has had limited effects on global GHG emissions because 
some countries did not ratify the Protocol, some Parties did not 
meet their commitments, and its commitments applied to only a 
portion of the global economy (medium evidence, low agreement). 
The Parties collectively surpassed their collective emission reduction 
target in the first commitment period, but the Protocol credited emis-
sions reductions that would have occurred even in its absence. The 
Kyoto Protocol does not directly influence the emissions of non-Annex 
I countries, which have grown rapidly over the past decade. [5.2, 
13.13.1.1] 
The flexible mechanisms under the Protocol have cost-saving 
potential, but their environmental effectiveness is less clear 
(medium confidence). The CDM, one of the Protocol’s flexible mecha-
nisms, created a market for GHG emissions offsets from developing 
countries, generating credits equivalent to nearly 1.4 GtCO2eq as of 
October 2013. The CDM’s environmental effectiveness has been mixed 
due to concerns about the limited additionality of projects, the valid-
ity of baselines, the possibility of emissions leakage, and recent credit 
price decreases. Its distributional impact has been unequal due to the 
concentration of projects in a limited number of countries. The Proto-
col’s other flexible mechanisms, Joint Implementation (JI) and Inter-
national Emissions Trading (IET), have been undertaken both by gov-
ernments and private market participants, but have raised concerns 
related to government sales of emission units. (Table TS.10) [13.7.2, 
13.13.1.2, 14.3.7.1]
Recent UNFCCC negotiations have sought to include more ambi-
tious contributions from the countries with commitments under 
the Kyoto Protocol, mitigation contributions from a broader 
set of countries, and new finance and technology mechanisms. 
Under the 2010 Cancún Agreement, developed countries formalized 
voluntary pledges of quantified, economy-wide GHG emission reduc-
tion targets and some developing countries formalized voluntary 
pledges to mitigation actions. The distributional impact of the agree-
ment will depend in part on the magnitude and sources of financ-
ing, although the scientific literature on this point is limited, because 
financing mechanisms are evolving more rapidly than respective scien-
tific assessments (limited evidence, low agreement). Under the 2011 
Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, delegates agreed to craft a 
future legal regime that would be ‘applicable to all Parties […] under 
the Convention’ and would include substantial new financial support 
and technology arrangements to benefit developing countries, but the 
delegates did not specify means for achieving those ends. [13.5.1.1, 
13.13.1.3, 16.2.1]
TS.4.5 Investment and finance 
A transformation to a low-carbon economy implies new pat-
terns of investment. A limited number of studies have examined 
the investment needs for different mitigation scenarios. Information 
is largely limited to energy use with global total annual investment 
in the energy sector at about 1200 billion USD. Mitigation scenarios 
that reach atmospheric CO2eq concentrations in the range from 430 to 
530 ppm CO2eq by 2100 (without overshoot) show substantial shifts 
in annual investment flows during the period 2010 – 2029 if compared 
to baseline scenarios (Figure TS.39): annual investment in the exist-
ing technologies associated with the energy supply sector (e. g., con-
ventional fossil fuelled power plants and fossil fuel extraction) would 
decline by 30 (2 to 166) billion USD per year (median: – 20 % compared 
to 2010) (limited evidence, medium agreement). Investment in low-
emissions generation technologies (renewables, nuclear, and power 
plants with CCS) would increase by 147 (31 to 360) billion USD per year 
(median: +100 % compared to 2010) during the same period (limited 
evidence, medium agreement) in combination with an increase by 336 
(1 to 641) billion USD in energy efficiency investments in the building, 
transport and industry sectors (limited evidence, medium agreement). 
Higher energy efficiency and the shift to low-emission generation tech-
nologies contribute to a reduction in the demand for fossil fuels, thus 
causing a decline in investment in fossil fuel extraction, transformation 
and transportation. Scenarios suggest that average annual reduction 
of investment in fossil fuel extraction in 2010 – 2029 would be 116 (– 8 
to 369) billion USD (limited evidence, medium agreement). Such spill-
over effects could yield adverse effects on the revenues of countries 
that export fossil fuels. Mitigation scenarios also reduce deforestation 
against current deforestation trends by 50 % reduction with an invest-
ment of 21 to 35 billion USD per year (low confidence). [16.2.2]
Estimates of total climate finance range from 343 to 385 billion 
USD per year between 2010 and 2012 (medium confidence). The 
range is based on 2010, 2011, and 2012 data. Climate finance was 
almost evenly invested in developed and developing countries. Around 




figures reflect the total financial flow for the underlying investments, 
not the incremental investment, i. e., the portion attributed to the miti-
gation / adaptation cost increment (see Box TS.14). In general, quantita-
tive data on climate finance are limited, relate to different concepts, 
and are incomplete. [16.2.1.1]
Depending on definitions and approaches, climate finance flows 
to developing countries are estimated to range from 39 to 120 
billion USD per year during the period 2009 to 2012 (medium 
confidence). The range covers public and private flows for mitiga-
tion and adaptation. Public climate finance was 35 to 49 billion USD 
(2011 / 2012 USD) (medium confidence). Most public climate finance 
provided to developing countries flows through bilateral and multilat-
eral institutions usually as concessional loans and grants. Under the 
UNFCCC, climate finance is funding provided to developing countries 
by Annex II Parties and averaged nearly 10 billion USD per year from 
2005 to 2010 (medium confidence). Between 2010 and 2012, the ´fast 
start finance´ provided by some developed countries amounted to over 
10 billion USD per year (medium confidence). Estimates of interna-
tional private climate finance flowing to developing countries range 
from 10 to 72 billion USD (2009 / 2010 USD) per year, including foreign 
direct investment as equity and loans in the range of 10 to 37 billion 
USD (2010 USD and 2008 USD) per year over the period of 2008 – 2011 
(medium confidence). Figure TS.40 provides an overview of climate 
finance, outlining sources and managers of capital, financial instru-
ments, project owners, and projects. [16.2.1.1]
Within appropriate enabling environments, the private sec-
tor, along with the public sector, can play an important role in 
financing mitigation. The private sector contribution to total climate 
finance is estimated at an average of 267 billion USD (74 %) per year in 
the period 2010 to 2011 and at 224 billion USD (62 %) per year in the 
Figure TS.39 | Change of average annual investment flows in mitigation scenarios (2010 – 2029). Investment changes are calculated by a limited number of model studies and 
model comparisons for mitigation scenarios that reach concentrations within the range of 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq by 2100 compared to respective average baseline investments. The 
vertical bars indicate the range between minimum and maximum estimate of investment changes; the horizontal bar indicates the median of model results. Proximity to this median 
value does not imply higher likelihood because of the different degree of aggregation of model results, low number of studies available and different assumptions in the different 


































































Figure TS.40 | Types of climate finance flows. ‘Capital’ includes all relevant financial flows. The size of the boxes is not related to the magnitude of the financial flow. [Figure 16.1]
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Box TS.14 | There are no agreed definitions of ´climate investment´ and ‘climate finance’
‘Total climate finance’ includes all financial flows whose expected 
effect is to reduce net GHG emissions and / or to enhance resilience 
to the impacts of climate variability and the projected climate 
change. This covers private and public funds, domestic and inter-
national flows, expenditures for mitigation and adaptation, and 
adaptation to current climate variability as well as future climate 
change. It covers the full value of the financial flow rather than 
the share associated with the climate change benefit. The share 
associated with the climate change benefit is the incremental cost. 
The ‘total climate finance flowing to developing countries’ is the 
amount of the total climate finance invested in developing coun-
tries that comes from developed countries. This covers private and 
public funds for mitigation and adaptation. ‘Public climate finance 
provided to developing countries’ is the finance provided by devel-
oped countries´ governments and bilateral institutions as well as 
multilateral institutions for mitigation and adaptation activities in 
developing countries. ‘Private climate finance flowing to develop-
ing countries’ is finance and investment by private actors in / from 
developed countries for mitigation and adaptation activities in 
developing countries. Under the UNFCCC, climate finance is not 
well-defined. Annex II Parties provide and mobilize funding for 
climate-related activities in developing countries.
The ‘incremental investment’ is the extra capital required for the 
initial investment for a mitigation or adaptation project in compar-
ison to a reference project. Incremental investment for mitigation 
and adaptation projects is not regularly estimated and reported, 
but estimates are available from models. The ‘incremental cost’ 
reflects the cost of capital of the incremental investment and the 
change of operating and maintenance costs for a mitigation or 
adaptation project in comparison to a reference project. It can be 
calculated as the difference of the net present values of the two 
projects. Many mitigation measures have higher investment costs 
and lower operating and maintenance costs than the measures 
displaced so incremental cost tends to be lower than the incre-
mental investment. Values depend on the incremental investment 
as well as projected operating costs, including fossil fuel prices, 
and the discount rate. The ‘macroeconomic cost of mitigation pol-
icy’ is the reduction of aggregate consumption or GDP induced 
by the reallocation of investments and expenditures induced by 
climate policy (see Box TS.9). These costs do not account for the 
benefit of reducing anthropogenic climate change and should 





period 2011 to 2012 (limited evidence, medium agreement) [16.2.1]. In 
a range of countries, a large share of private sector climate investment 
relies on low-interest and long-term loans as well as risk guarantees 
provided by public sector institutions to cover the incremental costs 
and risks of many mitigation investments. The quality of a country’s 
enabling environment — including the effectiveness of its institutions, 
regulations and guidelines regarding the private sector, security of 
property rights, credibility of policies, and other factors — has a sub-
stantial impact on whether private firms invest in new technologies 
and infrastructure [16.3]. By the end of 2012, the 20 largest emitting 
developed and developing countries with lower risk country grades 
for private sector investments produced 70 % of global energy related 
CO2 emissions (low confidence). This makes them attractive for inter-
national private sector investment in low-carbon technologies. In many 
other countries, including most least-developed countries, low-carbon 
investment will often have to rely mainly on domestic sources or inter-
national public finance. [16.4.2]
A main barrier to the deployment of low-carbon technologies 
is a low risk-adjusted rate of return on investment vis-à-vis 
high-carbon alternatives (high confidence). Public policies and 
support instruments can address this either by altering the aver-
age rates of return for different investment options, or by creating 
mechanisms to lessen the risks that private investors face [15.12, 
16.3]. Carbon pricing mechanisms (carbon taxes, cap-and-trade sys-
tems), as well as renewable energy premiums, FITs, RPSs, investment 
grants, soft loans and credit insurance can move risk-return profiles 
into the required direction [16.4]. For some instruments, the pres-
ence of substantial uncertainty about their future levels (e. g., the 
future size of a carbon tax relative to differences in investment and 
operating costs) can lead to a lessening of the effectiveness and / or 
efficiency of the instrument. Instruments that create a fixed or 
immediate incentive to invest in low-emission technologies, such as 
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Since the first Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
assessment report (FAR) (IPCC, 1990a), the quantity and depth of sci-
entific research on climate change mitigation has grown enormously. 
In tandem with scholarship on this issue, the last two decades have 
seen relatively active efforts around the world to design and adopt 
policies that control (‘mitigate’) the emissions of pollutants that affect 
the climate. The effects of those emissions are felt globally; mitigation 
thus involves managing the global commons and requires a measure 
of international coordination among nations. But the actual policies 
that lead to mitigation arise at the local and national levels as well 
as internationally. Those policies have included, among others, market-
based approaches such as emission trading systems along with regula-
tion and voluntary initiatives; they encompass many diverse economic 
development strategies that countries have adopted with the goal of 
promoting human welfare and jobs while also achieving other goals 
such as mitigating emissions of climate pollutants. These policies also 
include other efforts to address market failures, such as public invest-
ments in research and development (R&D) needed to increase the pub-
lic good of knowledge about new less emission-intensive technologies 
and practices. International diplomacy — leading to agreements such 
as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol as well as various complementary 
initiatives such as the commitments pledged at the Copenhagen and 
Cancun Conferences of the Parties — has played a substantial role in 
focusing attention on mitigation of greenhouse gases (GHGs).
The field of scientific research in this area has evolved in parallel with 
actual policy experience allowing, in theory, insights from each domain 
to inform the other. Since the 4th assessment report (AR4) of IPCC 
(2007a; b) there have been numerous important developments in both 
the science and practical policy experience related to mitigation. There 
is growing insight into how climate change mitigation policies inter-
act with other important social goals from the local to the national 
and international levels. There is also growing practical experience 
and scholarly research concerning a wide array of policy instruments. 
Scholars have developed much more sophisticated information on how 
public opinion influences the design and stringency of climate change 
mitigation policies. 
Meanwhile, events in the world have had a large impact on how scien-
tific researchers have seen the scale of the mitigation challenge and its 
practical policy outcomes. For example, a worldwide economic reces-
sion beginning around 2008 has affected patterns of emissions and 
investment in the world economy and in many countries has affected 
political priorities on matters related to climate change mitigation.
The present chapter identifies six conclusions. Where appropriate, we 
indicate not only the major findings but also our confidence in the 
finding and the level of supporting evidence. (For an overview of the 
language on agreement and confidence see Mastrandrea et al. (2011).
First, since AR4, annual global GHG emissions have continued 
to grow and reached 49�5 billion tonnes (giga tonnes or Gt) of 
carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2eq) in the year 2010, higher 
than any level prior to that date, with an uncertainty estimate 
at ± 10 % for the 90 % confidence interval� On a per-capita basis, 
emissions from industrialized countries that are listed in Annex I of the 
UNFCCC are on average 2.5 times of those from developing countries. 
However, since AR4, total emissions from countries not listed in Annex I 
have overtaken total emissions from the Annex I industrialized coun-
tries (see glossary for Annex I countries). Treating the 27 members of 
the EU as a single country, about ten large countries — from the indus-
trialized and developing worlds — account for 70 % of world emissions. 
(robust evidence, high agreement) [Section 1.3]. The dominant driving 
forces for anthropogenic emissions include population, the structure 
of the economy, income and income distribution, policy, patterns of 
consumption, investment decisions, individual and societal behaviour, 
the state of technology, availability of energy resources, and land-use 
change. In nearly all countries it is very likely that the main short-term 
driver of changes in the level of emissions is the overall state of the 
economy. In some countries there is also a significant role for climate 
policies focused on controlling emissions. (medium evidence, medium 
agreement) [1.3]
Second, national governments are addressing climate change in 
the context of other national priorities, such as energy security 
and alleviation of poverty� In nearly all countries the most impor-
tant driving forces for climate policy are not solely the concern about 
climate change. (medium evidence, medium agreement) [1.2 and 1.4]. 
Studies on policy implementation show that improvements to cli-
mate policy programs need to engage these broader national priori-
ties. Despite the variety of existing policy efforts and the existence of 
the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, GHG emissions have grown at 
about twice the rate in the recent decade (2000 – 2010) than any other 
decade since 1970. (robust evidence, high agreement) [1.3.1]
Third, the current trajectory of global annual and cumulative 
emissions of GHGs is inconsistent with widely discussed goals 
of limiting global warming at 1�5 to 2 degrees Celsius above 
the pre-industrial level (medium evidence, medium agreement). 
[1.2.1.6 and 1.3.3] The ability to link research on mitigation of emis-
sions to actual climate outcomes, such as average temperature, has 
not substantially changed since AR4 due to a large number of uncer-
tainties in scientific understanding of the physical sensitivity of the 
climate to the build-up of GHGs discussed in Working Group I of the 
IPCC (WGI). Those physical uncertainties are multiplied by the many 
socioeconomic uncertainties that affect how societies would respond 
to emission control policies (low evidence, high agreement). Acknowl-
edging these uncertainties, mitigating emissions along a pathway that 
would be cost-effective and consistent with likely avoiding warming 
of more than 2 degrees implies that nearly all governments promptly 
engage in international cooperation, adopt stringent national and 
international emission control policies, and deploy rapidly a wide array 





assumptions that are less ideal — for example, with international coop-
eration that emerges slowly or only restricted availability of some tech-
nologies — show that achieving this 2 degree goal is much more costly 
and requires deployments of technology that are substantially more 
aggressive than the least-cost strategies (robust evidence, medium 
agreement) [1.3.3]. The assumptions needed to have a likely chance of 
limiting warming to 2 degrees are very difficult to satisfy in real world 
conditions (medium evidence; low agreement). The tenor of modelling 
research since AR4 suggests that the goal of stabilizing warming at 1.5 
degrees Celsius is so challenging to achieve that relatively few model-
ling studies have even examined it in requisite detail (low evidence, 
medium agreement) [1.3.3]. 
Fourth, deep cuts in emissions will require a diverse portfolio 
of policies, institutions, and technologies as well as changes in 
human behaviour and consumption patterns (high evidence; high 
agreement). There are many different development trajectories capable 
of substantially mitigating emissions; the ability to meet those trajec-
tories will be constrained if particular technologies are removed from 
consideration. It is virtually certain that the most appropriate policies 
will vary by sector and country, suggesting the need for flexibility 
rather than a singular set of policy tools. In most countries the actors 
that are relevant to controlling emissions aren’t just national govern-
ments. Many diverse actors participate in climate policy from the local 
to the global levels — including a wide array of nongovernmental orga-
nizations representing different environmental, social, business and 
other interests. (robust evidence, medium agreement) [1.4]
Fifth, policies to mitigate emissions are extremely complex and 
arise in the context of many different forms of uncertainty� 
While there has been much public attention to uncertainties in the 
underlying science of climate change — a topic addressed in detail in 
the WGI and II reports — profound uncertainties arise in the socioeco-
nomic factors addressed here in WGIII. Those uncertainties include the 
development and deployment of technologies, prices for major primary 
energy sources, average rates of economic growth and the distribu-
tion of benefits and costs within societies, emission patterns, and a 
wide array of institutional factors such as whether and how countries 
cooperate effectively at the international level. In general, these uncer-
tainties and complexities multiply those already identified in climate 
science by WGI and WGII. The pervasive complexities and uncertainties 
suggest that there is a need to emphasize policy strategies that are 
robust over many criteria, adaptive to new information, and able to 
respond to unexpected events. (medium evidence, medium agreement) 
[1.2]. 
Sixth, there are many important knowledge gaps that additional 
research could address� This report points to at least two of 
them� First is that the scholarship has developed increasingly sophisti-
cated techniques for assessing risks, but so far those risk management 
techniques have not spread into widespread use in actual mitigation 
strategies. Risk management requires drawing attention to the interac-
tions between mitigation and other kinds of policy responses such as 
adaptation to climate change; they require more sophisticated under-
standing of how humans perceive risk and respond to different kinds 
of risks. And such strategies require preparing for possible extreme 
climate risks that may implicate the use of geoengineering technolo-
gies as a last resort in response to climate emergencies (limited evi-
dence, low agreement). Second, the community of analysts studying 
mitigation has just begun the process of examining how mitigation 
costs and feasibility are affected by ‘real world’ assumptions such as 
possible limited availability of certain technologies. Improving this line 
of research could radically improve the utility of studies on mitigation 
and will require integration of insights from a wide array of social sci-
ence disciplines, including economics, psychology, political science, 
sociology and others.  
1.1 Introduction
Working Group III (WGIII) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC) is charged with assessing scientific research 
related to the mitigation of climate change. ‘Mitigation’ is the effort 
to control the human sources of climate change and their cumula-
tive impacts, notably the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and 
other pollutants, such as black carbon particles, that also affect the 
planet’s energy balance. Mitigation also includes efforts to enhance 
the processes that remove GHGs from the atmosphere, known as 
sinks (see glossary (Annex I) for definition). Because mitigation low-
ers the anticipated effects of climate change as well as the risks of 
extreme impacts, it is part of a broader policy strategy that includes 
adaptation to climate impacts — a topic addressed in more detail in 
WGII. There is a special role for international cooperation on mitiga-
tion policies because most GHGs have long atmospheric lifetimes 
and mix throughout the global atmosphere. The effects of mitigation 
policies on economic growth, innovation, and spread of technologies 
and other important social goals also implicate international concern 
because nations are increasingly inter-linked through global trade and 
economic competition. The economic effects of action by one nation 
depend, in part, on the action of others as well. Yet, while climate 
change is fundamentally a global issue, the institutions needed for 
mitigation exist at many different domains of government, including 
the local and national level. 
This chapter introduces the major issues that arise in mitigation policy 
and also frames the rest of the WGIII Contribution to the AR5. First 
we focus on the main messages since the publication of AR4 in 2007 
(Section 1.2). Then we look at the historical and future trends in emis-
sions and driving forces, noting that the scale of the mitigation chal-
lenge has grown enormously since 2007 due to rapid growth of the 
world economy and the continued lack of much overt effort to con-
trol emissions. This trend raises questions about the viability of widely 
discussed goals such as limiting climate warming to 2 degrees Cel-





conceptual issues — such as sustainable development, green growth, 
and risk management — that frame the mitigation challenge and how 
those concepts are used in practice (Section 1.4). Finally, we offer a 
roadmap for the rest of the volume (Section 1.5).
1.2 Main messages and 
changes from  previous 
assessment
Since AR4, there have been many developments in the world economy, 
emissions, and policies related to climate change. Here we review six 
of the most consequential trends and then examine their implications 
for this Fifth Assessment Report by the IPCC (AR5).  
1�2�1 Sustainable development
Since AR4 there has been a substantial increase in awareness of how 
climate change interacts with the goal of sustainable development 
(see Chapter 4 in this volume and WGII Chapter 20). While there is 
no single widely accepted definition of sustainable development, the 
concept implies integrating economic growth with other goals such 
as eradication of poverty, environmental protection, job creation, 
security, and justice (World Commission on Environment and Devel-
opment, 1987; UNDP, 2009; ADB et al., 2012; OECD, 2012; ILO, 2012; 
United Nations, 2012). Countries differ enormously in which of these 
elements they emphasize, and for decades even when policymakers 
and scientific analysts have all embraced the concept of sustainable 
development they have implied many different particular goals. Since 
AR4, new concepts have emerged that are consistent with this broader 
paradigm, such as ‘green growth’ and ‘green economy’ — concepts 
that also reflect the reality that policy is designed to maximize multiple 
objectives. The practical implications of sustainable development are 
defined by societies themselves. In many respects, this multi-faceted 
understanding of sustainable development is not new as it reflects 
the effort in the social sciences over the last century to develop tech-
niques for measuring and responding to the many positive and nega-
tive externalities that arise as economies evolve — concepts discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 3 of this volume.  
New developments since AR4 have been the emergence of quantita-
tive modelling frameworks that explore the synergies and tradeoffs 
between the different components of sustainable development includ-
ing climate change (e. g., McCollum et  al., 2011; Riahi et  al., 2012; 
Howells et al., 2013).
Scientific research has examined at least three major implications of 
sustainable development for the mitigation of emissions. First, since 
AR4 there have been an exceptionally large number of studies that 
have focused on how policies contribute to particular elements of sus-
tainable development. Examples include: 
•	 The ways that biofuel programs have an impact on poverty allevia-
tion, employment, air quality, rural development, and energy / food 
security (see 11.13), such as in Brazil (La Rovere et al., 2011) and 
the United States (Leiby and Rubin, 2013).  
•	 The socioeconomic implications of climate and energy policies in 
the EU (Böhringer and Keller, 2013; Boussena and Locatelli, 2013).
•	 The impacts of Chinese energy efficiency targets on the country’s 
emissions of warming gases (Hu and Rodriguez Monroy, 2012; 
Paltsev et al., 2012) and the evolution of energy technologies (Xie, 
2009; Zhang, 2010; Guo, 2011; Ye, 2011; IEA, 2013). 
•	 The government of India’s Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mis-
sion (JNNSM) that utilizes a wide array of policies with the goal of 
making solar power competitive with conventional grid power by 
2022 (Government of India, 2009). 
•	 The Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which 
was explicitly designed to encourage investment in projects that 
mitigate GHG emissions while also advancing sustainable develop-
ment (UNFCCC, 2012d; Wang et al., 2013). Since AR4, researchers 
have examined the extent to which the CDM has actually yielded 
such dividends for job creation, rural development, and other ele-
ments of sustainable development (Rogger et al., 2011; Subbarao 
and Lloyd, 2011).
Chapters in this report that cover the major economic sectors (Chapters 
7 – 11) as well as spatial development (Chapter 12) examine such poli-
cies. The sheer number of policies relevant to mitigation has made it 
impractical to develop a complete inventory of such policies let alone a 
complete systematic evaluation of their impacts. Since AR4, real world 
experimentation with policies has evolved more rapidly than careful 
scholarship can evaluate the design and impact of such policies. 
A second consequence of new research on sustainable development 
has been closer examination of the interaction between different pol-
icy instruments. Since the concept of sustainable development implies 
a multiplicity of goals and governments aim to advance those goals 
with a multiplicity of policies, the interactions between policy interven-
tions can have a large impact on the extent to which goals are actu-
ally achieved. Those interactions can also affect how policy is designed, 
implemented, and evaluated — a matter that is examined in several 
places in this report (Chapters 3 – 4, 14 – 15).
For example, the European Union (EU) has implemented an Emission 
Trading Scheme (ETS) that covers about half of the EU’s emissions, 
along with an array of other policy instruments. Since AR4 the EU has 
expanded the ETS to cover aviation within the EU territory. Some other 
EU policies cover the same sectors that are included in the ETS (e. g., 
the deployment of renewable energy supplies) as well as sectors that 
are outside the ETS (e. g., energy efficiency regulations that affect build-
ings or agricultural policies aimed at promoting carbon sinks). Many of 





goals, such as energy security or rural economic development, beyond 
just concern about climate change. Even as the price of emission credits 
under the ETS declined since AR4 — implying that the ETS itself was 
having a less binding impact on emissions — the many other mitiga-
tion-related policies have remained in place (Chapters 14 and 15).  
Such interactions make it impossible to evaluate individual policies in 
isolation from other policies that have overlapping effects. It has also 
given rise to a literature that has grown substantially since AR4 that 
explores how policies and measures adopted for one purpose might 
have the ‘co-benefit’ of advancing other goals as well. Most of that 
literature has looked at non-monetary co-benefits (see Sections 5.7, 
7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 10.8, 11.7, 11.A.6) — for example, an energy efficiency 
policy adopted principally with the goal of advancing energy security 
might also lead to lower emissions of GHGs or other pollutants. The 
concept of co-benefits, however, has also raised many challenges for 
economic evaluation of policies, and since AR4 there have been sub-
stantial efforts to clarify how the interactions between policies influ-
ence economic welfare. Such research has underscored that while the 
concept of ‘co-benefits’ is widely used to create the impression that 
policies adopted for one goal yield costless improvements in other 
goals, the interactions can also yield adverse side-effects (see Sections 
3.6.3, 4.2 and 6.6). 
Third, the continued interest in how climate change mitigation inter-
acts with goals of sustainable development has also led to challeng-
ing new perspectives on how most countries mobilize the political, 
financial, and administrative resources needed to mitigate emissions. 
More than two decades ago when the topic of climate change was first 
extensively debated by policymakers around the world, most scholar-
ship treated GHG emissions as an externality that would require new 
policies designed explicitly with the goal of controlling emissions. Con-
cerns about climate change would lead to policy outcomes tailored for 
the purpose of mitigation, and those outcomes would interact with the 
many other goals of sustainable development. Since AR4 policy experi-
ence and scholarship have focused on a different perspective — that 
for most countries a substantial portion of ‘climate policy’ would 
emerge as a derivative of other policies aimed at the many facets of 
sustainable development. A range of policy interventions were identi-
fied in theory to enable integration and optimization of climate change 
policies with other priorities such as land use planning and protection 
of water resources (Muller, 2012; Pittock et al., 2013; Dulal and Akbar, 
2013). Similarly, many of the policies that would reduce emissions of 
GHGs could also have large beneficial effects on public health (Gan-
ten et al., 2010; Li and Crawford-Brown, 2011; Groosman et al., 2011; 
Haines, 2012) (see Sections 6.6, 7.9.2 and WGII 11.9).
These new perspectives on the interactions between climate change 
and sustainable development policies have led to a more realistic view 
of how most governments are addressing the challenges of mitigation. 
However, since AR4 it has also become clear that the totality of the 
global effort remains inconsistent with widely discussed goals for pro-
tecting the climate, such as limiting warming to 1.5 or 2 degrees Cel-
sius. Despite the slowing down of emissions growth rate in the wake 
of the global financial crisis, annual volume of total emissions from 
emerging countries has been surging from the new century (see Sec-
tion 1.3 for more details). And the mitigation progress in the devel-
oped world is slower than expectation, especially when carbon emis-
sions embodied in trade is considered (Steinberger et al., 2012; Aichele 
and Felbermayr, 2012). Moreover, per capita energy consumption and 
emissions of some developing countries remain far lower than that of 
developed countries, suggesting that per capita emissions will rise as 
economies converge (Olivier et al., 2012). 
1�2�2 The world macroeconomic situation 
Shortly after the publication of AR4 in 2007, the world encountered a 
severe and deep financial crisis (Sornette and Woodard, 2010). The cri-
sis, which spread rapidly in the second half of 2008, destabilized many 
of the largest financial institutions in the United States, Europe, and 
Japan, and shocked public confidence in the global financial system. 
The crisis also wiped out an estimated USD 25 trillion in value from the 
world’s publicly traded companies, with particularly severe effects on 
banks (Naudé, 2009; IMF, 2009). The effects of the crisis are evident in 
economic growth — shown in Figure 1.1. The year 2009 witnessed the 
first contraction in global GDP since the Second World War (Garrett, 
2010). International trade of goods and services had grown rapidly 
since the turn of the millennium — from 18 % of world GDP in 2000 to 
28 % in 2008 (WTO, 2011). The crises caused global trade to drop to 
22 % in 2009 before rebounding to 25 % in 2010. The effects of the 
recent economic crisis have been concentrated in the advanced indus-
trialized countries (te Velde, 2008; Lin, 2008; ADB, 2009, 2010). While 
this particular crisis has been large, studies have shown that these 
events often recur, suggesting that there is pervasive over-confidence 
that policy and investment strategies can eliminate such cyclic behav-
iour (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011). 
Figure 1.1 reveals that countries were affected by the global economic 
crisis in different ways. The recessions were generally most severe 
in the advanced industrialized countries, but the contagion of reces-
sions centred on the high income countries has spread, especially to 
countries with small, open, and export-oriented economies — in large 
part due to the decline in exports, commodity prices, and associated 
revenues. The crisis has also affected foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and official development assistance (ODA) (IMF, 2009, 2011) with 
few exceptions such as in the area of climate change where ODA for 
climate mitigation and adaptation increased substantially until 2010 
before a decline in 2011 (OECD, 2013). The crisis also had substantial 
effects on unemployment across most of the major economies and on 
public budgets. The slow recovery and deceleration of import demand 
from key advanced economies continued to contribute to the notice-
able slowdown in the emerging market and developing economies 
during 2012 (IMF, 2013). As well, some of the major emerging market 
economies suffered from the end of their national investment booms 
(IMF, 2013). 
Figure 1�1 | Annual real growth rates of GDP by decade (left panel) and since 2000 (right panel) for four groups of countries as defined by the World Bank (World Bank, 2013): 
high-income, mature industrialized countries (HIC), upper-middle-income countries (UMC), lower-middle-income (LMC), and low-income countries (LIC) and globally. The category 
of 49 least developed countries (LDCs) as defined according to the United Nations (United Nations, 2013b) overlaps heavily with the 36 countries that the World Bank classifies as 
‘low-income’. Estimates weighted by economic size and variations to one standard deviation are shown. Growth rates weighted by size of the economy; whiskers on the decadal 
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The continued growth of developing economies, albeit at a slower 
pace than before the crisis, helps to explain why global commodity 
prices, such as for oil and metals, have quickly rebounded (see Fig-
ure 1.2). Another factor that helps explain continued high prices for 
some commodities are reductions in supply in response to weakening 
demand. Among the many implications of high and volatile commod-
ity prices are continued concerns about the availability and security 
of energy and food supply, especially in the least-developed countries. 
Those concerns have also reshaped, to some degree, how problems 
such as global climate change are viewed in many countries and soci-
eties. Where climate change mitigation has linked to these broader 
economic and energy security concerns it has proven politically easier 
to mobilize action; where they are seen in conflict the other economic 
and security priorities have often dominated (Chandler et al. 2002; IEA 
2007; ADB 2009). 
The implications of these macroeconomic patterns are many, but at 
least five are germane to the challenges of climate change mitigation: 
•	 First, the momentum in global economic growth has shifted to 
the emerging economies — a pattern that was already evident in 
the 2000s before the crisis hit. Although accelerated by the recent 
financial crisis, this shift in production, investment, and technol-
ogy to emerging economies is a phenomenon that is consistent 
with the expectation that in a globalized world economy capital 
resources will shift to emerging economies if they can be used with 
greater marginal productivity commensurate with associated risks 
(Zhu, 2011). With that shift has been a shift in the growth of green-
house gas emissions to these emerging economies as well. 
•	 Second, much of this shift has arisen in the context of globaliza-
tion in investment and trade, leading to higher emissions that are 
‘embodied’ in traded goods and services, suggesting the need 
for additional or complementary accounting systems that reflect 
the ultimate consumption of manufacturing goods that cause 
emissions rather than just the territorial place where emissions 
occurred during manufacturing (Houser et al., 2008; Davis and Cal-
deira, 2010; Peters et al., 2011, 2012a) (see also Chapter 5). 
•	 Third, economic troubles affect political priorities. As a general rule, 
hard economic times tend to focus public opinion on policies that 
yield immediate economic benefits that are realized close to home 
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(Kahler and Lake, 2013). Long-term goals, such as global climate 
protection, suffer unless they are framed to resonate with these 
other, immediate goals. Chapter 2 of this volume looks in more 
detail at the wider array of factors that affect how humans per-
ceive and manage risks that are spread out over long time hori-
zons. 
•	 Fourth, economic slowdown may also reduce the rate of techno-
logical progress that contributes to addressing climate change, 
such as in energy efficiency (Bowen et al., 2009), but for alterna-
tive views, see (Peters et  al., 2012b). The crisis also has acceler-
ated shifts in the global landscape for innovation (Gnamus, 2009). 
The largest emerging economies have all built effective systems 
for innovation and deployment of new technologies — including 
low emission technologies. Thus ‘technology transfer’ now includes 
‘South-South’ although a central role remains for ‘North-South’ dif-
fusion of technologies as part of a global effort to mitigate emis-
sions (see also Chapters 5 and 16). 
•	 Fifth, commodity prices remain high and volatile despite sluggish 
economic growth in major parts of the world economy. High costs 
for food have amplified concerns about competition between food 
production and efforts to mitigate emissions, notably through the 
growing of bioenergy crops (see 11.13). High prices for fossil fuels 
along with steel and other commodities affect the cost of building 
and operating different energy systems, which could in turn affect 
mitigation since many of the options for cutting emissions (e. g., 
power plants with carbon capture and storage technology) are rel-
atively intensive users of steel and concrete. Relatively expensive 
energy will, as well, encourage conservation and efficiency. Since 
AR4 there have been substantial changes in the availability, cost, 
and performance of energy systems — a topic to which we now 
turn.  
1�2�3 The availability, cost and performance 
of energy systems
The purpose of energy systems — from resource extraction to refin-
ing and other forms of conversion, to distribution of energy services 
for final consumption — is to provide affordable energy services that 
can catalyze economic and social development. The choice of energy 
systems depends on a wide array of investment and operating costs, 
the relative performance of different systems, infrastructures, and life-
styles. These choices are affected by many factors, such as access to 
information, status, access to technology, culture, price, and perfor-
mance (Garnaut, 2011). The assessment of different energy options 
depends critically on how externalities, such as pollution, are included 
in the calculations.
Following a decade of price stability at low levels, since 2004 energy 
prices have been high and volatile (see Figure 1.2). Those prices have 
gone hand-in-hand with substantial geopolitical consequences that 
have included a growing number of oil importing countries focusing on 





























policies surrounding energy security (e. g., Yergin, 2011). Some analysts 
interpret these high prices as a sign of imminent ‘peak production’ of 
exhaustible resources with subsequent steady decline, while others 
have argued that the global fossil and fissile resource endowment is 
plentiful (Rogner, 2012). Concerns about the scarcity of resources have 
traditionally focused on oil (Aleklett et al., 2010), but more recently the 
notions of peak coal (Heinberg and Fridley, 2010), peak gas, and peak 
uranium (EWG, 2006) have also entered the debate (see 7.4).
Sustained high prices have encouraged a series of technological inno-
vations that have created the possibility of large new supplies from 
unconventional resources (e. g., oil sands, shale oil, extra-heavy oil, 
deep gas, coal bed methane (CBM), shale gas, gas hydrates). By some 
estimates, these unconventional oil and gas sources have pushed the 
‘peak’ out to the second half of the 21st century (GEA, 2012), and they 
are a reminder that ‘peak’ is not a static concept. These unconventional 
sources have raised a number of important questions and challenges, 
such as their high capital intensity, high energy intensity (and cost), 
large demands on other resources such as water for production and 
other potential environmental consequences. Consequently, there are 
many contrasting viewpoints about the future of these unconventional 
resources (e. g., Hirsch et  al., 2006; Smil, 2011; IEA, 2012a; Jordaan, 
2012; Rogner et al., 2012). 
The importance of these new resources is underscored by the rapid 
rise of unconventional shale gas supplies in North America — a tech-
nology that had barely any impact on gas supplies at the time that 
the AR4 was being finalized in 2006, but that by 2010 accounted for 
one-fifth of North American gas supply with exploratory drilling else-
where in the world now under way. This potential for large new gas 
supplies — not only from shale gas but also coal-bed methane, deep 
gas, and other sources — could lower emissions where gas competes 
with coal if gas losses and additional energy requirements for the frac-
turing process can be kept relatively small. (A modern gas-fired power 
plant emits about half the CO2 per unit of electricity than a compara-
ble coal-fired unit.) In the United States, 49 % of net electricity genera-
tion came from coal in 2006; by 2011 that share had declined to 43 % 
and by 2012 that share had declined to 37 % and could decline further 
as traditional coal plants face new environmental regulations as well 
as the competition from inexpensive natural gas (EIA, 2013a; b; d). 
Worldwide, however, most baseline projections still envision robust 
growth in the utilization of coal, which already is one of the fastest 
growing fuels with total consumption rising 50 % between 2000 and 
2010 (IEA, 2011a). The future of coal hinges, in particular, on large 
emerging economies such as China and India as well as the diffu-
sion of technologies that allow coal combustion with lower emissions 
(GEA, 2012).
An option of particular interest for mitigating emissions is carbon diox-
ide capture and storage (CCS), which would allow for the utilization of 
coal while cutting emissions. Without CCS or some other advanced coal 
combustion system, coal is the most emission intensive of all the major 
fossil fuels yet, as we discuss below, consumption of coal is expanding 
rapidly. Thus, since AR4, CCS has figured prominently in many stud-
ies that look at the potential for large cuts in global emissions (IEA, 
2010a, 2011b; GEA, 2012). However, CCS still has not attracted much 
tangible investment. By mid-2012 there were eight large-scale projects 
in operation globally and a further eight under construction. The total 
CO2 emissions avoided by all 16 projects in operation or under con-
struction will be about 36 million tonnes a year by 2015, which is less 
than 0.1 % of total expected world emissions that year (Global CCS 
Institute, 2012). CCS is much discussed as an option for mitigation but 
not much deployed. The fuller implementation of large-scale CCS sys-
tems generally requires extensive funding and an array of complemen-
tary institutional arrangements such as legal frameworks for assigning 
liability for long-term storage of CO2. Since AR4, studies have under-
scored a growing number of practical challenges to commercial invest-
ment in CCS (IEA 2010b) (see also Chapter 7). 
Since AR4, innovation and deployment of renewable energy supplies 
has been particularly notable (IEA, 2012a; GEA, 2012). The IPCC Spe-
cial Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Miti-
gation (SRREN) (IPCC, 2011) provides a comprehensive assessment 
of the potential role of renewables in reducing GHG emissions. Glob-
ally wind electricity generating capacity has, for example, experienced 
double-digit annual growth rates since 2005 with an increasing share 
in developing countries. While still being only a small part of the world 
energy system, renewable technology capacities, especially wind but 
also solar, are growing so rapidly that their potential for large scale 
growth is hard to assess but could be very large (IEA, 2011b; GEA, 
2012). Renewable energy potentials exist not only for stationary users 
via electricity but also for transportation through biofuels and electric-
powered vehicles (see 11.13). Renewable energy technologies appear 
to hold great promise, but like all major sources of energy they also 
come with an array of concerns. Many renewable sources of electric-
ity are variable and intermittent, which can make them difficult to 
integrate into electric grids at scale (see Chapter 7; Chapter 8 in IPCC, 
2011). Some biofuels are contested due to fears for food security and 
high lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions of some fuel types (see Chap-
ter 2 in IPCC, 2011; Delucchi, 2010). Other concerns are financial, since 
nearly every major market for renewable energy has relied heavily on 
a variety of policy support such as subsidies, leading investors and 
analysts alike to wonder whether and how these energy sources will 
continue to be viable for investors if subsidies are curtailed. Indeed, 
some governments concerned about the size of public budgets have 
pared back subsidies and claimed that additional cutbacks will be 
forth coming.
Since AR4, there have also been substantial advances in the technolog-
ical possibilities for making energy systems more efficient and respon-
sive. The use of energy efficient devices, plants, and equipment has 
been legislated in many jurisdictions (RISØ, 2011). Integrating informa-
tion and communication technology (ICT) into energy networks offers 
the potential to deliver and use energy more efficiently and flexibly, 
which could make it much easier to integrate variable and intermittent 





storage technologies could also play a central role.) This interconnec-
tion offers the promise of energy systems — especially in electricity, 
where the potential for pervasive use of ICT is often called a ‘smart 
grid’ — that integrate demand response with supplies, allowing for 
smooth and reliable operation of grids even with fluctuating renew-
able supplies (EPRI, 2011). Innovations of this type may also interact 
with behavioural changes that can have large effects on emissions 
as well. For example, greater flexibility and efficiency could encour-
age consumers to use more energy, partially offsetting the benefits of 
these investments in smarter energy supply networks. Or, close atten-
tion to energy supplies could encourage shifts in behaviour that are 
much more frugal with energy (see Chapter 7).
A central challenge in shifting to clean energy supplies and to creat-
ing much more efficient end-use of energy is that many energy tech-
nologies require large capital costs with long time horizons. Thus, even 
when such technologies are cost-effective they may face barriers to 
entry if investors and users are not confident that needed policy and 
market support will be reliable. Innovations in financing — for example, 
mechanisms that allow households to lease solar panels rather than 
pay the full cost up front — can play a role in addressing such issues, 
as can public schemes to fund initial deployment of new technologies. 
Such arrangements are part of a broader effort often called ‘market 
transformation’ that, if implemented well, can lead to new trajectories 
for deployment of technologies that otherwise would face many barri-
ers to entry (IEA, 2010c). 
Since AR4, a large number of governments have begun to explore 
the expansion or introduction of nuclear power. They have also faced 
many challenges in the deployment and management of this tech-
nology. Countries with active nuclear power programmes have been 
contemplating replacing aging plants with new builds or expanding 
the share of nuclear power in their electricity mix for reasons of eco-
nomics, supply security, and mitigation of climate change. In addition, 
more than 20 countries, currently, that have never had commercial 
reactors have launched national programmes in preparation for the 
introduction of the technology, and several newcomer countries have 
entered contractual arrangements with vendors (IAEA, 2011). 
After the Fukushima accident in March 2011, an event that forced 
Japan to review its energy policy substantially, the future patterns in 
nuclear power investment have become more difficult to parse. Some 
countries have scaled back nuclear investment plans or ruled out 
new build (e. g., Switzerland, Belgium); some, notably Germany, have 
decided to close existing reactors. In the United States, since AR4, sev-
eral reactors have been slated for closure and owners have announced 
that still more closures are possible — mainly for reasons of economic 
competitiveness since aging reactors can be costly to maintain in the 
face of less expensive gas-fired electricity. At the same time, in 2013 
construction began on four new reactors in the United States — the 
first new construction in that country in three decades. Several coun-
tries preparing the introduction of nuclear power have extended the 
time frame for the final go-ahead decisions; only few in a very early 
stage of preparation for the introduction stopped their activities alto-
gether. In other countries, including all the countries that have been 
most active in building new reactors (e. g., China, India, Russia, and 
South Korea), there aren’t many noticeable effects from Fukushima 
and the investment in this energy source is accelerating, despite some 
scale-back in the wake of Fukushima (IEA, 2012a). These countries’ 
massive investments in nuclear were much less evident, especially in 
China, India and South Korea, at the time of AR4. 
The Fukushima accident has also increased investment in deployment 
of new, safer reactor designs such as so-called ‘Generation III’ reac-
tors and small modular reactors (see Chapter 7.5.4). Despite all of 
these new investment activities, standard baseline projections for the 
world energy system see nuclear power declining slightly in share as 
total demand rises and other electric power sources are more com-
petitive (IEA, 2012a; EIA, 2013c). In many countries, the future com-
petitiveness of nuclear power hinges on the adoption of policies that 
account for the climate change and energy security advantages of the 
technology.
1�2�4 International institutions and 
 agreements
For more than two decades formal intergovernmental institutions have 
existed with the task of promoting coordination of national policies 
on the mitigation of emissions. In 1992, diplomats finalized the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which 
entered into force in 1994. The first session of the Conference of the 
Parties (COP) to that Convention met in Berlin in 1995 and outlined 
a plan for new talks leading to the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, which 
entered into force in 2005. The main regulatory provisions of the Kyoto 
Protocol concerned numerical emission targets for industrialized coun-
tries (listed in Annex B of the Protocol1) during the years 2008 to 2012. 
When AR4 concluded in 2007, diplomats were in the early stages of 
negotiations for possible amendment of the Kyoto treaty while also 
exploring other mechanisms to encourage additional long-term coop-
eration on mitigation. The regulatory targets of the original Kyoto 
treaty would expire at the end of 2012. Those negotiations had been 
expected to finish at the COP 15 meeting in Copenhagen in 2009, but 
a wide number of disagreements made that impossible. Instead, talks 
continued while, in tandem, governments made an array of pledges 
that they solidified at the 2010 COP meeting in Cancun. These ‘Cancun 
pledges’ concern the policies they would adopt to mitigate emissions 
and other related actions on the management of climate risks; some 
of those pledges are contingent upon actions by other countries. The 
1 In this chapter, Annex B countries are categorized as: countries that are members 
of Annex B; countries originally listed in Annex B but which are not members of 
the Kyoto Protocol (non-members are USA and Canada). Countries not listed in 





91 countries that adopted these pledges account for the vast major-
ity (about 80 %) of world emissions (UNFCCC, 2011, 2012a; b; UNEP, 
2012). If fully implemented, the pledges might reduce emissions in 
2020 about one-tenth below the emissions level that would have 
existed otherwise — not quite enough to return emissions to 2005 lev-
els — and it would be very hard to attain widely discussed goals of 
stabilizing warming at 1.5 or 2 degrees without almost immediate and 
full participation in international agreements that coordinate substan-
tial emission reductions (Figure 1.9). International agreements are dis-
cussed in detail in Chapter 13 of this report.
At this writing, diplomatic talks are focused on the goal of adopting 
a new agreement that would raise the level of ambition in mitigation 
and be in effect by 2020 (UNFCCC, 2012c). In tandem, governments 
have also made a number of important decisions, in particular the 
adoption at Doha in 2012 of the second commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol, from 2013 to 2020. However, five developed countries 
originally listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol are not participating 
in the second commitment period: Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Rus-
sia, and the United States (UNFCCC, 2013b).
The growing complexity of international diplomacy on climate change 
mitigation, which has been evident especially since AR4 and the 
Copenhagen meeting, has led policymakers and scholars alike to look 
at many other institutional forms that could complement the UN-based 
process. Some of these initiatives imply diplomatic efforts on separate 
parallel tracks (see Chapter 13). Proposals exist within the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer to regulate some 
of the gases that have replaced ozone-destroying chemicals yet have 
proved to have strong impacts on the climate. A wide array of other 
institutions has become engaged with the climate change issue. The 
G8 — the group of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the 
UK, and the USA that convenes regularly to address a wide array of 
global economic challenges — has repeatedly underscored the impor-
tance of limiting warming to 2 degrees and implored its members to 
take further actions. The G20, a much broader group of economies 
has put climate change matters on its large agenda; the G20 has also 
helped to organize active efforts to reform fossil fuel subsidies and to 
implement green growth strategies. The UN, itself, has a large num-
ber of complementary diplomatic efforts on related topics, such as the 
‘Rio+20’ process. 
Many other institutions are now actively addressing particular 
aspects of climate change mitigation, such as the International 
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), which focuses on renewable 
energy; the Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC), which focuses 
on how limits on short-lived pollutants such as black carbon can 
help slow climate change, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), which focuses on nuclear power, the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organiza-
tion (IMO) that have focused on emissions from bunker fuels, and 
many others with expertise in particular domains. The International 
Energy Agency (IEA) is now extensively engaged in analyzing how 
developments in the energy sector could affect patterns of emissions 
(e. g., IEA, 2012). Looking across these many different activities, inter-
national institutions that have engaged the climate change topic are 
highly decentralized rather than hierarchically organized around a 
single regulatory framework (Keohane and Victor, 2011). Since AR4, 
research on decentralized international institutions has risen sharply 
(Alter and Meunier, 2009; Zelli et al., 2010; Johnson and Urpelainen, 
2012), building in part on similar concepts that have emerged in 
other areas of research on collective action (e. g., McGinnis, 1999; 
Ostrom, 2010).
Since AR4, there has been a sharp increase in scholarly and practical 
attention to how climate change mitigation could interact with other 
important international institutions such as the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) (see also Chapter 13 of this volume) (Brewer, 2010). Rela-
tionships between international trade agreements and climate change 
have been a matter of long standing interest in climate diplomacy and 
are closely related to a larger debate about how differences in envi-
ronmental regulation might affect economic competitiveness as well 
as the spread of mitigation and adaptation technology (Gunther et al., 
2012). A potential role for the WTO and other trade agreements also 
arises because the fraction of emissions embodied in internationally 
traded goods and services is rising with the globalization of manufac-
turing (see 1.2.1.2 above and 1.3.1 below). Trade agreements might 
also play a role in managing (or allowing the use of) trade sanctions 
that could help enforce compliance with mitigation commitments — a 
function that raises many legal questions as well as numerous risks 
that could lead to trade wars and an erosion of political support that 
is essential to the sustainability of an open trading system (Bacchus 
et al., 2010). For example, Article 3 of the UNFCCC requires that “[m]
easures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, 
should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-
tion or a disguised restriction on international trade.” (UNFCCC, 1992). 
The impacts of mitigation on trade issues are also related to concerns 
that have been raised about how emission controls could reduce 
national employment and income (ILO, 2012, 2013).
Since the AR4 in 2007, the scholarly community has analyzed the 
potentials, design, and practices of international cooperation exten-
sively. A body of research has emerged to explain why negotiations on 
complex topics such as climate change are prone to gridlock (Murase, 
2011; Victor, 2011; Yamaguchi, 2012). There is also a large and vibrant 
research program by political scientists and international lawyers on 
institutional design, looking at issues such as how choices about the 
number of countries, type of commitments, the presence of enforce-
ment mechanisms, schemes to reduce cost and increase flexibility, 
and other attributes of international agreements can influence their 
appeal to governments and their practical effect on behaviour (see 
e. g., the comprehensive reviews and assessment on these topics by 
Hafner-Burton, Victor, and Lupu, 2012 as well as earlier research of 
Abbott et al., 2000; and Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, 2001). Much 
of that research program has sought to explain when and how inter-





problems. Such research is part of a rich tradition of scholarship aimed 
at explaining whether and how countries comply with their interna-
tional commitments (Downs et  al., 1996; Simmons, 2010). Some of 
that research focuses on policy strategies that do not involve formal 
legalization but, instead, rely more heavily on setting norms through 
industry organizations, NGOs, and other groups (Vogel, 2008; Buthe 
and Mattli, 2011). The experience with voluntary industry standards 
has been mixed; in some settings these standards have led to large 
changes in behaviour and proved highly flexible while in others they 
have little or no impact or even divert attention (Rezessy and Bertoldi, 
2011). 
One of the many challenges in developing and analyzing climate 
change policy is that there are long chains of action between interna-
tional institutions such as the UNFCCC and the ultimate actors whose 
behaviour might be affected, such as individuals and firms. We note 
that there have been very important efforts to engage the business 
community on mitigation as well as adaptation to facilitate the mar-
ket transformations needed for new emission technologies and busi-
ness practices to become widespread (WEF, 2009; UN Global Compact 
and UNEP, 2012) (see Chapter 15). While there are diverse efforts to 
engage these many different actors, measuring the practical impact on 
emissions has been extremely difficult and much of the scholarship in 
this area is therefore highly descriptive.
1�2�5 Understanding the roles of emissions 
other than fossil fuel CO2
Much policy analysis has focused on CO2 from burning fossil fuels, 
which comprise about 60 % of total global greenhouse gas emis-
sions in 2010 (see Section 1.3.1 below). However, the UNFCCC and 
the Kyoto Protocol cover a wider array of CO2 sources and of warming 
substances — including methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), perfluoro-
carbons (PFCs), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride 
(SF6). Nitrogen trifluoride (NF3) was added as a GHG under the Kyoto 
Protocol for its second commitment period. This large list was included, 
in part, to create opportunities for firms and governments to optimize 
their mitigation efforts flexibly across different substances. The effects 
of different activities on the climate varies because the total level of 
emissions and the composition of those emissions varies. For example, 
at current levels the industrial and power sectors have much larger 
impacts on climate than agriculture (Figure 1.3). 
A variety of studies have shown that allowing for trading across these 
different gases will reduce the overall costs of action; however, many 
studies also point to the complexity in agreeing on the correct time 
horizons and strategies for policy efforts that cover gases with such 
different properties (Reilly et  al., 2003; Ramanathan and Xu, 2010; 
Shindell et  al., 2012). In addition to the gases regulated under the 
Kyoto Protocol, many of the gases that deplete the ozone layer — and 
are regulated under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete 
the Ozone Layer — are also strong greenhouse gases (Velders et  al., 
2007). Since AR4 a variety of short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs) 
have come under scrutiny (UNEP, 2011a; Shindell et  al., 2012; Victor 
et  al., 2012; Smith and Mizrahi, 2013). Those include tropospheric 
ozone (originating from air pollutant emissions of nitrogen oxides and 
various forms of incompletely oxidized carbon) and aerosols (such as 
black carbon and organic carbon and secondary such as sulphates) 
that affect climate forcing (see Chapter 8, Section 8.2.2 and Section 
5.2). This remains an area of active research, not least because some 
studies suggest that the climate impacts of short-lived pollutants like 
black carbon could be much larger or smaller (Ramanathan and Car-
michael, 2008; Bond et al., 2013) (WGI, Chapters 7 and 8). Such pol-
lutants could have a large role in mitigation strategies since they have 
a relatively swift impact on the climate — combined with mitigation 
of long-lived gases like CO2 such strategies could make it more easily 
feasible to reach near-term temperature goals, but there are still many 
debates over the right balance of mitigation effort on short-lived and 
long-lived pollutants (Ramanathan and Xu, 2010; Penner et al., 2010; 
Victor et al., 2012; Smith and Mizrahi, 2013). By contrast, other aero-
sols — notably the sulphate aerosol formed from SO2 emissions from 
the industrial and power sectors, shipping, and large-scale biomass 
burning — have a net cooling effect because they interact with clouds 
to reflect sunlight back to space (see Section 5.2 and WGI, Chapter 7.4; 
(Fuglestvedt et al., 2009). 
Starting with the FAR, the IPCC has calculated global warming poten-
tials (GWPs) to convert climate pollutants into common units over 20, 
100, and 500 year time horizons (Chapter 2, IPCC, 1990b). Indeed, 
when GWPs were first presented by IPCC the analysis included the 
statement that “[t]hese three different time horizons are presented 
as candidates for discussion and should not be considered as having 
any special significance” (see Chapter 2, page 59 in IPCC, 1990b). 
In the Kyoto Protocol, diplomats chose the middle value — 100 
years — despite the lack of any published conclusive basis for that 
choice (Shine, 2009). That approach emphasizes long-lived pollutants 
such as CO2, which are essential to stopping climate warming over 
many decades to centuries. As shown in Table 1.1, when GWPs are 
computed with a short time horizon the share of short-lived gases, 
notably methane, in total warming is much larger and that of CO2 
becomes proportionally smaller. The uncertainty in the GWPs of 
non-CO2 substances increases with time horizon and for GWP100 the 
uncertainty is about 30 % to 40 % (90 % confidence interval) (IPCC, 
2013a). If policy decisions are taken to emphasize SLCPs as a means 
of altering short-term rates of climate change rises then alternative 
GWPs or other metrics and mitigation strategies may be needed 
(IPCC, 2009; Fuglestvedt et al., 2010; Victor et al., 2012; Daniel et al., 






Figure 1�3 | Panel A (top left): Allocation of total GHG emissions in 2010 (49.5 GtCO2eq / yr) across the five sectors examined in detail in this report (see Chapters 7 – 11). Pullout 
from panel A allocates indirect CO2 emission shares from electricity and heat production to the sectors of final energy use. Panel B (top right): Allocates that same total emissions 
(49.5 GtCO2eq / yr) to reveal how each sector’s total increases or decreases when adjusted for indirect emissions. Panel C (lower panel): Total annual GHG emissions by groups of 
gases 1970 – 2010, along with estimated uncertainties illustrated for 2010 (whiskers). The uncertainty ranges provided by the whiskers for 2010 are illustrative given the limited 
literature on GHG emission uncertainties. Sources: Historic Emission Database IEA / EDGAR dataset (JRC / PBL, 2013, IEA, 2012a), see Annex II.9. Data shown for direct emissions 
on Panels A and B represents land-based CO2 emissions from forest and peat fires and decay that approximate to CO2 flux from anthropogenic emissions sources in the FOLU 
(Forestry and Other Land Use) sub-sector — additional detail on Agriculture and FOLU (‘AFOLU’, together) fluxes is in Chapter 11, Section 11.2 and Figure 11.2 and 11.6. Emissions 
weighted with 100-year GWPs as used in the original Kyoto Protocol (i. e., values from the SAR as those values are now widely used in policy discussions) and, in general, sectoral 
and national / regional allocations as recommended by the 1996 IPCC guidelines (IPCC, 1996). Using the most recent GWP-100 values from the AR5 (see WGI Section 8.6) global 
GHG emission totals would be slightly higher (52 GtCO2eq) and non-CO2 emission shares are 20 % for CH4, 5 % for N2O and 2 % for F-gases. Error bars in panel 1.3c show the 
90 % confidence interval of the emission estimates based on these sources: CO2 from fossil fuel and industrial processes ± 8.4 % (Andres et al., 2012; Kirschke et al., 2013) CO2 
from FOLU ± 2.9 GtCO2 / yr (estimates from WGI table 6.1 with central value shown on figure 1.3c is per EDGAR / IEA); Methane ± 20 % (Kirschke et al. 2013); Nitrous oxide ± 60 % 
(WGI, table 6.9); F-gases ± 20 % (UNEP, 2012). Readers are cautioned, however, that the literature basis for all of these uncertainty figures is very weak. There have been very few 
formal, documented analysis of emissions uncertainty for any gas. Indicative uncertainty for total emissions is from summing the squares of the weighted uncertainty of individual 
gases (see 5.2.3.4 for more detail), which yields a total uncertainty of + / – 9 % for a 90 % confidence interval in 2010. We note, however, that there is insufficient published informa-
tion to make a rigorous assessment of global uncertainty and other estimates suggest different uncertainties. The calculation leading to 9 % assumes complete independence of 
the individual gas-based estimates; if, instead, it is assumed that extreme values for the individual gases are correlated then the uncertainty range may be 19 %. Moreover, the 9 % 
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1�2�6 Emissions trajectories and implications 
for Article 2
Chapter 1 of the WGIII AR4 found that, without major policy changes, 
the totality of policy efforts do not put the planet on track for meeting 
the objectives of Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (IPCC, 2007a). Since then, emis-
sions have continued to grow — a topic we examine in more detail 
below. Article 2 of the UNFCCC describes the ultimate objective of the 
Convention. It states:
The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal 
instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to 
achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 
Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in 
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a 
level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to 
allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to 
ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable 
economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner. 
(UNFCCC, 1992). 
Interpreting the UNFCCC goal is difficult. The first part of Article 2, 
which calls for stabilization of GHG concentration at levels that are not 
‘dangerous,’ requires examining scientific climate impact assessments 
as well as normative judgments — points that are explored in detail in 
the WGII contribution. The second part of Article 2 is laden with condi-
tions whose interpretation is even less amenable to scientific analysis. 
In light of the enormous variations in vulnerability to climate change 
across regions and ecosystems, it is unlikely that scientific evidence 
will conclude on a single such goal as ‘dangerous’. Variations in what 
different societies mean by ‘dangerous’ and the risks they are will-
ing to endure further amplify that observation. Article 2 requires that 
societies balance a variety of risks and benefits — some rooted in the 
dangers of climate change itself and others in the potential costs and 
benefits of mitigation and adaptation. 
Since the publication of AR4 a series of high-level political events have 
sought to create clarity about what Article 2 means in practice. For 
example, the Bali Action Plan, adopted at COP 13 held in Bali, Indo-
nesia, in December 2007, cited AR4 as a guide for negotiations over 
long-term cooperation to manage climate change. At the L’Aquila G8 
Summit in 2009, five months before the COP15 meeting in Copenha-
gen, leaders “recognized the broad scientific view that the increase in 
Table 1�1 | Implications of the choice of Global Warming Potential (GWP) for mitigation strategy. Table shows the main geophysical properties of the major Kyoto gases and the 
implications of the choice of values for GWPs with different time horizons (20, 100, or 500 years) on the share of weighted total emissions for 2010; other IPCC chapters report 
detail on alternative indexes such as Global Temperature change Potential (GTP) (Chapter 3; WGI Chapter 8). At present, the 100-year GWPs are used most widely, and we show 
those values as reported in the IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR) in 1995 and subsequently used in the Kyoto Protocol. Note that CO2 is removed by multiple processes and 
thus has no single lifetime (see WGI Box 6.1). We show CF4 as one example of the class of perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and HFC-134a and HFC-23 as examples of hydrofluorocarbons 
(HFCs). All other industrial fluorinated gases listed in the Kyoto Protocol (‘F-gases’) are summed. We do not show warming agents that are not included in the Kyoto Protocol, such 
as black carbon. Emissions reported in JRC / PBL (2013) using GWPs reported in IPCC’s Second, Fourth and Fifth Assessment Reports (IPCC, 1995, 2007c, 2013a). The AR4 was used 
for GWP-500 data; interpretation of long time horizon GWPs is particularly difficult due to uncertainties in carbon uptake and climate response — differences that are apparent in 
how different models respond to different pulses and scenarios for CO2 and the many nonlinearities in the climate system (see WGI, Supplemental Material 8.SM.11.4 and Joos 
et al., 2013) and thus IPCC no longer reports 500 year GWPs. Due to changes in the GWP values from AR4 to AR5 the 500-year shares are not precisely comparable with the other 
GWPs reported here. Geophysical properties of the gases drawn from WGI, Appendix 8.A, Table 8.A.1 — final draft data).






(W / m2 / ppb)
SAR (Kyoto)
WGI 
(20 and 100 year from AR5 & 500 year from AR4)
100 years 20 years 100 years 500 years
CO2  various 1.37 x 10 – 5  76 % 52 % 73 % 88 %
CH4           12.4 3.63 x 10 – 4 16 % 42 % 20 %  7 %
N2O        121 3.00 x 10 – 3 6.2 % 3.6 % 5.0 % 3.5 %
F-gases: 2.0 % 2.3 % 2.2 % 1.8 %
HFC-134a          13.4 0.16 0.5 % 0.9 % 0.4 % 0.2 %
HFC-23        222 0.18 0.4 % 0.3 % 0.4 % 0.5 %
CF4  50,000 0.09 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.2 %
SF6    3,200 0.57 0.3 % 0.2 % 0.3 % 0.5 %
NF3 *       500 0.20 not applicable 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Other F-gases ** various various 0.7 % 0.9 % 0.8 % 0.4 %
* NF3 was added for the second commitment period of the Kyoto period, NF3 is included here but contributes much less than 0.1 %.





global average temperature above pre-industrial levels ought not to 
exceed 2 °C,” and they also supported a goal of cutting emissions at 
least 80 % by 2050 (G8 Leaders, 2009). Later that year, an COP 15, dele-
gates ‘took note’ of the Copenhagen Accord which recognized “the sci-
entific view that the increase in global temperature should be below 2 
degree Celsius,” and later meetings arrived at similar conclusions (Deci-
sion1 / CP.16). Ever since the 2009 Copenhagen Conference the goal of 
1.5 degrees has also appeared in official UN documents, and some dele-
gations have suggested that a 1 degree target be adopted. Some schol-
ars suggest that these goals can create focal points that facilitate policy 
coordination, although there is a variety of perspectives about whether 
these particular goals are playing that role, in part because of grow-
ing evidence that they will be extremely difficult or impossible to attain 
(Schneider and Lane, 2006; National Research Council of the National 
Academies, 2011; Victor, 2011; Helm, 2012). Readers should note that 
each major IPCC assessment has examined the impacts of multiplicity 
of temperature changes but has left political processes to make deci-
sions on which thresholds may be appropriate (WGIII AR4 Chapter 1). 
At present, emissions are not on track for stabilization let alone deep 
cuts (see Section 1.3 below). This reality has led to growing research 
on possible extreme effects of climate change and appropriate policy 
responses. For example, Weitzman (2009) raised the concern that stan-
dard policy decision tools such as cost-benefit analysis and expected util-
ity theory have difficulty dealing with climate change decisions, owing 
to the difficulty in assessing the probability of catastrophic impacts. 
Partly driven by these concerns, the literature on geoengineering options 
to manage solar radiation and possibly offset climate change along 
with technologies that allow removal of CO2 and other climate-altering 
gases from the atmosphere has been increasing exponentially (see 6.9). 
Because they have theoretically high leverage on climate, geoengineer-
ing schemes to alter the planet’s radiation balance have attracted par-
ticular attention; however, because they also create many risks that are 
difficult if not impossible to forecast, only a small but growing number 
of scientists have considered them seriously (Rickels et  al. 2011; Gar-
diner 2010; IPCC 2012; Keith, Parson, and Morgan 2010). 
1.3 Historical, current 
and future trends
Since AR4 there have been new insights into the scale of the mitiga-
tion challenge and the patterns in emissions. Notably, there has been 
a large shift in industrial economic activity toward the emerging coun-
tries — especially China — that has affected those nations’ emission 
patterns. At the same time, emissions across the industrialized world 
are largely unchanged from previous levels. Many countries have 
adopted policies to encourage shifts to lower GHG emissions from the 
energy system, such as through improved energy efficiency and greater 
use of renewable energy technologies. 
1�3�1 Review of four decades of greenhouse 
gas emissions 
While there are several sources of data, the analysis here relies on 
the EDGAR data set (JRC / PBL, 2013) [see Annex  II.9 Methods and 
Metrics for a complete delineation of emission categories]. We focus 
here on all major direct greenhouse gases (GHGs) related to human 
activities — including carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous 
oxide (N2O), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), and 
sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). We also examine various ozone-depleting 
substances (ODS), which are regulated under the Montreal Protocol 
due to their effects on the ozone layer but also act as long-lived GHG: 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), and 
halons. Due to lack of comparable data we do not here examine black 
carbon, tropospheric ozone precursors, cooling aerosols, and nitrogen 
trifluoride (NF3.) For the analyses that follow we use 100-year GWPs 
from the SAR because they are widely used by governments, but we 
are mindful that other time horizons and other global warming metrics 
also merit attention (see 1.2.5 above).
By sector, the largest sources of greenhouse gases were the sectors of 
energy production (34 %, mainly CO2 from fossil fuel combustion), and 
agriculture, forestry and land-use (AFOLU) (24 %, mainly CH4 and N2O) 
(Figure 1.3a). Within the energy sector, most emissions originate from 
generation of electricity that is, in turn, used in other sectors. Thus, 
accounting systems in other sectors often refer to direct emissions 
from the sector (e. g., CO2 emissions caused in industry during the pro-
duction of cement) as well as ‘indirect’ emissions that arise outside the 
boundaries of that particular economic sector (e. g., the consumption 
of electric power in buildings causes indirect emissions in the energy 
supply sector (Figure 1.3a and 1.3b). Looking at the total source of 
greenhouse gases at present CO2 contributes 76 %; CH4 about 16 %, 
N2O about 6 % and the combined F-gases about 2 % (Figure 1.3c).
Following the breakdown in sectors discussed in this report (Chapters 
7 to 11), Figure 1.3c looks at emissions over time by gas and sector. 
Figure 1.4 looks at those patterns over time according to different 
groups of countries, which reveals the effects of periodic economic 
slowdowns and contractions on emissions. Globally, emissions of all 
greenhouse gases increased by about 75 % since 1970. Over the last 
two decades, a particularly striking pattern has been the globalization 
of production and trade of manufactured goods (see Section 1.2.1.2 
above). In effect, high-income countries are importing large embodied 
emissions from the rest of the world, mainly the upper middle-income 
countries (Figure 1.5). 
Overall, per-capita emissions in the highly industrialized countries are 
roughly flat over time and remain, on average, about 5 times higher 
than those of the lowest income countries whose per-capita emis-
sions are also roughly flat. Per-capita emissions from upper-middle 
income countries have been rising steadily over the last decade (see 
inset to Figure 1.4). There are substantial differences between mean 





Figure 1�4 | Global growth in emissions of GHGs by economic region. Main figure shows world total (top line) and growth rates per decade, as well as the World Bank’s four eco-
nomic regions (see Figure 1.1 caption for more detail). Inset shows trends in annual per capita mean (solid lines) and median (dotted lines) GHG emissions by region 1970 – 2010 in 
tonnes of CO2eq (t / cap / yr) (United Nations, 2013a). Global totals include bunker fuels; regional totals do not. The data used is from the same sources reported in Figure 1.3c. Error 
bars are approximated confidence interval of 1 standard deviation, derived by aggregating individual country estimates by gas and sector of the 16th and 84th emission percentiles 
provided by the MATCH analysis (Höhne et al., 2011); data also available at http: / / www. match-info. net / . However, we note that this probably over-states actual uncertainty in the 
totals, since individual country uncertainty estimates under this method are implicitly taken to be completely correlated. Thus, for the global totals we estimate a 90 % uncertainty 
range using the same method as discussed for Figure 1.3c. While in 2010 the uncertainty using that method is 9 %, over the full time period of Figure 1.4 the value varies from 9 % 
to 12 % with an average value of 10 %. We caution that multi-country and global uncertainty estimates remain an evolving area of research (see caption 1.3c and Section 5.2.3). 
























































































these categories. Some very low income countries have extremely low 
per-capita emissions while some upper middle income developing 
countries have per-capita emissions comparable with those of some 
industrialized nations.
Emissions from the energy sector (mainly electricity production) and 
from transportation dominate the global trends. Worldwide power sec-
tor emissions have tripled since 1970 (see Figure 7.3), and transport 
has doubled (see Figure 8.1). Since 1990 emissions from electricity and 
heat production increased by 27 % for the group of OECD countries; in 
the rest of the world the rise has been 64 % (see Figure 7.5). Over the 
same period, emissions from road transport increased by 29 % in OECD 
countries and 61 % in the other countries (see Figure 8.3). Emissions 
from these systems depend on infrastructures such as power grids and 
roads, and thus there is also large inertia as those infrastructures are 
slow to change (Davis et al., 2010). 
Forest related GHG emissions are due to biomass burning and decay of 
biomass remaining after forest burning and after logging. In addition, 
the data shown includes CO2 emissions from decomposition of drained 
peatland and from peat fires (Olivier and Janssens-Maenhout, 2012). 
The forest related figures presented here are in line with the synthesis 
paper by Houghton et al. (2012) on recent estimates of carbon fluxes 
from land use and land cover change. 
There has been a large effort to quantify the uncertainties in the histor-
ical emissions since AR4 was published. Such efforts have been difficult 
due to the small number of truly independent data sources, especially 
at the finest level of resolution such as emissions from particular sec-
tors and countries. Uncertainties are particularly large for greenhouse 
gas emissions associated with agriculture and changes in land use. By 
contrast, recent estimates of emissions from fossil fuel combustion var-
ied by only 2.7 % across the most widely used data sources (Macknick, 
2011). In addition to variations in the total quantity of fossil fuel com-
busted, the coefficients used by IPCC to calculate emissions also vary 
from 7.2 % for coal use in industry to 1.5 % for diesel used in road 
transport (Olivier et  al., 2010). Emissions from agriculture and land-
use change are estimated to vary by 50 % (Tubiello et al., 2013), and 
a recent study that compared 13 different estimates of total emissions 
from changes in land use found broadly comparable results (Houghton 
et al., 2012). Since land use is a small fraction of total CO2 emissions 
the total estimate of anthropogenic CO2 emissions has uncertainty of 
only ± 10 % (UNEP, 2012). Looking beyond CO2, estimates for all other 
warming gases are generally more uncertain. Estimated uncertainties 
for global emissions of methane, nitrous oxide, and fluorine based 
gases are ± 25 %, ± 30 %, and ± 20 % respectively (UNEP, 2012).
Statistically significant uncertainty quantifications require large inde-
pendent and consistent data sets or estimates, which generally do 
not exist for historical GHG emission data. In such cases, uncertainty 
is referred to as ‘indicative uncertainty’ based on the limited informa-
tion available that does not meet the standard of a rigorous statistical 
analysis (see 5.2.3).
When adjusting emission statistics to assign indirect GHG emissions 
from electricity and heat consumption to end-use sectors, as is done in 
panel 1.3b, the main sectors affected are the industrial and buildings 
sectors. Those sectors’ shares in global GHG emissions then increase by 
11 % and 12 % to reach levels of 31 % (industry) and 19 % (buildings). 
The addition of these so-called ‘Scope 2’ emissions is sometimes done 
to show or analyze the more comprehensive impact of total energy con-
sumption of these end-use sectors to total energy-related emissions.
Figure 1.4 looks at these patterns from the global perspective over 
time. The AR4 worked with the most recent data available at the time 
(2004). Since then, the world has seen sustained accelerated annual 
growth of emissions — driven by CO2 emissions from fossil fuel com-
bustion. There was a temporary levelling off in 2008 linked to high fuel 
prices and the gathering global economic crisis, but the sustained eco-
nomic growth in the emerging economies has since fuelled continued 
Figure 1�5 | CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion for the four economic regions 
attributed on the basis of territory (solid line) and final consumption (dotted line) in 
gigatonnes of CO2 per year (Gt / yr). The shaded areas are the net CO2 trade balance 
(difference) between each of the four country groupings (see Figure 1.1) and the rest of 
the world. Blue shading indicates that the region is a net importer of emissions, leading 
to consumption-based CO2 emission estimates that are higher than traditional terri-
tory-based emission estimates. Yellow indicates the reverse situation — net exporters of 
embodied emissions. Low-income countries, because they are not major players in the 
global trade of manufactured products, have essentially no difference between territory 
and consumption based estimates. For high-income countries and upper-middle-income 
countries, embodied emissions have grown over time. Figures based on Caldeira and 
Davis (2011) and Peters et al. (2012b), but with data from Eora, a global multi-regional 
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growth in world emissions. This is particularly evident in the economic 
data (Figure 1.1) showing that the large group of countries other than 
the highly industrialized nations continue to grow despite the world 
economic crisis. However, growth rates globally, including in these 
rapidly rising countries, have been slower than the levels seen in the 
1990s, which portends less rapid growth in world emissions. 
Figure 1.6 shows global GHG emissions since 1970 in 20-year intervals 
for the five economic sectors covered in Chapters 7 – 11, i. e., Energy 
Systems, Transport, Buildings, Industry and Agriculture, Forestry and 
Other Land Use (AFOLU). International transport (‘bunkers’) are shown 
separately as these can neither be attributed to any of these economic 
sectors or country grouping. In every country grouping except low-
income countries, total emissions have risen since 1970 with the larg-
est increases evident in energy systems. The only major sector that does 
not display these globally rising trends is AFOLU as a growing number 
of countries adopt policies that lead to better protection of forests, 
improved yields in agriculture reduce pressure to convert natural for-
ests to cropland, and other trends allow for a ‘great restoration’ of pre-
viously degraded lands (Ausubel et al., 2013). In low-income countries 
total emissions are dominated by trends in AFOLU; in all other country 
groupings the energy system plays the central role in emissions.   
It is possible to decompose the trends in CO2 emissions into the vari-
ous factors that ‘drive’ these outcomes — an exercise discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 5. One way to decompose the factors contribut-
ing to total emissions is by the product of population, GDP per capita, 
energy intensity (total primary energy supply per GDP) and the carbon 
intensity of the energy system (carbon emitted per unit energy). This 
approach is also known as the ‘Kaya Identity’ (Kaya, 1990) and reso-
nates with similar earlier work (Holdren and Ehrlich, 1974). A variety of 
studies have done these decompositions (Raupach et al., 2007; Steckel 
et al., 2011; Cline, 2011; Akimoto et al., 2013). Figure 1.7 shows such 
an analysis for the global level, and Chapter 5 in this report offers more 
detailed decompositions.
The analysis reveals enhanced growth in the 2000s of global income, 
which drove higher primary energy consumption and CO2 emissions. 
Figure 1�6 | Greenhouse gas emissions measured in gigatonnes of CO2eq per year (Gt / yr) in 1970, 1990 and 2010 by five economic sectors (Energy supply, Transport, Buildings, 
Industry, as well as Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) and four economic regions (see caption to Figure 1.1). ‘Bunkers’ refer to emissions from international trans-
portation and thus are not, under current accounting systems, allocated to any particular nation’s territory. Note: The direct emission data from JRC / PBL (2013) (see Annex II.9) 
represents land-based CO2 emissions from forest and peat fires and decay that approximate to CO2 flux from anthropogenic emissions sources in the FOLU (Forestry and Other Land 
Use) sub-sector. For a more detailed representation of AFOLU GHG flux (Agriculture and FOLU) see Chapter 11, Section 11.2 and Figure 11.2 and 11.6. Source: same sources as 












































(That pattern levelled around 2009 when the global recession began to 
have its largest effects on the world economy.) Also notable is carbon 
intensity: the ratio of CO2 emissions to primary energy. On average, 
since 1970 the world’s energy system has decarbonized. However, in 
the most recent decade there has been a slight re-carbonization. In the 
portions of the global economy that have grown most rapidly, low-car-
bon and zero-carbon fuels such as gas, nuclear power and renewables 
have not expanded as rapidly as relatively high-carbon coal.
Interpreting the Kaya Identity using global data masks important 
regional and local differences in these drivers. For example, the demo-
graphic transition in China is essentially completed while in Africa pop-
ulation growth remains a sizable driver. Technology — a critical factor 
in improving energy and carbon intensities as well as access to energy 
resources — varies greatly between regions (see Chapters 5 and 7). The 
recent re-carbonization is largely the result of expanded coal combus-
tion in developing countries driven by high rates of economic growth, 
while across the highly industrialized world carbon intensity has been 
declining due to the shift away from high carbon fuels (notably coal) 
to natural gas, renewables, and also to nuclear in some countries. The 
simple Kaya identity relies on broad, composite indicators that nei-
ther explain causalities nor explicitly account for economic structures, 
behavioural patterns, or policy factors, which again vary greatly across 
regions. Technological change might allow for radically lower emis-
sions in the future, but the pattern over this four-decade history sug-
gests that the most important global driver of emissions is economic 
growth. 
Although the average per capita income levels in the large emerging 
economies in 2010 were approximately 30 % or less of the per capita 
income levels of OECD countries in 1980, their levels of carbon inten-
sity and energy intensity are comparable with those of North America 
in the early 1980s (IEA, 2012b). 
1�3�2 Perspectives on mitigation 
Looking to the future, it is important to be mindful that the energy 
system, which accounts for the majority of GHG emissions, is slow to 
change even in the face of concerted policy efforts (Davis et al., 2010; 
WEF, 2012; GEA, 2012). For example, many countries have tried to alter 
trends in CO2 emissions with policies that would make the energy sup-
ply system more efficient and shift to low emission fuels, including 
renewables and nuclear power (Chapter 7).  
There are many different perspectives on which countries and peoples 
are accountable for the climate change problem, which should make 
the largest efforts, and which policy instruments are most practical and 
effective. Many of these decisions are political, but scientific analysis 
can help frame some of the options. Here we look at six different per-
spectives on the sources and possible mitigation obligations for world 
emissions — illustrated in Figure 1.8 and elsewhere in the chapter. This 
discussion engages questions of burden sharing in international coop-
eration to mitigate climate change, a topic addressed in more detail in 
Chapter 4.
One perspective, shown in panel A of Figure 1.8, concerns total emis-
sions and the countries that account for that total. Twenty countries 
account for 75 % of world emissions; just five countries account for 
about half. This perspective suggests that while all countries have 
important roles to play, the overall impact of mitigation efforts are 
highly concentrated in a few. 
A second perspective, shown in panel B of Figure 1.8, concerns the 
accumulation of emissions over time. The climate change problem is 
fundamentally due to the ‘stock’ of emissions that builds up in the 
atmosphere. Because of the long atmospheric lifetime of CO2, a frac-
tion of the CO2 emitted to the atmosphere from James Watt’s steam 
engine that in the late 18th century helped trigger the Industrial Revo-
lution still remains in the atmosphere. Several studies have accounted 
in detail for the sources of emissions from different countries over time, 
taking into account the geophysical processes that remove these gases 
(Botzen et al., 2008; Höhne et al., 2011; Wei et al., 2012). Attributing 
past cumulative emissions to countries is fraught with uncertainty and 
depends on method applied and emissions sources included. Because 
the uncertainties differ by source of emissions, panel B first shows just 
cumulative emissions from industrial sources (left bar) and then adds 
the lowest and highest estimates for emissions related to changes in 
land use (middle two bars). Many studies on the concept of ‘histori-
cal responsibility’ look at cumulative emissions since 1751, but that 
approach ignores the fact that widespread knowledge of the potential 
Figure 1�7 | Decomposition of the change in total annual CO2 emissions from fossil 
fuel combustion by decade and four driving factors; population (light blue), GDP per 
capita (dark blue), energy intensity of GDP (yellow) and carbon intensity of energy 
(red orange). The bar segments show the changes associated with each factor alone, 
holding the respective other factors constant. Total emission changes are indicated by 
a white triangle. The change in emissions over each decade is measured in gigatonnes 
of CO2 per year [GtCO2 / yr]; economic output is converted into common units using 
purchasing power parities; the use of market exchange rates would lower the share 
associated with economic output although that would still be the largest single factor. 
Source: updated from Steckel et al. (2011) using data from IEA (2012c; d).

















































harms of climate change is only a more recent phenomenon — dat-
ing, perhaps, to around 1990 when global diplomatic talks that led 
to the UNFCCC were fully under way. Thus the right bar in panel B 
shows cumulative emissions for all sources of CO2 (including a cen-
tral estimate for sources related to changes in land use) from 1990 to 
2010. Each of these different methods leads to a different assignment 
of responsible shares and somewhat different rankings. Other studies 
have examined other time horizons (e. g., Le Quéré et al., 2012). Many 
scholars who use this approach to analysing historical responsibility 
and similar approaches to assessing possible future contributions often 
refer to a fixed ‘carbon budget’ and identify the ‘gap’ between that 
fixed budget and allowable future emissions (e. g., IPCC, 2013b; UNEP, 
2011b; Chapter 6). 
A few studies have extended the concepts of historical responsibility to 
include other gases as well (den Elzen et al., 2013; Smith et al., 2013). 
For simplicity, however, in panel B we report total cumulative emis-
sions of just CO2, the long-lived gas that accounts for the vast majority 
of long-term climate warming. Adding other gases requires a model 
that can account for the different atmospheric lifetimes of those gases, 
which introduces yet more uncertainty and complexity in the analy-
sis of historical responsibility. The results of such analysis are highly 
sensitive to choices made in the calculation. For example, the share 
of developed countries can be almost 80 % when excluding non-CO2 
GHGs, Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry, and recent emissions 
(until 2010) or about 47 % when including these emissions (den Elzen 
et al., 2013). As a general rule, because emissions of long-lived gases 
are rising, while emissions of the distant past are highly uncertain, 
their influence is overshadowed by the dominance of the much higher 
emissions of recent decades (Höhne et al., 2011). 
A third perspective concerns the effects of international trade. So far, 
nearly all of the statistics presented in this chapter have been orga-
nized according to the national territory where the emissions are 
released into the atmosphere. In reality, of course, some emissions are 
‘embodied’ in products that are exported and discussed in more detail 
in Section 1.2.2. A tonne of steel produced in China but exported to 
the United States results in emissions in China when the fundamen-
tal demand for the steel originated in the United States. Comparing 
the emissions estimated from consumption and production (left and 
right bars of panel A) shows that the total current accounting for world 
emissions varies considerably — with the largest effects on China and 
the United States — although the overall ranking does not change 
much when these trade effects are included. Figure 1.5 earlier in this 
chapter as well as Section 1.2.1.2 present much more detailed infor-
mation on this perspective. 
A fourth perspective looks at per-capita emissions, shown in panel C 
of Figure 1.8. This perspective draws attention to fundamental differ-
ences in the patterns of development of countries. This panel shows 
the variation in per-capita emissions for each of the four country 
groupings. The large variation in emissions in low-income country 
reflects the large role for changes in land use, such as deforestation 
and degradation. There are some low-income countries with per-cap-
ita emissions that are higher than high-income nations. Some studies 
have suggested that debates over concepts such as ‘common but dif-
ferentiated responsibility’ — the guiding principle for allocating miti-
gation efforts in talks under the UNFCCC — should focus on individu-
als rather than nations and assign equal per-capita emission rights to 
individuals (Chakravarty et al., 2009). Still other studies have looked at 
the historical cumulative per-capita emissions, thus combining two of 
the different perspectives discussed here (Teng et al., 2012). Looking 
within the categories of countries shown in panel C, some developing 
countries already have higher per-capita emissions than some industri-
alized nations.
A fifth perspective is the carbon efficiency of different economies. 
Economies vary in how they convert inputs such as energy (and thus 
emissions associated with energy consumption) into economic value. 
This efficiency is commonly measured as the ratio of emission to unit 
economic output (CO2 / GDP) and illustrated in panel D of Figure 1.8. 
Typically, economies at an earlier stage of development rely heavily 
on extractive industries and primary processing using energy intensive 
methods often reinforced with subsidies that encourage excessive con-
sumption of energy. As the economy matures it becomes more efficient 
and shifts to higher value-added industries, such as services, that yield 
low emissions but high economic output. This shift also often includes 
a change from higher carbon primary fuels to less carbon-intensive 
fuels. From this perspective, emission obligations might be adjusted to 
reflect each country’s state of economic development while creating 
incentives for countries to transition to higher economic output with-
out concomitant increases in emissions.
A sixth perspective (panel E of Figure 1.8) looks at the change of emis-
sions between 1990 and 2010. 1990 is a base year for most of the 
Annex B countries in the Kyoto Protocol. That panel divides the world 
into three groups — the countries (listed in Annex B) that agreed to 
targets under the Kyoto Protocol and which formally ratified the Pro-
tocol; countries listed in Annex B but which never ratified the treaty 
(United States) or withdrew (Canada); and countries that joined the 
Kyoto Protocol but had no formal quantitative emission control tar-
gets under the treaty. If all countries listed in Annex B had joined and 
remained members of the Protocol those countries, on average, would 
have reduced emissions more than 5 % between 1990 and the compli-
ance period of 2008 – 2012. From 1990 to 2008 – 2011, the Annex B 
nations have reduced their collective emissions by 20 % excluding the 
United States and Canada and by 9 % if including them, even without 
obtaining emission credits through the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism (CDM) (UNFCCC, 2013a). (As already noted, the 
United States never ratified the Kyoto Protocol; Canada ratified but 
later withdrew.) However, some individual countries will not meet 
their national target without the CDM or other forms of flexibility that 
allow them to assure compliance. The trends on this panel reflect 
many distinct underlying forces. The big decline in Ukraine, Russia, the 
12 new members of the EU (EU+12) and one of the original EU mem-























































































































































































































































































































































































































ing of those economies in the midst of a large shift away from central 
planning. Some of those restructuring economies used base years 
other than 1990, a process allowed under the Kyoto Protocol, because 
they had higher emissions in earlier years and a high base year arith-
metically leads to larger percentage reductions. The relatively flat 
emissions patterns across most of the industrialized world reflect the 
normal growth patterns of mature economies. The sharp rise in emerg-
ing markets, notably China and India, reflect their rapid industrializa-
tion — a combination of their stage of development and pro-growth 
economic reforms. 
There are many ways to interpret the message from this sixth perspec-
tive, which is that all countries collectively are likely to comply with the 
Kyoto Protocol. One interpretation is that treaties such as the Kyoto 
Protocol have had some impacts on emissions by setting clear stan-
dards as well as institutional reforms that have led countries to adjust 
their national laws. From that perspective, the presence of the Kyoto 
obligations is why nearly all the countries that ratified the Kyoto obli-
gations are likely to comply. Another interpretation is that the Kyoto 
Protocol is a fitting illustration of the concept of ‘common but differ-
entiated responsibility’, which holds that countries should undertake 
different efforts and that those most responsible for the underlying 
problem should do the most. Still another interpretation is that choice 
of Kyoto obligations largely reveals ‘selection effects’ through which 
countries, in effect, select which international commitments to hon-
our. Countries that could readily comply adopted and ratified bind-
ing limits; the others avoided such obligations — a phenomenon that, 
according to this perspective, is evident not just in climate change 
agreements but other areas of international cooperation as well (e. g., 
Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, 1996; Victor 2011). 
Figure 1�8 | Multiple perspectives on climate change mitigation. Panel A: 2010 emission, ranked in order for the top 75 % of global total. Left bar shows ranking with consumption-
based statistics, and right bar shows territorial-based (see Figure 1.5 for more detail). Panel B: Cumulative emissions since 1750 (left three bars) and since 1990 (right bar) for four 
different methods of emission accounting. The first method looks just at industrial sources of CO2 (left bar); the second method adds to those industrial sources the lowest plausible 
estimate for emissions related to changes in land use (second bar), the third uses the highest plausible estimate for land use (third bar) and the final method uses median estimates 
for land use emissions along with median industrial emissions. (We focus here on uncertainty in land use emissions because those have higher variation than industrial sources.) 
Panel C: ranking of per-capita emissions by country as well as (inset) for the four groupings of countries Shadings show the 10th to 90th percentile range (light) as well as the 25th 
to 75th percentile range (dark); horizontal bars identify the median and diamonds the mean. Panel D: Ranking of carbon intensity of economies (emissions per unit GDP, weighted 
with purchasing power parity) as a function of total size of the economy as well as (inset) for the four groupings of countries Shadings show the 10th to 90th percentile range (light) 
as well as the 25th to 75th percentile range (dark); horizontal bars identify the median and diamonds the mean. Country names are abbreviated using the three letter standardiza-
tion maintained by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO, standard 3166). Panel E: Emissions changes from 1990 to 2012 divided into Annex B of the Kyoto Proto-
col (countries with quantified emission targets, red orange), countries that were eligible for Annex B but are not members (Canada and the United States, yellow) and non-Annex B 
countries (blue). Sources: Panel A: based on Peters et al., 2011 data; Panel B: based on MATCH data (Höhne et al., 2011). High and low plausible values for land use emissions are 
two different datasets provided in the MATCH analysis (see Figure 1.4 for more detail and caveat); since the MATCH analysis is based on actual emission data up to 2005, the last 
four years are were taken from the Historic Emission Database EDGAR / IEA emission data (JRC / PBL, 2013, IEA, 2012a, See Annex II.9). Panel C: JRC / PBL, 2013 and United Nations, 
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Still other interpretations are possible as well, with varied implications 
for policy strategies and the allocation of burdens and benefits among 
peoples and nations.
1�3�3 Scale of the future mitigation challenge 
Future emission volumes and their trajectories are hard to estimate, 
and there have been several intensive efforts to make these projec-
tions. Most such studies start with one or more ‘business-as-usual 
(BAU)’ projections that show futures without further policy interven-
tions, along with scenarios that explore the effects of policies and sen-
sitivities to key variables. Chapter 5 looks in more detail at the long-
term historical trends in such emissions, and Chapter 6 examines the 
varied models that are widely used to make emission projections. 
Using the WGIII AR5 Scenario Database, comprised of those models 
described in Chapter 6 (See Annex  II.10), Figure 1.9 also shows the 
emission trajectories over the long sweep of history from 1750 through 
the present and then projections out to 2100. 
The long-term scenarios shown on Figure 1.9 illustrate the emissions 
trajectories that would be needed to stabilize atmospheric concen-
trations of greenhouse gases at the equivalent of around 450 ppm 
(430 – 480) and 550 ppm (530 – 580) CO2eq by 2100. The scenarios 
centered on 450 ppm CO2eq are likely (> 66 % chance) to avoid a rise 
in temperature that exceeds 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels. 
Scenarios reaching 550 ppm CO2eq have less than a 50 % chance of 
avoiding warming more than 2 degrees, and the probability of limit-
ing warming to 2 degrees further declines if there is significant over-
shoot of the 550 ppm CO2eq concentration. It is important to note 
that there is no precise relationship between such temperature goals 
and the accumulation of emissions in the atmosphere largely because 
the sensitivity of the climate system to changes in atmospheric con-
centrations is not known with precision. There is also uncertainty in 
the speed at which future emissions will be net removed from the 
atmosphere by natural processes since those processes are not per-
fectly understood. If removal processes are relatively rapid and climate 
sensitivity is low, then a relatively large quantity of emissions might 
lead to small changes in global climate. If those parameters prove to 
have less favourable values then even modest increases in emissions 
could have big impacts on climate. These uncertainties are addressed 
in much more detail in WGI Chapter 12 and discussed in Chapter 6 of 
this report as well. While these uncertainties in how the natural system 
will respond are important, recent research suggests that a wide range 
of uncertainties in social systems — such as the design of policies 
and other institutional factors — are likely to be a much larger factor 
in determining ultimate impacts on warming from human emissions 
(Rogelj et al., 2013a; b).
Figure 1.9 underscores the scale of effort that would be needed to 
move from BAU emissions to goals such as limiting warming to 2 
degrees. The rapid rise in emissions since 1970 (left inset) is in stark 
contrast with the rapid decline that would be needed over the com-
ing century. Because it is practically difficult to orient policy around 
very long term goals, the middle inset examines the coming few 
decades — the period during which emissions would need to peak and 
then decline if stabilization concentrations such as 450 or 550 ppm 
CO2eq are to be achieved. 
A variety of studies have probed whether national emission reduction 
pledges, such as those made in the aftermath of the Copenhagen con-
ference, would be sufficient to put the planet on track to meet the 2 
degree target (Den Elzen et al., 2011; Rogelj et al., 2011). For example, 
Den Elzen et al. (2011) found the gap between allowable emissions to 
maintain a ‘medium’ chance (50 – 66 %) of meeting the 2 degree tar-
get and the total reduction estimated based on the pledges made at 
and after COP 15, are as big as 2.6 – 7.7 GtCO2e in 2020; that analysis 
assumed that countries would adopt least-cost strategies for mitiga-
tion emissions, but if less idealized scenarios are followed, then the 
gap would be even larger. A large number of other studies also look 
at the size of the gap between emission trajectories and the levels 
needed to reach goals such as 2 degrees (Clarke et  al., 2009; Cline, 
2011; Yamaguchi, 2012). By logical extension, limiting warming to 1.5 
degrees (or even 1 degree, as some governments and analysts suggest 
should be the goal) is even more challenging. In a major inter-com-
parison of energy models, eight of 14 scenarios found that stabilizing 
concentrations at 450 ppm CO2eq (which would be broadly consistent 
with stabilizing warming at 2 degrees) would be achievable under 
optimal conditions in which all countries participated immediately in 
global regulation of emissions and if a temporary overshooting of the 
450 ppm goal were allowed (Clarke et  al., 2009). As a general rule, 
it is still difficult to assess scientifically whether the Cancun pledges 
(which mainly concern the year 2020) are consistent with most long-
term stabilization scenarios because a wide range of long-term sce-
narios is compatible with a wide range of 2020 emissions; as time 
progresses to 2030 and beyond, there is a tighter constraining rela-
tionship between allowable emissions and long-term stabilization 
(Riahi et al., 2013). The middle inset in figure 1.9 shows those pledges 
and suggests that they may be consistent with some scenarios that 
stabilize concentrations at around 550 ppm CO2eq but are inconsis-
tent with the least cost scenarios that would stabilize concentrations 
at 450 ppm CO2eq.   
There is no simple relationship between the next few decades and 
long-term stabilization because lack of much mitigation in the next 
decades can, in theory, be compensated by much more aggressive mit-
igation later in the century — if new zero- and negative-emission tech-
nologies become available for widespread use. That point is illustrated 
in the upper right inset which shows how assumptions about the tim-
ing of mitigation and the availability of technologies affects a subset 
of scenarios that stabilize concentrations between 450 ppm CO2eq and 
550 ppm CO2eq. Least cost, optimal scenarios depart immediately from 
BAU trajectories. However, such goals can be reached even if there 
are delays in mitigation over the next two decades provided that new 
technologies become available that allow for extremely rapid reduc-
tions globally in the decades immediately after the delay.   
Figure 1�9 | The scale of the mitigation effort needed. Main figure shows the sweep of history from 1750 to 2010 (actual emission estimates) and published projections out to 
the future. Projections include baseline scenarios that do not assume new mitigation policies (grey shading), baseline scenarios that assume aggressive spread of energy efficiency 
technologies and changes in behaviour (purple shading), mitigation scenarios that reach concentration levels of about 550 ppm CO2eq (yellow) and 450 ppm CO2eq (blue). (The 
mitigation scenarios include those that assume optimal regulation over time and those with delays to 2030). The bottom left inset shows recent historical emissions and is the same 
as Figure 1.3c. The top left inset shows the same scenarios from the main figure, but with more detail over the next few decades, including the relationship between the Cancun 
pledges and the various stabilization scenarios. The top right panel looks instead at long-term patterns in emissions and explores the effects of delays to 2030. It focuses on a subset 
of the mitigation scenarios from the main panel that are consistent with limiting atmospheric concentrations of CO2 to about 450 ppm CO2eq to 500 ppm CO2eq — a goal broadly 
consistent with limiting warming to about 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels by 2100 and thus a topic that many models have examined in some detail. The dark green fans 
show model estimates for optimal least cost strategies for stabilization; light green fans show least cost mitigation with emissions that track baseline scenarios until 2030 and then 
make deep cuts with the assumption that new technologies come into place. Chart also shows in light black a subset of scenarios based on the premise that very large quantities 
of net negative emissions (about 40 GtCO2eq / yr by 2100) can be achieved and thus illustrate how assumptions of negative emissions technology may influence the expected time 
path of emissions. The black scenarios, the output of just one model, entail substantial overshoot of concentrations before stabilization is achieved and unlikely to limit warming 
to 2 degrees (see Chapter 6). Sources: Historical data drawn from EDGAR / IEA databases reported in IEA, 2012a See Annex II.9; projections drawn from the WGIII AR5 Scenarios 
Database described in greater detail in Annex II.10; estimates of the impact of the Copenhagen pledges reported in Chapter 13.
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Still other interpretations are possible as well, with varied implications 
for policy strategies and the allocation of burdens and benefits among 
peoples and nations.
1�3�3 Scale of the future mitigation challenge 
Future emission volumes and their trajectories are hard to estimate, 
and there have been several intensive efforts to make these projec-
tions. Most such studies start with one or more ‘business-as-usual 
(BAU)’ projections that show futures without further policy interven-
tions, along with scenarios that explore the effects of policies and sen-
sitivities to key variables. Chapter 5 looks in more detail at the long-
term historical trends in such emissions, and Chapter 6 examines the 
varied models that are widely used to make emission projections. 
Using the WGIII AR5 Scenario Database, comprised of those models 
described in Chapter 6 (See Annex  II.10), Figure 1.9 also shows the 
emission trajectories over the long sweep of history from 1750 through 
the present and then projections out to 2100. 
The long-term scenarios shown on Figure 1.9 illustrate the emissions 
trajectories that would be needed to stabilize atmospheric concen-
trations of greenhouse gases at the equivalent of around 450 ppm 
(430 – 480) and 550 ppm (530 – 580) CO2eq by 2100. The scenarios 
centered on 450 ppm CO2eq are likely (> 66 % chance) to avoid a rise 
in temperature that exceeds 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels. 
Scenarios reaching 550 ppm CO2eq have less than a 50 % chance of 
avoiding warming more than 2 degrees, and the probability of limit-
ing warming to 2 degrees further declines if there is significant over-
shoot of the 550 ppm CO2eq concentration. It is important to note 
that there is no precise relationship between such temperature goals 
and the accumulation of emissions in the atmosphere largely because 
the sensitivity of the climate system to changes in atmospheric con-
centrations is not known with precision. There is also uncertainty in 
the speed at which future emissions will be net removed from the 
atmosphere by natural processes since those processes are not per-
fectly understood. If removal processes are relatively rapid and climate 
sensitivity is low, then a relatively large quantity of emissions might 
lead to small changes in global climate. If those parameters prove to 
have less favourable values then even modest increases in emissions 
could have big impacts on climate. These uncertainties are addressed 
in much more detail in WGI Chapter 12 and discussed in Chapter 6 of 
this report as well. While these uncertainties in how the natural system 
will respond are important, recent research suggests that a wide range 
of uncertainties in social systems — such as the design of policies 
and other institutional factors — are likely to be a much larger factor 
in determining ultimate impacts on warming from human emissions 
(Rogelj et al., 2013a; b).
Figure 1.9 underscores the scale of effort that would be needed to 
move from BAU emissions to goals such as limiting warming to 2 
degrees. The rapid rise in emissions since 1970 (left inset) is in stark 
contrast with the rapid decline that would be needed over the com-
Figure 1�9 | The scale of the mitigation effort needed. Main figure shows the sweep of history from 1750 to 2010 (actual emission estimates) and published projections out to 
the future. Projections include baseline scenarios that do not assume new mitigation policies (grey shading), baseline scenarios that assume aggressive spread of energy efficiency 
technologies and changes in behaviour (purple shading), mitigation scenarios that reach concentration levels of about 550 ppm CO2eq (yellow) and 450 ppm CO2eq (blue). (The 
mitigation scenarios include those that assume optimal regulation over time and those with delays to 2030). The bottom left inset shows recent historical emissions and is the same 
as Figure 1.3c. The top left inset shows the same scenarios from the main figure, but with more detail over the next few decades, including the relationship between the Cancun 
pledges and the various stabilization scenarios. The top right panel looks instead at long-term patterns in emissions and explores the effects of delays to 2030. It focuses on a subset 
of the mitigation scenarios from the main panel that are consistent with limiting atmospheric concentrations of CO2 to about 450 ppm CO2eq to 500 ppm CO2eq — a goal broadly 
consistent with limiting warming to about 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels by 2100 and thus a topic that many models have examined in some detail. The dark green fans 
show model estimates for optimal least cost strategies for stabilization; light green fans show least cost mitigation with emissions that track baseline scenarios until 2030 and then 
make deep cuts with the assumption that new technologies come into place. Chart also shows in light black a subset of scenarios based on the premise that very large quantities 
of net negative emissions (about 40 GtCO2eq / yr by 2100) can be achieved and thus illustrate how assumptions of negative emissions technology may influence the expected time 
path of emissions. The black scenarios, the output of just one model, entail substantial overshoot of concentrations before stabilization is achieved and unlikely to limit warming 
to 2 degrees (see Chapter 6). Sources: Historical data drawn from EDGAR / IEA databases reported in IEA, 2012a See Annex II.9; projections drawn from the WGIII AR5 Scenarios 
Database described in greater detail in Annex II.10; estimates of the impact of the Copenhagen pledges reported in Chapter 13.
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Determining the exact cost required to achieve any particular goal is 
difficult because the models that are used to analyze emissions must 
contend with many uncertainties about how the real world will evolve. 
While the list of those uncertainties is long, the model outcomes are 
particularly sensitive to five that are discussed in much more detail in 
Chapter 6: 
•	 Participation. Studies typically analyze scenarios in which all 
nations participate with the same timing and level of effort, which 
also probably leads to the least costly total level of effort. However, 
a variety of ‘delayed participation’ scenarios are also analyzed, and 
with delays it becomes more difficult (and costly) to meet mitiga-
tion goals (Bertram et  al., 2013; Riahi et  al., 2013; Rogelj et  al., 
2013b; Luderer et al., 2013). 
•	 International institutions. Outcomes such as global participa-
tion will require effective institutions, such as international agree-
ments on emission reductions and schemes like international trad-
ing of emission offsets and financial transfers. If those institutions 
prove difficult to create or less than optimally effective then global 
mitigation goals are harder to reach.
•	 Technology. The least cost outcomes (and greatest ease in meet-
ing mitigation goals) require that all emission control technolo-
gies be available as quickly as possible. In many models, meeting 
aggressive goals also requires the availability of negative emission 
technologies — for example, power plants fired with biomass and 
including carbon dioxide capture and storage. No such plant actu-
ally exists in the world today and with pessimistic assumptions 
about the availability of such technologies it becomes much harder 
or impossible to reach aggressive mitigation goals (Edenhofer 
et  al., 2010; Tavoni et  al., 2012; Eom et  al., 2013; Kriegler et  al., 
2013). 
•	 Economic growth. Typically, these models assume that if eco-
nomic growth is high then so are emissions (and, in some models, 
so is the rate of technological innovation). Of course, in the real 
world, countries can delink economic output and emissions, such 
as through mitigation policy. More pessimistic assumptions about 
growth can make emission goals easier to reach (because there is 
a smaller gap between likely and desired emissions) or harder to 
reach (because technologies will not be invented as quickly). 
•	 Peak timing. Because long-term climate change is driven by the 
accumulation of long-lived gases in the atmosphere (notably CO2), 
these models are sensitive to the exact year at which emissions 
peak before emission reductions slow and then stop accumulation 
of carbon in the atmosphere. Models that allow for early peaks 
create more flexibility for future years, but that early peak also 
requires the early appearance of mitigation technologies. Later 
peak years allow for delayed appearance of new technologies but 
also require more aggressive efforts after the peak. Some models 
also allow for an ‘overshoot’ of peak concentrations, which makes 
it easier for the model to reach long-term stabilization but lowers 
the odds that stabilization will limit actual warming to a particular 
target. 
In general, only when the most flexible assumptions are made — such 
as permission for some temporary overshooting of goals and allow-
ing models the maximum flexibility in the technologies that are uti-
lized — is the result a least cost outcome. Since AR4, the modeling com-
munity has devoted much more attention to varying those assumptions 
to allow for less flexible assumptions that are typically better tuned 
to real world difficulties. These more realistic assumptions are often 
called ‘second best’ or ‘less idealized’. At present, with the most flex-
ible idealized assumptions several models suggest that the goal of 
reaching 2 degrees is feasible. With a variety of less ideal — but more 
realistic — assumptions that goal is much more difficult to reach, and 
many models find the goal infeasible or exceptionally expensive. These 
practical difficulties suggest that while optimal analyses are interest-
ing, the real world may follow pathways that are probably more costly 
and less environmentally effective than optimal outcomes. They are 
also a reminder that such models are a portrayal of the world that 
Figure 1�10 | The effects of real world assumptions on mitigation costs. Relative mitiga-
tion cost increase in case of technology portfolio variations compared to a scenario with 
default technology assumptions for stabilizing atmospheric GHG concentrations centered 
on 450 ppm (430 – 480 ppm, right) and 550 ppm (530 – 580 ppm, left) CO2eq in the year 
2100. Boxplots show the 25th to 75th percentile range with median value (heavy line) 
and unshaded area the total range across all reported scenarios, with the caveat that the 
numbers of scenarios used in such analyses is relatively small. Scenario names on x-axis 
indicate the technology variation relative to the default assumptions: Low Energy Inten-
sity= energy intensity rising at less than standard values, such as due to extensive use of 
energy efficiency programs and technologies (N = 7, 12); No CCS = CCS technologies 
excluded (N = 3, 11); Limited Bioenergy = maximum of 100 EJ / yr bioenergy supply (N = 

























































is necessarily simplified and highly dependent on assumptions. There 
can be many unforeseen changes that make such goals easier or more 
difficult to reach. For example, unexpectedly high economic growth 
and expansion of coal-fired electricity has raised emissions and made 
goals harder to reach; unexpected innovations in renewables, energy 
efficiency and natural gas are possibly making climate goals easier to 
reach.
The importance of these real world approaches to analysis is illustrated 
in Figure 1.10, which shows how different assumptions about energy 
intensity (which is related to human behaviour) and the availability 
of technologies affect the estimated total cost. Compared with costs 
under default technology assumption, if energy intensity is assumed to 
improve rapidly (Low EI) the total cost for mitigating to 430 – 480 ppm 
CO2eq (right boxplot) or 530 – 580 ppm CO2eq (left boxplot) then costs 
are cut in half. (These low EI scenarios are shown, as well, in purple 
on Figure 1.9 — they lead, systematically, to emissions that are signifi-
cantly lower than standard BAU scenarios.) Most studies that look at 
technological and behavioural assumptions conclude that real-world 
costs could be higher than typical, optimal estimates. For example, if 
CCS technologies are not available then the cost of meeting 450 ppm 
stabilization could be 1.5 times to 4 times greater than compared to 
full CCS availability. Similarly, if there is limited bioenergy supply then 
costs could be dramatically higher than standard least cost estimates. 
1.4 Mitigation  challenges 
and strategies
While this report addresses a wide array of subjects related to climate 
change, our central purpose is to discuss mitigation of emissions. The 
chapters that follow will examine the challenges for mitigation in 
more detail, but five are particularly notable. These challenges, in many 
respects, are themes that will weave through this report and appear in 
various chapters. 
1�4�1 Reconciling priorities and achieving 
sustainable development 
Climate change is definitely one of the most serious challenges 
human beings face. However, it is not the only challenge. For exam-
ple, a survey of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) offers 
examples of the wider array of urgent priorities that governments 
face. These goals, worked out in the context of the United Nations 
Millennium Declaration in September 2000, cover eight broad areas 
of development that span eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, 
reducing child mortality, combating HIV / AIDS, malaria and other dis-
eases. Within those broad areas the MDGs include 18 specific tar-
gets. For example, halving, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion 
of people whose income is less than $1 a day, and halving, between 
1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger, are 
among targets under the goal of eradicate extreme poverty and hun-
ger. (Since then, the official poverty level has been revise upwards to 
$1.25 / day by the World Bank.) MDGs are unquestionably the urgent 
issues human beings should cope with immediately and globally. 
Achieving such goals along with an even broader array of human 
aspirations is what many governments mean by ‘sustainable devel-
opment’ as echoed in many multilateral statements such as the dec-
laration from the Rio +20 conference in 2012 (United Nations, 2012). 
All countries, in different ways, seek sustainable development. Each 
puts its priorities in different places. The need to make tradeoffs and 
find synergies among priorities may be especially acute in the least 
developed countries where resources are particularly scarce and 
vulnerabilities to climate change are systematically higher than in 
the rest of the world (see Box 1.1). Those priorities also vary over 
time — something evident as immediate goals such as job creation 
and economic growth have risen in salience in the wake of the global 
financial crisis of the late 2000s. Moreover, sustainable development 
requires tradeoffs and choices because resources are finite. There 
have been many efforts to frame priorities and determine which of 
the many topics on global agendas are most worthy. Making such 
choices, which is a highly political process, requires looking not only 
at the present but also posterity (Summers, 2007). Applying standard 
techniques for making tradeoffs — for example, cost-benefit analy-
sis (CBA) — is extremely difficult in such settings, though the impor-
tance of CBA itself is well recognized (Sachs, 2004) (See Section 3.6). 
Important goals, such as equity, are difficult to evaluate alongside 
other goals that can more readily be monetized. Moreover, with cli-
mate change there are additional difficulties such as accounting for 
low probability but high impact catastrophic damages and estimat-
ing the monetary value of non-market damages (Nussbaum, 2000; 
Weitzman, 2009).
1�4�2 Uncertainty and risk management 
The policy challenge in global climate change is one of risk manage-
ment under uncertainty. The control of emissions will impose costs on 
national economies, but the exact amount is uncertain. Those costs 
could prove much higher if, for example, policy instruments are not 
designed to allow for flexibility. Or they could be much lower if tech-
nological innovation leads to much improved energy systems. Mind-
ful of these uncertainties, there is a substantial literature on how 
policy design can help contain compliance costs, allowing policymak-
ers to adopt emission controls with greater confidence in their cost 
(Metcalf, 2009). 
Perhaps even more uncertain than the costs of mitigation are the 
potential consequences of climate change. As reviewed elsewhere 
in the IPCC assessment, there is growing recognition of the impor-





which could lead to strong feedbacks and very large impacts — for 
example, higher sea levels and substantial impacts on natural eco-
systems (IPCC, 2014 (forthcoming); see also WGI, Chapters 11 – 14 
and Annex  I). Investments in adaptation, which vary in their fea-
sibility, can help reduce exposure to climate impacts and may also 
lessen uncertainty in the assessment of possible and probable impacts 
(World Bank, 2010). 
Since risks arise on both fronts — on the damages of climate change 
and on the costs of mitigation responses — scholars often call this a 
‘risk-risk’ problem. In the case of climate change, management in this 
context of risk and uncertainty must contend with another large chal-
lenge. Mitigation actions and effects of climate change involve a mul-
titude of actors working at many different levels, from individual firms 
and NGOs to national policy to international coordination. The interest 
of those different actors in undertaking climate change mitigation also 
varies. Moreover, this multitude faces a large array of decisions and 
can deploy many different instruments that interact in complex ways. 
Chapter 2 explores the issues involved with this multitude of actors 
and instruments. And Chapter 3 introduces a framework for analys-
ing the varied policy instruments that are deployed and assessing their 
economic, ecological, ethical and other outcomes.
Box 1�1 | Least Developed Countries: mitigation challenges and opportunities
The Least Developed Countries (LDCs) consist of 49 countries 
and over 850 million people, located primarily in Africa and 
Asia — with 34 LDCs in Africa alone (UNFPA, 2011). These coun-
tries are characterised by low income (three-year average gross 
national income per capita of less than USD 992), weak human 
assets index (nutrition, health, school enrolment, and literacy), 
and high economic vulnerability criterion (UNCTAD, 2012a). 
Despite their continued marginalization in the global economy, 
these countries’ economies grew at about 6 % per year from 
2000 to 2008, largely stimulated by the strong pull-effect of the 
Asian emerging economies (Cornia, 2011). However, the global 
economic downturn and the worsening Eurozone crisis have had 
an effect on most LDC economies. In 2011, LDCs grew by 4.2 %, 
1.4 percentage lower than the preceding year, hence mirroring the 
slowdown of growth worldwide (UNCTAD, 2012a). Many of the 
traditional domestic handicaps remain as LDC economies continue 
to be locked into highly volatile external transactions of commodi-
ties and low-productivity informal activities, having neither the 
reserves nor the resources needed to cushion their economies and 
adjust easily to negative shocks. 
Regarding the social trends, LDCs as a group have registered 
encouraging progress towards achieving some of the Millen-
nium Development Goals (MDGs), especially in primary school 
enrolment, gender parity in primary school enrolment, HIV / AIDS 
prevalence rates and the share of women in non-agricultural 
wage employment (Sachs, 2012). However, poverty reduction 
has been less successful; only four (of 33) LDCs are on track to 
cut the incidence of extreme poverty to half 1990 levels by 2015 
(UNCTAD, 2011). In line with this, the Istanbul Programme of 
Action, adopted at the 4th UN Conference on the Least Developed 
Countries (LDC-IV) highlighted the importance of building the 
productive base of LDCs’ economies and promoting the process 
of structural transformation involving an increase in the share of 
high productivity manufacturing and an increase in agricultural 
productivity (UNCTAD, 2012b).
The LDCs’ continued reliance on climate-sensitive activities such 
as agriculture means that adapting to climate change remains 
a central focus of economic development. If climate changes 
become acute the additional burden of adaptation could draw 
resources away from other activities, such as mitigation. Alter-
natively, more acute attention to adaptation could help mobilize 
additional efforts for mitigation within these countries and other 
countries that are the world’s largest emitters. The scientific 
literature has not been able to determine exactly when and 
how adaptation and mitigation are complementary or compet-
ing activities in LDCs; what is clear, however, is that meeting the 
climate and development challenge entails integrating mitigation 
and adaptation actions in the context of sustainable develop-
ment (Ayers and Huq, 2009; Martens et al., 2009; Moomaw and 
Papa, 2012). In LDCs, like all other countries, investment in new 
infrastructures offers the opportunity to avoid future GHG emis-
sions and lower mitigation costs (Bowen and Fankhauser, 2011). 
Other emissions avoidance options are also available for LDCs in 
areas of innovative urban development, improvements in material 
productivity (Dittrich et al., 2012) and the application of enhanced 
land use efficiency through intensified agricultural practices and 
sustainable livestock management (Burney et al., 2010). 
There could be significant additional costs associated with the 
expansion of infrastructure in LDCs aimed at decoupling GHG 
emissions and development. Paying these costs in countries with 
extremely scarce resources could be a challenge (Krausmann 
et al., 2009). Moreover, the additional costs could deter private 
investors in low carbon interventions, leaving the public sector 
with additional burdens, at least in the short-term (UN DESA, 
2009; Collier and Venables, 2012). For most LDC governments, 
creating the conditions for accelerated economic growth and 
broad-based improvements in human well-being will remain the 
main driver of national development policies and could lead to the 






Scientific research on risk management has several implications for 
managing the climate change problem. One is the need to invest in 
research and assessment that can help reduce uncertainties. In relation 
to climate change these uncertainties are pervasive and they involve 
investments across many intellectual disciplines and activities, such as 
engineering (related to controlling emissions) and the many fields of 
climate science (related to understanding the risks of climate change). 
In turn, these knowledge generating and assessment processes must 
be linked to policy action in an iterative way so that policymakers can 
act, learn, and adjust while implementing policy measures that are 
‘robust’ across a variety of scenarios (McJeon et  al., 2011). Another 
major implication is the need to examine the possibilities of extreme 
climate impacts. These so called ‘tail’ risks in climate impacts could 
include relatively rapid changes in sea level, feedbacks from melting 
permafrost that amplify the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere, or possibly a range of so far barely analyzed outcomes 
(see generally Weitzman 2011). There are many options that could play 
a role in these risk management strategies such as adaptation, rapid 
deployment of low or negative emission technologies (e. g., nuclear, 
advanced renewables, or bioenergy plants that store their emissions 
underground) and geoengineering. Many of these options raise gover-
nance and risk management challenges of their own.
1�4�3 Encouraging international collective 
action
Unlike many matters of national policy, a defining characteristic of the 
climate change issue is that most of its sources are truly global. Nearly 
all climate-altering gases have atmospheric lifetimes sufficiently long 
that it does not matter where on the planet they are emitted. They 
spread worldwide and affect the climate everywhere. Thus, national 
governments develop their own individual policies with an eye to what 
other nations are likely to do and how they might react (Victor, 2011). 
Even the biggest emitters are mostly affected by emissions from other 
countries rather than principally their own pollution. International col-
lective action is unavoidable. 
As the level of ambition to manage the risks of climate change rises, 
collective action can help governments achieve efficient and effective 
outcomes in many ways. Those include not just coordination on poli-
cies to control emissions but also collective efforts to promote adap-
tation to climate change. International coordination is also needed to 
share information about best practices in many areas. For example, 
many of the promising options for reducing emissions involve changes 
in behaviour; governments are learning which policies are most effec-
tive in promoting those changes and sharing that information more 
widely can yield practical leverage on emissions (Aldy and Stavins, 
2007; Dubash and Florini, 2011) (see also Chapter 13). Coordination 
is also essential on matters of finance since many international goals 
seek action by countries that are unwilling or unable to pay the cost 
fully themselves (see Chapter 16) (WEF, 2011). Extremely short-lived 
pollutants, such as soot, do not mix globally yet these, too, entrain 
many issues of international cooperation. Often this pollution moves 
across regional borders. And coordination across borders can also help 
promote diffusion of best practices to limit these pollution sources. 
International cooperation, including financial transfers, can also help dif-
fuse knowledge and capabilities to countries as they adapt to the effects 
of climate change (UNFCCC, 2008, 2012c; World Bank, 2010). Indeed, in 
response to these many logics for international cooperation on mitiga-
tion and adaptation extensive intergovernmental and other coordinat-
ing efforts are under way (see Section 1.2.1.4 and also Chapter 13). 
One of the central challenges in international cooperation is that while 
national governments play central roles — for example, negotiating, 
and implementing treaties — effective cooperation must also engage 
a large number of other actors, notably in the private sector. Moreover, 
governments and other actors cooperate not only at the global level 
through universal forums such as the United Nations but also in a wide 
array of regional forums. One result of these multiple processes that 
entrain public institutions as well as private actors is decentralized and 
overlapping systems for government (see Chapter 13).
1�4�4 Promoting investment and technological 
change 
Radical delinking of GDP growth with emissions will probably require 
massive changes in technology. Achieving those changes will require 
closer attention to policies that affect technology innovation and 
deployment. Technologies vary in many ways — they have different 
maturity stages and potential for improvement through ‘learning’; 
they have different mitigation potentials and require different policy 
responses in developing and developed countries. Many studies have 
looked in detail at how this diversity of technology policy approaches 
might influence emissions and climate policy in the future (UN DESA, 
2009, 2011; WBCSD, 2009; IEA, 2012d). 
Nearly all low GHG technology options share one commonality — a 
shift in the cost structure of supplying energy services from operat-
ing / fuel costs to upfront capital costs. Thus policy options are particu-
larly focused on how to create credible assurances for investors who 
pay these capital costs. Policies that reduce demand for energy — nota-
bly those that mobilize investments in energy efficiency in both end use 
and supply — can play pivotal roles by limiting the total cost needed to 
transform energy supplies. The rate at which these changes in energy 
systems can occur is an important area of research. The high fixed cost 
of infrastructures also create ‘lock-in’ effects that help explain why it 
is difficult to change real world emission patterns quickly (Davis et al., 
2010; IEA, 2012a).
International cooperation, finance, and technology transfer all have 
important roles to play as a catalyst to accelerate technology prog-
ress at each stage in the lifecycle of a technology (see Chapter 13 on 





cess of innovation and diffusion of technologies. For example, massive 
improvements in wind turbine technology have arisen through coopera-
tion between innovators and manufacturers in many different markets. 
Similarly, business has played central roles in innovating and applying 
energy efficiency technologies and practices that can help cut costs 
and allow higher profits and additional employment opportunities. 
(ILO, 2012, 2013). Numerous studies indicate that it will be difficult to 
achieve widely discussed goals such as limiting warming to 2 degrees 
at least without drastic efficiency improvements (but also life style 
changes) (UNECE, 2010; Huntington and Smith, 2011; OECD, 2011; IEA, 
2012d; Riahi et al., 2012). Innovations are needed not just in technol-
ogy but also lifestyles and business practices that often evolve in tan-
dem with technology. For example, after the Fukushima Daiichi accident 
in March 2011, changes in Japanese life style and behaviour curbed 
nationwide domestic household electricity demand by 5 % during the 
winter 2011 / 12 compared with the previous year after accounting for 
degree day differences (Ministry of Environment, Japan, 2012). Simi-
larly, electricity demand in the Tokyo area was around 10 % lower in the 
summer 2011 than in 2010 and about 40 % of the reduction of demand 
resulted from behavioural changes that allowed for greater conserva-
tion of electricity used for air-conditioning (Nishio and Ofuji, 2012). 
As a practical matter, strategies for innovating and deploying new 
technologies imply shifts in policy on many different fronts. In addition 
to the role for businesses, the public sector has a large role to play in 
affecting the underlying conditions that affect where and how firms 
actually make long-lived and at times financially risky investments. 
Those conditions include respect for contracts, a predictable and cred-
ible scheme for public policy, protection of intellectual property, and 
relatively efficient mechanisms for creating contracts and resolving 
disputes. These issues, explored in more detail in Chapter 16, are hardly 
unique to climate change. In addition, there may be large roles for the 
public sector in making public investments in basic technology that 
the private sector, on its own, would not adequately provide — a topic 
covered in more detail in Chapters 3.11 and 15.6.  
1�4�5 Rising attention to adaptation 
For a long time, nearly all climate policy has focused on mitigation. 
Now, with some change in climate inevitable (and a lot more likely) 
there has been a shift in emphasis to adaptation. While adaptation is 
primarily the scope of WGII, there are important interactions between 
mitigation and adaptation in the development of a mitigation strat-
egy. If it is expected that global mitigation efforts will be limited, 
then adaptation will play a larger role in overall policy strategy. If it 
is expected that countries (and natural ecosystems) will find adapta-
tion particularly difficult, then societies should become more heavily 
invested in the efforts to mitigate emissions. 
Mitigation and adaptation also have quite different implications for 
collective action by nations. A strategy that relies heavily on mitigation 
requires collective action because no nation, acting alone, can have 
much impact on the global concentration of GHGs. Even the biggest 
nations account for only about one-quarter of global emissions. By 
contrast, most activities relevant for adaptation are local — while they 
may rely, at times, on international funding and know-how they imply 
local expenditures and local benefits. The need for (and difficulty of) 
achieving international collective action is perhaps less daunting than 
for mitigation (Victor, 2011). 
Developing the right balance between mitigation and adaptation 
requires many tradeoffs and difficult choices (See WG II Chapter 17 for 
a more detailed discussion). In general, societies most at risk from cli-
mate change — and thus most in need of active adaptation — are those 
that are least responsible for emissions. That insight arises, in part, 
from the fact that as economies mature they yield much higher emis-
sions but they also shift to activities that are less sensitive to vagaries 
of the climate. Other tradeoffs in striking the mitigation / adaptation 
balance concern the allocation of resources among quite different 
policy strategies. The world has spent more than 20 years of diplomatic 
debate on questions of mitigation and has only more recently begun 
extensive discussions and policy planning on the strategies needed for 
adaptation. As a practical matter, the relevant policymakers also differ. 
For mitigation many of the key actions hinge on international coordi-
nation and diplomacy. For adaptation the policymakers on the front 
lines are, to a much greater degree, regional and local officials such 
as managers of infrastructures that are vulnerable to extreme weather 
and changes in sea level.
1.5 Roadmap for 
WG III report
The rest of this report is organized into five major sections.
First, Chapters 2 – 4 introduce fundamental concepts and framing 
issues. Chapter 2 focuses on risk and uncertainty. Almost every aspect 
of climate change — from the projection of emissions to impacts on 
climate and human responses — is marked by a degree of uncertainty 
and requires a strategy for managing risks; since AR4, a large number 
of studies has focused on how risk management might be managed 
where policies have effects at many different levels and on a diverse 
array of actors. Scholars have also been able to tap into a rich literature 
on how humans perceive (and respond to) different types of risks and 
opportunities. Chapter 3 introduces major social, economic, and ethi-
cal concepts. Responding to the dangers of unchecked climate change 
requires tradeoffs and thus demands clear metrics for identifying and 
weighing different priorities of individuals and societies. Chapter 3 
examines the many different cost and benefit metrics that are used for 
this purpose along with varied ethical frameworks that are essential to 
any full assessment. Chapter 4 continues that analysis by focusing on 





practices surrounding this concept reflect the many distinct efforts by 
societies and the international community to manage tradeoffs and 
synergies involved with economic growth, protection of the environ-
ment, social equity, justice and other goals.
Second, Chapters 5 – 6 put the sources of emissions and the scale of 
the mitigation challenge into perspective. Chapter 5 evaluates the fac-
tors that determine patterns of anthropogenic emissions of GHGs and 
particulate pollutants that affect climate. Chapter 6 looks at the suite 
of computer models that simulate how these underlying driving forces 
may change over time. Those models make it possible to project future 
emission levels and assess the certainty of those projections; they also 
allow evaluation of whether and how changes in technology, econ-
omy, behaviour and other factors could lower emissions as needed to 
meet policy goals. 
Third, Chapters 7 – 11 look in detail at the five sectors of economic activity 
that are responsible for nearly all emissions. These sectors include energy 
supply systems (Chapter 7), such as the systems that extract primary 
energy and convert it into useful forms such as electricity and refined 
petroleum products. While energy systems are ultimately responsible for 
the largest share of anthropogenic emissions of climate gases, most of 
those emissions ultimately come from other sectors, such as transporta-
tion, that make final use of energy carriers. Chapter 8 looks at trans-
portation, including passenger and freight systems. Chapter 9 examines 
buildings and Chapter 10 is devoted to industry. Together, Chapters 7 – 10 
cover the energy system as a whole. Chapter 11 focuses on agriculture, 
forestry, and other land use (AFOLU), the only sector examined in this 
study for which the majority of emissions are not rooted in the energy 
system. Chapter 11 includes an appendix that delves in more detail into 
the special issues related to bioenergy systems (Section 11.13).
Looking across Chapters 7 – 11 one major common theme is the con-
sideration and quantification of ‘co-benefits’ and ‘adverse side-effects’ 
of mitigating climate change, i. e., effects that a policy or measure 
aimed at one objective might have on other objectives. Measures lim-
iting emissions of GHGs or enhancing sinks often also yield other ben-
efits such as lowering the harmful health effects of local air pollution 
or regional acidification when firms and individuals switch to less pol-
luting combustion technologies and fuels. But fuel switching from coal 
to gas can have adverse side-effects on the jobs in the coal mining 
industry. Although difficult to quantify, these co-benefits and adverse 
side-effects often play a large role in evaluating the costs and benefits 
of mitigation policies (see also Sections 3.6.3, 4.2, 4.8 and 6.6). 
Often, this approach of looking sector-by-sector (and within each sector 
at individual technologies, processes, and practices) is called ‘bottom 
up’. That perspective, which is evident in Chapters 7 – 11 complements 
the ‘top down’ perspective of Chapters 5 – 6 in which emissions are 
analyzed by looking at the whole economy of a nation or the planet. 
Fourth, Chapter 12 looks at spatial planning since many emissions 
are rooted in how humans live, such as the density of population and 
the infrastructure of cities. Matters of spatial planning are treated dis-
tinctly in this report because they are so fundamental to patterns of 
emissions and the design and implementation of policy options.
Fifth, Chapters 13 – 16 look at the design and implementation of policy 
options from a variety of perspectives. Chapter 13 concentrates on 
the special issues that arise with international cooperation. Since no 
nation accounts for more than about one-quarter of world emissions, 
and economies are increasingly linked through trade and competition, 
a large body of research has examined how national policies could be 
coordinated through international agreements like the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and other mechanisms for coopera-
tion. Chapter 14 continues that analysis by focusing on regional coop-
eration and development patterns. 
Chapter 15 looks at what has been learned within countries about the 
design and implementation of policies. Nearly every chapter in this 
study looks at an array of mitigation policies, including policies that 
work through market forces as well as those that rely on other mecha-
nisms such as direct regulation. Chapter 15 looks across that experi-
ence at what has been learned. 
Chapter 16, finally, looks at issues related to investment and finance. 
The questions of who pays for mitigation and the mechanisms that can 
mobilize needed investment capital are rising in prominence in inter-
national and national discussions about mitigation. Chapter 16 exam-
ines one of the most rapidly growing areas of scholarship and explores 
the interaction between public institutions such as governments and 
private firms and individuals that will ultimately make most decisions 
that affect climate change mitigation. Among its themes is the central 
role that financial risk management plays in determining the level and 
allocation of investment financing. 
1.6 Frequently Asked 
Questions
FAQ 1.1 What is climate change mitigation?
The Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in its 
Article 1, defines climate change as: “a change of climate which is 
attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the com-
position of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natu-
ral climate variability observed over comparable time periods”. The 
UNFCCC thereby makes a distinction between climate change attrib-
utable to human activities altering the atmospheric composition, and 
climate variability attributable to natural causes. The IPCC, in contrast, 
defines climate change as “a change in the state of the climate that 
can be identified (e. g., by using statistical tests) by changes in the 





extended period, typically decades or longer”, making no such dis-
tinction.  
Climate Change Mitigation is a “human intervention to reduce the 
sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases” (GHG) (See Glos-
sary (Annex  I)). The ultimate goal of mitigation (per Article 2 of the 
UNFCCC) is preventing dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
the climate system within a time frame to allow ecosystems to adapt, 
to ensure food production is not threatened and to enable economic 
development to proceed in a sustainable manner.
FAQ 1.2 What causes GHG emissions?
Anthropogenic GHGs come from many sources of carbon dioxide 
(CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and fluorinated gases (HFCs, 
PFCs and SF6). CO2 makes the largest contribution to global GHG emis-
sions; fluorinated gases (F-gases) contribute only a few per cent. The 
largest source of CO2 is combustion of fossil fuels in energy conver-
sion systems like boilers in electric power plants, engines in aircraft 
and automobiles, and in cooking and heating within homes and busi-
nesses. While most GHGs come from fossil fuel combustion, about one 
third comes from other activities like agriculture (mainly CH4 and N2O), 
deforestation (mainly CO2), fossil fuel production (mainly CH4) indus-
trial processes (mainly CO2, N2O and F-gases) and municipal waste and 
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The scientific understanding of climate change and the impact it 
has on different levels of decision-making and policy options has 
increased since the publication of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report (AR4). In addi-
tion, there is a growing recognition that decision makers often rely 
on intuitive thinking processes rather than undertaking a systematic 
analysis of options in a deliberative fashion. It is appropriate that 
climate change risk management strategies take into account both 
forms of thinking when considering policy choices where there is risk 
and uncertainty. 
Consideration of risk perception and decision processes can 
improve risk communication, leading to more effective poli-
cies for dealing with climate change� By understanding the sys-
tematic biases that individuals utilize in dealing with climate change 
problems, one can more effectively communicate the nature of the 
climate change risk. An understanding of the simplified decision 
rules employed by decision makers in making choices may be helpful 
in designing policies that encourage the adoption of mitigation and 
adaptation measures. [Section 2.4]
Decision processes often include both deliberative and intuitive 
thinking� When making mitigation and adaptation choices, decision 
makers sometimes calculate the costs and benefits of their alterna-
tives (deliberative thinking). They are also likely to utilize emotion- and 
rule-based responses that are conditioned by personal past experience, 
social context, and cultural factors (intuitive thinking). [2.4.2]
Laypersons tend to judge risks differently than experts� Layper-
sons’ perceptions of climate change risks and uncertainties are often 
influenced by past experience, as well as by emotional processes that 
characterize intuitive thinking. This may lead them to overestimate or 
underestimate the risk. Experts engage in more deliberative thinking 
than laypersons by utilizing scientific data to estimate the likelihood 
and consequences of climate change. [2.4.6]
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and cost-effectiveness analysis 
(CEA) can enable decision makers to examine costs and ben-
efits, but these methodologies also have their limitations� Both 
approaches highlight the importance of considering the likelihood of 
events over time and the importance of focusing on long-term hori-
zons when evaluating climate change mitigation and adaptation poli-
cies. CBA enables governments and other collective decision-making 
units to compare the social costs and benefits of different alternatives. 
However, CBA cannot deal well with infinite (negative) expected utili-
ties arising from low probability catastrophic events often referred to 
as ‘fat tails’. CEA can generate cost estimates for stabilizing green-
house gas (GHG) concentrations without having to take into account 
the uncertainties associated with cost estimates for climate change 
impacts. A limitation of CEA is that it takes the long-term stabilization 
as a given without considering the economic efficiency of the target 
level. [2.5.3, 2.5.4]
Formalized expert judgment and elicitation processes improve 
the characterization of uncertainty for designing climate 
change strategies (high confidence). Experts can quantify uncer-
tainty through formal elicitation processes. Their judgments can char-
acterize the uncertainties associated with a risk but not reduce them. 
The expert judgment process highlights the importance of undertaking 
more detailed analyses to design prudent climate policies. [2.5.6]
Individuals and organizations that link science with policy grap-
ple with several different forms of uncertainty� These uncertain-
ties include absence of prior agreement on framing of problems and 
ways to scientifically investigate them (paradigmatic uncertainty), lack 
of information or knowledge for characterizing phenomena (epistemic 
uncertainty), and incomplete or conflicting scientific findings (transla-
tional uncertainty). [2.6.2]
The social benefit from investments in mitigation tends to 
increase when uncertainty in the factors relating GHG emissions 
to climate change impacts are considered (medium confidence). 
If one sets a global mean temperature (GMT) target, then normative 
analyses that include uncertainty on the climate response to elevated 
GHG concentration, suggest that investments in mitigation measures 
should be accelerated. Under the assumption of nonlinear impacts of 
a GMT rise, inclusion of uncertainty along the causal chain from emis-
sions to impacts suggests enhancing mitigation. [2.6.3]
The desirability of climate policies and instruments are affected 
by decision makers’ responses to key uncertainties� At the 
national level, uncertainties in market behaviour and future regulatory 
actions have been shown to impact the performance of policy instru-
ments designed to influence investment patterns. Both modelling and 
empirical studies have shown that uncertainty as to future regulatory 
and market conditions adversely affects the performance of emission 
allowance trading markets [2.6.5.1]. Other studies have shown that 
subsidy programmes (e. g., feed-in tariffs, tax credits) are relatively 
immune to market uncertainties, but that uncertainties with respect to 
the duration and level of the subsidy program can have adverse effects 
[2.6.5.2]. In both cases, the adverse effects of uncertainty include less 
investment in low-carbon infrastructure, increasing consumer prices, 
and reducing the pressure for technological development.
Decision makers in developing countries often face a particu-
lar set of challenges associated with implementing mitigation 
policies under risk and uncertainty (medium confidence). Manag-
ing risk and uncertainty in the context of climate policy is of particular 
importance to developing countries that are resource constrained and 
face other pressing development goals. In addition, institutional capac-
ity in these countries may be less developed compared to advanced 
economies. Therefore, decision makers in these countries (governments 
and economic agents such as firms, farmers, households, to name a 
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few) have less room for ‘error’ (uncertain outcomes and / or wrong or 
poorly implemented policies). The same applies to national, regional 
and local governments in developed countries who can ill afford to 
waste scarce resources through policy errors. [Box 2.1]
2.1 Introduction
This framing chapter considers ways in which risk and uncertainty can 
affect the process and outcome of strategic choices in responding to 
the threat of climate change. 
‘Uncertainty’ denotes a cognitive state of incomplete knowledge that 
results from a lack of information and / or from disagreement about 
what is known or even knowable. It has many sources ranging from 
quantifiable errors in the data to ambiguously defined concepts or ter-
minology to uncertain projections of human behaviour. The Guidance 
Note for Lead Authors of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report on Consis-
tent Treatment of Uncertainties (Mastrandrea et al., 2010) summarizes 
alternative ways of representing uncertainty. Probability density func-
tions and parameter intervals are among the most common tools for 
characterizing uncertainty.
‘Risk’ refers to the potential for adverse effects on lives, livelihoods, 
health status, economic, social and cultural assets, services (includ-
ing environmental), and infrastructure due to uncertain states of the 
world. To the extent that there is a detailed understanding of the char-
acteristics of a specific event, experts will normally be in agreement 
regarding estimates of the likelihood of its occurrence and its resulting 
consequences. Risk can also be subjective in the sense that the likeli-
hood and outcomes are based on the knowledge or perception that a 
person has about a given situation. There may also be risks associated 
with the outcomes of different climate policies, such as the harm aris-
ing from a change in regulations.
There is a growing recognition that today’s policy choices are highly 
sensitive to uncertainties and risk associated with the climate system 
and the actions of other decision makers. The choice of climate policies 
can thus be viewed as an exercise in risk management (Kunreuther 
et al., 2013a). Figure 2.1 suggests a risk management framework that 
serves as the structure of the chapter.
After defining risk and uncertainty and their relevant metrics (Section 
2.2), we consider how choices with respect to climate change policy 
options are sensitive to risk and uncertainty (Section 2.3). A taxon-
omy depicts the levels of decision making ranging from international 
agreements to actions undertaken by individuals in relation to climate 
change policy options under conditions of risk and uncertainty that 
range from long-term global temperature targets to lifestyle choices. 
The goals and values of the different stakeholders given their immedi-
ate and long-term agendas will also influence the relative attractive-
ness of different climate change policies in the face of risk and uncer-
tainty.
Sections 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 characterize descriptive and normative 
theories of decision-making and models of choice for dealing with 
risk and uncertainty and their implications for prescriptive analysis. 
Descriptive refers to theories of actual behaviour, based on experi-
mental evidence and field studies that characterize the perception 
of risk and decision processes. Normative in the context of this chap-
ter refers to theories of choice under risk and uncertainty based on 
abstract models and axioms that serve as benchmarks as to how 
decision makers should ideally make their choices. Prescriptive refers 
to ways of improving the decision process and making final choices 
(Kleindorfer et al., 1993).
A large empirical literature has revealed that individuals, small groups 
and organizations often do not make decisions in the analytic or ratio-
nal way envisioned by normative models of choice in the economics 
and management science literature. People frequently perceive risk 
in ways that differ from expert judgments, posing challenges for risk 
communication and response. There is a tendency to focus on short 
time horizons, utilize simple heuristics in choosing between alterna-
tives, and selectively attend to subsets of goals and objectives.
To illustrate, the voting public in some countries may have a wait-
and-see attitude toward climate change, leading their governments to 
postpone mitigation measures designed to meet specified climate tar-
gets (Sterman, 2008; Dutt and Gonzalez, 2011). A coastal village may 
decide not to undertake measures for reducing future flood risks due 
to sea level rise (SLR), because their perceived likelihood that SLR will 
cause problems to their village is below the community council’s level 
of concern. 
Section 2.4 provides empirical evidence on behavioural responses to 
risk and uncertainty by examining the types of biases that influence 
individuals’ perception of the likelihood of an event (e. g., availability, 
learning from personal experience), the role that emotional, social, and 
cultural factors play in influencing the perception of climate change 
risks and strategies for encouraging decision makers to undertake 
cost-effective measures to mitigate and adapt to the impacts of cli-
mate change.
A wide range of decision tools have been developed for evaluating 
alternative options and making choices in a systematic manner even 
when probabilities are difficult to characterize and / or outcomes are 
uncertain. The relevance of these tools for making more informed 
decisions depends on how the problem is formulated and framed, the 
nature of the institutional arrangements, and the interactions between 
stakeholders (Hammond et al., 1999; Schoemaker and Russo, 2001).
Governments debating the merits of a carbon tax may turn to cost-
benefit analysis or cost-effectiveness analysis to justify their positions. 
They may need to take into account that firms who utilize formal 
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approaches, such as decision analysis, may not reduce their emissions 
if they feel that they are unlikely to be penalized because the carbon 
tax will not be well enforced. Households and individuals may find the 
expected utility model or decision analysis to be useful tools for evalu-
ating the costs and benefits of adopting energy efficient measures 
given the trajectory of future energy prices.
Section 2.5 delineates formal methodologies and decision aids for ana-
lysing risk and uncertainty when individuals, households, firms, com-
munities and nations are making choices that impact their own well-
being and those of others. These tools encompass variants of expected 
utility theory, decision analysis, cost-benefit analyses or cost-effective-
ness analyses that are implemented in integrated assessment models 
(IAMs). Decision aids include adaptive management, robust decision 
making and uncertainty analysis techniques such as structured expert 
judgment and scenario analysis. The chapter highlights the importance 
of selecting different methodologies for addressing different problems.
Developing robust policy response strategies and instruments should 
take into account how the relevant stakeholders perceive risk and their 
behavioural responses to uncertain information and data (descriptive 
analysis). The policy design process also needs to consider the meth-
odologies and decision aids for systematically addressing issues of 
risk and uncertainty (normative analysis) that suggest strategies for 
improving outcomes at the individual and societal level (prescriptive 
analysis).
Section 2.6 examines how the outcomes of particular options, in terms 
of their efficiency or equity, are sensitive to risks and uncertainties and 
affect policy choices. After examining the role of uncertainty in the sci-
ence / policy interface, it examines the role of integrated assessment 
models (IAMs) from the perspective of the social planner operating 
at a global level and the structuring of international negotiations and 
paths to reach agreement. Integrated assessment models combined 
with an understanding of the negotiation process for reaching inter-
national agreements may prove useful to delegates for justifying the 
positions of their country at a global climate conference. The section 
also examines the role that uncertainty plays in the performance of dif-
ferent technologies now and in the future as well as how lifestyle deci-
sions such as investing in energy efficient measures can be improved. 
Figure 2�1 | A risk management framework. Numbers in brackets refer to sections where more information on these topics can be found.




Risk Perception and Responses 
to Risk and Uncertainty 
(Descriptive Analysis)              
[Section 2.4]
Tools and Decisions Aids for 
Analysing Uncertainty and Risk
(Normative Analysis)           
[Section 2.5]
Impact of Risk and Uncertainty on 
Climate Change Policy Choices 
[Sections 2.2 and 2.3] 
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The section concludes by examining the roles that risk and uncertainty 
play in support of or opposition to climate policies.
The way climate change is managed will have an impact on policy 
choices as shown by the feedback loop in Figure 2.1, suggesting that 
the risk management process for addressing climate change is itera-
tive. The nature of this feedback can be illustrated by the following 
examples. Individuals may be willing to invest in solar panels if they 
are able to spread the upfront cost over time through a long-term 
loan. Firms may be willing to promote new energy technologies that 
provide social benefits with respect to climate change if they are 
given a grant to assist them in their efforts. National governments 
are more likely to implement carbon markets or international trea-
ties if they perceive the short-term benefits of these measures to be 
greater than the perceived costs. Education and learning can play key 
roles in how climate change is managed through a reconsideration 
of policies for managing the risks and uncertainties associated with 
climate change.
2.2 Metrics of  uncertainty 
and risk
The IPCC strives for a treatment of risk and uncertainty that is consis-
tent across all three Working Groups based the Guidance Note (GN) 
for Lead Authors of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report on Consistent 
Treatment of Uncertainties (Mastrandrea et  al., 2010). This section 
summarizes key aspects of the GN that frames the discussion in this 
chapter.
The GN indicates that author teams should evaluate the associated 
evidence and agreement with respect to specific findings that involve 
risk and uncertainty. The amount of evidence available can range from 
small to large, and can vary in quality and consistency. The GN recom-
mends reporting the degree of certainty and / or uncertainty of a given 
topic as a measure of the consensus or agreement across the scien-
tific community. Confidence expresses the extent to which the IPCC 
authors do in fact support a key finding. If confidence is sufficiently 
high, the GN suggests specifying the key finding in terms of probabil-
ity. The evaluation of evidence and degree of agreement of any key 
finding is labelled a traceable account in the GN.
The GN also recommends taking a risk-management perspective by 
stating that “sound decision making that anticipates, prepares for, 
and responds to climate change depends on information about the 
full range of possible consequences and associated probabilities.” 
The GN also notes that, “low-probability outcomes can have signifi-
cant impacts, particularly when characterized by large magnitude, long 
persistence, broad prevalence, and / or irreversibility.” For this reason, 
the GN encourages the presentation of information on the extremes 
of the probability distributions of key variables, reporting quantitative 
estimates when possible and supplying qualitative assessments and 
evaluations when appropriate.
2.3 Risk and uncertainty 
in climate change
Since the publication of AR4, political scientists have documented the 
many choices of climate policy and the range of interested parties con-
cerned with them (Moser, 2007; Andonova et al., 2009; Bulkeley, 2010; 
Betsill and Hoffmann, 2011; Cabré, 2011; Hoffmann, 2011; Meckling, 
2011; Victor, 2011).
There continues to be a concern about global targets for mean surface 
temperature and GHG concentrations that are discussed in Chapter 6 
of this report. This choice is normally made at the global level with 
some regions, countries, and sub-national political regions setting their 
own targets consistent with what they believe the global ones should 
be. Policymakers at all levels of decision making face a second-order 
set of choices as to how to achieve the desired targets. Choices in this 
vein that are assessed in Chapters 7 – 12 of this report, include tran-
sition pathways for various drivers of emissions, such as fossil fuels 
within the energy system, energy efficiency and energy-intensive 
behavioural patterns, issues associated with land-use and spatial plan-
ning, and / or the emissions of non- CO2 greenhouse gases.
The drivers influencing climate change policy options are discussed in 
more detail in Chapters 13 – 16 of this report. These options include 
information provision, economic instruments (taxes, subsidies, fines), 
direct regulations and standards, and public investments. At the same 
time, individuals, groups and firms decide what actions to take on their 
own. These choices, some of which may be in response to governmen-
tal policy, include investments, lifestyle and behaviour.
Decisions for mitigating climate change are complemented by climate 
adaptation options and reflect existing environmental trends and driv-
ers. The policy options are likely to be evaluated with a set of crite-
ria that include economic impacts and costs, equity and distributional 
considerations, sustainable development, risks to individuals and soci-
ety and co-benefits. Many of these issues are discussed in Chapters 3 
and 4.
2�3�1 Uncertainties that matter for climate 
policy choices
The range and number of interested parties who are involved in cli-
mate policy choices have increased significantly in recent years. There 
has been a widening of the governance forums within which climate 
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policies and international agreements are negotiated at the global 
level (Victor, 2011), across multiple networks within national gov-
ernments (Andonova et al., 2009; Hoffmann, 2011), and at the local, 
regional and / or interest group level (Moser, 2007; Bulkeley, 2010). At 
the same time, the number of different policy instruments under active 
discussion has increased, from an initial focus on cap-and-trade and 
carbon tax instruments (Betsill and Hoffmann, 2011; Hoffmann, 2011), 
to feed-in tariffs or quotas for renewable energy (Wiser et al., 2005; 
Mendonça, 2007), investments in research and development (Sagar 
and van der Zwaan, 2006; De Coninck et al., 2008; Grubler and Riahi, 
2010), and reform of intellectual property laws (Dechezleprêtre et al., 
2011; Percival and Miller, 2011).
Choices are sensitive to the degree of uncertainty with respect to a 
set of parameters that are often of specific importance to particular 
climate policy decisions. Here, and as shown in Figure 2.2, we group 
these uncertainties into five broad classes, consistent with the 
approach taken in Patt and Weber (2014):
•	 Climate responses to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and their 
associated impacts. The large number of key uncertainties with 
respect to the climate system are discussed in Working Group  I 
(WGI). There are even greater uncertainties with respect to the 
impacts of changes in the climate system on humans and the eco-
logical system as well as their costs to society. These impacts are 
assessed in WGII.
•	 Stocks and flows of carbon and other GHGs. The large uncertain-
ties with respect to both historical and current GHG sources and 
sinks from energy use, industry, and land-use changes are assessed 
in Chapter 5. Knowledge gaps make it especially difficult to esti-
mate how the flows of greenhouse gases will evolve in the future 
under conditions of elevated atmospheric CO2 concentrations and 
their impact on climatic and ecological processes.
•	 Technological systems. The deployment of technologies is likely to 
be the main driver of GHG emissions and a major driver of climate 
vulnerability. Future deployment of new technologies will depend 
on how their price, availability, and reliability evolve over time as a 
result of technological learning. There are uncertainties as to how 
fast the learning will take place, what policies can accelerate learn-
ing and the effects of accelerated learning on deployment rates of 
new technologies. Technological deployment also depends on the 
degree of public acceptance, which in turn is typically sensitive to 
perceptions of health and safety risks.
•	 Market behaviour and regulatory actions. Public policies can create 
incentives for private sector actors to alter their investment behav-
iour, often in the presence of other overlapping regulations. The 
extent to which firms change their behaviour in response to the 
policy, however, often depends on their expectations about other 
highly uncertain market factors, such as fossil fuel prices. There are 
also uncertainties concerning the macro-economic effects of the 
aggregated behavioural changes. An additional factor influencing 
the importance of any proposed or existing policy-driven incen-
tive is the likelihood with which regulations will be enacted and 
enforced over the lifetime of firms’ investment cycles. 
•	 Individual and firm perceptions. The choices undertaken by key 
decision makers with respect to mitigation and adaptation mea-
sures are impacted by their perceptions of risk and uncertainties, 
as well as their perceptions of the relevant costs and expected 
benefits over time. Their decisions may also be influenced by the 
actions undertaken by others.
Section 2.6 assesses the effects of uncertainties of these different 
parameters on a wide range of policy choices, drawing from both 
empirical studies and the modelling literature. The following three 
examples illustrate how uncertainties in one or more of the above fac-
tors can influence choices between alternative options.
Example 1: Designing a regional emissions trading system (ETS). Over 
the past decade, a number of political jurisdictions have designed and 
implemented ETSs, with the European ETS being the one most stud-
ied. In designing the European system, policymakers took as their 
starting point pre-defined emissions reduction targets. It was unclear 
whether these targets would be met, due to uncertainties with respect 
to national baseline emissions. The stocks and flows of greenhouse 
gas emissions were partly determined by the uncertainty of the perfor-
mance of the technological systems that were deployed. Uncertainties 
in market behaviour could also influence target prices and the number 
of emissions permits allocated to different countries (Betsill and Hoff-
mann, 2011).
Example 2: Supporting scientific research into solar radiation manage-
ment (SRM). SRM may help avert potentially catastrophic temperature 
increases, but may have other negative impacts with respect to global 
and regional climatic conditions (Rasch et al., 2008). Research could 
reduce the uncertainties as to these other consequences (Robock et al., 
2010). The decision to invest in specific research activities requires an 
assessment as to what impact SRM will have on avoiding catastrophic 
temperature increases. Temperature change will be sensitive to the 
stocks and flows of greenhouse gases (GHG) and therefore to the 
responses by key decision makers to the impacts of GHG emissions. The 
decision to invest in specific research activities is likely to be influenced 
by the perceived uncertainty in the actions undertaken by individuals 
and firms (Blackstock and Long, 2010).
Example 3: Renting an apartment in the city versus buying a house 
in the suburbs. When families and households face this choice, it is 
likely to be driven by factors other than climate change concerns. The 
decision, however, can have major consequences on CO2 emissions as 
well as on the impacts of climate change on future disasters such as 
damage from flooding due to sea level rise. Hence, governments may 
seek to influence these decisions as part of their portfolio of climate 
change policies through measures such as land-use regulations or the 
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pricing of local transportation options. The final choice is thus likely to 
be sensitive to uncertainties in market behaviour as well as actions 
undertaken by individuals and firms.
To add structure and clarity to the many uncertainties that different 
actors face for different types of problems, we introduce a taxonomy 
shown in Figure 2.2 that focuses on levels of decision making (the 
rows) that range from international organizations to individuals and 
households, and climate policy options (the columns) that include 
long-term targets, transition pathways, policy instruments, resource 
allocation and lifestyle options. The circles that overlay the cells in Fig-
ure 2.2 highlight the principal uncertainties relevant to decision-mak-
ing levels and climate policy choices that appear prominently in the 
literature associated with particular policies. These are reviewed in 
Section 2.6 of this chapter and in many of the following chapters of 
WGIII. The literature appraises the effects of a wide range of uncertain-
ties, which we group according to the five types described above.
2�3�2 What is new on risk and uncertainty in 
AR5
Chapter 2 in WGIII AR4 on risk and uncertainty, which also served as a 
framing chapter, illuminated the relationship of risk and uncertainty to 
decision making and reviewed the literature on catastrophic or abrupt 
climate change and its irreversible nature. It examined three pillars for 
dealing with uncertainties: precaution, risk hedging, and crisis preven-
tion and management. The report also summarized the debate in the 
economic literature about the limits of cost-benefit analysis in situa-
tions of uncertainty.
Since the publication of AR4, a growing number of studies have con-
sidered additional sources of risk and uncertainties, such as regulatory 
and technological risks, and examined the role they play in influenc-
ing climate policy. There is also growing awareness that risks in the 
extremes or tail of the distribution make it problematic to rely on his-
torical averages. As the number of political jurisdictions implement-
ing climate policies has increased, there are now empirical findings to 
supplement earlier model-based studies on the effects of such risks. At 
the local level, adaptation studies using scenario-based methods have 
been developed (ECLACS, 2011).
This chapter extends previous reports in four ways. First, rather than 
focusing solely at the global level, this chapter expands climate-related 
decisions to other levels of decision making as shown in Figure 2.2. 
Second, compared to AR4, where judgment and choice were primar-
ily framed in rational-economic terms, this chapter reviews the psy-
chological and behavioural literature on perceptions and responses to 
risk and uncertainty. Third, the chapter considers the pros and cons of 
alternative methodologies and decision aids from the point of view of 
practitioners. Finally, the chapter expands the scope of the challenges 
associated with developing risk management strategies in relation to 
Figure 2�2 | Taxonomy of levels of decision making and climate policy choices. Circles show type and extent of uncertainty sources as they are covered by the literature. Numbers in 
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AR4 that requires reviewing a much larger body of published research. 
To illustrate this point, the chapter references more than 50 publica-
tions on decision making under uncertainty with respect to integrated 
assessment models (IAMs), the first time such a detailed examination 
of this literature has been undertaken.
2.4 Risk perception and 
responses to risk 
and uncertainty
2�4�1 Considerations for design of climate 
change risk reduction policies
When stakeholders are given information about mitigation and adap-
tation measures to reduce climate change risks, they make the fol-
lowing judgments and choices: How serious is the risk? Is any action 
required? Which options are ruled out because the costs seem prohibi-
tive? Which option offers the greatest net expected benefits? 
In designing such measures and in deciding how to present them to 
stakeholders, one needs to recognize both the strengths and limita-
tions of decision makers at the different levels delineated in Figure 2.2. 
Decision makers often have insufficient or imperfect knowledge about 
climate risks, a deficit that can and needs to be addressed by better 
data and public education. However, cognitive and motivational bar-
riers are equally or more important in this regard (Weber and Stern, 
2011).
Normative models of choice described in Section 2.5 indicate how 
decisions under risk and uncertainty should be made to achieve effi-
ciency and consistency, but these approaches do not characterize how 
choices are actually made. Since decision makers have limitations in 
their ability to process information and are boundedly rational (Simon, 
1955), they often use simple heuristics and rules of thumb (Payne et al., 
1988). Their choices are guided not only by external reality (objective 
outcomes and their likelihood) but also by the decision makers’ inter-
nal states (e. g., needs and goals) and their mental representation of 
outcomes and likelihood, often shaped by previous experience. In other 
words, a descriptive model of choice needs to consider cognitive and 
motivational biases and decision rules as well as factors that are con-
sidered when engaging in deliberative thinking. Another complicating 
factor is that when groups or organizations make decisions, there is the 
potential for disagreement and conflict among individuals that may 
require interpersonal and organizational facilitation by a third party.
Mitigation and adaptation decisions are shaped also by existing eco-
nomic and political institutional arrangements. Policy and market tools 
for addressing climate change, such as insurance, may not be feasible 
in developing countries that have no history of this type of protection; 
however, this option may be viewed as desirable in a country with an 
active insurance sector (see Box 2.1). Another important determinant 
of decisions is the status quo, because there is a tendency to give more 
weight to the negative impacts of undertaking change than the equiv-
alent positive impacts (Johnson et al., 2007). For example, proposing 
a carbon tax to reduce GHG emissions may elicit much more concern 
from affected stakeholders as to how this measure will impact on 
their current activities than the expected climate change benefits from 
reducing carbon emissions. Choices are also affected by cultural differ-
ences in values and needs (Maslow, 1954), in beliefs about the exis-
tence and causes of climate change (Leiserowitz et al., 2008), and in 
the role of informal social networks for cushioning catastrophic losses 
(Weber and Hsee, 1998). By considering actual judgment and choice 
processes, policymakers can more accurately characterize the effective-
ness and acceptability of alternative mitigation policies and new tech-
nologies. Descriptive models also provide insights into ways of framing 
mitigation or adaptation options so as to increase the likelihood that 
desirable climate policy choices are adopted. Descriptive models, with 
their broader assumptions about goals and processes, also allow for 
the design of behavioural interventions that capitalize on motivations 
such as equity and fairness. 
2�4�2 Intuitive and deliberative judgment and 
choice
The characterization of judgment and choice that distinguishes intui-
tive processes from deliberative processes builds on a large body of 
cognitive psychology and behavioural decision research that can 
be traced to William James (1878) in psychology and to Friedrich 
Nietzsche (2008) and Martin Heidegger (1962) in philosophy. A recent 
summary has been provided by Kahneman (2003; 2011) as detailed in 
Table 2.1:
Table 2�1 | Intuitive and deliberative process characteristics.
Intuitive Thinking (System 1)
Operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no voluntary control.
Uses simple and concrete associations, including emotional reactions or simple rules of 
conduct that have been acquired by personal experience with events and their consequences.
Deliberative Thinking (System 2)
Initiates and executes effortful and intentional abstract cognitive 
operations when these are seen as needed.
These cognitive operations include simple or complex computations or formal logic.
Even though the operations of these two types of processes do not 
map cleanly onto distinct brain regions, and the two systems often 
operate cooperatively and in parallel (Weber and Johnson, 2009), the 
distinction between Systems 1 and 2 helps to clarify the tension in the 
human mind between the automatic and largely involuntary processes 
of intuitive decisions, versus the effortful and more deliberate pro-
cesses of analytic decisions (Kahneman, 2011).
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Many of the simplified decision rules that characterize human judg-
ment and choice under uncertainty utilize intuitive (System 1) pro-
cesses. Simplification is achieved by utilizing the experiences, expec-
tations, beliefs, and goals of the interested parties involved in the 
decision. Such shortcuts require much less time and effort than a 
more detailed analysis of the tradeoffs between options and often 
leads to reasonable outcomes. If one takes into account the con-
straints on time and attention and processing capacity of decision 
makers, these decisions may be the best we can do for many choices 
under uncertainty (Simon, 1955). Intuitive processes are utilized not 
only by the general public, but also by technical experts such as insur-
ers and regulators (Kunreuther et al., 2013c) and by groups and orga-
nizations (Cyert and March, 1963; Cohen et  al., 1972; Barreto and 
Patient, 2013).
Intuitive processes work well when decision makers have copious 
data on the outcomes of different decisions and recent experience is 
a meaningful guide for the future, as would be the case in station-
ary environments (Feltovich et al., 2006). These processes do not work 
well, however, for low-probability high-consequence events for which 
the decision maker has limited or no past experience (Weber, 2011). 
In such situations, reliance on intuitive processes for making decisions 
will most likely lead to maintaining the status quo and focusing on the 
recent past. This suggests that intuitive decisions may be problematic 
in dealing with climate change risks such as increased flooding and 
storm surge due to sea level rise, or a surge in fossil fuel prices as 
a result of an unexpected political conflict. These are risks for which 
there is limited or no personal experience or historical data and con-
siderable disagreement and uncertainty among experts with respect to 
their risk assessments (Taleb, 2007).
The formal models and tools that characterize deliberative (System 2) 
thinking require stakeholders to make choices in a more abstract and 
systematic manner. A deliberative process focuses on potential short- 
and long-term consequences and their likelihoods, and evenly evalu-
ates the options under consideration, not favouring the status quo. For 
the low-probability high-consequence situations for which decision 
makers have limited experience with outcomes, alternative decision 
frameworks that do not depend on precise specification of probabili-
ties should be considered in designing risk management strategies for 
climate change (Charlesworth and Okereke, 2010; Kunreuther et  al., 
2013a).
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. Section 2.4.3 
describes some important consequences of the intuitive processes uti-
lized by individuals, groups, and organizations in making decisions. 
The predicted effectiveness of economic or technological climate 
change mitigation solutions typically presuppose rational delibera-
tive thinking and evaluation without considering how perceptions 
and reactions to climate risks impose on these policy options. Sec-
tion 2.4.4 discusses biases and heuristics that suggest that individu-
als learn in ways that differ significantly from deliberative Bayesian 
updating. Section 2.4.5 addresses how behaviour is affected by social 
amplification of risk and considers the different levels of decision 
making in Figure 2.2 by discussing the role of social norms, social 
comparisons, and social networks in the choice process. Section 2.4.6 
characterizes the general public’s perceptions of climate change risks 
and uncertainty and their implications for communicating relevant 
information.
Empirical evidence for the biases associated with climate change 
response decisions triggered by intuitive processes exists mostly at 
the level of the individual. As discussed in Sections 2.5 and 2.6, intui-
tive judgment and choice processes at other levels of decision making, 
such as those specified in Figure 2.2, need to be acknowledged and 
understood. 
2�4�3 Consequences of intuitive decision 
making
The behaviour of individuals are captured by descriptive models of 
choice such as prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) for 
decisions under risk and uncertainty and the beta-delta model (Laib-
son, 1997) for characterizing how future costs and benefits are evalu-
ated. While individual variation exists, the patterns of responding to 
potential outcomes over time and the probabilities of their occur-
rence have an empirical foundation based on controlled experiments 
and well-designed field studies examining the behaviour of technical 
experts and the general public (Loewenstein and Elster, 1992; Cam-
erer, 2000).
2�4�3�1 Importance of the status quo
The tendency to maintain the current situation is a broadly observed 
phenomenon in climate change response contexts (e. g., inertia in 
switching to a non-carbon economy or in switching to cost-effective 
energy efficient products) (Swim et al., 2011). Sticking with the current 
state of affairs is the easy option, favoured by emotional responses in 
situations of uncertainty (“better the devil you know than the devil 
you don’t”), by many proverbs or rules (“when in doubt, do nothing”), 
and observed biases in the accumulation of arguments for different 
choice options (Weber et al., 2007). Overriding the status quo requires 
commitment to change and effort (Fleming et al., 2010).
Loss aversion and reference points
Loss aversion is an important property that distinguishes prospect the-
ory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) from expected utility theory (von 
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) by introducing a reference-depen-
dent valuation of outcomes, with a steeper slope for perceived losses 
than for perceived gains. In other words, people experience more pain 
from a loss than they get pleasure from an equivalent gain. The status 
quo is often the relevant reference point that distinguishes outcomes 
perceived as losses from those perceived as gains. Given loss aversion, 
the potential negative consequences of moving away from the current 
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state of affairs are weighted much more heavily than the potential 
gains, often leading the decision maker not to take action. This behav-
iour is referred to as the status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 
1988).
Loss aversion explains a broad range of decisions in controlled labora-
tory experiments and real world choices that deviate from the predic-
tions of rational models like expected utility theory (Camerer, 2000). 
Letson et al. (2009) show that adapting to seasonal and inter-annual 
climate variability in the Argentine Pampas by allocating land to dif-
ferent crops depends not only on existing institutional arrangements 
(e. g., whether the farmer is renting the land or owns it), but also on 
individual differences in farmers’ degree of loss aversion and risk 
aversion. Greene et al. (2009) show that loss aversion combined with 
uncertainty about future cost savings can explain why consumers fre-
quently appear to be unwilling to invest in energy-efficient technology 
such as a more expensive but more fuel-efficient car that has posi-
tive expected utility. Weber and Johnson (2009) distinguish between 
perceptions of risk, attitudes towards risk, and loss aversion that have 
different determinants, but are characterized by a single ‘risk attitude’ 
parameter in expected utility models. Distinguishing and measuring 
these psychologically distinct components of individual differences in 
risk taking (e. g., by using prospect theory and adaptive ways of elicit-
ing its model parameters; Toubia et al., 2013) provides better targeted 
entry points for policy interventions.
Loss aversion influences the choices of experienced decision makers 
in high-stakes risky choice contexts, including professional financial 
markets traders (Haigh and List, 2005) and professional golfers (Pope 
and Schweitzer, 2011). Yet, other contexts fail to elicit loss aversion, 
as evidenced by the failure of much of the global general public to be 
alarmed by the prospect of climate change (Weber, 2006). In this and 
other contexts, loss aversion does not arise because decision makers 
are not emotionally involved (Loewenstein et al., 2001).
Use of framing and default options for the design of decision 
aids and interventions
Descriptive models not only help explain behaviours that deviate from 
the predictions of normative models of choice but also provide entry 
points for the design of decision aids and interventions collectively 
referred to as choice architecture, indicating that people’s choices 
depend in part on the ways that possible outcomes of different 
options are framed and presented (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). Pros-
pect theory suggests that changing decision makers’ reference points 
can impact on how they evaluate outcomes of different options and 
hence their final choice. Patt and Zeckhauser (2000) show, for exam-
ple, how information about the status quo and other choice options 
can be presented differently to create an action bias with respect to 
addressing the climate change problem. More generally, choice archi-
tecture often involves changing the description of choice options and 
the context of a decision to overcome the pitfalls of intuitive (System 
1) processes without requiring decision makers to switch to effortful 
(System 2) thinking (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).
One important choice architecture tool comes in the form of behav-
ioural defaults, that is, recommended options that will be implemented 
if no active decision is made (Johnson and Goldstein, 2013). Default 
options serve as a reference point so that decision makers normally 
stick with this option due to loss aversion (Johnson et al., 2007; Weber 
et al., 2007). ‘Green’ energy defaults have been found to be very effec-
tive in lab studies involving choices between different lighting tech-
nologies (Dinner et al., 2011), suggesting that environmentally friendly 
and cost-effective energy efficient technology will find greater deploy-
ment if it were to show up as the default option in building codes and 
other regulatory contexts. Green defaults are desirable policy options 
because they guide decision makers towards individual and social 
welfare maximizing options without reducing choice autonomy. In a 
field study, German utility customers adopted green energy defaults, a 
passive choice that persisted over time and was not changed by price 
feedback (Pichert and Katsikopoulos, 2008). Moser (2010) provides 
other ways to frame climate change information and response options 
in ways consistent with the communication goal and characteristics of 
the audience.
2�4�3�2 Focus on the short term and the here-and-now
Finite attention and processing capacity imply that unaided intuitive 
choices are restricted in their scope. This makes individuals susceptible 
to different types of myopia or short-sightedness with respect to their 
decisions on whether to invest in measures they would consider cost-
effective if they engaged in deliberative thinking (Weber and Johnson, 
2009; Kunreuther et al., 2013b).
Present bias and quasi-hyperbolic time discounting 
Normative models suggest that future costs and benefits should be 
evaluated using an exponential discount function, that is, a constant 
discount rate per time period (i. e., exponentially), where the discount 
rate should reflect the decision maker’s opportunity cost of money (for 
more details see Section 3.6.2). In reality, people discount future costs 
or benefits much more sharply and at a non-constant rate (i. e., hyper-
bolically), so that delaying an immediate receipt of a benefit is viewed 
much more negatively than if a similar delay occurs at a future point in 
time (Loewenstein and Elster, 1992). Laibson (1997) characterized this 
pattern by a quasi-hyperbolic discount function, with two parameters: 
(1) present bias, i. e., a discount applied to all non-immediate outcomes 
regardless how far into the future they occur, and (2) a rational dis-
counting parameter. The model retains much of the analytical tracta-
bility of exponential discounting, while capturing the key qualitative 
feature of hyperbolic discounting.
Failure to invest in protective measures 
In the management of climate-related natural hazards such as flood-
ing, an extensive empirical literature reveals that adoption rates of 
protective measures by the general public are much lower than if indi-
viduals had engaged in deliberative thinking by making relevant trad-
eoffs between expected costs and benefits. Thus, few people living in 
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flood prone areas in the United States voluntarily purchase flood insur-
ance, even when it is offered at highly subsidized premiums under the 
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) (Kunreuther et al., 1978). In 
the context of climate change mitigation, many efficient responses like 
investments in household energy efficiency are not adopted because 
decision makers focus unduly on the upfront costs of these measures 
(due to hyperbolic discounting amplified by loss aversion) and weight 
the future benefits of these investments less than predicted by norma-
tive models (see Sections 2.6.4.3 and 3.10). The failure of consumers 
to buy fuel-efficient cars because of their higher upfront costs (Section 
8.3.5) is another example of this behaviour.
At a country or community level, the upfront costs of mitigating CO2 
emissions or of building seawalls to reduce the effects of sea level rise 
loom large due to loss aversion, while the uncertain and future ben-
efits of such actions are more heavily discounted than predicted by 
normative models. Such accounting of present and future costs and 
benefits on the part of consumers and policymakers might make it dif-
ficult for them to justify these investments today and arrive at long-
term sustainable decisions (Weber, 2013).
Focus on short-term goals
Krantz and Kunreuther (2007) emphasize the importance of goals 
and plans as a basis for making decisions. In the context of climate 
change, protective or mitigating actions often require sacrificing 
short-term goals that are highly weighted in people’s choices in order 
to meet more abstract, distant goals that are typically given very low 
weight. A strong focus on short-term goals (e. g., immediate survival) 
may have been helpful as humans evolved, but may have negative 
consequences in the current environment where risks and challenges 
are more complex and solutions to problems such as climate change 
require a focus on long time horizons. Weber et al. (2007) succeeded 
in drastically reducing people’s discounting of future rewards by 
prompting them to first generate arguments for deferring consump-
tion, contrary to their natural inclination to focus initially on rationales 
for immediate consumption. To deal with uncertainty about future 
objective circumstances as well as subjective evaluations, one can 
adopt multiple points of view (Jones and Preston, 2011) or multiple 
frames of reference (De Boer et  al., 2010); a generalization of the 
IPCC’s scenario approach to an uncertain climate future is discussed 
in Chapter 6.
Mental accounting as a protection against short-term focus
People often mentally set up separate ‘accounts’ for different classes 
of expenditures and do not treat money as fungible between these 
accounts (Thaler, 1999). Mental accounts for different expenditures 
serve as effective budgeting and self-control devices for decision mak-
ers with limited processing capacity and self-control. A focus on short-
term needs and goals can easily deplete financial resources, leaving not 
enough for long(er)-term goals. Placing a limit on short-term spending 
prevents this from happening. But such a heuristic also has a down-
side by unduly limiting people’s willingness to invest in climate change 
mitigation or adaptation measures (e. g., flood proofing or solar pan-
els) that exceed their allocated budget for this account, regardless of 
future benefits. Such constraints (real or mental) often lead to the use 
of lexicographic (rather than compensatory) choice processes, where 
option sets are created or eliminated sequentially, based on a series of 
criteria of decreasing importance (Payne et al., 1988).
Mental accounting at a nonfinancial level may also be responsible for 
rebound effects of a more psychological nature, in addition to the eco-
nomically based rebound effects discussed in Section 8.3.5. Rebound 
effects describe the increase in energy usage that sometimes fol-
lows improvements in household, vehicle, or appliance efficiency. For 
example, households who weatherize their homes tend to increase 
their thermostat settings during the winter afterwards, resulting in a 
decrease in energy savings relative to what is technologically achiev-
able (Hirst et al., 1985). While rebound effects on average equal only 
10 – 30 % of the achievable savings, and therefore do not cancel out 
the benefits of efficiency upgrades (Ehrhardt-Martinez and Laitner, 
2010), they are significant and may result from fixed mental accounts 
that people have for environmentally responsible behaviour. Having 
fulfilled their self-imposed quota by a particular action allows decision 
makers to move on to other goals, a behaviour also sometimes referred 
to as the single-action bias (Weber, 2006).
2�4�3�3 Aversion to risk, uncertainty, and ambiguity
Most people are averse to risk and to uncertainty and ambiguity when 
making choices. More familiar options tend to be seen as less risky, all 
other things being equal, and thus more likely to be selected (Figner 
and Weber, 2011).
Certainty effect or uncertainty aversion
Prospect theory formalizes a regularity related to people’s perceptions 
of certain versus probabilistic prospects. People overweight outcomes 
they consider certain, relative to outcomes that are merely proba-
ble — a phenomenon labelled the certainty effect (Kahneman and Tver-
sky, 1979). This frequently observed behaviour can explain why the 
certain upfront costs of adaptation or mitigation actions are viewed as 
unattractive when compared to the uncertain future benefits of under-
taking such actions (Kunreuther et al., 2013b).
Ambiguity aversion
Given the high degree of uncertainty or ambiguity in most forecasts 
of future climate change impacts and the effects of different mitiga-
tion or adaptation strategies, it is important to consider not only deci-
sion makers’ risk attitudes, but also attitudes towards ambiguous out-
comes. The Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg, 1961) revealed that, in addition 
to being risk averse, most decision makers are also ambiguity averse, 
that is, they prefer choice options with well-specified probabilities 
over options where the probabilities are uncertain. Heath and Tversky 
(1991) demonstrated, however, that ambiguity aversion is not present 
when decision makers believe they have expertise in the domain of 
choice. For example, in contrast to the many members of the general 
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public who consider themselves to be experts in sports or the stock 
market, relatively few people believe themselves to be highly compe-
tent in environmentally relevant technical domains such as the trad-
eoffs between hybrid electric versus conventional gasoline engines in 
cars, so they are likely to be ambiguity averse. Farmers who feel less 
competent with respect to their understanding of new technology are 
more ambiguity averse and less likely to adopt farming innovations (in 
Peru; Engle-Warnick and Laszlo, 2006; and in the USA; Barham et al., 
2014). With respect to the likelihood of extreme events, such as natural 
disasters, insurers feel they do not have special expertise in estimating 
the likelihood of these events so they also tend to be ambiguity averse 
and set premiums that are considerably higher than if they had more 
certainty with respect to the likelihood of their occurrence (Kunreuther 
et al., 1993; Cabantous et al., 2011).
2�4�4 Learning
The ability to change expectations and behaviour in response to new 
information is an important survival skill, especially in uncertain and 
non-stationary environments. Bayesian updating characterizes learning 
when one engages in deliberative thinking. Individuals who engage 
in intuitive thinking are also highly responsive to new and especially 
recent feedback and information, but treat the data differently than 
that implied by Bayesian updating (Weber et al., 2004).
Availability bias and the role of salience
People’s intuitive assessment of the likelihood of an uncertain event 
is often based on the ease with which instances of its occurrence can 
be brought to mind, a mechanism called availability by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1973). Sunstein (2006) discusses the use of the availabil-
ity heuristics in response to climate change risks and how it differs 
among groups, cultures, and nations. Availability is strongly influenced 
by recent personal experience and can lead to an underestimation of 
low-probability events (e. g., typhoons, floods, or droughts) before they 
occur, and their overestimation after an extreme event has occurred. 
The resulting availability bias can explain why individuals first pur-
chase insurance after a disaster has occurred and cancel their policies 
several years later, as observed for earthquake (Kunreuther et al., 1978) 
and flood insurance (Michel-Kerjan et al., 2012). It is likely that most 
of these individuals had not suffered any losses during this period 
and considered the insurance to be a poor investment. It is difficult 
to convince insured individuals that the best return on their policy is 
no return at all. They should celebrate not having suffered a loss (Kun-
reuther et al., 2013c).
Linear thinking
A majority of people perceive climate in a linear fashion that reflects 
two common biases (Sterman and Sweeney, 2007; Cronin et al., 2009; 
Dutt and Gonzalez, 2011). First, people often rely on the correlation 
heuristic, which means that people wrongly infer that an accumulation 
(CO2 concentration) follows the same path as the inflow (CO2 emis-
sions). This implies that cutting emissions will quickly reduce the con-
centration and damages from climate change (Sterman and Sweeney, 
2007). According to Dutt (2011) people who rely on this heuristic likely 
demonstrate wait-and-see behaviour on policies that mitigate climate 
change because they significantly underestimate the delay between 
reductions in CO2 emissions and in the CO2 concentration. Sterman and 
Sweeny (2007) show that people‘s wait-and-see behaviour on mitiga-
tion policies is also related to a second bias whereby people incorrectly 
infer that atmospheric CO2 concentration can be stabilized even when 
emissions exceeds absorption.
Linear thinking also leads people to draw incorrect conclusions from 
nonlinear metrics, like the miles-per-gallon (mpg) ratings of vehicles’ 
gasoline consumption in North America (Larrick and Soll, 2008). When 
given a choice between upgrading to a 15-mpg car from a 12-mpg car, 
or to a 50-mpg car from a 29-mpg car, most people choose the latter 
option. However, for 100 miles driven under both options, it is easily 
shown that the first upgrade option saves more fuel (1.6 gallons for 
every 100 miles driven) than the second upgrade option (1.4 gallons 
for every 100 miles driven).
Effects of personal experience
Learning from personal experience is well predicted by reinforcement 
learning models (Weber et al., 2004). Such models describe and predict 
why the general public is less concerned about low-probability high-
impact climate risks than climate scientists would suggest is warranted 
by the evidence (Gonzalez and Dutt, 2011). These learning models also 
capture the volatility of the public’s concern about climate change 
over time, for example in reaction to the personal experience of local 
weather abnormalities (an abnormal cold spell or heat wave) that have 
been shown to influence belief in climate change (Li et al., 2011).
Most people do not differentiate very carefully between weather, cli-
mate (average weather over time), and climate variability (variations 
in weather over time). People confound climate and weather in part 
because they have personal experience with weather and weather 
abnormalities but little experience with climate change, an abstract 
statistical concept. They thus utilize weather events in making judg-
ments about climate change (Whitmarsh, 2008). This confusion has 
been observed in countries as diverse as the United States (Bostrom 
et  al., 1994; Cullen, 2010) and Ethiopia (BBC World Service Trust, 
2009).
Personal experience can differ between individuals as a function of 
their location, history, and / or socio-economic circumstances (Figner 
and Weber, 2011). Greater familiarity with climate risks, unless accom-
panied by alarming negative consequences, could actually lead to a 
reduction rather than an increase in the perceptions of its riskiness 
(Kloeckner, 2011). On the other hand, people’s experience can make 
climate a more salient issue. For example, changes in the timing and 
extent of freezing and melting (and associated effects on sea ice, flora, 
and fauna) have been experienced since the 1990s in the American 
and Canadian Arctic and especially indigenous communities (Laidler, 
2006), leading to increased concern with climate change because tra-
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ditional prediction mechanisms no longer can explain these phenom-
ena (Turner and Clifton, 2009).
People’s expectations of change (or stability) in climate variables also 
affect their ability to detect trends in probabilistic environments. For 
instance, farmers in Illinois were asked to recall growing season tem-
perature or precipitation statistics for seven preceding years. Farmers 
who believed that their region was affected by climate change recalled 
precipitation and temperature trends consistent with this expectation, 
whereas farmers who believed in a constant climate, recalled precipita-
tions and temperatures consistent with that belief (Weber, 1997). Rec-
ognizing that beliefs shape perception and memory provides insight 
into why climate change expectations and concerns vary between seg-
ments of the US population with different political ideologies (Leise-
rowitz et al., 2008).
The evidence is mixed when we examine whether individuals learn 
from past experience with respect to investing in adaptation or miti-
gation measures that are likely to be cost-effective. Even after the 
devastating 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons in the United States, a 
large number of residents in high-risk areas had still not invested in 
relatively inexpensive loss-reduction measures, nor had they under-
taken emergency preparedness measures (Goodnough, 2006). Surveys 
conducted in Alaska and Florida, regions where residents have been 
exposed more regularly to physical evidence of climate change, show 
greater concern and willingness to take action (ACI, 2004; Leiserowitz 
and Broad, 2008; Mozumder et al., 2011).
A recent study assessed perceptions and beliefs about climate change of 
a representative sample of the Britain public (some of whom had expe-
rienced recent flooding in their local area). It also asked whether they 
would reduce personal energy use to reduce greenhouse gas emission 
(Spence et al., 2011). Concern about climate change and willingness to 
take action was greater in the group of residents who had experienced 
recent flooding. Even though the flooding was only a single and local 
data point, this group also reported less uncertainty about whether cli-
mate change was really happening than those who did not experience 
flooding recently, illustrating the strong influence of personal experi-
ence. Other studies fail to find a direct effect of personal experience with 
flooding generating concern about climate risks (Whitmarsh, 2008).
Some researchers find that personal experience with ill health from air 
pollution affects perceptions of and behavioural responses to climate 
risks (Bord et  al., 2000; Whitmarsh, 2008), with the negative effects 
from air pollution creating stronger pro-environmental values. Myers 
et  al. (2012) looked at the role of experiential learning versus moti-
vated reasoning among highly engaged individuals and those less 
engaged in the issue of climate change. Low-engaged individuals 
were more likely to be influenced by their perceived personal experi-
ence of climate change than by their prior beliefs, while those highly 
engaged in the issue (on both sides of the climate issue) were more 
likely to interpret their perceived personal experience in a manner that 
strengthens their pre-existing beliefs.
Indigenous climate change knowledge contributions from Africa 
(Orlove et al., 2010), the Arctic (Gearheard et al., 2009), Australia 
(Green et al., 2010), or the Pacific Islands (Lefale, 2010), derive from 
accumulated and transmitted experience and focus mostly on pre-
dicting seasonal or interannual climate variability. Indigenous knowl-
edge can supplement scientific knowledge in geographic areas with 
a paucity of data (Green and Raygorodetsky, 2010) and can guide 
knowledge generation that reduces uncertainty in areas that matter 
for human responses (ACI, 2004). Traditional ecological knowledge is 
embedded in value-institutions and belief systems related to historical 
modes of experimentation and is transferred from generation to gen-
eration (Pierotti, 2011).
Underweighting of probabilities and threshold models of 
choice
The probability weighting function of prospect theory indicates that 
low probabilities tend to be overweighted relative to their objective 
probability unless they are perceived as being so low that they are 
ignored because they are below the decision maker’s threshold level 
of concern. Prior to a disaster, people often perceive the likelihood of 
catastrophic events occurring as below their threshold level of con-
cern, a form of intuitive thinking in the sense that one doesn’t have 
to reflect on the consequences of a catastrophic event (Camerer and 
Kunreuther, 1989). The need to take steps today to deal with future cli-
mate change presents a challenge to individuals who are myopic. They 
are likely to deal with this challenge by using a threshold model that 
does not require any action for risks below this level. The problem is 
compounded by the inability of individuals to distinguish between low 
likelihoods that differ by one or even two orders of magnitude (e. g., 
between 1 in 100 and 1 in 10,000) (Kunreuther et al., 2001).
2�4�5 Linkages between different levels of 
decision making
Social amplification of risk
Hazards interact with psychological, social, institutional, and cultural 
processes in ways that may amplify or attenuate public responses to 
the risk or risk event by generating emotional responses and other 
biases associated with intuitive thinking. Amplification may occur 
when scientists, news media, cultural groups, interpersonal networks, 
and other forms of communication provide risk information. The ampli-
fied risk leads to behavioural responses, which, in turn, may result in 
secondary impacts such as the stigmatization of a place that has expe-
rienced an adverse event (Kasperson et al., 1988; Flynn et al., 2001). 
The general public’s overall concern about climate change is influ-
enced, in part, by the amount of media coverage the issue receives as 
well as the personal and collective experience of extreme weather in a 
given place (Leiserowitz et al., 2012; Brulle et al., 2012).
Social norms and social comparisons
Individuals’ choices are often influenced by other people’s behaviour, 
especially under conditions of uncertainty. Adherence to formal rules 
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(e. g., standard operating procedures or best practices in organizations) 
or informal rules of conduct is an important way in which we  intui-
tively decide between different courses of action (Weber and Linde-
mann, 2007). “When in doubt, copy what the majority is doing” is not 
a bad rule to follow in many situations, as choices adopted by oth-
ers are assumed to be beneficial and safe (Weber, 2013). In fact, such 
social imitation can lead to social norms. Section 3.10.2 describes the 
effects of social norms in greater detail. Goldstein et al. (2008) demon-
strate the effectiveness of providing descriptive norms (“this is what 
most people do”) versus injunctive norms (“this is what you should 
be doing”) to reduce energy use in US hotels. The application of social 
norms to encourage investment in energy efficient products and tech-
nology is discussed in Section 2.6.5.3.
Social comparisons are another effective way to evaluate and learn 
about the quality of obtained outcomes (Weber, 2004). It helps, for 
example, to compare one’s own energy consumption to that of neigh-
bours in similar-sized apartments or houses to see how effective 
efforts at energy conservation have been. Such non-price interventions 
can substantially change consumer behaviour, with effects equivalent 
to that of a short-run electricity price increase of 11 % to 20 % (Alcott, 
2011). Social comparisons, imitation, and norms may be necessary to 
bring about lifestyle changes that are identified in Chapter 9 as reduc-
ing GHG emissions from the current levels (Sanquist et al., 2012).
Social learning and cultural transmission
Section 9.3.10 suggests that indigenous building practices in many 
parts of the world provide important lessons for affordable low-
energy housing design and that developed countries can learn from 
traditional building practices, transmitted over generations, the social-
scale equivalent of ‘intuitive’ processing and learning at the individual 
level.
Risk protection by formal (e� g�, insurance) and informal 
 institutions (e� g�, social networks) 
Depending on their cultural and institutional context, people can pro-
tect themselves against worst-case and / or potentially catastrophic 
economic outcomes either by purchasing insurance (Kunreuther et al., 
2013c) or by developing social networks that will help bail them out or 
assist them in the recovery process (Weber and Hsee, 1998). Individual-
ist cultures favour formal insurance contracts, whereas collectivist soci-
eties make more use of informal mutual insurance via social networks. 
This distinction between risk protection by either formal or informal 
means exists at the individual level and also at the firm level, e. g., the 
chaebols in Korea or the keiretsus in Japan (Gilson and Roe, 1993).
Impact of uncertainty on coordination and competition
Adaptation and especially mitigation responses require coordination 
and cooperation between individuals, groups, or countries for many 
of the choices associated with climate change. The possible outcomes 
often can be viewed as a game between players who are concerned 
with their own payoffs but who may still be mindful of social goals and 
objectives. In this sense they can be viewed in the context of a pris-
oners’ dilemma (PD) or social dilemma. Recent experimental research 
on two-person PD games reveals that individuals are more likely to 
be cooperative when payoffs are deterministic than when the out-
comes are probabilistic. A key factor explaining this difference is that 
in a deterministic PD game, the losses of both persons will always be 
greater when they both do not cooperate than when they do. When 
outcomes are probabilistic there is some chance that the losses will be 
smaller when both parties do not cooperate than when they do, even 
though the expected losses to both players will be greater if they both 
decide not to cooperate than if they both cooperate (Kunreuther et al., 
2009).
In a related set of experiments, Gong et al. (2009) found that groups 
are less cooperative than individuals in a two-person deterministic PD 
game; however, in a stochastic PD game, where defection increased 
uncertainty for both players, groups became more cooperative than 
they were in a deterministic PD game and more cooperative than indi-
viduals in the stochastic PD game. These findings have relevance to 
behaviour with respect to climate change where future outcomes of 
specific policies are uncertain. Consider decisions made by groups of 
individuals, such as when delegations from countries are negotiating 
at the Conference of Parties (COP) to make commitments for reduc-
ing GHG emissions where the impacts on climate change are uncer-
tain. These findings suggest that there is likely to be more cooperation 
between governmental delegations than if each country was repre-
sented by a single decision maker.
Cooperation also plays a crucial role in international climate agree-
ments. There is a growing body of experimental literature that looks at 
individuals’ cooperation when there is uncertainty associated with oth-
ers adopting climate change mitigation measures. Tavoni et al. (2011) 
found that communication across individuals improves the likelihood 
of cooperation. Milinski et al. (2008) observed that the higher the risky 
losses associated with the failure to cooperate in the provision of a 
public good, the higher the likelihood of cooperation. If the target for 
reducing CO2 is uncertain, Barrett and Dannenberg (2012) show in an 
experimental setting that cooperation is less likely than if the target is 
well specified.
2�4�6 Perceptions of climate change risk and 
uncertainty
Empirical social science research shows that the perceptions of climate 
change risks and uncertainties depend not only on external reality but 
also on the observers’ internal states, needs, and the cognitive and 
emotional processes that characterize intuitive thinking. Psychological 
research has documented the prevalence of affective processes in the 
intuitive assessment of risk, depicting them as essentially effort-free 
inputs that orient and motivate adaptive behaviour, especially under 
conditions of uncertainty that are informed and shaped by personal 
experience over time (Finucane et al., 2000; Loewenstein et al., 2001; 
Peters et al., 2006).
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Two important psychological risk dimensions have been shown to 
influence people’s intuitive perceptions of health and safety risks 
across numerous studies in multiple countries (Slovic, 1987). The first 
factor, ‘dread risk’, captures emotional reactions to hazards like nuclear 
reactor accidents, or nerve gas accidents, that is, things that make peo-
ple anxious because of a perceived lack of control over exposure to 
the risks and because consequences may be catastrophic. The second 
factor, ‘unknown risk‘, refers to the degree to which a risk (e. g., DNA 
technology) is perceived as new, with unforeseeable consequences 
and with exposures not easily detectable.
Perceptions of the risks associated with a given event or hazard are 
also strongly influenced by personal experience and can therefore dif-
fer between individuals as a function of their location, history, and / or 
socio-economic circumstances (see Box 2.1) (Figner and Weber, 2011). 
Whereas personal exposure to adverse consequences increases fear 
and perceptions of risk, familiarity with a risk can lower perceptions 
of its riskiness unless it is accompanied by alarming negative conse-
quences  (Kloeckner, 2011). Seeing climate change only as a simple 
and gradual change from current to future average temperatures and 
precipitation may make it seem controllable — the non-immediacy 
of the danger seems to provide time to plan and execute protective 
responses (Weber, 2006). These factors suggest that laypersons differ 
in their perception of climate risks more than experts who engage in 
deliberative thinking and estimate the likelihood and consequences of 
climate change utilizing scientific data.
Impact of uncertainties in communicating risk
If the uncertainties associated with climate change and its future 
impact on the physical and social system are not communicated accu-
rately, the general public may misperceive them (Corner and Hahn, 
2009). Krosnick et al. (2006) found that perceptions of the seriousness 
of global warming as a national issue in the United States depended on 
the degree of certainty of respondents as to whether global warming is 
Box 2�1 | Challenges facing developing countries
One of the key findings on developing countries is that non-state 
actors such as tribes, clans, castes, or guilds may be of substantial 
influence on how climate policy choices are made and diffused 
rather than having the locus of decision making at the level of the 
individual or governmental unit. For instance, a farming tribe / caste 
may address the climate risks and uncertainties faced by their com-
munity and opt for a system of crop rotation to retain soil fertil-
ity or shift cultivation to preserve the nutritious state of farmlands. 
Research in developing countries in Africa has shown that people 
may understand probabilistic information better when it is pre-
sented in a group where members have a chance to discuss it (Patt 
et  al., 2005; Roncoli, 2006). This underscores why the risks and 
uncertainty associated with climate change has shifted governmen-
tal responsibility to non-state actors (Rayner, 2007).
In this context, methodologies and decision aids used in individual-
centred western societies for making choices that rely on uncertain 
probabilities and uncertain outcomes may not apply to develop-
ing countries. Furthermore, methodologies, such as expected utility 
theory, assume an individual decision maker whereas in develop-
ing countries, decisions are often made by clans or tribes. In addi-
tion, tools such as cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis 
and robust decision making may not always be relevant for devel-
oping countries since decisions are often based on social norms, 
traditions, and customs
The adverse effects of climate change on food, water, security, 
and incidences of temperature-influenced diseases (Shah and Lele, 
2011), are further fuelled by a general lack of awareness about 
climate change in developing countries (UNDP, 2007); conse-
quently, policymakers in these countries support a wait-and-see 
attitude toward climate change (Dutt, 2011). Resource allocation 
and investment constraints may also lead policy-makers to post-
pone policy decisions to deal with climate change, as is the case 
with respect to integration of future energy systems in small island 
states (UNFCCC, 2007). The delay may prevent opportunities for 
learning and increase future vulnerabilities. It may also lock in 
countries into infrastructure and technologies that may be difficult 
to alter.
The tension between short- and long-term priorities in low income 
countries is often accentuated by uncertainties in political culture 
and regulatory policies (Rayner, 1993). This may lead to policies 
that are flawed in design and / or implementation or those that 
have unintended negative consequences. For example, subsidies 
for clean fuels such as liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) in a country 
like India often do not reach their intended beneficiaries (the poor), 
and at the same time add a large burden to the exchequer (Gov-
ernment of India, Ministry of Finance, 2012; IISD, 2012).
Other institutional and governance factors impede effective cli-
mate change risk management in developing countries. These 
include lack of experience with insurance (Patt et al., 2010), dearth 
of data, and analytical capacity. A more transparent and effec-
tive civil service would also be helpful, for instance in stimulating 
investments in renewable energy generation capacities (Komen-
dantova et  al., 2012). Financial constraints suggest the impor-
tance of international assistance and private sector contribution to 
implement adaptation and mitigation strategies for dealing with 
climate change in developing countries.
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occurring and will have negative consequences coupled with their belief 
that humans are causing the problem and have the ability to solve it. 
Accurately communicating the degree of uncertainty in both climate 
risks and policy responses is therefore a critically important challenge 
for climate scientists and policymakers (Pidgeon and Fischhoff, 2011).
Roser-Renouf et al. (2011), building upon the work of Krosnick et al. 
(2006), apply social cognitive theory to develop a model of climate 
advocacy to increase the attention given to climate change in the spirit 
of social amplification of risk. They found that campaigns looking to 
increase the number of citizens contacting elected officials to advocate 
climate policy action should focus on increasing the belief that global 
warming is real, human-caused, a serious risk, and solvable. These four 
key elements, coupled with the understanding that there is strong sci-
entific agreement on global warming (Ding et al., 2011), are likely to 
build issue involvement and support for action to reduce the impacts 
of climate change.
The significant time lags within the climate system and a focus on 
short-term outcomes lead many people to believe global warming 
will have only moderately negative impacts. This view is reinforced 
because adverse consequences are currently experienced only in some 
regions of the world or are not easily attributed to climate change. For 
example, despite the fact that “climate change currently contributes to 
the global burden of disease and premature deaths” (IPCC, 2007) rela-
tively few people make the connection between climate change and 
human health risks.
One challenge is how to facilitate correct inferences about the role of 
climate change as a function of extreme event frequency and sever-
ity. Many parts of the world have seen increases in the frequency and 
magnitude of heat waves and heavy precipitation events (IPCC, 2012). 
In the United States, a large majority of Americans believe that climate 
change exacerbated extreme weather events (Leiserowitz et al., 2012). 
That said, the perception that the impact of climate change is neither 
immediate nor local persists (Leiserowitz et al., 2008), leading many 
to think it rational to advocate a wait-and-see approach to emissions 
reductions (Sterman, 2008; Dutt and Gonzalez, 2013).
Differences in education and numeracy
Individual and group differences in education and training and the 
resulting different cognitive and affective processes have additional 
implications for risk communication. It may help to supplement the 
use of words to characterize the likelihood of an outcome recom-
mended by the current IPCC Guidance Note (GN) with numeric prob-
ability ranges (Budescu et al., 2009). Patt and Dessai (2005) show that 
in the IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR), words that characterized 
numerical probabilities were interpreted by decision makers in incon-
sistent and often context-specific ways, a phenomenon with a long his-
tory in cognitive psychology (Wallsten et al., 1986; Weber and Hilton, 
1990). These context-specific interpretations of probability words are 
deeply rooted, as evidenced by the fact that the likelihood of using 
the intended interpretation of TAR probability words did not differ with 
level of expertise (attendees of a UN COP conference versus students) 
or as a function of whether respondents had read the TAR instructions 
that specify how the probability words characterized numerical prob-
abilities (Patt and Dessai, 2005).
Numeracy, the ability to reason with numbers and other mathemati-
cal concepts, is a particularly important individual and group differ-
ence in this context as it has implications for the presentation of likeli-
hood information using either numbers (for example, 90 %) or words 
(for example, “very likely” or “likely”) or different graphs or diagrams 
(Peters et al., 2006; Mastrandrea et al., 2011). Using personal experi-
ence with climate variables has been shown to be effective in com-
municating the impact of probabilities (e. g., of below-, about-, and 
above-normal rainfall in an El Ni~no year) to decision makers with low 
levels of numeracy, for example subsistence farmers in Zimbabwe (Patt 
et al., 2005).
2.5 Tools and decision 
aids for analysing 
 uncertainty and risk
This section examines how more formal approaches can assist deci-
sion makers in engaging in more deliberative thinking with respect to 
climate change policies when faced with the risks and uncertainties 
characterized in Section 2.3.
2�5�1 Expected utility theory
Expected utility [E(U)] theory (Ramsey, 1926; von Neumann and Mor-
genstern, 1944; Savage, 1954); remains the standard approach for pro-
viding normative guidelines against which other theories of individual 
decision making under risk and uncertainty are benchmarked. Accord-
ing to the E(U) model, the solution to a decision problem under uncer-
tainty is reached by the following four steps:
1. Define a set of possible decision alternatives.
2. Quantify uncertainties on possible states of the world.
3. Value possible outcomes of the decision alternatives as utilities.
4. Choose the alternative with the highest expected utility.
This section clarifies the applicability of expected utility theory to the 
climate change problem, highlighting its potentials and limitations.
2�5�1�1 Elements of the theory
E(U) theory is based on a set of axioms that are claimed to have nor-
mative rather than descriptive validity. Based on these axioms, a per-
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son’s subjective probability and utility function can be determined by 
observing preferences in structured choice situations. These axioms 
have been debated, strengthened, and relaxed by economists, psy-
chologists, and other social scientists over the years. The axioms have 
been challenged by controlled laboratory experiments and field stud-
ies discussed in Section 2.4 but they remain the basis for parsing deci-
sion problems and recommending options that maximize expected 
utility.
2�5�1�2 How can expected utility improve decision 
making?
E(U) theory provides guidelines for individual choice, such as a farmer 
deciding what crops to plant or an entrepreneur deciding whether to 
invest in wind technology. These decision makers would apply E(U) the-
ory by following the four steps above. The perceptions and responses 
to risk and uncertainty discussed in Section 2.5 provide a rationale 
for undertaking deliberative thinking before making final choices. 
More specifically, a structured approach, such as the E(U) model, can 
reduce the impact of probabilistic biases and simplified decision rules 
that characterize intuitive thinking. At the same time, the limitations 
of E(U) must be clearly understood, as the procedures for determining 
an optimal choice do not capture the full range of information about 
outcomes and their risks and uncertainties.
Subjective versus objective probability 
In the standard E(U) model, each individual has his / her own subjec-
tive probability estimates. When there is uncertainty on the scientific 
evidence, experts’ probability estimates may diverge from each other, 
sometimes significantly. With respect to climate change, observed rela-
tive frequencies are always preferred when suitable sets of observa-
tions are accessible. When these data are not available, one may want 
to utilize structured expert judgment for quantifying uncertainty (see 
Section 2.5.7).
Individual versus social choice 
In applying E(U) theory to problems of social choice, a number of 
issues arise. Condorcet’s voting paradox shows that groups of ratio-
nal individuals deciding by majority rule do not exhibit rational prefer-
ences. Using a social utility or social welfare function to determine an 
optimal course of action for society requires some method of mea-
suring society’s preferences. In the absence of these data the social 
choice problem is not a simple exercise of maximizing expected utility. 
In this case, a plurality of approaches involving different aggregations 
of individual utilities and probabilities may best aid decision makers. 
The basis and use of the social welfare function are discussed in Sec-
tion 3.4.6.
Normative versus descriptive
As noted above, the rationality axioms of E(U) are claimed to have 
normative as opposed to descriptive validity. The paradoxes of Allais 
(1953) and Ellsberg (1961) reveal choice behaviour incompatible 
with E(U); whether this requires modifications of the normative the-
ory is a subject of debate. McCrimmon (1968) found that business 
executives willingly corrected violations of the axioms when they 
were made aware of them. Other authors (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979; Schmeidler, 1989; Quiggin, 1993; Wakker, 2010) account for 
such paradoxical choice behaviour by transforming the probabilities 
of outcomes into decision weight probabilities that play the role of 
likelihood in computing optimal choices but do not obey the laws 
of probability. However, Wakker (2010, p. 350) notes that decision 
weighting fails to describe some empirically observed behavioural 
patterns. 
2�5�2 Decision analysis
2�5�2�1 Elements of the theory
Decision analysis is a formal approach for choosing between alterna-
tives under conditions of risk and uncertainty. The foundations of deci-
sion analysis are provided by the axioms of expected utility theory. The 
methodology for choosing between alternatives consists of the follow-
ing elements that are described in more detail in Keeney (1993):
1. Structure the decision problem by generating alternatives and 
specifying values and objectives or criteria that are important to 
the decision maker.
2. Assess the possible impacts of different alternatives by determin-
ing the set of possible consequences and the probability of each 
occurring.
3. Determine preferences of the relevant decision maker by develop-
ing an objective function that considers attitudes toward risk and 
aggregates the weighted objectives.
4. Evaluate and compare alternatives by computing the expected util-
ity associated with each alternative. The alternative with the high-
est expected utility is the most preferred one.
To illustrate the application of decision analysis, consider a homeowner 
that is considering whether to invest in energy efficient technology as 
part of their lifestyle options as depicted in Figure 2.2:
1. The person focuses on two alternatives: (A1) Maintain the status 
quo, and (A2) Invest in solar panels, and has two objectives: (O1) 
Minimize cost, and (O2) Assist in reducing global warming.
2. The homeowner would then determine the impacts of A1 and A2 
on the objectives O1 and O2 given the risks and uncertainties 
associated with the impact of climate change on energy usage as 
well as the price of energy.
3. The homeowner would then consider his or her attitude toward 
risks and then combine O1 and O2 into a multiattribute utility 
function.
4. The homeowner would then compare the expected utility of A1 
and A2, choosing the one that had the highest expected utility.
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2�5�2�2 How can decision analysis improve  decision 
making?
Decision analysis enables one to undertake sensitivity analyses with 
respect to the uncertainties associated with the various consequences 
and to different value structures. Suppose alternative A1 had the high-
est expected utility. The homeowner could determine when the deci-
sion to invest in solar panels would be preferred to maintaining the 
status quo by asking questions such as: 
•	 What would the minimum annual savings in energy expenses have 
to be over the next 10 years to justify investing in solar panels?
•	 What is the fewest number of years one would have to reside in 
the house to justify investing in solar panels?
•	 What impact will different levels of global warming have on the 
expected costs of energy over the next 10 years for the home-
owner to want to invest in solar panels?
•	 How will changing the relative weights placed on minimizing cost 
(O1) and assisting in reducing global warming (O2) affect the 
expected utility of A1 and A2?
2�5�3 Cost-benefit analysis 
2�5�3�1 Elements of the theory 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) compares the costs and benefits of differ-
ent alternatives with the broad purpose of facilitating more efficient 
allocation of society’s resources. When applied to government deci-
sions, CBA can indicate the alternative that has the highest social net 
present value based on a discount rate, normally constant over time, 
that converts future benefits and costs to their present values (Board-
man et  al., 2005; see also the extensive discussion in Section 3.6). 
Social, rather than private, costs and benefits are compared, including 
those affecting future generations (Brent, 2006). In this regard, bene-
fits across individuals are assumed to be additive. Distributional issues 
may be addressed by putting different weights on specific groups to 
reflect their relative importance. Under conditions of risk and uncer-
tainty, one determines expected costs and benefits by weighting out-
comes by their likelihoods of occurrence. In this sense, the analysis is 
similar to expected utility theory and decision analysis discussed in 
Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2.
CBA can be extremely useful when dealing with well-defined problems 
that involve a limited number of actors who make choices among dif-
ferent mitigation or adaptation options. For example, a region could 
examine the benefits and costs over the next fifty years of building 
levees to reduce the likelihood and consequences of flooding given 
projected sea level rise due to climate change.
CBA can also provide a framework for defining a range of global 
long-term targets on which to base negotiations across countries 
(see for example Stern, 2007). However, CBA faces major challenges 
when defining the optimal level of global mitigation actions for the 
following three reasons: (1) the need to determine and aggregate 
individual welfare, (2) the presence of distributional and intertempo-
ral issues, and (3) the difficulty in assigning probabilities to uncertain 
climate change impacts. The limits of CBA in the context of climate 
change are discussed at length in Sections 3.6 and 3.9. The discus-
sion that follows focuses on challenges posed by risk and uncer-
tainty.
2�5�3�2 How can CBA improve decision making?
Cost-benefit analysis assumes that the decision maker(s) will even-
tually choose between well-specified alternatives. To illustrate this 
point, consider a region that is considering measures that coastal vil-
lages in hazard-prone areas can undertake to reduce future flood risks 
that are expected to increase in part due to sea level rise. The different 
options range from building a levee (at the community level) to pro-
viding low interest loans to encourage residents and businesses in the 
community to invest in adaptation measures to reduce future damage 
to their property (at the level of an individual or household).
Some heuristics and resulting biases discussed in the context of 
expected utility theory also apply to cost-benefit analysis under uncer-
tainty. For example, the key decision maker, the mayor, may utilize a 
threshold model of choice by assuming that the region will not be 
subject to flooding because there have been no floods or hurricanes 
during the past 25 years. By relying solely on intuitive processes there 
would be no way to correct this behaviour until the next disaster 
occurred, at which time the mayor would belatedly want to protect the 
community. The mayor and his advisors may also focus on short-time 
horizons, and hence do not wish to incur the high upfront costs associ-
ated with building flood protection measures such as dams or levees. 
They are unconvinced that that such an investment will bring signifi-
cant enough benefits over the first few years when these city officials 
are likely to be held accountable for the expenditures associated with 
a decision to go forward on the project.
Cost-benefit analysis can highlight the importance of considering 
the likelihood of events over time and the need to discount impacts 
exponentially rather than hyperbolically, so that future time periods 
are given more weight in the decision process. In addition, CBA can 
highlight the tradeoffs between efficient resource allocation and distri-
butional issues as a function of the relative weights assigned to differ-
ent stakeholders (e. g., low income and well-to-do households in flood 
prone areas).
2�5�3�3 Advantages and limitations of CBA
The main advantage of CBA in the context of climate change is that it is 
internally coherent and based on the axioms of expected utility theory. 
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As the prices used to aggregate costs and benefits are the outcomes 
of market activity, CBA is, at least in principle, a tool reflecting people’s 
preferences. Although this is one of the main arguments in favour of 
CBA (Tol, 2003), this line of reasoning can also be the basis for rec-
ommending that this approach not be employed for making choices if 
market prices are unavailable. Indeed, many impacts associated with 
climate change are not valued in any market and are therefore hard to 
measure in monetary terms. Omitting these impacts distorts the cost-
benefit relationship.
Several ethical and methodological critiques have been put forward 
with respect to the application of CBA to climate policy (Charlesworth 
and Okereke, 2010; Caney, 2011). For example, the uncertainty sur-
rounding the potential impacts of climate change, including possible 
irreversible and catastrophic effects on ecosystems, and their asym-
metric distribution around the planet, suggests CBA may be inappro-
priate for assessing optimal responses to climate change in these cir-
cumstances.
A strong and recurrent argument against CBA (Azar and Lindgren, 
2003; Tol, 2003; Weitzman, 2009, 2011) relates to its failure in dealing 
with infinite (negative) expected utilities arising from low-probability 
catastrophic events often referred to as ‘fat tails’. In these situations, 
CBA is unable to produce meaningful results, and thus more robust 
techniques are required. The debate concerning whether fat tails are 
indeed relevant to the problem at hand is still unsettled (see for exam-
ple Pindyck, 2011). Box 3.9 in Chapter 3 addresses the fat tail problem 
and suggests the importance of understanding the impacts associated 
with low probability, high impact climate change scenarios in evaluat-
ing alternative mitigation strategies.
One way to address the fat tail problem would be to focus on the 
potential catastrophic consequences of low-probability, high-impact 
events in developing GHG emissions targets and to specify a thresh-
old probability and a threshold loss. One can then remove events from 
consideration that are below these critical values in determining what 
mitigation and / or adaptation to adopt as part of a risk management 
strategy for dealing with climate change (Kunreuther et  al., 2013c). 
Insurers and reinsurers specify these thresholds and use them to deter-
mine the amount of coverage that they are willing to offer against 
a particular risk. They then diversify their portfolio of policies so the 
annual probability of a major loss is below a pre-specified thresh-
old level of concern (e. g., 1 in 1000) (Kunreuther et al., 2013c). This 
approach is in the spirit of a classic paper by Roy (1952) on safety-
first behaviour and can be interpreted as an application of probabilis-
tic cost-effectiveness analysis (i. e., chance constrained programming) 
discussed in the next section. It was applied in a somewhat different 
manner to environmental policy by Ciriacy-Wantrup (1971) who con-
tended that “a safe minimum standard is frequently a valid and rel-
evant criterion for conservation policy.” 
One could also view uncertainty or risk associated with different 
options as one of the many criteria on which alternatives should be 
evaluated. Multi-criteria analysis (MCA) is sometimes proposed to 
overcome some of the limitations of CBA (see more on its basic fea-
tures in Chapter 3 and for applications in Chapter 6). MCA implies that 
the different criteria or attributes should not be aggregated by convert-
ing all of them into monetary units. MCA techniques commonly apply 
numerical analysis in two stages:
•	 Scoring: for each option and criterion, the expected consequences 
of each option are assigned a numerical score on a strength of 
preference scale. More (less) preferred options score higher (lower) 
on the scale. In practice, scales often extend from 0 to 100, where 
0 is assigned to a real or hypothetical least preferred option, and 
100 is assigned to a real or hypothetical most preferred option. All 
options considered in the MCA would then fall between 0 and 100.
•	 Weighting: numerical weights are assigned to define their relative 
performance on a chosen scale that will often range from 0 (no 
importance) to 1 (highest importance) (Dodgson et al., 2009).
2�5�4 Cost-effectiveness analysis
2�5�4�1 Elements of the theory
Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) is a tool based on constrained optimi-
zation for comparing policies designed to meet a pre-specified target. 
The target can be defined through CBA, by applying a specific guide-
line such as the precautionary principle (see Section 2.5.5), or by speci-
fying a threshold level of concern or environmental standard in the 
spirit of the safety-first models discussed above. The target could be 
chosen without the need to formally specify impacts and their respec-
tive probabilities. It could also be based on an ethical principle such as 
minimizing the worst outcome, in the spirit of a Rawlsian fair agree-
ment, or as a result of political and societal negotiation processes.
Cost-effectiveness analysis does not evaluate benefits in monetary 
terms. Rather, it attempts to find the least-cost option that achieves a 
desired quantifiable outcome. In one sense CEA can be seen as a spe-
cial case of CBA in that the technique replaces the criterion of choos-
ing a climate policy based on expected costs and benefits with the 
objective of selecting the option that minimizes the cost of meeting 
an exogenous target (e. g., equilibrium temperature, concentration, or 
emission trajectory).
Like CBA, CEA can be generalized to include uncertainty. One solution 
concept requires the externally set target to be specified with certainty. 
The option chosen is the one that minimizes expected costs. Since 
temperature targets cannot be met with certainty (den Elzen and van 
Vuuren, 2007; Held et al., 2009), a variation of this solution concept 
requires that the likelihood that an exogenous target (e. g., equilib-
rium temperature) will be exceeded is below a pre-defined threshold 
probability. This solution procedure, equivalent to chance constrained 
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programming (CCP) (Charnes and Cooper, 1959), enables one to use 
stochastic programming to examine the impacts of uncertainty with 
respect to the cost of meeting a pre-specified target. Chance con-
strained programming is a conceptually valid decision-analytic frame-
work for examining the likelihood of attaining climate targets when 
the probability distributions characterizing the decision maker’s state 
of knowledge is held constant over time (Held et al., 2009).
2�5�4�2 How can CEA improve decision making?
To illustrate how CEA can be useful, consider a national government 
that wants to set a target for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions in preparation for a meeting of delegates from different countries 
at the Conference of Parties (COP). It knows there is uncertainty as to 
whether specific policy measures will achieve the desired objectives. 
The uncertainties may be related to the outcomes of the forthcoming 
negotiation process at the COP and / or to the uncertain impacts of 
proposed technological innovations in reducing GHG emissions. Cost-
effectiveness analysis could enable the government to assess alterna-
tive mitigation strategies (or energy investment policies) for reduc-
ing GHG emissions in the face of these uncertainties by specifying a 
threshold probability that aggregate GHG emissions will not be greater 
than a pre-specified target level.
2�5�4�3 Advantages and limitations of CEA over CBA
Cost-effectiveness analysis has an advantage over CBA in tackling 
the climate problem in that it does not require formalized knowledge 
about global warming impact functions (Pindyck, 2013). The focus of 
CEA is on more tangible elements, such as energy alternatives, where 
scientific understanding is more established (Stern, 2007). Still, CEA 
does require scientific input on potential risks associated with climate 
change. National and international political processes specify tempera-
ture targets and threshold probabilities that incorporate the prefer-
ences of different actors guided by data from the scientific community. 
The corresponding drawback of CEA is that the choice of the target is 
specified without considering its impact on economic efficiency. Once 
costs to society are assessed and a range of temperature targets is 
considered, one can assess people’s preferences by considering the 
potential benefits and costs associated with different targets. However, 
if costs of a desirable action turn out to be regarded as too high, then 
CEA may not provide sufficient information to support taking action 
now. In this case additional knowledge on the mitigation benefit side 
would be required.
An important application of CEA in the context of climate change is 
evaluating alternative transition pathways that do not violate a pre-
defined temperature target. Since a specific temperature target can-
not be attained with certainty, formulating probabilistic targets as a 
CCP problem is an appropriate solution technique to use. However, 
introducing anticipated future learning so that probability distribu-
tions change over time can lead to infeasible solutions (Eisner et al., 
1971). Since this is a problem with respect to specifying temperature 
targets, Schmidt et  al. (2011) proposed an approach that that com-
bines CEA and CBA. The properties of this hybrid model (labelled ‘cost 
risk analysis’) require further investigation. At this time, CEA through 
the use of CCP represents an informative concept for deriving miti-
gation costs for the case where there is no learning over time. With 
learning, society would be no worse off than the proposed CEA solu-
tion.
2�5�5 The precautionary principle and robust 
decision making
2�5�5�1 Elements of the theory
In the 1970s and 1980s, the precautionary principle was proposed for 
dealing with serious uncertain risks to the natural environment and 
to public health (Vlek, 2010). In its strongest form the precautionary 
principle implies that if an action or policy is suspected of having a risk 
that causes harm to the public or to the environment, precautionary 
measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships 
are not established. The burden of proof that the activity is not harmful 
falls on the proponent of the activity rather than on the public. A con-
sensus statement to this effect was issued at the Wingspread Confer-
ence on the Precautionary Principle on 26 January 1998.
The precautionary principle allows policymakers to ban products or 
substances in situations where there is the possibility of their caus-
ing harm and / or where extensive scientific knowledge on their risks is 
lacking. These actions can be relaxed only if further scientific findings 
emerge that provide sound evidence that no harm will result. An influ-
ential statement of the precautionary principle with respect to climate 
change is principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development: “where there are threats of serious or irreversible dam-
age, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degra-
dation.”
Robust decision making (RDM) is a particular set of methods devel-
oped over the last decade to address the precautionary principle in a 
systematic manner. RDM uses ranges or, more formally, sets of plau-
sible probability distributions to describe uncertainty and to evaluate 
how well different policies perform with respect to different outcomes 
arising from these probability distributions. RDM provides decision 
makers with tradeoff curves that allow them to debate how much 
expected performance they are willing to sacrifice in order to improve 
outcomes in worst case scenarios. RDM thus captures the spirit of the 
precautionary principle in a way that illuminates the risks and benefits 
of different policies. Lempert et al. (2006) and Hall et al. (2012) review 
the application of robust approaches to decision making with respect 
to mitigating or adapting to climate change.
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The tolerable windows approach can also be regarded as a ‘robust 
method’. Temperature targets are specified and the bundle of decision 
paths compatible with the targets is characterized. Mathe matically, the 
tolerable windows approach incorporates the features of CEA or CCP 
without optimization. The selection of the relevant targets and the paths 
to achieving it are left to those making the decision. (See Bruckner and 
Zickfeld (2008) for an introduction and an overview to peer-reviewed 
literature on the tolerable windows approach.)
2�5�6 Adaptive management
Adaptive management is an approach to governance that that grew 
out of the field of conservation ecology in the 1970s and incorporates 
mechanisms for reducing uncertainty over time (Holling, 1978; Walters 
and Hilborn, 1978). Paraphrasing the IPCC Special Report on Extreme 
Events (SREX) (IPCC, 2012), adaptive management represents struc-
tured processes for improving decision making and policy over time, 
by incorporating lessons learned. From the theoretical literature, two 
strands of adaptive management have been developed for improving 
decision making under uncertainty: passive and active.
Passive adaptive management (PAM) involves carefully designing 
monitoring systems, at the relevant spatial scales, so as to be able to 
track the performance of policy interventions and improve them over 
time in response to what has been learned. Active adaptive manage-
ment (AAM) extends PAM by designing the interventions themselves 
as controlled experiments, so as to generate new knowledge. For 
example, if a number of political jurisdictions were seeking to imple-
ment support mechanisms for technology deployment, in an AAM 
approach they would deliberately design separate mechanisms that 
are likely to differ across jurisdictions. By introducing such variance 
into the management regime, however, one would collectively learn 
more about how industry and investors respond to a range of interven-
tions. All jurisdictions could then use this knowledge in a later round 
of policymaking, reflecting the public goods character of institutional 
knowledge.
With respect to the application of PAM, Nilsson (2005) reports on a 
case study of Sweden, in which policymakers engaged in repetitive ex 
post analyses of national climate policy, and then responded to the les-
sons learned by modifying their goals and strategies. There are many 
documented cases of PAM applications in the area of climate change 
adaptation (Lawler et al., 2008; Berkes et al., 2000; Berkes and Jolly, 
2001; Joyce et  al., 2009; Armitage, 2011). The information gathering 
and reporting requirements of the UNFCCC are also in the spirit of 
PAM with respect to policy design, as are the diversity of approaches 
implemented for renewable energy support across the states and prov-
inces of North America and the countries in Europe. The combination of 
the variance in action with data gathered about the consequences of 
these actions by government agencies has allowed for robust analysis 
on the relative effectiveness of different instruments (Blok, 2006; Men-
donça, 2007; Butler and Neuhoff, 2008). 
Individuals relying on intuitive thinking are unlikely to undertake 
experimentation that leads to new knowledge, as discussed in Section 
2.4.3.1. In theory, adaptive management ought to correct this problem 
by making the goal of learning through experimentation an explicit 
policy goal. Lee (1993) illustrates this point by presenting a paradig-
matic case of AAM designed to increase salmon stocks in the Columbia 
River watershed in the western United States and Canada. In this case, 
there was the opportunity to introduce a number of different manage-
ment regimes on the individual river tributaries, and to reduce uncer-
tainty about salmon population dynamics. As Lee (1993) documented, 
policymakers on the Columbia River were ultimately not able to carry 
through with AAM: local constituencies, valuing their own immediate 
interests over long-term learning in the entire region, played a crucial 
role in blocking it. One could imagine such political and institutional 
issues hindering the application of AAM at a global scale with respect 
to climate change policies.
To date, there are no cases in the literature specifically documenting 
climate change policies explicitly incorporating AAM. However, there 
are a number of examples where policy interventions implicitly fol-
low AAM principles. One of these is promotion of energy research and 
development (R&D). In this case the government invests in a large 
number of potential new technologies, with the expectation that some 
technologies will not prove practical, while others will be successful 
and be supported by funding in the form of incentives such as subsi-
dies (Fischer and Newell, 2008).
2�5�7 Uncertainty analysis techniques
Uncertainty analysis consists of both qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies (see Box 2.2 for more details). A Qualitative Uncer-
tainty Analysis (QLUA) helps improve the choice process of decision 
makers by providing data in a form that individuals can easily under-
stand. QLUA normally does not require complex calculations so that it 
can be useful in helping to overcome judgmental biases that character-
ize intuitive thinking. QLUA assembles arguments and evidence and 
provides a verbal assessment of plausibility, frequently incorporated in 
a Weight of Evidence (WoE) narrative.
A Quantitative Uncertainty Analysis (QNUA) assigns a joint distribu-
tion to uncertain parameters of a specific model used to characterize 
different phenomena. Quantitative Uncertainty Analysis was pioneered 
in the nuclear sector in 1975 to determine the risks associated with 
nuclear power plants (Rasmussen, 1975). The development of QNUA 
and its prospects for applications to climate change are reviewed by 
Cooke (2012).
2�5�7�1  Structured expert judgment
Structured expert judgment designates methods in which experts 
quantify their uncertainties to build probabilistic input for complex 
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decision problems (Morgan and Henrion, 1990; Cooke, 1991; O’Hagan 
et  al., 2006). A wide variety of activities fall under the heading of 
expert judgment that includes blue ribbon panels, Delphi surveys, and 
decision conferencing.
Elements
Structured expert judgment such as science-based uncertainty quan-
tification was pioneered in the Rasmussen Report on risks of nuclear 
power plants (Rasmussen, 1975). The methodology was further elabo-
rated in successive studies and involves protocols for expert selection 
and training, elicitation procedures and performance-based combi-
nations that are described in more detail in Goossens et  al. (2000). 
In large studies, multiple expert panels provide inputs to computer 
models with no practical alternative for combining expert judg-
ments except to use equal weighting. Hora (2004) has shown that 
equal weight combinations of statistically accurate (‘well calibrated’) 
experts loses statistical accuracy. Combinations based on experts’ 
statistical accuracy have consistently given more accurate and infor-
mative results (see for example Cooke and Goossens, 2008; Aspinall, 
2010).
How can this tool improve decision making under uncertainty?
Structured expert judgment can provide insights into the nature of 
the uncertainties associated with a specific risk and the importance of 
undertaking more detailed analyses to design meaningful strategies 
and policies for dealing with climate change in the spirit of deliberative 
thinking. In addition to climate change (Morgan and Keith, 1995; Zick-
feld et al., 2010), structured expert judgment has migrated into many 
fields such as volcanology (Aspinall, 1996, 2010), dam/dyke  safety 
(Aspinall, 2010), seismicity (Klügel, 2008), civil aviation (Ale et  al., 
2009), ecology (Martin et  al., 2012; Rothlisberger et  al., 2012), toxi-
cology (Tyshenko et al., 2011), security (Ryan et al., 2012), and epidemi-
ology (Tuomisto et al., 2008).
The general conclusions emerging from experience with structured 
expert judgments to date are: (1) formalizing the expert judgment pro-
cess and adhering to a strict protocol adds substantial value to under-
standing the importance of characterizing uncertainty; (2) experts 
differ greatly in their ability to provide statistically accurate and infor-
mative quantifications of uncertainty; and (3) if expert judgments must 
be combined to support complex decision problems, the combination 
Box 2�2 | Quantifying uncertainty 
Natural language is not adequate for propagating and com-
municating uncertainty. To illustrate, consider the U. S. National 
Research Council 2010 report Advancing the Science of Climate 
Change (America’s Climate Choices: Panel on Advancing the Sci-
ence of Climate Change; National Research Council, 2010). Using 
the AR4 calibrated uncertainty language, the NRC is highly confi-
dent that (1) the Earth is warming and that (2) most of the recent 
warming is due to human activities.
What does the second statement mean? Does it mean the NRC is 
highly confident that the Earth is warming and the recent warm-
ing is anthropogenic or that, given the Earth is warming, are they 
highly confident humans cause this warming? The latter seems 
most natural, as the warming is asserted in the first statement. In 
that case the ‘high confidence’ applies to a conditional statement. 
The probability of both statements being true is the probability 
of the condition (Earth is warming) multiplied by the probability 
of this warming being caused by humans, given that warming is 
taking place. If both statements enjoy high confidence, then in 
the calibrated language of AR4 where high confidence implies a 
probability of 0.8, the statement that both are true would only be 
“more likely than not” (0.8 x 0.8 = 0.64).
Qualitative uncertainty analysis easily leads the unwary to errone-
ous conclusions. Interval analysis is a semi-qualitative method in 
which ranges are assigned to uncertain variables without distribu-
tions and can mask the complexities of propagation, as attested 
by the following statement in an early handbook on risk analysis: 
“The simplest quantitative measure of variability in a parameter or 
a measurable quantity is given by an assessed range of the values 
the parameter or quantity can take. This measure may be adequate 
for certain purposes (e. g., as input to a sensitivity analysis), but in 
general it is not a complete representation of the analyst’s knowl-
edge or state of confidence and generally will lead to an unreal-
istic range of results if such measures are propagated through an 
analysis”, (U. S. NRC, 1983, Chapter 12, p.12).
The sum of 10 independent variables each ranging between 
zero and ten, can assume any value between zero and 100. The 
upper (lower) bound can be attained only if ALL variables take 
their maximal (minimal) values, whereas values near 50 can 
arise through many combinations. Simply stating the interval 
[0, 100] conceals the fact that very high (low) values are much 
more exceptional than central values. These same concepts are 
widely represented throughout the uncertainty analysis literature. 
According to Morgan and Henrion (1990): “Uncertainty analysis 
is the computation of the total uncertainty induced in the out-
put by quantified uncertainty in the inputs and models […] Fail-
ure to engage in systematic sensitivity and uncertainty analysis 
leaves both analysts and users unable to judge the adequacy of 
the analysis and the conclusions reached”, (Morgan and Henrion, 
1990, p. 39).
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method should be subjected to the following quality controls: statisti-
cal accuracy and informativeness (Aspinall, 2010).
As attested by a number of governmental guidelines, structured expert 
judgment is increasingly accepted as quality science that is applicable 
when other methods are unavailable (U. S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 2005). Some expert surveys of economists concerned with 
climate change examine damages (Nordhaus, 1994) and appropri-
ate discount rates (Weitzman, 2001). Structured expert judgments of 
climate scientists were recently used to quantify uncertainty in the 
ice sheet contribution to sea level rise, revealing that experts’ uncer-
tainty regarding the 2100 contribution to sea level rise from ice sheets 
increased between 2010 and 2012 (Bamber and Aspinall, 2013).
Damages or benefits to ecosystems from invasions of non-indigenous 
species are difficult to quantify and monetize on the basis of histori-
cal data. However ecologists, biologists and conservation economists 
have substantial knowledge regarding the possible impacts of inva-
sive species. Recent studies applied structured expert judgment with 
a performance-based combination and validation to quantify the costs 
and benefits of the invasive species introduced since 1959 into the U. S. 
Great Lakes by opening the St. Lawrence Seaway (Rothlisberger et al., 
2009, 2012). Lessons from studies such as these reveal that experts 
may have applicable knowledge that can be captured in a structured 
elicitation when historical data have large uncertainties associated 
with them.
Advantages and limitations of structured expert judgment 
Expert judgment studies do not reduce uncertainty; they merely quan-
tify it. If the uncertainties are large, as indeed they often are, then deci-
sion makers cannot expect science to relieve them of the burden of 
deciding under conditions of ambiguity. Since its inception, structured 
expert judgment has been met with scepticism in some quarters; it is, 
after all, just opinions and not hard facts. Its steady growth and widen-
ing acceptance over 35 years correlates with the growth of complex 
decision support models. The use of structured expert judgment must 
never justify a diminution of effort in collecting hard data.
2�5�7�2 Scenario analysis and ensembles
Scenario analysis develops a set of possible futures based on extrapo-
lating current trends and varying key parameters, without sampling in 
a systematic manner from an uncertainty distribution. Utilizing suffi-
ciently long time horizons ensures that structural changes in the sys-
tem are considered. The futurist Herman Kahn and colleagues at the 
RAND Corporation are usually credited with inventing scenario analy-
sis (Kahn and Wiener, 1967). In the climate change arena, scenarios are 
currently presented as different emission pathways or Representative 
Concentration Pathways (RCPs). Predicting the effects of such path-
ways involves modelling the Earth’s response to changes in GHG con-
centrations from natural and anthropogenic sources. Different climate 
models will yield different projections for the same emissions scenario. 
Model Intercomparison studies generate sets of projections termed 
‘ensembles’ (van Vuuren et al., 2011).
Elements of the theory
Currently, RCPs are carefully constructed on the bases of plausible 
storylines while insuring (1) they are based on a representative set of 
peer-reviewed scientific publications by independent groups, (2) they 
provide climate and atmospheric models as inputs, (3) they are harmo-
nized to agree on a common base year, and (4) they extend to the year 
2100. The four RCP scenarios, shown in Figure 2.3 relative to the range 
of baseline scenarios in the literature, roughly span the entire scenario 
literature, which includes control scenarios reaching 430 ppm CO2eq 
or lower by 2100. The scenarios underlying the RCPs were originally 
developed by four independent integrated assessment models, each 
with their own carbon cycle. To provide the climate community with 
four harmonized scenarios, they were run through the same carbon 
cycle / climate model (Meinshausen et al., 2011). Note that a represen-
tative set is not a random sample from the scenarios as they do not 
represent independent samples from some underlying uncertainty dis-
tribution over unknown parameters.
Ensembles of model runs generated by different models, called multi-
model ensembles or super-ensembles, convey the scatter of the climate 
response and natural internal climate variability around reference sce-
narios as sampled by a set of models, but cannot be interpreted proba-
bilistically without an assessment of model biases, model interdepen-
dence, and how the ensemble was constructed (see WGI AR5 Section 
12.2; Knutti et  al., 2010). In many cases the assessed uncertainty is 
larger than the raw model spread, as illustrated in Figure 2.4. The 
shaded areas (+ / - 1 standard deviation) around the time series do not 
imply that 68 % are certain to fall in the shaded areas, but the model-
ers’ assessed uncertainty (likely ranges, vertical bars on the right) are 
larger. These larger ranges reflect uncertainty in the carbon cycle and 
the full range of climate sensitivity (WGI AR4 Section 10.5.4.6 and Box 
10.3; Knutti et al., 2008) but do not reflect other possible sources of 
uncertainty (e. g., ice sheet dynamics, permafrost, or changes in future 
solar and volcanic forcings). Moreover, many of these models have 
common ancestors and share parameterizations or code (Knutti et al., 
2013) creating dependences between different model runs. Probability 
statements on global surface warming require estimating the models’ 
bias and interdependence (see WGI AR5 Sections 12.2 and 12.4.1.2). 
WGI AR5 assigns likelihood statements (calibrated language) to global 
temperature ranges for the RCP scenarios (WGI AR5 Table SPM.2) but 
does not provide probability density functions (PDFs), as there is no 
established formal method to generate PDFs based on results from dif-
ferent published studies.
Advantages and limitation of scenario and ensemble analyses
Scenario and  ensemble analyses are an essential step in scoping the 
range of effects of human actions and climate change. If the scenarios 
span the range of possible outcomes, they may be seen as providing 
support for uncertainty distributions in a formal uncertainty analysis. If 
specific assumptions are imposed when generating the scenarios, then 
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Figure 2�3 | Total radiative forcing (left panel) and cumulative carbon emissions since 1751 (right panel) in baseline scenario literature compared to RCP scenarios. Forcing was estimated 
ex-post from models with full coverage using the median output from the MAGICC results. Secondary axis in the left panel expresses forcing in CO2eq concentrations. Scenarios are depicted 


















































































Figure 2�4 | Solid lines are multi-model global averages of surface warming (relative to 1980 – 1999) for the scenarios A2, A1B and B1, shown as continuations of the 20th century 
simulations. Shading denotes the ± 1 standard deviation range of individual model annual averages. The orange line is for the experiment where concentrations were held constant 
at year 2000 values. The grey bars at right indicate the best estimate (solid line within each bar) and the likely range assessed for the six families of emissions scenarios discussed 
in the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (AR4). The assessment of the best estimate and likely ranges in the grey bars includes the Atmosphere-Ocean General Circulation Models 
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the support is conditional on these assumptions (see Section 6.2.3). 
The advantage of scenario / ensemble analyses is that they can be per-
formed without quantifying the uncertainty of the underlying unknown 
parameters. On the downside, it is easy to read more into these analy-
ses than is justified. Analysts often forget that scenarios are illustra-
tive possible futures along a continuum. They tend to use one of those 
scenarios in a deterministic fashion without recognizing that they have 
a low probability of occurrence and are only one of many possible out-
comes. The use of probabilistic language in describing the swaths of 
scenarios (such as standard deviations in Figure 2.4) may also encour-
age the misunderstandings that these represent science-based ranges 
of confidence.
The study of representative scenarios based on probabilistic fore-
casts have been shown to facilitate strategic planning by professional 
groups such as military commanders, oil company managers, and poli-
cymakers (Schoemaker, 1995; Bradfield et al., 2005). Recent work on 
ice sheet modelling (Little et al., 2013) points in this direction. Using 
modelling assumptions and prior distributions on model coefficients, 
Monte Carlo simulations are used to produce probabilistic predictions. 
Expert informed modelling is methodologically intermediate between 
structured expert judgment (Bamber and Aspinall, 2013) and non-
probabilistic scenario sweeps. Structured expert judgment leaves the 
modelling assumptions to the experts who quantify their uncertainty 
on future observables.
2.6 Managing  uncertainty, 
risk and learning
2�6�1 Guidelines for developing policies
This section assesses how the risks and uncertainties associated with 
climate change can affect choices with respect to policy responses, 
strategies, and instruments. At the time of the AR4, there was some 
modelling-based literature on how uncertainties affected policy design, 
but very few empirical studies. In the intervening years, international 
negotiations failed to establish clear national emissions reductions 
targets, but established a set of normative principles, such as limit-
ing global warming to 2 °C. These are now reflected in international, 
national, and subnational planning processes and have affected the 
risks and uncertainties that matter for new climate policy develop-
ment. Greater attention and effort has been given to finding syner-
gies between climate policy and other policy objectives, so that it is 
now important to consider multiple benefits of a single policy instru-
ment. For example, efforts to protect tropical rainforests (McDermott 
et  al., 2011), rural livelihoods (Lawlor et  al., 2010), biodiversity (Jin-
nah, 2011), public health (Stevenson, 2010), fisheries (Axelrod, 2011), 
arable land (Conliffe, 2011), energy security (Battaglini et  al., 2009), 
and job creation (Barry et al., 2008) have been framed as issues that 
should be considered when evaluating climate policies.
The treatment here complements the examination of policies and 
instruments in later chapters of this report, such as Chapter 6 (which 
assesses the results of IAMs) and Chapters 13 – 15 (which assess policy 
instruments at a range of scales). Those later chapters provide greater 
details on the overall tradeoffs to be made in designing policies. The 
focus here is on the special effects of various uncertainties and risks on 
those tradeoffs. 
•	 Section 2.6.2 discusses how institutions that link science with pol-
icy grapple with several different forms of uncertainty so that they 
meet both scientific and political standards of accountability.
•	 Section 2.6.3 presents the results of integrated assessment models 
(IAMs) that address the choice of a climate change temperature 
target or the optimal transition pathway to achieve a particular 
target. IAMs normally focus on a social planner operating at the 
global level.
•	 Section 2.6.4 summarizes the findings from modelling and empiri-
cal studies that examine the processes and architecture of interna-
tional treaties.
•	 Section 2.6.5 presents the results of modelling studies and the 
few empirical analyses that examine the choice of particular policy 
instruments at the sovereign state level for reducing GHG emis-
sions. It also examines how the adoption of energy efficiency prod-
ucts and technologies can be promoted at the firm and household 
levels. Special attention is given to how uncertainties affect the 
performance and effectiveness of these policy instruments.
•	 Section 2.6.6 discusses empirical studies of people’s support or 
opposition with respect to changes in investment patterns and 
livelihood or lifestyles that climate policies will bring about. These 
studies show people’s sensitivity to the impact that climate change 
will have on their personal health or safety and their perceptions 
of the health and safety risks associated with the new technolo-
gies addressing the climate change problem. 
Linking intuitive thinking and deliberative thinking processes for deal-
ing with uncertainties associated with climate change and climate 
policy should increase the likelihood that instruments and robust poli-
cies will be implemented. In this sense, the concepts presented in this 
section should be viewed as a starting point for integrating descriptive 
models with normative models of choice for developing risk manage-
ment strategies.
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2�6�2 Uncertainty and the science/policy 
 interface 
Science/policy interfaces are defined as social processes which encom-
pass relationships between scientists and other actors in the policy 
process, and which allow for exchanges, co-evolution, and joint con-
struction of knowledge with the aim of enriching decision making (Van 
den Hove, 2007). Analysts have called attention to several different 
forms of uncertainty affecting the science/policy relationship that can 
be summarized as follows:
•	 Paradigmatic uncertainty results from the absence of prior agree-
ment on the framing of problems, on methods for scientifically 
investigating them, and on how to combine knowledge from 
disparate research traditions. Such uncertainties are especially 
common in cross-disciplinary, application-oriented research and 
assessment for meeting policy objectives (Gibbons, 1994; Nowotny 
et al., 2001).
•	 Epistemic uncertainty results from lack of information or knowl-
edge for characterizing phenomena. Stirling (2007) further dis-
tinguishes between uncertainty (insufficient knowledge to assess 
probabilities), ambiguity (insufficient knowledge about possible 
outcomes), and ignorance (insufficient knowledge of likely out-
comes and their probabilities). Others have noted that producing 
more knowledge may exacerbate uncertainty, especially when 
actors disagree about how to frame a problem for scientific inves-
tigation (Beck, 1992; Gross, 2010).
•	 Translational uncertainty results from scientific findings that are 
incomplete or conflicting, so that they can be invoked to support 
divergent policy positions (Sarewitz, 2010). In such circumstances, 
protracted controversy often occurs, as each side challenges the 
methodological foundations of the other’s claims in a process 
called ‘experimenters’ regress’ (Collins, 1985).
Institutions that link science to policy must grapple with all of the 
above forms of uncertainty, often simultaneously. Because their 
work cuts across conventional lines between science and politics, 
these institutions have been called ‘boundary organizations’ (Gus-
ton, 2001) and their function has been termed ‘hybrid management’ 
(Miller, 2001). Straddling multiple worlds, science-policy institutions 
are required to meet both scientific and political standards of account-
ability. Whereas achieving scientific consensus frequently calls for 
bounding and closing down disagreements, achieving political legiti-
macy requires opening up areas of conflict in order to give voice to 
divergent perspectives.
The task of resolving conflicts in policy-relevant science is generally 
entrusted to multidisciplinary expert bodies. These organizations are 
best suited to addressing the paradigmatic uncertainties that arise 
when problems are novel or when synthesis is required across fields 
with different standards of good scientific practice. Bridging epistemic 
and translational uncertainties, however, imposes added demands. For 
expert advisory bodies to be viewed as legitimate they must represent 
all relevant viewpoints in a politically acceptable manner (Jasanoff, 
1990; 2005a). What counts as acceptable varies to some degree across 
national decision-making cultures. Each culture may place different 
weights on experts’ personal integrity, the reliability of their disciplin-
ary judgments, and their ability to forge agreement across competing 
values (Jasanoff, 2005b, pp. 209 – 224).
To achieve legitimacy, institutions charged with linking science to policy 
must also open themselves up to public input at one or more stages in 
their deliberations. This process of “extended peer review” (Funtowicz 
and Ravetz, 1992) is regarded as necessary, though insufficient, for the 
production of “socially robust knowledge”, that is, knowledge that can 
withstand public scrutiny and scepticism (Gibbons, 1994). Procedures 
that are sufficient to produce public trust in one political context may 
not work in others because national political cultures are character-
ized by different “civic epistemologies”, i. e., culturally specific modes 
of generating and publicly testing policy-relevant knowledge (Jasanoff, 
2005a).
International and global scientific assessment bodies confront addi-
tional problems of legitimacy because they operate outside long-
established national decision-making cultures and are accountable to 
publics subscribing to different civic epistemologies (Jasanoff, 2010). 
The temptation for such bodies has been to seek refuge in the linear 
model in the hope that the strength of their internal scientific consen-
sus will be sufficient to win wide political buy-in. The recent research 
on linking science to policy suggests otherwise.
2�6�3 Optimal or efficient stabilization 
pathways (social planner 
perspective) 
Integrated assessment models (IAMs) vary widely in their underly-
ing structure and decision-making processes. IAMs designed for 
cost-benefit analysis typically simulate the choices of an idealized 
‘social planner’, who by definition is someone who makes decisions 
on behalf of society, in order to achieve the highest social welfare by 
weighting the benefits and cost of mitigation measures. In contrast, 
many IAMs designed for cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) specify the 
social planner’s objective as identifying the transformation pathway 
that achieves a pre-defined climate goal at the lowest discounted 
aggregated costs to society. In both cases, the analyses do not con-
sider distributional effects of policies on different income groups, but 
instead focus on the effect on total macroeconomic costs. Hence, 
with these types of IAMs, negotiators that are part of the political 
process are able to rank the relative desirability of alternative poli-
cies to the extent that they share the definition of social welfare 
embedded in the model (e. g., discounted aggregate cost minimi-
zation), and believe that those implementing the policy will do so 
cooperatively.
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Chapter 6 describes in more detail important structural characteristics 
of a set of IAMs used to generate transformation pathways. The mod-
elling analyses highlighted in Chapter 6 utilize the scenario approach 
to represent uncertainty. In this section we instead focus on IAM 
results where uncertainty is an integral part of the decision-analytic 
framework.
Climate policy assessment should be considered in the light of uncer-
tainties associated with climate or damage response functions, the 
costs of mitigation technology and the uncertainty in climate change 
policy instruments. A key question these analyses address is how 
uncertainty with respect to the above factors alters the optimal social 
planner’s short-term reactions to climate change. A subset also asks 
whether adjusting behaviour to uncertainty and designing more flex-
ible policies and technology solutions would induce a significant wel-
fare gain. 
Table 2.2 provides an overview of the existing literature on IAMs that 
examine mitigation actions. The rows classify the literature on the 
basis of the type of uncertainty: upstream, associated with emission 
baseline drivers, such as economic and population growth; down-
stream continuous, associated with climate feedbacks and damages; 
downstream strongly nonlinear, associated with the possibility of 
thresholds and irreversibilities; policy responses, associated with the 
uncertain adoption of policy tools; and multiple sources, when more 
than one of the sources above are considered simultaneously. The 
three columns categorize the literature according to the ways intro-
ducing uncertainty influence the findings. The theoretical economic 
literature shows that the effect of including uncertainty in decision 
making on near-term mitigation is ambiguous (for an overview see 
e. g., Lange and Treich, 2008; De Zeeuw and Zemel, 2012). However, 
for most studies that assume downstream strongly nonlinear uncer-
tainties under a social welfare maximization or downstream uncer-
tainties in combination with a temperature target, including uncer-
tainty in the analysis leads to an optimal or efficient level of 
mitigation that is greater and / or accelerated than under conditions of 
certainty.
The literature on IAMs incorporating uncertainty uses either Monte 
Carlo simulations or fully stochastic programming techniques. Monte 
Carlo studies provide insights regarding the order-of-magnitude effect 
of multiple model parameter uncertainties for model output (Nordhaus 
and Popp, 1997; Tol, 1999; Webster et  al., 2002; Hope, 2008, p.  200; 
Ackerman et al., 2010; Dietz, 2011; Pycroft et al., 2011). In this sense 
they can be interpreted as a preparatory step towards a full-fledged 
decision analysis under uncertainty.
Table 2�2 | Overview of literature on integrated assessment models examining mitigation actions. (cea) indicates: analysis based on a probabilistic generalization of CEA. Papers 
that appear several times report different scenarios or assumptions. The few studies highlighted by “*” use non-probabilistic decision criteria under uncertainty (e. g., minimax regret 
or maximin). 1
Type of Uncertainty Considered
Effect on Mitigation Action
Accelerates / Increases Mitigation Action Delays/Decreases Mitigation Action Ambiguous Effect
Upstream (emission drivers) Reilly et al., 1987; Webster et al., 2002; O’Neill 
and Sanderson, 2008; Rozenberg et al., 2010
O’Neill and Sanderson, 2008
Downstream (climate 
and damages) — mildly 
nonlinear damages
Chichilnisky and Heal, 1993; Peck and Teisberg, 1994; 
Ha-Duong and Treich, 2004; Syri et al., 2008; Athanassoglou 
and Xepapadeas, 2011; Kaufman, 2012; Ackerman et al., 2013
Kolstad, 1994, 1996a; Baranzini et al., 2003 Clarke and Reed, 1994; Kolstad, 1996b; 
Tsur and Zemel, 1996; Gollier et al., 2000; 
Fisher and Narain, 2003; Ha-Duong and 
Treich, 2004; Baker et al., 2006; Lange and 
Treich, 2008; Lorenz et al., 2012b; Ulph 
and Ulph, 1997; Ackerman et al., 2013
Downstream (climate and 
damages) — strongly nonlinear 
event or temperature target
Ha-Duong, 1998; Gjerde et al., 1999; O’Neill and Oppenheimer, 
2002; Baranzini et al., 2003; Dumas and Ha-Duong, 2005; 
Syri et al., 2008(cea); Johansson et al., 2008(cea); Hope, 
2008; Webster, 2008; Tsur and Zemel, 2009; Schmidt et al., 
2011(cea); Funke and Paetz, 2011; Iverson and Perrings, 
2012*; Lorenz et al., 2012b; de Zeeuw and Zemel, 2012
Peck and Teisberg, 1995 Gollier and Treich, 2003
Uncertainty on Policy Response Ha-Duong et al., 1997; Blanford, 2009; Bosetti and Tavoni, 
2009; Bosetti et al., 2009; Durand-Lasserve et al., 2010(cea)
Baudry, 2000; Baker and Shittu, 2006(cea)2 Farzin and Kort, 2000(cea)
Multiple Sources of Uncertainty Nordhaus and Popp, 1997; Grubb, 1997; Pizer, 1999; Tol, 
1999; Obersteiner et al., 2001; Yohe et al., 2004; Keller et al., 
2004; Baker and Shittu, 2008; Baker and Adu-Bonnah, 2008; 
Bahn et al., 2008; Held et al., 2009; Hope, 2009; Labriet et al., 
2012(cea), 2010; Hof et al., 2010* ; Funke and Paetz, 2011* 
Scott et al., 1999 Manne and Richels, 1991; Baker and Shittu, 
2008(4); Baker and Adu-Bonnah, 20083
Notes:
1 In some studies the ‘baseline case’ is a decision analysis based on a reduced form of uncertainty.
2 The impact on R&D investments depend on technology; the most common result is, however, that uncertainty decreases the optimal level of R&D investments.
3 In the sense of: increasing damage uncertainty would lead to higher investments in less risky programmes, but the effect depends on the type of technology.
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Table 2.2 also characterizes the effect of the inclusion of uncertainty 
on early-period mitigation efforts. A decision analysis is generally com-
pared to a baseline-case represented by a deterministic study utilizing 
average values of uncertain parameters. (In some studies, the baseline 
case is a decision analysis based on a reduced form of uncertainty.)
It should be noted that, although IAMs mimic decision makers who 
utilize deliberative processes, in reality social planners might resort to 
intuitive thinking to simplify their decision processes, leading to biases 
and inferior choices. To date there is no research that considers such 
behaviour by decision makers and how it affects the projections of 
IAMs. We discuss the need for such studies in Section 2.7 on gaps in 
knowledge and data.
2�6�3�1 Analyses predominantly addressing climate or 
damage response uncertainty
Although studies differ in their approaches, the case against acceler-
ated or increased mitigation action is the possibility that irreversible 
sunk cost investments in abatement options outweigh the irreversible 
effects of climate change. This has been an infrequent finding, with the 
exception of those studies that have not included catastrophic / thresh-
old damage and give no consideration to the non-climate related 
benefits of these investments, such as enhancing energy security or 
local pollution benefits. Indeed, the one set of papers that finds a need 
for increased or accelerated mitigation action is ambiguous when 
the social welfare optimum is examined under downstream continu-
ous / mildly nonlinear damages uncertainty. Lorenz et al. (2012a) show 
that this is due primarily to the fact that damage nonlinearities are 
often compensated by other nonlinearities such as a concave (i. e., sub-
linear) concentration-temperature relation.
Studies that cluster in the first column (accelerated or increased 
mitigation action) assumed strongly non-linear damage functions or 
temperature targets (3rd row). Cost-effectiveness analysis has been 
applied to reflect targets when the models have been generalized to 
include uncertainty. In this regard, Held et al. (2009), utilizing chance 
constrained programming (CCP) (see Section 2.5.4.1), examine uncer-
tainty in climate and technology response properties. As their reference 
case they calculated the mitigation effort needed to achieve a 2 °C 
temperature target, assuming average values for all uncertain param-
eters. Given uncertainty, however, it is clear that any given mitigation 
effort will exceed the target with some probability; for the reference 
case this is approximately 50 %. As the required probability for meet-
ing the target increases, a greater level of mitigation effort is required. 
(An analogous argument holds for tipping-point derived targets. See 
McInerney and Keller, 2008). If the required probability is 66.6 % rather 
than 50 %, investments in mitigation technologies need to occur in 
earlier decades.
The effects on investment in mitigation also depend on whether uncer-
tainty is expected to be reduced. Is a reduction of uncertainty on cli-
mate sensitivity and related climate response properties realistic? In 
an early paper, Kelly and Kolstad (1999) evaluated the amount of time 
needed to significantly reduce uncertainty about the parameters influ-
encing climate sensitivity by observing global warming. They found the 
required time to be 90 to 160 years. Leach (2007) conducted a simi-
lar analysis that allowed two rather than one independent sources of 
downstream uncertainty. In that case, the time required to resolve the 
climate sensitivity parameters is likely to be even longer. These kind of 
studies assumed that our basic understanding of atmospheric chem-
istry and physics would remain unchanged over time. If one were to 
relax this constraint, then one could imagine that learning would prog-
ress more rapidly.
Another set of papers examines the ‘anticipation effect’, namely what 
it means if we believe we will learn in the future, rather than that our 
knowledge will remain constant. Lange and Treich (2008) showed that 
the sign and magnitude of mitigation depend on the particular numeri-
cal model and type of uncertainty when introducing the anticipation 
effect. Using CBA, for example, Lorenz et al. (2012b), Peck and Teisberg 
(1993), Webster et  al. (2008), and Yohe and Wallace (1996) showed 
the anticipation effect to be negligible when assuming continuous and 
only weakly non-linear damages. However, Lorenz (2012b) showed 
slightly less immediate mitigation (compared to no-learning) if one 
anticipates learning within a given, narrow, time window with respect 
to threshold-type impacts. Such a mild reduction of early mitigation 
in response to anticipation was also reported in Keller et al. (2004) in 
accordance with Ulph and Ulph (1997).
When CEA is used to represent temperature targets in combination 
with climate response uncertainty, it is difficult to evaluate learning 
effects (see the discussion in Section 2.5.4.3). One way to allow for 
numerical solutions in this case is to assume an upper limit on the dis-
tribution of climate sensitivity to examine the effect of learning in the 
presence of a climate target. Under this assumption, more mitigation is 
called for (Bahn et al., 2008; Syri et al., 2008; Fouquet and Johansson, 
2008; Webster, 2008).
A further set of papers considers the impossibility of specifying a pre-
cise probability density function for characterizing climate sensitivity 
as suggested by many climate scientists. This implies that these prob-
abilities are difficult to estimate and decisions have to be made under 
conditions of ambiguity. Funke and Paetz (2011) account for model 
structure uncertainty by employing a robust control approach based 
on a maximin principle. When considering uncertainty on the ecologi-
cal side of the balance, they conclude that model uncertainty implies 
a need for more aggressive near-term emissions reductions. Athanas-
soglou and Xepapadeas (2011) extend this approach to include adap-
tation. Iverson and Perrings (2012) apply combinations of maximin 
and / or minimax decision criteria, examining the effects of widening 
the range of climate sensitivity. Hof et al. (2010), contrast a CBA with 
a minimax regret approach and find that the minimax regret approach 
leads to more stringent and robust climate targets for relatively 
low discount rates if both high climate sensitivity and high damage 
181
Integrated Risk and Uncertainty Assessment of Climate Change Response Policies
2
Chapter 2
estimates are assumed. What remains unresearched is the possibil-
ity of using non-probabilistic methods to evaluate the effects of an 
unbounded, or ‘fat-tails’, distribution for climate responses and cli-
mate impacts.
Finally, a potentially path-breaking development in economics is the 
effort of Ackerman et al. (2013), Crost and Traeger (2013), and Kaufman 
(2012) to disentangle risk aversion (a static effect) from consumption 
smoothing (an intertemporal effect) (for a conceptual discussion see 
Ha-Duong and Treich, 2004) in an Integrated Assessment Model. Com-
pared to the results of a standard discounted expected utility model 
that relates risk aversion to consumption smoothing, Ackerman (2013) 
as well as Crost and Traeger (2013) find optimal mitigation to be twice 
as great. Since these are the first papers on this topic, it is too early to 
tell whether their results represent a robust result that captures soci-
ety’s risk preferences.
2�6�3�2 Analyses predominantly addressing policy 
response uncertainty
There are two strands of research in the area of policy response uncer-
tainty. The first has focused on examining how the extent and timing of 
mitigation investments are affected by the uncertainty on the effective-
ness of Research, Development, and Demonstration (RD&D) and / or the 
future cost of technologies for reducing the impact of climate change. 
An example of this would be optimal investment in energy technolo-
gies that a social planner should undertake, knowing that there might 
be a nuclear power ban in the near future. Another strand of research 
looks at how uncertainty concerning future climate policy instruments 
in combination with climate and / or damage uncertainty affects a miti-
gation strategy. An example would be the optimal technological mix in 
the power sector to hedge future climate regulatory uncertainty.
With respect to the first strand, the main challenge is to quantify 
uncertainty related to the future costs and / or availability of mitigation 
technologies. Indeed, there does not appear to be a single stochastic 
process that underlies all (RD&D) programmes’ effectiveness or inno-
vation processes. Thus elicitation of expert judgment on the probabi-
listic improvements in technology performance and cost becomes a 
crucial input for numerical analysis. A literature is emerging that uses 
expert elicitation to investigate the uncertain effects of RD&D invest-
ments on the prospect of success of mitigation technologies (see for 
example Baker et al., 2008; Curtright et al., 2008; Chan et al., 2010; 
Baker and Keisler, 2011). In future years, this new body of research 
will allow the emergence of a literature studying the probabilistic 
relationship between R&D and the future cost of energy technologies 
in IAMs.
The few existing papers reported in Table 2.2 under the Policy Response 
uncertainty column (see Blanford, 2009; Bosetti and Tavoni, 2009) 
point to increased investments in energy RD&D and in early deploy-
ment of carbon-free energy technologies in response to uncertainty. 
An interesting analysis has been performed in Goeschl and Perino 
(2009), where the potential for technological ‘boomerangs’ is consid-
ered. Indeed, while studies cited above consider an innovation failure 
an R&D project that does not deliver a clean technology at a competi-
tive cost, Goeschl and Perino (2009) define R&D failure when it brings 
about a new, environmentally harmful, technology. Under such char-
acterization they find that short-term R&D investments are negatively 
affected.
Turning to the second strand of literature reported in the Policy 
Response or in the Multiple Uncertainty columns of Table 2.2 (see Ha-
Duong et  al., 1997; Baker and Shittu, 2006; Durand-Lasserve et  al., 
2010), most analyses imply increased mitigation in the short term 
when there is uncertainty about future climate policy due to the asym-
metry of future states of nature. In the event of the realization of the 
‘no climate policy’ state, investment in carbon-free capital has low or 
zero value. Conversely, if a ‘stringent climate policy’ state of nature is 
realized, it will be necessary to rapidly ramp up mitigation to reduce 
the amount of carbon in the atmosphere. This cost is consistently 
higher, thus implying higher mitigation prior to the realization of the 
uncertain policy state.
2�6�4 International negotiations and 
 agreements
Social planner studies, as reviewed in the previous sub-sections, con-
sider the appropriate magnitude and pace of aggregate global emis-
sions reduction. These issues have been the subject of negotiations 
about long-term strategic issues at the international level along with 
the structuring of national commitments and the design of mecha-
nisms for compliance, monitoring, and enforcement.
2�6�4�1 Treaty formation
A vast literature looks at international treaties in general and how they 
might be affected by uncertainties. Cooper (1989) examined two cen-
turies of international agreements that aimed to control the spread of 
communicable diseases and concludes that it is only when uncertainty 
is largely resolved that countries will enter into agreements. Young 
(1994), on the other hand, suggests that it may be easier to enter into 
agreements when parties are uncertain over their individual net bene-
fits from an agreement than when that uncertainty has been resolved. 
Coalition theory predicts that for international negotiations related to 
a global externality such as climate change, stable coalitions will gen-
erally be small and / or ineffective (Barrett, 1994). Recently, De Canio 
and Fremstad (2013) show how the recognition of the seriousness of 
a climate catastrophe on the part of leading governments — which 
increases the incentives for reaching an agreement — could transform 
a prisoner’s dilemma game into a coordination game leading to an 
increased likelihood of reaching an international agreement to limit 
emissions.
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Relatively little research has been undertaken on how uncertainty 
affects the stability of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) 
and when uncertainty and learning has the potential to unravel agree-
ments. Kolstad (2007), using a game theoretic model, looks specifically 
at environmental agreements. He finds that systematic uncertainty 
decreases the size of the largest stable coalition of an MEA. Kolstad 
and Ulph (2011) show that partial or complete learning has a nega-
tive impact on the formation of an MEA because as outcomes become 
more certain, some countries also learn the MEA will reduce their own 
welfare benefits, which deters them from joining the coalition. Baker 
(2005), using a model of the impacts of uncertainty and learning in a 
non-cooperative game, shows that the level of correlation of damages 
across countries is a crucial determinant of outcome.
Barrett (2013) has investigated the role of catastrophic, low probabil-
ity events on the likelihood of cooperation with respect to a global 
climate agreement. By comparing a cooperative agreement with the 
Nash equilibrium it is possible to assess a country’s incentives for par-
ticipating in such an agreement. Looking at stratospheric ozone as an 
analogy for climate, Heal and Kunreuther (2013) observed that the 
signing of the Montreal Protocol by the United States led many other 
countries to follow suit. The authors in turn suggest how it could be 
applied to foster an international treaty on greenhouse gas emissions 
by tipping a non-cooperative game from an inefficient to an efficient 
equilibrium.
Several analyses, including Victor (2011) and Hafner-Burton et  al. 
(2012), contend that the likelihood of a successful comprehensive 
international agreement for climate change is low because of the sen-
sitivity of negotiations to uncertain factors, such as the precise align-
ment and actions of participants. Keohane and Victor (2011), in turn, 
suggest that the chances of a positive outcome would be higher in 
the case of numerous, more limited agreements. Developing countries 
have been unlikely to agree to binding targets in the context of inter-
national agreements due in part to the interests of developed coun-
tries dominating the negotiation process. For the situation to change, 
the developing countries would have to enhance their negotiating 
power in international climate change discussions by highlighting their 
concerns (Rayner and Malone, 2001).
The above analyses all assume that the agents are deliberative think-
ers, each of whom has the same information on the likelihood and con-
sequences of climate change. Section 2.7 indicates the need for future 
research that examines the impact of intuitive thinking on behaviour 
on international negotiations and processes for improving the chances 
of reaching an agreement on treaties.
2�6�4�2 Strength and form of national commitments
Buys et al. (2009) construct a model to predict national level support 
for a strong global treaty based on both the climatic and economic 
risks that parties to the treaty face domestically; however Buys et al. 
do not test the model empirically. Their model distinguishes between 
vulnerabilities to climate impacts and climate policy restrictions with 
respect to carbon emissions and implies that countries would be most 
supportive of strong national commitments when they are highly vul-
nerable to climate impacts and their emitting sectors are not greatly 
affected by stringent policy measures.
Victor (2011) analyzes the structure of the commitments themselves, 
or what Hafner-Burton et al. (2012) call rational design choices. Victor 
suggests that while policymakers have considerable control over the 
carbon intensity of their economies, they have much less control over 
the underlying economic growth of their country. As a result, there is 
greater uncertainty on the magnitude of emissions reductions, which 
depends on both factors, than on the reductions in carbon intensity. 
Victor suggests that this could account for the reluctance by many 
countries to make binding commitments with respect to emissions 
reductions. Consistent with this reasoning, Thompson (2010) examined 
negotiations within the UNFCCC and found that greater uncertainty 
with respect to national emissions was associated with a decrease in 
support for a national commitment to a global treaty.
Webster et  al. (2010) examined whether uncertainty with respect to 
national emissions increases the potential for individual countries to 
hedge by joining an international trade agreement. They found that 
hedging had a minor impact compared to the other effects of interna-
tional trade, namely burden sharing and wealth transfer. These find-
ings may have relevance for structuring a carbon market to reduce 
emissions by taking advantage of disparities in marginal abatement 
costs across different countries. In theory, the right to trade emission 
permits or credits could lessen the uncertainties associated with any 
given country’s compliance costs compared to the case where no trad-
ing were possible. Under a trading scheme, if a country discovered its 
own compliance costs to be exceptionally high, for example, it could 
purchase credits on the market.
2�6�4�3 Design of measurement, verification regimes, 
and treaty compliance
A particularly important issue in climate treaty formation and com-
pliance is uncertainty with respect to actual emissions from industry 
and land use. Measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) regimes 
have the potential to set incentives for participation in a treaty and 
still be stringent, robust, and credible with respect to compliance. 
The effects of strategies for managing GHG emissions are uncertain 
because the magnitude of the emissions of carbon dioxide and other 
GHG gases, such as methane, often cannot be detected given the 
error bounds associated with the measurement process. This is espe-
cially the case in the agriculture, forestry, and other land-use (AFOLU) 
 sectors.
In the near term, an MRV regime that met the highest standards 
could require stock and flow data for carbon and other GHGs. These 
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data are currently available only in wealthy countries, thus preclud-
ing developing countries from participating (Oliveira et al., 2007). By 
contrast, there are design options for MRV regimes that are less accu-
rate, but which still provide data on the drivers of emissions so that 
the developing countries could be part of the system. By being more 
inclusive, these options could be a more effective way to actually 
reduce aggregate emissions, at least in the near term (Bucki et al., 
2012). In the longer term, robust and harmonized estimation of GHG 
flows — emissions and their removal — in agriculture and forestry 
requires investment in monitoring and reporting capacity, especially 
in developing countries (Böttcher et al., 2009; Romijn et al., 2012). 
Reflecting this need for an evolving MRV regime to match data avail-
ability, the 2006 Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Invento-
ries, prepared by an IPCC working group, suggested three hierarchi-
cal tiers of data for emission and carbon stock change factors with 
increasing levels of data requirements and analytical complexity. Tier 
1 uses IPCC default values of high uncertainty; Tier 2 uses country-
specific data; and Tier 3 uses higher spatial resolution, models, and 
inventories. In 2008, only  Brazil,  India and Mexico had the capacity 
to use Tier 2 and no developing country was able to use tier 3 (Hard-
castle and Baird, 2008). Romijn et al. (2012) focused on 52 tropical 
countries and found that four of them had a very small capacity gap 
regarding the monitoring of their forests through inventories, while 
the remaining 48 had limited or no ability to undertake this monitor-
ing process.
In order to overcome the gaps and uncertainties associated with 
lower tier approaches, different principles can be applied to form 
pools (Böttcher et al., 2008). For example, a higher level of aggrega-
tion by including soil, litter and harvested products in addition to a 
biomass pool as part of the MRV regime decreases relative uncer-
tainty: the losses in one pool (e. g., biomass) are likely to be offset by 
gains in other pools (e. g., harvested products) (Böttcher et al., 2008). 
Researchers have suggested that the exclusion of a pool (e. g., soil) 
in an MRV regime should be allowed only if there is adequate docu-
mentation that the exclusion provides a more conservative estimate of 
emissions (Grassi et al., 2008). They also suggest that an international 
framework needs to create incentives for investments. In this respect, 
overcoming initialization costs and unequal access to monitoring 
technologies would be crucial for implementation of an integrated 
monitoring system, and fostering international cooperation (Böttcher 
et al., 2009).
2�6�5 Choice and design of policy 
instruments
Whether motivated primarily by a binding multilateral climate treaty 
or by some other set of factors, there is a growing set of policy instru-
ments that countries have implemented or are considering to deal with 
climate change. Typically, these instruments will influence the deci-
sions of firms and private individuals, so that policymakers try to antici-
pate how these agents will react to them.
Some policy instruments operate by mandating particular kinds of 
behaviour, such as the installation of pollution control technology or 
limits on emissions from particular sources. There is an extensive litera-
ture in political science demonstrating that the effects of these instru-
ments are fairly predictable (Shapiro and McGarity, 1991) and are 
insensitive to market or regulatory uncertainties, simply because they 
prescribe particular technologies or practices which must be strictly 
adhered to. There is a literature in economics, however, suggesting that 
their very inflexibility makes them inefficient (Malueg, 1990; Jaffe and 
Stavins, 1995).
In the presence of substantial technological uncertainty, no matter 
what policy instrument is employed, interventions that shift invest-
ment behaviour from currently low cost to currently high cost tech-
nologies run the risk of increasing short-term costs and energy security 
concerns for consumers (Del Rio and Gual, 2007; Frondel et al., 2008, 
2010). In some cases, long-term costs may be higher or lower, depend-
ing on how different technologies evolve over time (Williges et  al., 
2010; Reichenbach and Requate, 2012). This section is structured by 
considering two broad classes of interventions for targeting the energy 
supply: interventions that focus on emissions, by placing a market price 
or tax on CO2 or other greenhouse gases; and interventions that pro-
mote Research, Development, Deployment, and Diffusion (RDD&D) of 
particular technologies. In both types of interventions, policy choices 
can be sensitive to uncertainties in technology costs, markets, and the 
state of regulation in other jurisdictions and over time. In the case 
of technology-oriented policy, choices are also sensitive to the risks 
that particular technologies present. We then describe instruments for 
reducing energy demand by focusing on lifestyle choice and energy 
efficient products and technologies. Finally, we briefly contrast the 
effects of uncertainties in the realm of climate change adaptation with 
climate change mitigation, recognizing that more detail on adaptation 
can be found in the WGII AR5.
2�6�5�1 Instruments creating market penalties for GHG 
emissions
Market-based instruments increase the cost of energy derived from 
fossil fuels, potentially leading firms involved in the production and 
conversion of energy to invest in low carbon technologies. Consider-
able research prior to AR4 identified the differences between two such 
instruments — carbon taxes and cap-and-trade regimes — with respect 
to uncertainty. Since AR4, research has examined the effects of regula-
tory risk and market uncertainty on one instrument or the other by 
addressing the following question: how is the mitigation investment 
decision affected by uncertainty with respect to whether and to what 
extent a market instrument and well-enforced regulations will be in 
place in the future?
Much of this research has focused on uncertainty with respect to car-
bon prices under a cap-and-trade system. A number of factors influence 
the relationship between the size of the cap and the market price that 
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includes fossil fuel prices, consumer demand for energy, and economic 
growth more generally. Each of these factors can lead to volatility in car-
bon market prices (Alberola et al., 2008; Carraro et al., 2009; Chevallier, 
2009). Vasa and Michaelowa (2011) assessed the impact of policy uncer-
tainty on carbon markets and found that the possibility of easily creating 
and destroying carbon markets leads to extreme short-term rent-seeking 
behaviour and high volatility in market prices. Experience so far with the 
most developed carbon market — the European Emissions Trading Sys-
tem (ETS) — reveals high volatility marked by not-infrequent decreases 
of the price of carbon to very low values (Feng et al., 2011).
Numerous modelling studies have shown that regulatory uncertainty 
reduces the effectiveness of market-based instruments. More specifi-
cally, a current or expected carbon price induces a decrease in invest-
ment into lower carbon infrastructure and hence less technological 
learning, when there is uncertainty as to future market conditions, com-
pared to the case where future conditions are known (Yang et al., 2008; 
Fuss et al., 2009; Oda and Akimoto, 2011). In order to compensate and 
maintain a prescribed level of change in the presence of uncertainty, car-
bon prices would need to be higher. Estimates of the additional macro-
economic costs range from 16 – 37 % (Blyth et  al., 2007) to as much 
as 50 % (Reinelt and Keith, 2007), depending on the particular type of 
investment under consideration. The precise instrument design details 
can affect investment behaviour. Patiño-Echeverri et al. (2007, 2009), for 
example, found that less frequent but larger regulatory policy changes 
had less of a negative interactive effect with uncertainty, while Zhao 
(2003) found a greater impact of uncertainty on the performance of a 
carbon tax than on a cap-and-trade system. Fan et al. (2010) added to 
this analysis by examining the sensitivity of these results to increasing 
risk aversion, under two alternative carbon market designs: one in which 
carbon allowances were auctioned by the government to firms, and a 
second in which existing firms received free allowances due to a grand-
fathering rule.
Under an auctioned system for carbon allowances, increasing risk 
aversion leads to greater investments in low carbon technologies. In 
contrast, under a grandfathered market design, increasing risk aver-
sion combined with uncertainty pushes investment behaviour closer to 
what it would be in the absence of the carbon market: more invest-
ment in coal. The intuition behind this finding is that the grandfathered 
scheme would create a situation of windfall profits (since the freely 
allocated permits have a value to the firms receiving them), and risk-
averse investors would be more influenced by the other, less desirable 
state of the world, the absence of carbon markets. Fan et al., (2012) 
replicated these results using a broader range of technological choices 
than in their earlier paper. Whereas these latter two papers used a 
game-theoretic model, Fuss et al., (2012) employed a real options the-
ory model to arrive at qualitatively the same conclusions.
One option for reducing carbon price volatility is to set a cap or floor 
for that price to stabilize investment expectations (Jacoby and Eller-
man, 2004; Philibert, 2009). Wood and Jotzo (2011) found that setting 
a price floor increased the effectiveness of the carbon price in stimulat-
ing investments in low carbon technologies, given a particular expec-
tation of macroeconomic drivers (e. g., economic growth and fossil fuel 
prices that influence the degree to which a carbon cap is a constraint 
on emissions). Szolgayova et al., (2008), using a real options model to 
examined the value of waiting for information, found the cap stabi-
lized expectations. In the process, the cap lessened the effectiveness 
of an expected carbon price at altering investment behaviour, as many 
investments in low carbon technologies are undertaken only because 
of the possibility of very high carbon prices in the future. In another 
study assuming rational actor behaviour, Burtraw et al. (2010) found 
that a symmetric safety valve that sets both a floor and a ceiling price 
outperforms a single-sided safety valve in terms of both emissions 
reduction and economic efficiency. Murray et al. (2009) suggested that 
a reserve allowance for permits outperforms a simple safety valve in 
this regard.
Empirical research on the influence of uncertainty on carbon market per-
formance has been constrained by the small number of functioning mar-
kets, thus making it difficult to infer the effects of differences in market 
design. The few studies to date suggest that the details of market design 
can influence the perception of uncertainty, and in turn the performance 
of the market. More specifically, investment behaviour into the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) has been influenced by uncertainties 
in terms of what types of projects are eligible (Castro and Michaelowa, 
2011), as well as the actual number of Certified Emissions Reductions 
(CERs) that can be acquired from a given project (Richardson, 2008). 
Looking at the European Union’s Emission Trading System (ETS), 
researchers have observed that expected carbon prices do affect invest-
ment behaviour, but primarily for investments with very short amortiza-
tion periods. High uncertainty with respect to the longer-term market 
price of carbon has limited the ETS from having an impact on longer-term 
investments such as R&D or new power plant construction (Hoffmann, 
2007). Blyth and Bunn (2011) found that uncertainty for post-2012 
targets was a major driver of ETS prices, with an effect of suppress-
ing those prices. The literature suggests that prices have not been high 
enough to drive renewable energy investment in the absence of feed-in 
tariffs (Blanco and Rodrigues, 2008). Barbose et al. (2008) examined a 
region — the western United States — where no ETS was functioning but 
many believed that it would, and found that most utilities did consider 
the possibility of carbon prices in the range of USD 4 to USD 22 a ton. At 
the same time, the researchers could not determine whether this projec-
tion of carbon prices would have an actual effect on utilities’ decisions, 
were an actual ETS in place, because they were unable to document the 
analysis underlying the utilities’ investment decisions.
2�6�5�2 Instruments promoting technological RDD&D
Several researchers suggest that future pathways for RDD&D will be 
the determining factor for emissions reductions (Prins and Rayner, 
2007; Lilliestam et al., 2012). Policy instruments can provide an incen-
tive for firms not only to alter their investment portfolio towards low 
185
Integrated Risk and Uncertainty Assessment of Climate Change Response Policies
2
Chapter 2
carbon technologies, but also to devote resources towards innovation 
(Baker et al., 2008). Because instruments differ in terms of how they 
influence behaviour, such as whether or not they create an immediate 
incentive or one that accrues over the lifetime of the investment, their 
relative effectiveness can be sensitive to relevant market uncertainties.
The literature reviewed in the previous section reveals that in the pres-
ence of substantial regulatory uncertainty, market-based instruments do 
a poor job of promoting RDD&D. This has given rise to policy proposals 
to supplement a pure-market system with another instrument — such 
as a cap, floor, or escape valve — to reduce price volatility and stabilize 
expectations. By contrast, combining a market-based instrument with 
specific technology support can lead to greater volatility in the carbon 
price, even when there is very little uncertainty about which technolo-
gies will be assisted in the coming years (Blyth et al., 2009).
Several empirical studies with a focus on risk and uncertainty have 
compared the effectiveness of market instruments with other instru-
ments such as feed-in tariffs or renewable quota systems, in stimu-
lating low carbon investments and R&D. Butler and Neuhoff (2008) 
compared the feed-in tariff in Germany with the quota system in the 
United Kingdom, and found the German system outperformed the UK 
system on two dimensions: stimulating overall investment quantity, 
and reducing costs to consumers. The primary driver was the effective-
ness of the feed-in tariff in reducing risks associated with future reve-
nues from the project investment, therefore making it possible to lower 
the cost of project financing. Other researchers replicate this finding 
using other case studies (Mitchell et al., 2006; Fouquet and Johansson, 
2008). Lüthi and Wüstenhagen (2012) surveyed investors with access 
to a number of markets, and found that they steered their new projects 
to those markets with feed-in tariff systems, as it was more likely than 
other policy instruments to reduce their risks. Lüthi (2010) compared 
policy effectiveness across a number of jurisdictions with feed-in tar-
iffs, and found that above a certain level of return, risk-related factors 
did more to influence investment than return-related factors.
Looking at the early stages in the technology development process, 
Bürer and Wüstenhagen (2009) surveyed ‘green’ tech venture capital-
ists in the United States and Europe using a stated preference approach 
to identify which policy instrument or instruments would reduce the 
perceived risks of investment in a particular technology. They identi-
fied a strong preference in both continents, but particularly Europe, 
for feed-in tariffs over cap-and-trade and renewable quota systems, 
because of the lower risks to return on investment associated with the 
former policy instrument. Moreover, venture capital investors typically 
look for short- to medium-term returns on their investment, for which 
the presence of feed-in tariffs has the greatest positive effect.
Held et al. (2006) identified patterns of success across a wide variety of 
policy instruments to stimulate investment in renewable energy tech-
nologies in Europe. They found that long-term regulatory consistency 
was vital for new technology development. Other studies have shown 
that regulatory inconsistency with respect to subsidy programs — such 
as feed-in tariffs in Spain or tax credits in the United States — can lead to 
temporarily overheated markets, pushing up investment costs and con-
sumer prices, and reducing the pressure for technological development 
(Del Rio and Gual, 2007; Sáenz de Miera et al., 2008; Barradale, 2010).
In contrast to the large literature looking at the overall effects of 
uncertainty, there have only been a few empirical papers documenting 
the particular risks that concern investors the most. Leary and Este-
ban (2009) found regulatory uncertainty — particularly with respect to 
issues of siting — to concern investors in wave- and tide-based energy 
projects. Komendantova et  al. (2012) examined perceptions among 
European investors in solar projects in North Africa, and found con-
cerns about regulatory change and corruption were much greater than 
concerns about terrorism and technology risks. The same researchers 
modelled the sensitivity of required state subsidies for project develop-
ment in response to these risks, and found the subsidies required to 
stimulate a given level of solar investment rose by a factor of three, 
suggesting large benefits from stemming corruption and stabilizing 
regulations (Komendantova et al., 2011). Meijer et al. (2007) examined 
the perceived risks for biogas project developers in the Netherlands, 
and found technological, resource, and political uncertainty to be their 
most important concerns. These studies are useful by documenting 
policymakers’ concerns so they can address these issues in the future. 
Table 2.3 synthesizes the modelling and empirical results on renewable 
quota systems and feed-in tariffs, as well as with results for cap-and-
trade systems from the previous sub-section. The table highlights the 
Table 2�3 | Uncertainties affecting the effectiveness of alternative policy instruments.
Instrument Uncertainty Investor fears
Effect on low carbon 
technology
Allowance trading market
Technological systems Other low carbon technologies will prove more cost-effective Dampened investment
Market behaviour Growth in energy demand will decline Dampened investment
Market behaviour Fossil fuel prices will fall Dampened investment
Regulatory actions Governments will increase the number of allowances Dampened investment
Renewable quotas
Technological systems Other low carbon technologies will prove more cost-effective Dampened investment
Market behaviour Supply for renewable energy will rise faster than the quota Dampened investment
Subsidies and feed-in tariffs Regulatory actions Subsidy for this particulartechnology will decline Overheated market
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effects of three of the classes of uncertainties identified earlier in this 
chapter, namely with respect to technological systems, market behav-
iour, and the future regulatory actions of governments.
2�6�5�3 Energy efficiency and behavioural change
As pointed out in Section 2.6.5.2 and earlier sections, one way to 
mitigate climate risk is to encourage RD&D with respect to provid-
ing energy from renewable sources, such as wind and solar, as well 
as to promote low energy use products. For firms to undertake these 
investments, there needs to be some guarantee that a market for their 
products will exist. Currently consumers are reluctant to adopt energy 
efficient measures, such as compact fluorescent bulbs, energy efficient 
refrigerators, boilers and cooling systems, as well as new technologies 
such as solar installations and wind power. This can be attributed to 
the uncertainties associated with future energy prices and consump-
tion of energy coupled with misperceptions of the products’ benefits 
and an unwillingness to incur the upfront costs of these measures as 
discussed in Section 2.4.3.2.
Gardner and Stern (2008) identified a list of energy efficient measures 
that could reduce North American consumers’ energy consumption by 
almost 30 % but found that individuals were not willing to invest in 
them because they have misconceptions about the measures’ effec-
tiveness. Other studies show that the general public has a poor under-
standing of energy consumption associated with familiar activities 
(Sterman and Sweeney, 2007). A national online survey of 505 partici-
pants by Attari et al. (2010) revealed that most respondents felt that 
measures such as turning off the lights or driving less were much more 
effective as energy efficient improvements than experts’ viewed them 
to be. 
There are both behavioural and economic factors described in Sec-
tion 2.4.3.2 that can explain the reluctance of households to incur 
the upfront costs of these energy efficient measures. Due to a focus 
on short-term horizons, individuals may underestimate the savings in 
energy costs from investing in energy efficient measures. In addition 
they are likely to discount the future hyperbolically so that the upfront 
cost is perceived to be greater than expected discounted reduction 
in energy costs (Dietz et al., 2013; Kunreuther et al., 2013b). Coupled 
with these descriptive models or choices that are triggered by intui-
tive thinking, households may have severe budget constraints that 
discourage them from investing in these energy efficient measures. 
If they intend to move in several years and feel that the investment 
in the energy efficient measure will not be adequately reflected in an 
increase in their property value, then it is inappropriate for them not to 
invest in these measures if they undertake deliberative thinking.
To encourage households to invest in energy efficient measures, mes-
sages that communicate information on energy use and savings from 
undertaking these investments need to be conveyed (Abrahamse et al., 
2005). Recent research has indicated the importance of highlighting 
indirect and direct benefits (e. g., being ‘green’, energy independence, 
saving money) in people’s adoption of energy efficiency measures 
to address the broad range and heterogeneity in people’s goals and 
values that contribute to the subjective utility of different courses of 
action (Jakob, 2006). One also needs to recognize the importance of 
political identity considerations when choosing the nature of these 
messages, as different constituencies have different associations to 
options that mitigate climate change and labels that convey potential 
benefits from adopting energy efficient measures (Hardisty et al., 2010; 
Gromet et al., 2013).
The advent of the ‘smart’ grid in Western countries, with its ‘smart’ 
metering of household energy consumption and the development of 
‘smart’ appliances will make it feasible to provide appliance-specific 
feedback about energy use and energy savings to a significant number 
of consumers within a few years. A field study involving more than 
1,500 households in Linz, Austria revealed that feedback on electric-
ity consumption corresponded with electricity savings of 4.5 % for the 
average household in this pilot group (Schleich et al., 2013).
To deal with budget constraints, the upfront costs of these measures 
need to be spread over time so the measures are viewed as economi-
cally viable and attractive. The Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) 
programme in the United States is designed to address the budget con-
straint problem. Participants in this programme receive financing for 
improvements that is repaid through an assessment on their property 
taxes for up to 20 years. Financing spreads the cost of energy improve-
ments over the expected life of measures such as weather sealing, 
energy efficient boilers and cooling systems, and solar installations 
and allows for the repayment obligation to transfer automatically to 
the next property owner if the property is sold. The program addresses 
two important barriers to increased adoption of energy efficiency and 
small-scale renewable energy: high upfront costs and fear that project 
costs will not be recovered prior to a future sale of the property (Kun-
reuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2011).
Social norms that encourage greater use of energy efficient technology 
at the household level can also encourage manufacturers to invest in 
the R&D for developing new energy efficient technologies and public 
sector actions such as well-enforced standards of energy efficiency as 
part of building sale requirements, (Dietz et al., 2013).
2�6�5�4 Adaptation and vulnerability reduction
Compared to mitigation measures, investments in adaptation appear 
to be more sensitive to uncertainties in the local impacts associated 
with the damage costs of climate change. This is not surprising for 
two reasons. First, while both mitigation and adaptation may result in 
lower local damage costs associated with climate impacts, the benefits 
of adaptation flow directly and locally from the actions taken (Prato, 
2008). Mitigation measures in one region or country, by contrast, 
deliver benefits that are global; however, they are contingent on the 
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actions of people in other places and in the future, rendering their local 
benefits more uncertain. One cannot simply equate marginal local 
damage costs with marginal mitigation costs, and hence the impor-
tance of uncertainty with respect to the local damage costs is dimin-
ished (Webster et al., 2003).
Second, politically negotiated mitigation targets, such as the 2 °C 
threshold appear to have been determined by what is feasible and 
affordable in terms of the pace of technological diffusion, rather than 
by an optimization of mitigation costs and benefits (Hasselmann 
et al., 2003; Baker et al., 2008; Hasselmann and Barker, 2008). Hence, 
mitigation actions taken to achieve a temperature target would not 
be changed if the damage costs (local or global) were found to be 
somewhat higher or lower. This implies that mitigation measures will 
be insensitive to uncertainty of these costs associated with climate 
change. Adaptation decisions, in contrast, face fewer political and 
technical constraints, and hence can more closely track what is needed 
in order to minimize local expected costs and hence will be more sensi-
tive to the uncertainties surrounding future damage costs from climate 
change (Patt et al., 2007, 2009).
There are two situations where decisions on adaptation policies and 
actions may be largely insensitive to uncertainties about the poten-
tial impacts of climate change on future damage. The first is where 
adaptation is constrained by the availability of finance, such as inter-
national development assistance. Studies by the World Bank, OECD, 
and other international organizations have estimated the financing 
needs for adaptation in developing countries to be far larger than 
funds currently available (Agrawala and Fankhauser, 2008; World 
Bank, 2010; Patt et  al., 2010). In this case, adaptation actions are 
determined by decisions with respect to the allocation of available 
funds in competing regions rather than the local impacts of climate 
change on future damage (Klein et  al., 2007; Hulme et  al., 2011). 
Funding decisions and political constraints at the national level can 
also constrain adaptation so that choices no longer are sensitive to 
uncertainties with respect to local impacts (Dessai and Hulme, 2004, 
2007).
The other situation is where adaptation is severely constrained by cul-
tural norms and / or a lack of local knowledge and analytic skill as to 
what actions can be taken (Brooks et al., 2005; Füssel and Klein, 2006; 
O’Brien, 2009; Jones and Boyd, 2011). In this case, adaptive capacity 
could be improved through investments in education, development of 
local financial institutions and property rights systems, women’s rights, 
and other broad-based forms of poverty alleviation. There is a grow-
ing literature to suggest that such policies bring substantial benefits in 
the face of climate change that are relatively insensitive to the precise 
nature and extent of local climate impacts (Folke et al., 2002; World 
Bank, 2010; Polasky et al., 2011). These policies are designed to reduce 
these countries’ vulnerability to a wide range of potential risks rather 
than focusing on the impacts of climate change (Thornton et al., 2008; 
Eakin and Patt, 2011).
2�6�6 Public support and opposition to climate 
policy
In this section, we review what is known about public support or 
opposition to climate policy, climate-related infrastructure, and cli-
mate science. In all three cases, a critical issue is the role that percep-
tions of risks and uncertainties play in shaping support or opposition. 
Hence, the material presented here complements the discussion of 
perceptions of climate change risks and uncertainties (see Section 
2.4.6). Policy discussions on particular technologies often revolve 
around the health and safety risks associated with technology 
options, transition pathways, and systems such as nuclear energy 
(Pidgeon et al., 2008; Whitfield et al., 2009), coal combustion (Car-
michael et al., 2009; Hill et al., 2009), and underground carbon stor-
age (Itaoka et al., 2009; Shackley et al., 2009). There are also risks to 
national energy security that have given rise to political discussions 
advocating the substitution of domestically produced renewable 
energy for imported fossil fuels (Eaves and Eaves, 2007; Lilliestam 
and Ellenbeck, 2011).
2�6�6�1 Popular support for climate policy
There is substantial empirical evidence that people’s support or oppo-
sition to proposed climate policy measures is determined primarily by 
emotional factors and their past experience rather than explicit cal-
culations as to whether the personal benefits outweigh the personal 
costs. A national survey in the United States found that people’s sup-
port for climate policy also depended on cultural factors, with region-
ally differentiated worldviews playing an important role (Leiserowitz, 
2006), as did a cross-national comparison of Britain and the United 
States (Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 2006), and studies comparing develop-
ing with developed countries (Vignola et al., 2012).
One of the major determinants of popular support for climate policy 
is whether people have an underlying belief that climate change is 
dangerous. This concern can be influenced by both cultural factors and 
the methods of communication (Smith, 2005; Pidgeon and Fischhoff, 
2011). Leiserowitz (2005) found a great deal of heterogeneity linked 
to cultural effects with respect to the perception of climate change 
in the United States. The use of language used to describe climate 
change — such as the distinction between ‘climate change’ and ‘global 
warming’ — play a role in influencing perceptions of risk, as well as 
considerations of immediate and local impacts (Lorenzoni et al., 2006). 
The portrayal of uncertainties and disagreements with respect to cli-
mate impacts was found to have a weak effect on whether people per-
ceived the impacts as serious, but a strong effect on whether they felt 
that the impacts deserved policy intervention (Patt, 2007). Studies in 
China (Wang et al., 2012) and Austria (Damm et al., 2013) found that 
people’s acceptance of climate-related policies was related to their 
underlying perceptions of risk but also to their beliefs about govern-
ment responsibility.
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An important question related to climate change communication is 
whether the popular reporting of climate change through disaster sce-
narios has the effect of energizing people to support aggressive policy 
intervention, or to become dismissive of the problem. A study examin-
ing responses to fictionalized disaster scenarios found them to have 
differential effects on perceptions and support for policy. They reduced 
people’s expectation of the local impacts, while increasing their sup-
port for global intervention (Lowe et  al., 2006). Other studies found 
interactive effects: those with a low awareness of climate change 
became concerned about being exposed to disaster scenarios, while 
those with a high awareness of climate change were dismissive of the 
possible impacts (Schiermeier, 2004).
Finally, the extent to which people believe it is possible to actually 
influence the future appears to be a major determinant of their support 
for both individual and collective actions to respond to climate change. 
In the case of local climate adaptation, psychological variables associ-
ated with self-empowerment were found to have played a much larger 
role in influencing individual behaviour than variables associated with 
economic and financial ability (Grothmann and Patt, 2005; Grothmann 
and Reusswig, 2006). With respect to mitigation policy, perceptions 
concerning the barriers to effective mitigation and beliefs that it was 
possible to respond to climate change were found to be important 
determinants of popular support (Lorenzoni et al., 2007).
2�6�6�2 Local support and opposition to infrastructure 
projects
The issue of local support or opposition to infrastructure projects in 
implementing climate policy is related to the role that perceived tech-
nological risks play in the process. This has been especially important 
with respect to nuclear energy, but is of increasing concern for carbon 
storage and renewable energy projects, and has become a major issue 
when considering expansion of low carbon energy technologies (Ellis 
et al., 2007; Van Alphen et al., 2007; Zoellner et al., 2008).
In the case of renewable energy technologies, a number of factors 
appear to influence the level of public support or opposition, factors 
that align well with a behavioural model in which emotional responses 
are highly contextual. One such factor is the relationship between proj-
ect developers and local residents. Musall and Kuik (2011) compared 
two wind projects, where residents feared negative visual impacts. They 
found that their fear diminished, and public support for the projects 
increased when there was co-ownership of the development by the local 
community. A second factor is the degree of transparency surrounding 
project development. Dowd et  al. (2011) investigated perceived risks 
associated with geothermal projects in Australia. Using a survey instru-
ment, they found that early, transparent communication of geothermal 
technology and risks tended to increase levels of public support.
A third such factor is the perception of economic costs and benefits 
that go hand-in-hand with the perceived environmental risks. Zoellner 
et al. (2008) examined public acceptance of three renewable technolo-
gies (grid-connected PV, biomass, and wind) and found that perceived 
economic risks associated with higher energy prices were the largest 
predictor of acceptance. Concerns over local environmental impacts, 
including visual impacts, were of concern where the perceived eco-
nomic risks were high. Breukers and Wolsink (2007) also found that 
that the visual impact of wind turbines was the dominant factor in 
explaining opposition against wind farms. Their study suggests that 
public animosity towards a wind farm is partly reinforced by the plan-
ning procedure itself, such as when stakeholders perceive that norms 
of procedural justice are not being followed.
Many studies have assessed the risks and examined local support for 
carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS). According to Ha-Duong 
et al. (1997), the health and safety risks associated with carbon dioxide 
capture and transportation technologies differ across causal pathways 
but are similar in magnitude to technologies currently supported by 
the fossil-fuel industry. Using natural analogues, Roberts et al. (2011) 
concluded that the health risks of natural CO2 seepage in Italy was 
significantly lower than many socially accepted risks. For example, it 
were three orders of magnitude lower than the probability of being 
struck by lightning. 
Despite these risk assessments, there is mixed evidence of public 
acceptance of CO2 storage. For example, a storage research project was 
authorized in Lacq, France, but another was halted in Barendreich, The 
Netherlands due to public opposition. On the other hand, Van Alphen 
et al. (2007) evaluated the concerns with CCS among important stake-
holders, including government, industry, and NGO representatives and 
found support if the facility could be shown to have a low probability 
of leakage and was viewed as a temporary measure.
Wallquist et  al. (2012) used conjoint analysis to interpret a Swiss 
survey on the acceptability of CCS and found that concerns over 
local risks and impacts dominated the fears of the long-term climate 
impacts of leakage. The local concerns were less severe, and the public 
acceptance higher, for CCS projects combined with biomass combus-
tion, suggesting that positive feelings about removing CO2 from the 
atmosphere, rather than simply preventing its emission into the atmo-
sphere, influences perceptions of local risks. Terwel et al. (2011) found 
that support for CCS varied as a function of the stakeholders promot-
ing and opposing it, in a manner similar to the debate on renewable 
energy. Hence, there was greater support of CCS when its promoters 
were perceived to be acting in the public interest rather than purely for 
profit. Those opposing CCS were less likely to succeed when they were 
perceived to be acting to protect their own economic interests, such as 
property values, rather than focusing on environmental quality and the 
public good.
In the period between the publication of AR4 and the accident at 
the Fukushima power plant in Japan in March 2011, the riskiness of 
nuclear power as a climate mitigation option has received increasing 
attention. Socolow and Glaser (2009) highlight the urgency of taking 
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steps to reduce these risks, primarily by ensuring that nuclear fuels 
and waste materials are not used for weapons production. A number 
of papers examine the public’s perceived risks of nuclear power. In the 
United States, Whitfield et al. (2009) found risk perceptions to be fairly 
stable over time, with those people expressing confidence in ‘tradi-
tional values’ perceiving nuclear power to be less risky than others. 
In the United Kingdom, Pidgeon et al. (2008) found a willingness to 
accept the risks of nuclear power when it was framed as a means of 
reducing the risks of climate change, but that this willingness largely 
dissipated when nuclear power was suggested as an alternative to 
renewable energy for accomplishing this same objective.
2.7 Gaps in  knowledge 
and data
The interface between science and policy is affected by epistemic 
uncertainty or uncertainty due to lack of information or knowledge for 
characterizing phenomena. Below we characterize suggested areas for 
future research that may enable us to reduce epistemic uncertainty.
Perceptions and responses to risk and uncertainty:
•	 Examine cross-cultural differences in human perception and reac-
tion to climate change and response options.
•	 Understand the rebound effect induced by adopting mitiga-
tion measures for reducing the impact of climate change (e. g., 
increased driving when switching to a more fuel efficient car).
•	 Consider the design of long-term mitigation and adaptation strat-
egies coupled with short-term economic incentives to overcome 
myopic behaviour (e. g., loans for investing in energy efficient tech-
nologies so yearly payments are lower than the reduction in the 
annual energy bill).
•	 Encourage deliberative thinking in the design of policies to over-
come biases such as a preference for the current state of affairs or 
business-as-usual.
•	 Understand judgment and choice processes of key decision makers 
in firms and policymakers, especially in a climate change response 
context.
•	 Use descriptive models and empirical studies to design strategies 
for climate change negotiations and implementation of treaties.
Tools and decision aids for improving choices related to climate 
change:
•	 Characterize the likelihood of extreme events and examine their 
impact on the design of climate change policies.
•	 Study how robust decision making can be used in designing cli-
mate policy options when there is uncertainty with respect to the 
likelihood of climate change and its impacts.
•	 Examine how integrated assessment models can quantify the 
value of new climate observing systems.
•	 Empirically study how decision makers could employ intuitive 
and deliberative thinking to improve decisions and climate policy 
choices.
•	 Study the effectiveness of experiential methods like simulations, 
games, and movies in improving public understanding and percep-
tion of climate change processes.
•	 Consider the role of structured expert judgment in characterizing 
the nature of uncertainties associated with climate change and the 
design of mitigation and adaptation policies for addressing this risk.
Managing uncertainty risk and learning:
•	 Exploit the effectiveness of social norms in promoting mitigation 
and adaptation. 
•	 Quantify the environmental and societal risks associated with new 
technologies.
•	 Consider the special challenges faced by developing countries in 
dealing with risk and uncertainty with respect to climate change 
policies.
•	 Measure investor rankings of different risks associated with new 
technologies.
•	 Examine impact of government policy on mitigation decisions by 
firms and households.
•	 Determine what risks and uncertainties matter the most in devel-
oping policy instruments for dealing with climate change. 
•	 Examine the risks to energy systems, energy markets, and the secu-
rity of energy supply stemming from mitigation policies.
•	 Integrate analysis of the effects of interrelated policy decisions, 
such as how much to mitigate, what policy instruments to use for 
promoting climate change mitigation, and adaptation investment 
under conditions of risk and uncertainty.
2.8 Frequently Asked 
Questions
FAQ 2�1 When is uncertainty a reason to wait 
and learn rather than acting now in 
 relation to climate policy and risk 
management strategies? [Section 2�6�3]
Faced with uncertainty, policymakers may have a reason to wait and 
learn before taking a particular action rather than taking the action 
now. Waiting and learning is desirable when external events are likely 
to generate new information of sufficient importance as to suggest 
that the planned action would be unwise. Uncertainty may not be a 
reason to delay when the action itself generates new information and 
knowledge. 
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Uncertainty may also be a reason to avoid actions that are irreversible 
and / or have lock-in effects, such as making long-term investments in 
fossil-fuel based energy systems when climate outcomes are uncertain. 
This behaviour would reflect the precautionary principle for not under-
taking some measures or activities.
While the above criteria are fairly easy to understand, their applica-
tion can be complicated because a number of uncertainties relevant 
to a given decision may reinforce each other or may partially cancel 
each other out (e. g., optimistic estimates of technological change may 
offset pessimistic estimates of climate damages). Different interested 
parties may reach different conclusions as to whether external infor-
mation is likely or not to be of sufficient importance as to render the 
original action / inaction regrettable.
A large number of studies examine the act-now-or-wait-and-see ques-
tion in the context of climate change mitigation. So far, most of these 
analyses have used integrated assessment models (IAMs). At the 
national level, these studies examine policy strategies and instruments 
to achieve mitigation targets; at the firm or individual level the studies 
examine whether one should invest in a particular technology.
A truly integrated analysis of the effects of multiple types of uncer-
tainty on interrelated policy decisions, such as how much to mitigate, 
with what policy instruments, promoting what investments, has yet to 
be conducted. The probabilistic information needed to support such an 
analysis is currently not available.
FAQ 2�2 How can behavioural responses and 
tools for improving decision making 
impact on  climate change policy? 
[ Section 2�4]
The choice of climate change policies can benefit from examining the 
perceptions and responses of relevant stakeholders. Empirical evidence 
indicates decision makers such as firms and households tend to place 
undue weight on short-run outcomes. Thus, high upfront costs make 
them reluctant to invest in mitigation or adaptation measures. Consis-
tent with the theory of loss aversion, investment costs and their associ-
ated risks have been shown to be of greater importance in decisions 
to fund projects that mitigate climate change than focusing on the 
expected returns associated with the investment. 
Policy instruments (e. g., long-term loans) that acknowledge these 
behavioural biases and spread upfront costs over time so that they 
yield net benefits in the short-run have been shown to perform quite 
well. In this context, policies that make investments relatively risk free, 
such as feed-in tariffs, are more likely to stimulate new technology 
than those that focus on increasing the expected price such as cap-
and-trade systems.
Human responses to climate change risks and uncertainties can also 
indicate a failure to put adequate weight on worst-case scenarios. 
Consideration of the full range of behavioural responses to informa-
tion will enable policymakers to more effectively communicate cli-
mate change risks to stakeholders and to design decision aids and 
climate change policies that are more likely to be accepted and imple-
mented.
FAQ 2�3 How does the presence of uncertainty 
affect the choice of policy instruments? 
[Section 2�6�5]
Many climate policy instruments are designed to provide decision 
makers at different levels (e. g., households, firms, industry asso-
ciations, guilds) with positive incentives (e. g., subsidies) or penalties 
(e. g., fines) to incentivize them to take mitigation actions. The impact 
of these incentives on the behaviour of the relevant decision makers 
depends on the form and timing of these policy instruments.
Instruments such as carbon taxes that are designed to increase the 
cost of burning fossil fuels rely on decision makers to develop expec-
tations about future trajectories of fuel prices and other economic 
conditions. As uncertainty in these conditions increases, the respon-
siveness of economic agents decreases. On the other hand, invest-
ment subsidies and technology standards provide immediate incen-
tives to change behaviour, and are less sensitive to long-term market 
uncertainty. Feed-in tariffs allow investors to lock in a given return on 
investment, and so may be effective even when market uncertainty is 
high.
FAQ 2�4 What are the uncertainties and risks 
that are of particular importance to 
climate policy in developing countries? 
[Box 2�1]
Developing countries are often more sensitive to climate risks, such as 
drought or coastal flooding, because of their greater economic reliance 
on climate-sensitive primary activities, and because of inadequate 
infrastructure, finance, and other enablers of successful adaptation and 
mitigation. Since AR4, research on relevant risks and uncertainties in 
developing countries has progressed substantially, offering results in 
two main areas.
Studies have demonstrated how uncertainties often place low carbon 
energy sources at an economic disadvantage, especially in developing 
countries. The performance and reliability of new technologies may 
be less certain in developing countries than in industrialized coun-
tries because they could be unsuited to the local context and needs. 
Other reasons for uncertain performance and reliability could be due 
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to poor manufacturing, a lack of adequate testing in hot or dusty envi-
ronments, or limited local capacity to maintain and repair equipment. 
Moreover, a number of factors associated with economic, political, 
and regulatory uncertainty result in much higher real interest rates in 
developing countries than in the developed world. This creates a disin-
centive to invest in technologies with high upfront but lower operating 
costs, such as renewable energy, compared to fossil-fuel based energy 
infrastructure.
Given the economic disadvantage of low carbon energy sources, 
important risk tradeoffs often need to be considered. On the one hand, 
low-carbon technologies can reduce risks to health, safety, and the 
environment, such as when people replace the burning of biomass for 
cooking with modern and efficient cooking stoves. But on the other 
hand, low-carbon modern energy is often more expensive than its 
higher-carbon alternatives. There are however, some opportunities for 
win-win outcomes on economic and risk grounds, such as in the case 
of off-grid solar power.
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This framing chapter describes the strengths and limitations of the 
most widely used concepts and methods in economics, ethics, and 
other social sciences that are relevant to climate change. It also pro-
vides a reference resource for the other chapters in the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), 
as well as for decision makers.
The significance of the social dimension and the role of ethics and 
economics is underscored by Article 2 of the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, which indicates that an ultimate 
objective of the Convention is to avoid dangerous anthropogenic inter-
ference with the climate system. Two main issues confronting society 
(and the IPCC) are: what constitutes ‘dangerous interference’ with the 
climate system and how to deal with that interference. Determining 
what is dangerous is not a matter for natural science alone; it also 
involves value judgements — a subject matter of the theory of value, 
which is treated in several disciplines, including ethics, economics, and 
other social sciences.
Ethics involves questions of justice and value. Justice is concerned with 
equity and fairness, and, in general, with the rights to which people 
are entitled. Value is a matter of worth, benefit, or good. Value can 
sometimes be measured quantitatively, for instance, through a social 
welfare function or an index of human development.
Economic tools and methods can be used in assessing the positive 
and negative values that result from particular decisions, policies, and 
measures. They can also be essential in determining the mitigation 
and adaptation actions to be undertaken as public policy, as well as 
the consequences of different mitigation and adaptation strategies. 
Economic tools and methods have strengths and limitations, both of 
which are detailed in this chapter.
Economic tools can be useful in designing climate change miti-
gation policies (very high confidence). While the limitations of eco-
nomics and social welfare analysis, including cost-benefit analysis, are 
widely documented, economics nevertheless provides useful tools for 
assessing the pros and cons of taking, or not taking, action on climate 
change mitigation, as well as of adaptation measures, in achieving 
competing societal goals. Understanding these pros and cons can help 
in making policy decisions on climate change mitigation and can influ-
ence the actions taken by countries, institutions and individuals. [Sec-
tion 3.2]
Mitigation is a public good; climate change is a case of ‘the 
tragedy of the commons’ (high confidence). Effective climate change 
mitigation will not be achieved if each agent (individual, institution or 
country) acts independently in its own selfish interest, suggesting the 
need for collective action. Some adaptation actions, on the other hand, 
have characteristics of a private good as benefits of actions may accrue 
more directly to the individuals, regions, or countries that undertake 
them, at least in the short term. Nevertheless, financing such adaptive 
activities remains an issue, particularly for poor individuals and coun-
tries. [3.1, 3.2]
Analysis contained in the literature of moral and political phi-
losophy can contribute to resolving ethical questions that are 
raised by climate change (medium confidence). These questions 
include how much overall climate mitigation is needed to avoid ‘dan-
gerous interference’, how the effort or cost of mitigating climate 
change should be shared among countries and between the present 
and future, how to account for such factors as historical responsibility 
for emissions, and how to choose among alternative policies for miti-
gation and adaptation. Ethical issues of wellbeing, justice, fairness, and 
rights are all involved. [3.2, 3.3, 3.4]
Duties to pay for some climate damages can be grounded in 
compensatory justice and distributive justice (medium confi-
dence). If compensatory duties to pay for climate damages and adap-
tation costs are not due from agents who have acted blamelessly, 
then principles of compensatory justice will apply to only some of 
the harmful emissions [3.3.5]. This finding is also reflected in the pre-
dominant global legal practice of attributing liability for harmful emis-
sions [3.3.6]. Duties to pay for climate damages can, however, also be 
grounded in distributive justice [3.3.4, 3.3.5].
Distributional weights may be advisable in cost-benefit analysis 
(medium confidence). Ethical theories of value commonly imply that 
distributional weights should be applied to monetary measures of ben-
efits and harms when they are aggregated to derive ethical conclu-
sions [3.6.1]. Such weighting contrasts with much of the practice of 
cost-benefit analysis.
The use of a temporal discount rate has a crucial impact on the 
evaluation of mitigation policies and measures� The social dis-
count rate is the minimum rate of expected social return that com-
pensates for the increased intergenerational inequalities and the 
potential increased collective risk that an action generates. Even with 
disagreement on the level of the discount rate, a consensus favours 
using declining risk-free discount rates over longer time horizons (high 
confidence). [3.6.2]
An appropriate social risk-free discount rate for consumption 
is between one and three times the anticipated growth rate in 
real per capita consumption (medium confidence). This judgement 
is based on an application of the Ramsey rule using typical values in 
the literature of normative parameters in the rule. Ultimately, however, 
these are normative choices. [3.6.2]
Co-benefits may complement the direct benefits of mitigation 
(medium confidence). While some direct benefits of mitigation are 
reductions in adverse climate change impacts, co-benefits can include 
a broad range of environmental, economic, and social effects, such as 
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reductions in local air pollution, less acid rain, and increased energy 
security. However, whether co-benefits are net positive or negative in 
terms of wellbeing (welfare) can be difficult to determine because of 
interaction between climate policies and pre-existing non-climate poli-
cies. The same results apply to adverse side-effects. [3.6.3]
Tax distortions change the cost of all abatement policies (high 
confidence). A carbon tax or a tradable emissions permit system can 
exacerbate tax distortions, or, in some cases, alleviate them; carbon tax 
or permit revenue can be used to moderate adverse effects by cutting 
other taxes. However, regulations that forgo revenue (e. g., by giving 
permits away) implicitly have higher social costs because of the tax 
interaction effect. [3.6.3]
Many different analytic methods are available for evaluating 
policies� Methods may be quantitative (for example, cost-benefit 
analysis, integrated assessment modelling, and multi-criteria analysis) 
or qualitative (for example, sociological and participatory approaches). 
However, no single-best method can provide a comprehensive analysis 
of policies. A mix of methods is often needed to understand the broad 
effects, attributes, trade-offs, and complexities of policy choices; more-
over, policies often address multiple objectives. [3.7]
Four main criteria are frequently used in evaluating and choos-
ing a mitigation policy (medium confidence). They are: cost-effec-
tiveness and economic efficiency (excluding environmental benefits, 
but including transaction costs); environmental effectiveness (the 
extent to which the environmental targets are achieved); distributional 
effects (impact on different subgroups within society); and institutional 
feasibility, including political feasibility. [3.7.1]
A broad range of policy instruments for climate change miti-
gation is available to policymakers� These include: economic 
incentives, direct regulatory approaches, information programmes, 
government provision, and voluntary actions. Interactions between 
policy instruments can enhance or reduce the effectiveness and cost 
of mitigation action. Economic incentives will generally be more 
cost-effective than direct regulatory interventions. However, the 
performance and suitability of policies depends on numerous con-
ditions, including institutional capacity, the influence of rent-seek-
ing, and predictability or uncertainty about future policy settings. 
The enabling environment may differ between countries, including 
between low-income and high-income countries. These differences 
can have implications for the suitability and performance of policy 
instruments. [3.8]
Impacts of extreme events may be more important economi-
cally than impacts of average climate change (high confidence). 
Risks associated with the entire probability distribution of outcomes 
in terms of climate response [WGI] and climate impacts [WGII] are 
relevant to the assessment of mitigation. Impacts from more extreme 
climate change may be more important economically (in terms of the 
expected value of impacts) than impacts of average climate change, 
particularly if the damage from extreme climate change increases more 
rapidly than the probability of such change declines. This is important 
in economic analysis, where the expected benefit of mitigation may be 
traded off against mitigation costs. [3.9.2]
Impacts from climate change are both market and non-market� 
Market effects (where market prices and quantities are observed) 
include impacts of storm damage on infrastructure, tourism, and 
increased energy demand. Non-market effects include many ecological 
impacts, as well as changed cultural values, none of which are gen-
erally captured through market prices. The economic measure of the 
value of either kind of impact is ‘willingness-to-pay’ to avoid damage, 
which can be estimated using methods of revealed preference and 
stated preference. [3.9]
Substitutability reduces the size of damages from climate 
change (high confidence). The monetary damage from a change in the 
climate will be lower if individuals can easily substitute for what is 
damaged, compared to cases where such substitution is more difficult. 
[3.9]
Damage functions in existing Integrated Assessment Models 
(IAMs) are of low reliability (high confidence). The economic assess-
ments of damages from climate change as embodied in the damage 
functions used by some existing IAMs (though not in the analysis 
embodied in WGIII) are highly stylized with a weak empirical foun-
dation. The empirical literature on monetized impacts is growing but 
remains limited and often geographically narrow. This suggests that 
such damage functions should be used with caution and that there 
may be significant value in undertaking research to improve the preci-
sion of damage estimates. [3.9, 3.12]
Negative private costs of mitigation arise in some cases, 
although they are sometimes overstated in the literature 
(medium confidence). Sometimes mitigation can lower the private 
costs of production and thus raise profits; for individuals, mitigation 
can raise wellbeing. Ex-post evidence suggests that such ‘negative cost 
opportunities’ do indeed exist but are sometimes overstated in engi-
neering analyses. [3.9]
Exchange rates between GHGs with different atmospheric life-
times are very sensitive to the choice of emission metric� The 
choice of an emission metric depends on the potential application and 
involves explicit or implicit value judgements; no consensus surrounds 
the question of which metric is both conceptually best and practical to 
implement (high confidence). In terms of aggregate mitigation costs 
alone, the Global Warming Potential (GWP), with a 100-year time hori-
zon, may perform similarly to selected other metrics (such as the time-
dependent Global Temperature Change Potential or the Global Cost 
Potential) of reaching a prescribed climate target; however, various 
metrics may differ significantly in terms of the implied distribution of 
costs across sectors, regions, and over time (limited evidence, medium 
agreement). [3.9]
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The behaviour of energy users and producers exhibits a variety 
of anomalies (high confidence). Understanding climate change as a 
physical phenomenon with links to societal causes and impacts is a 
very complex process. To be fully effective, the conceptual frameworks 
and methodological tools used in mitigation assessments need to take 
into account cognitive limitations and other-regarding preferences that 
frame the processes of economic decision making by people and firms. 
[3.10]
Perceived fairness can facilitate cooperation among individu-
als (high confidence). Experimental evidence suggests that reciprocal 
behaviour and perceptions of fair outcomes and procedures facilitate 
voluntary cooperation among individual people in providing public 
goods; this finding may have implications for the design of interna-
tional agreements to coordinate climate change mitigation. [3.10]
Social institutions and culture can facilitate mitigation and 
adaptation (medium confidence). Social institutions and culture can 
shape individual actions on mitigation and adaptation and be comple-
mentary to more conventional methods for inducing mitigation and 
adaptation. They can promote trust and reciprocity and contribute to 
the evolution of common rules. They also provide structures for acting 
collectively to deal with common challenges. [3.10]
Technological change that reduces mitigation costs can be 
encouraged by institutions and economic incentives (high con-
fidence). As pollution is not fully priced by the market, private indi-
viduals and firms lack incentives to invest sufficiently in the develop-
ment and use of emissions-reducing technologies in the absence of 
appropriate policy interventions. Moreover, imperfect appropriability of 
the benefits of innovation further reduces incentives to develop new 
technologies. [3.11]
3.1 Introduction
This framing chapter has two primary purposes: to provide a frame-
work for viewing and understanding the human (social) perspective on 
climate change, focusing on ethics and economics; and to define and 
discuss key concepts used in other chapters. It complements the two 
other framing chapters: Chapter 2 on risk and uncertainty and Chapter 
4 on sustainability. The audience for this chapter (indeed for this entire 
volume) is decision makers at many different levels.
The significance of the social dimension and the role of ethics and eco-
nomics is underscored by Article 2 of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which indicates that the 
ultimate objective of the Convention is to avoid dangerous anthropo-
genic interference with the climate system. Two main issues confront-
ing society are: what constitutes ‘dangerous interference’ with the 
climate system and how to deal with that interference (see box 3.1). 
Providing information to answer these inter-related questions is a pri-
mary purpose of the IPCC. Although natural science helps us under-
stand how emissions can change the climate, and, in turn, generate 
physical impacts on ecosystems, people, and the physical environment, 
determining what is dangerous involves judging the level of adverse 
consequences, the steps necessary to mitigate these consequences, 
and the risk that humanity is willing to tolerate. These are questions 
requiring value judgement. Although economics is essential to evaluat-
ing the consequences and trade-offs associating with climate change, 
how society interprets and values them is an ethical question.
Our discussion of ethics centres on two main considerations: justice 
and value. Justice requires that people and nations should receive 
what they are due, or have a right to. For some, an outcome is just 
if the process that generated it is just. Others view justice in terms 
of the actual outcomes enjoyed by different people and groups and 
the values they place on those outcomes. Outcome-based justice can 
range from maximizing economic measures of aggregate welfare to 
rights-based views of justice, for example, believing that all countries 
have a right to clean air. Different views have been expressed about 
what is valuable. All values may be anthropocentric or there may be 
non-human values. Economic analysis can help to guide policy action, 
provided that appropriate, adequate, and transparent ethical assump-
tions are built into the economic methods.
The significance of economics in tackling climate change is widely rec-
ognized. For instance, central to the politics of taking action on climate 
change are disagreements over how much mitigation the world should 
undertake, and the economic costs of action (the costs of mitigation) 
and inaction (the costs of adaptation and residual damage from a 
changed climate). Uncertainty remains about (1) the costs of reducing 
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), (2) the damage caused by a 
change in the climate, and (3) the cost, practicality, and effectiveness 
of adaptation measures (and, potentially, geoengineering). Prioritiz-
ing action on climate change over other significant social goals with 
more near-term payoffs is particularly difficult in developing countries. 
Because social concerns and objectives, such as the preservation of 
traditional values, cannot always be easily quantified or monetized, 
economic costs and benefits are not the only input into decision mak-
ing about climate change. But even where costs and benefits can be 
quantified and monetized, using methods of economic analysis to 
steer social action implicitly involves significant ethical assumptions. 
This chapter explains the ethical assumptions that must be made for 
economic methods, including cost-benefit analysis (CBA), to be valid, 
as well as the ethical assumptions that are implicitly being made 
where economic analysis is used to inform a policy choice.
The perspective of economics can improve our understanding of the 
challenges of acting on mitigation. For an individual or firm, mitigation 
involves real costs, while the benefits to themselves of their own miti-
gation efforts are small and intangible. This reduces the incentives for 
individuals or countries to unilaterally reduce emissions; free-riding on 
the actions of others is a dominant strategy. Mitigating greenhouse 
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gas (GHG) emissions is a public good, which inhibits mitigation. This 
also partly explains the failure of nations to agree on how to solve the 
problem.
In contrast, adaptation tends not to suffer from free-riding. Gains to 
climate change from adaptation, such as planting more heat tolerant 
crops, are mainly realized by the parties who incur the costs. Associated 
externalities tend to be more localized and contemporaneous than for 
GHG mitigation. From a public goods perspective, global coordination 
may be less important for many forms of adaptation than for mitiga-
tion. For autonomous adaptation in particular, the gains from adapta-
tion accrue to the party incurring the cost. However, public adaptation 
requires local or regional coordination. Financial and other constraints 
may restrict the pursuit of attractive adaptation opportunities, particu-
larly in developing countries and for poorer individuals.
This chapter addresses two questions: what should be done about 
action to mitigate climate change (a normative issue) and how the 
world works in the multifaceted context of climate change (a descrip-
tive or positive issue). Typically, ethics deals with normative questions 
and economics with descriptive or normative questions. Descriptive 
questions are primarily value-neutral, for example, how firms have 
reacted to cap-and-trade programmes to limit emissions, or how soci-
eties have dealt with responsibility for actions that were not known to 
be harmful when they were taken. Normative questions use economics 
and ethics to decide what should be done, for example, determining 
the appropriate level of burden sharing among countries for current 
and future mitigation. In making decisions about issues with norma-
tive dimensions, it is important to understand the implicit assumptions 
involved. Most normative analyses of solutions to the climate problem 
implicitly involve contestable ethical assumptions.
This chapter does not attempt to answer ethical questions, but rather 
provides policymakers with the tools (concepts, principles, arguments, 
and methods) to make decisions. Summarizing the role of economics 
and ethics in climate change in a single chapter necessitates several 
caveats. While recognizing the importance of certain non-economic 
social dimensions of the climate change problem and solutions to it, 
space limitations and our mandate necessitated focusing primarily on 
ethics and economics. Furthermore, many of the issues raised have 
already been addressed in previous IPCC assessments, particularly AR2 
(published in 1995). In the past, ethics has received less attention than 
economics, although aspects of both subjects are covered in AR2. The 
literature reviewed here includes pre-AR4 literature in order to pro-
vide a more comprehensive understanding of the concepts and meth-
ods. We highlight ‘new’ developments in the field since the last IPCC 
assessment in 2007.
3.2 Ethical and socio-economic 
concepts and principles
When a country emits GHGs, its emissions cause harm around the 
globe. The country itself suffers only a part of the harm it causes. It is 
therefore rarely in the interests of a single country to reduce its own 
emissions, even though a reduction in global emissions could benefit 
every country. That is to say, the problem of climate change is a “trag-
edy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968). Effective mitigation of climate 
change will not be achieved if each person or country acts indepen-
dently in its own interest.
Consequently, efforts are continuing to reach effective international 
agreement on mitigation. They raise an ethical question that is widely 
recognized and much debated, namely, ‘burden-sharing’ or ‘effort-
sharing’. How should the burden of mitigating climate change be 
divided among countries? It raises difficult issues of justice, fairness, 
and rights, all of which lie within the sphere of ethics.
Burden-sharing is only one of the ethical questions that climate change 
raises.1 Another is the question of how much overall mitigation should 
1 A survey of the ethics of climate change is Gardiner (2004), pp. 555 – 600.
Box 3�1 | Dangerous interference with the climate system
Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change states that “the ultimate objective of the Convention 
[…] is to achieve […] stabilization of greenhouse gas concentra-
tions in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” Judging 
whether our interference in the climate system is dangerous, i. e., 
risks causing a very bad outcome, involves two tasks: estimat-
ing the physical consequences of our interference and their 
likelihood; and assessing their significance for people. The first 
falls to science, but, as the Synthesis Report of the IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report (AR4) states, “Determining what constitutes 
‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’ 
in relation to Article 2 of the UNFCCC involves value judgements” 
(IPCC, 2007, p. 42). Value judgements are governed by the theory 
of value. In particular, valuing risk is covered by decision theory 
and is dealt with in Chapter 2. Central questions of value that 
come within the scope of ethics, as well as economic methods for 
measuring certain values are examined in this chapter.
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take place. UNFCCC sets the aim of “avoiding dangerous anthropo-
genic interference with the climate system”, and judging what is dan-
gerous is partly a task for ethics (see Box 3.1). Besides justice, fairness, 
and rights, a central concern of ethics is value. Judgements of value 
underlie the question of what interference with the climate system 
would be dangerous.
Indeed, ethical judgements of value underlie almost every decision 
that is connected with climate change, including decisions made by 
individuals, public and private organizations, governments, and group-
ings of governments. Some of these decisions are deliberately aimed at 
mitigating climate change or adapting to it. Many others influence the 
progress of climate change or its impacts, so they need to take climate 
change into account.
Ethics may be broadly divided into two branches: justice and value. 
Justice is concerned with ensuring that people get what is due to them. 
If justice requires that a person should not be treated in a particular 
way — uprooted from her home by climate change, for example — then 
the person has a right not to be treated that way. Justice and rights are 
correlative concepts. On the other hand, criteria of value are concerned 
with improving the world: making it a better place. Synonyms for 
‘value’ in this context are ‘good’, ‘goodness’ and ‘benefit’. Antonyms 
are ‘bad’, ‘harm’ and ‘cost’.
To see the difference between justice and value, think of a transfer of 
wealth made by a rich country to a poor one. This may be an act of 
restitution. For example, it may be intended to compensate the poor 
country for harm that has been done to it by the rich country’s emis-
sions of GHG. In this case, the transfer is made on grounds of justice. 
The payment is taken to be due to the poor country, and to satisfy a 
right that the poor country has to compensation. Alternatively, the rich 
country may make the transfer to support the poor country’s mitiga-
tion effort, because this is beneficial to people in the poor country, 
the rich country, and elsewhere. The rich country may not believe the 
poor country has a right to the support, but makes the payment simply 
because it does ‘good’. This transfer is made on grounds of value. What 
would be good to do is not necessarily required as a matter of justice. 
Justice is concerned with what people are entitled to as a matter of 
their rights.
The division between justice and value is contested within moral phi-
losophy, and so is the nature of the interaction between the two. 
Some authors treat justice as inviolable (Nozick, 1974): justice sets 
limits on what we may do and we may promote value only within 
those limits. An opposite view — called ‘teleological’ by Rawls 
(1971) — is that the right decision to make is always determined 
by the value of the alternatives, so justice has no role. But despite 
the complexity of their relationship and the controversies it raises, 
the division between justice and value provides a useful basis for 
organizing the discussion of ethical concepts and principles. We 
have adopted it in this chapter: sections 3.3 and 3.4 cover justice 
and value, respectively. One topic appears in both sections because 
it bridges the divide: this topic is distributive justice viewed one way 
and the value of equality viewed the other. Section 3.3.7 on geoen-
gineering is also in an intermediate position because it raises ethical 
issues of both sorts. Section 3.6 explains how some ethical values 
can be measured by economic methods of valuation. Section 3.5 
describes the scope and limitations of these methods. Later sections 
develop the concepts and methods of economics in more detail. Prac-
tical ways to take account of different values in policy-making are 
discussed in Section 3.7.1.
3.3 Justice, equity and 
responsibility 
Justice, fairness, equity, and responsibility are important in interna-
tional climate negotiations, as well as in climate-related political deci-
sion making within countries and for individuals.
In this section we examine distributive justice, which, for the purpose 
of this review, is about outcomes, and procedural justice or the way in 
which outcomes are brought about. We also discuss compensation for 
damage and historic responsibility for harm. In the context of climate 
change, considerations of justice, equity, and responsibility concern the 
relations between individuals, as well as groups of individuals (e. g., 
countries), both at a single point in time and across time. Accordingly, 
we distinguish intra-generational from intergenerational justice. The 
literature has no agreement on a correct answer to the question, what 
is just? We indicate where opinions differ.
3�3�1 Causal and moral responsibility 
From the perspective of countries rather than individuals or groups of 
individuals, historic emissions can help determine causal responsibil-
ity for climate change (den Elzen et al., 2005; Lamarque et al., 2010; 
Höhne et  al., 2011). Many developed countries are expected to suf-
fer relatively modest physical damage and some are even expected to 
realize benefits from future climate change (see Tol, 2002a; b). On the 
other hand, some developing countries bear less causal responsibil-
ity, but could suffer significant physical damage from climate change 
(IPCC, 2007, WG II AR4 SPM). This asymmetry gives rise to the follow-
ing questions of justice and moral responsibility: do considerations of 
justice provide guidance in determining the appropriate level of pres-
ent and future global emissions; the distribution of emissions among 
those presently living; and the role of historical emissions in distribut-
ing global obligations? The question also arises of who might be con-
sidered morally responsible for achieving justice, and, thus, a bearer of 
duties towards others. The question of moral responsibility is also key 
to determining whether anyone owes compensation for the damage 
caused by emissions.
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3�3�2 Intergenerational justice and rights of 
future people
Intergenerational justice encompasses some of the moral duties owed 
by present to future people and the rights that future people hold 
against present people.2 A legitimate acknowledgment that future or 
past generations have rights relative to present generations is indica-
tive of a broad understanding of justice.3 While justice considerations 
so understood are relevant, they cannot cover all our concerns regard-
ing future and past people, including the continued existence of 
humankind and with a high level of wellbeing.4
What duties do present generations owe future generations given that 
current emissions will affect their quality of life? Some justice theo-
rists have offered the following argument to justify a cap on emissions 
(Shue, 1993, 1999; Caney, 2006a; Meyer and Roser, 2009; Wolf, 2009). 
If future people’s basic rights include the right to survival, health, and 
subsistence, these basic rights are likely to be violated when tempera-
tures rise above a certain level. However, currently living people can 
slow the rise in temperature by limiting their emissions at a reason-
able cost to themselves. Therefore, living people should reduce their 
emissions in order to fulfil their minimal duties of justice to future 
generations. Normative theorists dispute the standard of living that 
corresponds to people’s basic rights (Page, 2007; Huseby, 2010). Also 
in dispute is what level of harm imposed on future people is morally 
objectionable. Some argue that currently living people wrongfully 
harm future people if they cause them to have a lower level of well-
being than their own (e. g., Barry, 1999); others that currently living 
people owe future people a decent level of wellbeing, which might be 
lower than their own (Wolf, 2009). This argument raises objections on 
grounds of justice since it presupposes that present people can violate 
the rights of future people, and that the protection of future people’s 
rights is practically relevant for how present people ought to act.
Some theorists claim that future people cannot hold rights against 
present people, owing to special features of intergenerational rela-
tions: some claim that future people cannot have rights because they 
cannot exercise them today (Steiner, 1983; Wellman, 1995, ch. 4). Oth-
ers point out that interaction between non-contemporaries is impos-
sible (Barry, 1977, pp. 243 – 244, 1989, p. 189). However, some justice 
theorists argue that neither the ability to, nor the possibility of, mutual 
interaction are necessary in attributing rights to people (Barry, 1989; 
Buchanan, 2004). They hold that rights are attributed to beings whose 
interests are important enough to justify imposing duties on others.
2 In the philosophical literature, “justice between generations” typically refers to 
the relations between people whose lifetimes do not overlap (Barry, 1977). In 
contrast, “justice between age groups” refers to the relations of people whose 
lifetimes do overlap (Laslett and Fishkin, 1992). See also Gardiner (2011), 
pp. 145 – 48.
3 See Rawls (1971, 1999), Barry (1977), Sikora and Barry (1978), Partridge (1981), 
Parfit (1986), Birnbacher (1988), and Heyd (1992).
4 See Baier (1981), De-Shalit (1995), Meyer (2005), and for African philosophi-
cal perspectives see, Behrens (2012). See Section 3.4 on the wellbeing of future 
people.
The main source of scepticism about the rights of future people and 
the duties we owe them is the so-called ‘non-identity problem’. Actions 
we take to reduce our emissions will change people’s way of life and 
so affect new people born. They alter the identities of future people. 
Consequently, our emissions do not make future people worse off than 
they would otherwise have been, since those future people would not 
exist if we took action to prevent our emissions. This makes it hard to 
claim that our emissions harm future people, or that we owe it to them 
as a matter of their rights to reduce our emissions.5
It is often argued that the non-identity problem can be overcome 
(McMahan, 1998; Shiffrin, 1999; Kumar, 2003; Meyer, 2003; Harman, 
2004; Reiman, 2007; Shue, 2010). In any case, duties of justice do not 
include all the moral concerns we should have for future people. Other 
concerns are matters of value rather than justice, and they too can be 
understood in such a way that they are not affected by the non-iden-
tity problem. They are considered in Section 3.4.
If present people have a duty to protect future people’s basic rights, 
this duty is complicated by uncertainty. Present people’s actions or 
omissions do not necessarily violate future people’s rights; they create 
a risk of their rights being violated (Bell, 2011). To determine what cur-
rently living people owe future people, one has to weigh such uncer-
tain consequences against other consequences of their actions, includ-
ing the certain or likely violation of the rights of currently living people 
(Oberdiek, 2012; Temkin, 2012). This is important in assessing many 
long-term policies, including on geoengineering (see Section 3.3.7), 
that risk violating the rights of many generations of people (Crutzen, 
2006; Schneider, 2008; Victor et al., 2009; Baer, 2010; Ott, 2012).
3�3�3 Intergenerational justice: distributive 
justice
Suppose that a global emissions ceiling that is intergenerationally just 
has been determined (recognizing that a ceiling is not the only way to 
deal with climate change), the question then arises of how the ceil-
ing ought to be divided among states (and, ultimately, their individ-
ual members) (Jamieson, 2001; Singer, 2002; Meyer and Roser, 2006; 
Caney, 2006a). Distributing emission permits is a way of arriving at a 
globally just division. Among the widely discussed views on distribu-
tive justice are strict egalitarianism (Temkin, 1993), indirect egalitarian 
views including prioritarianism (Parfit, 1997), and sufficientarianism 
(Frankfurt, 1999). Strict egalitarianism holds that equality has value 
in itself. Prioritarianism gives greater weight to a person’s wellbeing 
the less well off she is, as described in Section 3.4. Sufficientarianism 
recommends that everyone should be able to enjoy a particular level 
of wellbeing.
5 For an overview of the issue see Meyer (2010). See also Schwartz (1978), Parfit 
(1986), and Heyd (1992). For a different perspective see Perrett (2003).
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For example, two options can help apply prioritarianism to the dis-
tribution of freely allocated and globally tradeable emission permits. 
The first is to ignore the distribution of other goods. Then strict egali-
tarianism or prioritarianism will require emission permits to be distrib-
uted equally, since they will have one price and are thus equivalent 
to income. The second is to take into account the unequal distribution 
of other assets. Since people in the developing world are less well off 
than in the developed world, strict egalitarianism or prioritarianism 
would require most or all permits to go to the developing world. How-
ever, it is questionable whether it is appropriate to bring the overall 
distribution of goods closer to the prioritarian ideal through the dis-
tribution of just one good (Wolff and de-Shalit, 2007; Caney, 2009, 
2012).
3�3�4 Historical responsibility and distributive 
justice
Historical responsibility for climate change depends on countries’ con-
tributions to the stock of GHGs. The UNFCCC refers to “common but 
differentiated responsibilities” among countries of the world.6 This is 
sometimes taken to imply that current and historical causal responsi-
bility for climate change should play a role in determining the obliga-
tions of different countries in reducing emissions and paying for adap-
tation measures globally (Rajamani, 2000; Rive et  al., 2006; Friman, 
2007).
A number of objections have been raised against the view that his-
torical emissions should play a role (see, e. g., Gosseries, 2004; Caney, 
2005; Meyer and Roser, 2006; Posner and Weisbach, 2010). First, as 
currently living people had no influence over the actions of their ances-
tors, they cannot be held responsible for them. Second, previously liv-
ing people may be excused from responsibility on the grounds that 
they could not be expected to know that their emissions would have 
harmful consequences. Thirdly, present individuals with their particu-
lar identities are not worse or better off as a result of the emission-
generating activities of earlier generations because, owing to the non-
identity problem, they would not exist as the individuals they are had 
earlier generations not acted as they did.
From the perspective of distributive justice, however, these objections 
need not prevent past emissions and their consequences being taken 
into account (Meyer and Roser, 2010; Meyer, 2013). If we are only 
concerned with the distribution of benefits from emission-generating 
activities during an individual’s lifespan, we should include the ben-
efits present people have received from their own emission-generating 
activities. Furthermore, present people have benefited since birth or 
conception from past people’s emission-producing actions. They are 
6 Specifically, Article 3 of the UNFCCC includes the sentence: “The Parties should 
protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of 
humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.”
therefore better off as a result of past emissions, and any principle of 
distributive justice should take that into account. Some suggest that 
taking account of the consequences of some past emissions in this 
way should not be subject to the objections mentioned in the previous 
paragraph (see Shue, 2010). Other concepts associated with historical 
responsibility are discussed in Chapter 4.
3�3�5 Intra-generational justice: compensatory 
justice and historical responsibility
Do those who suffer disproportionately from the consequences of cli-
mate change have just claims to compensation against the main per-
petrators or beneficiaries of climate change (see, e. g., Neumayer, 2000; 
Gosseries, 2004; Caney, 2006b)?
One way of distinguishing compensatory from distributive claims is to 
rely on the idea of a just baseline distribution that is determined by 
a criterion of distributive justice. Under this approach, compensation 
for climate damage and adaptation costs is owed only by people who 
have acted wrongfully according to normative theory (Feinberg, 1984; 
Coleman, 1992; McKinnon, 2011). Other deviations from the baseline 
may warrant redistributive measures to redress undeserved benefits or 
harms, but not as compensation. Some deviations, such as those that 
result from free choice, may not call for any redistribution at all.
The duty to make compensatory payments (Gosseries, 2004; Caney, 
2006b) may fall on those who emit or benefit from wrongful emis-
sions or who belong to a community that produced such emissions. 
Accordingly, three principles of compensatory justice have been sug-
gested: the polluter pays principle (PPP), the beneficiary pays princi-
ple (BPP), and the community pays principle (CPP) (Meyer and Roser, 
2010; Meyer, 2013). None of the three measures is generally accepted, 
though the PPP is more widely accepted than the others. The PPP 
requires the emitter to pay compensation if the agent emitted more 
than its fair share (determined as outlined in Section 3.3.2) and it 
either knew, or could reasonably be expected to know, that its emis-
sions were harmful. The victim should be able to show that the emis-
sions either made the victim worse off than before or pushed below a 
specified threshold of harm, or both. 
The right to compensatory payments for wrongful emissions under PPP 
has at least three basic limitations. Two have already been mentioned 
in Section 3.3.4. Emissions that took place while it was permissible 
to be ignorant of climate change (when people neither did know nor 
could be reasonably be expected to know about the harmful conse-
quences of emissions) may be excused (Gosseries, 2004, pp. 39 – 41). 
See also Section 3.3.6. The non-identity problem (see Section 3.3.2) 
implies that earlier emissions do not harm many of the people who 
come into existence later. Potential duty bearers may be dead and can-
not therefore have a duty to supply compensatory measures. It may 
therefore be difficult to use PPP in ascribing compensatory duties and 
identifying wronged persons. The first and third limitations restrict the 
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assignment of duties of compensation to currently living people for 
their most recent emissions, even though many more people are caus-
ally responsible for the harmful effects of climate change. For future 
emissions, the third limitation could be overcome through a climate 
change compensation fund into which agents pay levies for imposing 
the risk of harm on future people (McKinnon, 2011).
According to BPP, a person who is wrongfully better off relative to a 
just baseline is required to compensate those who are worse off. Past 
emissions benefit some and impose costs on others. If currently liv-
ing people accept the benefits of wrongful past emissions, it has been 
argued that they take on some of the past wrongdoer’s duty of com-
pensation (Gosseries, 2004). Also, we have a duty to condemn injustice, 
which may entail a duty not to benefit from an injustice that causes 
harm to others (Butt, 2007). However, BPP is open to at least two 
objections. First, duties of compensation arise only from past emissions 
that have benefited present people; no compensation is owed for other 
past emissions. Second, if voluntary acceptance of benefits is a con-
dition of their giving rise to compensatory duties, the bearers of the 
duties must be able to forgo the benefits in question at a reasonable 
cost.
Under CPP, moral duties can be attributed to people as members of 
groups whose identity persists over generations (De-Shalit, 1995; 
Thompson, 2009). The principle claims that members of a community, 
including a country, can have collective responsibility for the wrongful 
actions of other past and present members of the community, even 
though they are not morally or causally responsible for those actions 
(Thompson, 2001; Miller, 2004; Meyer, 2005). It is a matter of debate 
under what conditions present people can be said to have inherited 
compensatory duties. Although CPP purports to overcome the problem 
that a polluter might be dead, it can justify compensatory measures 
only for emissions that are made wrongfully. It does not cover emis-
sions caused by agents who were permissibly ignorant of their harm-
fulness. (The agent in this case may be the community or state).
The practical relevance of principles of compensatory justice is limited. 
Insofar as the harms and benefits of climate change are undeserved, 
distributive justice will require them to be evened out, independently 
of compensatory justice. Duties of distributive justice do not presup-
pose any wrongdoing (see Section 3.3.4). For example, it has been 
suggested on grounds of distributive justice that the duty to pay for 
adaptation should be allocated on the basis of people’s ability to pay, 
which partly reflects the benefit they have received from past emis-
sions (Jamieson, 1997; Shue, 1999; Caney, 2010; Gardiner, 2011). 
However, present people and governments can be said to know about 
both the seriously harmful consequences of their emission-generating 
activities for future people and effective measures to prevent those 
consequences. If so and if they can implement these measures at a rea-
sonable cost to themselves to protect future people’s basic rights (see, 
e. g., Birnbacher, 2009; Gardiner, 2011), they might be viewed as owing 
intergenerational duties of justice to future people (see Section 3.3.2).
3�3�6 Legal concepts of historical 
 responsibility
Legal systems have struggled to define the boundaries of responsibility 
for harmful actions and are only now beginning to do so for climate 
change. It remains unclear whether national courts will accept lawsuits 
against GHG emitters, and legal scholars vigorously debate whether 
liability exists under current law (Mank, 2007; Burns and Osofsky, 
2009; Faure and Peeters, 2011; Haritz, 2011; Kosolapova, 2011; Kysar, 
2011; Gerrard and Wannier, 2012). This section is concerned with moral 
responsibility, which is not the same as legal responsibility. But moral 
thinking can draw useful lessons from legal ideas.
Harmful conduct is generally a basis for liability only if it breaches 
some legal norm (Tunc, 1983), such as negligence, or if it interferes 
unreasonably with the rights of either the public or property owners 
(Mank, 2007; Grossman, 2009; Kysar, 2011; Brunée et al., 2012; Gold-
berg and Lord, 2012; Koch et al., 2012). Liability for nuisance does not 
exist if the agent did not know, or have reason to know, the effects 
of its conduct (Antolini and Rechtschaffen, 2008). The law in connec-
tion with liability for environmental damage still has to be settled. 
The European Union, but not the United States, recognizes exemption 
from liability for lack of scientific knowledge (United States Congress, 
1980; European Union, 2004). Under European law, and in some US 
states, defendants are not responsible if a product defect had not yet 
been discovered (European Commission, 1985; Dana, 2009). Some 
legal scholars suggest that assigning blame for GHG emissions dates 
back to 1990 when the harmfulness of such emissions was established 
internationally, but others argue in favour of an earlier date (Faure and 
Nollkaemper, 2007; Hunter and Salzman, 2007; Haritz, 2011). Legal 
systems also require a causal link between a defendant’s conduct and 
some identified harm to the plaintiff, in this case from climate change 
(Tunc, 1983; Faure and Nollkaemper, 2007; Kosolapova, 2011; Kysar, 
2011; Brunée et al., 2012; Ewing and Kysar, 2012; Goldberg and Lord, 
2012). A causal link might be easier to establish between emissions 
and adaptation costs (Farber, 2007). Legal systems generally also 
require causal foreseeability or directness (Mank, 2007; Kosolapova, 
2011; van Dijk, 2011; Ewing and Kysar, 2012), although some statutes 
relax this requirement in specific cases (such as the US Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 
commonly known as Superfund. Emitters might argue that their contri-
bution to GHG levels was too small and the harmful effects too indirect 
and diffuse to satisfy the legal requirements (Sinnot-Armstrong, 2010; 
Faure and Peeters, 2011; Hiller, 2011; Kysar, 2011; van Dijk, 2011; Ger-
rard and Wannier, 2012).
Climate change claims could also be classified as unjust enrichment 
(Kull, 1995; Birks, 2005), but legal systems do not remedy all forms of 
enrichment that might be regarded as ethically unjust (Zimmermann, 
1995; American Law Institute, 2011; Laycock, 2012). Under some legal 
systems, liability depends on whether benefits were conferred without 
legal obligation or through a transaction with no clear change of own-
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ership (Zimmermann, 1995; American Law Institute, 2011; Laycock, 
2012). It is not clear that these principles apply to climate change.
As indicated, legal systems do not recognize liability just because a 
positive or negative externality exists. Their response depends on the 
behaviour that caused the externality and the nature of the causal 
link between the agent’s behaviour and the resulting gain or loss to 
another.
3�3�7 Geoengineering, ethics, and justice
Geoengineering (also known as climate engineering [CE]), is large-
scale technical intervention in the climate system that aims to cancel 
some of the effects of GHG emissions (for more details see Working 
Group I (WGI) 6.5 and WGIII 6.9). Geoengineering represents a third 
kind of response to climate change, besides mitigation and adaptation. 
Various options for geoengineering have been proposed, including dif-
ferent types of solar radiation management (SRM) and carbon dioxide 
removal (CDR). This section reviews the major moral arguments for and 
against geoengineering technologies (for surveys see Robock, 2008; 
Corner and Pidgeon, 2010; Gardiner, 2010; Ott, 2010; Betz and Cacean, 
2012; Preston, 2013). These moral arguments do not apply equally to 
all proposed geoengineering methods and have to be assessed on a 
case-specific basis.7
Three lines of argument support the view that geoengineering tech-
nologies might be desirable to deploy at some point in the future. First, 
that humanity could end up in a situation where deploying geoengi-
neering, particularly SRM, appears as a lesser evil than unmitigated 
climate change (Crutzen, 2006; Gardiner, 2010; Keith et  al., 2010; 
Svoboda, 2012a; Betz, 2012). Second, that geoengineering could be 
a more cost-effective response to climate change than mitigation or 
adaptation (Barrett, 2008). Such efficiency arguments have been criti-
cized in the ethical literature for neglecting issues such as side-effects, 
uncertainties, or fairness (Gardiner, 2010, 2011; Buck, 2012). Third, 
that some aggressive climate stabilization targets cannot be achieved 
through mitigation measures alone and thus must be complemented 
by either CDR or SRM (Greene et al., 2010; Sandler, 2012).
Geoengineering technologies face several distinct sets of objections. 
Some authors have stressed the substantial uncertainties of large-
scale deployment (for overviews of geoengineering risks see also 
7 While the literature typically associates some arguments with particular types of 
methods (e. g., the termination problem with SRM), it is not clear that there are 
two groups of moral arguments: those applicable to all SRM methods on the one 
side and those applicable to all CDR methods on the other side. In other words, 
the moral assessment hinges on aspects of geoengineering that are not connected 
to the distinction between SRM and CDR.
Schneider (2008) and Sardemann and Grunwald (2010)), while others 
have argued that some intended and unintended effects of both CDR 
and SRM could be irreversible (Jamieson, 1996) and that some cur-
rent uncertainties are unresolvable (Bunzl, 2009). Furthermore, it has 
been pointed out that geoengineering could make the situation worse 
rather than better (Hegerl and Solomon, 2009; Fleming, 2010; Hamil-
ton, 2013) and that several technologies lack a viable exit option: SRM 
in particular would have to be maintained as long as GHG concentra-
tions remain elevated (The Royal Society, 2009). 
Arguments against geoengineering on the basis of fairness and jus-
tice deal with the intra-generational and intergenerational distribu-
tional effects. SRM schemes could aggravate some inequalities if, as 
expected, they modify regional precipitation and temperature patterns 
with unequal social impacts (Bunzl, 2008; The Royal Society, 2009; 
Svoboda et al., 2011; Preston, 2012). Furthermore, some CDR methods 
would require large-scale land transformations, potentially competing 
with agricultural land-use, with uncertain distributive consequences. 
Other arguments against geoengineering deal with issues including 
the geopolitics of SRM, such as international conflicts that may arise 
from the ability to control the “global thermostat” (e. g., Schelling, 
1996; Hulme, 2009), ethics (Hale and Grundy, 2009; Preston, 2011; 
Hale and Dilling, 2011; Svoboda, 2012b; Hale, 2012b), and a critical 
assessment of technology and modern civilization in general (Fleming, 
2010; Scott, 2012).
One of the most prominent arguments against geoengineering sug-
gests that geoengineering research activities might hamper mitigation 
efforts (e. g., Jamieson, 1996; Keith, 2000; Gardiner, 2010), which pre-
sumes that geoengineering should not be considered an acceptable 
substitute for mitigation. The central idea is that research increases the 
prospect of geoengineering being regarded as a serious alternative to 
emission reduction (for a discussion of different versions of this argu-
ment see Hale, 2012a; Hourdequin, 2012). Other authors have argued, 
based on historical evidence and analogies to other technologies, that 
geoengineering research might make deployment inevitable (Jamie-
son, 1996; Bunzl, 2009), or that large-scale field tests could amount to 
full-fledged deployment (Robock et al., 2010). It has also been argued 
that geoengineering would constitute an unjust imposition of risks 
on future generations, because the underlying problem would not be 
solved but only counteracted with risky technologies (Gardiner, 2010; 
Ott, 2012; Smith, 2012). The latter argument is particularly relevant to 
SRM technologies that would not affect greenhouse gas concentra-
tions, but it would also apply to some CDR methods, as there may be 
issues of long-term safety and capacity of storage.
Arguments in favour of research on geoengineering point out that 
research does not necessarily prepare for future deployment, but can, 
on the contrary, uncover major flaws in proposed schemes, avoid pre-
mature CE deployment, and eventually foster mitigation efforts (e. g. 
Keith et al., 2010). Another justification for Research and Development 
(R&D) is that it is required to help decision-makers take informed deci-
sions (Leisner and Müller-Klieser, 2010).
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3.4 Values and wellbeing
One branch of ethics is the theory of value. Many different sorts of 
value can arise, and climate change impinges on many of them. Value 
affects nature and many aspects of human life. This section surveys 
some of the values at stake in climate change, and examines how far 
these values can be measured, combined, or weighed against each 
other. Each value is subject to debate and disagreement. For example, 
it is debatable whether nature has value in its own right, apart from 
the benefit it brings to human beings. Decision-making about climate 
change is therefore likely to be contentious.
Since values constitute only one part of ethics, if an action will increase 
value overall it by no means follows that it should be done. Many 
actions benefit some people at the cost of harming others. This raises 
a question of justice even if the benefits in total exceed the costs. 
Whereas a cost to a person can be compensated for by a benefit to 
that same person, a cost to a person cannot be compensated for by 
a benefit to someone else. To suppose it can is not to “take seriously 
the distinction between persons”, as John Rawls puts it (1971, p. 27). 
Harming a person may infringe their rights, or it may be unfair to them. 
For example, when a nation’s economic activities emit GHG, they may 
benefit the nation itself, but may harm people in other nations. Even if 
the benefits are greater in value than the harms, these activities may 
infringe other nations’ rights. Other nations may therefore be entitled 
to object to them on grounds of justice.
Any decision about climate change is likely to promote some values 
and damage others. These may be values of very different sorts. In 
decision making, different values must therefore be put together or 
balanced against each other. Some pairs of values differ so radically 
from each other that they cannot be determinately weighed together. 
For example, it may be impossible to weigh the value of preserving a 
traditional culture against the material income of the people whose 
culture it is, or to weigh the value of biodiversity against human well-
being. Some economists claim that one person’s wellbeing cannot be 
weighed against another’s (Robbins, 1937; Arrow, 1963). When values 
cannot be determinately weighed, they are said to be ‘incommensu-
rable’ or ‘incomparable’ (Chang, 1997). Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA) 
(discussed in Section 3.7.2.1) is a technique that is designed to take 
account of several incommensurable values (De Montis et  al., 2005; 
Zeleny and Cochrane, 1982).
3�4�1 Non-human values
Nature provides great benefits to human beings in ways that range 
from absorbing our waste, to beautifying the world we inhabit. An 
increasing number of philosophers have argued in recent years that 
nature also has value in its own right, independently of its benefits to 
human beings (Leopold, 1949; Palmer, 2011). They have argued that 
we should recognize animal values, the value of life itself, and even the 
value of natural systems and nature itself.
In moral theory, rational adult humans, who are self-conscious subjects 
of a life, are often taken (following Kant, 1956) to have a kind of uncon-
ditional moral worth — sometimes called ‘dignity’ — that is not found 
elsewhere on earth. Others believe that moral worth can be found else-
where (Dryzek, 1997). Many human beings themselves lack rationality 
or subjectivity, yet still have moral worth — the very young, the very 
old and people with various kinds of impairment among them. Given 
that, why deny moral worth to those animals that are to some extent 
subjects of a life, who show emotional sophistication (Regan, 2004), 
and who experience pleasure, pain, suffering, and joy (Singer, 1993)?
An argument for recognizing value in plants as well as animals was 
proposed by Richard Routley (1973). Routley gives the name ‘human 
chauvinism’ to the view that humans are the sole possessors of intrin-
sic value. He asks us to imagine that the last man on earth sets out to 
destroy every living thing, animal or plant. Most people believe this 
would be wrong, but human chauvinists are unable to explain why. 
Human chauvinism appears to be simply a prejudice in favour of the 
human species (Routley and Routley, 1980). In contrast, some philoso-
phers argue that value exists in the lives of all organisms, to the extent 
that they have the capacity to flourish (Taylor, 1986; Agar, 2001).
Going further, other philosophers have argued that biological com-
munities and holistic ecological entities also have value in their own 
right. Some have argued that a species has more value than all of its 
individuals have together, and that an ecosystem has still more value 
(Rolston, 1988, 1999; compare discussion in Brennan and Lo, 2010). 
It has further been proposed that, just as domination of one human 
group by another is a moral evil, showing disrespect for the value of 
others, then so is the domination of nature by humans in general. 
If nature and its systems have moral worth, then the domination of 
nature is also a kind of disrespect (Jamieson, 2010).
If animals, plants, species, and ecosystems do have value in their own 
right, then the moral impact of climate change cannot be gauged by 
its effects on human beings alone. If climate change leads to the loss 
of environmental diversity, the extinction of plant and animal species, 
and the suffering of animal populations, then it will cause great harms 
beyond those it does to human beings. Its effects on species numbers, 
biodiversity, and ecosystems may persist for a very long time, perhaps 
even longer than the lifetime of the human species (Nolt, 2011).
It is very difficult to measure non-human values in a way that makes 
them commensurate with human values. Economists address this 
issue by dividing value into use value (associated with actual use of 
nature — instrumental value) and nonuse or existence value (intrinsic 
value of nature). As an example, biodiversity might have value because 
of the medical drugs that might be discovered among the diverse 
biota (use value). Or biodiversity might be valued by individuals sim-
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ply because they believe that biologic diversity is important, over and 
above any use to people that might occur. The total amount people are 
willing to pay has sometimes been used as an economic measure of 
the total value (instrumental and intrinsic) of these features (Aldred, 
1994). As the discussion of the past few paragraphs has suggested, 
nature may have additional value, over and above the values placed by 
individual humans (Broome, 2009; Spash et al., 2009).
3�4�2 Cultural and social values
The value of human wellbeing is considered in Section 3.4.3, but the 
human world may also possess other values that do not form part of 
the wellbeing of individual humans. Living in a flourishing culture and 
society contributes to a person’s wellbeing (Kymlicka, 1995; Appiah, 
2010), but some authors claim that cultures and societies also pos-
sess values in their own right, over and above the contribution they 
make to wellbeing (Taylor, 1995). Climate change threatens damage to 
cultural artefacts and to cultures themselves (Adger et al., 2012). Evi-
dence suggests that it may already be damaging the culture of Arctic 
indigenous peoples (Ford et al., 2006, 2008; Crate, 2008; Hassol, 2004; 
see also WGII Chapter 12). Cultural values and indigenous peoples are 
discussed in Section 3.10.2.
The degree of equality in a society may also be treated as a value that 
belongs to a society as a whole, rather than to any of the individu-
als who make up the society. Various measures of this value are avail-
able, including the Gini coefficient and the Atkinson measure (Gini, 
1912; Atkinson, 1970); for an assessment see (Sen, 1973). Section 3.5 
explains that the value of equality can alternatively be treated as a 
feature of the aggregation of individual people’s wellbeings, rather 
than as social value separate from wellbeing.
3�4�3 Wellbeing
Most policy concerned with climate change aims ultimately at making 
the world better for people to live in. That is to say, it aims to promote 
people’s wellbeing. A person’s wellbeing, as the term is used here, 
includes everything that is good or bad for the person — everything 
that contributes to making their life go well or badly. What things 
are those — what constitutes a person’s wellbeing? This question has 
been the subject of an extensive literature since ancient times.8 One 
view is that a person’s wellbeing is the satisfaction of their prefer-
ences. Another is that it consists in good feelings such as pleasure. A 
third is that wellbeing consists in possessing the ordinary good things 
of life, such as health, wealth, a long life, and participating well in a 
8 For example: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. Recent work includes: Griffin (1986); 
Sumner (1999); Kraut (2007).
good community. The ‘capabilities approach’ in economics (Sen, 1999) 
embodies this last view. It treats the good things of life as ‘function-
ings’ and ‘capabilities’ — things that a person does and things that 
they have a real opportunity of doing, such as living to old age, having 
a good job, and having freedom of choice.
A person’s wellbeing will be affected by many of the other values that 
are mentioned above, and by many of the considerations of justice 
mentioned in Section 3.3. It is bad for a person to have their rights 
infringed or to be treated unfairly, and it is good for a person to live 
within a healthy culture and society, surrounded by flourishing nature.
Various concrete measures of wellbeing are in use (Fleurbaey, 2009; 
Stiglitz et al., 2009). Each reflects a particular view about what well-
being consists in. For example, many measures of ‘subjective wellbe-
ing’ (Oswald and Wu, 2010; Kahneman and Deaton, 2010) assume that 
wellbeing consists in good feelings. Monetary measures of wellbeing, 
which are considered in Section 3.6, assume that wellbeing consists 
in the satisfaction of preferences. Other measures assume wellbeing 
consists in possessing a number of specific good things. The Human 
Development Index (HDI) is intended to be an approximate measure of 
wellbeing understood as capabilities and functionings (UNDP, 2010). It 
is based on three components: life expectancy, education, and income. 
The capabilities approach has inspired other measures of wellbeing 
too (Dervis and Klugman, 2011). In the context of climate change, 
many different metrics of value are intended to measure particular 
components of wellbeing: among them are the numbers of people at 
risk from hunger, infectious diseases, coastal flooding, or water scar-
city. These metrics may be combined to create a more general measure. 
Schneider et  al. (2000) advocates the use of a suite of five metrics: 
(1) monetary loss, (2) loss of life, (3) quality of life (taking account of 
forced migration, conflict over resources, cultural diversity, and loss of 
cultural heritage sites), (4) species or biodiversity loss, and (5) distribu-
tion and equity.
3�4�4 Aggregation of wellbeing
Whatever wellbeing consists of, policy-making must take into account 
the wellbeing of everyone in the society. So the wellbeings of differ-
ent people have somehow to be aggregated together. How do they 
combine to make up an aggregate value of wellbeing for a society as a 
whole? Social choice theory takes up this problem (Arrow, 1963; Sen, 
1970). Section 3.6 will explain that the aim of economic valuation is to 
measure aggregate wellbeing.
Assume that each person has a level of wellbeing at each time they are 
alive, and call this their ‘temporal wellbeing’ at that time. In a society, 
temporal wellbeing is distributed across times and across the people. 
When a choice is to be made, each of the options leads to a particular 
distribution of wellbeing. Our aim is to assess the value of such distri-
butions. Doing so involves aggregating wellbeings across times and 
across people, to arrive at an overall, social value for the distribution.
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Next let us assume that each person’s temporal wellbeings can be 
aggregated to determine a ‘lifetime wellbeing’ for the person, and that 
the social value of the distribution of wellbeing depends only on these 
lifetime wellbeings. This is the assumption that each person’s wellbe-
ing is “separable”, to use a technical term. It allows us to split aggre-
gation into two steps. First, we aggregate each person’s temporal well-
beings across the times in their life in order to determine their lifetime 
wellbeing. The second step in the next section is to aggregate across 
individuals using a social welfare function.
On one account, a person’s lifetime wellbeing is simply the total of 
their temporal wellbeings at each time they are alive. If a person’s 
wellbeing depended only on the state of their health, this formula 
would be equivalent to ‘QALYs’ or ‘DALYs’ (quality-adjusted life years 
or disability-adjusted life years), which are commonly used in the anal-
ysis of public health (Murray, 1994; Sassi, 2006). These measures take 
a person’s lifetime wellbeing to be the total number of years they live, 
adjusted for their health in each year. Since wellbeing actually depends 
on other things as well as health, QALYs or DALYs provide at best an 
approximate measure of lifetime wellbeing. If they are aggregated 
across people by simple addition, it assumes implicitly that a year of 
healthy life is equally as valuable to one person as it is to another. 
That may be an acceptable approximation for the broad evaluation 
of climate change impacts and policies, especially for evaluating their 
effects on health (Nord et al., 1999; Mathers et al., 2009; but also see 
Currie et al., 2008).
Other accounts give either increasing, (Velleman, 1991) or alternatively 
decreasing, (Kaplow et  al., 2010) weight to wellbeing that comes in 
later years of life, in determining a person’s lifetime wellbeing.
3�4�6 Social welfare functions
Once we have a lifetime wellbeing for each person, the next step is 
to aggregate these lifetime wellbeings across people, to determine an 
overall value for society. This involves comparing one person’s wellbe-
ing with another’s. Many economists have claimed that interpersonal 
comparisons of wellbeing are impossible.9 If they are right, the wellbe-
ings of different people are incommensurable and cannot be aggre-
gated. In this section we set this view aside, and assume that temporal 
wellbeings are measured in a way that is comparable across people.10 
This allows us to aggregate different people’s lifetime wellbeings 
through a social welfare function (SWF) to arrive at an overall value or 
‘social welfare’.11
9 Examples are: Robbins (1937), Archibald (1959), Arrow (1963). A survey and 
discussion of this sceptical view appears in Hammond (1993).
10 Potential bases of interpersonal comparisons are examined in: Fleurbaey and 
Hammond (2004); Sen (1982); Elster and Roemer (1993); Mirrlees (1982); 
Broome, (2004); Arrow (1977); Harsanyi (1977); Adler (2011).
11 A recent major study is Adler (2011).
We shall first consider SWFs under the simplifying but unrealistic 
assumption that the decisions that are to be made do not affect how 
many people exist or which people exist: all the options contain the 
same people. A theorem of Harsanyi’s (1955) gives some grounds for 
thinking that, given this assumption, the SWF is additively separable 
between people. This means it has the form:
Equation 3�4�1 V = v1(w1) + v2(w2) + … + vJ(wJ)
Here wi is person i’s lifetime wellbeing. This formula says that each 
person’s wellbeing can be assigned a value vi(wi), and all these val-
ues — one for each person — are added up to determine the social 
value of the distribution.
The proof of Harsanyi’s Theorem depends on assumptions that can 
be challenged (Diamond, 1967; Broome, 2004; Fleurbaey, 2010). So, 
although the additively separable form shown in Equation 3.4.1 is 
commonly assumed in economic valuations, it is not entirely secure. 
In particular, this form makes it impossible to give any value to equal-
ity except indirectly through prioritarianism, which was introduced in 
Section 3.3.2 and is defined below. The value of inequality cannot be 
measured by the Gini coefficient, for example, since this measure is not 
additively separable (Sen, 1973).
It is often assumed that the functions vi (  ) all have the same form, 
which means that each person’s wellbeing is valued in the same way:
Equation 3�4�2 V = v (w1) + v (w2) + … + v (wJ)
Alternatively, the wellbeing of people who live later is sometimes 
discounted relative to the wellbeing of people who live earlier; this 
implies that the functional form of vi (  ) varies according to the date 
when people live. Discounting of later wellbeing is often called ‘pure’ 
discounting. It is discussed in Section 3.6.2.
Even if we accept Equation 3.4.2, different ethical theories imply dif-
ferent SWFs. Utilitarianism values only the total of people’s wellbeing. 
The SWF may be written:
Equation 3�4�3 V = w1 + w2 + … + wJ
Utilitarianism gives no value to equality in the distribution of wellbe-
ing: a given total of wellbeing has the same value however unequally 
it is distributed among people.
But the idea of distributive justice mentioned in Section 3.3.3 sug-
gests that equality of wellbeing does have value. Equation 3.4.2 will 
give value to equality if the function v() is strictly concave. This 
means the graph of v() curves downwards, as Figure 3.1 illustrates. 
(Section 3.6.1.1 explains that a person’s wellbeing wi is commonly 
assumed to be a strictly concave function of her consumption, but 
this is a different point.) The resulting ethical theory is called priori-
tarianism. As Figure 3.1 shows, according to prioritarianism, improv-
Figure 3�1 | The prioritarian view of social welfare. The figure compares the social val-
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ing a person’s wellbeing contributes more to social welfare if the 
person is badly off than if they are well off. The prioritarian slogan is 
“priority to the worse off”. Prioritarianism indirectly gives value to 
equality: it implies that a given total of wellbeing is more valuable 
the more equally it is distributed (Sen, 1973; Weirich, 1983; Parfit, 
1997). In judgements about climate change, a prioritarian function 
will give relatively more importance to the interests of poorer people 
and poorer countries.
3�4�7 Valuing population
The next problem in aggregating wellbeing is to take account of 
changes in population. Climate change can be expected to affect the 
world’s human population. Severe climate change might even lead to a 
catastrophic collapse of the population (Weitzman, 2009), and even to 
the extinction of human beings. Any valuation of the impact of climate 
change and of policies to mitigate climate change should therefore 
take changes in population into account.
The utilitarian and prioritarian SWFs for a fixed population may be 
extended in a variety of ways to a variable population. For example, 
the utilitarian function may be extended to ‘average utilitarianism’ 
(Hurka, 1982), whose SWF is the average of people’s wellbeing. Aver-
age utilitarianism gives no value to increasing numbers of people. The 
implicit or explicit goal of a great deal of policy-making is to promote 
per capita wellbeing (Hardin, 1968). This is to adopt average utilitari-
anism. This goal tends to favour anti-natalist policies, aimed at limiting 
population. It would strongly favour population control as a means of 
mitigating climate change, and it would not take a collapse of popula-
tion to be, in itself, a bad thing.
The utilitarian function may alternatively be extended to ‘critical-level 
utilitarianism’, whose SWF is the total of the amount by which each 
person’s wellbeing exceeds some fixed critical level. It is
Equation 3�4�4 V = (w1 – c) + (w2 – c) + … + (wJ – c) 
where c is the critical level (Broome, 2004; Blackorby et  al., 2005). 
Other things being equal, critical-level utilitarianism favours adding 
people to the population if their wellbeing is above the critical level.
‘Total utilitarianism’ (Sidgwick, 1907) is critical-level utilitarianism 
with the critical level set to zero. Its SWF is the total of people’s well-
being. Total utilitarianism is implicit in many Integrated Assessment 
Models (IAMs) of climate change (e. g., Nordhaus, 2008). Its mean-
ing is indeterminate until it is settled which level of lifetime wellbeing 
to count as zero. Many total utilitarians set the zero at the level of 
a life that has no good or bad experiences — that is lived in a coma 
throughout, for instance (Arrhenius, forthcoming). Since people on 
average lead better lives than this, total utilitarianism with this zero 
tends to be less anti-natalist than average utilitarianism. However, it 
does not necessarily favour increasing population. Each new person 
damages the wellbeing of existing people, through their emissions of 
GHG, their other demands on Earth’s limited resources, and the emis-
sions of their progeny. If the damage an average person does to others 
in total exceeds their own wellbeing, total utilitarianism, like average 
utilitarianism, favours population control as a means of mitigating cli-
mate change.12
Each of the existing ethical theories about the value of population has 
intuitively unattractive implications (Parfit, 1986). Average utilitarian-
ism is subject to particularly severe objections. Arrhenius (forthcoming) 
crystallizes the problems of population ethics in the form of impos-
sibility theorems. So far, no consensus has emerged about the value of 
population. Yet climate change policies are expected to affect the size 
of the world’s population, and different theories of value imply very 
different conclusions about the value of these policies. This is a serious 
difficulty for evaluating policies aimed at mitigating climate change, 
which has largely been ignored in the literature (Broome, 2012).
3.5 Economics, rights, 
and duties 
Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 have outlined some of the ethical principles 
that can guide decision making for climate change. The remainder of 
this chapter is largely concerned with the concepts and methods of 
12 Harford (1998) shows that an additional person causes damage from her own 
emissions and the emissions of her children (and of their children, etc.). Kelly and 
Kolstad (2001) examine this issue in the specific context of climate change.
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economics. They can be used to aggregate values at different times and 
places, and weigh aggregate value for different policy actions. They can 
also be used to draw information about value from the data provided 
by prices and markets. Economics can measure diverse benefits and 
harms, taking account of uncertainty, to arrive at overall judgements of 
value. It also has much to contribute to the choice and design of policy 
mechanisms, as Section 3.8 and later chapters show.
Valuations provided by economics can be used on a large scale: IAMs 
can be used to simulate the evolution of the world’s economy under 
different climate regimes and determine an economically efficient 
reduction in GHG emissions. On a smaller scale, economic methods of 
CBA can be used in choosing between particular policies and technolo-
gies for mitigation.
Economics is much more than a method of valuation. For example, 
it shows how decision making can be decentralized through market 
mechanisms. This has important applications in policy instruments for 
mitigation with potential for cost-effectiveness and efficiency (Chap-
ters 6 and 15). Economic analysis can also give guidance on how 
policy mechanisms for international cooperation on mitigation can 
be designed to overcome free-rider problems (Chapters 13 and 14). 
However, the methods of economics are limited in what they can do. 
They can be based on ethical principles, as Section 3.6 explains. But 
they cannot take account of every ethical principle. They are suited 
to measuring and aggregating the wellbeing of humans, but not to 
taking account of justice and rights (with the exception of distribu-
tive justice — see below), or other values apart from human wellbeing. 
Moreover, even in measuring and aggregating wellbeing, they depend 
on certain specific ethical assumptions. This section describes the limits 
of economic methods.
Because of their limitations, economic valuations are often not on their 
own a good basis for decision making. They frequently need to be sup-
plemented by other ethical considerations. It may then be appropriate 
to apply techniques of multi-criteria analysis (MCA), discussed in Sec-
tion 3.7.2.1 (Zeleny and Cochrane, 1982; Keeney and Raiffa, 1993; De 
Montis et al., 2005).
3�5�1 Limits of economics in guiding decision 
making
Economics can measure and aggregate human wellbeing, but Sections 
3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 explain that wellbeing may be only one of several 
criteria for choosing among alternative mitigation policies. Other ethi-
cal considerations are not reflected in economic valuations, and those 
considerations may be extremely important for particular decisions 
that have to be made. For example, some have contended that coun-
tries that have emitted a great deal of GHG in the past owe restitution 
to countries that have been harmed by their emissions. If so, this is an 
important consideration in determining how much finance rich coun-
tries should provide to poorer countries to help with their mitigation 
efforts. It suggests that economics alone cannot be used to determine 
who should bear the burden of mitigation (also see Box 3.2).
What ethical considerations can economics cover satisfactorily? Since 
the methods of economics are concerned with value, they do not take 
account of justice and rights in general. However, distributive justice 
can be accommodated within economics, because it can be under-
stood as a value: specifically the value of equality. The theory of fair-
ness within economics (Fleurbaey, 2008) is an account of distributive 
justice. It assumes that the level of distributive justice within a soci-
ety is a function of the wellbeings of individuals, which means it can 
be reflected in the aggregation of wellbeing. In particular, it may be 
measured by the degree of inequality in wellbeing, using one of the 
standard measures of inequality such as the Gini coefficient (Gini, 
1912), as discussed in the previous section. The Atkinson measure of 
inequality (Atkinson, 1970) is based on an additively separable SWF, 
and is therefore particularly appropriate for representing the prioritar-
ian theory described in Section 3.4.6. Furthermore, distributive justice 
can be reflected in weights incorporated into economic evaluations as 
Section 3.6 explains.
Economics is not well suited to taking into account many other aspects 
of justice, including compensatory justice. For example, a CBA might 
not show the drowning of a Pacific island as a big loss, since the island 
has few inhabitants and relatively little economic activity. It might con-
clude that more good would be done in total by allowing the island 
to drown: the cost of the radical action that would be required to 
save the island by mitigating climate change globally would be much 
greater than the benefit of saving the island. This might be the correct 
conclusion in terms of overall aggregation of costs and benefits. But 
the island’s inhabitants might have a right not to have their homes 
and livelihoods destroyed as a result of the GHG emissions of richer 
nations far away. If that is so, their right may override the conclusions 
of CBA. It may give those nations who emit GHG a duty to protect the 
people who suffer from it, or at least to make restitution to them for 
any harms they suffer.
Even in areas where the methods of economics can be applied in princi-
ple, they cannot be accepted without question (Jamieson, 1992; Sagoff, 
2008). Particular simplifying assumptions are always required, as shown 
throughout this chapter. These assumptions are not always accurate 
or appropriate, and decision-makers need to keep in mind the result-
ing limitations of the economic analyses. For example, climate change 
will shorten many people’s lives. This harm may in principle be included 
within a CBA, but it remains highly contentious how that should be 
done. Another problem is that, because economics can provide con-
crete, quantitative estimates of some but not all values, less quantifi-
able considerations may receive less attention than they deserve.
The extraordinary scope and scale of climate change raises particular 
difficulties for economic methods (Stern, forthcoming). First, many of 
the common methods of valuation in economics are best designed for 
marginal changes, whereas some of the impacts of climate change and 
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efforts at mitigation are not marginal (Howarth and Norgaard, 1992). 
Second, the very long time scale of climate change makes the discount 
rate crucial at the same time as it makes it highly controversial (see 
Section 3.6.2). Third, the scope of the problem means it encompasses 
the world’s extremes of wealth and poverty, so questions of distribu-
tion become especially important and especially difficult. Fourth, mea-
suring non-market values — such as the existence of species, natural 
environments, or traditional ways of life of local societies — is fraught 
with difficulty. Fifth, the uncertainty that surrounds climate change is 
very great. It includes the likelihood of irreversible changes to societies 
and to nature, and even a small chance of catastrophe. This degree of 
uncertainty sets special problems for economics (Nelson, 2013).
3.6 Aggregation of costs 
and benefits
3�6�1 Aggregating individual wellbeing
Policies that respond to climate change almost always have some good 
and some bad effects; we say they have ‘benefits’ and ‘costs’. In choos-
ing a policy, we may treat one of the available options as a standard 
of comparison — for instance, the status quo. Other options will have 
costs and benefits relative to this standard. Most mitigation strategies 
have costs in the present and yield benefits in the future. Policy-making 
involves assessing the values of these benefits and costs and weigh-
ing them against each other. Chapter 6 contains an example in which 
different mitigation strategies yielding different temporal allocations 
of climate impacts are compared. The weighing of costs and benefits 
need not be a precise process. Sections 3.2 and 3.4 explain that costs 
and benefits may be values of very different sorts, which cannot be 
precisely weighed against each other. They may also be very uncertain.
Nevertheless, the discipline of economics has developed methods for 
measuring numerically values of one particular sort: human wellbeing. 
In this section, we describe these methods; Section 3.5 explains their 
serious limitations. Economists often use money as their unit of mea-
surement for values, but not always. In health economics, for example, 
the unit of benefit for health care is often the ‘quality-adjusted life 
year’ (QALY) (see Box 3.3). In economics, monetary measures of value 
are used in cost-effectiveness analysis (see Weimer and Vining, 2010), 
in estimating the social cost of carbon (see Section 3.9.4), in inter-tem-
poral optimization within IAMs (e. g., Stern, 2007; Nordhaus, 2008), in 
CBA and elsewhere.
Generally the overall value of aggregate wellbeing needs to be mea-
sured, and not merely the wellbeing of each individual. A numerical 
measure of overall wellbeing may be based on ethical analysis, through 
a SWF of the sort introduced in Section 3.4. This basis of valuation is 
described here. The literature contains a putative alternative basis built 
on the ‘potential Pareto criterion’ (see Box 3.4), but this is subject to 
severe objections (De Scitovszky, 1941; Gorman, 1955; Arrow, 1963, 
Chapter 4; Boadway and Bruce, 1984; Blackorby and Donaldson, 1990).
We take as our point of departure the formulation of the SWF in Equa-
tion 3.4.2, which is based on assumptions described in Section 3.4.6. 
To these we now add a further assumption that times are separable, 
meaning that the distribution of wellbeing can be evaluated at each 
time separately and its overall value is an aggregate of these separate 
‘snap-shot’ values. A theorem of Gorman’s (1968) ensures that social 
welfare then takes the fully additively separable form:
Equation 3�6�1 V = δ1V1 + δ2V2 + . . . + δTVT
Box 3�2 | Who mitigates versus who pays?
To mitigate climate change, emissions of GHG will need to be 
reduced to varying degrees worldwide. Economic analysis tells 
us that, for the sake of cost-effectiveness, the greatest reductions 
should be made where they can be made most cheaply. Ideally, 
emissions should be reduced in each place to just the extent that 
makes the marginal cost of further reductions the same every-
where. One way of achieving this result is to have a carbon price 
that is uniform across the world; or it might be approximated by a 
mix of policy instruments (see Section 3.8).
Since, for efficiency, mitigation should take place where it is 
cheapest, emissions of GHG should be reduced in many develop-
ing countries, as well as in rich ones. However, it does not follow 
that mitigation must be paid for by those developing countries; 
rich countries may pay for mitigation that takes place in poor 
countries. Financial flows between countries make it possible to 
separate the question of where mitigation should take place from 
the question of who should pay for it. Because mitigating climate 
change demands very large-scale action, if put in place these 
transfers might become a significant factor in the international 
distribution of wealth. Provided appropriate financial transfers 
are made, the question of where mitigation should take place is 
largely a matter for the economic theory of efficiency, tempered by 
ethical considerations. But the distribution of wealth is a matter of 
justice among countries, and a major issue in the politics of climate 
change (Stanton, 2011). It is partly a matter of distributive justice, 
which economics can take into account, but compensatory justice 
may also be involved, which is an issue for ethics (Section 3.3).
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where each Vt is the value of wellbeing at time t and is the total of the 
values of individual wellbeings at that time. That is:
Equation 3�6�2 Vt = v (w1t) + v (w2t) + . . . + v (wIt)
Each wit is the temporal wellbeing of person i at time t. Each δt is a 
‘discount factor’, which shows how wellbeing at time t is valued rela-
tive to wellbeing at other times.
The assumption that times are separable has some unsatisfactory 
consequences. First, it cannot give value to equality between people’s 
lives taken as a whole, but only to equality at each particular time. 
Second, Equation 3.6.1 is inconsistent with average utilitarianism, or 
with valuing per capita temporal wellbeing at any time, whereas per 
capita wellbeing is a common object of climate-change policy. Third, 
Equation 3.6.1 makes no distinction between discounting within 
a single person’s life and intergenerational discounting. Yet a case 
can be made for treating these two sorts of discounting differently 
(Kaplow et al., 2010). Nevertheless, this assumption and the resulting 
equation Equation 3.6.1 underlies the usual practice of economists 
when making valuations. First they aggregate temporal wellbeing 
across people at each time to determine a snapshot social value for 
each time. Then all these values are aggregated across times. This sec-
tion and the next describe the usual practice based on these equa-
tions.13 The second step — aggregation across time — is considered in 
Section 3.6.1. The rest of this section considers the first step — aggre-
gation at time.
13 An alternative approach does not assume separability of times. First it determines 
a lifetime wellbeing for each person in the way described in Section 3.4.5. For 
instance, i’s lifetime wellbeing might be a discounted total of her temporal wellbe-
ings. Then this approach aggregates across people using Equation 3.4.2. See 
Fullerton and Rogers (1993), Murphy and Topel (2006) and Kaplow et al. (2010).
Box 3�3 | The value of life
Climate change may shorten many people’s lives, and mitigat-
ing climate change may extend many people’s lives. Lives must 
therefore be included in any CBA that is concerned with climate 
change. The literature contains two different approaches to valu-
ing a person’s life. One is based on the length of time the person 
gains if their life is saved, adjusted according to the quality of 
their life during that time (QALY), an approach widely used to 
value lives in health economics and public health. For assessing 
the impact of climate on human health and longevity, the World 
Health Organization uses the ‘disability-adjusted life year’ (DALY), 
which is similar (Mathers et al., 2009; for DALYs see, Murray, 
1994).
The other approach values the extension of a person’s life on the 
basis of what they would be willing to pay for it. In practice, this 
figure is usually derived from what the person would be willing 
to pay for an increased chance of having an extended life. If, say, 
a person is willing to pay $100 to reduce her chance of dying in a 
road accident from 2 in 10,000 to 1 in 10,000, then her willing-
ness to pay (WTP) for extending her life is $100 x 10,000 = $1 
million. A WTP measure of the value of life is widely used in envi-
ronmental economics (e. g., U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
2010 Appendix B); it is often known as a ‘value of statistical life’ 
(Viscusi and Aldy, 2003).
The main differences between these approaches are:
1. Since WTP is measured in money, it is immediately compa-
rable with other values measured in money. QALYs need to be 
assigned a monetary value to make them comparable (Mason 
et al., 2009).
2. The use of QALYs implies a theoretical assumption about the 
value of extending a life — that it is proportional to the length 
of the extension, adjusted for quality — whereas WTP methods 
generally leave it entirely to the individual to set a value on 
extending their own life (Broome, 1994).
3. Each measure implies a different basis for interpersonal 
comparisons of value. When QALYs are aggregated across 
people by addition, the implicit assumption is that a year of 
healthy life has the same value for each person. When WTP is 
aggregated across people by addition (without distributional 
weights), the implicit assumption is that a dollar has the same 
value for each person. Neither assumption is accurate, but for 
comparisons involving very rich countries and very poor ones, 
the former assumption seems nearer the truth (Broome, 2012, 
Chapter 9).
The two approaches can converge. The text explains that distribu-
tional weights should be applied to monetary values before they 
are aggregated, and this is true of WTP for extending life. If appro-
priate weights are applied, WTP becomes more nearly propor-
tional to QALYs. Indeed, if we adopt the assumption that a QALY 
has the same value for each person, we may use it to give us a 
basis for calculating distributional weights to apply to money val-
ues (Somanathan, 2006). For example, suppose WTP for a 30-year 
extension to healthy life in the United States is USD 5 million, and 
in India it is USD 250,000; then, on this assumption, USD 1 to an 
Indian has the same social value as USD 20 to an American.
227




Climate policies affect the wellbeing of individuals by changing their 
environment and their individual consumption. The first step in a prac-
tical economic valuation is to assign a monetary value to the costs and 
benefits that come to each person at each time from the change. This 
value may be either the amount of money the person is willing to pay 
for the change, or the amount they are willing to accept as compensa-
tion for it. If the change is a marginal increase or decrease in the per-
son’s consumption of a marketed commodity, it will be equal to the 
price of the commodity.
The effect of a change on the person’s wellbeing is the monetary value 
of the change multiplied by the rate at which money contributes to the 
person’s wellbeing. This rate is the marginal benefit of money or mar-
ginal utility of money to the person. It is generally assumed to dimin-
ish with increasing income (Marshall, 1890; Dalton, 1920; Pigou, 1932, 
p. 89; Atkinson, 1970).
The effects of the change on each person’s wellbeing at each time must 
next be aggregated across people to determine the effect on social 
value. Equation 3.6.2 shows how each person’s wellbeing contributes 
to social value through the value function v(). The change in wellbeing 
must therefore be multiplied by the marginal social value of wellbeing, 
which is the first derivative of this function. It is an ethical parameter. 
According to utilitarianism, that marginal social value is constant and 
the same for everyone; according to prioritarianism, it diminishes with 
increasing wellbeing.
Box 3�4 | Optimality versus Pareto improvement in climate change
The assessment of a change normally requires benefits to be 
weighed against costs. An exception is a change − known as a 
‘Pareto improvement’ − that benefits some people without harm-
ing anyone. Climate change provides one possible example. GHG 
is an externality: a person whose activities emit GHG does not 
bear the full cost of their activities; some of the costs are borne 
by those who are harmed by the emissions. Consequently, climate 
change causes Pareto inefficiency, which means that a Pareto 
improvement would in principle be possible. Indeed it would be 
possible to remove the inefficiency in a way that requires no sac-
rifice by anyone in any generation, compared to business-as-usual 
(BAU). To achieve this result, the present generation must real-
locate investment towards projects that reduce emissions of GHG, 
while maintaining its own consumption. Because it maintains 
its own consumption, the present generation makes no sacrifice. 
Because it reduces its conventional investment, this generation 
bequeaths less conventional capital to future generations. Other 
things being equal, this reallocation would make future genera-
tions less well off, but the reduction in emissions will more than 
compensate them for that loss (Stern, forthcoming; Foley, 2009; 
Rezai et al., 2011).
It is commonly assumed that climate change calls for sacrifices by 
the present generation for the sake of future generations. Figure 
3.2 illustrates why. The possibility frontier shows what combina-
tions of consumption are possible for present and future genera-
tions. Because of the externality, Business-as-usual lies below this 
frontier. The frontier can be reached by a Pareto improvement. 
Contours of two different SWFs are shown: one SWF places more 
value than the other on future consumption relative to present 
consumption. The two contours reflect in a purely illustrative 
way SWFs that are implicit in Stern (2007) and Nordhaus (2008) 
respectively. The point where a contour touches the possibility 
frontier is the social optimum according to that function. Neither 
optimum is a Pareto improvement on business-as-usual. Although 
the inefficiency could be removed without any sacrifices, the best 
outcomes described by both Stern and Nordhaus do require a 
sacrifice by the present generation.
From an international rather than an intergenerational perspec-
tive, it is also true on the same grounds that the inefficiency of 
climate change can be removed without any nation making a 
sacrifice (Posner and Weisbach, 2010). But it does not follow that 
this would be the best outcome.
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In sum, the effect of a change in social value at a particular time is 
calculated by aggregating the monetary value of the change to each 
person, weighted by the social marginal value of money to the person, 
which is the product of the marginal benefit of money to that per-
son and the marginal social value of their wellbeing (Fleurbaey, 2009). 
Since the marginal benefit of money is generally assumed to dimin-
ish with increasing income, the marginal social value of money can be 
assumed to do the same.
Many practical CBAs value costs and benefits according to aggregated 
monetary values without any weighting. The implicit assumption is that 
the marginal social value of money is the same for each person. The 
consequence of omitting weights is particularly marked when applying 
CBA to climate change, where extreme differences in wealth between 
rich and poor countries need to be taken into account. An example 
appeared in the Second Assessment Report of the IPCC (1995), where 
it considered the value of human life. The report showed that the effect 
of ignoring weighting factors would be to assign perhaps twenty times 
more value to an American life than to an Indian life. (See also Box 3.3). 
Even within a single country, weighting makes a big difference. Drèze 
(1998) examined the benefits of reducing pollution in Delhi and con-
trasts New Delhi, which is relatively rich, with Delhi, which is relatively 
poorer. If the criterion is reducing pollution for the greatest number 
of people, then projects in Delhi will be favoured; whereas projects in 
New Delhi will be favoured if the criterion is unweighted net benefits. 
Another example of a monetary measure of value that does not incor-
porate distributional weights is Gross Domestic Product (GDP). To 
evaluate changes by their effect on GDP is, once again, to assume that 
the value of a dollar to a rich person is the same as its value to a poor 
person (Schneider et al., 2000).
It is sometimes assumed that CBA is conducted against the back-
ground of efficient markets and an optimal redistributive taxation 
system, so that the distribution of income can be taken as ideal from 
society’s point of view. If that were true, it might reduce the need for 
distributional weights. But this is not an acceptable assumption for 
most projects aimed at climate change. Credit and risk-sharing mar-
kets are imperfect at the world level, global coordination is limited by 
agency problems, information is asymmetric, and no supra-national tax 
authority can reduce worldwide inequalities. Furthermore, intergen-
erational transfers are difficult. In any case, the power of taxation to 
redistribute income is limited because redistributive taxes create inef-
ficiency (Mirrlees, 1971). Even optimal taxation would therefore not 
remove the need for distributional weights. Thus, the assumption that 
incomes are (second-best) optimally redistributed does not neutralize 
the argument for welfare weights in aggregating costs and benefits.
The need for weights makes valuation more complicated in practice. 
The data available for costs and benefits is generally aggregated across 
people, rather than separated for particular individuals. This means that 
weights cannot be applied directly to individuals’ costs and benefits, as 
they ideally should be. This difficulty can be overcome by applying suit-
ably calculated weights to the prices of commodities, calculated on the 
basis of income distribution of each commodity’s consumers.14
3�6�2 Aggregating costs and benefits across 
time
In climate change decisions, aggregating the pros and cons of alterna-
tive actions is particularly difficult because most benefits of mitigation 
will materialize only in the distant future. On the other hand, the costs 
of mitigation are borne today. Using a discount rate can therefore make 
a big difference in evaluating long-term projects or investments for cli-
mate change mitigation. For example, a benefit of $1 million occurring 
in 100 years has a present value of $369,000 if the discount rate is 
1 %, $52,000 if it is 3 %, and $ 1,152 if it is 7 %. An important debate 
in economics since AR4, spawned in part by the Stern (2007) Review, 
has centred on the discount rate that should be applied in evaluating 
climate change impacts and mitigation costs (Nordhaus, 2007; Stern, 
2008; Dasgupta, 2008; Smith, 2010; see also Quiggin, 2008).
A descriptive approach to discounting examines how human beings 
trade-off the present against their own futures. It focuses on how 
individuals and markets make inter-temporal financial decisions, as 
revealed by the market interest rate. A simple arbitrage argument 
favours using the interest rate as the discount rate for climate policy 
decisions: if one reallocates capital from a safe but marginal project 
(whose return must be equal to the interest rate) to a safe project with 
the same maturity whose return is smaller than the interest rate, the 
net impact is null for the current generation, and is negative for future 
generations. Thus, when projects are financed by a reallocation of capi-
tal rather than an increase in aggregate saving (reducing consump-
tion), the discount rate should be equal to the shadow cost of capital. 
Table 3.1 documents real returns on different classes of assets in west-
ern countries, including government bonds, which are usually consid-
ered to be the safest, most risk-free assets. As can be seen, these rates 
are close to zero. 
The same arbitrage argument could be used to discount risky projects. 
In that case, the discount rate should be equal to the expected rate of 
return of traded assets with the same risk profile. For example, if the 
project has the same risk profile as a diversified portfolio of equity, 
one should use the expected rate of return of equity, as documented in 
Table 3.1. It contains a relatively large equity premium.
This descriptive approach to the discount rate has many drawbacks. 
First, we should not expect markets to aggregate preferences effi-
ciently when some agents are not able to trade, as is the case for 
future generations (Diamond, 1977). Second, current interest rates 
14 The method is presented in Drèze and Stern (1989, pp. 909 – 989). Applications of 
distributional weights to climate change appear in Azar and Sterner (1996); and 
Fankhauser et al. (1997).
Table 3�1 | Real returns of financial assets. Source: Updated data from (Dimson, 2002), in Gollier (2012).
Government Bills  
(maturity < 1 year)
Government Bonds  
(maturity =10 years)
Equity
1900 – 2006 1971 – 2006 1900 – 2006 1971 – 2006 1900 – 2006 1971 – 2006
Australia 0.6 % 2.5 % 1.3 % 2.8 % 7.8 % 6.3 %
France – 2.9 % 1.2 % – 0.3 % 6.6 % 3.7 % 7.8 %
Japan – 2.0 % 0.4 % – 1.3 % 3.9 % 4.5 % 5.0 %
United Kingdom 1.0 % 1.9 % 1.3 % 3.9 % 5.6 % 7.1 %
USA 1.0 % 1.3 % 1.9 % 4.0 % 6.6 % 6.6 %
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are driven by the potentially impatient attitude of current consumers 
towards transferring their own consumption to the future. But climate 
change is about transferring consumption across different people and 
generations, so that determining the appropriate social discount rate 
is mostly a normative problem. Thirdly, we do not observe safe assets 
with maturities similar to those of climate impacts, so the arbitrage 
argument cannot be applied.
We now examine the problem of a social policy-maker who must make 
climate policy choices using a SWF discussed earlier. In aggregating 
damages and costs over time, in order to make things comparable 
across long periods we value consumption changes in the future by 
equivalent changes in consumption today. These changes in the struc-
ture of consumption should be evaluated in monetary terms using 
values described in Section 3.6.1.1. The incorporation of the intergen-
erational equity objective has challenged the traditional CBA approach 
for the evaluation of climate change policies. Practitioners of CBA and 
evaluators are expected to use discount rates that are consistent with 
the pre-specified SWF that represents the society’s intergenerational 
values, as in AR2 (1995). We simplify the model used in Section 3.6.1.1 
by assuming only one generation per period and only one consumer 
good. In an uncertain context, an action is socially desirable if it raises 
the SWF given by 3.6.1:
Equation 3�6�3  V =  ∑  
t = 0
∞
 e −δt Eu ( c t ) 
where u ( c t ) = v ( w ( c t ) ) =  V t is the contribution to the SWF of genera-
tion t consuming  c t . Because  c t is uncertain, one should take the expec-
tation Eu (c t ) of this uncertain contribution. The concavity of function u 
combines prioritarism (inequality aversion) and risk aversion. Param-
eter δ measures our collective pure preference for the present, so that 
the discount factor d ( t ) =  e −δt decreases exponentially. δ is an ethical 
parameter that is not related to the level of impatience shown by indi-
viduals in weighting their own future wellbeing (Frederick et al., 2002). 
Many authors have argued for a rate of zero or near-zero (Ramsey, 
1928; Pigou, 1932; Harrod, 1949; Parfit, 1986; Cowen, 1992; Schelling, 
1995; Broome, 2004; Stern, 2008). Assuming δ  >  0 would penalize 
future generations just because they are born later. Many regard such 
‘datism’ to be as ethically unacceptable as sexism or racism. Cowen 
(1992) points out that discounting violates the Pareto principle for a 
person who might live either at one time or at a later time. Some have 
argued for a positive rate (Dasgupta and Heal, 1980; Arrow, 1999). A 
traditional argument against a zero rate is that it places an extremely 
heavy moral burden on the current generation (see, e. g., Dasgupta, 
2007). But even when δ = 0, as we see below, we still end up with a 
discount rate of about 4 %, which is higher than it was during the last 
century. Stern (2008) used δ = 0.1 % to account for risk of extinction. 
We conclude that a broad consensus is for a zero or near-zero pure 
rate of time preference for the present.
In a growing economy ( c t  >  c 0 ), investing for the future in a safe proj-
ect has the undesirable effect of transferring consumption from the 
poor (current generations) to the wealthy (future generations). Thus, 
investing in safe projects raises intergenerational inequalities. The 
discount rate can then be interpreted as the minimum rate of return 
that is necessary to compensate for this adverse effect on the SWF of 
investing for the future. This is summarized by the Ramsey rule (i. e., 
the consumption approach to discounting) (Ramsey, 1928). Assuming 
a standard constant elasticity in the consumption utility function (e. g., 
u(c) =  c 1 – η  / (1 – η)), and no uncertainty,15 the minimum rate of return 
ρt of a project that marginally transfers consumption from 0 to t and 
that guarantees an increase of intergenerational welfare V is defined 
as follows: 
Equation 3�6�4 ρt = δ + ηgt
where δ represents the pure rate at which society discounts the utility 
of future generations, and gt is the annualized growth rate of mon-
etized consumption anticipated at date t, and η > 0 measures inequal-
ity aversion. The greater the anticipated economic growth rate gt, the 
higher the social discount rate ρt. The growth rate gt is an empirical 
variable that represents our collective beliefs about prospective eco-
nomic growth. In Box 3.5, we discuss plausible values for the inequal-
ity aversion parameter η.
15 For alternative assumptions, see Gollier (2002).
ably calculated weights to the prices of commodities, calculated on the 
basis of income distribution of each commodity’s consumers.14
3�6�2 Aggregating costs and benefits across 
time
In climate change decisions, aggregating the pros and cons of alterna-
tive actions is particularly difficult because most benefits of mitigation 
will materialize only in the distant future. On the other hand, the costs 
of mitigation are borne today. Using a discount rate can therefore make 
a big difference in evaluating long-term projects or investments for cli-
mate change mitigation. For example, a benefit of $1 million occurring 
in 100 years has a present value of $369,000 if the discount rate is 
1 %, $52,000 if it is 3 %, and $ 1,152 if it is 7 %. An important debate 
in economics since AR4, spawned in part by the Stern (2007) Review, 
has centred on the discount rate that should be applied in evaluating 
climate change impacts and mitigation costs (Nordhaus, 2007; Stern, 
2008; Dasgupta, 2008; Smith, 2010; see also Quiggin, 2008).
A descriptive approach to discounting examines how human beings 
trade-off the present against their own futures. It focuses on how 
individuals and markets make inter-temporal financial decisions, as 
revealed by the market interest rate. A simple arbitrage argument 
favours using the interest rate as the discount rate for climate policy 
decisions: if one reallocates capital from a safe but marginal project 
(whose return must be equal to the interest rate) to a safe project with 
the same maturity whose return is smaller than the interest rate, the 
net impact is null for the current generation, and is negative for future 
generations. Thus, when projects are financed by a reallocation of capi-
tal rather than an increase in aggregate saving (reducing consump-
tion), the discount rate should be equal to the shadow cost of capital. 
Table 3.1 documents real returns on different classes of assets in west-
ern countries, including government bonds, which are usually consid-
ered to be the safest, most risk-free assets. As can be seen, these rates 
are close to zero. 
The same arbitrage argument could be used to discount risky projects. 
In that case, the discount rate should be equal to the expected rate of 
return of traded assets with the same risk profile. For example, if the 
project has the same risk profile as a diversified portfolio of equity, 
one should use the expected rate of return of equity, as documented in 
Table 3.1. It contains a relatively large equity premium.
This descriptive approach to the discount rate has many drawbacks. 
First, we should not expect markets to aggregate preferences effi-
ciently when some agents are not able to trade, as is the case for 
future generations (Diamond, 1977). Second, current interest rates 
14 The method is presented in Drèze and Stern (1989, pp. 909 – 989). Applications of 
distributional weights to climate change appear in Azar and Sterner (1996); and 
Fankhauser et al. (1997).
Table 3�1 | Real returns of financial assets. Source: Updated data from (Dimson, 2002), in Gollier (2012).
Government Bills  
(maturity < 1 year)
Government Bonds  
(maturity =10 years)
Equity
1900 – 2006 1971 – 2006 1900 – 2006 1971 – 2006 1900 – 2006 1971 – 2006
Australia 0.6 % 2.5 % 1.3 % 2.8 % 7.8 % 6.3 %
France – 2.9 % 1.2 % – 0.3 % 6.6 % 3.7 % 7.8 %
Japan – 2.0 % 0.4 % – 1.3 % 3.9 % 4.5 % 5.0 %
United Kingdom 1.0 % 1.9 % 1.3 % 3.9 % 5.6 % 7.1 %
USA 1.0 % 1.3 % 1.9 % 4.0 % 6.6 % 6.6 %
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By using a near-zero time discount rate, Stern (2007, see also 2008) 
advanced the debate in the literature. Despite disagreement on the 
empirical approach to estimating the discount rate, the literature sug-
gests consensus for using declining discount rates over time. Different 
prominent authors and committees have taken different positions on 
the values of δ, η and g, making different recommendations for the 
social discount rate ρ. We summarize them in Table 3.2.
In Table 3.2, the Ramsey formula can be seen to yield a wide range of 
discount rates, although most or all of the estimates reflect developed 
country experience. From this table and Box 3.5, a relative consensus 
emerges in favour of δ = 0 and η between 1 and 3, although they are 
prescriptive parameters. This means that the normative Ramsey rule 
leads to a recommendation for a social discount rate of between one 
and three times the estimated growth rate in consumption between 
today and the relevant safe benefit or cost to be discounted. The social 
discount rate is normative because it relies on the intensity of our col-
lective inequality aversion. However, the practical coherence of our 
ethical principles requires that if one has high inequality aversion, one 
should also redistribute wealth more assiduously from the currently 
rich to the currently poor. Furthermore, it is ultimately a judgement by 
the policymaker on the appropriate value of the parameters of the 
Ramsey rule, and thus the social discount rate.
The discount rate described here should be used to discount risk-free 
costs and benefits (Anthoff et al., 2009). The rates that appear in Table 
3.2 are higher than real interest rates observed on financial markets, as 
documented in Table 3.1. This discrepancy defines the risk-free rate puz-
zle (Weil, 1989). The recent literature on discounting has tried to solve 
this puzzle by taking into account the uncertainty surrounding economic 
Box 3�5 | Plausible values for collective inequality aversion (η)
Consider the following thought experiment. A country has two 
equally populated social groups. The wealthy group consumes 
twice as many goods and services as the poor group. Consider 
also an economic policy whose aim is to increase consumption by 
1 unit for every person in the poor group. This implies a reduc-
tion of consumption for every wealthy person by x units, which 
may not be equal to 1 owing to inherent inefficiencies in the 
tax system. If one is neutral about inequalities, one would not 
accept this policy if x is larger than 1. Inequality aversion justifies 
accepting some productive inefficiency, so that an x larger than 
1 may be allowed. What is the maximum value of x that one 
would accept to implement the policy? Answering this question 
tells us something about inequality aversion, with a large x being 
associated with a larger η. If one is collectively ready to sacrifice 
as much as x = 2 units of consumption from the rich to provide 
one unit of consumption to the poor, this is compatible with an 
inequality aversion index η = 1. An x of 4 or 8 would correspond 
to an index of inequality aversion of 2 and 3, respectively.
Behind the veil of ignorance (Rawls, 1971), our collective prefer-
ences towards inequality should be identified as our individual risk 
aversion. The economic literature in finance and macroeconomics 
usually assumes a η between 1 and 5 to explain observed behav-
iours towards risk, as well as asset prices (Kocherlakota, 1996).
Table 3�2 | Calibration of the discount rate based on the Ramsey rule (Equation 3.6.4).
Author
Rate of pure preference 
for present
Inequality aversion Anticipated Growth rate Implied social discount rate
Cline (1992) 0 % 1.5 1 % 1.5 %
IPCC (1996) 0 % 1.5 – 2 1.6 % – 8 % 2.4 % – 16 %
Arrow (1999) 0 % 2 2 %  4 %
UK: Green Book (HM Treasury, 2003) 1.5 % 1 2 % 3.5 %*
US UMB (2003)** 3 % – 7 %
France: Rapport Lebègue (2005) 0 % 2 2 % 4 %*
Stern (2007) 0.1 % 1 1.3 % 1.4 %
Arrow (2007) 2 – 3
Dasgupta (2007) 0.1 % 2 – 4
Weitzman (2007a) 2 % 2 2 % 6 %
Nordhaus (2008) 1 % 2 2 % 5 %
Notes:
* Decreasing with the time horizon.
** OMB uses a descriptive approach.
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growth. Prudent agents should care more about the future if the future 
is more uncertain, in line with the concept of sustainable development. 
Assuming a random walk for the growth rate of consumption per capita, 
this argument applied to Equation 3.6.4 leads to an extended Ramsey 
rule in which a negative precautionary effect is added:
Equation 3�6�5  ρt = δ + ηgt – 0.5 η(η + 1)σt2
where σt is the annualized volatility of the growth rate of GDP / cap, 
and gt is now the expected annualized growth rate until time horizon t. 
In Table 3.3, we calibrate this formula for different countries by using 
the estimation of the trend and volatility parameters of observed 
growth rates of consumption per capita over the period 1969 – 2010, 
using η = 2. We learn from this Table that the Ramsey rule (Equation 
3.4.1) often provides a good approximation of the social discount rate 
to be applied to consumption. It also shows that because of differ-
ences in growth expectations, nations may have different attitudes 
towards reducing present consumption for the benefit of future gener-
ations. This is also a further source of international disagreement on 
the strength of GHG mitigation efforts. The global discount rate for 
evaluating global actions will therefore depend on how costs and ben-
efits are allocated across countries.16
A prudent society should favour actions that generate more benefits 
for the generations that face greater uncertainty, which justifies a 
16 Table 3.3 is based on the assumption that the growth process is a random walk, 
so that the average growth rate converges to its mean in the very long run. It 
would be more realistic to recognize that economic growth has a much more 
uncertain nature in the long run: shocks on growth rates are often persistent, 
economies faces long-term cycles of uncertain length, and some parameters of 
the growth process are uncertain. Because these phenomena generate a positive 
correlation in future annual growth rates, they tend to magnify the uncertainty 
affecting the wellbeing of distant generations, compared to the random walk 
hypothesis of the extended Ramsey rule (Equation 3.6.5).
decreasing term structure for risk-free discount rates (Gollier, 2012; 
Arrow et al., 2013; Weitzman, 2013). These results are related to the 
literature on Gamma discounting (Weitzman, 1998, 2001, 2010b; New-
ell and Pizer, 2003; Gollier and Weitzman, 2010). A simple guideline 
emerging from this literature is that the long-maturity discount rate is 
equal to the smallest discount rate computed from Equation 3.6.5 with 
the different plausible levels of its parameters. For example, assuming 
η = 2, if the trend of growth gt is unknown but somewhere between 
1 % and 3 %, a discount rate around 2 x mean (1 %, 3 %)  =  4 % is 
socially desirable in the short term, although a discount rate of only 2 x 
min (1 %, 3 %) = 2 % is desirable for very long maturities.
Assuming a constant rate of pure preference for the present (actu-
ally δ = 0), these recommendations yield a perfectly time-consistent 
valuation strategy, although the resulting discount rates decrease with 
maturity. A time inconsistency problem arises only if we assume that 
the rate of pure preference for the present varies according to the time 
horizon. Economists have tended to focus on hyperbolic discounting 
and time inconsistency (Laibson, 1997) and the separation between 
risk aversion and consumption aversion fluctuations over time (Epstein 
and Zin, 1991). See Section 3.10.1 and Chapter 2.
The literature deals mainly with the rate at which safe projects should 
be discounted. In most cases, however, actions with long-lasting 
impacts are highly uncertain, something that must be taken into 
account in their evaluation. Actions that reduce the aggregated risk 
borne by individuals should be rewarded and those that increase risk 
should be penalized. This has traditionally been done by raising the 
discount rate of a project by a risk premium π = βπg that is equal to 
the project-specific risk measure β times a global risk premium πg. The 
project-specific beta is defined as the expected increase in the ben-
efit of the project when the consumption per capita increases by 1 %. 
It measures the additional risk that the action imposes on the com-
munity. On average, it should be around 1. As we see from Table 3.3, 
Table 3�3 | Country-specific discount rate computed from the Ramsey rule (Equation 3.6.5) using the historical mean g and standard deviation σ of growth rates of real GDP / cap 
1969 – 2010, together with δ = 0,  and η = 2. Source: Gollier (2012).
  Country g σ
Discount rate
Ramsey rule Equation 3�6�4 Extended Ramsey rule  
OECD countries
United States 1.74 % 2.11 % 3.48 % 3.35 %
United Kingdom 1.86 % 2.18 % 3.72 % 3.58 %
Japan 2.34 % 2.61 % 4.68 % 4.48 %
Economies in transition
China 7.60 % 3.53 % 15.20 % 14.83 %
India 3.34 % 3.03 % 6.68 % 6.40 %
Russia 1.54 % 5.59 % 3.08 % 2.14 %
Africa
Gabon 1.29 % 9.63 % 2.58 % – 0.20 %
Zaire (RDC) – 2.76 % 5.31 % – 5.52 % – 6.37 %
Zambia – 0.69 % 4.01 % – 1.38 % – 1.86 %
Zimbabwe – 0.26 % 6.50 % – 0.52 % – 1.79 %
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the risk premium as measured by the difference between the rate of 
return on bonds and the rate of return on equity is between 3 % and 
6 %. A more normative approach described by the consumption-based 
capital asset pricing model (Cochrane, 2001) would lead to a much 
smaller risk premium equalling  π gt = η σ t 2 if calibrated on the volatil-
ity of growth in western economies.17 However, Barro (2006, 2009) 
and Martin (2013) recently showed that the introduction of rare cata-
strophic events — similar to those observed in some developing coun-
tries during the last century — can justify using a low safe discount rate 
of around 1 % and a large aggregate risk premium of around 4 % at 
the same time. The true discount rate to be used in the context of cli-
mate change will then rely heavily on the climate beta. So far, almost 
no research has been conducted on the value of the climate beta, that 
is, the statistical relationship between the level of climate damage 
and the level of consumption per capita in the future. The exception 
is Sandsmark and Vennemo (2006), who suggest that it is almost zero. 
But existing Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) show that more cli-
mate damage is incurred in scenarios with higher economic growth, 
suggesting that combating climate change does not provide a hedge 
against the global risk borne by future generations. Nordhaus (2011b) 
assumes that the actual damages borne by future generations are 
increasing, so that the climate beta is positive, and the discount rate 
for climate change should be larger than just applying the extended 
Ramsey rule.
Several authors (Malinvaud, 1953; Guesnerie, 2004; Weikard and Zhu, 
2005; Hoel and Sterner, 2007; Sterner and Persson, 2008; Gollier, 2010; 
Traeger, 2011; Guéant et  al., 2012) emphasize the need to take into 
account the evolution of relative prices in CBAs involving the distant 
future. In a growing economy, non-reproducible goods like environ-
mental assets will become relatively scarcer in the future, thereby 
implying an increasing social value.
3�6�3 Co-benefits and adverse side-effects
This section defines the concept of co-benefits and provides a gen-
eral framework for analysis in other chapters (a negative co-benefit is 
labelled an ‘adverse side effect’). A good example of a co-benefit in the 
literature is the reduction of local pollutants resulting from a carbon 
policy that reduces the use of fossil fuels and fossil-fuel-related local 
pollutants (see Sections 5.7 and 6.6.2.1). It is also important to dis-
tinguish between co-benefits and the societal welfare consequences 
of generated co-benefits. To use the same example, if local pollutants 
are already heavily regulated, then the net welfare benefits of further 
reductions in local pollutants may be small or even negative.
17 With a volatility in the growth rate of consumption per capita around  σ t = 4 % 
(see Table 3.3), and a degree of inequality aversion of, η = 2, we obtain a risk 
premium of only  π gt = 0.32 %.
3�6�3�1 A general framework for evaluation of 
co-benefits and adverse side-effects
As a simple example, suppose social welfare V is a function of different 
goods or objectives  z i (i = 1, …, m), and that each of those objectives 
might be influenced by some policy instrument,  p 1 .18 The policy may 
have an impact on several objectives at the same time. Now consider a 
marginal change d p 1 in the policy. The welfare effect is given by:





∂ z i 
 
∂ z i  _ 
∂ p 1 
d p 1 
For example, suppose d p 1  > 0 is additional GHG abatement (tightening 
the cap on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions). Then the ‘direct’ benefits 
of that climate policy might include effects on climate objectives, such 
as mean global temperature ( z 1 ), sea level rise ( z 2 ), agricultural pro-
ductivity ( z 3 ), biodiversity ( z 4 ), and health effects of global warming 
( z 5 ). The ‘co-benefits’ of that climate policy might include changes in a 
set of objectives such as SO2 emissions ( z 6 ), energy security ( z 7 ), labour 
supply and employment ( z 8 ), the distribution of income ( z 9 ), the degree 
of urban sprawl ( z 10 ), and the sustainability of the growth of develop-
ing countries ( z 11 ). See Table 15.1 for an overview of objectives dis-
cussed in the sector chapters in the context of co-benefits and adverse 
side effects. The few studies that attempt a full evaluation of the global 
welfare effects of mitigation co-benefits focus only on a few objectives 
because of methodological challenges (as assessed in Section 6.6). For 
discussion of income distribution objectives, see the ‘social welfare 
functions’ in Section 3.4.6.
Because this problem inherently involves multiple objectives, it can be 
analysed using Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA) that “requires policymak-
ers to state explicit reasons for choosing policies, with reference to the 
multiple objectives that each policy seeks to achieve” (Dubash et al., 
2013, p. 47). See also Section 3.7.2.1, Section 6.6 and McCollum et al. 
(2012).
Even external effects on public health could turn out to be either direct 
benefits of climate policy or co-benefits. The social cost of carbon 
includes the increased future incidence of heat stroke, heart attacks, 
malaria, and other warm climate diseases. Any reduction in such 
health-related costs of climate change is therefore a direct benefit of 
climate policy. The definition of a co-benefit is limited to the effect of 
reductions in health effects caused by non-climate impacts of mitiga-
tion efforts.
Use of the terminology should be clear and consistent. CBAs need 
to include all gains and losses from the climate policy being anal-
ysed — as shown in Equation 3.6.6 — the sum of welfare effects from 
direct benefits net of costs, plus the welfare effects of co-benefits and 
adverse side effects.
18 This V is a loose interpretation of a social welfare function, such as defined in 
Equation 3.6.2, insofar as welfare is not usually represented a function of policy 
objectives or aggregate quantities of goods.
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Here, the co-benefit is defined as the effect on a non-climate objective 
(∂ z i / ∂ p 1 ), leaving aside social welfare (not multiplied by ∂V / ∂ z i ). In con-
trast, the ‘value’ of the co-benefit is the effect on social welfare (∂V / ∂ 
z i ), which could be evaluated by economists using valuation methods 
discussed elsewhere in this chapter.19 It may require use of a ‘second-
best’ analysis that accounts for multiple market distortions (Lipsey and 
Lancaster, 1956). This is not a minor issue. In particular, ∂V / ∂ z i may be 
positive or negative.
The full evaluation of dV in the equation above involves four steps: first, 
identify the various multiple objectives  z i (i = 1, …, m) (see, e. g., Table 
4.8.1 for a particular climate policy such as a CO2 emissions cap); sec-
ond, identify all significant effects on all those objectives (direct effects 
and co-effects ∂ z i /∂ p 1 , for i = 1, …, m) (see Chapters 7 – 12); third, eval-
uate each effect on social welfare (multiply each ∂ z i / ∂ p 1 by ∂V / ∂ z i ); 
and fourth, aggregate them as in Equation 3.6.6. Of course, computing 
social welfare also has normative dimensions (see Section 3.4.6).
3�6�3�2 The valuation of co-benefits and adverse side-
effects
The list of goods or objectives  z i (i = 1, …, m) could include any com-
modity, but some formulations allow the omission of goods sold in 
markets with no market failure or distortion, where the social marginal 
benefit (all to the consumer) is equal to the social marginal cost (all on 
the producer). With no distortion in a market for good i, a small change 
in quantity has no net effect on welfare (∂V / ∂ z i   =  0). The effect on 
welfare is not zero, however, if climate policy affects the quantity of a 
good sold in a market with a ‘market failure’, such as non-competitive 
market power, an externality, or any pre-existing tax. In general, either 
monopoly power or a tax would raise the price paid by consumers 
relative to the marginal cost faced by producers. In such cases, any 
increase in the commodity would have a social marginal benefit higher 
than social marginal cost (a net gain in welfare).
We now describe a set of studies that have evaluated some co-benefits 
and adverse side-effects (many more studies are reviewed in Sections 
5.7, 7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 10.8, 11.7, 12.8 and synthesized in Section 6.6). First, 
oligopolies may exert market power and raise prices above marginal 
cost in large industries such as natural resource extraction, iron and 
steel, or cement. And climate policy may affect that market power. 
Ryan (2012) finds that a prominent environmental policy in the United 
States actually increased the market power of incumbent cement man-
ufactures, because it decreased competition from potential entrants 
that faced higher sunk costs. That is, it created barriers to entry. That 
effect led to a significant loss in consumer surplus that was not incor-
porated in the policy’s initial benefit-cost analysis.
19 We distinguish here between the welfare effect of the co-benefit (∂V / ∂ z i ) and the 
welfare effect of the policy operating through a particular co-benefit ( ∂V _∂ z i   
∂ z i  _ ∂ p 1 
d p 1 ).
Second, Ren et  al. (2011) point out that a climate policy to reduce 
CO2 emissions may increase the use of biofuels, but that “corn-based 
ethanol production discharges nitrogen into the water environment … 
[which] … can cause respiratory problems in infants and exacerbate 
algae growth and hypoxia in water bodies” (p. 498). In other words, 
a change in climate policy (d p 1 ) affects the use of nitrogen fertilizer 
and its runoff (∂ z i / ∂ p 1 ). The effect is an ‘adverse side effect.’ If nitrogen 
runoff regulation is less than optimal, the effect on social welfare is 
negative (∂V / ∂ z i  < 0).
Third, arguably the most studied co-benefits of climate policy are the 
effects on local air pollutant emissions, air quality, and health effects 
of ground-level ozone (see Section 6.6 for a synthesis of findings from 
scenario literature and sector-specific measures). Burtraw et al. (2003) 
conclude that a USD 25 per tonne carbon tax in the United States 
would reduce NOX emissions and thereby provide health improve-
ments. Further, the researchers valued these health co-benefits at 
USD1997 8 (USD2010 10,50) per tonne of carbon reduction in the year 
2010. More recently, Groosman et  al. (2011) model a specific U. S. 
climate policy proposal (Warner-Lieberman, S.2191). They calculate 
effects on health from changes in local flow pollutants (a co-benefit). 
These health co-benefits mainly come from reductions in particulates 
and ozone, attributable to reductions in use of coal-fired power plants 
(Burtraw et al., 2003; Groosman et al., 2011).20 The authors also value 
that co-benefit at USD2006 103 billion to USD2006 1.2 trillion (USD2010 
111 billion to USD2010 1,3 billion) for the years 2010 – 2030. That total 
amount corresponds to USD 1 to USD 77 per tonne of CO2 (depend-
ing on model assumptions and year; see Section 5.7 for a review of a 
broader set of studies with higher values particularly for developing 
countries).
Researchers have calculated climate policy co-benefits in many other 
countries; for instance, Sweden (Riekkola et al., 2011), China (Aunan 
et al., 2004), and Chile (Dessus and O’Connor, 2003).
A complete analysis of climate policy would measure all such direct 
or side-effects (∂ z i / ∂ p 1 ) while recognizing that other markets may be 
functioning properly or be partially regulated (for optimal regulation, 
∂V / ∂ z i = 0). If the externality from SO2 is already partly corrected by a 
tax or permit price that is less than the marginal environmental dam-
age (MED) of SO2, for example, then the welfare gain from a small 
reduction in SO2 may be less than its MED. Or, if the price per tonne of 
SO2 is equal to its MED, and climate policy causes a small reduction in 
SO2, then the social value of that co-benefit is zero.21 Similarly, if the 
labour market is functioning properly with no involuntary unemploy-
20 Both of the cited studies estimate the dollar value of health improvements, but 
these are ‘gross’ benefits that may or may not correctly account for the offsetting 
effects of existing controls on these local pollution emissions, which is necessary 
to determine the net welfare effects.
21 This ‘marginal’ analysis contemplates a small change in either CO2 or SO2. If either 
of those changes is large, however, then the analysis is somewhat different.
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ment, then climate policy may have direct costs from use of that labour 
but no welfare gain from changes in employment. In other words, in 
measuring the welfare effects of co-benefits, it is not generally appro-
priate simply to use the gross marginal value associated with a co-
benefit.
In the context of externalities and taxes, this point can be formalized 
by the following extension of Fullerton and Metcalf (2001):
Equation 3�6�7 dV =  ∑ 
i = 1
m
 ( t i −  μ i )  
∂ z i  _ 
∂ p 1 
d p 1 
On the right side of the equation,  μ i is the MED from the  i th commodity; 
and  t i is its tax rate (or permit price, or the effect of a mandate that 
makes an input such as emissions more costly). The effect of each good 
on welfare (∂V / ∂ z i in Equation 3.6.6 above) is reduced in this model 
to just ( t i −  μ i ). The intuition is simple:  t i is the buyer’s social marginal 
benefit minus the seller’s cost; the externality  μ i is the social marginal 
cost minus the seller’s cost. Therefore, ( t i −  μ i ) is the social marginal 
benefit minus social marginal cost. It is the net effect on welfare from 
a change in that commodity. If every externality  μ i is corrected by a 
tax rate or price exactly equal to  μ i , then the outcome is ‘first best’. In 
that case, dV in Equation 3.6.7 is equal to zero, which means welfare 
cannot be improved by any change in any policy. If any  t i is not equal 
to  μ i , however, then the outcome is not optimal, and a ‘second best’ 
policy might improve welfare if it has any direct or indirect effect on 
the amount of that good.
Although the model underlying Equation 3.6.7 is static and climate 
change is inherently dynamic, the concepts represented in the static 
model can be used to understand the application to climate. Climate 
policy reduces carbon emissions, but Equation 3.6.7 shows that this 
‘direct’ effect does not add to social welfare unless the damage per 
tonne of carbon ( μ C ) exceeds the tax on carbon ( t C ). The social cost of 
carbon is discussed in Section 3.9.4. To see a co-benefit in this equa-
tion, suppose  z S is the quantity of SO2 emissions,  t S is the tax per tonne, 
and  μ S is the MED of additional SO2. If the tax on SO2 is too small 
to correct for the externality ( t S −    μ S < 0), then the market provides 
‘too much’ of it, and any policy such as a carbon tax that reduces the 
amount of SO2 (∂ z S / ∂ p 1 < 0) would increase economic welfare. The 
equation sums over all such effects in all markets for all other inputs, 
outputs, and pollutants.
If those local pollution externalities are already completely corrected 
by a tax or other policy ( t S =    μ S ), however, then a reduction in SO2 
adds nothing to welfare. The existing policy raises the firm’s cost of 
SO2 emissions by exactly the MED. That firm’s consumers reap the full 
social marginal benefit per tonne of SO2 through consumption of the 
output, but those consumers also pay the full social marginal cost per 
tonne of SO2. In that case, one additional tonne of SO2 has social costs 
exactly equal to social benefits, so any small increase or decrease in 
SO2 emissions caused by climate policy provides no net social gain. In 
fact, if  t S >  μ S , then those emissions are already over-corrected, and any 
decrease in SO2 would reduce welfare.
3�6�3�3 The double dividend hypothesis
Another good example of a co-benefit arises from the interaction 
between carbon policies and other policies (Parry, 1997; Parry and 
Williams, 1999). Though enacted to reduce GHG emissions, a climate 
policy may also raise product prices and thus interact with other taxes 
that also raise product prices. Since the excess burden of taxation rises 
more than proportionately with the size of the overall effective mar-
ginal tax rate, the carbon policy’s addition to excess burden may be 
much larger if it is added into a system with high taxes on output or 
inputs.
This logic has given rise to the ‘double dividend hypothesis’ that an 
emissions tax can both improve the environment and provide revenue 
to reduce other distorting taxes and thus improve efficiency of the 
tax system (e. g., Oates and Schwab, 1988; Pearce, 1991; Parry, 1995; 
Stern, 2009).22 Parry (1997) and Goulder et al. (1997) conclude that the 
implementation of a carbon tax or emissions trading can increase the 
deadweight loss of pre-existing labour tax distortions (the ‘tax inter-
action effect’), but revenue can be used to offset distortionary taxes 
(the ‘revenue recycling effect’). Parry and Williams (1999) investigate 
the impacts of existing tax distortions in the labour market for eight 
climate policy instruments (including energy taxes and performance 
standards) for the United States in 1995. They conclude that pre-exist-
ing tax distortions raise the costs of all abatement policies, so the co-
benefits of carbon taxes or emissions trading depend on whether gen-
erated revenues can be directed to reduce other distortionary taxes. 
A lesson is that forgoing revenue-raising opportunities from a GHG 
regulation can significantly increase inefficiencies. The European Union 
is auctioning an increasing share of permits with revenue going to 
Member States (see 14.4.2). Australia is using a large share of carbon 
pricing revenue to reduce income tax (Jotzo, 2012).
To put this discussion into the context of co-benefits, note that Ful-
lerton and Metcalf (2001) use their version of Equation 3.6.7 to con-
sider labour ( z L ), taxed at a pre-existing rate  t L (with marginal exter-
nal damages of zero, so  μ L = 0). Suppose the only other distortion is 
from carbon emissions ( z C ), with MED of  μ C . Thus the economy has ‘too 
little’ labour supply, and ‘too much’ pollution. The combination ‘policy 
change’ is a small carbon tax with revenue used to cut the tax rate  t L . 
Other taxes and damages are zero ( t i =  μ i = 0) for all goods other than 
z L and  z C . Thus, Equation 3.6.7 above simplifies further, to show that 
the two key outcomes are just the net effect on pollution (d z C ) and the 
net effect on labour (d z L ):
Equation 3�6�8 dV =   t L d z L + ( t C −  μ C ) d z C 
22 The literature contains two versions of the double dividend hypothesis. A ‘strong’ 
version says that efficiency gains from diminishing distortionary taxes can more 
than compensate the costs of pollution taxes. Another ‘weak’ version says that 
those gains compensate only part of the costs of pollution taxes (Goulder, 1995).
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Therefore, an increase in the carbon tax that reduces emissions (d 
z C < 0) has a direct benefit of increased economic welfare through the 
second term, but only to the extent that emissions damages exceed 
the tax rate ( μ C >  t C ). If the labour tax cut increases labour supply, then 
the first term also increases welfare (a double dividend). But the car-
bon tax also raises the cost of production and the equilibrium output 
price, which itself reduces the real net wage (the tax interaction effect). 
If that effect dominates the reduction in the labour tax rate (from the 
revenue recycling effect), then labour supply may fall (d z L < 0). In that 
case, the first term has a negative effect on wellbeing. In other words, 
the double-dividend is possible under some circumstances and not 
others. If the revenue is not used to cut the labour tax rate, then the 
real net wage does fall, and the labour supply may fall. 
3.7  Assessing methods 
of policy choice
Specific climate policies are discussed in Section 3.8; in this section, 
we discuss methods for evaluating the relative merits of different poli-
cies. See also Alkin (2004), Pawson and Tilley (1997), Bardach (2005), 
Majchrzak (1984), Scriven (1991) Rossi et al. (2005), and Chen (1990). 
The design and choice of a specific climate policy instrument (or mix of 
instruments) depends on many economic, social, cultural, ethical, insti-
tutional, and political contexts. Different methods for ex-ante and ex-
post analysis are available and different types of analytical approaches 
may be used in tandem to provide perspectives to policymakers.
3�7�1 Policy objectives and evaluation criteria
In addition to reducing GHG emissions, climate policy may have other 
objectives. Following WGIII AR4 (Gupta et al., 2007), these objectives 
are organized below in four broad categories: economic, distribu-
tional / fairness, environmental, and institutional / political feasibility.23 
The relative importance of these policy objectives differs among coun-
tries, especially between developed and developing countries.
In this section we discuss elements of these four categories and expand 
on recent policy evaluation studies (e. g., Opschoor and Turner, 1994; 
Ostrom, 1999; Faure and Skogh, 2003; Sterner, 2003; Mickwitz, 2003; 
Blok, 2007), leaving details of applications and evidence to Chapters 
8 – 11 and 13 – 15.
23 Political factors have often been more important than economic factors in explain-
ing instrument choice (Hepburn, 2006). Redistribution to low-income households 
is an important feature in Australia’s emissions pricing policy (Jotzo and Hatfield-
Dodds, 2011).
The basic economic framework for policy analysis is depicted in Figure 
3.3. This diagram illustrates both the impacts of policies and the crite-
ria for evaluating them in the context of the production of a polluting 
good (i. e., emissions associated with producing a good). The focus is 
stylized, but we note that many ‘non-economic’ values can still be 
incorporated, to the extent that values can be placed on other consid-
erations, such as effects on nature, culture, biodiversity and ‘dignity’ 
(see Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2).
As shown in Figure 3.3, the quantity of GHG emissions from producing 
a good, such as electricity, is shown on the horizontal axis, and the 
price or cost per unit of that good is shown on the vertical axis. The 
demand for the emissions is derived from the demand for electricity, as 
shown by the curve called Private Marginal Benefit (PMB). The private 
market supply curve is the Private Marginal Cost (PMC) of production, 
and so the unfettered equilibrium quantity would be Q0 at equilibrium 
price P0. This polluting activity generates external costs, however, and 
so each unit of output has a Social Marginal Cost (SMC) measured by 
the vertical sum of PMC plus Marginal External Cost (MEC). With no 
externalities on the demand side, PMB = SMB.
Under the stated simplifying assumptions, the social optimum is where 
SMC = PMB, at Q’. The first point here, then, is that the optimal quan-
tity can be achieved by several different policies under these simple 
conditions. A simple regulatory quota could restrict output from Q0 
to Q’, or a fixed number of tradeable permits could restrict pollution 
to the quantity Q’. In that case, Pn is the equilibrium price net of per-
mit cost (the price received by the firm), while Pg is the price gross of 
permit cost (paid by the consumer). The permit price is the difference, 
Figure 3�3 | A partial equilibrium model of the costs and benefits of a market output, 
assuming perfect competition, perfect information, perfect mobility, full employment, 
and many identical consumers (so all individuals equally benefit from production and 
they equally bear the external cost of pollution).
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Pg – Pn. Alternatively, a tax of (Pg – Pn) per unit of pollution would raise 
the firm’s cost to SMC and result in equilibrium quantity Q’.
The diagram in Figure 3.3 will be used below to show how the equiva-
lence of these instruments breaks down under more general circum-
stances, as well as gains and losses to various groups. In other words, 
we use this diagram to discuss economic as well as distributional, 
other environmental and cultural objectives, and institutional / political 
feasibility.
3�7�1�1 Economic objectives 
Economic efficiency� Consider an economy’s allocation of resources 
(goods, services, inputs, and productive activities). An allocation is effi-
cient if it is not possible to reallocate resources so as to make at least 
one person better off without making someone else worse off. This 
is also known as the Pareto criterion for efficiency (discussed in Sec-
tion 3.6.1) (see e. g., Sterner, 2003; Harrington et al., 2004; Tietenberg, 
2006). In Figure 3.3, any reduction in output from Q0 improves effi-
ciency because it saves costs (height of SMC) that exceed the benefits 
of that output (height of PMB).24 This reduction can be achieved by a 
tax levied on the externality (a carbon tax), or by tradeable emission 
permits. Further reductions in output generate further net gains, by the 
extent to which SMC exceeds SMB, until output is reduced to Q’ (where 
SMC = SMB). Hence, the gain in economic efficiency is area C. Perfect 
efficiency is difficult to achieve, for practical reasons, but initial steps 
from Q0 achieve a larger gain (SMC > SMB) than the last step to Q’ 
(because SMC ≈ SMB near the left point of triangle C).
An aspect of economic efficiency over time is the extent to which a 
carbon policy encourages the right amount of investment in research, 
innovation, and technological change, in order to reduce GHG emis-
sions more cheaply (Jung et al., 1996; Mundaca and Neij, 2009). See 
Section 3.11.
Cost-effectiveness� Pollution per unit of output in Figure 3.3 is fixed, 
but actual technologies provide different ways of reducing pollution 
per unit of output. A policy is cost-effective if it reduces pollution 
(given a climate target) at lowest cost. An important condition of cost-
effectiveness is that marginal compliance costs should be equal among 
parties (ignoring other distortions such as regulations) (Babiker et al., 
2004).
Transaction costs� In addition to the price paid or received, market 
actors face other costs in initiating and completing transactions. These 
costs alter the performance and relative effectiveness of different poli-
cies and need to be considered in their design, implementation, and 
assessment (Mundaca et al., 2013; see also Matthews, 1986, p. 906).
24 Other approaches are discussed in Section 3.6.
3�7�1�2 Distributional objectives
Six distributional effects� A policy may generate gains to some and 
losses to others. The fairness or overall welfare consequences of these 
distributional effects is important to many people and can be evalu-
ated using a SWF, as discussed in Section 3.4.6. These effects fall into 
six categories (Fullerton, 2011), and are illustrated in Box 3.6 below. In 
Figure 3.3, any policy instrument might reduce the quantity of pollut-
ing output, such as from Q0 to Q’, which reduces emissions, raises the 
equilibrium price paid by consumers (from P0 to Pg), and reduces the 
price received by firms (from P0 to Pn). The six effects are illustrated in 
Box 3.6. The framework can be applied to any environmental problem 
and any policy to correct it.
With reference to Box 3.6, the first effect of a carbon policy on con-
sumers is generally regressive (though most analyses are for developed 
countries), because the higher price of electricity imposes a heavier 
burden on lower income groups who spend more of their income on 
electricity (Metcalf, 1999; Grainger and Kolstad, 2010). However, fuel 
taxes tend to be progressive in developing countries (Sterner, 2011). 
The sign of the second effect, on factors of production, is generally 
ambiguous. The third effect is regressive if permits are given to firms, 
because then profits accrue to shareholders who tend to be in high-
income brackets (Parry, 2004). But if government captures the scar-
city rents by selling permits or through a carbon tax, the funds can be 
used to offset burdens on low-income consumers and make the overall 
effect progressive instead of regressive. Other effects are quite difficult 
to measure.
Much of the literature on ‘environmental justice’ discusses the poten-
tial effects of a pollution policy on neighbourhoods with residents from 
different income or ethnic groups (Sieg et al., 2004). Climate policies 
affect both GHG emissions and other local pollutants such as SO2 or 
NOX, whose concentrations vary widely. Furthermore, the cost of miti-
gation may not be shared equally among all income or ethnic groups. 
And even ‘global’ climate change can have different temperature 
impacts on different areas, or other differential effects (e. g., on coastal 
areas via rise in sea level).
The distributional impacts of policies include aspects such as fairness / 
equity (Gupta et al., 2007). A perceived unfair distribution of costs and 
benefits could prove politically challenging (see below), since efficiency 
may be gained at the expense of equity objectives.
3�7�1�3 Environmental objectives
Environmental effectiveness� A policy is environmentally effective 
if it achieves its expected environmental target (e. g., GHG emission 
reduction). The simple policies mentioned above might be equally 
effective in reducing pollution (from Q0 to Q’ in Figure 3.3), but actual 
policies differ in terms of ambition levels, enforcement and compli-
ance.
Box 3�6 | Six distributional effects of climate policy, illustrated for a permit obligation or  emissions 
tax on coal-fired electricity, under the assumption of perfectly competitive electricity markets
First, the policy raises the cost of generating electricity and if cost 
increases are passed through to consumers, for example through 
competitive markets or changes in regulated prices, the consum-
er’s price increases (from P0 to Pg), so it reduces consumer surplus. 
In Figure 3.3, the loss to consumers is the sum of areas A + D. 
Losses are greater for those who spend more on electricity.
Second, the policy reduces the net price received by the firm (from 
P0 to Pn), so it reduces producer surplus by the sum of areas B + E. 
The effect is reduced payments to factors of production, such as 
labour and capital. Losses are greater for those who receive more 
income from the displaced factor.
Third, pollution and output are restricted, so the policy generates 
‘scarcity rents’ such as the value of a restricted number of permits 
(areas A + B). If the permits are given to firms, these rents accrue 
to shareholders. The government could partly or fully capture the 
rents by selling the permits or by a tax per unit of emissions (Ful-
lerton and Metcalf, 2001).
Fourth, because the policy restricts GHG emissions, it confers ben-
efits on those who would otherwise suffer from climate change. 
The value of those benefits is areas C + D + E.
Fifth, the electricity sector uses less labour, capital and other 
resources. It no longer pays them (areas E + F). With perfect 
mobility, these factors are immediately redeployed elsewhere, 
with no loss. In practice however, social costs may be substan-
tial, including transaction costs of shifting to other industries or 
regions, transitional or permanent unemployment, and social and 
psychological displacement.
Sixth, any gain or loss described above can be capitalized into 
asset prices, with substantial immediate effects for current own-
ers. For example, the value of a corporation that owns coal-fired 
generation assets may fall, in line with the expected present value 
of the policy change, while the value of corporations that own 
low-emissions generation technologies may rise.
The connection between these distributional effects and 
‘economic efficiency’ is revealed by adding up all the gains 
and losses just described: the consumer surplus loss is A + D; 
 producer surplus loss is B + E; the gain in scarcity rents is A + B; 
and the environmental gain is C + D + E, assuming the gainers 
and losers receive equal weights. The net sum of the gains and 
losses is area C, described above as the net gain in economic 
efficiency.
In many cases, a distributional implication of imposing effi-
cient externality pricing (e. g., area A + B) is much larger than 
the efficiency gains (area C). This illustrates the importance of 
distributional considerations in discussions on emissions-reducing 
policies, and it indicates why distributional considerations often 
loom large in debates about climate policy.
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Co-benefits� Climate policy may reduce both GHG emissions and 
local pollutants, such as SO2 emissions that cause acid rain, or NOX 
emissions that contribute to ground level ozone. As described in Sec-
tion 3.6.3, reductions in other pollutants may not yield any net gain to 
society if they are already optimally regulated (where their marginal 
abatement costs and their marginal damages are equal). If pollutants 
are inefficiently regulated, however, climate regulations can yield posi-
tive or negative net social gains by reducing them.
Climate policy is also likely to affect other national objectives, such as 
energy security. For countries that want to reduce their dependence on 
imported fossil fuels, climate policy can bolster energy efficiency and 
the domestic renewable energy supply, while cutting GHG emissions. 
See Section 3.6.3 on co-benefits.
Carbon leakage� The effectiveness of a national policy to reduce emis-
sions can be undermined if it results in increased emissions in other 
countries, for example, because of trading advantages in countries 
with more relaxed policies (see Section 3.9.5). Another type of leakage 
occurs within emission trading systems. Unilateral emission reductions 
by one party will release emission permits and be outweighed by new 
emissions within the trading regime.
3�7�1�4 Institutional and political feasibility
Administrative burden� This depends on how a policy is imple-
mented, monitored, and enforced (Nordhaus and Danish, 2003). The 
size of the burden reflects, inter alia, the institutional framework, 
human and financial costs and policy objectives (Nordhaus and Dan-
ish, 2003; Mundaca et al., 2010). Administrative costs in public policy 
are often overlooked (Tietenberg, 2006)
Political feasibility is the likelihood of a policy gaining acceptance 
and being adopted and implemented (Gupta et  al., 2007, p.  785). It 
covers the obstacles faced and key design features that can generate 
or reduce resistance among political parties (Nordhaus and Danish, 
2003). Political feasibility may also depend on environmental effective-
3�7�1�2 Distributional objectives
Six distributional effects� A policy may generate gains to some and 
losses to others. The fairness or overall welfare consequences of these 
distributional effects is important to many people and can be evalu-
ated using a SWF, as discussed in Section 3.4.6. These effects fall into 
six categories (Fullerton, 2011), and are illustrated in Box 3.6 below. In 
Figure 3.3, any policy instrument might reduce the quantity of pollut-
ing output, such as from Q0 to Q’, which reduces emissions, raises the 
equilibrium price paid by consumers (from P0 to Pg), and reduces the 
price received by firms (from P0 to Pn). The six effects are illustrated in 
Box 3.6. The framework can be applied to any environmental problem 
and any policy to correct it.
With reference to Box 3.6, the first effect of a carbon policy on con-
sumers is generally regressive (though most analyses are for developed 
countries), because the higher price of electricity imposes a heavier 
burden on lower income groups who spend more of their income on 
electricity (Metcalf, 1999; Grainger and Kolstad, 2010). However, fuel 
taxes tend to be progressive in developing countries (Sterner, 2011). 
The sign of the second effect, on factors of production, is generally 
ambiguous. The third effect is regressive if permits are given to firms, 
because then profits accrue to shareholders who tend to be in high-
income brackets (Parry, 2004). But if government captures the scar-
city rents by selling permits or through a carbon tax, the funds can be 
used to offset burdens on low-income consumers and make the overall 
effect progressive instead of regressive. Other effects are quite difficult 
to measure.
Much of the literature on ‘environmental justice’ discusses the poten-
tial effects of a pollution policy on neighbourhoods with residents from 
different income or ethnic groups (Sieg et al., 2004). Climate policies 
affect both GHG emissions and other local pollutants such as SO2 or 
NOX, whose concentrations vary widely. Furthermore, the cost of miti-
gation may not be shared equally among all income or ethnic groups. 
And even ‘global’ climate change can have different temperature 
impacts on different areas, or other differential effects (e. g., on coastal 
areas via rise in sea level).
The distributional impacts of policies include aspects such as fairness / 
equity (Gupta et al., 2007). A perceived unfair distribution of costs and 
benefits could prove politically challenging (see below), since efficiency 
may be gained at the expense of equity objectives.
3�7�1�3 Environmental objectives
Environmental effectiveness� A policy is environmentally effective 
if it achieves its expected environmental target (e. g., GHG emission 
reduction). The simple policies mentioned above might be equally 
effective in reducing pollution (from Q0 to Q’ in Figure 3.3), but actual 
policies differ in terms of ambition levels, enforcement and compli-
ance.
Box 3�6 | Six distributional effects of climate policy, illustrated for a permit obligation or  emissions 
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First, the policy raises the cost of generating electricity and if cost 
increases are passed through to consumers, for example through 
competitive markets or changes in regulated prices, the consum-
er’s price increases (from P0 to Pg), so it reduces consumer surplus. 
In Figure 3.3, the loss to consumers is the sum of areas A + D. 
Losses are greater for those who spend more on electricity.
Second, the policy reduces the net price received by the firm (from 
P0 to Pn), so it reduces producer surplus by the sum of areas B + E. 
The effect is reduced payments to factors of production, such as 
labour and capital. Losses are greater for those who receive more 
income from the displaced factor.
Third, pollution and output are restricted, so the policy generates 
‘scarcity rents’ such as the value of a restricted number of permits 
(areas A + B). If the permits are given to firms, these rents accrue 
to shareholders. The government could partly or fully capture the 
rents by selling the permits or by a tax per unit of emissions (Ful-
lerton and Metcalf, 2001).
Fourth, because the policy restricts GHG emissions, it confers ben-
efits on those who would otherwise suffer from climate change. 
The value of those benefits is areas C + D + E.
Fifth, the electricity sector uses less labour, capital and other 
resources. It no longer pays them (areas E + F). With perfect 
mobility, these factors are immediately redeployed elsewhere, 
with no loss. In practice however, social costs may be substan-
tial, including transaction costs of shifting to other industries or 
regions, transitional or permanent unemployment, and social and 
psychological displacement.
Sixth, any gain or loss described above can be capitalized into 
asset prices, with substantial immediate effects for current own-
ers. For example, the value of a corporation that owns coal-fired 
generation assets may fall, in line with the expected present value 
of the policy change, while the value of corporations that own 
low-emissions generation technologies may rise.
The connection between these distributional effects and 
‘economic efficiency’ is revealed by adding up all the gains 
and losses just described: the consumer surplus loss is A + D; 
 producer surplus loss is B + E; the gain in scarcity rents is A + B; 
and the environmental gain is C + D + E, assuming the gainers 
and losers receive equal weights. The net sum of the gains and 
losses is area C, described above as the net gain in economic 
efficiency.
In many cases, a distributional implication of imposing effi-
cient externality pricing (e. g., area A + B) is much larger than 
the efficiency gains (area C). This illustrates the importance of 
distributional considerations in discussions on emissions-reducing 
policies, and it indicates why distributional considerations often 
loom large in debates about climate policy.
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ness and whether regulatory and other costs are equitably distributed 
across society (Rist, 1998). The ability of governments to implement 
political decisions may be hampered by interest groups; policies will 
be more feasible if the benefits can be used to buy the support of a 
winning coalition (Compston, 2010). Ex ante, these criteria can be used 
in assessing and improving policies. Ex post, they can be used to verify 
results, withdraw inefficient policies and correct policy performance. 
For specific applications, see Chapters 7 – 15.
3�7�2 Analytical methods for decision support
Previous IPCC Assessment Reports have addressed analytical methods 
to support decision making, including both numerical and case-based 
methods. Bruce et al. (1996, chap. 2 and 10) focus heavily on quantita-
tive methods and IAMs. Metz et al. (2001) provide a wider review of 
approaches, including emerging participatory forms of decision mak-
ing. Metz et al. (2007) briefly elaborate on quantitative methods and 
list sociological analytical frameworks. In this section, we summarize 
the core information on methodologies separated into quantitative- 
and qualitative-oriented approaches.
3�7�2�1 Quantitative-oriented approaches
In decision making, quantitative methods can be used to organize and 
manage numerical information, provide structured analytical frame-
works, and generate alternative scenarios — with different levels of 
uncertainty (Majchrzak, 1984). An approach that attempts to estimate 
and aggregate monetized values of all costs and benefits that could 
result from a policy is CBA. It may require estimating non-market val-
ues, and choosing a discount rate to express all costs and benefits 
in present value. When benefits are difficult to estimate in monetary 
terms, a Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) may be preferable. A CEA 
can be used to compare the costs of different policy options (Tieten-
berg, 2006) for achieving a well-defined goal. It can also estimate and 
identify the lowest possible compliance costs, thereby generating a 
ranking of policy alternatives (Levin and McEwan, 2001). Both CEA 
and CBA are similarly limited in their ability to generate data, measure 
and value future intangible costs.
Various types of model can provide information for CBA, including 
energy-economy-environment models that study energy systems and 
transitions towards more sustainable technology. A common classifi-
cation of model methodologies includes ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ 
approaches. Hybrids of the two can compensate for some known limi-
tations and inherent uncertainties (Rivers and Jaccard, 2006):25
25 The literature acknowledges that it is difficult to make a clear classification among 
modelling approaches, as variations among categories and also alternative 
simulation methodologies do exist (e. g., macroeconometric Keynesian models, 
agent-based approaches) (Hourcade et al., 2006; Mundaca et al., 2010; Scrieciu 
et al., 2013).
•	 Given exogenously defined macroeconomic and demographic sce-
narios, bottom-up models can provide detailed representations of 
supply- and demand-side technology paths that combine both cost 
and performance data. Conventional bottom-up models may lack a 
realistic representation of behaviour (e. g., heterogeneity) and may 
overlook critical market imperfections, such as transaction costs 
and information asymmetries (e. g., Craig et  al., 2002; DeCanio, 
2003; Greening and Bernow, 2004).
•	 By contrast, top-down models, such as computable general equi-
librium (CGE), represent technology and behaviour using an aggre-
gate production function for each sector to analyze effects of poli-
cies on economic growth, trade, employment, and public revenues 
(see, e. g., DeCanio, 2003). They are often calibrated on real data 
from the economy. However, such models may not represent all 
markets, all separate policies, all technological flexibility, and all 
market imperfections (Laitner et  al., 2003). Parameters are esti-
mated from historical data, so forecasts may not predict a future 
that is fundamentally different from past experience (i. e., path 
dependency) (Scheraga, 1994; Hourcade et al., 2006). For potential 
technology change, many models use sub-models of specific sup-
ply or end-use devices based on engineering data (Jacoby et al., 
2006; Richels and Blanford, 2008; Lüken et al., 2011; Karplus et al., 
2013).
With CBA, it is difficult to reduce all social objectives to a single met-
ric. One approach to dealing with the multiple evaluation criteria is 
Multi-Criteria Analysis, or MCA (Keeney and Raiffa, 1993; Greening 
and Bernow, 2004). Some argue that analyzing environmental and 
energy policies is a multi-criteria problem, involving numerous deci-
sion makers with diverse objectives and levels of understanding of the 
science and complexity of analytical tools (Sterner, 2003; Greening and 
Bernow, 2004). The advantage of MCA is that the analyst does not 
have to determine how outcomes are traded-off by the policymaker. 
For instance, costs can be separated from ecosystem losses. But even 
with MCA, one must ultimately determine the appropriate trade-off 
rates among the different objectives. Nevertheless, it can be a use-
ful way of analyzing problems where being restricted to one metric 
is problematic, either politically or practically. CGE models can specify 
consumer and producer behaviour and ‘simulate’ effects of climate 
policy on various outcomes, including real gains and losses to different 
groups (e. g., households that differ in income, region or demographic 
characteristics). With behavioural reactions, direct burdens are shifted 
from one taxpayer to another through changes in prices paid for vari-
ous outputs and received for various inputs. A significant challenge is 
the definition of a ‘welfare baseline’ (i. e., identifying each welfare level 
without a specific policy).
Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) or simply Integrated Models 
(IAs) combine some or all of the relevant components necessary to 
evaluate the consequences of mitigation policies on economic activity, 
the global climate, the impacts of associated climate change, and the 
relevance of that change to people, societies, and economies. Some 
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models may only be able to represent how the economy responds to 
mitigation policy and no more; some models may include a physical 
model of the climate and be able to translate changes in emissions 
into changes in global temperature; some models may also include 
a representation of the impacts of climate change; and some models 
may translate those impacts into damage to society and economies. 
Models can be highly aggregate (top-down) or detailed process analy-
sis models (bottom-up), or a combination of both (see also Chapter 
6). Some IAMs relate climate change variables with other physical 
and biological variables like crop yield, food prices, premature death, 
flooding or drought events, or land use change (Reilly et  al., 2013). 
Computational limits may preclude the scales required for some cli-
mate processes (Donner and Large, 2008),26 but recent attempts are 
directed towards integrating human activities with full Earth System 
models (Jones et al., 2013). All of the models used in WGIII (primarily 
Chapter 6) focus on how mitigation policies translate into emissions; 
none of those models have a representation of climate damages. IAMs 
have been criticized in recent years (e. g., Ackerman et al., 2009; Pin-
dyck, 2013). Much of the most recent criticism is directed at models 
that include a representation of climate damage; none of the models 
used in Chapter 6 fall into this category. Refer to Chapter 6 for more 
detail in this regard.
Other quantitative-oriented approaches to support policy evaluation 
include tolerable windows (Bruckner et al., 1999), safe-landing / guard 
rail (Alcamo and Kreileman, 1996), and portfolio theory (Howarth, 
1996). Outside economics, those who study decision sciences empha-
size the importance of facing difficult value-based trade-offs across 
objectives, and the relevance of various techniques to help stakehold-
ers address trade-offs (see, e. g., Keeney and Raiffa, 1993).
3�7�2�2 Qualitative approaches
Various qualitative policy evaluation approaches focus on the social, 
ethical, and cultural dimensions of climate policy. They sometimes 
complement quantitative approaches by considering contextual dif-
ferences, multiple decision makers, bounded rationality, information 
asymmetries, and political and negotiation processes (Toth et al., 2001; 
Halsnæs et  al., 2007). Sociological analytical approaches examine 
human behaviour and climate change (Blumer, 1956), including beliefs, 
attitudes, values, norms, and social structures (Rosa and Dietz, 1998). 
Focus groups can capture the fact that “people often need to listen to 
others’ opinions and understandings to form their own” (Marshall and 
Rossman, 2006, p.  114). Participatory approaches focus on process, 
involving the active participation of various actors in a given decision-
making process (van den Hove, 2000). Participatory approaches in sup-
port of decision making include appreciation-influence-control, goal 
26 Stanton et al. (2009) also place climate change models into categories (welfare 
maximization, general equilibrium, partial equilibrium, cost minimization, and 
simulation models).
oriented project planning, participatory rural appraisal, and beneficiary 
assessment. MCA can also take a purely qualitative form. For the pros 
and cons of participatory approaches, see Toth et  al. (2001, p.  652). 
Other qualitative-oriented approaches include systematic client con-
sultation, social assessment and team up (Toth et al., 2001; Halsnæs 
et al., 2007).
3.8 Policy instruments 
and regulations 
A broad range of policy instruments for climate change mitiga-
tion is available to policymakers. These include economic incentives, 
such as taxes, tradeable allowances, and subsidies; direct regulatory 
approaches, such as technology or performance standards; information 
programs; government provision, of technologies or products; and vol-
untary actions.
Chapter 13 of WGIII AR4 provided a typology and definition of mitiga-
tion policy instruments. Here we present an update on the basis of new 
research on the design, applicability, interaction, and political economy 
of policy instruments, as well as on applicability of policy instruments 
in developed and developing countries (see Box 3.8). For details about 
applications and empirical assessments of mitigation policy instru-
ments, see Chapters 7 – 12 (sectoral level), Chapter 13 (international 
cooperation), Chapter 14 (regional cooperation), and Chapter 15 
(national and sub-national policies).
3�8�1 Economic incentives
Economic (or market) instruments include incentives that alter the con-
ditions or behaviour of target participants and lead to a reduction in 
aggregate emissions. In economic policy instruments, a distinction is 
made between ‘price’ and ‘quantity’. A tradeable allowance or permit 
system represents a quantity policy whereby the total quantity of pol-
lution (a cap) is defined, and trading in emission rights under that cap 
is allowed. A price instrument requires polluters to pay a fixed price per 
unit of emissions (tax or charge), regardless of the quantity of emis-
sions.
3�8�1�1 Emissions taxes and permit trading
Both the approaches described above create a price signal as an incen-
tive to reducing emissions (see Box 3.7), which can extend throughout 
the economy. Economic instruments will tend to be more cost-effective 
than regulatory interventions and may be less susceptible to rent-seek-
ing by interest groups. The empirical evidence is that economic instru-
ments have, on the whole, performed better than regulatory instru-
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ments, but that in many cases improvements could have been made 
through better policy design (Hahn, 1989; Anthoff and Hahn, 2010).
3�8�1�2 Subsidies 
Subsidies can be used as an instrument of mitigation policy by correct-
ing market failures in the provision of low-carbon technologies and 
products. They have a particular role in supporting new technologies. 
Empirical research has shown that social rates of return on R&D can be 
higher than private rates of return, since spillovers are not fully inter-
nalized by the firms (see 3.11).
Subsidies are also used to stimulate energy efficiency and renewable 
energy production. Such subsidies do generally not fully correct nega-
tive externalities but rather support the alternatives, and are less effi-
cient alternatives to carbon taxes and emission trading for inducing 
mitigation. Energy subsidies are often provided for fossil fuel produc-
tion or consumption, and prove to increase emissions and put heavy 
burdens on public budgets (Lin and Jiang, 2011; Arze del Granado 
et al., 2012; Gunningham, 2013). Lowering or removing such subsidies 
would contribute to global mitigation, but this has proved difficult (IEA 
et al., 2011).
Subsidies to renewable energy and other forms of government expen-
diture on mitigation also have other drawbacks. First, public funds 
need to be raised to finance the expenditures, with well-known eco-
nomic inefficiencies arising from taxation (Ballard and Fullerton, 1992). 
Second, subsidies, if not correcting market failures, can lead to exces-
sive entry into, or insufficient exit from, an industry (Stigler, 1971). 
Third, subsidies can become politically entrenched, with the beneficia-
ries lobbying governments for their retention at the expense of society 
overall (Tullock, 1975).
Hybrids of fees and subsidies are also in use. A renewable energy cer-
tificate system can be viewed as a hybrid with a fee on energy con-
sumption and a subsidy to renewable production (e. g., Amundsen and 
Mortensen, 2001). Feebates (Greene et  al., 2005) involve setting an 
objective, such as average vehicle fuel economy; then firms or individu-
als that under-perform pay a fee per unit of under-performance and 
over-performers receive a subsidy. The incentives may be structured to 
generate no net revenue — the fees collected finance the subsidy.
3�8�2 Direct regulatory approaches
Prescriptive regulation involves rules that must be fulfilled by polluters 
who face a penalty in case of non-compliance. Examples are perfor-
mance standards that specify the maximum allowable GHG emissions 
from particular processes or activities; technology standards that man-
date specific pollution abatement technologies or production methods; 
and product standards that define the characteristics of potentially 
polluting products, including labelling of appliances in buildings, indus-
try, and the transport sector (Freeman and Kolstad, 2006).
These regulatory approaches will tend to be more suitable in circum-
stances where the reach or effectiveness of market-based instruments 
is constrained because of institutional factors, including lack of mar-
kets in emissions intensive sectors such as energy. In ‘mixed econo-
mies’, where parts of the economy are based on command-and-control 
Box 3�7 | Equivalence of emissions taxes and permit trading schemes 
Price-based and quantity-based instruments are equivalent 
under certainty, but differ in the extent of mitigation and costs 
if emissions and abatement costs are uncertain to the regulator 
(Weitzman, 1974). Hybrid instruments, where a quantity constraint 
can be overridden if the price is higher or lower than a thresh-
old, have been shown to be more efficient under uncertainty 
(Roberts and Spence, 1976; McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2002; Pizer, 
2002). Variants of hybrid approaches featuring price ceilings and 
price floors have been implemented in recent emissions trading 
schemes (Chapters 14 and 15). The possibility of periodic adjust-
ments to tax rates and caps and their implementation under 
permit schemes further breaks down the distinction between 
price-based and quantity-based market-based instruments.
Equivalence also exists for fiscal effects and the costs imposed on 
emitters. Until recently, most of the literature has assumed that 
emissions taxes and permit trading differ in the revenue they yield 
for governments and the costs imposed on emitters, assuming 
that emissions tax revenue fully accrues to governments while 
under emissions trading schemes permits are given freely to 
emitters. This was also the case in early policy practice (Chapters 
14 and 15). It has been widely assumed that permit schemes are 
easier to implement politically because permits are allocated free 
to emitters. However, recognition has grown that permits can be 
wholly or partly auctioned, and that an emissions tax need not 
apply to the total amount of emissions covered (e. g., Aldy J. E. 
et al., 2010; Goulder, 2013). Tax thresholds could exempt part of 
the overall amount of an emitter’s liabilities, while charging the 
full tax rate on any extra emissions, analogous to free permits 
(Pezzey, 2003; Pezzey and Jotzo, 2012). Conversely, governments 
could auction some or all permits in an emissions trading scheme, 
and use the revenue to reduce other more distorting taxes and 
charges (Section 3.6.3.3), assist consumers, or pay for complemen-
tary policies.
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approaches while others rely on markets, effective climate change mit-
igation policy will generally require a mix of market and non-market 
instruments.
3�8�3 Information programmes
Reductions in GHG emissions can also be achieved by providing accu-
rate and comprehensive information to producers and consumers on 
the costs and benefits of alternative options. Information instruments 
include governmental financing of research and public statistics, and 
awareness-raising campaigns on consumption and production choices 
(Mont and Dalhammar, 2005).
3�8�4 Government provision of public goods 
and services, and procurement
Government funding of public goods and services may be aimed 
directly at reducing GHG emissions, for example, by providing infra-
structures and public transport services that use energy more effi-
ciently; promoting R&D on innovative approaches to mitigation; and 
removing legal barriers (Creutzig et al., 2011).
3�8�5 Voluntary actions
Voluntary agreements can be made between governments and pri-
vate parties in order to achieve environmental objectives or improve 
environmental performance beyond compliance with regulatory obli-
gations. They include industry agreements, self-certification, environ-
mental management systems, and self-imposed targets. The literature 
is ambiguous about whether any additional environmental gains are 
obtained through voluntary agreements (Koehler, 2007; Lyon and Max-
well, 2007; Borck and Coglianese, 2009).
3�8�6 Policy interactions and complementarity 
Most of the literature deals with the use and assessment of one instru-
ment, or compares alternative options, whereas, in reality, numerous, 
often overlapping instruments are in operation (see Chapters 7 – 16). 
Multiple objectives in addition to climate change mitigation, such 
as energy security and affordability and technological and industrial 
development, may call for multiple policy instruments. Another ques-
tion is whether and to what extent emissions pricing policies need to 
be complemented by regulatory and other instruments to achieve cost-
effective mitigation, for example, because of additional market failures, 
as in the case of energy efficiency (Box 3.10) and technological devel-
opment (3.11.1).
However, the coexistence of different instruments creates synergies, 
overlaps and interactions that may influence the effectiveness and 
costs of policies relative to a theoretical optimum (Kolstad et al., 1990; 
see also Section 3.6 above). Recent studies have analyzed interactions 
between tradeable quotas or certificates for renewable energy and 
emission trading (e. g., Möst and Fichtner, 2010; Böhringer and Rosen-
dahl, 2010) and emissions trading and tradeable certificates for energy 
efficiency improvements (e. g., Mundaca, 2008; Sorrell et al., 2009) (see 
also Chapters 9 and 15). Similar effects occur in the overlay of other 
selective policy instruments with comprehensive pricing instruments. 
Policy interactions can also create implementation and enforcement 
challenges when policies are concurrently pursued by different legal 
or administrative jurisdictions (Goulder and Parry, 2008; Goulder and 
Stavins, 2011).
3�8�7 Government failure and policy failure
To achieve large emissions reductions, policy interventions will be 
needed. But failure is always a possibility, as shown by recent experi-
ences involving mitigation policies (Chapters 13 – 16). The literature is 
beginning to reflect this. The failure of such policies tends to be asso-
ciated with the translation of individual preferences into government 
action.
3�8�7�1 Rent-seeking
Policy interventions create rents, including subsidies, price changes 
arising from taxation or regulation, and emissions permits. Private 
interests lobby governments for policies that maximize the value of 
their assets and profits. The sums involved in mitigating climate change 
provide incentives to the owners of assets in GHG intensive industries 
or technologies for low-carbon production to engage in rent-seeking.27
The political economy of interest group lobbying (Olson, 1971) is 
apparent in the implementation of climate change mitigation policies. 
Examples include lobbying for allocations of free permits under the 
emissions trading schemes in Europe (Hepburn et al., 2006; Sijm et al., 
2006; Ellerman, 2010) and Australia (Pezzey et  al., 2010) as well as 
renewable energy support policies in several countries (Helm, 2010).
To minimize the influence of rent-seeking and the risk of regulatory 
capture, two basic approaches have been identified (Helm, 2010). 
One is to give independent institutions a strong role, for example, the 
United Kingdom’s Committee on Climate Change (McGregor et  al., 
2012) and Australia’s Climate Change Authority (Keenan R.J et  al., 
2012) (see also Chapter 15).
Another approach to reducing rent-seeking is to rely less on regulatory 
approaches and more on market mechanisms, which are less prone to 
capture by special interests because the value and distribution of rents 
27 CBA takes into account that governments are social-profit maximizers, which may 
not necessarily be the case.
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is more transparent. This may of course lead to other problems associ-
ated with regulatory design.
3�8�7�2 Policy uncertainty
One aim of climate change mitigation policy is to promote emissions-
reducing investments in sectors where assets have a long economic 
lifespan, such as energy (Chapter 7), buildings (Chapter 9) and transport 
(Chapter 8). Investment decisions are mainly based on expectations 
about future costs and revenues. Therefore, expectations about future 
policy settings can be more important than current policies in determin-
ing the nature and extent of investment for mitigation (Ulph, 2013).
Uncertainty over future policy directions, including changes in existing 
policies arising from, say, political change, can affect investment deci-
sions and inhibit mitigation, as well as create economic costs 
(Weitzman, 1980; see also Chapter 2). To achieve cost-effective mitiga-
tion actions, a stable and predictable policy framework is required.
3.9  Metrics of costs 
and benefits
This section focuses on conceptual issues that arise in the quantifica-
tion and measurement, using a common metric, of the pros and cons 
associated with mitigation and adaptation (i. e., benefits and costs). 
How costs are balanced against benefits in evaluating a climate policy 
is a matter for ethics, as has repeatedly been emphasized in this chap-
ter. The discussion is largely based on the economic paradigm of bal-
ancing costs against benefits, with both measured in monetary units. 
But leaving aside how benefits and costs are monetized or balanced 
to develop policy, the underlying information can be helpful for policy 
makers who adopt other ethical perspectives. This section is also rel-
evant for methods that reduce performance to a small number of met-
rics rather than a single one (such as MCA).
We begin with the chain of cause and effect. The chain starts with 
human activity that generates emissions that may be reduced with 
mitigation (recognizing that nature also contributes to emissions of 
GHGs). The global emissions of GHGs lead to changes in atmospheric 
concentrations, then to changes in radiative forcing, and finally to 
changes in climate. The latter affect biological and physical systems in 
good as well as bad ways (including through impacts on agriculture, 
forests, ecosystems, energy generation, fire, and floods). These changes 
in turn affect human wellbeing, negatively or positively, with both 
monetary and other consequences.28 Each link in the chain has a time 
dimension, since emissions at a particular point in time lead to radia-
tive forcing at future points in time, which later lead to more impacts 
and damages. The links also have spatial dimensions. Models play a key 
role in defining the relationships between the links in the chain. Global 
Climate Models (GCMs) translate emissions through atmospheric con-
centrations and radiative forcing into changes in climate. Other mod-
els — including crop, forest growth and hydrology models — translate 
28 We refer to effects on biological and physical systems as ‘impacts’, and effects of 
those impacts on human wellbeing as ‘damages’, whether positive or negative. 
These effects may include non-human impacts that are of concern to humans (see 
also Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.3).
Box 3�8 | Different conditions in developed and developing countries and implications for suit-
ability of policy instruments 
Differences in economic structure, institutions, and policy objec-
tives between low-income and high-income countries can mean 
differences in the suitability and performance of policy instru-
ments. Overriding policy objectives in most developing countries 
tend to be strongly oriented towards facilitating development (Kok 
et al., 2008), increasing access to energy and alleviating poverty 
(see Chapters 4 and 14). In general, they have fewer human and 
financial resources, less advanced technology, and poorer institu-
tional and administrative capacity than developed countries. This 
may constrain their ability to evaluate, implement, and enforce 
policies. Further, the prerequisites for effectiveness, such as liberal-
ized energy markets to underpin price-based emissions reduc-
tion instruments, are often lacking. Thus, the use of some policy 
instruments, including carbon trading schemes, can pose greater 
institutional hurdles and implementation costs, or not be feasible. 
Capacity building is therefore critical in creating mechanisms to 
support policy choices and implementation. Economic reform may 
also be needed in order to remove distortions in regulatory and 
pricing mechanisms and enable effective mitigation policies to be 
devised and implemented.
The opportunity cost of capital, and of government resources in 
particular, may be higher in developing countries than in devel-
oped countries. Consequently, the payoff from mitigation policies 
needs to be higher than in developed countries in order for 
mitigation investment to be judged worthwhile. Thus, developing 
countries may require international financial assistance in order 
to support their mitigation activities or make them economically 
viable.
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changes in climate into physical impacts. Economic models translate 
those impacts into measures that reflect a human perspective, typically 
monetary measures of welfare loss or gain. GCMs aggregate emissions 
of various gases into an overall level of radiative forcing; hydrology 
models aggregate precipitation at multiple locations within a water-
shed into stream flow at a given location; economic models aggregate 
impacts into an overall measure of welfare loss.
Much of the literature on impacts focuses on particular types of 
impacts at particular locations. Another aspect involves metrics that 
allow differential regulation of different GHGs, for instance, the rela-
tive weight that regulators should place on CH4 and CO2 in mitigation 
strategies. Because impacts and damages are so poorly known it has 
proved surprisingly difficult to provide a rigorous answer to that ques-
tion. 
3�9�1 The damages from climate change
The impacts of climate change may benefit some people and harm 
others. It can affect their livelihood, health, access to food, water and 
other amenities, and natural environment. While many non-monetary 
metrics can be used to characterize components of impacts, they pro-
vide no unambiguous aggregation methods for characterizing over-
all changes in welfare. In principle, the economic theory of monetary 
valuation provides a way, albeit an imperfect one, of performing this 
aggregation and supporting associated policy-making processes.
Changes that affect human wellbeing can be ‘market’ or ‘non-market’ 
changes. Market effects involve changes in prices, revenue and net 
income, as well as in the quantity, quality, or availability of market 
commodities. Key is the ability to observe both prices and how people 
respond to them when choosing quantities to consume. Non-market 
changes involve the quantity, quality, or availability of things that mat-
ter to people and which are not obtained through the market (e. g., 
quality of life, culture, and environmental quality). A change in a physi-
cal or biological system can generate both market and non-market 
damage to human wellbeing. For example, an episode of extreme heat 
in a rural area may generate heat stress in farm labourers and may 
dry up a wetland that serves as a refuge for migratory birds, while kill-
ing some crops and impairing the quality of others. From an economic 
perspective, damages would be conceptualized as a loss of income for 
farmers and farm workers, an increase in crop prices for consumers 
and a reduction in their quality; and non-market impacts might include 
the impairment of the ecosystem and human health (though some 
health effects may be captured in the wages of farm workers).
Economists define value in terms of a ‘trade-off’. As discussed in Sec-
tion 3.6.1, the economic value of an item, measured in money terms, 
is defined as the amount of income that would make a person whole, 
either in lieu of the environmental change or in conjunction with the 
environmental change; that is, its ‘income equivalent’. This equivalence 
is evaluated through the Willingness To Pay (WTP) and Willingness To 
Accept (WTA) compensation measures (see also Willig, 1976; Hane-
mann, 1991). The item in question may or may not be a marketed com-
modity: it can be anything that the person values. Thus, the economic 
value of an item is not in general the same as its price or the total 
expenditure on it. The economic concept of value based on a trade-off 
has some critics. The item being valued may be seen as incommensu-
rable with money, such that no trade-off is possible. Or, the trade-off 
may be deemed inappropriate or unethical (e. g., Kelman, 1981; see 
also Jamieson, 1992; Sagoff, 2008). In addition, while the economic 
concept of value is defined for an individual, it is typically measured for 
aggregates of individuals, and the issue of equity-weighting is often 
disregarded (Nyborg, 2012; see also Subsection 3.5.1.3).29
The methods used to measure WTP and WTA fall into two categories, 
known as ‘revealed preference’ and ‘stated preference’ methods. For a 
marketed item, an individual’s purchase behaviour reveals information 
about their value of it. Observation of purchase behaviour in the mar-
ketplace is the basis of the revealed preference approaches. One can 
estimate a demand function from data on observed choice behaviour. 
Then, from the estimated demand function, one can infer the purchas-
er’s WTP or WTA values for changes in the price, quantity, quality, or 
availability of the commodity. Another revealed preference approach, 
known as the hedonic pricing method, is based on finding an observed 
relationship between the quality characteristics of marketed items and 
the price at which they are sold (e. g., between the price of farmland 
and the condition and location of the farmland). From this approach, 
one can infer the ’marginal’ value of a change in characteristics.30 For 
instance, some have attempted to measure climate damages using an 
hedonic approach based on the correlation of residential house prices 
and climate in different areas (Cragg and Kahn, 1997; Maddison, 2001, 
2003; Maddison and Bigano, 2003; Rehdanz and Maddison, 2009). The 
primary limitation of revealed preference methods is the frequent lack 
of a market associated with the environmental good being valued.
With stated preference, the analyst employs a survey or experiment 
through which subjects are confronted with a trade-off. With contin-
gent valuation, for example, they are asked to choose whether or not 
to make a payment, such as a tax increase that allows the govern-
ment to undertake an action that accomplishes a specific outcome 
(e. g., protecting a particular ecosystem). By varying the cost across 
subjects and then correlating the cost offered with the percentage of 
‘yes’ responses, the analyst traces out a form of demand function from 
which the WTP (or WTA) measure can be derived. With choice experi-
ments, subjects are asked to make repeated choices among alternative 
29 The use of the term ‘willingness’ in WTP and WTA should not be taken literally. For 
instance, individuals may have a willingness to pay for cleaner air (the reduction 
in income that would be equivalent in welfare terms to an increase in air quality) 
but they may be very unwilling to make that payment, believing that clean air is a 
right that should not have to be purchased.
30 Details of these methods can be found in Becht (1995), chapters by McConnell 
and Bockstael (2006), Palmquist (2006), Phaneuf and Smith (2006), Mäler and 
Vincent (2005), or in textbooks such as Kolstad (2010), Champ, Boyle and Brown 
(2003), Haab and McConnell (2002) or Bockstael and McConnell (2007).
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options that combine different outcomes with different levels of cost.31 
Although a growing number of researchers use stated preference stud-
ies to measure the public’s WTP for climate change mitigation, one 
prominent criticism is the hypothetical nature of the choices involved.32
All these methods have been applied to valuing the damages from cli-
mate change.33 AR2 contained a review of the literature on the eco-
nomic valuation of climate change impacts. Since then, the literature 
has grown exponentially. The economic methodology has changed 
little (except for more coverage of non-market impacts and more use 
of stated preference). The main change is in the spatial representa-
tion of climate change impacts; whereas the older literature tended 
to measure the economic consequences of a uniform increase of, say 
2.5 °C across the United States, the recent literature uses downscaling 
to measure impacts on a fine spatial scale. Most of the recent literature 
on the economic valuations of climate change has focused on market 
impacts, especially impacts on agriculture, forestry, sea level, energy, 
water, and tourism.34
The most extensive economic literature pertains to agriculture. The 
demand for many such commodities is often inelastic, so the short-run 
consequence of a negative supply shock is a price increase; while a 
benefit to producers, it is harmful for consumers (Roberts and Schlenker, 
2010; Lobell et al., 2011). Some studies measure the effect of weather 
on current profits, rather than that of climate on long-term profitability 
(e. g., Deschênes and Greenstone, 2007), and some explore the effect 
of both weather and climate on current profits (Kelly et  al., 2005). 
Examining weather and climate simultaneously leads to difficulties 
in identifying the separate effects of weather and climate (Deschênes 
and Kolstad, 2011), as well as in dealing with the confounding effects 
of price changes (Fisher et al., 2012). While some recent studies have 
found that extreme climate events have a disproportionate impact on 
agricultural systems (Schlenker and Roberts, 2009; Lobell et al., 2011; 
Deschênes and Kolstad, 2011; see also WGII, Section 7.3.2.1), the 
relatively high degree of spatial or temporal aggregation means that 
31 Details can be found in Carson and Hanemann (2005), or in textbooks such as 
Champ, Boyle and Brown (2003), Haab and McConnell (2002), and Bennett and 
Blamey (2001).
32 Examples include Berrens et al. (2004), Lee and Cameron (2008), Solomon and 
Johnson (2009), and Aldy et al. (2012) for the U. S.; Akter and Bennett (2011) for 
Australia; Longo et al. (2012) for Spain; Lee et al. (2010) for Korea; Adaman et al. 
(2011) for Turkey; and Carlsson et al. (2012) for a comparative study of WTP in 
China, Sweden and the US.
33 Other economic measures of damage are sometimes used that may not be 
appropriate. The economic damage is, in principle, the lesser of the value of what 
was lost or the cost of replacing it (assuming a suitable and appropriate replace-
ment exists). Therefore, the replacement cost itself may or may not be a relevant 
measure. Similarly, if the cost of mitigation is actually incurred, it is a lower bound 
on the value placed on the damage avoided. Otherwise, the mitigation cost is 
irrelevant if nobody is willing to incur it.
34 While there is a large literature covering physical and biological impacts, except 
for agriculture and forestry only a tiny portion of the literature carries the analysis 
to the point of measuring an economic value. However, the literature is expanding. 
A Web of Knowledge search on the terms (“climate change” or “global warm-
ing”) and “damage” and “economic impacts” returns 39 papers for pre-2000, 
136 papers for 2000 – 2009 and 209 papers for 2010 through September 2013.
those events are not well captured in many existing economic analy-
ses. Another difficulty is the welfare significance of shifts in location 
of agricultural production caused by climate. Markets for agricultural 
commodities are national or international in scope, so some economic 
analyses focus on aggregate international producer and consumer 
welfare. Under the potential Pareto criterion, transfers of income from 
one region to another are of no welfare significance, though of real 
policy significance.35
With other market sectors, the literature is both sparse and highly frag-
mented, but includes some estimates of economic impacts of climate 
change on energy, water, sea level rise, tourism, and health in partic-
ular locations. With regard to energy, climate change is expected to 
reduce demand for heating and increase demand for cooling (see WGII 
AR5, Chapter 10). Even if those two effects offset one another, the eco-
nomic cost need not be negligible. With water supply, what matters in 
many cases is not total annual precipitation but the match between 
the timing of precipitation and the timing of water use (Strzepek and 
Boehlert, 2010). Those questions require analysis on a finer temporal 
or spatial scale than has typically been employed in the economic 
damage literature.
Estimates of the economic costs of a rise in sea level generally focus on 
either the property damage from flooding or on the economic costs of 
prevention, for example, sea wall construction (Hallegatte et al., 2007; 
Hallegatte, 2008; 2012). They sometimes include costs associated with 
the temporary disruption of economic activity. Estimates typically do 
not measure the loss of wellbeing for people harmed or displaced by 
flooding.36 Similarly, the economic analyses of climate change impacts 
on tourism have focused on changes, for example, in the choice of 
destination and the income from tourism activities attributable to an 
increase in temperature, but not on the impacts on participants’ well-
being.37
The economic metrics conventionally used in the assessment of non-
climate health outcomes have also been used to measure the impact 
of climate on health (e. g., Deschênes and Greenstone, 2011; Watkiss 
and Hunt, 2012). Measures to reduce GHGs may also reduce other pol-
lutants associated with fossil fuel combustion, such as NOx and par-
ticulates, which lead to time lost from work and reduced productivity 
(Östblom and Samakovlis, 2007). Exposure to high ambient tempera-
35 The same issue arises with the effects on timber production in a global timber 
market; see for example, Sohngen et al. (2001).
36 Exceptions include Daniel et al. (2009) and Botzen and van den Bergh (2012). 
Cardoso and Benhin (2011) provide a stated preference valuation of protecting 
the Columbian Caribbean coast from sea level rise. 
37 Exceptions include Pendleton and Mendelsohn (1998); Loomis and Richardson 
(2006); Richardson and Loomis (2004); Pendleton et al. (2011); Tseng and Chen 
(2008); and for commercial fishing, Narita et al. (2012).
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tures is known to diminish work capacity and reduce labour produc-
tivity.38
3�9�2 Aggregate climate damages
This section focuses on the aggregate regional and global economic 
damages from climate change as used in IAMs to balance the benefits 
and costs of mitigation on a global scale.
The first estimates of the economic damage associated with a specific 
degree of climate change were made for the United States (Smith and 
Tirpak, 1989; Nordhaus, 1991; Cline, 1992; Titus, 1992; Fankhauser, 
1994). These studies involved static analyses estimating the damage 
associated with a particular climate end-point, variously taken to be a 
1 °C, 2.5 °C, or 3 °C increase in global average annual temperature. This 
approach gave way to dynamic analyses in IAMs that track economic 
output, emissions, atmospheric CO2 concentration, and damages. 
Because some IAMs examine costs and benefits for different levels of 
emissions, they need damage ‘functions’ rather than point estimates.
Three IAMs have received most attention in the literature, all initially 
developed in the 1990s. The DICE model was first published in Nord-
haus (1993a; b) but had its genesis in Nordhaus (1977); its regionally 
disaggregated sibling RICE was first published by Nordhaus and Yang 
(1996).39 The FUND model was first published in Tol (1995). And the 
PAGE model, developed for European decision makers, was first pub-
lished in Hope et al. (1993) and was used in the Stern (2007) review.40 
The models have undergone various refinements and updates.41 While 
details have changed, their general structure has stayed the same, and 
questions remain about the validity of their damage functions (see Pin-
dyck, 2013).
The IAMs use a highly aggregated representation of damages. The spa-
tial unit of analysis in DICE is the entire world, whereas the worldis 
divided into 12 broad regions in RICE, 16 regions in FUND, and eight 
in PAGE. DICE and RICE have a single aggregate damage function for 
the change in global or regional GDP as a function of the increase 
in global average temperature, here denoted ΔTt, and sea-level rise 
38 See Kjellstrom et al. (2009), Zivin and Neidell (2010), or Dunne et al. (2013). Some 
recent studies have focused on the correlation between high temperatures and 
poverty (Nordhaus, 2006), the link between fluctuations in temperature, cyclones 
and fluctuations in economic activity (Dell et al., 2009, 2012; Hsiang, 2010), and 
the connection between climate change and human conflict (Hsiang et al., 2013).
39 There are many extensions of DICE, including AD-DICE (de Bruin et al., 2009), with 
a more explicit treatment of adaptation.
40 Some other IAMs have damage functions, including the MERGE Model (Manne 
and Richels, 1992, 1995, 2004a); the CETA model (Peck and Teisberg, 1992, 
1994); and, more recently, several IAMs developed by European researchers 
including the WITCH model (Bosetti et al., 2006), its extension the AD-WITCH 
model (Bosello et al., 2010), the ENVISAGE model (Roson and Mensbrugghe, 
2012), and a model developed by Eboli et al. (2010) and Bosello et al. (2012). 
41 The most recent versions are: DICE2013 (Nordhaus and Sztorc, 2013); RICE2010 
(Nordhaus, 2010); PAGE 2009 (Hope, 2011, 2013); FUND 3.7 (Anthoff and Tol, 
2013).
(which in turn is modelled as a function of ΔTt). PAGE has four sepa-
rate damage functions for different types of damages in each region: 
economic, non-economic, sea-level rise, and climate discontinuity (as 
a function of ΔTt and the derivative rise in sea level). FUND has eight 
sectoral damage functions for each region, with each damage depen-
dent on the regional ΔTt and, in some cases, the rate of change in ΔTt. 
Adaptation and catastrophic damage are included in a very simple way 
in some models (Greenstone et al., 2013).
Let Djkt denote damages of type j in year t and region k, expressed as a 
proportion of per capita GDP in that year and region, Ykt. The damage 
functions, say Djkt = Djkt(ΔTt) are calibrated based on: (1) the modeller’s 
choice of a particular algebraic formula for Djkt(ΔTt): (2) the common 
assumption of zero damage at the origin [Djkt(0) = 0]; and (3) the mod-
eller’s estimate of damages at a benchmark change in global average 
temperature, ΔT* (typically associated with a doubling of atmospheric 
CO2). For example, in the original versions of PAGE and DICE the dam-
age function resolves into a power function:
Equation 3�9�1 Djt = aj[ΔTt / ΔT*]bYt
where b is a coefficient estimated or specified by the modeller, and 
aj is the modeller’s estimate of the economic damage for the bench-
mark temperature change.42 In DICE, b = 2 is chosen.43 In PAGE, b is 
a random variable between 1.5 and 3. In FUND, the damage functions 
are deterministic but have a slightly more complicated structure and 
calibration than in Equation 3.9.1.
Because each damage function is convex (with increasing marginal 
damage), the high degree of spatial and temporal aggregation causes 
the model to understate aggregate damages. This can be seen by rep-
resenting the spatial or temporal distribution of warming by a mean 
and variance, and writing expected damages in a second order expan-
sion around the mean.
A concern may be whether the curvature reflected in Equation 3.9.1 
is adequate. The functions are calibrated to the typical warming asso-
ciated with a doubling of CO2 concentration, along with associated 
damage. The aggregate damage is based on heroic extrapolations to 
a regional or global scale from a sparse set of studies (some from the 
1990s) done at particular geographic locations. The impacts literature 
is now paying somewhat more attention to higher levels of warm-
ing (New et al. (2011), World Bank (2012), and WGII Section 19.5.1), 
though estimates of monetary damage remain scarce (however, the 
literature is expanding rapidly). Another concern is the possibility of 
tipping points and extreme events (Lenton et al., 2008) (see also Box 
3.9), possibly including increases in global temperature as large as 
10 – 12 °C that are not always reflected in the calibration (Sherwood 
and Huber, 2010).
42 Typically, ΔT* is 2.5 or 3 °C. When ΔTt = ΔT* in this equation, then Djt = ajYt.
43 This formulation is also used by Kandlikar (1996) and Hammitt et al. (1996a) with 
b = 1, 2 or 3.
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The economic loss or gain from warming in a given year typically 
depends on the level of warming in that same year, with no lagged 
effects (at least for damages other than sea-level rise in DICE, the 
non-catastrophe component of damages in PAGE, and some sectors 
of FUND). Thus, impacts are (a) reversible, and (b) independent of the 
prior trajectory of temperatures. This assumption simplifies the com-
putations, but some impacts and damages may actually depend on 
the rate of increase in temperature.44 The optimal trajectory of mitiga-
44 This rate of change was considered by Manne and Richels (2004a) in MERGE and 
by Peck and Teisberg (1994) in CETA. The latter found that it can have quite a 
large effect on the size of the optimal carbon tax.
tion and the level of damages could also depend on the cumulative 
amount of warming in previous years (measured, say, in degree 
years).
DICE, FUND and PAGE represent damage as equivalent to a change in 
production of market commodities that is proportional to output (a ‘mul-
tiplicative’ formulation). Weitzman (2010a) finds that this specification 
matters with high levels of warming because an additive formulation 
leads to more drastic emission reduction. Besides affecting current mar-
ket production, climate change could damage natural, human, or physi-
cal capital (e. g., through wildfires or floods). Damage to capital stocks 
may last beyond a year and have lingering impacts that are not cap-
tured in current formulations (Wu et al., 2011). Economic consequences 
Box 3�9 | Uncertainty and damages: the fat tails problem
Weitzman (2009, 2011) has drawn attention to what has become 
known as the fat-tails problem. He emphasized the existence of a 
chain of structural uncertainties affecting both the climate system 
response to radiative forcing and the possibility of some resulting 
impacts on human wellbeing that could be catastrophic. Uncer-
tainties relate to both means of distributions and higher moments. 
The resulting compounded probability distribution of possible 
economic damage could have a fat bad tail: i. e., the likelihood of 
an extremely large reduction in wellbeing does not go quickly to 
zero.1 With or without risk aversion, the expected marginal reduc-
tion in wellbeing associated with an increment in emissions today 
could be very large, even infinite2 See also Section 2.5.3.3.
A policy implication of the conditions described in the previous 
paragraph is that tail events can become much more important 
in determining expected damage than would be the case with 
probability distributions with thinner tails. Weitzman (2011) illus-
trates this for the distribution of temperature consequences of a 
doubling of atmospheric CO2 (climate sensitivity), using WGI AR4 
estimates to calibrate two distributions, one fat-tailed and one 
thin-tailed, to have a median temperature change of 3 °C and a 
15 % probability of a temperature change in excess of 4.5 °C. With 
this calibration, the probability of temperatures in excess of 8 °C 
is nearly ten times greater with the fat-tailed distribution than 
1 Weitzman (2009) defines a fat-tailed distribution as one with an infinite 
moment generating function (a thin-tailed distribution has a finite moment 
generating function); more intuitively, for a fat-tailed distribution, the tail 
probability approaches zero more slowly than exponentially. For example, 
the normal (and any distribution with finite support) would be thin-tailed 
whereas the Pareto distribution (a power law distribution) would be fat-
tailed.
2 Weitzman (2007b, 2009) argued that the expected marginal reduction in 
wellbeing could be infinite. His results have been challenged by some as 
too pessimistic, e. g., Nordhaus (2011a), Pindyck (2011) and Costello et al. 
(2010).
the thin-tailed distribution. If high consequence, low probability 
events become more likely at higher temperatures, then tail events 
can dominate the computation of expected damages from climate 
change, depending on the nature of the probability distribution 
and other features of the problem (including timing and discount-
ing).
At a more technical level, with some fat-tailed distributions and 
certain types of utility functions (constant relative risk aversion), 
the expectation of a marginal reduction in wellbeing associated 
with an increment in emissions is infinite. This is because in these 
cases, marginal utility becomes infinite as consumption goes to 
zero. This is a troubling result since infinite marginal damage 
implies all available resources should be dedicated to reducing 
the effects of climate change. But as Weitzman himself and other 
authors have pointed out, this extreme result is primarily a techni-
cal problem that can be solved by bounding the utility function or 
using a different functional form. 
The primary conclusion from this debate is the importance of 
understanding the impacts associated with low probability, 
high climate change scenarios. These may in fact dominate the 
expected benefits of mitigation.
The policy implication of this conclusion is that the nature of 
uncertainty can profoundly change how climate policy is framed 
and analyzed with respect to the benefits of mitigation. Specifi-
cally, fatter tails on probability distributions of climate outcomes 
increase the importance in understanding and quantifying the 
impacts and economic value associated with tail events (such as 
8 °C warming). It is natural to focus research attention on most 
likely outcomes (such as a 3 °C warming from a CO2 doubling), 
but it may be that less likely outcomes will dominate the expected 
value of mitigation.
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depend on what is assumed about the elasticity of substitution in the 
utility function between market commodities and non-market climate 
impacts. An elasticity of substitution of unity is equivalent to the conven-
tional multiplicative formulation, but a value less than unity, generates 
a more drastic trajectory of emission reductions (Krutilla, 1967; Sterner 
and Persson, 2008).
The utility function in these three IAMs does not distinguish between 
the welfare gains deriving from risk reduction when people are risk 
averse versus the gains from smoothing consumption over time 
when people have declining marginal utility of income: both prefer-
ences are captured by the curvature of the utility function as mea-
sured by η, in Equation 3.6.4. However, Kreps and Porteus (1978) and 
Epstein and Zin (1991) show that two separate functions can have 
separate parameters for risk aversion and inter-temporal substitu-
tion. This formulation is used successfully in the finance literature to 
explain anomalies in the market pricing of financial assets, including 
the equity premium (Campbell, 1996; Bansal and Yaron, 2004). The 
insight from this literature is that the standard model of discounted 
expected utility, used in DICE, FUND and PAGE, sets the risk premium 
too low and the discount rate too high, a result confirmed by Acker-
man et al. (2013) and Crost and Traeger (2013).
Our general conclusion is that the reliability of damage functions 
in current IAMs is low. Users should be cautious in relying on them 
for policy analysis: some damages are omitted, and some estimates 
may not reflect the most recent information on physical impacts; the 
empirical basis of estimates is sparse and not necessarily up-to-date; 
and adaptation is difficult to properly represent. Furthermore, the lit-
erature on economic impacts has been growing rapidly and is often 
not fullyrepresented in damage functions used in IAMs. Some authors 
(e. g., WGII Chapter 19) conclude these damage functions are biased 
downwards. It should be underscored that most IAMs used in Chapter 
6 of this volume do not consider damage functions so this particular 
criticism does not apply to Chapter 6 analyses.
3�9�3 The aggregate costs of mitigation
Reductions in GHG emission often impose costs on firms, households 
(see also Box 3.10), and governments as a result of changes in prices, 
revenues and net income, and in the availability or quality of com-
modities. GHG reduction requires not only technological but also 
behavioural and institutional changes, which may affect wellbeing. 
The changes in wellbeing are measured in monetary terms through 
a change in income that is equivalent to the impact on wellbeing. 
Changes in prices and incomes are often projected through economic 
models (see Chapter 6). In many cases, mitigation primarily involves 
improvements in energy efficiency or changes in the generation and 
use of energy from fossil fuels in order to reduce GHG emissions. 
The models assessed in Chapter 6 are called IAMs (or Integrated 
Models — IMs) because they couple several systems together (such 
as the economy and the climate) in an integrated fashion, track-
ing the impact of changes in economic production on GHG emis-
sions, as well as of emissions on global temperatures and the effect 
of mitigation policies on emissions. As discussed in Section 6.2, the 
IAMs used in Chapter 6 are heterogeneous. However, for most of the 
Chapter 6 IAMs, climate change has no feedback effects on market 
supply and demand, and most do not include damage functions.45 
45 Climate is assumed to be separable from market goods in the models’ utility 
functions. If that assumption is incorrect, Carbone and Smith (2013) show that the 
welfare calculation may have significant error.
Box 3�10 | Could mitigation have a negative private cost?
A persistent issue in the analysis of mitigation options and costs 
is whether available mitigation opportunities can be privately 
profitable — that is, generate benefits to the consumer or firm that 
are in excess of their own cost of implementation — but which 
are not voluntarily undertaken. Absent another explanation, a 
negative private cost implies that a person is not fully pursuing his 
own interest. (By contrast, a negative social cost arises when the 
total of everybody’s benefits exceeds costs, suggesting that some 
private decision-maker is not maximizing the interests of others.) 
The notion that available mitigation opportunities may have 
negative costs recently received attention because of analyses 
by McKinsey & Company (2009), Enkvist et al. (2007) and others 
that focused especially on energy use for lighting and heating in 
residential and commercial buildings, and on some agricultural 
and industrial processes. Much of this literature is in the context 
of the “energy efficiency gap,”1 which dates to the 1970s, and the 
“Porter hypothesis”.2 
The literature suggesting that available opportunities may have 
negative cost often points to institutional, political, or social 
barriers as the cause. But other literature suggests economic 
1 The efficiency gap is defined as the difference between the socially desirable 
amount of energy efficiency (however defined) and what firms and consum-
ers are willing to undertake voluntarily (see Meier and Whittier, 1983; Joskow 
and Marron, 1992, 1993; Jaffe and Stavins, 1994). 
2 Porter (1991) and Porter and van der Linde (1995) argued that unilateral 
reductions in pollution could stimulate innovation and improve firms’ com-
petitiveness as a by-product; see also Lanoie et al. (2008); Jaffe and Palmer 
(1997). The subsequent literature has obtained mixed finding (Ambec and 
Barla, 2006; Ambec et al., 2013). 
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explanations. In addition, however, evidence indicates that the 
extent of such negative cost opportunities can be overstated, 
particularly in purely engineering studies.
Engineering studies may overestimate the energy savings, for 
example because they assume perfect installation and mainte-
nance of the equipment (Dubin et al., 1986; Nadel and Keating, 
1991) or they fail to account for interactions among different 
investments such as efficient lighting and cooling (Hunting-
ton, 2011). Engineering studies also may fail to account for all 
costs actually incurred, including time costs, scarce manage-
rial attention and the opportunity cost of the money, time, or 
attention devoted to energy efficiency.3 In some cases, the 
engineering analysis may not account for reductions in qual-
ity (e. g., CFL lighting is perceived as providing less attractive 
lighting services). Choices may also be influenced by uncertainty 
(e. g., this is an unfamiliar product, one doesn’t know how 
well it will work, or what future energy prices will be). Another 
consideration sometimes overlooked in engineering analyses is 
the rebound effect — the cost saving induces a higher rate of 
equipment usage (see Section 3.9.5). The analyses may overlook 
heterogeneity among consumers: what appears attractive for 
the average consumer may not be attractive for all (or many) 
consumers, based on differences in their circumstances and 
preferences. One approach to validation is to examine energy 
efficiency programs and compare ex ante estimates of efficiency 
opportunities with ex post accomplishment; the evidence from 
such comparisons appears to be inconclusive, though more 
analysis may be fruitful.4
Economic explanations for the apparent failure to pursue 
profitable mitigation / energy saving opportunities include the 
following.5 Given uncertainty and risk aversion, consumers 
may rationally desire a higher return as compensation. Price 
uncertainty and the irreversibility of investment may also pose 
additional economic barriers to the timing of adoption — it may 
pay to wait before making the investment (Hassett and Metcalf, 
3 For example, Anderson and Newell (2004) examined energy audits for manu-
facturing plants and found that roughly half of the projects recommended by 
auditors were not adopted despite extremely short payback periods. When 
asked, plant managers responded that as much as 93 % of the projects were 
rejected for economic reasons, many of which related to high opportunity 
costs. Joskow and Marron (1992, 1993) show some engineering estimates 
understated actual costs.
4 Arimura et al. (2012) review US electricity industry conservation programmes 
(demand side management — DSM) and conclude that programmes saved 
energy at a mean cost of USD 0.05 per kWh, with a 90 % confidence interval 
of USD 0.003 to USD 0.010. Allcott and Greenstone (2012) conclude that 
this average cost is barely profitable. Although this may be true, one cannot 
conclude that on this evidence alone that ex ante engineering estimates of 
costs were too optimistic.
5 Allcott and Greenstone (2012) and Gillingham and Palmer (2014) provide 
excellent reviews.
1993; Metcalf, 1994). Mitigation investments take time to pay 
off, and consumers act as if they are employing high discount 
rates when evaluating such investments (Hausman, 1979). These 
consumer discount rates might be much higher than those of 
commercial businesses, reflecting liquidity and credit constraints. 
The durability of the existing capital stock can be a barrier to 
rapid deployment of otherwise profitable new technologies. Also, 
a principal-agent problem arises when the party that pays for an 
energy-efficiency investment doesn’t capture all the benefits, or 
vice versa. For example a tenant installs an efficient refrigerator, 
but the landlord retains ownership when the tenant leaves (split 
incentives). Or the landlord buys a refrigerator but doesn’t care 
about its energy efficiency. Such problems can also arise in orga-
nizations where different actors are responsible, say, for energy 
bills and investment accounts.6 Finally, energy users, especially 
residential users, may be uninformed, or poorly informed, about 
the energy savings they are forgoing. In some cases, the seller 
of the product has better information than the potential buyer 
(asymmetric information) and may fail to convey that informa-
tion credibly (Bardhan et al., 2013).
Recently, some economists have suggested that systematic 
behavioral biases in decision-making can cause a failure to 
make otherwise profitable investment. These have been classi-
fied as non-standard beliefs (e. g., incorrect assessments of fuel 
savings — Allcott, 2013), non-standard preferences (e. g., loss 
aversion — Greene et al., 2009), and non-standard decision mak-
ing (e. g., tax salience — Chetty et al., 2009). Such phenomena 
can give rise to what might be considered ‘misoptimization’ by 
decision makers, which in turn could create a role for efficiency-
improving policy not motivated by conventional market failures 
(Allcott et al., forthcoming); see Section 3.10.1 for a fuller 
account.
In summary, whether opportunities for mitigation at negative 
private cost exist is ultimately an empirical question. Both eco-
nomic and non-economic reasons can explain why they might 
exist, as noted in recent reviews (Huntington, 2011; Murphy and 
Jaccard, 2011; Allcott and Greenstone, 2012; Gillingham and 
Palmer, 2014). But, evidence also suggests that the occurrence 
of negative private costs is sometimes overstated, for reasons 
identified above. This remains an active area of research and 
debate.
6 Davis (2011) and Gillingham et al. (2012) provide evidence of principal-agent 
problems in residential energy, although amount of energy lost as a result 
was not large in the cases examined.
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The calculation of cost depends on assumptions made (1) in specify-
ing the model’s structure and (2) in calibrating its parameters. The 
models are calibrated to actual economic data. While more valida-
tion is required, some models are validated by making and testing 
predictions of the response to observed changes (Valenzuela et al., 
2007; Beckman et al., 2011; Baldos and Hertel, 2013). While some 
models do not address either the speed or cost of adjustment, many 
models incorporate adjustment costs and additional constraints to 
reflect deviations from full optimization (see Jacoby et  al., 2006; 
Babiker et  al., 2009; van Vuuren et  al., 2009). Most models allow 
little scope for endogenous (price-induced) technical change (3.11.4) 
or endogenous non-price behavioural factors (3.10.1). It is a mat-
ter of debate how well the models accurately represent underlying 
economic processes (see Burtraw, 1996; Burtraw et al., 2005; Hane-
mann, 2010). 
Besides estimating total cost, the models can be used to estimate 
Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC), the private cost of abating one 
additional unit of emissions. With a cap-and-trade system, emissions 
would theoretically be abated up to the point where MAC equals 
the permit price; with an emissions tax, they would be abated to the 
point where MAC equals the tax rate. It is common to graph the MAC 
associated with different levels of abatement. Under simplified con-
ditions, the area under the MAC curve measures the total economic 
cost of emissions reduction, but not if it fails to capture some of the 
economy-wide effects associated with large existing distortions (Klep-
per and Peterson, 2006; Paltsev et al., 2007; Kesicki and Ekins, 2012; 
Morris et al., 2012). However, a MAC is a static approximation to the 
dynamic process involved in pollution abatement; it thus has its limi-
tations.
3�9�4 Social cost of carbon
Although estimates of aggregate damages from climate change are 
useful in formulating GHG mitigation policies (despite the caveats 
listed in Section 3.9.2), they are often needed for more mundane 
policy reasons. Governments have to make decisions about regulation 
when implementing energy policies, such as on fuel or EE standards 
for vehicles and appliances. The social cost of carbon emissions can be 
factored into such decisions.
To calculate the social cost, consider a baseline trajectory of emissions 
(E0,…,Et) that results in a trajectory of temperature changes, ΔTt. Sup-
pose a damage function for year t is discounted to the present and 
called D(ΔTt), as discussed in Equation 3.9.2. These trajectories result 
in a discounted present value of damages: 




D(Δ T t )dt 
Then take the derivative with respect to a small change in emissions 
at t = 0, E0, to measure the extra cost associated with a one tonne 
increase in emissions at time 0 (that is, the increment in PVD): 
Equation 3�9�3 MDCC =  ∂PVD __
∂ E 0 
 
When applied to CO2 this equation gives the marginal damage from 
the change in climate that results from an extra tonne of carbon. It 
is also called the social cost of carbon (SCC). It should be empha-
sized that the calculation of SCC is highly sensitive to the projected 
future trajectory of emissions and also any current or future regulatory 
regime.46 
Because of its potential use in formulating climate or energy regula-
tory policy, governments have commissioned estimates of SCC. Since 
2002, an SCC value has been used in policy analysis and regulatory 
impact assessment in the United Kingdom (Clarkson and Deyes, 2002). 
It was revised in 2007 and 2010. In 2010, a standardized range of SCC 
values based on simulations with DICE, FUND, and PAGE using alterna-
tive projections of emissions and alternative discount rates, was made 
available to all U. S. Government agencies.47 It was updated in 2013 
(US Interagency Working Group, 2013).
3�9�5 The rebound effect
Technological improvements in energy efficiency (EE) have direct 
effects on energy consumption and thus GHG emissions, but can 
cause other changes in consumption, production, and prices that 
will, in turn, affect GHG emissions. These changes are generally 
called ‘rebound’ or ‘takeback’ because in most cases they reduce 
the net energy or emissions reduction associated with the effi-
ciency improvement. The size of rebound is controversial, with some 
research papers suggesting little or no rebound and others conclud-
ing that it offsets most or all reductions from EE policies (Greening 
et  al., 2000; Binswanger, 2001; Gillingham et  al., 2013, summarize 
the empirical research). Total EE rebound can be broken down into 
three distinct parts: substitution-effect, income-effect, and economy-
wide.
In end-use consumption, substitution-effect rebound, or ‘direct 
rebound’ assumes that a consumer will make more use of a device 
if it becomes more energy efficient because it will be cheaper to use. 
Substitution-effect rebound extends to innovations triggered by the 
improved EE that results in new ways of using the device. To pay for 
that extra use, the individual must still consume less of something 
else, so net substitution-effect rebound is the difference between the 
energy expended in using more of the device and the energy saved 
from using whatever was previously used less (see Thomas and Aze-
vedo, 2013).
46 Some ambiguity regards the definition of the SCC and the correct way to calculate 
it in the context of an equilibrium IAM (in terms of distinguishing between a mar-
ginal change in welfare vs. a marginal change in damage only). See, for instance, 
an account of the initial U. S. Government effort (Greenstone et al., 2013). 
47 Obviously, estimates of the SCC are sensitive to the structural and data assump-
tions in the models used to compute the SCC. Weitzman (2013), for instance, 
demonstrates the significance of the discount rate in the calculation. 
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Income-effect rebound or ‘indirect rebound’, arises if the improvement 
in EE makes the consumer wealthier and leads them to consume addi-
tional products that require energy. Even if energy efficient light bulbs 
lead to no substitution-effect rebound (more lighting), income-effect 
rebound would result if the consumer spends the net savings from 
installing the bulbs on new consumption that uses energy. The income-
effect rebound will reflect the size of the income savings from the EE 
improvement and the energy intensity of marginal income expendi-
tures.
Analogous rebound effects for EE improvements in production are 
substitution towards an input with improved energy efficiency, and 
substitution among products by consumers when an EE improve-
ment changes the relative prices of goods, as well as an income effect 
when an EE improvement lowers production costs and creates greater 
wealth.
Economy-wide rebound refers to impacts beyond the behaviour of 
the entity benefiting directly from the EE improvement, such as the 
impact of EE on the price of energy. For example, improved fuel econ-
omy lowers vehicle oil demand and prices leading some consumers 
to raise their consumption of oil products. The size of this energy 
price effect will be greater with less elastic supply and more elas-
tic demand. Some argue that the macroeconomic multiplier effects 
of a wealth shock from EE improvement also create economy-wide 
rebound.
Rebound is sometimes confused with the concept of economic leak-
age, which describes the incentive for emissions-intensive economic 
activity to migrate away from a region that restricts GHGs (or other 
pollutants) towards areas with fewer or no restrictions on such emis-
sions. Energy efficiency rebound will occur regardless of how broadly 
or narrowly the policy change is adopted. As with leakage, however, 
the potential for significant rebound illustrates the importance of con-
sidering the full equilibrium effects of a policy designed to address 
climate change.
3�9�6 Greenhouse gas emissions metrics
The purpose of emissions metrics is to establish an exchange rate, that 
is, to assign relative values between physically and chemically different 
GHGs and radiative forcing agents (Fuglestvedt et al., 2003; Plattner 
et al., 2009). For instance, per unit mass, CH4 is a more potent GHG 
than CO2 in terms of instantaneous radiative forcing, yet it operates 
on a shorter time scale. In a purely temporal sense, the impacts are 
different. Therefore, how should mitigation efforts be apportioned for 
emissions of different GHGs?48 
48 This issue is discussed in Chapter 8 of WGI.
GHG emissions metrics are required for generating aggregate GHG 
emissions inventories; to determine the relative prices of different 
GHGs in a multi-gas emissions trading system; for designing multi-gas 
mitigation strategies; or for undertaking life-cycle assessment (e. g., 
Peters et  al., 2011b). Since metrics quantify the trade-offs between 
different GHGs, any metric used for mitigation strategies explicitly or 
implicitly evaluates the climate impact of different gases relative to 
each other. 
The most prominent GHG emissions metric is the Global Warming 
Potential (GWP), which calculates the integrated radiative forcing from 
the emission of one kilogram of a component j out to a time horizon T:




 R F j ( t )  dt
The AGWP is an absolute metric. The corresponding relative metric is 
then defined as GWPj = AGWPj / AGWPCO2.
The GWP with a finite time horizon T was introduced by the IPCC 
(1990). With a 100-year time horizon, the GWP is used in the Kyoto 
Protocol and many other scientific and policy applications for convert-
ing emissions of various GHGs into ‘CO2 equivalents’. As pointed out 
in WGI, no scientific argument favours selecting 100 years compared 
with other choices. Conceptual shortcomings of the GWP include: (a) 
the choice of a finite time horizon is arbitrary, yet has strong effects on 
metric value (IPCC, 1990); (b) the same CO2-equivalent amount of dif-
ferent gases may have different physical climate implications (Fuglest-
vedt et al., 2000; O’Neill, 2000; Smith and Wigley, 2000); (c) physical 
impacts and impacts to humans (well-being) are missing; and (d) tem-
poral aggregation of forcing does not capture important differences in 
temporal behaviour. Limitations and inconsistencies also relate to the 
treatment of indirect effects and feedbacks (see WGI, Chapter 8).
Many alternative metrics have been proposed in the scientific lit-
erature. It can be argued that the net impacts from different gases 
should be compared (when measured in the same units) and the rela-
tive impact used for the exchange rate. The Global Damage Potential 
(GDamP) follows this approach by using climate damages as an impact 
proxy, and exponential discounting for inter-temporal aggregation of 
impacts (Hammitt et al., 1996b; Kandlikar, 1996). Since marginal dam-
ages depend on the time at which GHGs are emitted, the GDamP is 
a time-variant metric. The GDamP accounts for the full causal chain 
from emissions to impacts. One advantage of the framework is that 
relevant normative judgements, such as the choice of inter-temporal 
discounting and the valuation of impacts, are explicit (Deuber et  al., 
2013). In practice, however, the GDamP is difficult to operationalize. 
The difficulties in calculating the GDamP and SCC are closely related 
(see Section 3.9.4).
The Global Cost Potential (GCP) calculates the time-varying ratio of 
marginal abatement costs of alternative gases arising in a cost-effec-
tive multi-gas mitigation strategy given a prescribed climate target 
(Manne and Richels, 2001), such as a cap on temperature change or 
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on GHG concentrations. While the GCP avoids the problems associated 
with damage functions, it still requires complex integrated energy-
economy-climate models to calculate GHG price ratios, and is therefore 
less transparent to stakeholders than physical metrics.49
The time-dependant Global Temperature Change Potential (GTP) is a 
physical metric that does not involve integration of the chosen impact 
parameter over time (Shine et al., 2007). It is defined as the relative 
effect of different gases on temperature at a predefined future date 
from a unit impulse of those gases. Typically these are normalized to 
a base, such as same mass of CO2 emitted. While the GWP and GTP 
were not constructed with a specific policy target in mind, the GCP is 
conceptually more consistent with a policy approach aiming at achiev-
ing climate objectives in a cost-effective way (Fuglestvedt et al., 2003; 
Manning and Reisinger, 2011; Tol et al., 2012).
Virtually all absolute metrics (AMj) can be expressed in terms of a gen-
eralization of Equation 3.9.4 (Kandlikar, 1996; Forster et al., 2007):




   I j ( ΔT(t), RF(t), … ) W ( t )  dt
where the impact function Ij links the metric to the change in a physi-
cal climate parameter, typically the global mean radiative forcing RF 
(e. g., in the case of the GWP) or the change in global mean tempera-
ture ∆T (e. g., GTP and most formulations of the GDamP). In some 
cases, the impact function also considers the rate of change of a phys-
ical climate parameter (Manne and Richels, 2001; Johansson et  al., 
2006).
49 In the context of a multi-gas integrated assessment model which seeks to mini-
mize the cost of meeting a climate target.
The temporal ‘weighting function, W(t)’, determines how the met-
ric aggregates impacts over time. It can prescribe a finite time hori-
zon (GWP), evaluation at a discrete point in time (GTP), or expo-
nential discounting over an infinite time horizon (GDamP), which is 
 consistent with the standard approach to inter-temporal aggrega-
tion used in economics (see Section 3.6.2). The weighting used in 
the GWP is a weight equal to one up to the time horizon and zero 
thereafter.
The categorization according to their choice of impact and temporal 
weighting function (Table 3.4) serves to expose underlying explicit and 
implicit assumptions, which, in turn, may reflect normative judgements. 
It also helps to identify relationships between different metric concepts 
(Tol et  al., 2012; Deuber et  al., 2013). In essence, the choice of an 
appropriate metric for policy applications involves a trade-off between 
completeness, simplicity, measurability, and transparency (Fuglestvedt 
et al., 2003; Plattner et al., 2009; Deuber et al., 2013). The GDP and 
GCP are cost effective in implementing multi-gas mitigation policies, 
but are subject to large measurability, value-based, and scientific 
uncertainties. Simple physical metrics, such as the GWP, are easier to 
calculate and produce a more transparent result, but are inaccurate in 
representing the relevant impact trade-offs between different GHGs 
(Fuglestvedt et al., 2003; Deuber et al., 2013).
The choice of metric can have a strong effect on the numerical value of 
GHG exchange rates. This is particularly relevant for CH4, which oper-
ates on a much shorter timescale than CO2. In WGI, Section 8.7, an 
exchange ratio of CH4 to CO2 of 28 is given for GWP and of 4 for a time 
horizon of 100 years for GTP.50 For a quadratic damage function and a 
50 See WGI Chapter 8, Appendix 8A for GWP and GTP values for an extensive list of 
components.
Table 3�4 | Overview and classification of different metrics from the scientific literature. 
Name of metric Impact function Atmospheric background Time dimension Reference
GWP Global Warming Potential RF Constant
Constant temporal weighting 
over fixed time horizon
IPCC (1990)
GWP-LA
Global Warming Potential 
(discounting)
RF
Constant, average of 
future conditions
Exponential discounting Lashof and Ahuja (1990)
GTP-H
Global Temperature Change 
Potential (fixed time horizon)
ΔT Constant
Evaluation at a fixed time 
T after emission






Evaluation at a fixed end 
point time in the future
Shine et al. (2007)
CETP
Cost Effective Temperature 
Potential
ΔT Exogenous scenario
Complex function of time when 
climate threshold is reached
Johannson (2012)
MGTP
Mean Global Temperature 
Change Potential
ΔT Time-varying
Constant temporal weighting 
over fixed time horizon
Gillet and Mathews (2010), 
Peters et al. (2011a)
GCP Global Cost Potential 
Infinite damage above 
climate target
Time-varying Exponential discounting Manne and Richels (2001)
GDamP Global Damage Potential D(ΔT) Time-varying Exponential discounting
Kandlikar (1996), Hammit 
et al. (1996a)
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discount rate of 2 %, Boucher (2012) obtained a median estimate of 
the GDamP exchange ratios of 24.3. This exchange rate obviously has 
very significant implications for relative emphasis a country may place 
on methane mitigation vs. carbon dioxide mitigation.
A small but increasing body of literature relates to the economic 
implications of metric choice. A limited number of model-based 
examinations find that, despite its conceptual short-comings, the 
GWP-100 performs roughly similarly to GTP or a cost-optimizing 
metric (such as the GCP) in terms of aggregate costs of reaching a 
prescribed climate target, although regional and sectoral differences 
may be significant (Godal and Fuglestvedt, 2002; Johansson et al., 
2006; Reisinger et al., 2013; Smith et al., 2013; Ekholm et al., 2013). 
In other words, based on these few studies, the scope for reducing 
aggregate mitigation costs of reaching a particular climate target by 
switching to a metric other than the currently used GWP-100 may 
be limited, although there may be significant differences in terms of 
regional costs.
In the Kyoto Protocol, emission reductions of one GHG can be traded 
with reductions in all other GHGs. Such ‘single-basket’ approaches 
implicitly assume that the GHGs can linearly substitute each other in 
the mitigation effort. However, the same CO2-equivalent amount of dif-
ferent GHGs can result in climate responses that are very different for 
transitional and long-term temperature change, chiefly due to differ-
ent life-times of the substances (Fuglestvedt et  al., 2000; Smith and 
Wigley, 2000). As an alternative, multi-basket approaches have been 
proposed, which only allow trading within groups of forcing agents 
with similar physical and chemical properties (Rypdal et al., 2005; Jack-
son, 2009; Daniel et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2013). Smith et al. (2013) 
propose a methodology for categorizing GHGs into two baskets of 
(a) long-lived species, for which the cumulative emissions determine 
the long-term temperature response, and (b) shorter-lived species 
for which sustained emissions matter. Applying separate emission 
equivalence metrics and regulations to each of the two baskets can 
effectively control the maximum peak temperature reached under a 
global climate policy regime. However, further research on the insti-
tutional requirements and economic implications of such an approach 
is needed, as it requires regulators to agree on separate caps for each 
basket and reduces the flexibility of emission trading systems to har-
vest the cheapest mitigation options.
3.10  Behavioural  economics 
and culture
This section summarizes behavioural economics related to climate 
change mitigation. We focus on systematic deviations from the tra-
ditional neoclassical economic model, which assumes that prefer-
ences are complete, consistent, transitive, and non-altruistic, and that 
humans have unbounded computational capacity and rational expec-
tations. In this context, social and cultural issues and conditions that 
frame our attitudes, as well as living conditions, are also addressed. 
Chapter 2 also considers behavioural questions, though primarily in 
the context of risk and uncertainty.
Although the focus is on the behaviour of individuals, some firms and 
organizations also take actions that appear to be inconsistent with the 
standard neoclassical model of the profit-maximizing firm (Lyon and 
Maxwell, 2007).
3�10�1 Behavioural economics and the cost of 
emissions reduction
Behavioural economics deals with cognitive limitations (and abilities) 
that affect people’s economic decision-making processes. Choices can 
be affected and / or framed by perceived fairness, social norms, cooper-
ation, selfishness, and so on.51 Behavioural economics emphasizes the 
cognitive, social, and emotional factors that lead to apparently irratio-
nal choices. A growing number of documented systematic deviations 
from the neoclassical model help explain people’s behaviour, but here 
we focus on several that we see as most relevant to climate change 
mitigation.52 
3�10�1�1 Consumer undervaluation of energy costs
Consumers may undervalue energy costs when they purchase energy-
using durables, such as vehicles, or make other investment decisions 
related to energy use.53 By ‘undervalue’, we mean that consumers’ 
choices systematically fail to maximize the utility they experience when 
the choices are implemented (‘experienced’ utility) (Kahneman and 
Sugden, 2005; see also, e. g., Fleurbaey, 2009). This misoptimization 
reduces demand for EE. Three potential mechanisms of undervaluation 
may be most influential (see also Box 3.10). First, when considering 
a choice with multiple attributes, evidence suggests that consumers 
are inattentive to add-on costs and ancillary attributes, such as ship-
ping and handling charges or sales taxes (Hossain and Morgan, 2006; 
Chetty et al., 2009). It could be that EE is a similar type of ancillary 
product attribute and is thus less salient at the time of purchase. Sec-
ond, significant evidence across many contexts also suggests that 
humans are ‘present biased’ (DellaVigna, 2009). If energy costs affect 
consumption in the future while purchase prices affect consumption 
in the present, this would lead consumers to be less energy efficient. 
Third, people’s beliefs about the implications of different choices may 
51 See, e. g., Babcock and Loewenstein (1997), Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999), Asheim 
et al. (2006), Barrett (2007), Levati et al. (2007), Potters et al. (2007), Shogren and 
Taylor (2008) and Dannenberg et al. (2010).
52 See Rachlinksi (2000), Brekke and Johansson-Stenmann (2008), Gowdy (2008) 
and the American Psychological Association (2010).
53 This can even apply to cases that use sophisticated methods to support decisions 
(e. g., Korpi and Ala-Risku, 2008).
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be systematically biased (Jensen, 2010; Bollinger et  al., 2011; Kling 
et  al., 2012; McKenzie et  al., 2013). Attari et  al. (2010) show that 
people systematically underestimate the energy savings from a set 
of household energy conserving activities, and Allcott (2013) shows 
that the average consumer either correctly estimates or systematically 
slightly underestimates the financial savings from more fuel-efficient 
vehicles. Each of these three mechanisms of undervaluation appears 
plausible based on results from other contexts. However, rigorous evi-
dence of misoptimization is limited in the specific context of energy 
demand (Allcott and Greenstone, 2012).
Three implications arise for climate and energy policy if the aver-
age consumer who is marginal to a policy does, in fact, undervalue 
energy costs. The first is an ‘internality dividend’ from carbon taxes 
(or other policies that internalize the carbon externality into energy 
prices): a carbon tax can actually increase consumer welfare when 
consumers undervalue energy costs (Allcott et  al., forthcoming). This 
occurs because undervaluation would be a pre-existing distortion that 
reduces demand for EE below consumers’ private optima, and one that 
increasing carbon taxes helps to correct. Second, in addition to car-
bon taxes, other tax or subsidy policies that raise the relative purchase 
price of energy-inefficient durable goods can improve welfare (Crop-
per and Laibson, 1999; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2008; Fullerton et al., 
2011). Third, welfare gains are largest from policies that preferentially 
target consumers who undervalue energy costs the most. This effect is 
related to the broader philosophies of libertarian paternalism (Sunstein 
and Thaler, 2003) and asymmetric paternalism (Camerer et al., 2003), 
which advocate policies that do not infringe on freedom of choice but 
could improve choices by the subset of people who misoptimize. In 
the context of energy demand, such policies might include labels or 
programmes that provide information about, and attract attention to, 
energy use by durable goods.
3�10�1�2 Firm behaviour
Some of the phenomena described above may also apply to firms. Lyon 
and Maxwell (2004, 2008) examine in detail the tendency of firms to 
undertake pro-environment actions, such as mitigation, without being 
prompted by regulation. Taking a neoclassical approach to the prob-
lem, they find that firms view a variety of pro-environment actions as 
being to their advantage. However, evidence of a compliance norm 
has been found in other contexts where firms’ responses to regulation 
have been studied (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Gunningham et al., 
2003).
The conventional economic model represents the firm as a single, 
unitary decision-maker, with a single objective, namely, profit maxi-
mization. As an alternative to this ‘black-box’ model of the firm (Mal-
loy, 2002), the firm may be seen as an organization with a multiplic-
ity of actors, perhaps with different goals, and with certain distinctive 
internal features (Coase, 1937; Cyert and March, 1963; Williamson, 
1975).
3�10�1�3 Non-price interventions to induce behavioural 
change
Besides carbon taxes and other policies that affect relative prices, 
other non-price policy instruments can reduce energy demand, and, 
therefore, carbon emissions. Such interventions include supplying 
information on potential savings from energy-efficient investment, 
drawing attention to energy use, and providing concrete examples of 
energy-saving measures and activities (e. g., Stern, 1992; Abrahamse 
et al., 2005). They also include providing feedback on historical energy 
consumption (Fischer, 2008) and information on how personal energy 
use compares to a social norm (Allcott, 2011).54
In some cases, non-price energy conservation and efficiency pro-
grammes may have low costs to the programme operator, and it is 
therefore argued that they are potential substitutes if carbon taxes 
are not politically feasible (Gupta et al., 2007). However, it is question-
able whether such interventions are appropriate substitutes for carbon 
taxes, for example, in terms of environmental and cost effectiveness, 
because their impact may be small (Gillingham et al., 2006) and unac-
counted costs may reduce the true welfare gains. For example, con-
sumers’ expenditures on energy-efficient technologies and time spent 
turning lights off may not be observed.
Research in other domains (e. g., Bertrand et al., 2010) has shown that 
a person’s choices are sometimes not consistent. They may be mal-
leable by ‘ancillary conditions’ — non-informational factors that do 
not affect experienced utility. In the context of EE, this could imply 
that energy demand may be reduced with relatively low welfare costs 
through publicity aimed at changing consumer preferences. However, 
publicly-funded persuasion campaigns bring up important ethical and 
political concerns, and the effectiveness of awareness-raising pro-
grammes on energy and carbon will depend on how consumers actu-
ally use the information and the mix of policy instruments (Gillingham 
et  al., 2006; Gupta et  al., 2007; also Worrell et  al., 2004; Mundaca 
et al., 2010).
3�10�1�4 Altruistic reductions of carbon emissions
In many contexts, people are altruistic, being willing to reduce their 
own welfare to increase that of others. For example, in laboratory ‘dic-
tator games’, people voluntarily give money to others (Forsythe et al., 
1994), and participants in public goods games regularly contribute 
more than the privately-optimal amount (Dawes and Thaler, 1988; Led-
yard, 1993). Charitable donations in the United States amount to more 
than 2 % of GDP (List, 2011). Similarly, many individuals voluntarily 
contribute to environmental public goods, such as reduced carbon 
54 The efficacy of these interventions can often be explained within neoclassical eco-
nomic models. From an expositional perspective, it is still relevant to cover them in 
this section.
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emissions. For example, USD 387 million were spent in the U. S. on vol-
untary carbon offset purchases in 2009 (Bloomberg, 2010).
Pre-existing altruistic voluntary carbon emission reductions could mod-
erate the effects of a new carbon tax on energy demand because the 
introduction of monetary incentives can ‘crowd out’ altruistic motiva-
tions (Titmuss, 1970; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Gneezy and Rus-
tichini, 2000). Thus, a carbon tax could reduce voluntary carbon emis-
sion reductions even as it increases financially-motivated reductions. 
While this effect might not weaken the welfare argument for a carbon 
tax, it does reduce the elasticity of carbon emissions with respect to a 
carbon tax. 
Reciprocity, understood as the practice of people rewarding generos-
ity and castigating cruelty towards them, has been found to be a key 
driver of voluntary contributions to public goods. Positive reciprocity 
comes in the form of conditional cooperation, which is a tendency to 
cooperate when others do so too (Axelrod, 1984; Fischbacher et  al., 
2001; Frey and Meier, 2004). However, cooperation based on positive 
reciprocity is often fragile and is declining over time (Bolton et  al., 
2004; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010). Incentives and penalties are 
fundamental to maintaining cooperation in environmental treaties 
(Barrett, 2003). Adding a strategic option to punish defectors often 
stabilizes cooperation, even when punishment comes at a cost to pun-
ishers (Ostrom et al., 1992; Fehr and Gächter, 2002). Yet, if agents are 
allowed to counter-punish, the effectiveness of reciprocity to promote 
cooperation might be mitigated (Nikiforakis, 2008). However, most 
laboratory studies have been conducted under symmetric conditions 
and little is known about human cooperation in asymmetric settings, 
which tend to impose more serious normative conflicts (Nikiforakis 
et al., 2012).
Experiments also reveal a paradox: actors can agree to a combined 
negotiated climate goal for reducing the risk of catastrophe, but 
behave as if they were blind to the risks (Barrett and Dannenberg, 
2012). People are also often motivated by concerns about the fairness 
of outcomes and procedures; in particular, many do not like falling 
behind others (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; 
Charness and Rabin, 2002; Bolton et  al., 2005). Such concerns can 
both promote and hamper the effectiveness of negotiations, includ-
ing climate negotiations, in overcoming cooperation and distributional 
problems (Güth et al., 1982; Lange and Vogt, 2003; Lange et al., 2007; 
Dannenberg et al., 2010).
Uncertainty about outcomes and behaviours also tends to hamper 
cooperation (Gangadharan and Nemes, 2009; Ambrus and Greiner, 
2012). As a result, the information given to, and exchanged by, deci-
sion makers may affect social comparison processes and reciprocal 
interaction, and thus the effectiveness of mechanisms to resolve con-
flicts (Goldstein et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2010; Bolton et al., 2013). In 
particular, face-to-face communication has been proved to significantly 
promote cooperation (Ostrom, 1990; Brosig et  al., 2003). Concerns 
about free-riding are perceived as a barrier to engaging in mitigation 
actions (Lorenzoni et al., 2007). The importance of fairness in promot-
ing international cooperation (see also Chapter 4) is one of the few 
non-normative justifications for fairness in climate policy.
3�10�1�5 Human ability to understand climate change
So far, we have covered deviations from the neoclassical model that 
affect energy demand. Such deviations can also affect the policy-mak-
ing process. The understanding of climate change as a physical phe-
nomenon with links to societal causes and impacts is highly complex 
(Weber and Stern, 2011). Some deviations are behavioural and affect 
perceptions and decision making in various settings besides climate 
change. (See Section 2.4 for a fuller discussion). For example, percep-
tions of, and reactions to, uncertainty and risk can depend not only 
on external reality, as assumed in the neoclassical model, but also on 
cognitive and emotional processes (Section 2.4.2). When making deci-
sions, people tend to overweight outcomes that are especially ‘avail-
able’ or salient (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974, 1979). They are more 
averse to losses than they are interested in gains relative to a refer-
ence point (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Because climate change 
involves a loss of existing environmental amenities, this can increase 
its perceived costs. However, if the costs of abatement are seen as a 
reduction relative to a reference rate of future economic growth, this 
can increase the perceived costs of climate change mitigation.
Some factors make it hard for people to think about climate change 
and lead them to underweight it: change happens gradually; the major 
effects are likely to occur in the distant future; the effects will be felt 
elsewhere; and their nature is uncertain. Furthermore, weather is natu-
rally variable, and the distinction between weather and climate is often 
misunderstood (Reynolds et al., 2010). People’s perceptions and under-
standing of climate change do not necessarily correspond to scientific 
knowledge (Section 2.4.3) because they are more vulnerable to emo-
tions, values, views, and (unreliable) sources (Weber and Stern, 2011). 
People are likely to be misled if they apply their conventional modes of 
understanding to climate change (Bostrom et al., 1994).
3�10�2 Social and cultural issues
In recent years, the orientation of social processes and norms towards 
mitigation efforts has been seen as an alternative or complement to 
traditional mitigation actions, such as incentives and regulation. We 
address some of the concepts discussed in the literature, which, from 
a social and cultural perspective, contribute to strengthening climate 
change actions and policies.
3�10�2�1 Customs
In both developed and developing countries, governments, social orga-
nizations, and individuals have tried to change cultural attitudes 
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towards emissions, energy use, and lifestyles (European Commission, 
2009). For example, household energy-use patterns for space and 
water heating differ significantly between Japan and Norway because 
of lifestyle differences (Wilhite et  al., 1996; Gram-Hanssen, 2010). 
Some have argued that the bio-cultural heritage of indigenous peoples 
is a resource that should be valued and preserved as it constitutes an 
irreplaceable bundle of teachings on the practices of mitigation and 
sustainability (Sheridan and Longboat, 2006; Russell-Smith et  al., 
2009; Kronik and Verner, 2010). Sometimes local strategies and indices 
have metamorphosed into national policies, as in the case of ‘Buen 
Vivir’ in Ecuador (Choquehuanca, 2010; Gudynas, 2011) and ‘Gross 
National Happiness’ (GNH), described in Box 3.11. In rich countries, 
and among social groups with high levels of environmental awareness, 
interest in sustainability has given rise to cultural movements promot-
ing change in modes of thought, production, and consumption. Includ-
ing the cultural dimension in mitigation policies facilitates social 
acceptability.
3�10�2�2 Indigenous peoples
Indigenous peoples number millions across the globe (Daes, 1996). 
Land and the natural environment are integral to their sense of iden-
tity and belonging and to their culture, and are essential for their 
survival (Gilbert, 2006; Xanthaki, 2007). The ancestral lands of indig-
enous peoples contain 80 % of the earth’s remaining healthy eco-
systems and global biodiversity priority areas, including the largest 
tropical forests (Sobrevila, 2008). Because they depend on natural 
resources and inhabit biodiversity-rich but fragile ecosystems, indig-
enous peoples are particularly vulnerable to climate change and have 
only limited means of coping with such change (Henriksen, 2007; Per-
manent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 2008). They are often marginal-
ized in decision making and unable to participate adequately in local, 
national, regional, and international climate-change mechanisms. Yet, 
it is increasingly being recognized that indigenous peoples can impart 
valuable insights into ways of managing mitigation and adaptation 
(Nakashima et al., 2012), including forest governance and conserving 
ecosystems (Nepstad et al., 2006; Hayes and Murtinho, 2008; Persha 
et al., 2011).
3�10�2�3 Women and climate change
Women often have more restricted access to, and control of, the 
resources on which they depend than men. In many developing coun-
tries, most small-scale food producers are women. They are usually the 
ones responsible for collecting water and fuel and for looking after 
the sick. If climate change adversely affects crop production and the 
availability of fuel and water, or increases ill health, women may bear 
a disproportionate burden of those consequences (Dankelman, 2002; 
UNEP, 2011).55 On the other hand, they may be better at adapting to 
climate change, both at home and in the community. But given their 
traditional vulnerability, the role of women across society will need 
to be re-examined in a gender-sensitive manner to ensure they have 
equal access to all types of resources (Agostino and Lizarde, 2012).
3�10�2�4 Social institutions for collective action 
Social institutions shape individual actions in ways that can help in 
both mitigation and adaptation. They promote trust and reciprocity, 
establish networks, and contribute to the evolution of common rules. 
They also provide structures through which individuals can share 
information and knowledge, motivate and coordinate behaviour, and 
act collectively to deal with common challenges. Collective action is 
reinforced when social actors understand they can participate in local 
solutions to a global problem that directly concerns them.
As noted in Sections 3.10.1.5 and 2.4, public perceptions of the cause 
and effect of climate change vary, in both developed and developing 
countries, with some erroneous ideas persisting even among well-
educated people. Studies of perceptions (O’Connor et al., 1999; Corner 
et al., 2012) demonstrate that the public is often unaware of the roles 
that individuals and society can play in both mitigation and adapta-
tion. The concepts of social and policy learning can be used in stimu-
55 Natural disasters over the period 1981 – 2002 revealed evidence of a gender gap: 
natural disasters lowered women’s life expectancy more than men’s: the worse the 
disaster and the lower the woman’s socio-economic status the bigger the disparity 
(Neumayer and Plümper, 2007).
Box 3�11 | Gross National Happiness (GNH)
The Kingdom of Bhutan has adopted an index of GNH as a tool for 
assessing national welfare and planning development (Kingdom 
of Bhutan, 2008). According to this concept, happiness does not 
derive from consumption, but rather from factors such as the 
ability to live in harmony with nature (Taplin et al., 2013). Thus, 
GNH is both a critique of, and an alternative to, the conventional 
global development model (Taplin et al., 2013). The GNH Index 
measures wellbeing and progress according to nine key domains 
(and 72 core indicators) (Uddin et al., 2007). The intention is to 
increase access to health, education, clean water, and electrical 
power (Pennock and Ura, 2011) while maintaining a balance 
between economic growth, environmental protection, and the 
preservation of local culture and traditions. This is seen as a 
‘Middle Way’ aimed at tempering the environmental and social 
costs of unchecked economic development (Frame, 2005; Taplin 
et al., 2013).
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lating and organizing collective action. Social learning involves par-
ticipation by members of a group in discourse, imitation, and shared 
collective or individual actions. The concept of policy learning describes 
the process of adaptation by organizations to external change while 
retaining or strengthening their own objectives and domination over 
existing socio-economic structures (Adger and Kelly, 1999). The task 
of an educational programme in mitigating and adapting to climate 
change is to represent a collective global problem in individual and 
social terms. This will require the strategies for disseminating scientific 
information to be reinforced and the practical implications advertised 
in ways that are understandable to diverse populations (González 
Gaudiano and Meira Cartea, 2009).
3.11  Technological change
Mitigation scenarios aim at significant reductions in current emission 
levels that will be both difficult and costly to achieve with existing tech-
nological options. However, cost-reducing technological innovations are 
plausible. The global externality caused by climate change compounds 
market failures common to private sector innovations. Appropriate 
policy interventions are accordingly needed to encourage the type and 
amount of climate-friendly technological change (TC) that would lead 
to sizable reductions in the costs of reducing carbon emissions. This 
section reviews theories, concepts, and principles used in the study of 
environmentally oriented TC, and highlights key lessons from the lit-
erature, in particular, the potential of policy to encourage TC. Examples 
of success and failure in promoting low carbon energy production and 
consumption technologies are further evaluated in Chapters 6 – 16.
3�11�1 Market provision of TC
As pollution is not fully priced by the market, private individuals lack 
incentives to invest in the development and use of emissions-reducing 
technologies in the absence of appropriate policy interventions. Mar-
ket failures other than environmental pollution include what is known 
as the ‘appropriability problem’. This occurs when inventors copy and 
build on existing innovations, and reap part of the social returns on 
them. While the negative climate change externality leads to over 
use of the environment, the positive ‘appropriability’ externality leads 
to an under-supply of technological innovation.56 Indeed, empirical 
research provides ample evidence that social rates of return on R&D 
are higher than private rates of return (Griliches, 1992). Thus, the ben-
56 For incremental innovations, the net technology externality can be negative. 
Depending on market structure and intellectual property rules, the inventor of an 
incremental improvement on an existing technology may be able to appropriate 
the entire market, thereby earning profits that exceed the incremental value of the 
improvement.
efits of new knowledge may be considered as a public good (see, e. g., 
Geroski, 1995).
Imperfections in capital markets often distort the structure of incen-
tives for financing technological development. Information about the 
potential of a new technology may be asymmetrically held, creating 
adverse selection (Hall and Lerner, 2010). This may be particularly 
acute in developing countries. The issue of path dependence, acknowl-
edged in evolutionary models of TC, points to the importance of trans-
formative events in generating or diverting technological trajectories 
(see Chapters 4 and 5). Even endogenously induced transformative 
events may not follow a smooth or predictable path in responding 
to changing economic incentives, suggesting that carbon-price policy 
alone may not promote the desired transformative events.
3�11�2 Induced innovation
The concept of ‘induced innovation’ postulates that investment in 
R&D is profit-motivated and responds positively to changes in relative 
prices57 (Hicks, 1932; Binswanger and Ruttan, 1978; Acemoglu, 2002).58 
Initial evidence of induced TC focused on the links between energy 
prices and innovation and revealed the lag between induced responses 
and the time when price changes came into effect, which is estimated 
at five years by Newell et al. (1999) and Popp (2002) (see Chapter 5). 
Policy also plays an important role in inducing innovation, as demon-
strated by the increase in applications for renewable energy patents 
within the European Union in response to incentives for innovation 
provided by both national policies and international efforts to combat 
climate change (Johnstone et al., 2010). Recent evidence also suggests 
that international environmental agreements provide policy signals that 
encourage both innovation (Dekker et  al., 2012) and diffusion (Popp 
et al., 2011). With the exception of China, most climate-friendly inno-
vation occurred in developed countries (Dechezlepretre et al., 2011).59
3�11�3 Learning-by-doing and other structural 
models of TC
An extensive literature relates to rates of energy cost reduction based 
on the concept of ‘experience’ curves (see Chapter 6). In econom-
ics, this concept is often described as learning-by-doing (LBD) — to 
describe the decrease in costs to manufacturers as a function of cumu-
lative output — or ‘learning-by-using’, reflecting the reduction in costs 
57 It should be pointed out that in economics, ‘induced innovation’ typically means 
innovation induced by relative price differences. The IPCC uses a different defini-
tion: innovation induced by policy.
58 In economics, ‘induced innovation’ typically means innovation induced by relative 
price differences. The IPCC uses a different definition: innovation induced by 
policy.
59 Global R&D expenditures amounted to USD 1.107 trillion in 2007, with OECD 
nations accounting for 80 %, and the U. S. and Japan together accounting for 
46 % (National Science Board, 2010).
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(and / or increase in benefits) to consumers as a function using a tech-
nology. While learning curves are relatively easy to incorporate into 
most climate integrated assessment models (IAMs), the application of 
LBD has limitations as a model of TC (Ferioli et  al., 2009). Learning 
curves ignore potential physical constraints. For example, while costs 
may initially fall as cumulative output expands, if renewable energy 
is scaled up, the use of suboptimal locations for production would 
increase costs. Ferioli et  al. (2009) also provide evidence that learn-
ing can be specific to individual components, so that the savings from 
learning may not fully transfer from one generation of equipment to 
the next. They therefore suggest caution when extrapolating cost sav-
ings from learning curves to long-term frames or large-scale expan-
sions. Similarly, in a study on cost reductions associated with photo-
voltaic cells, Nemet (2006) finds that most efficiency gains come from 
universities, which have little traditional LBD through production expe-
rience. Hendry and Harborne (2011) provide examples of the interac-
tion of experience and R&D in the development of wind technology.
3�11�4 Endogenous and exogenous TC and 
growth
Within climate policy models, TC is either treated as exogenous or 
endogenous. Köhler et  al. (2006), Gillingham et  al. (2008) and Popp 
et al. (2010) provide reviews of the literature on TC in climate models.
Exogenous TC (most common in models) progresses at a steady rate 
over time, independently of changes in market incentives. One draw-
back of exogenous TC is that it ignores potential feedback between 
climate policy and the development of new technologies. Models 
with endogenous TC address this limitation by relating technological 
improvements in the energy sector to changes in energy prices and 
policy. These models demonstrate that ignoring induced innovation 
overstates the costs of climate control.
The Nordhaus (1977, 1994) DICE model is the pioneering example 
of a climate policy model incorporating TC into IAMs. In most imple-
mentations of DICE, TC is exogenous. Efforts to endogenize TC have 
been difficult, mainly because market-based spillovers from R&D are 
not taken into account when deciding how much R&D to undertake. 
Recent attempts to endogenize TC include WITCH model (Bosetti et al., 
2006) and Popp’s (2004) ENTICE model. Popp (2004) shows that mod-
els that ignore directed TC do indeed significantly overstate the costs 
of environmental regulation (more detailed discussion on TC in these 
and more recent models is provided in Chapter 6).
An alternative approach builds on new growth theories, where TC is 
by its nature endogenous, in order to look at the interactions between 
growth and the environment. Policies like R&D subsidies or carbon 
taxes affect aggregate growth by affecting entrepreneurs’ incentives 
to innovate. Factoring in firms’ innovations dramatically changes our 
view of the relationship between growth and the environment. More 
recent work by Acemoglu et al. (2012) extends the endogenous growth 
literature to the case where firms can choose the direction of innova-
tion (i. e., they can decide whether to innovate in more or less carbon-
intensive technologies or sectors).60
In contrast, LBD models use learning curve estimates to simulate fall-
ing costs for alternative energy technologies as cumulative experi-
ence with the technology increases. One criticism of these models is 
that learning curve estimates provide evidence of correlation, but not 
causation. While LBD is easy to implement, it is difficult to identify 
the mechanisms through which learning occurs. Goulder and Mathai 
(2000) provide a theoretical model that explores the implications of 
modelling technological change through R&D or LBD (several empirical 
studies on this are reviewed in more detail in Chapter 6).
3�11�5 Policy measures for inducing R&D
Correcting the environmental externality or correcting knowledge mar-
ket failures present two key options for policy intervention to encour-
age development of climate-friendly technologies. Patent protection, 
R&D tax credits, and rewarding innovation are good examples of 
correcting failures in knowledge markets and promoting higher rates 
of innovation. On the other hand, policies regulating environmental 
externalities, such as a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system, influence 
the direction of innovation.
Chapter 15 discusses in more detail how environmental and tech-
nology policies work best in tandem (e. g., Popp, 2006; Fischer, 2008; 
Acemoglu et al., 2012). For instance, in evaluating a broad set of poli-
cies to reduce CO2 emissions and promote innovation and diffusion 
of renewable energy in the United States electricity sector, Fischer & 
Newell (2008) find that a portfolio of policies (including emission pric-
ing and R&D) achieves emission reductions at significantly lower cost 
than any single policy (see Chapters 7 to 13). However, Gerlagh and 
van der Zwaan (2006) note the importance of evaluating the trade-off 
between cost savings from innovation and Fischer and Newell (2008) 
assumptions of decreasing returns to scale due to space limitations for 
new solar and wind installations.
3�11�6 Technology transfer (TT)
Technology transfer (TT) has been at the centre of the scholarly debate 
on climate change and equity in economic development as a way for 
developed countries to assist developing countries access new low car-
bon technologies. Modes of TT include, trade in products, knowledge 
and technology, direct foreign investment, and international move-
60 Other works investigating the response of technology to environment regulations 
include Grübler and Messner (1998), Manne and Richels (2004b), Messner (1997), 
Buonanno et al. (2003), Nordhaus (2002), Di Maria and Valente (2008), Bosetti 
et al. (2008), Massetti et al. (2009), Grimaud and Rouge (2008), and Aghion et al. 
(2009).
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ment of people (Hoekman et al., 2005). Phases and steps for TT involve 
absorption and learning, adaptation to the local environment and 
needs, assimilation of subsequent improvements, and generalization. 
Technological learning or catch-up thus proceeds in stages: importing 
foreign technologies; local diffusion and incremental improvements in 
process and product design; and marketing, with different policy mea-
sures suited to different stages of the catch-up process.
‘Leapfrogging’, or the skipping of some generations of technology or 
stages of development, is a useful concept in the climate change miti-
gation literature for enabling developing countries to avoid the more 
emissions-intensive stages of development (Watson and Sauter, 2011). 
Examples of successful low-carbon leapfrogging are discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 14.
Whether proprietary rights affect transfers of climate technologies has 
become a subject of significant debate. Some technologies are in the 
public domain; they are not patented or their patents have expired. 
Much of the debate on patented technologies centres on whether 
the temporary monopoly conferred by patents has hampered access 
to technology. Proponents of strong intellectual property (IP) rights 
believe that patents enhance TT as applicants have to disclose informa-
tion on their inventions. Some climate technology sectors, for example, 
those producing renewable energy, have easily available substitutes 
and sufficient competition, so that patents on these technologies do 
not make them costly or prevent their spread (Barton, 2007). In other 
climate-related technology sectors, IP protection could be a barrier to 
TT (Lewis, 2007). (The subject is further discussed in Chapters 13 and 
15.)
Various international agreements on climate change, trade, and intel-
lectual property include provisions for facilitating the transfer of tech-
nology to developing countries. Climate change agreements encour-
age participation by developing countries and address barriers to the 
adoption of technologies, including financing. However, some scholars 
have found these agreements to be ineffective because they do not 
incorporate mechanisms for ensuring technology transfers to develop-
ing countries (Moon, 2008). (The literature on international coopera-
tion on TT is further discussed in Chapters 13, 14 and 16.)
3.12  Gaps in  knowledge 
and data
As this chapter makes clear, many questions are not completely 
answered by the literature. So it is prudent to end our assessment with 
our findings on where research might be directed over the coming 
decade so that the AR6 (should there be one) may be able to say more 
about the ethics and economics of climate change.
•	 To plan an appropriate response to climate change, it is important 
to evaluate each of the alternative responses that are available. 
How can we take into account changes in the world’s population? 
Should society aim to promote the total of people’s wellbeing 
in the world, or their average wellbeing, or something else? The 
answer to this question will make a great difference to the conclu-
sions we reach.
•	 The economics and ethics of geoengineering is an emerging 
field that could become of the utmost importance to policymak-
ers. Deeper analysis of the ethics of this topic is needed, as well 
as more research on the economic aspects of different possible 
geoengineering approaches and their potential effects and side-
effects.
•	 To develop better estimates of the social cost of carbon and to bet-
ter evaluate mitigation options, it would be helpful to have more 
realistic estimates of the components of the damage function, 
more closely connected to WGII assessments of physical impacts. 
Quantifying non-market values, that is, measuring valuations 
placed by humans on nature and culture, is highly uncertain and 
could be improved through more and better methods and empiri-
cal studies. As discussed in Section 3.9, the aggregate damage 
functions used in many IAMs are generated from a remarkable 
paucity of data and are thus of low reliability.
•	 The development of regulatory mechanisms for mitigation would 
be helped by more ex-post evaluation of existing regulations, 
addressing the effectiveness of different regulatory approaches, 
both singly and jointly. For instance, understanding, retrospec-
tively, the effectiveness of the European Union Emissions Trad-
ing Scheme (EU ETS), the California cap-and-trade system, or the 
interplay between renewable standards and carbon regulations in 
a variety of countries.
•	 Energy models need to provide a more realistic portrait of micro-
economic decision-making frameworks for technology-choice 
(energy-economy models).
•	 A literature is emerging in economics and ethics on the risk of cat-
astrophic climate change impacts, but much more probing into the 
ethical dimensions is needed to inform future economic analysis.
•	 More research that incorporates behavioural economics into 
climate change mitigation is needed. For instance, more work 
on understanding how individuals and their social preferences 
respond to (ambitious) policy instruments and make decisions rel-
evant to climate change is critical.
•	 Despite the importance of the cost of mitigation, the aggregate 
cost of mitigating x tonnes of carbon globally is poorly understood. 
To put it differently, a global carbon tax of x dollars per tonne 
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would yield y(t) tonnes of carbon abatement at time, t. We do not 
understand the relationship between x and y(t).
•	 The choice of the rate at which future uncertain climate damages 
are discounted depends on their risk profile in relation to other 
risks in the economy. By how much does mitigating climate change 
reduce the aggregate uncertainty faced by future generations?
•	  As has been recently underscored by several authors (Pindyck, 
2013; Stern, 2013) as well as this review, integrated assessment 
models have very significant shortcomings for CBA, as they do 
not fully represent climate damages, yet remain important tools 
for investigating climate policy. They have been widely and suc-
cessfully applied for CEA analysis (Paltsev et al., 2008; Clarke et al., 
2009; Krey and Clarke, 2011; Fawcett et al., 2013). Research into 
improving the state-of-the-art of such models (beyond just updat-
ing) can have high payoff.
3.13  Frequently Asked 
Questions
FAQ 3�1 The IPCC is charged with providing the 
world with a clear scientific view of the 
current state of knowledge on climate 
change� Why does it need to consider 
ethics?
The IPCC aims to provide information that can be used by govern-
ments and other agents when they are considering what they should 
do about climate change. The question of what they should do is a 
normative one and thus has ethical dimensions because it generally 
involves the conflicting interests of different people. The answer rests 
implicitly or explicitly on ethical judgements. For instance, an answer 
may depend on a judgement about the responsibility of the present 
generation towards people who will live in the future or on a judge-
ment about how this responsibility should be distributed among dif-
ferent groups in the present generation. The methods of ethical theory 
investigate the basis and logic of judgements such as these.
FAQ 3�2 Do the terms justice, fairness and equity 
mean the same thing?
The terms ‘justice’, ‘fairness’ and ‘equity’ are used with subtly different 
meanings in different disciplines and by different authors. ‘Justice’ and 
‘equity’ commonly have much the same meaning: ‘justice’ is used more 
frequently in philosophy; ‘equity’ in social science. Many authors use 
‘fairness’ as also synonymous with these two. In reporting on the lit-
erature, the IPCC assessment does not impose a strictly uniform usage 
on these terms. All three are often used synonymously. Section 3.3 
describes what they refer to, generally using the term ‘justice’.
Whereas justice is broadly concerned with a person receiving their due, 
‘fairness’ is sometimes used in the narrower sense of receiving one’s 
due (or ‘fair share’) in comparison with what others receive. So it is 
unfair if people do not all accept an appropriate share of the burden 
of reducing emissions, whereas on this narrow interpretation it is not 
unfair — though it may be unjust — for one person’s emissions to harm 
another person. Fairness is concerned with the distribution of goods 
and harms among people. ‘Distributive justice’ — described in Section 
3.3 — falls under fairness on the narrow interpretation.
FAQ 3�3 What factors are relevant in considering 
responsibility for future measures that 
would mitigate climate change?
It is difficult to indicate unambiguously how much responsibility dif-
ferent parties should take for mitigating future emissions. Income and 
capacity are relevant, as are ethical perceptions of rights and justice. 
One might also investigate how similar issues have been dealt with 
in the past in non-climate contexts. Under both common law and civil 
law systems, those responsible for harmful actions can only be held 
liable if their actions infringe a legal standard, such as negligence or 
nuisance. Negligence is based on the standard of the reasonable per-
son. On the other hand, liability for causing a nuisance does not exist 
if the actor did not know or have reason to know the effects of its 
conduct. If it were established that the emission of GHGs constituted 
wrongful conduct within the terms of the law, the nature of the causal 
link to the resulting harm would then have to be demonstrated.
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Since the first assessment report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC) has considered issues of sustainable development 
(SD) and equity: acknowledging the importance to climate decision 
making, and progressively expanding the scope to include: the co-
benefits of climate actions for SD and equity, the relevance of lifestyle 
and behaviour, the relevance of technological choices, the relevance of 
procedural equity to effective decision making, and the relevance of 
ethical frameworks and equitable burden sharing in assessing climate 
responses. This Assessment Report further explores key dimensions of 
SD and equity, highlighting the significance of disparities across dif-
ferent regions and groups, and the ways in which designing a climate 
policy is a component of a wide-ranging societal choice of a develop-
ment path. [Section 4.1, 4.2]
Sustainable development, a central framing issue in this Assess-
ment Report, is intimately connected to climate change (high 
confidence). SD is variably conceived as development that preserves 
the interests of future generations, that preserves the ecosystem ser-
vices on which continued human flourishing depends, or that harmo-
nizes the co-evolution of three pillars (economic, social, environmental) 
[4.2]. First, the climate threat constrains possible development paths, 
and sufficiently disruptive climate change could preclude any prospect 
for a sustainable future (medium evidence, high agreement). Thus, a 
stable climate is one component of SD. Second, there are synergies and 
tradeoffs between climate responses and broader SD goals, because 
some climate responses generate co-benefits for human and economic 
development, while others can have adverse side-effects and gener-
ate risks (robust evidence, high agreement). These co-benefits and risks 
are studied in the sector chapters of this report, along with measures 
and strategies to optimize them. Options for equitable burden sharing 
can reduce the potential for the costs of climate action to constrain 
development (medium evidence, high agreement). Third, at a more fun-
damental level, the capacities underlying an effective climate response 
overlap strongly with capacities for SD (medium evidence, high agree-
ment) and designing an effective climate policy involves ‘mainstream-
ing’ climate in the design of comprehensive SD strategies and thinking 
through the general orientation of development (medium evidence, 
medium agreement). [4.2, 4.5]
Equity is an integral dimension of SD (high confidence). First, 
intergenerational equity underlies the concept of sustainability. Intra-
generational equity is also often considered an intrinsic component of 
SD. In the particular context of international climate policy discussions, 
several arguments support giving equity an important role: a moral 
justification that draws upon ethical principles; a legal justification 
that appeals to existing treaty commitments and soft law agreements 
to cooperate on the basis of stated equity principles; and an effective-
ness justification that argues that a fair arrangement is more likely to 
be agreed internationally and successfully implemented domestically 
(medium evidence, medium agreement). A relatively small set of core 
equity principles serve as the basis for most discussions of equitable 
burden sharing in a climate regime: responsibility (for GHG emissions), 
capacity (ability to pay for mitigation, but sometimes other dimensions 
of mitigative capacity), the right to development, and equality (often 
interpreted as an equal entitlement to emit). [4.2, 4.6]
While it is possible to envision an evolution toward equitable 
and sustainable development, its underlying determinants are 
also deeply embedded in existing societal patterns that are 
unsustainable and highly inertial (high confidence). A useful set 
of determinants from which to examine the prospects for and impedi-
ments to SD and equity are: the legacy of development relations; gov-
ernance and political economy; population and demography; values 
and behaviour; human and social capital; technology; natural resource 
endowments; and finance and investment. The evolution of each of 
these determinants as a driver (rather than barrier) to a SD transition 
is conceivable, but also poses profound challenges (medium evidence, 
medium agreement). [4.3]
Governing a transition toward an effective climate response 
and SD pathway is a challenge involving rethinking our relation 
to nature, accounting for multiple generations and interests 
(including those based on endowments in natural resources), 
overlapping environmental issues, among actors with widely 
unequal capacities, resources, and political power, and diver-
gent conceptions of justice (high confidence). Key debated issues 
include articulating top-down and bottom-up approaches, engaging 
participation of diverse countries and actors, creating procedurally 
equitable forms of decentralization and combining market mecha-
nisms with government action, all in a particular political economic 
context (robust evidence, high agreement). [4.3]
Technology and finance both are strong determinants of future 
societal paths, and while society’s current systems of allocat-
ing resources and prioritizing efforts toward investment and 
innovation are in many ways robust and dynamic, there are 
also some fundamental tensions with the underlying objec-
tives of SD (high confidence). First, the technological innovation and 
financial systems are highly responsive to short-term motivations, and 
are sensitive to broader social and environmental costs and benefits 
only to the — often limited — extent that these costs and benefits are 
internalized by regulation, taxation, laws and social norms. Second, 
while these systems are quite responsive to market demand that is 
supported by purchasing power, they are only indirectly responsive to 
needs, particularly of those of the world’s poor, and they operate with 
a time horizon that disregards potential needs of future generations 
(medium evidence, medium agreement). [4.3]
Enhancing human capital based on individual knowledge and 
skills, and social capital based on mutually beneficial formal 
and informal relationships is important for facilitating a tran-
sition toward sustainable development (medium evidence, high 
agreement). ‘Social dilemmas’ arise in which short-term individual 
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interests conflict with long-term social interests, with altruistic values 
being favourable to SD. However, the formation of values and their 
translation into behaviours is mediated by many factors, including the 
available set of market choices and lifestyles, the tenor of dominant 
information sources (including advertisements and popular culture), 
the culture and priorities of formal and civil institutions, and prevailing 
governance mode (medium evidence, medium agreement). The demo-
graphic transition toward low fertility rates is usually viewed favorably, 
though an ageing population creates economic and social challenges, 
and migrations due to climate impacts may exacerbate tensions 
(medium evidence, medium agreement). [4.3, 4.4]
The global consumption of goods and services has increased 
dramatically over the last decades, in both absolute and per 
capita terms, and is a key driver of environmental degradation, 
including global warming (high confidence). This trend involves 
the spread of high-consumption lifestyles in some countries and sub-
regions, while in other parts of the world large populations continue to 
live in poverty. There are high disparities in consumption both between 
and within countries (robust evidence, high agreement). [4.4]
Two basic types of decoupling are often invoked in the context 
of a transition toward sustainable development: the decoupling 
of material resource consumption (including fossil fuels) and 
environmental impact (including climate change) from economic 
growth, and the decoupling of economic growth from human 
well-being (high confidence). The first type — the dematerialization of 
the economy, i. e., of consumption and production — is generally con-
sidered crucial for meeting SD and equity goals, including mitigation of 
climate change. Production-based (territorial) accounting suggests that 
some decoupling of impacts from economic growth has occurred, espe-
cially in industrialized countries, but its extent is significantly dimin-
ished based on a consumption-based accounting (robust evidence, 
medium agreement). Consumption-based emissions are more strongly 
associated with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) than production-based 
emissions, because wealthier countries generally satisfy a higher share 
of their final consumption of products through net imports compared to 
poorer countries. Ultimately, absolute levels of resource use and envi-
ronmental impact — including GHG emissions — generally continue to 
rise with GDP (robust evidence, high agreement), though great varia-
tions between countries highlight the importance of other factors such 
as geography, energy system, production methods, waste management, 
household size, diet and lifestyle. The second type of decoupling — of 
human well-being from economic growth — is a more controversial 
goal than the first. There are ethical controversies about the measure 
of well-being and the use of subjective data for this purpose (robust 
evidence, medium agreement). There are also empirical controversies 
about the relationship between subjective well-being and income, 
with some recent studies across countries finding a clear relationship 
between average levels of life satisfaction and per capita income, 
while the evidence about the long-term relationship between satisfac-
tion and income is less conclusive and quite diverse among countries 
(medium evidence, medium agreement). Studies of emotional well-
being do identify clear satiation points beyond which further increases 
in income no longer enhance emotional well-being (medium evidence, 
medium agreement). Furthermore, income inequality has been found to 
have a marked negative effect on average subjective well-being, due to 
perceived unfairness and undermined trust of institutions among low 
income groups (medium evidence, medium agreement). [4.4]
Understanding the impact of development paths on emissions 
and mitigative capacity, and, more generally, how development 
paths can be made more sustainable and more equitable in the 
future requires in-depth analysis of the mechanisms that under-
pin these paths (high confidence). Of particular importance are the 
processes that may generate path dependence and lock-ins, notably 
‘increasing returns’ but also use of scarce resources, switching costs, 
negative externalities or complementarities between outcomes (robust 
evidence, high agreement). [4.5, 4.6] The study of transitions between 
pathways is an emerging field, notably in the context of technology 
transitions. Yet analyzing how to transition to a sustainable, low-emis-
sion pathway remains a major scientific challenge. It would be aided 
by models with a holistic framework encompassing the economy, soci-
ety (in particular the distribution of resources and well-being), and the 
environment, that take account of relevant technical constraints and 
trends, and explore a long-term horizon while simultaneously captur-
ing processes relevant for the short-term and the key uncertainties 
(medium evidence, medium agreement). [4.5, 4.7]
Mitigation and adaptation measures can strongly affect broader 
SD and equity objectives, and it is thus useful to understand 
their broader implications (high confidence). Building both mitiga-
tive capacity and adaptive capacity relies to a profound extent on the 
same factors as those that are integral to equitable and sustainable 
development (medium evidence, high agreement), and equitable bur-
den sharing can enhance these capacities where they are most fragile 
[4.6]. This chapter focuses on examining ways in which the broader 
objectives of equitable and sustainable development provide a policy 
frame for an effective, robust, and long-term response to the climate 
problem. [4.8]
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4�1�1 Key messages of previous IPCC reports
This chapter seeks to place climate change, and climate change mitiga-
tion in particular, in the context of equity and SD. Prior IPCC assess-
ments have sought to do this as well, progressively expanding the 
scope of assessment to include broader and more insightful reflections 
on the policy-relevant contributions of academic literature.
The IPCC First Assessment Report (FAR) (IPCC, 1990) underscored the 
relevance of equity and SD to climate policy. Mandated to identify 
“possible elements for inclusion in a framework convention on cli-
mate change”, the IPCC prominently put forward the “endorsement 
and elaboration of the concept of sustainable development” for nego-
tiators to consider as part of the Convention’s Preamble. It noted as 
key issues “how to address equitably the consequences for all” and 
“whether obligations should be equitably differentiated according to 
countries’ respective responsibilities for causing and combating cli-
mate change and their level of development”. This set the stage for 
the ensuing United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) negotiations, which ultimately included explicit appeals to 
equity and SD, including in its Preamble, its Principles (Article 2), its 
Objective (Article 3), and its Commitments (Article 4). 
The IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR) (IPCC, 1995), published 
after the UNFCCC was signed, maintained this focus on equity and SD. 
It reflected a growing appreciation for the prospects for SD co-benefits 
and reiterated the policy relevance of equity and SD. It did this most 
visibly in a special section of the Summary for Policymakers present-
ing “Information Relevant to Interpreting Article 2 of the UNFCCC”, 
including “Equity and social considerations” and “Economic develop-
ment to proceed in a sustainable manner”. Notably, the SAR added 
an emphasis on procedural equity through a legitimate process that 
empowers all actors to effectively participate, and on the need to build 
capacities and strengthen institutions, particularly in developing coun-
tries. 
The IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) (IPCC, 2000) 
demonstrated that broader SD goals can contribute indirectly, yet 
substantially, to reducing emissions. This IPCC contribution reflected 
a change in the scientific literature, which had in recent years 
expanded its discussion of SD to encompass analyses of lifestyles, 
culture, and behaviour, complementing its traditional techno-eco-
nomic analyses. It also reflected a recognition that economic growth 
(especially as currently measured) is not the sole goal of societies. 
The SRES thus provided insights into how policy intervention can 
decouple economic growth from emissions and well-being from eco-
nomic growth, showing that both forms of decoupling are important 
elements of a transition to a world with low greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions.
The IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR) (IPCC, 2001) deepened the 
consideration of broader SD objectives in assessing response strate-
gies. Perhaps owing to a growing appreciation for the severity of the 
climate challenge, the TAR stressed the need for an ambitious and 
encompassing response, and was thus more attentive to the risk of 
climate-focused measures conflicting with basic development aspira-
tions. It thus articulated the fundamental equity challenge of climate 
change as ensuring “that neither the impact of climate change nor 
that of mitigation policies exacerbates existing inequities both within 
and across nations”, specifically because “restrictions on emissions 
will continue to be viewed by many people in developing countries 
as yet another constraint on the development process” (See Box 4.1 
for further discussion of the relationship between climate change and 
development challenges in developing countries.). The TAR recognized 
the need to deepen the analysis of equitable burden sharing in order 
to avoid undermining prospects for SD in developing countries. More 
generally, the TAR observed that equitable burden sharing is not solely 
an ethical matter. Even from a rational-actor game-theoretic perspec-
tive, an agreement in which the burden is equitably shared is more 
likely to be signed by a large number of countries, and thus to be more 
effective and efficient. 
The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) (IPCC, 2007) further 
expanded the consideration of broader SD objectives. It stressed 
the importance of civil society and other non-government actors in 
designing climate policy and equitable SD strategies generally. The 
AR4 focused more strongly on the distributional implications of cli-
mate policies, noting that conventional climate policy analysis that 
is based too narrowly on traditional utilitarian or cost-benefit frame-
works will neglect critical equity issues. These oversights include 
human rights implications and moral imperatives; the distribution of 
costs and benefits of a given set of policies, and the further distri-
butional inequities that arise when the poor have limited scope to 
influence policy. This is particularly problematic, the AR4 notes, in 
integrated assessment model (IAM) analyses of ‘optimal’ mitigation 
pathways, because climate impacts do not affect the poor exclusively 
through changes in incomes. Nor do they satisfactorily account for 
uncertainty and risk, which the poor treat differently than the rich. 
The poor have higher risk aversion and lower access to assets and 
financial mechanisms that buffer against shocks. The AR4 went on 
to outline alternative ethical frameworks including rights-based and 
capabilities-based approaches, suggesting how they can inform cli-
mate policy decisions. In particular, the AR4 discussed the implica-
tions of these different frameworks for equitable international bur-
den sharing. 
The IPCC Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate 
Change Mitigation (SRREN) (IPCC, 2011) deepened the consideration 
of broader SD objectives in assessing renewable energy options, not-
ing particularly that while synergies can arise (for example, helping 
to expand access to energy services, increase energy security, and 
reduce some environmental pressures), there can also be tradeoffs 
(such as increased pressure on land resources, and affordability) and 
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these must be negotiated in a manner sensitive to equity consider-
ations. 
The IPCC Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events 
and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation (SREX) (IPCC 
2012a) highlighted key further dimensions of SD and equity, including 
the distinction and interplay between incremental and transformative 
changes — both of which are necessary for an effective climate policy 
response, and emphasized the diversity of values that underlie deci-
sion making, e. g., a human rights framework vs. utilitarian cost-benefit 
analysis. 
4�1�2 Narrative focus and key messages 
In keeping with the previous IPCC assessments, this chapter considers 
SD and equity as matters of policy relevance for climate change deci-
sion makers. The chapter examines the ways in which climate change 
is in fact inextricably linked with SD and equity, and it does so with the 
aim of drawing policy-relevant conclusions regarding equitable and 
sustainable responses to climate change. 
In one direction, the link is self-evident: an effective climate response 
is necessary for equitable and sustainable development to occur. The 
disruptions that climate change would cause in the absence of an 
effective societal response are sufficiently severe (see Working Group 
(WG) I and II contributions to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5)) 
to severely compromise development, even taking into account future 
societies’ ability to adapt (Shalizi and Lecocq, 2010). Nor is this devel-
opment likely to be equitable, as an increasingly inhospitable climate 
will most seriously undermine the future prospects of those nations, 
communities, and individuals that are in greatest need of develop-
ment. Without an effective response to climate change, including both 
timely mitigation and proactive adaptation, development can be nei-
ther sustainable nor equitable. 
In recent years, the academic community has come increasingly to 
appreciate the extent to which SD and equity are also needed as 
frameworks for assessing and prioritizing climate responses: given 
the strong tradeoffs and synergies between the options for a climate 
response and SD, the design of an effective climate response must 
accord with the objectives for development and equity and exploit the 
synergies. A climate strategy that does not do so runs the risk either of 
being ineffective for lack of consensus and earnest implementation or 
of jeopardizing SD just as would unabated climate change. Therefore, 
a shift toward more equitable and sustainable modes of development 
may provide the only context in which an effective climate response 
can be realized. 
The scientific community is coming to understand that climate change 
is but one example of how humankind is pressing up against its plane-
tary limits (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; Rockström et al., 
2009a). Technical measures can certainly help in the near-term to alle-
viate climate change. However, the comprehensive and durable strate-
gies society needs are those that recognize that climate change shares 
its root causes with other dimensions of the global sustainability crisis, 
and that without addressing these root causes, robust solutions may 
not be accessible. 
This chapter, and many parts of this report, uncovers ways in which a 
broader agenda of SD and equity may support and enable an effective 
societal response to the climate challenge, by establishing the basis 
by which mitigative and adaptive capacity can be built and sustained. 
In examining this perspective, this chapter focuses on several broad 
themes. 
4�1�2�1 Consumption, disparities, and well-being
The first theme relates to well-being and consumption. The relationship 
between consumption levels and environmental pressures, including 
GHG emissions, has long been a key concern for SD, with a growing 
focus on high-consumption lifestyles in particular and consumption 
disparities. A significant part of the literature develops methodologies 
for assessing the environmental impacts across national boundaries 
of consumption, through consumption-based accounting and GHG 
footprint analysis. Important research is now also emerging on the 
relationship between well-being and consumption, and how to moder-
ate consumption and its impacts without hindering well-being — and 
indeed, while enhancing it. More research is now available on the 
importance of behaviour, lifestyles, and culture, and their relationship 
to over-consumption (Sections 4.3, 4.4).
Research is emerging to help understand ‘under-consumption’, i. e., 
poverty and deprivation, and its impacts on well-being more broadly, 
and specifically on the means by which it undermines mitigative and 
adaptive capacity (WGII Chapter 20). Energy poverty is one critical 
example, linked directly to climate change, of under-consumption that 
is well-correlated with weakened livelihoods, lack of resilience, and 
limited mitigative and adaptive capacity. Overcoming under-consump-
tion and reversing over-consumption, while maintaining and advanc-
ing human well-being, are fundamental dimensions of SD, and are 
equally critical to resolving the climate problem (Sections 4.5, 4.6). 
4�1�2�2 Equity at the national and international scales
Given the disparities evident in consumption patterns, the distributional 
implications of climate response strategies are critically important. As 
recent history shows, understanding how policies affect different seg-
ments of the population is essential to designing and implementing 
politically acceptable and effective national climate response strat-
egies. A transition perceived as just would attract a greater level of 
public support for the substantial techno-economic, institutional, and 
lifestyle shifts needed to reduce emissions substantially and enable 
adaptive responses.
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At the international level, an equitable regime with fair burden shar-
ing is likely to be a key condition for an effective global response (Sec-
tions 4.2, 4.6). Given the urgency of the climate challenge, a rather 
rapid transition will be required if the global temperature rise is to 
remain below the politically discussed targets, such as 1.5 °C or 2 °C 
over pre-industrial levels, with global emissions possibly peaking as 
soon as 2020 (see WGI, Figure 6.25). Particularly in a situation calling 
for a concerted global effort, the most promising response is a coop-
erative approach “that would quickly require humanity to think like a 
society of people, not like a collection of individual states” (Victor, 
1998). 
While scientific assessments cannot define what equity is and how 
equitable burden sharing should be implementing the Convention and 
climate policies in general, they can help illuminate the implications of 
alternative choices and their ethical basis (Section 4.6, also Sections 
3.2, 3.3, 6.3.6, 13.4.3).
Box 4�1 | Sustainable development and climate change mitigation in developing countries
The interconnectedness of climate change, sustainable develop-
ment, and equity poses serious challenges for developing coun-
tries but it also presents opportunities.
Developing countries are confronted by a daunting mitigation 
challenge in the midst of pressing development needs. Developing 
country emissions comprised more than half of global emissions 
in 2010, and grew during the preceding decade by an amount 
that accounted for the total global emissions rise (JRC / PBL (2013), 
IEA (2012a), see Annex II.9; see Section 5.2). In the absence of 
concerted mitigation actions, the coming decades would see this 
trend prolonged, with a continued growth in global emissions 
driven predominantly by developing countries’ rising emis-
sions (see Section 6.3). This trend is the unsurprising outcome 
of the recent economic growth in many developing countries. 
The increase in emissions coincided with a number of positive 
developments: over the past decade, the overall poverty rate has 
declined, maternal and child mortality have fallen, the prevalence 
of several preventable diseases has decreased, and access to safe 
drinking water and sanitation has expanded, while the Human 
Development Index (HDI) across nations has risen and its conver-
gence has become more pronounced. This “rise of the South” has 
been termed “unprecedented in its speed and scale [...] affecting 
a hundred times as many people as the Industrial Revolution” 
and setting in motion a “dramatic rebalancing” of economic and 
geopolitical forces (United Nations, 2011a; United Nations Devel-
opment Programme, 2013). 
Notwithstanding these gains, further developmental progress is 
urgently needed throughout the developing world. More than 
1.5 billion people remain in multi-dimensional poverty, energy 
insecurity is still widespread, inequality of income and access to 
social services is persistently high, and the environmental resource 
base on which humans rely is deteriorating in multiple ways (Mil-
lennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; Bazilian et al., 2010; United 
Nations Development Programme, 2013). Moreover, unavoid-
able climate change will amplify the challenges of development: 
climate impacts are expected to slow economic growth and 
exacerbate poverty, and current failures to address emerging 
impacts are already eroding the basis for sustainable development 
(WGII SPM). 
Thus, the challenge confronting developing countries is to preserve 
and build on the developmental achievements to date, sharing 
them broadly and equitably across their populations, but to do so 
via a sustainable development pathway that does not reproduce 
the fossil-fuel based and emissions-intensive conventional pathway 
by which the developed world moved from poverty to prosperity. 
Faced with this dilemma, developing countries have sought evi-
dence that such alternative development pathways exist, looking 
in particular to developed countries to take the lead during the two 
decades since the UNFCCC was negotiated. Some such evidence 
has emerged, in the form of a variety of incipient climate policy 
experiments (see Section 15.6, 15.7) that appear to have generated 
some innovation in low-carbon technologies (see Section 4.4) and 
modestly curbed emissions in some countries (see Section 5.3).
Developing countries have stepped forward with significant 
actions to address climate change, but will need to build miti-
gative and adaptive capacity if they are to respond yet more 
effectively (see Section 4.6). More broadly, the underlying determi-
nants of development pathways in developing countries are often 
not aligned toward a sustainable pathway (see Sections 4.3, 4.5). 
At the same time, developing countries are in some ways well-
positioned to shift toward sustainable pathways: most developing 
countries are still in the process of building their urban and indus-
trial infrastructure and can avoid lock-in (see Sections 4.5, 5.6). 
Many are also in the process of establishing the cultural norms 
and lifestyles of an emerging middle class, and can do so without 
reproducing the consumerist values of many developed countries 
(4.3, 4.4). Some barriers, such as lack of access to financial and 
technological resources, can be overcome through international 
cooperation based on principles of equity and fair burden sharing 
(see Sections 4.6, 6.3).
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4�1�2�3 Building institutions and capacity for effective 
governance
While there is strong evidence that a transition to a sustainable and 
equitable path is technically feasible (see Sections 6.1.2, 6.3), chart-
ing an effective and viable course through the climate challenge is not 
merely a technical exercise. It will involve myriad and sequential deci-
sions, among states and civil society actors, supported by the broad-
est possible constituencies (Section 4.3). Such a process benefits from 
the education and empowerment of diverse actors to participate in 
systems of decision making that are designed and implemented with 
procedural equity as a deliberate objective. This applies at the national 
as well as international levels, where effective governance relating to 
global common resources, in particular, is not yet mature. 
Any given approach to addressing the climate challenge has poten-
tial winners and losers. The political feasibility of that approach will 
depend strongly on the distribution of power, resources, and decision-
making authority among the potential winners and losers. In a world 
characterized by profound disparities, procedurally equitable systems 
of engagement, decision making, and governance appear needed to 
enable a polity to come to equitable and sustainable solutions to the 
sustainable development challenge.
4.2 Approaches and 
indicators
This section maps out the various conceptual approaches to the issues 
of SD (4.2.1), equity (4.2.2), and their linkages to climate change and 
climate policy.
4�2�1 Sustainability and sustainable 
 development (SD) 
4�2�1�1 Defining and measuring sustainability
The most frequently quoted definition of SD is “development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs”, from the Brundtland 
Report (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). 
This definition acknowledges a tension between sustainability and 
development (Jabareen, 2006), and that development objectives aim 
at meeting basic needs for all citizens and securing them in a sustain-
able manner (Murdiyarso, 2010). One of the first definitions of SD 
(Prescott-Allen, 1980) refers to a development process that is compat-
ible with the preservation of ecosystems and species. 
A popular conceptualization of SD goes beyond securing needs 
and preserving the environment and involves three ‘pillars’ or three 
‘bottom-lines’ of sustainability: environmental, economic, and social 
aspects (Dobson, 1991; Elkington, 1998; Flint and Danner, 2001; Pope 
et al., 2004; Sneddon et al., 2006; Murdiyarso, 2010; Okereke, 2011). 
There is some variation in the articulation of the three spheres, with 
some scholars arguing for an equal appraisal of their co-evolution and 
mutual interactions, and others positing a hierarchy with economic 
activities embedded in the social matrix, which is itself grounded in the 
ecosphere (Levin, 2000; Fischer et al., 2007). This broad SD framework 
is equally relevant for rich countries concerned with growth, well-
being, human development, and lifestyles.
A well-known distinction opposes weak sustainability to strong sus-
tainability approaches (Neumayer, 2010). The former relies on the 
assumption that human-made capital can replace natural resources 
and ecosystem services with a high degree of substitutability. Strong 
sustainability, in contrast, takes the view that certain critical natu-
ral stocks — such as the climate system and biodiversity — cannot 
be replaced by human-made capital and must be maintained. Weak 
sustainability is often believed to be inherent to economic modelling 
that aggregates all forms of capital together (Dietz and Neumayer, 
2007), but economic models and indicators can accommodate any 
degree of substitutability between different forms of capital (Fleur-
baey and Blanchet, 2013). The linkage between strong sustainabil-
ity and IAMs is discussed in Sathaye et  al. (2011). A different but 
related issue is whether one should evaluate development paths only 
in terms of human well-being, which depends on the environment 
services (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005), or also account 
for natural systems as intrinsically valuable (McShane, 2007; Attfield, 
2008). 
Sustainability is closely related to resilience (WII AR5 2.5 and 
20.2 – 20.6; Folke et al., 2010; Gallopin, 2006; Goerner et al., 2009) and 
vulnerability (Kates, 2001; Clark and Dickson, 2003; IPCC, 2012a). A 
key premise of this direction of research is that social and biophysi-
cal processes are interdependent and co-evolving (Polsky and Eakin, 
2011). The biosphere itself is a complex adaptive system, the monitor-
ing of which is still perfectible (Levin, 2000; Thuiller, 2007). Critical per-
spectives on these concepts, when applied to SD analysis, can be found 
in Turner (2010) and Cannon and Müller-Mahn (2010).
 Although there are various conceptions of sustainability in the litera-
ture, there are internationally agreed principles of SD adopted by 
heads of states and governments at the 1992 UN Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development (UNCED) and reaffirmed at subsequent 
review and implementation conferences (United Nations, 1992a, 1997, 
2002, 2012a). A key guiding principle is: “The right to development 
must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environ-
mental needs of present and future generations” (1992 Rio Declara-
tion Principle 3). The Rio principles were reaffirmed at the June 2012 
summit level UN Conference on SD.
Box 4�2 | Sustainable development indicators (SDI) 
When SD became a prominent consideration in policymaking in 
the early 1990s, SDI initiatives flourished. Pressure-state-response 
(PSR) and capital accounting-based (CAB) frameworks, in particu-
lar, were widely used to assess sustainability. The PSR approach 
was further modified as driving force-state-response (DSR) by the 
United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) 
(2001) and driving force-pressure-state-impact-response (DPSIR) 
by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (UNEP, 
1997, 2000, 2002). The System of Integrated Environmental-Eco-
nomic Accounting (SEEA) of the United Nations offers a wealth of 
information about the state of ecosystems and is currently under 
revision and expansion.1 The CAB approach is embodied in the 
Adjusted Net Savings indicator of the World Bank (2003, 2011), 
which is mentioned in Section 4.3 and 14.1 of this report. It is 
based on the economic theory of ‘genuine savings’ (understood as 
the variation of all natural and man-made capital stocks, evaluated 
at certain specific accounting prices), which shows that on a path 
that maximizes the discounted utilitarian sum, a negative value for 
genuine savings implies that the current level of well-being is not 
sustainable (Hamilton and Clemens, 1999; Pezzey, 2004).
General presentations and critical assessments of SDIs can be 
found in a large literature (Daly, 1996; Aronsson et al., 1997; 
1 Documentation is available at http: / / unstats.un.org / unsd / envaccounting / 
seea.asp.
Pezzey and Toman, 2002; Lawn, 2003; Hamilton and Atkinson, 
2006; Asheim, 2007; Dietz and Neumayer, 2007; Neumayer, 
2010; Martinet, 2012; Mori and Christodoulou, 2012; Fleurbaey 
and Blanchet, 2013). This literature is pervaded by a concern 
for comprehensiveness — i. e., recording all important aspects of 
well-being, equity, and nature preservation for current and future 
generations — and accuracy — i. e., avoiding arbitrary or unreliable 
weighting of the relevant dimensions when synthesizing multidi-
mensional information. The general conclusion of this literature 
is that there is currently no satisfactory empirical indicator of 
sustainability. 
A limitation of the PSR model is that it fails to identify causal 
relations, and it oversimplifies the links between dimensions. 
It is moreover based upon aggregate indices, which lose much 
information contained in the underlying indicators. An important 
limitation of the SEEA is that social and institutional issues are 
essentially left out, and its stock-and-flow approach is problematic 
with respect to environmental and social aspects that do not have 
a market price. Similarly, computing CAB indicators compounds 
the difficulty of comprehensively estimating the evolution of capi-
tal stocks with the difficulty of computing the accounting prices. 
Market prices do provide relevant information for valuing capital 
stocks in a perfectly managed economy (as shown by Weitzman, 
1976), but may be very misleading in actual conditions (Dasgupta 
and Mäler, 2000; Arrow et al., 2012).
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4�2�1�2 Links with climate change and climate policy
The literature on the complex relations between climate change, cli-
mate policies, and SD is large (Swart et al., 2003; Robinson et al., 2006; 
Bizikova et al., 2007; Sathaye et al., 2007; Thuiller, 2007; Akimoto et al., 
2012; Janetos et al., 2012). The links between SD and climate issues 
are examined in detail in WGII Chapter 20. Mapping out these links is 
also important in this WGIII report, and is done in this section.
Three main linkages can be identified, each of which contains many 
elements. First, the climate threat constrains possible development 
paths, and sufficiently disruptive climate change could preclude any 
prospect for sustainable future (WGII Chapter 19). In this perspective, 
an effective climate response is necessarily an integral objective of an 
SD strategy. 
Second, there are tradeoffs between climate responses and broader SD 
goals, because some climate responses can impose other environmen-
tal pressures, have adverse distributional effects, draw resources away 
from other developmental priorities, or otherwise impose limitations 
on growth and development (Sections 4.6, 7.11, 8.9, 9.9, 10.10, 11.9, 
12.8). Section 4.4 examines how to avoid such tradeoffs by changing 
behavioural patterns and decoupling emissions and growth, and / or 
decoupling growth and well-being.
Third, there are multiple potential synergies between climate responses 
and broader SD objectives. Climate responses may generate co-bene-
fits for human and economic development (Sections 3.6, 4.8, 6.6, 7.9, 
8.7, 9.7, 10.8, 11.7). At a more fundamental level, capacities underly-
ing an effective climate response overlap strongly with capacities for 
SD (Sections 4.6, 5.3).
A key message of this report is that designing a successful climate pol-
icy may require going beyond a narrow focus on mitigation and adap-
tation, beyond the analysis of a few co-benefits of climate policy, and 
may instead require ‘mainstreaming’ climate issues into the design of 
comprehensive SD strategies, including at local and regional levels. Fig-
ure 4.1 illustrates the different perspectives from which climate policy 
can be envisioned. In the broadest, boldest perspective, the choice of 
the development path (see Sections 4.5, 6.1) is at stake.
A popular conceptualization of SD goes beyond securing needs 
and preserving the environment and involves three ‘pillars’ or three 
‘bottom-lines’ of sustainability: environmental, economic, and social 
aspects (Dobson, 1991; Elkington, 1998; Flint and Danner, 2001; Pope 
et al., 2004; Sneddon et al., 2006; Murdiyarso, 2010; Okereke, 2011). 
There is some variation in the articulation of the three spheres, with 
some scholars arguing for an equal appraisal of their co-evolution and 
mutual interactions, and others positing a hierarchy with economic 
activities embedded in the social matrix, which is itself grounded in the 
ecosphere (Levin, 2000; Fischer et al., 2007). This broad SD framework 
is equally relevant for rich countries concerned with growth, well-
being, human development, and lifestyles.
A well-known distinction opposes weak sustainability to strong sus-
tainability approaches (Neumayer, 2010). The former relies on the 
assumption that human-made capital can replace natural resources 
and ecosystem services with a high degree of substitutability. Strong 
sustainability, in contrast, takes the view that certain critical natu-
ral stocks — such as the climate system and biodiversity — cannot 
be replaced by human-made capital and must be maintained. Weak 
sustainability is often believed to be inherent to economic modelling 
that aggregates all forms of capital together (Dietz and Neumayer, 
2007), but economic models and indicators can accommodate any 
degree of substitutability between different forms of capital (Fleur-
baey and Blanchet, 2013). The linkage between strong sustainabil-
ity and IAMs is discussed in Sathaye et  al. (2011). A different but 
related issue is whether one should evaluate development paths only 
in terms of human well-being, which depends on the environment 
services (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005), or also account 
for natural systems as intrinsically valuable (McShane, 2007; Attfield, 
2008). 
Sustainability is closely related to resilience (WII AR5 2.5 and 
20.2 – 20.6; Folke et al., 2010; Gallopin, 2006; Goerner et al., 2009) and 
vulnerability (Kates, 2001; Clark and Dickson, 2003; IPCC, 2012a). A 
key premise of this direction of research is that social and biophysi-
cal processes are interdependent and co-evolving (Polsky and Eakin, 
2011). The biosphere itself is a complex adaptive system, the monitor-
ing of which is still perfectible (Levin, 2000; Thuiller, 2007). Critical per-
spectives on these concepts, when applied to SD analysis, can be found 
in Turner (2010) and Cannon and Müller-Mahn (2010).
 Although there are various conceptions of sustainability in the litera-
ture, there are internationally agreed principles of SD adopted by 
heads of states and governments at the 1992 UN Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development (UNCED) and reaffirmed at subsequent 
review and implementation conferences (United Nations, 1992a, 1997, 
2002, 2012a). A key guiding principle is: “The right to development 
must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environ-
mental needs of present and future generations” (1992 Rio Declara-
tion Principle 3). The Rio principles were reaffirmed at the June 2012 
summit level UN Conference on SD.
Box 4�2 | Sustainable development indicators (SDI) 
When SD became a prominent consideration in policymaking in 
the early 1990s, SDI initiatives flourished. Pressure-state-response 
(PSR) and capital accounting-based (CAB) frameworks, in particu-
lar, were widely used to assess sustainability. The PSR approach 
was further modified as driving force-state-response (DSR) by the 
United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) 
(2001) and driving force-pressure-state-impact-response (DPSIR) 
by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (UNEP, 
1997, 2000, 2002). The System of Integrated Environmental-Eco-
nomic Accounting (SEEA) of the United Nations offers a wealth of 
information about the state of ecosystems and is currently under 
revision and expansion.1 The CAB approach is embodied in the 
Adjusted Net Savings indicator of the World Bank (2003, 2011), 
which is mentioned in Section 4.3 and 14.1 of this report. It is 
based on the economic theory of ‘genuine savings’ (understood as 
the variation of all natural and man-made capital stocks, evaluated 
at certain specific accounting prices), which shows that on a path 
that maximizes the discounted utilitarian sum, a negative value for 
genuine savings implies that the current level of well-being is not 
sustainable (Hamilton and Clemens, 1999; Pezzey, 2004).
General presentations and critical assessments of SDIs can be 
found in a large literature (Daly, 1996; Aronsson et al., 1997; 
1 Documentation is available at http: / / unstats.un.org / unsd / envaccounting / 
seea.asp.
Pezzey and Toman, 2002; Lawn, 2003; Hamilton and Atkinson, 
2006; Asheim, 2007; Dietz and Neumayer, 2007; Neumayer, 
2010; Martinet, 2012; Mori and Christodoulou, 2012; Fleurbaey 
and Blanchet, 2013). This literature is pervaded by a concern 
for comprehensiveness — i. e., recording all important aspects of 
well-being, equity, and nature preservation for current and future 
generations — and accuracy — i. e., avoiding arbitrary or unreliable 
weighting of the relevant dimensions when synthesizing multidi-
mensional information. The general conclusion of this literature 
is that there is currently no satisfactory empirical indicator of 
sustainability. 
A limitation of the PSR model is that it fails to identify causal 
relations, and it oversimplifies the links between dimensions. 
It is moreover based upon aggregate indices, which lose much 
information contained in the underlying indicators. An important 
limitation of the SEEA is that social and institutional issues are 
essentially left out, and its stock-and-flow approach is problematic 
with respect to environmental and social aspects that do not have 
a market price. Similarly, computing CAB indicators compounds 
the difficulty of comprehensively estimating the evolution of capi-
tal stocks with the difficulty of computing the accounting prices. 
Market prices do provide relevant information for valuing capital 
stocks in a perfectly managed economy (as shown by Weitzman, 
1976), but may be very misleading in actual conditions (Dasgupta 
and Mäler, 2000; Arrow et al., 2012).
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4�2�2 Equity and its relation to sustainable 
development and climate change
Equity is prominent in research and policy debates about SD and cli-
mate, both as distributive equity (distribution of resources in contexts 
such as burden sharing, distribution of well-being in the broader context 
of social justice, see Sections 3.3, 4.4, 4.6) and procedural equity (par-
ticipation in decision making, see Section 4.3). Various aspects of the 
general concept, as developed in social ethics, are introduced in Section 
3.2 under the name of fairness and justice. (In this chapter the terms 
equity, fairness, and justice are not distinguished but are used according 
to common usage depending on context). The aim of this subsection is 
to analyze the links between equity, SD, and climate issues.
Equity between generations underlies the very notion of SD. Figure 4.2, 
a variant of a figure from Howarth and Norgaard (1992), illustrates sus-
tainability as the possibility for future generations to reach at least the 
same level of well-being as the current generation. It shows in particu-
lar that sustainability is a matter of distributive equity, not of efficiency, 
even if eliminating inefficiencies affecting future sustainable well-being 
may improve sustainability, as stressed in Grubb et al. (2013).
There has been a recent surge of research on intergenerational equity, 
motivated by dissatisfaction with the tradition of discounting the utility 
of future generations in the analysis of growth paths (see, e. g., Asheim 
(2007), Roemer and Suzumura (2002) for recent syntheses). The debate 
on discounting is reviewed in Section 3.6.2. Recent literature presents 
new arguments deriving the imperative of sustaining well-being across 
generations from more basic equity principles (Asheim et al., 2001, 2012).
Equity within every generation is often considered an intrinsic compo-
nent of SD linked to the social pillar. The Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) may be seen as one indication of a more explicit global 
commitment to the social pillar (United Nations, 2000). Yet, the rela-
tion between equity within generations and SD is complex. Attempting 
to meet the needs of the world’s poor by proliferating the consumption 
patterns and production processes of the world’s richest populations 
would be unsustainable (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; 
Rockström et al., 2009b; Steffen et al., 2011; IPCC, 2014). Such a sce-
nario would not likely play out well for the world’s poor. Environmental 
issues are interwoven with the fabric of racial, social, and economic 
injustice. Environmental costs and benefits are often distributed so 
that those who already suffer other socio-economic disadvantages 
tend to bear the greatest burden (Okereke, 2011). 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the normative framework in which a SD path can 
be grounded on certain values (well-being, equity) and interrelated 
goals (development and conservation), and the synergies and tradeoffs 
between SD and climate policy, with procedural equity and iterative 
learning nurturing each step, from conceptualization to implementation. 
In the rest of this section, we focus on one key dimension of equity 
that is of central importance to international negotiations toward an 
effective global response to climate change. As in many other contexts, 
fundamental questions of resource allocation and burden sharing arise 
in climate change, and therefore equity principles are invoked and 
debated. Three lines of argument have been put forward to justify a 
reference to equity in this context (Section 4.6 examines the details of 
burden sharing principles and frameworks in a climate regime.)
The first justification is the normative claim that it is morally proper 
to allocate burdens associated with our common global climate chal-
lenge according to ethical principles. The broad set of ethical arguments 
for ascribing moral obligations to individual nations has been reviewed 
in Section 3.3, drawing implicitly upon a cosmopolitan view of justice, 
which posits that some of the basic rights and duties that arise between 
people within nations also hold between people of different nations. 
The second justification is the legal claim that countries have accepted 
treaty commitments to act against climate change that include 
the commitment to share the burden of action equitably. This claim 
derives from the fact that signatories to the UNFCCC have agreed that: 
“Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present 
and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in 
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities” (UNFCCC, 2002). These commitments are con-
sistent with a body of soft law and norms such as the no-harm rule 
according to which a state must prevent, reduce or control the risk 
of serious environmental harm to other states (Stockholm Convention 
(UNEP, 1972), Rio declaration (United Nations, 1992b), Stone, 2004). 
In addition, it has been noted that climate change adversely affects a 
range of human rights that are incorporated in widely ratified treaties 
(Aminzadeh, 2006; Humphreys, 2009; Knox, 2009; Wewerinke and Yu 
III, 2010; Bodansky, 2010). 
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The third justification is the positive claim that equitable burden shar-
ing will be necessary if the climate challenge is to be effectively met. 
This claim derives from the fact that climate change is a classic com-
mons problem (Hardin, 1968; Soroos, 1997; Buck, 1998; Folke, 2007) 
(also see Section 13.2.1.1). As with any commons problem, the solu-
tion lies in collective action (Ostrom, 1990). This is true at the global 
scale as well as the local, only more challenging to achieve (Ostrom 
et al., 1999). Inducing cooperation relies, to an important degree, on 
convincing others that one is doing one’s fair share. This is why notions 
of equitable burden-sharing are considered important in motivating 
actors to effectively respond to climate change. They are even more 
important given that actors are not as equal as the proverbial ‘com-
moners’, where the very name asserts homogeneity (Milanović et al., 
2007). To the contrary, there are important asymmetries or inequalities 
between stakeholders (Okereke et al., 2009; Okereke, 2010): asymme-
try in contribution to climate change (past and present), in vulnerabil-
ity to the impacts of climate change, in capacity to mitigate the prob-
lem, and in power to decide on solutions. Other aspects of the relation 
between intragenerational equity and climate response include the 
gender issues noted in 4.3, and the role of virtue ethics and citizen 
attitudes in changing lifestyles and behaviours (Dobson, 2007; Lane, 
2012), a topic analyzed in Section 4.4.
Young (2013) has identified three general conditions — which apply 
to the climate context — under which the successful formation and 
eventual effectiveness of a collective action regime may hinge on 
equitable burden sharing: the absence of actors who are powerful 
enough to coercively impose their preferred burden sharing arrange-
ments; the inapplicability of standard utilitarian methods of calculat-
ing costs and benefits; and the fact that regime effectiveness depends 
on a long-term commitment of members to implement its terms. With 
respect to climate change, it has long been noted that a regime that 
many members find unfair will face severe challenges to its adoption 
or be vulnerable to festering tensions that jeopardize its effectiveness 
(Harris, 1996; Müller, 1999; Young, 2012). Specifically, any attempt to 
protect the climate by keeping living standards low for a large part 
of the world population will face strong political resistance, and will 
almost certainly fail (Roberts and Parks, 2007; Baer et al., 2009). While 
costs of participation may provide incentives for non-cooperation or 
defection in the short-term, the climate negotiations are not a one-
shot game, and they are embedded in a much broader global context; 
climate change is only one of many global problems — environmental, 
economic, and social — that will require effective cooperative global 
governance if development — and indeed human welfare — is to be 
sustained in the long term (Singer, 2004; Jasanoff, 2004; Speth and 
Haas, 2006; Kjellen, 2008). 
Despite these three lines of justification, the question of the role that 
equity does or should play in the establishment of global climate policy 
and burden sharing in particular is nonetheless controversial (Victor, 
1998). The fact that there is no universally accepted global authority 
to enforce participation is taken by some to mean that sovereignty, 
not equity is the prevailing principle. Such a conception implies that 
the bottom-line criterion for a self-enforcing (Barrett, 2005) coopera-
tive agreement would be simply that everyone is no worse off than 
at the status quo. This has been termed “International Paretianism” 
(Posner and Weisbach, 2010), and its ironic, even perverse results have 
been pointed out: “an optimal climate treaty could well require side 
payments to rich countries like the United States and rising countries 
like China, and indeed possibly from very poor countries which are 
extremely vulnerable to climate change — such as Bangladesh.” (Pos-
ner and Weisbach, 2010). 
4�2�2 Equity and its relation to sustainable 
development and climate change
Equity is prominent in research and policy debates about SD and cli-
mate, both as distributive equity (distribution of resources in contexts 
such as burden sharing, distribution of well-being in the broader context 
of social justice, see Sections 3.3, 4.4, 4.6) and procedural equity (par-
ticipation in decision making, see Section 4.3). Various aspects of the 
general concept, as developed in social ethics, are introduced in Section 
3.2 under the name of fairness and justice. (In this chapter the terms 
equity, fairness, and justice are not distinguished but are used according 
to common usage depending on context). The aim of this subsection is 
to analyze the links between equity, SD, and climate issues.
Equity between generations underlies the very notion of SD. Figure 4.2, 
a variant of a figure from Howarth and Norgaard (1992), illustrates sus-
tainability as the possibility for future generations to reach at least the 
same level of well-being as the current generation. It shows in particu-
lar that sustainability is a matter of distributive equity, not of efficiency, 
even if eliminating inefficiencies affecting future sustainable well-being 
may improve sustainability, as stressed in Grubb et al. (2013).
There has been a recent surge of research on intergenerational equity, 
motivated by dissatisfaction with the tradition of discounting the utility 
of future generations in the analysis of growth paths (see, e. g., Asheim 
(2007), Roemer and Suzumura (2002) for recent syntheses). The debate 
on discounting is reviewed in Section 3.6.2. Recent literature presents 
new arguments deriving the imperative of sustaining well-being across 
generations from more basic equity principles (Asheim et al., 2001, 2012).
Equity within every generation is often considered an intrinsic compo-
nent of SD linked to the social pillar. The Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) may be seen as one indication of a more explicit global 
commitment to the social pillar (United Nations, 2000). Yet, the rela-
tion between equity within generations and SD is complex. Attempting 
to meet the needs of the world’s poor by proliferating the consumption 
patterns and production processes of the world’s richest populations 
would be unsustainable (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; 
Rockström et al., 2009b; Steffen et al., 2011; IPCC, 2014). Such a sce-
nario would not likely play out well for the world’s poor. Environmental 
issues are interwoven with the fabric of racial, social, and economic 
injustice. Environmental costs and benefits are often distributed so 
that those who already suffer other socio-economic disadvantages 
tend to bear the greatest burden (Okereke, 2011). 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the normative framework in which a SD path can 
be grounded on certain values (well-being, equity) and interrelated 
goals (development and conservation), and the synergies and tradeoffs 
between SD and climate policy, with procedural equity and iterative 
learning nurturing each step, from conceptualization to implementation. 
In the rest of this section, we focus on one key dimension of equity 
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However, both critics and advocates of the importance of equity in 
the climate negotiations acknowledge that governments can choose 
to act on moral rather than purely self-interested principles (DeCanio 
and Fremstad, 2010; Posner and Weisbach, 2010, 2012; Baer, 2013; 
Jamieson, 2013) (see also Section 3.10). Whether or not states behave 
as rational actors, given the significant global gains to be had from 
cooperation, this leaves ample room for discussion of the role of equity 
in the distribution of those global gains, while still leaving all parties 
better off (Stone, 2004).
While the above discussion focuses on equity among nations, equally 
relevant concerns regarding equity within nations also arise, and 
indeed can be overriding determinants of the prospects for climate pol-
icy to be adopted. Demands for equity have been articulated by labour 
communities primarily in terms of a just transition (International 
Labour Office, 2010; Newell and Mulvaney, 2013), and often by mar-
ginalized populations and racial minorities in terms of environmental 
justice and just sustainability (Agyeman and Evans, 2004; Walker and 
Bulkeley, 2006; Shiva, 2008). While the particular demands are highly 
location- and context-specific, the broad concerns are procedural and 
about distributive justice with reduced power asymmetries, as under-
scored throughout this chapter. 
4.3 Determinants,  drivers 
and barriers 
This section explores the determinants of SD, emphasizing how each 
influences the extent to which societies can balance the economic, 
social, and environmental pillars of SD, while highlighting potential 
synergies and tradeoffs for the building of mitigative and adaptive 
capacity and the realization of effective and equitable mitigation and 
adaptation strategies. Determinants refer to social processes, proper-
ties, and artefacts, as well as natural resources, which together con-
dition and mediate the course of societal development, and thus the 
prospects for SD. When determinants facilitate SD they act as drivers 
and when they constrain it they act as barriers. 
The determinants discussed include: the legacy of development rela-
tions; governance and political economy; population and demography; 
human and social capital; behaviour, culture, and values; technology and 
innovation processes; natural resources; and finance and investment. 
These determinants are interdependent, characterized by feedbacks that 
blur the distinction between cause and effect, and their relative impor-
tance depends on context — see analogous discussion in the context 
of GHG emission drivers in Section 5.3. They are not unique, and other 
determinants such as leadership (Jones and Olken, 2005), randomness 
(Holling, 1973; Arthur, 1989), or human nature (Wilson, 1978) could be 
added to the list, but they are less amenable to deliberate intervention 
by policy-makers and other decision makers and have therefore been 
excluded. What follows lays the foundations for understanding concepts 
that recur throughout this chapter and those that follow.
4�3�1 Legacy of development relations
Following World War II, security, economic, and humanitarian relations 
between rich nations and poor nations were comingled and addressed 
under the umbrella of ‘development’ (Truman, 1949; Sachs, Wolfgang, 
1999). Differing perspectives on the mixed outcomes of six decades 
of development, and what the outcomes may indicate about underly-
ing intentions and capabilities, inform different actors in different ways 
as to what will work to address climate change and the transition 
to SD. During the 1950s and 1960s, for example, expectations were 
that poverty would be reduced dramatically by the end of the cen-
tury (Rist, 2003). It was widely believed that economic development 
could be instigated through aid from richer nations, both financial and 
in kind. Development was seen as a process of going through stages 
starting with transforming traditional agriculture through education, 
the introduction of new agricultural technologies, improved access to 
capital for farm improvements, and the construction of transportation 
infrastructure to facilitate markets. Improved agriculture would release 
workers for an industrial stage and thereby increase opportunities 
for education and commercial development in cities. As development 
proceeded, nations would increasingly acquire their own scientific 
capabilities and, later, sophisticated governance structures to regulate 
finance and industry in the public good, becoming well-rounded, well-
governed economies comparable to those of rich nations.
By the 1970s, however, it was clear that development was not on a 
path to fulfilling these linear expectations because: 1) contributions 
of aid from the rich nations were not at levels anticipated; 2) tech-
nological and institutional changes were only partially successful, 
proved inappropriate, or had unpredicted, unfortunate consequences; 
3) requests for military aid and the security and economic objectives of 
richer nations in the context of the Cold War were frequently given pri-
ority over poverty reduction; and 4) graft, patronage, and the favouring 
of special interests diverted funds from poverty reduction. The general 
belief that nations naturally went through stages of development to 
become well-rounded economies faded by the early 1980s. Greater 
participation in global trade, with its implied specialization, was 
invoked as the path to economic growth. Diverse other efforts were 
made to improve how development worked, but with only modest suc-
cess, leaving many in rich and poor nations concerned about develop-
ment process and prospects (United Nations, 2011a). 
Layering the goal of environmental sustainability onto the goal of 
poverty reduction further compounded the legacy of unmet expecta-
tions (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). 
There have been difficulties determining, shifting to, and governing 
for sustainable pathways (Sanwal, 2010) — see Section 4.3.2 below. 
The negotiation of new rules for the mobility of private capital and 
the drive for globalization of the economy also came with new expec-
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tations for development (Stiglitz, 2002). The Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG) established in 2000 to be met by 2015 are an example 
of how such expectations were thought to be realizable in the rap-
idly evolving times of the global financial economy. In retrospect and 
after the 2008 financial sector induced recession, significant improve-
ments are largely in China and India where economic growth acceler-
ated through private capital flows independent of the MDG process. 
Excluding these countries, the record is mixed at best and still poor in 
most of Africa (Keyzer and Wesenbeeck, 2007; Easterly, 2009; United 
Nations, 2011a). Additionally, since the 1990s, greenhouse gas emis-
sions became another focus of contention (Roberts and Parks, 2007; 
Penetrante, 2011; Dryzek et al., 2011). The developed nations became 
rich through the early use of fossil fuels and land transformations that 
put GHGs in the atmosphere, imposing costs on all people, rich and 
poor, through climate impacts that will persist over centuries (Sriniva-
san et al., 2008). Connections between causal and moral responsibility 
arose, complicating the legacy of development.
Such legacy of unmet development and sustainability expectations is 
open to multiple interpretations. In richer nations, the evidence can be 
interpreted to support the views of fiscal conservatives who oppose 
aid, libertarians who oppose humanitarian and environmental inter-
ventions, progressives who urge that more needs to be done to reach 
social and environmental goals, and some environmentalists who urge 
dematerialization and degrowth among the rich as necessary to meet 
the needs of the poor. In poorer nations, the legacy similarly supports 
various views including a distrust of rich nations for not delivering 
development and environmental assistance as promised, cynicism 
toward the intentions and conceptual rationales when it is provided, 
and also a wariness of development’s unpredicted outcomes. 
In both developed and developing nations these diverse sentiments 
among the public, policy makers, and climate negotiators contribute 
to what philosopher Gardiner (2011b) refers to as the “perfect moral 
storm” of climate policy. Some analysts argue that the legacy of devel-
opment and interrelated issues of equity so cloud global climate nego-
tiations that ad hoc agreements and voluntary pledges are the most 
that can be achieved (Victor, 2004) and considerations of development 
and equity are better left aside (Posner and Weisbach, 2010), although 
this leaves open whether such arrangements could provide an ade-
quately ambitious climate response consistent with the UNFCCC’s 
objectives. (See Section 4.6.2 for further discussion of perspectives on 
equity in a climate regime, and Section 13.4.3 for further discussion of 
regime architectures). 
4�3�2 Governance and political economy 
Governance and political economy are critical determinants for SD, 
equity, and climate change mitigation because they circumscribe the 
process through which these goals and how to attain them are articu-
lated and contested. The quest for equity and climate change mitigation 
in the context of SD thus necessitates an improved understanding and 
practice of governance (Biermann et al., 2009; Okereke et al., 2009). 
Governance in the broadest sense refers to the processes of interac-
tion and decision making among actors involved in a common problem 
(Kooiman, 2003; Hufty, 2011). It goes beyond notions of formal gov-
ernment or political authority and integrates other actors, networks, 
informal institutions, and incentive structures operating at various lev-
els of social organization (Rosenau, 1990; Chotray and Stoker, 2009). 
In turn, climate governance has been defined as the mechanisms and 
measures “aimed at steering social systems towards preventing, miti-
gating or adapting to the risks posed by climate change” (Jagers and 
Stripple, 2003). From this definition, it can be seen as a broad phe-
nomenon encompassing not only formal policymaking by states, but 
all the processes through which authority is generated and exerted to 
affect climate change and sustainability. This includes policymaking by 
states but also by many other actors -NGOs, TNCs, municipalities, for 
example — operating across various scales (Okereke et al., 2009). 
Many scholars have highlighted the challenges associated with gov-
erning for SD and climate change (Adger and Jordan, 2009; Levin et al., 
2012). First, it involves rethinking the ways society relates to nature 
and the underlying biophysical systems. This is relevant in the con-
text of the growing evidence of the impact of human activity on the 
planet and the understanding that extraordinary degrees of irrevers-
ible damage and harm are distinct possibilities if the right measures 
are not taken within an adequate timescale (Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment, 2005; Rockström et al., 2009a). Second, governing climate 
change involves complex intergenerational considerations. On the one 
hand, cause and effect of some environmental impacts and climate 
change are separated by decades, often generations, and on the other 
hand, those who bear the costs of remediation and mitigation may not 
be the ones to reap the benefits of avoided harm (Biermann, 2007).
Third, effective response to climate change may require a fundamental 
restructuring of the global economic and social systems, which in turn 
would involve overcoming multiple vested interests and the inertia 
associated with behavioural patterns and crafting new institutions that 
promote sustainability (Meadows et al., 2004; Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment, 2005). This challenge is exacerbated by the huge mis-
match between the planning horizon needed to address global envi-
ronmental problems and climate change and the tenure of decision 
makers (Hovi et al., 2009). 
Fourth, and finally, SD governance cuts across several realms of policy 
and organization. Particularly, the governance of mitigation and adap-
tation is an element of a complex and evolving arena of global envi-
ronmental governance, which deals with other, and often overlapping, 
issues such as biodiversity loss, desertification, water management, 
trade, energy security, and health, among others (Adger and Jordan, 
2009; Brown, 2009; Bell et al., 2010; Balsiger and Debarbieux, 2011; da 
Fonseca et al., 2012; Bark et al., 2012). Sites of climate change gover-
nance and policymaking are thus multiple and are not confined to the 
UNFCCC and national rule-making processes, a situation which raises 
challenges in relation to coordination, linkages, and synergies (Ostrom, 
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2010; Zelli, 2011; Jinnah, 2011) — see Sections 13.4, 13.13, 14.1, 15.2, 
notably Figure 13.1 for a visual summary. 
These considerations explain why climate governance has attracted 
more political controversy than other issues in relation to global sus-
tainability and its equity considerations. Some of the main aspects of 
this controversy include: who should participate in decision making; 
how to modulate power asymmetry among stakeholders; how to share 
responsibility among actors; what ideas and institutions should govern 
response measures; and where should interventions focus? Questions 
of justice are embedded throughout, aggravated by the high stakes 
involved and the stark asymmetry among states and others actors in 
terms of cause, effect, and capability to respond to the problem (Oker-
eke and Dooley, 2010; Okereke, 2010; Schroeder et al., 2012). 
Scholars have long analyzed the above issues within climate gover-
nance, offering a multitude of possible solutions. Concerning participa-
tion, a departure from the top-down approach implied in the Kyoto 
Protocol towards a more voluntary and bottom-up approach has been 
suggested (Rayner, 2010). Some argue that limiting participation to the 
“most capable, responsible and vulnerable” countries can foster prog-
ress toward more stringent mitigation policy (Eckersley, 2012). How-
ever, the latter has been opposed on the basis that it would further 
exacerbate issues of inequity (Aitken, 2012; Stevenson and Dryzek, 
2012). Others have discussed the need to create spaces for collabora-
tive learning to debate, legitimize, and potentially overcome knowl-
edge divides between experts and lay people in sectoral climate policy 
development (Swanson et al., 2010; Armitage et al., 2011; Colfer, 2011; 
Larsen et al., 2012) — see Sections 13.3.1 and 13.5 for further detail. 
On allocation of responsibility, a global agreement has been elusive 
not merely because parties and other key actors have differing concep-
tions of a fair allocation (Okereke, 2008), but because the pertinent 
policies are highly contentious given the combination of factors at 
play, prominent among which are finance, politics, ineffective institu-
tions, and vested interests. 
A defining image of the climate governance landscape is that key 
actors have vastly disproportionate capacities and resources, includ-
ing the political, financial, and cognitive resources that are necessary 
to steer the behaviour of the collective within and across territorial 
boundaries (Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2009). A central element of gov-
ernance therefore relates to huge asymmetry in such resources and the 
ability to exercise power or influence outcomes. Some actors, includ-
ing governments, make use of negotiation power and / or lobbying 
activities to influence policy decisions at multiple scales and, by doing 
so, affect the design and the subsequent allocation and distribution 
of benefits and costs resulting from such decisions (Markussen and 
Svendsen, 2005; Benvenisti and Downs, 2007; Schäfer, 2009; Sandler, 
2010) — see e. g., Section 15.5.2. The problem, however, also resides 
in the fact that those that wield the greatest power either consider it 
against their interest to facilitate rapid progress towards a global low 
carbon economy or insist that the accepted solutions must be aligned 
to increase their power and material gains (Sæverud and Skjærseth, 
2007; Giddens, 2009; Hulme, 2009; Lohmann, 2009, 2010; Okereke and 
McDaniels, 2012; Wittneben et al., 2012). The most notable effect of 
this is that despite some exceptions, the prevailing organization of the 
global economy, which confers significant power on actors associated 
with fossil fuel interests and with the financial sector, has provided the 
context for the sorts of governance practices of climate change that 
have dominated to date (Newell and Paterson, 2010). 
Many specific governance initiatives, described in Sections 13.13 and 
15.3, whether organized by states or among novel configurations of 
actors, have focused on creating new markets or investment opportuni-
ties. This applies, for example, to carbon markets (Paterson, 2009), car-
bon offsetting (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008; Lovell et al., 2009; Corbera 
and Schroeder, 2011; Corbera, 2012), investor-led governance initia-
tives such as the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) (Kolk et  al., 2008) 
or partnerships such as the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency 
Partnership (REEEP) (Parthan et al., 2010). Some scholars find that car-
bon markets can contribute to achieving a low fossil carbon transition, 
but require careful designs to achieve environmental and welfare gains 
(Wood and Jotzo, 2011; Pezzey and Jotzo, 2012; Springmann, 2012; 
Bakam et al., 2012). Others note that such mechanisms are vulnerable 
to ‘capture’ by special interests and against the original purposes for 
which they are conceived. Several authors have discussed this problem 
in the context of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) (Lohmann, 2008; 
Clò, 2010; Okereke and McDaniels, 2012; Böhm et al., 2012). 
Governing for SD and climate change requires close attention to three 
key issues. First, there is a need to understand current governance as 
encompassing more than the actors within formal government struc-
tures, and to understand how choices are driven by more than optimal 
decision making theory. Second effective governance requires under-
standing the dynamics that determine whether and how policy options 
are legitimized, and then formally deliberated and adopted (or not). 
Consequently, it is necessary to examine how these modes of gover-
nance are defined and established in the first place, by whom and for 
whose benefit, thus illuminating the relationship and tensions between 
effective governance and existing trends in political economy. Third, 
there is a need to explore how different modes of governance translate 
into outcomes, affecting the decisions and actions of actors at multiple 
scales, and to draw lessons about their environmental effectiveness 
and distributional implications. While some argue that states should 
still be regarded as key agents in steering such transitions (Eckersley, 
2004; Weale, 2009), most decision making relevant to SD and climate 
remains fundamentally decentralized. A key challenge of governance is 
thus to recognize the political economy context of these decision mak-
ers, to ensure procedurally equitable processes that address the alloca-
tion of responsibilities and ensure transparency and accountability in 
any transition towards SD. 
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4�3�3 Population and demography 
Population variables, including size, density, and growth rate, as well 
as age, sex, education, and settlement structures, play a determinant 
role in countries’ SD trajectories. Their drivers, in particular fertility, 
mortality, and migration, are reciprocally influenced by development 
pathways, including evolving policies, socio-cultural trends, as well as 
by changes in the economy (Bloom, 2011). In the climate change con-
text, population trends have been shown to matter both for mitigation 
efforts as well as for societies’ adaptive capacities to climate change 
(O’Neill et al., 2001). 
Current demographic trends show distinct patterns in different parts 
of the world. While population sizes are on a declining trajectory in 
Eastern Europe and Japan, they are set for significant further increase 
in many developing countries (particularly in Africa and south-western 
Asia) due to a very young population age structure and continued 
high levels of fertility. As most recent projections show, the world’s 
population is almost certain to increase to between 8 and 10 billion by 
mid-century. After that period, uncertainty increases significantly, with 
the future trend in birth rates being the key determinant, but it is also 
amplified by the uncertainty about future infectious disease mortal-
ity and the still uncertain consequences of climate change on future 
mortality trajectories (O’Neill et al., 2001; Lutz and KC, 2010; United 
Nations, 2011b; Lee, 2011; Scherbov et  al., 2011). The population of 
Sub-Saharan Africa will almost certainly double and could still increase 
by a factor of three or more depending on the course of fertility over 
the coming decades, which depends primarily on progress in female 
education and the availability of reproductive health services (Bon-
gaarts, 2009; Bloom, 2011; Bongaarts and Sinding, 2011). 
Declining fertility rates, together with continued increases in life-
expectancy, result in significant population ageing around the world, 
with the current low fertility countries being most advanced in this 
process. Population ageing is considered a major challenge for the 
solvency of social security systems. For populations still in the process 
of fertility decline, the expected burden of ageing is a more distant 
prospect, and the declining birth rates are expected to bring some near 
term benefits. This phase in the universal process of any demographic 
transition, when the ratio of children to adults is already declining and 
the proportion of elderly has not yet increased, is considered a window 
of opportunity for economic development, which may also result in an 
economic rebound effect leading to higher per capita consumption and 
emissions (Bloom and Canning, 2000). 
Low development is widely understood to contribute to high population 
growth, which declines only after the appearance of widespread access 
to key developmental needs such as perinatal and maternal healthcare, 
and female education and empowerment. Conversely, high population 
growth is widely regarded as an obstacle to SD because it tends to 
make efforts such as the provision of clean drinking water and agricul-
tural goods and the expansion of health services and school enrollment 
rates difficult (Dyson, 2006; Potts, 2007; Pimentel and Paoletti, 2009). 
This has given rise to the fear of a vicious circle of underdevelopment 
and gender inequity yielding high population growth and environmen-
tal degradation, in turn inhibiting the development necessary to bring 
down fertility (Caole and Hoover, 1958; Ehrlich and Holdren, 1971; 
Dasgupta, 1993). However, history shows that countries can break 
this vicious circle with the right social policies, with an early emphasis 
on education and family planning; prominent examples include South 
Korea and Mauritius, which were used in the 1950s as textbook exam-
ples of countries trapped in such a vicious circle (Meade, 1967). 
With respect to adaptation to climate change, the literature on popula-
tion and environment has begun to explore more closely people’s vul-
nerability to climate stressors, including variability and extreme events, 
and to analyze their adaptive capacity and reliance on environmen-
tal resources to cope with adversities and adapt to gradual changes 
and shocks (Bankoff et al., 2004; Adger et al., 2009) — see also Section 
4.6.1 and WGII AR5. Generally speaking, not only does the number of 
people matter, but so does their composition by age, gender, place of 
residence, and level of education, as well as the institutional context 
that influences people’s decision making and development opportuni-
ties (Dyson, 2006). One widely and controversially discussed form of 
adaptation can be international migration induced by climate change. 
There is often public concern that massive migration of this sort 
could contribute to political instability and possibly conflict. However, 
a major recent review of our knowledge in this field has concluded 
that much environmentally induced migration is likely to be internal 
migration and there is very little science-based evidence for assessing 
possible consequences of environmental change on large international 
migration streams (UK Government Office for Science, 2011).
4�3�4 Values and behaviours
Research has identified a range of individual and contextual predictors 
of behaviours in favour or against climate change mitigation, ranging 
from individuals’ psychological needs to cultural and social orientations 
towards time and nature (Swim et al., 2009) — see Sections 2.4, 3.10, 
and 5.5. Below we discuss some of these factors, focusing on human 
values that influence individual and collective behaviours and affect 
our priorities and actions concerning the pursuit of SD, equity goals, 
and climate mitigation. Values have been defined as “enduring beliefs 
that pertain to desirable end states or behaviours, transcend specific 
situations, guide selection or evaluation of behaviour and events and 
are ordered by importance” (Pepper et al., 2009; citing Schwartz and 
Bilsky, 1987). Values provide “guides for living the best way possible 
for individuals, social groups and cultures” (Pepper et al., 2009; citing 
Rohan, 2000) and so influence actions at all levels of society — includ-
ing the individual, the household, the firm, civil society, and govern-
ment. Individuals acquire values through socialization and learning 
experience (Pepper et al., 2009) and values thus relate to many of the 
other determinants discussed in this section. Values may be rooted 
in cultural, religious, and other belief systems, which may sometimes 
conflict with scientific understandings of environmental risks. In par-
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ticular, distinct values may influence perceptions and interpretations of 
climate impacts and hence climate responses (Wolf et al., 2013).
The relevance of values to SD and, particularly, to ecologically conscious 
(consumer) behaviour, is related to the nature of environmental issues as 
‘social dilemmas’, where short-term narrow individual interests conflict 
with the longer term social interest (Pepper et al., 2009). Researchers 
have highlighted the role of non-selfish values that promote the welfare 
of others (including nature), noting that some but not all indigenous 
societies are known to focus on ‘collective’ as opposed to ‘individual’ 
interests and values, which often result in positive resource conservation 
strategies and wellbeing (Gadgil et al., 1993; Sobrevila, 2008; Watson 
et al., 2011). However, it is well known that a range of factors also medi-
ate the impact of values on behaviour so that the link from values to 
ecologically conscious behaviour is often loose (Pepper et al., 2009). 
In fact, this ‘value-action’ gap suggests that pursuing climate change 
mitigation and SD globally may require substantial changes in behav-
iour in the short term along with a transformation of human values 
in the long term, e. g., progressively changing conceptions and atti-
tudes toward biophysical systems and human interaction (Gladwin 
et al., 1995; Leiserowitz et al., 2005; Vlek and Steg, 2007; Folke et al., 
2011a). Changing human values would require a better understanding 
of cross-cultural behavioural differences that in turn relate to environ-
mental, economic, and political histories (Norenzayan, 2011).
Behavioural change can be induced by changes in formal and civil 
institutions and governance, human values (Jackson, 2005a; Folke 
et al., 2011a; Fischer et al., 2012), perceptions of risk and causality, and 
economic incentives. Removing perverse subsidies for environmentally 
harmful products, favouring greener consumption and technologies, 
adopting more comprehensive forms of biophysical and economic 
accounting, and providing safer working conditions are considered 
central for achieving pro-SD behavioural change (Lebel and Lorek, 
2008; Le Blanc, 2010; Thøgersen, 2010). Yet behaviour experiments 
(Osbaldiston and Schott, 2012) suggest there is no ‘silver bullet’ for 
fostering ecologically conscious behaviour, as favourable actions (e. g., 
to conserve energy) are triggered by different stimuli, including infor-
mation, regulation or economic rewards, and influenced by the nature 
of the issue itself. Furthermore, people are able to “express both rela-
tively high levels of environmental concern and relatively high levels of 
materialism simultaneously” (Gatersleben et al., 2010). This suggests 
the need to be issue, context, and culturally aware when designing 
specific actions to foster pro-SD behaviour, as both environmental and 
materialistic concerns must be addressed. These complexities under-
score the challenges in changing beliefs, preferences, habits, and rou-
tines (Southerton, 2012) — see Sections 4.4 and 5.5.2. 
4�3�5 Human and social capital
Levels of human and social capital also critically influence a transition 
toward SD and the design and implementation of mitigation and adap-
tation strategies. Human capital results from individual and collective 
investments in acquiring knowledge and skills that become useful for 
improving wellbeing (Iyer, 2006). Such knowledge and skills can be 
acquired through formal schooling and training, as well as informally 
through customary practices and institutions, including communities 
and families. Human capital can thus be viewed as a critical compo-
nent of a broader-encompassing human capability, i. e., a person’s 
ability to achieve a given list of ‘functionings’ or achievements, which 
depend on a range of personal and social factors, including education, 
age, gender, health, income, nutritional knowledge, and environmen-
tal conditions, among others (Sen, 1997, 2001). See Clark (2009) and 
Schokkaert (2009) for a review of Sen’s capability approach and its 
critiques.
Economists have long considered improvements in human capital a 
key explanatory reason behind the evolution of economic systems, in 
terms of growth and constant innovation (Schultz, 1961; Healy and 
Cote, 2001). Macro-economic research shows a strong correlation 
between levels of economic development and levels of human capi-
tal and vice versa (Schultz, 2003; Iyer, 2006), while micro-economic 
studies reveal a positive relationship between increases in the quan-
tity and quality of formal education and future earnings (Duflo, 2001). 
Gains in human capital can be positively correlated to economic 
growth and efficiency, but also to nutritional, health, and education 
standards (Schultz, 1995). As such, improvements in human capital 
provide a basis for SD, as they shape countries’ socio-economic sys-
tems and influence people’s ability to make informed choices. Seem-
ingly, human capital often also explains the development and survival 
of business ventures (Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Patzelt, 2010; Gimmon 
and Levie, 2010), which are an important source of innovation and 
diffusion of principles and technologies that can contribute to SD and 
to ambitious mitigation and adaptation goals (Marvel and Lumpkin, 
2007; Terjesen, 2007). 
Additionally, a growing body of literature in economics, geography, 
and psychology (reviewed in Sections 2.4, 2.6.6 and 3.10 as well as 
in WGII Chapter 2) has shown that the diversity of environmental, 
socio-economic, educational and cultural contexts in which individu-
als make decisions shape their willingness and / or ability to engage in 
mitigation and adaptation action (Lorenzoni et al., 2007). It is impor-
tant to distinguish between formally acquired knowledge on climate 
change — often based on scientific developments — and traditional 
knowledge on climate-related issues (Smith and Sharp, 2012), as well 
as to recognize that the relative validity of both types of knowledge 
to different audiences, and the meaning and relevance of personal 
engagement, will be influenced by individual perceptions, preferences, 
values, and beliefs. Therefore, knowledge on climate issues does not 
alone explain individual and collective responses to the climate chal-
lenge (Whitmarsh, 2009; Sarewitz, 2011; Wolf and Moser, 2011; Berk-
hout, 2012). There is evidence of cognitive dissonance and strategic 
behaviour in both mitigation and adaptation. Denial mechanisms 
that overrate the costs of changing lifestyles, blame others, and that 
cast doubt on the effectiveness of individual action or the soundness 
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of scientific knowledge are well documented (Stoll-Kleemann et  al., 
2001; Norgaard, 2011; McCright and Dunlap, 2011), as is the con-
certed effort by opponents of climate action to seed and amplify those 
doubts (Jacques et  al., 2008; Kolmes, 2011; Conway and Oreskes, 
2011).
Among the different definitions of social capital, one of the most 
influential was proposed by Fukuyama (2002): the shared norms or 
values that promote social cooperation, which are founded in turn 
on actual social relationships, including trust and reciprocity. Social 
capital appears in the form of family bonds, friendship and collective 
networks, associations, and other more or less institutionalized forms 
of collective action. Social capital is thus generally perceived as an 
asset for both the individuals that recognize and participate in such 
norms and networks and for the respective group / society, insofar as 
they derive benefits from information, participating in decision making 
and belonging to the group. Social capital can be linked to successful 
outcomes in education, employment, family relationships, and health 
(Gamarnikow and Green, 1999), as well as to economic development 
and participatory, democratic governance (Woolcock, 1998; Fuku-
yama, 2002; Doh and McNeely, 2012). Indeed, social capital can also 
be sustained on unfair social norms and institutions that perpetuate 
an inequitable access to the benefits provided by social organization 
(Woolcock and Narayan, 2000), through social networks of corruption 
or criminal organizations, for example, that perpetuate the uneven dis-
tribution of public resources, and undermine societies’ cohesion and 
physical security.
Scholarship suggests that social capital is supportive for SD (Rudd, 
2000; Bridger and Luloff, 2001; Tsai, 2008; Ostrom, 2008; Jones et al., 
2011), having shown that it can be instrumental to address collective 
action problems (Ostrom, 1998; Rothstein, 2005), combat injustices 
and conditions of poverty and vulnerability (Woolcock and Narayan, 
2000), and benefit from resources (Bebbington, 1999; Diaz et  al., 
2002), and to foster mitigation and adaptation (Adger, 2003; Wolf 
et al., 2010). 
4�3�6 Technology
Technology has been a central element of human, social, and economic 
development since ancient times (Jonas, 1985; Mokyr, 1992). It can be 
a means to achieving equitable SD, by enabling economic and social 
development while using environmental resources more efficiently. 
The development and deployment of the overwhelming majority of 
technologies is mediated by markets, responding to effective demand 
of purchasers (Baumol, 2002), and carried out by private firms, where 
the pre-requisites of technological capacity and investment resources 
tend to be found. However, this process does not necessarily address 
the basic needs of those members of society with insufficient market 
demand to influence the decisions of innovators and investors, nor 
does it provide an incentive to reduce externalized costs, such as the 
costs of GHG pollution (Jaffe et al., 2005).
Fundamental objectives of equity and SD are still unmet. For example, 
the basic energy and nutritional needs of large parts of the world’s 
population remain unfulfilled. An estimated 1.3 billion people lacked 
access to electricity in 2010 and about 3 billion people worldwide 
relied on highly polluting and unhealthy traditional solid fuels for 
household cooking and heating (Pachauri et al., 2012; IEA, 2012b) (see 
Section 14.3.2.1). Similarly, the Food and Agricultural Organization 
(FAO) indicates that almost 870 million people (mostly in developing 
countries) were chronically undernourished in 2010 – 12 (FAO, 2012). 
Achieving the objectives of equitable SD demands the fulfilment of 
such basic and other developmental needs. The challenge is therefore 
to design, implement, and provide support for technology innovation 
and diffusion processes that respond to social and environmental 
goals, which at present do not receive adequate incentives through 
conventional markets.
Scholars of technological change have, in recent years, begun to 
highlight the ‘systemic’ nature of innovation processes as well as the 
fundamental importance of social and technical interactions in shap-
ing technological change (see Section 4.5.2.2). Accordingly, as a first 
step toward understanding how innovation could help meet social 
and environmental goals, a systematic assessment of the adequacy 
and performance of the relevant innovation systems would be help-
ful, including an examination of the scale of innovation investments, 
the allocation among various objectives and options, the efficiency by 
which investments yield outputs, and how effectively the outputs are 
utilized for meeting the diffusion objectives (Sagar and Holdren, 2002; 
Sanwal, 2011; Aitken, 2012). For example, many reports and analy-
ses have suggested that investments in innovation for public goods 
such as clean energy and energy access are not commensurate with 
the nature and scale of these challenges (Nemet and Kammen, 2007; 
AEIC, 2010; Bazilian et al., 2010). Innovation in and diffusion of new 
technologies also require skills and knowledge from both developers 
and users, as well as different combinations of enabling policies, insti-
tutions, markets, social capital, and financial means depending on the 
type of technology and the application being considered (Bretschger, 
2005; Dinica, 2009; Blalock and Gertler, 2009; Rao and Kishore, 2010; 
Weyant, 2011; Jänicke, 2012). Appropriately harnessing these kinds of 
capabilities and processes themselves may require novel mechanisms 
and institutional forms (Bonvillian and Weiss, 2009; Sagar et al., 2009).
At the same time, the role of public policy in creating demand for tech-
nologies that have a public goods nature cannot be overstated (see 
also Section 3.11), although these policies need to be designed care-
fully to be effective. In the case of renewables, for example, it has been 
shown that intermittent policy subsidies, governments’ changing R&D 
support, misalignments between policy levels, sectors, and institutions 
can greatly impede the diffusion of these technologies (Negro et al., 
2012). Similarly, in agriculture, while there are many intersections 
between mitigation and SD through options such as ‘sustainable agri-
culture’, the potential for leveraging these synergies is contingent on 
appropriate and effective policies (Smith et al., 2007) — see also Sec-
tions 4.6.1 and 11.10.
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Sometimes there may be a clear alignment between achieving equi-
table SD benefits and meeting climate goals such as the provision 
of clean energy to the rural poor. But in meeting multiple objectives, 
potential for conflicts and tradeoffs can also arise. For example, our 
likely continued reliance on fossil fuels (IEA 2012b) underlies the cur-
rent exploration of new or well-established GHG mitigation options, 
such as biofuels or nuclear power, and other approaches like carbon 
dioxide capture and storage (CCS) and geo-engineering, including 
solar radiation management techniques, to avoid a dangerous increase 
of the Earth’s temperature (Crutzen, 2006; Rasch et  al., 2008; IPCC, 
2012b). While such technological options may help mitigate global 
warming, they also pose potential adverse environmental and social 
risks, and thus give rise to concerns about their regulation and gov-
ernance (Mitchell, 2008; Pimentel et  al., 2009; de Paula Gomes and 
Muylaert de Araujo, 2011; Shrader-Frechette, 2011; Jackson, 2011b; 
Scheidel and Sorman, 2012; Scott, 2013; Diaz-Maurin and Giampietro, 
2013) — see Sections 7.9 and 11.7.
The public perception and acceptability of technologies is country 
and context-specific, mediated by age, gender, knowledge, attitudes 
towards environmental risks and climate change, and policy procedures 
(Shackley et al., 2005; Pidgeon et al., 2008; Wallquist et al., 2010; Cor-
ner et al., 2011; Poumadere et al., 2011; Visschers and Siegrist, 2012) 
and therefore resolution of these kinds of tradeoffs and conflicts may 
not be easy. Yet the tradeoffs and synergies between the three dimen-
sions of SD, as well as the impacts on socio-ecological systems across 
geographical scales will need to be systematically considered, which 
in turn will require the acknowledgement of multiple stakeholder per-
spectives. Assessment of energy technology options, for example, will 
need to include impact on landscapes’ ecological and social dimen-
sions — accounting for multiple values — and on energy distribution 
and access (Wolsink, 2007; Zografos and Martinez-Alier, 2009). 
There are also some crosscutting issues, such as regimes for technology 
transfer (TT) and intellectual property (IP) that are particularly relevant 
to international cooperation in meeting the global challenge of pursu-
ing equitable SD and mitigation, although progress under the UNFCCC 
has been incomplete. For example, TT under the CDM has been limited 
to selective conditions and mainly to a few countries (Dechezleprêtre 
et al., 2009; Seres et al., 2009; Wang, 2010). IP rights and patent laws 
have been shown as promoting innovation in some countries (Khan, 
2005), although recent work suggests a more nuanced picture (Moser, 
2013; Hudson and Minea, 2013). In fact, IP protection has also been 
regarded as a precondition for technology transfer but, again, reality 
has proven more complex (United Nations Environment Programme 
et al., 2010). A recent study shows that in the wind sector, there are 
‘patent thickets’, which might restrain the extent and scope of dissemi-
nation of wind power technologies (Wang et al., 2013). In part, there 
are such divergent views on this issue since IP and TT also touch upon 
economic competitiveness (Ockwell et al., 2010). As noted earlier, per-
spectives are shaped by perceived national circumstances, capabilities, 
and needs, yet these issues do need to be resolved — in fact, there may 
be no single approach that will meet all needs. Different IP regimes, 
for example, are required to meet development objectives at different 
stages of development (Correa, 2011). The importance of this issue and 
the lack of consensus provide impetus for further analysis of the evi-
dence and for exploration to develop IP and TT regimes that further 
international cooperation to meet climate, SD, and equity objectives.
4�3�7 Natural resources
Countries’ level of endowment with renewable and / or non-renew-
able resources influences but does not determine their development 
paths. The location, types, quantities, long-term availability and the 
rates of exploitation of non-renewable resources, including fossil fuels 
and minerals, and renewable resources such as fertile land, forests, 
or freshwater affect national economies (e. g., in terms of GDP, trade 
balance, and rent potential), agricultural and industrial production 
systems, the potential for civil conflict, and countries’ role in global 
geo-political and trade systems (Krausmann et  al., 2009; Muradian 
et al., 2012; Collier and Goderis, 2012). Economies can evolve to reflect 
changes in economic trends, in policies or in consumption patterns, 
both nationally and internationally. In the context of climate change, 
natural resource endowments affect the level and profile of GHG emis-
sions, the relative cost of mitigation, and the level of political commit-
ment to climate action. 
Resource-rich countries characterized by governance problems, includ-
ing rent-seeking behaviour and weak judiciary and political institu-
tions, have more limited capacity to distribute resource extraction rents 
and increase incomes (Mehlum et  al., 2006; Pendergast et  al., 2011; 
Bjorvatn et al., 2012). Some have negative genuine savings, i. e., they 
do not fully reinvest their resource rents in foreign assets or produc-
tive capital, which in turn impoverishes present and future generations 
and undermines both natural capital and human development pros-
pects (Mehlum et al., 2006; van der Ploeg, 2011). Furthermore, these 
countries also face risks associated with an over-specialization on agri-
culture and resource-based exports that can undermine other produc-
tive sectors, e. g., through increases in exchange rates and a reliance 
on importing countries economic growth trajectories (Muradian et al., 
2012). In some countries, an increase in primary commodity exports 
can lead to the rise of socio-environmental conflicts due to the increas-
ing exploitation of land, mineral, and other resources (Martinez-Alier 
et al., 2010; Mitchell and Thies, 2012; Muradian et al., 2012). 
Scholars have not reached definitive conclusions on the inter-relation-
ships between resource endowment and development paths, including 
impacts on social welfare and conflict, and prospects for SD. Recent 
reviews, for example, note the need to continue investigating cur-
rent resource booms and busts and documenting the latter’s effect on 
national economies, policies, and social well-being, and to draw histor-
ical comparisons across countries and different institutional contexts 
(Wick and Bulte, 2009; Deacon, 2011; van der Ploeg, 2011). It is clear 
though that the state and those actors involved in natural resources 
use play a determining role in ensuring a fair distribution of any bene-
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fits and costs (Banai et al., 2011). Further, economic valuation studies 
have noted that systematic valuations of both positive and negative 
externalities can inform policymaking relating to resource exploita-
tion, in some cases showing that the exploitation of land and mineral 
resources may not always be socially optimal, i. e., the social and envi-
ronmental costs of action may be higher than the economic benefits of 
exploitation (de Groot, 2006; Thampapillai, 2011). 
These considerations are relevant for mitigation policy for at least 
three reasons. First, they raise questions about if and how countries 
invest resource rents across economic, social, and environmental sec-
tors for SD (see Section 4.3.8). Second, they suggest that nations or 
sub-national actors with abundant fossil fuel reserves have, in princi-
ple, strong economic interest in exploiting them, and thus in opposing 
the adoption of policies that constrain such exploitation. The timeli-
ness of this issue is underscored by the growing financial sector atten-
tion (although not yet academic attention) to the potential impact of 
a global carbon constraint on the fossil sector (Grantham Institute and 
CTI 2013; HSBC Global Research, 2013; Standard & Poor’s, 2013). This 
raises the issue of how to compensate resource-rich countries for for-
gone benefits if necessary to win their participation in international 
mitigation efforts (Rival, 2010; Waisman et al., 2013). It similarly raises 
the issue of compensating (or circumventing) sub-national actors who 
are politically powerful enough to impede domestic climate efforts. 
And third, they suggest that, if any given resource-rich country faces 
increased exposure to climate variability and extreme events, the for-
gone benefits of resource rents may undermine its ability to absorb 
increasing adaptation costs. In this regard, a recent analysis of the 
relationship between countries’ adoption of mitigation policies and 
their vulnerability to climate change confirms that countries that may 
suffer considerable impacts of climate change in the future, which 
include many resource-rich developing countries, do not show a strong 
commitment to either mitigation or adaptation, while countries exhib-
iting strong political commitment and action towards mitigation are 
also active in promoting adaptation policies (Tubi et al., 2012). 
4�3�8 Finance and investment
The financial system, comprising a large set of private and public insti-
tutions and actors, is the medium by which households, firms, and 
collectivities manage insurable risks and fund investments to secure 
future returns, thereby laying the foundations for future well-being. As 
such, it is a key determinant of society’s development pathway and 
thus its prospects for an SD transition.
The financial system is characterized by four structural tensions with 
the ideals of SD. First, its dominant private component (banks and 
financial markets) is focused on commercial returns and cannot spon-
taneously internalize environmental and social spillovers, even if some 
investors’ interest in ‘sustainable investment’ is growing (UNPRI, 
2012). Climate change, identified as the “greatest and widest-ranging 
market failure ever seen” (Stern and Treasury, 2007), is but one obvi-
ous example of a large societally important cost that is neglected by 
capital markets. Second, the private component of the financial system 
is also largely unattuned to distributive issues and particularly insen-
sitive to “the essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overrid-
ing priority should be given” (World Commission on Environment and 
Development, 1987), even if foreign direct investments have contrib-
uted to overall growth in emerging economies. Third, the interests of 
future generations may be neglected (although over-investment is also 
possible — see Gollier, 2013) and within a generation, there are various 
governance, organizational and sociological mechanisms contribut-
ing to short-termism (Tonello, 2006; Marginson and McAulay, 2008). 
Fourth, the recent crisis has led some to conclude that the financial 
system itself is a source of economic instability (Farmer et al., 2012), an 
issue reinforced by the recent financialization of the global economy, 
with accelerated growth of the financial sector relative to the ‘real’ 
economy, and an increasing role of the financial system in mediating 
short-term speculation as distinct from long-term investment (Epstein, 
2005; Krippner, 2005; Palley, 2007; Dore, 2008). 
These inherent problems in the financial system are sometimes com-
pounded by hurdles in the economic and institutional environment. The 
challenges are felt especially in many developing countries, which face 
several investment barriers that affect their capacity to mobilize pri-
vate sector capital toward SD objectives and climate change mitigation 
and adaptation. These barriers include the comparatively high overall 
cost of doing business; market distortionary policies such as subsidies 
for conventional fuels; absence of credit-worthy off-takers; low access 
to early-stage financing; lower public R&D spending; too few wealthy 
consumers willing to pay a premium for ‘green products’; social and 
political instability; poor market infrastructure; and weak enforce-
ment of the regulatory frameworks. Establishing better mechanisms 
for leveraging private sector finance through innovative financing can 
help (EGTT, 2008), but there are also risks in relying on the private sec-
tor as market-based finance focuses on short term lending, and private 
financing during episodes of abundant liquidity may not constitute a 
source of stable long-term climate finance (Akyüz, 2012)  – see Section 
16.4 for further discussion and references on barriers, risks, and inno-
vative mechanisms.
While some developing countries are able to mobilize domestic 
resources to finance efforts toward SD, the needs for many developing 
countries exceed their financial capacity. Consequently, their ability to 
pursue SD, and climate change mitigation and adaptation actions in 
particular, can be severely constrained by lack of finance. The interna-
tional provision of finance, alongside technology transfer, can help to 
alleviate this problem, as well as accord with principles of equity, inter-
national commitments, and arguments of effectiveness — see Sections 
4.2.2 and 4.6.2. Under international agreements, in particular Agenda 
21 and the Rio Conventions of 1992, and reaffirmed in subsequent UN 
resolutions and programs including the 2012 UN Conference on Sus-
tainable Development (United Nations, 2012a), developed countries 
have committed to provide financial resources to developing countries 
that are new and additional to conventional development assistance.
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4.4 Production, trade, consump-
tion and waste patterns
The previous section has highlighted the role of behaviours and life-
styles and the complex interaction of the values, goals, and interests 
of many actors in the political economy of SD and equity. In order to 
better understand the possibilities and difficulties to equitably sustain 
well-being in the future, this section examines the consumption of 
goods and services by households, consumption trends and disparities, 
and the relationship between consumption and GHG emissions. It also 
discusses the components and drivers of consumption, efforts to make 
consumption (and production) more sustainable, and how consump-
tion affects well-being. In order to shed light on important debates 
about equity in mitigation, this chapter also reviews approaches to 
consumption-based accounting of GHG emissions (carbon footprint-
ing) and their relationship to territorial approaches. So while subse-
quent chapters analyze GHG emissions associated with specific sec-
tors and transformation pathways, this chapter focuses on a particular 
group (consumers) and examines their emissions in an integrated way.
The possibility of a SD pathway for the world hinges on ‘decoupling’ 
(von Weizsäcker et al., 1997, 2009; Jackson, 2005b, 2009). We consider 
two types of decoupling at the global scale and in the long term: the 
decoupling of material resource consumption (including fossil carbon) 
and environmental impact (including climate change) from economic 
growth (‘dematerialization’); and the decoupling of human well-being 
from economic growth and consumption. The first type (see Sections 
4.4.1 and 4.4.3) involves an increased material efficiency and environ-
mental efficiency of production and is generally considered crucial for 
meeting SD and equity goals (UNEP, 2011); yet while some demate-
rialization has occurred, absolute levels of resource use and environ-
mental impact have continued to rise, highlighting the important dis-
tinction between relative and absolute decoupling (Krausmann et al., 
2009). This has inspired examination of the second type of decoupling 
(Jackson, 2005b, 2009; Assadourian, 2010), including the reduction of 
consumption levels in wealthier countries. We address this topic (in 
Section 4.4.4) by examining how income and income inequality affect 
dimensions of well-being. While the second type of decoupling rep-
resents a ‘stronger’ form than the first, it is also a more controversial 
goal, even though the unsustainability of excessive consumption was 
highlighted by Chapter 4 of Agenda 21 (United Nations, 1992c). 
4�4�1 Consumption patterns, inequality and 
environmental impact
4�4�1�1 Trends in resource consumption
Global levels of resource consumption and GHG emissions show 
strong historical trends, driven primarily by developments in industrial-
ized countries and emerging economies (see Sections 5.2 and 14.3). 
The global annual use (extraction) of material resources — i. e., ores 
and industrial minerals, construction materials, biomass, and fossil 
energy carriers — increased eightfold during the 20th century, reaching 
about 55 Gt in 2000, while the average resource use per capita (the 
metabolic rate) doubled, reaching 8.5 – 9.2 tonnes per capita per year 
in 2005 (Krausmann et al., 2009; UNEP, 2011). The value of the global 
consumption of goods and services (the global GDP) has increased 
sixfold since 1960 while consumption expenditures per capita have 
almost tripled (Assadourian, 2010). Consumption-based GHG emis-
sions (‘carbon footprints’ — see Section 4.4.2.2) increased between 
1990 and 2009 in the world’s major economies, except the Russian 
Federation, ranging from 0.1 – 0.2 % per year in the EU27, to 4.8 – 6.0 % 
per year in China (Peters et al., 2012) (see Section 5.2.1). 
Global resource consumption has risen slower than GDP, especially 
after around 1970, indicating some decoupling of economic devel-
opment and resource use, and signifying an aggregate increase in 
resource productivity of about 1 – 2 % annually (Krausmann et  al., 
2009; UNEP, 2011). While dematerialization of economic activity has 
been most noticeable in the industrialized countries, metabolic rates 
across countries remain highly unequal, varying by a factor of 10 or 
more due largely to differences in level of development, although there 
is also significant cross-country variation in the relation between GDP 
and resource use (Krausmann et al., 2009; UNEP, 2011). 
4�4�1�2 Consumerism and unequal consumption levels
The spread of material consumption with rising incomes is one of the 
‘mega-drivers’ of global resource use and environmental degradation 
(Assadourian, 2010). While for the world’s many poor people, con-
sumption is driven mainly by the need to satisfy basic human needs, it 
is increasingly common across cultures that people seek meaning, con-
tentment and acceptance in consumption. This pattern is often referred 
to as ‘consumerism’, defined as a cultural paradigm where “the pos-
session and use of an increasing number and variety of goods and ser-
vices is the principal cultural aspiration and the surest perceived route 
to personal happiness, social status and national success” (Assadou-
rian, 2010, p. 187). 
Consumerist lifestyles in industrialized countries seem to be imitated 
by the growing elites (Pow, 2011) and middle-class populations in 
developing countries (Cleveland and Laroche, 2007; Gupta, 2011), 
exemplified by the increased demand for space cooling in emerging 
economies (Isaac and van Vuuren, 2009). Together with the unequal 
distribution of income in the world, the spread of consumerism means 
that a large share of goods and services produced are ‘luxuries’ that 
only the wealthy can afford, while the poor are unable to afford even 
basic goods and services (Khor, 2011). 
A disproportionate part of the GHG emissions arising from produc-
tion are linked to the consumption of products by a relatively small 
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portion of the world’s population, illustrated by the great variation in 
the per capita carbon footprint between countries and regions at dif-
ferent income levels (Hertwich and Peters, 2009; Davis and Caldeira, 
2010; Peters et al., 2011) (see Section 14.3.1). The carbon footprint is 
strongly correlated with consumption expenditure. Across countries, 
Hertwich and Peters (2009) found an expenditure elasticity of 0.57 for 
all GHGs: as nations become wealthier, the per capita carbon footprint 
increases by 57 % for each doubling of consumption. Within countries, 
similar relationships have been found between household expenditure 
and carbon footprint (Druckman and Jackson, 2009; Hertwich, 2011). 
Because wealthier countries meet a higher share of their final demand 
from (net) imports than do less wealthy countries, consumption-based 
emissions are more closely associated with GDP than are territorial 
emissions, the difference being the emissions embodied in trade (see 
Section 4.4.2 as well as 5.2 and 14.3).
4�4�1�3 Effect of non-income factors on per capita 
carbon footprint
Non-income factors such as geography, energy system, production 
methods, waste management (GAIA, 2012; Corsten et  al., 2013), 
household size, diet, and lifestyle also affect per capita carbon foot-
prints and other environmental impacts (Tukker et al., 2010a) so that 
the effects of increasing income varies considerably between regions 
and countries (Lenzen et  al., 2006; Hertwich, 2011; Homma et  al., 
2012), cities (Jones and Kammen, 2011) and between rural and urban 
areas (Lenzen and Peters, 2010). In this regard, the environmental 
impact of specific consumption patterns has been studied intensely in 
recent years (Druckman and Jackson, 2009; Davis and Caldeira, 2010; 
Tukker et al., 2010a; Hertwich, 2011). At the global level, Hertwich and 
Peters (2009) found that food is the consumption category with the 
greatest climate impact, accounting for nearly 20 % of GHG emissions, 
followed by housing / shelter, mobility, services, manufactured products, 
and construction (see Sections 8.2, 9.2, 10.3, 11.2, 12.2). Food and ser-
vices were a larger share in poor countries, while at high expenditure 
levels, mobility and the consumption of manufactured goods caused 
the largest GHG emissions (Hertwich and Peters, 2009). The factors 
responsible for variations in carbon footprints across households at 
different scales are further discussed in Sections 5.3, 5.5, 12.2 and 
14.3.4.
4�4�2 Consumption patterns and carbon 
accounting
4�4�2�1 Choice of GHG accounting method
New GHG accounting methods have emerged and proliferated in the 
last decade, in response to interest in 1) determining whether nations 
are reducing emissions (Bows and Barrett, 2010; Peters et  al., 2011, 
2012), 2) allocating GHG responsibility (Peters and Hertwich, 2008a; b; 
Bows and Barrett, 2010), 3) assuring the accountability of carbon mar-
kets (Stechemesser and Guenther, 2012), 4) determining the full impli-
cations of alternative energy technologies (von Blottnitz and Curran, 
2007; Martínez et al., 2009; Cherubini et al., 2009; Soimakallio et al., 
2011) and of outsourcing of industrial production (see Section 4.4.3.3) 
helping corporations become greener (Wiedmann et al., 2009), and 6) 
encouraging consumers to reduce their carbon footprints (Bolwig and 
Gibbon, 2010; Jones and Kammen, 2011). Methods differ on whether 
consumers or producers of products are responsible; whether emissions 
embedded in past or potential replacement of capital investments are 
included; and whether indirect emissions, for example, through global 
land-use change resulting from changing product prices, are included 
(Finkbeiner, 2009; Plevin et  al., 2010; Plassmann et  al., 2010). These 
methodological differences have normative implications.
Systems of GHG emissions accounting are constructed according to 
certain conventions and purposes (Davis and Caldeira, 2010). Better 
ways may be excessively expensive given the plausible importance of 
the value of better information in the decision process. Some interests 
will plead for standardized techniques based on past data because 
it favours them. Others will argue for tailored approaches that make 
their technologies or products look good. Producers favour responsibil-
ity being assigned to consumers, as do nations that are net export-
ers of industrial goods. Controversies over GHG emissions account-
ing approaches play into the broader issue of mitigation governance 
(see Section 4.4.2.4). And whether carbon markets are effective or 
not depends on good accounting and enforcement — but what will be 
enforced will depend on the accounting measures agreed upon. The 
next section discusses consumption-based GHG emissions accounting. 
4�4�2�2 Carbon footprinting (consumption-based GHG 
emissions accounting)
Carbon (or GHG) accounting refers to the calculation of the GHG 
emissions associated with economic activities at a given scale or with 
respect to a given functional unit — including products, households, 
firms, cities, and nations (Peters, 2010; Pandey et  al., 2011). GHG 
accounting has traditionally focused on emission sources, but recent 
years have seen a growing interest in analyzing the drivers of emis-
sions by calculating the GHG emissions that occur along the supply 
chain of different functional units such as those just mentioned (Peters, 
2010). The result of this consumption-based emissions accounting is 
often referred to as ‘carbon footprint’ even if it involves other GHGs 
along with CO2. Carbon footprinting starts from the premise that the 
GHG emissions associated with economic activity are generated at 
least partly as a result of people’s attempts to satisfy certain functional 
needs and desires (Lenzen et al., 2007; Druckman and Jackson, 2009; 
Bows and Barrett, 2010). These needs and desires carry the consumer 
demand for goods and services, and thereby the production processes 
that consume resources and energy and release pollutants. Emission 
drivers are not limited to individuals’ consumption behaviour, however, 
but include also the wider contexts of consumption such as transport 
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infrastructure, production and waste systems, and energy systems (see 
below and Sections 7.3, 8.2, 9.2, 10.3, 11.2, 12.2). 
There is no single accepted carbon footprinting methodology (Pandey 
et al., 2011), nor is there one widely accepted definition of carbon foot-
print. Peters (2010) proposes this definition, which allows for all possi-
ble applications across scales: “[t]he ‘carbon footprint’ of a functional 
unit is the climate impact under a specific metric that considers all rel-
evant emission sources, sinks and storage in both consumption and 
production within the specified spatial and temporal system bound-
ary” (pp. 245). The emissions associated with the functional unit (but 
physically not part of the unit) are referred to as ‘embodied carbon’, 
‘carbon flows’ or similar terms. (Annex II of this report discusses dif-
ferent carbon footprint methodologies, including Life Cycle Assessment 
(LCA) and environmentally-extended input-output (EIO) models.) Car-
bon footprints have been estimated with respect to different functional 
units at different scales. Most relevant to the analysis of consumption 
patterns and mitigation linkages are the carbon footprints of products 
and nations, discussed in turn.
4�4�2�3 Product carbon footprinting
A product carbon footprint includes all emissions generated during 
the lifecycle of a good or service — from production and distribution to 
end-use and disposal or recycling. Carbon footprinting of products (and 
firms) can enable a range of mitigation actions and can have co-ben-
efits (Sinden, 2009; Bolwig and Gibbon, 2010). Informing consumers 
about the climate impact of products through labelling or other means 
can influence purchasing decisions in a more climate-friendly direction 
and at the same time enable product differentiation (Edwards-Jones 
et al., 2009; Weber and Johnson, 2012). Carbon footprinting can also 
help companies reduce GHG emissions cost-effectively by identifying 
the various emission sources within the company and along the sup-
ply chain (Sinden, 2009; Sundarakani et  al., 2010; Lee, 2012). Those 
emissions can be reduced directly, or by purchasing offsets in carbon 
markets. There is both theoretical and empirical evidence of a positive 
relationship between a company’s environmental and financial perfor-
mance (Delmas and Nairn-Birch, 2011; Griffin et  al., 2012). The spe-
cific effect of carbon footprinting on company financial performance 
and investor valuation is not well researched, however, and the results 
are ambiguous: in the United Kingdom, Sullivan and Gouldson (2012) 
found limited investor interest in the climate change-related data pro-
vided by retailers, while a study from North America concludes that 
investors do care about companies’ GHG emission disclosures, whether 
these occur through a voluntary scheme or informal estimates (Griffin 
et al., 2012).1 (See also Section 15.3.3)
1 In the United States, increasing carbon emissions was found to positively impact 
the financial performance of firms when using accounting-based measures, 
while the impact was negative when using market-based performance measures 
(Delmas and Nairn-Birch, 2011).
There are also risks associated with product carbon footprinting. It 
can affect competitiveness and trade by increasing costs and reduce 
demand for products made abroad, including in developing countries, 
and it may violate World Trade Organization (WTO) trade rules (Bren-
ton et  al., 2009; Edwards-Jones et  al., 2009; Erickson et  al., 2012). 
A one-sided focus on GHG emissions in product development and 
consumer choice could also involve tradeoffs with other sustainabil-
ity dimensions (Finkbeiner, 2009; Laurent et  al., 2012). So there are 
reasons to adopt more broadly encompassing concepts and tools to 
assess and manage sustainability in relation to the consumption of 
goods and services.
4�4�2�4 Consumption-based and territorial approaches 
to GHG accounting
Consumption-based accounting of GHG emissions (carbon footprint-
ing) at national level differs from the production-based or territorial 
framework because of imports and exports of goods and services 
that, directly or indirectly, involve GHG emissions (Davis and Caldeira, 
2010; Peters et  al., 2011, 2012). The territorial framework allocates 
to a nation (or other jurisdiction) those emissions that are physically 
produced within its territorial boundaries. The consumption-based 
framework assigns the emissions released through the supply chain 
of goods and services consumed within a nation irrespective of their 
territorial origin. The difference in inventories calculated based on 
the two frameworks are the emissions embodied in trade (Peters and 
Hertwich, 2008b; Bows and Barrett, 2010). We emphasize that terri-
torial and consumption-based accounting of emissions as such repre-
sent pure accounting identities measuring the emissions embodied in 
goods and services that are produced or consumed, respectively, by an 
individual, firm, country, region, etc. Responsibility for these emissions 
only arises once it is assigned within a normative or legal framework, 
such as a climate agreement, specifying rights to emit or obligations to 
reduce emission based on one of these metrics. As detailed below, the 
two approaches function differently in a global versus a fragmented 
climate policy regime.
Steckel et al. (2010) show that within a global regime that internalizes 
a cost of GHG emissions, the two approaches are theoretically equiva-
lent in terms of their efficiency in inducing mitigation. For example, 
with a global cap-and-trade system with full coverage (i. e., an efficient 
global carbon market) and given initial emission allocations, coun-
tries exporting goods benefit from export revenues, with costs related 
to GHG emissions and any other negative impacts of production of 
those goods priced in, such that the choice of accounting system has 
no influence on the efficiency of production. Nor will it influence the 
welfare of countries, irrespective of being net exporters or importers of 
emissions, since costs associated with these emissions are fully inter-
nalized in product prices and will ultimately be borne by consumers. 
In practice, considerations such as transaction costs and information 
asymmetries would influence the relative effectiveness and choice of 
accounting system.
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In the case of a fragmented climate policy regime, one argument put 
in favour of a consumption-based framework is that, unlike the ter-
ritorial approach, it does not allow current emission inventories to be 
reduced by outsourcing production or relying more on imports to meet 
final demand. Hence, some authors (e. g., Peters and Hertwich, 2008b; 
Bows and Barrett, 2010) argue that this approach gives a fairer illus-
tration of responsibility for current emissions. Carbon footprinting also 
increases the range of mitigation options by identifying the distribu-
tion of GHG emissions among different activities, final uses, locations, 
household types, etc. This enables a better targeting of policies and 
voluntary actions (Bows and Barrett, 2010; Jones and Kammen, 2011). 
On the other hand, reducing emissions at the ‘consumption end’ of sup-
ply chains requires changing deeply entrenched lifestyle patterns and 
specific behaviours among many actors with diverse characteristics 
and preferences, as opposed to among the much fewer actors emitting 
GHGs at the source. It has also been pointed out that — identical to the 
accounting of production-based emissions — there is no direct one-to-
one relationship between changes in consumption-based and global 
emissions (Jakob and Marschinski, 2012). That is, if some goods or ser-
vices were not consumed in a given country, global emissions would 
not necessarily decrease by the same amount of emissions generated 
for their production, as this country’s trade partners would adjust their 
consumption — as well as production — patterns in response to price 
changes resulting from its changed demand profile. This has been shown 
for China (Peters et al., 2007) and India (Dietzenbacher and Mukhopad-
hyay, 2007): while these countries are large net exporters of embodied 
carbon, territorial emissions would remain roughly constant or even 
increase if they were to withdraw from international trade (and produce 
their entire current consumption domestically instead). Hence, without 
international trade, consumption-based emissions of these countries’ 
trade partners would likely be reduced, but not global emissions. 
It is for this reason that Jakob and Marschinski (2012) argue that a 
more detailed understanding of the underlying determinants of emis-
sions is needed than what is currently provided by either territorial or 
consumption-based accounts, in order to guide policies that will effec-
tively reduce global emissions in a fragmented climate policy regime. 
In particular, a better understanding of system interrelationships in a 
global economy is required in order to be able to attribute how, e. g., 
policy choices in one region affect global emissions by transmission via 
world market prices and associated changes in production and con-
sumption patterns in other regions. Furthermore, as market dynamics 
and resource use are driven by both demand and supply, it is conceiv-
able to rely on climate policies that target the consumption as well as 
the production side of emissions, as is done in some other policy areas
4�4�3 Sustainable consumption and 
 production — SCP
The concepts of ‘sustainable consumption’ and ‘sustainable produc-
tion’ represent, respectively, demand- and supply-side perspectives on 
sustainability. The efforts by producers to improve the environmental or 
social impact of a product are futile if consumers do not buy the good or 
service (Moisander et al., 2010). Conversely, sustainable consumption 
behaviour depends on the availability and affordability of such products 
in the marketplace. The idea of sustainable consumption and produc-
tion (SCP) was first placed high on the international policy agenda at 
the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development and was 
made part of Agenda 21. In 2003, a 10-year Framework of Programmes 
on SCP was initiated, which was formalized in a document adopted by 
the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development (United Nations, 
2012b, p. 2). A great variety of public and private SCP policies and ini-
tiatives have developed alongside the UN-led initiatives (see Section 
10.11.3), as has a large body of research that we report on below. 
4�4�3�1 Sustainable consumption and lifestyle
A rich research literature on sustainable consumption has developed 
over the past decade, including several special issues of international 
journals (Tukker et al., 2010b; Le Blanc, 2010; Kilbourne, 2010; Black, 
2010; Schrader and Thøgersen, 2011). Several books, such as Prosper-
ity without Growth (Jackson, 2009), discuss the unsustainable nature 
of current lifestyles, development trajectories, and economic systems, 
and how these could be changed in more sustainable directions. Sev-
eral definitions of sustainable consumption have been proposed within 
policy, business, and academia (Pogutz and Micale, 2011). At a meet-
ing in Oslo in 2005, a group of scientists agreed on the following broad 
and integrating conceptualization of sustainable consumption:
The future course of the world depends on humanity’s ability 
to provide a high quality of life for a prospective nine billion 
people without exhausting the Earth’s resources or irreparably 
damaging its natural systems … In this context, sustainable 
consumption focuses on formulating strategies that foster the 
highest quality of life, the efficient use of natural resources, 
and the effective satisfaction of human needs while simulta-
neously promoting equitable social development, economic 
competitiveness, and technological innovation. 
(Tukker et al., 2006) 
This perspective encompasses both demand-side and production 
issues, and addresses all three pillars of SD (social, economic, and envi-
ronmental) as well as equity and well-being, illustrating the complexity 
of sustainable consumption and its connections to other issues. 
Research has demonstrated that consumption practices and patterns 
are influenced by a range of economic, informational, psychologi-
cal, sociological, and cultural factors, operating at different levels or 
spheres in society — including the individual, the family, the local-
ity, the market, and the work place (Thøgersen, 2010). Furthermore, 
consumers’ preferences are often constructed in the situation (rather 
than pre-existing) and their decisions are highly contextual (Weber 
and Johnson, 2009) and often inconsistent with values, attitudes, and 
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perceptions of themselves as responsible and green consumers and 
citizens (Barr, 2006; de Barcellos et al., 2011) (see below, as well as 
Sections 2.6.6 and 3.10).
The sustainable consumption of goods and services can be viewed in 
the broader context of lifestyle and everyday life. Conversely, sustain-
able consumption practices are bound up with perceptions of identity, 
ideas of good life, and so on, and considered alongside other concerns 
such as affordability and health. Ethical consumption choices are also 
negotiated among family members with divergent priorities and inter-
pretations of sustainability. Choosing a simpler lifestyle (‘voluntary 
simplifying’) seems to be related to environmental concern (Shaw and 
Newholm, 2002; Huneke, 2005), but frugality, as a more general trait 
or disposition, is not (Lastovicka et al., 1999; Pepper et al., 2009).
Other research draws attention to the constraints placed on consump-
tion and lifestyle choices by factors beyond the influence of the indi-
vidual, family or community, which tends to lock consumption into 
unsustainable patterns by reducing ‘green agency’ at the micro level 
(Thøgersen, 2005; Pogutz and Micale, 2011). These structural issues 
include product availability, cultural norms and beliefs, and working 
conditions that favour a ‘work-and-spend’ lifestyle (Sanne, 2002). 
Brulle and Young (2007) found that the growth in personal consump-
tion in the United States during the 20th century is partly explained by 
the increase in advertising. According to this study, the effect of adver-
tising on spending is concentrated on luxury goods (household appli-
ances and supplies and automobiles) while it is nonexistent in the field 
of basic necessities (food and clothes), while Druckman and Jackson 
(2010) found that in the UK, expenditures on food and clothes clearly 
exceeded ‘necessary’ levels. 
The strength and pervasiveness of political economy factors such as 
those just mentioned, and the inadequate attention to them by policy, 
is an important cause of the lack of real progress towards more sus-
tainable consumption patterns (Thøgersen, 2005; Tukker et al., 2006; 
Le Blanc, 2010). Furthermore, the unsustainable lifestyles in industrial-
ized countries are being replicated by the growing elites (Pow, 2011) 
and middle-class populations in developing countries (Cleveland and 
Laroche, 2007; Gupta, 2011). Finally, most Sustainable Consumption 
(SC) studies are done in a consumer culture context, which limits dis-
cussion of instances where sustainable consumption has pre-empted 
consumerism. 
4�4�3�2 Consumer sustainability attitudes and the 
relation to behaviour
Despite the overwhelming impact of structural factors on consumer 
practices, choices and behaviour, it is widely agreed that the achieve-
ment of more sustainable consumption patterns also depends on how 
consumers value environmental quality and other dimensions of sus-
tainability (Jackson, 2005a; Thøgersen, 2005; Bamberg and Möser, 
2007). It also depends on whether people believe that their consump-
tion practices make a difference to sustainability (Frantz and Mayer, 
2009; Hanss and Böhm, 2010), which in turn is influenced by their 
value priorities and how much they trust the environmental informa-
tion provided to them by scientists, companies, and public authorities 
(Kellstedt et al., 2008). The motivational roots of sustainable consumer 
choices seem to be substantially the same, although not equally salient 
in different national and cultural contexts (Thøgersen, 2009; Thøgersen 
and Zhou, 2012).
In a survey of European attitudes towards sustainable consumption 
and production (Gallup Organisation, 2008a), 84 % of EU citizens said 
that the product’s impact on the environment is “very important” or 
“rather important” when making purchasing decisions. This attitude is 
rarely reflected in behaviour, however. There is plenty of evidence dem-
onstrating the presence of an ‘attitude-behaviour’ or ‘values-action’ 
gap whereby consumers expressing ‘green’ attitudes fail to adopt sus-
tainable consumption patterns and lifestyles (Barr, 2006; Young et al., 
2010; de Barcellos et al., 2011). To a large measure, this gap can be 
attributed to many other goals and concerns competing for the per-
son’s limited attention (Weber and Johnson, 2009). This observation is 
reflected in the substantial difference in the level of environmental con-
cern that Europeans express in opinion polls when the issue is treated 
in isolation, and when the environment is assessed in the context of 
other important societal issues. For example, in 2008, 64 % of Euro-
peans said protecting the environment was “very important” to them 
personally when the issue was presented in isolation (Gallup Organisa-
tion, 2008b) while only 4 % pointed at environmental pollution as one 
of the two most important issues facing their country at the moment 
(Gallup Organisation, 2008a). When there are many important issues 
competing for the person’s limited attention and resources, those that 
appear most pressing in everyday life are likely to prevail. 
The likelihood that a person will act on his or her environmental con-
cern is further diminished by factors affecting everyday decisions and 
behaviour, including the structural factors mentioned above, but also 
more specific factors such as habit, high transactions costs (i. e., time 
for information search and processing and product search), availability, 
affordability, and the influence of non-green criteria such as quality, 
size, brand, and discounts (Young et al., 2010). Some of these factors 
vary across different product categories and within sectors (McDonald 
et al., 2009). The impact of all of these impeding factors is substantial, 
calling into question the capacity of ‘the green consumer’ to effectively 
advance sustainable consumption and production (Csutora, 2012) and, 
more generally, the individualistic view of the consumer as a powerful 
market actor (Moisander et al., 2010).
Third-party eco-labels and declarations have proven to be an effective 
tool to transform consumer sustainability attitudes into behaviour in 
many cases (Thøgersen, 2002). One of the reasons is that a trusted 
label can function as a choice heuristic in the decision situation, allow-
ing the experienced consumer to make sustainable choices in a fast 
and frugal way (see Section 2.6.5 and Thøgersen et al., 2012). Label-
ing products with their carbon footprint may help to create new goals 
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(e. g., to reduce CO2 emissions) and to attract and keep attention on 
those goals, in the competition between goals (Weber and Johnson, 
2012). In Europe, 72 % of EU citizens thought that carbon labelling 
should be mandatory (Gallup Organisation, 2008a). In Australia, Van-
clay et al. (2010) found a strong purchasing response of 20 % when 
a green-labelled product (indicating relatively low lifecycle CO2 emis-
sions) was also the cheapest, and a much weaker response when 
green-labelled products were not the cheapest. Hence, consumers, at 
least in developed countries, show interest in product carbon footprint 
information and many consumers would prefer carbon-labelled prod-
ucts and firms over others, other things being equal (Bolwig and Gib-
bon, 2010). Yet the impeding factors and the related ‘attitude-behav-
iour’ gap limit how far one can get towards sustainable consumption 
with labelling and other information-based means alone.
Research on these topics in the developing world is lacking. Consid-
ering the notion of a hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1970; Chai and 
Moneta, 2012) and the challenges facing consumers in developing 
countries, carbon footprints and other environmental declarations 
might be seen as a luxury concern that only developed countries can 
afford. Countering this view, Kvaløy et  al. (2012) find environmental 
concern in developing countries at the same level as in developed 
countries. Furthermore, eco-labelled products increasingly appear at 
retail level in developing countries (Roitner-Schobesberger et al., 2008; 
Thøgersen and Zhou, 2012). 
4�4�3�3 Sustainable production
Research and initiatives on sustainable production have been con-
cerned with increasing the resource efficiency of, and reducing the pol-
lution and waste from, the production of goods and services through 
technological innovations in process and product design at the plant 
and product levels, and, more lately, through system-wide innovations 
across value chains or production networks (Pogutz and Micale, 2011). 
Policies that incentivize certain product choices have also been devel-
oped (see Section 10.11.3). Eco-efficiency (Schmidheiny and WBSCD, 
1992) is the main management philosophy guiding sustainable pro-
duction initiatives among companies (Pogutz and Micale, 2011) and 
is expressed as created value or provided functionality per caused 
environmental impact. Moving towards a more eco-efficient produc-
tion thus means creating the same or higher value or functionality 
while causing a lower environmental impact (relative or even abso-
lute decoupling). This involves consideration of multiple impacts across 
scales, ranging from global impacts like climate change over regional 
impacts associated with air and water pollution, to local impacts 
caused by use of land or water.
A strong increase in the eco-efficiency of production is a pre-requisite 
for developing a sustainable society (Pogutz and Micale, 2011). The 
I=PAT equation expresses the environmental impact I as a product of 
the population number P, the affluence A (value created or consumed 
per capita), and a technology factor T perceived as the reciprocal of eco-
efficiency. Considering the foreseeable growth in P and A, and the cur-
rent unsustainable level of I for many environmental impacts it is clear 
that the eco-efficiency (1 / T) must increase many times (a factor 4 to 
20)2 to ensure a sustainable production. While a prerequisite, even this 
kind of increases in eco-efficiency may not be sufficient since A and T 
are not mutually independent due to the presence of rebound — includ-
ing market effects; indeed, sometimes a reduction in T (increased eco-
efficiency) is accompanied by an even greater growth in A, thereby 
increasing the overall environmental impact I (Pogutz and Micale, 
2011). (A related concept to I=PAT is the Kaya identity, see Section 5.3)
With its focus on the provided function and its broad coverage of envi-
ronmental impacts, LCA is frequently used for evaluation of the eco-
efficiency of products or production activities (Hauschild, 2005; Finn-
veden et al., 2009) (see Annex II.4.2). LCA has been standardized by 
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO 14040 and ISO 
14044) and is a key methodology underlying standards for eco-label-
ling and environmental product declarations. LCA is also the analytical 
tool underlying DFE (design for environment) methods (Bhander et al., 
2003; Hauschild et al., 2004). 
With the globalization and outsourcing of industrial production, ana-
lyzing the entire product lifecycle (or product chain) — from resource 
extraction to end-of-life — gains increased relevance when optimizing 
the energy and material efficiency of production. A lifecycle approach 
will reveal the potential problem shifting that is inherent in outsourc-
ing and that may lead to increased overall resource consumption and 
GHG emissions of the product over its lifecycle in spite of reduced 
impacts of the mother company (Shui and Harriss, 2006; Li and Hewitt, 
2008; Herrmann and Hauschild, 2009). This is why a lifecycle perspec-
tive is applied when calculating the carbon footprint. Indeed, a life-
cycle-based assessment is generally needed to achieve resource and 
emissions optimization across the product chain. The use stage can be 
especially important for products that use electricity or fuels to function 
(Wenzel et al., 1997; Samaras and Meisterling, 2008; Yung et al., 2011; 
Sharma et al., 2011). Improvement potentials along product chains can 
be large, in particular when companies shift from selling only products 
to delivering product-service systems, often increasing the number of 
uses of the individual product (Manzini and Vezzoli, 2003). Exchange 
of flows of waste materials or energy can also contribute to increas-
ing eco-efficiency. Under the heading of ‘industrial symbiosis’, such 
mutually beneficial relationships between independent industries have 
emerged at multiple locations, generally leading to savings of energy 
and sometimes also materials and resources (Chertow and Lombardi, 
2005; Chertow, 2007; Sokka et al., 2011) (See Section 10.5).
While the broad coverage of environmental impacts supported by 
LCA is required to avoid unnoticed problem shifting between impacts, 
a narrower focus on climate change mitigation in relation to produc-
2 Factor 4 to factor 20 increases can be calculated depending on the expected 
increases in P and A and the needed reduction in I (von Weizsäcker et al., 1997; 
Schmidt-Bleek, 2008).
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tion would be supported by considering energy efficiency, which can 
be addressed at different levels: the individual process, the production 
facility, the product chain, and the industrial system (industrial symbio-
sis). At the process level, the operation of the individual process and 
consideration of the use-stage energy efficiency in the design of the 
machine tools and production equipment can be addressed (see Sec-
tion 10.4). Improvements in energy efficiency in manufacturing have 
focused on both the design and operation of a variety of processes 
(Gutowski et al., 2009; Duflou et al., 2010; Herrmann et al., 2011; Kara 
and Li, 2011), finding improvement potentials at the individual pro-
cess level of up to 70 % (Duflou et al., 2012), and at the plant level 
by re-using e. g., waste heat from one process for heating in another 
(Hayakawa et al., 1999). Exergy analysis and energy pinch analysis can 
be used to identify potentials for reutilization of energy flows in other 
processes (Creyts and Carey, 1999; Bejan, 2002). 
Research on the social dimensions of production systems have 
addressed such issues as worker conditions (Riisgaard, 2009), farm 
income (Bolwig et al., 2009), small producer inclusion into markets and 
value chains (Bolwig et  al., 2010; Mitchell and Coles, 2011) and the 
role of standards in fostering sustainability (Gibbon et al., 2010; Bol-
wig et al., 2013). Recently, the LCA methodology has been elaborated 
to include assessment of social impacts such as labour rights (Dreyer 
et al., 2010), in order to support the assessment of problem shifting 
and tradeoffs between environmental and social dimensions (Haus-
child et al., 2008).
4�4�4 Relationship between consumption and 
well-being
As noted earlier, global material resource consumption continues to 
increase despite substantial gains in resource productivity or eco-effi-
ciency, causing further increases in GHG emissions and overall envi-
ronmental degradation. In this light it is relevant to discuss whether 
human well-being or happiness can be decoupled from consumption 
or growth (Ahuvia and Friedman, 1998; Jackson, 2005b; Tukker et al., 
2006). We do this here by examining the relationship between dif-
ferent dimensions of well-being and income (and income inequality) 
across populations and over time.
Happiness is an ambiguous concept that is often used as a catchword 
for subjective well-being (SWB). SWB is multidimensional and includes 
both cognitive and affective components (Kahneman et al., 2003). Cog-
nitive well-being refers to the evaluative judgments individuals make 
when they think about their life and is what is reported in life satisfac-
tion or ladder-of-life data, whereas affective or emotional well-being 
refers to the emotional quality of an individual’s everyday experience 
as captured by surveys about the intensity and prevalence of feelings 
along the day (Kahneman and Deaton, 2010). Emotional well-being 
has been defined as “the frequency and intensity of experiences of joy, 
fascination, anxiety, sadness, anger, and affection that makes one’s 
life pleasant or unpleasant” (Kahneman and Deaton, 2010, p. 16489). 
Camfield and Skevington (2008) examine the relationship between 
SWB and quality of life (QoL) as used in the literature. They find that 
SWB and QoL are virtually synonymous; that they both contain a sub-
stantial element of life satisfaction, and that health and income are key 
determinants of SWB or QoL, while low income and high inequality are 
both associated with poor health and high morbidity.
The “Easterlin paradox” refers to an emerging body of literature sug-
gesting that while there is little or no relationship between SWB and 
the aggregate income of countries or long-term GDP growth, within 
countries people with more income are happier (Easterlin, 1973, 1995). 
Absolute income is, it is argued, only important for happiness when 
income is very low, while relative income (or income equality) is impor-
tant for happiness at a wide range of income levels (Layard, 2005; 
Clark et al., 2008). These insights have been used to question whether 
economic growth should be a primary goal of government policy (for 
rich countries), instead of, for example, focusing on reducing inequal-
ity within countries and globally, and on maximizing subjective well-
being. For instance, Assadourian (2010) argues against consumerism 
on the grounds that increased material wealth above a certain thresh-
old does not contribute to subjective well-being.
The Easterlin paradox has been contested in comparisons across coun-
tries (Deaton, 2008) and over time (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008; 
Sacks et al., 2010), on the basis of the World Gallup survey of well-
being. These works establish a clear linear relationship between aver-
age levels of ladder-of-life satisfaction and the logarithm of GDP per 
capita across countries, and find no satiation threshold beyond which 
affluence no longer enhances subjective well-being. Their time series 
analysis also suggests that economic growth is on average associated 
with rising happiness over time. On this basis they picture a strong 
role for absolute income and less for relative income comparisons in 
determining happiness.
These results contrast with studies of emotional well-being, which 
generally find a weak relationship between income and well-being 
at higher income levels. In the United States, for example, Kahneman 
and Deaton (2010) find a clear satiation effect: beyond around USD2010 
75,000 annual household income (just above the mean United States 
household income) “further increases in income no longer improve indi-
viduals’ emotional well-being (including aspects such as spending time 
with people they like, avoiding pain and disease, and enjoying leisure)” 
(p. 16492).3 But even for life satisfaction, there is contrasting evidence. 
In particular, Deaton (2008) finds much variation of SWB between coun-
tries at the same level of development, and Sacks et al. (2010) finds the 
long term positive relationship between income and life satisfaction to 
be weakly significant and sensitive to the sample of countries (see also 
Graham, 2009; Easterlin et  al., 2010; Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2010). 
An important phenomenon is that all components of SWB, in various 
degrees, adapt to most changes in objective conditions of life, except a 
3 This result is based on cross-sectional data and do not refer to the effects of a 
change in a person’s income.
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few things, such as physical pain (Kahneman et al., 2003; Layard, 2005; 
Clark et al., 2008; Graham, 2009; Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2010). 
The great variability of SWB data across individuals and countries and 
the adaptation phenomenon suggest that these data do not provide 
indices of well-being that are comparable across individuals and over 
time. Respondents have different standards when they answer sat-
isfaction questions at different times or in different circumstances. 
Therefore, the weakness of the observed link between growth and 
SWB is not only debated, but it is quite compatible with a strong and 
firm desire in the population for ever-growing material consumption 
(Fleurbaey, 2009). Decoupling growth and well-being may be more 
complicated than suggested by raw SWB indicators.
Decoupling individual well-being from consumption may be fraught 
with controversies, but decoupling social welfare from average con-
sumption might be possible via inequality reduction. It has been found 
that inequality in society has a marked negative effect on average SWB. 
For example, Oishi et al. (2011) found that over a 37-year period, Amer-
icans were less happy on average during years with greater income 
inequality. This was explained by the fact that lower-income respon-
dents “trusted other people less and perceived other people to be less 
fair in the years with more national income inequality” (Oishi et  al., 
2011, p. 1095). The potential decoupling of social welfare from average 
consumption is even more obvious if social welfare is defined in a way 
that gives priority to those who are less well-off (Atkinson, 1970). 
4.5 Development pathways
Sustainable development provides a framework for the evaluation 
of climate policies. This is particularly useful in view of the fact that 
a given concentration pathway or climate objective can typically be 
achieved through various policies and development pathways inducing 
different impacts on the economy, the society, and other aspects of the 
environment. Integrated models provide valuable tools for the analysis 
of pathways, though most models suffer from limitations analyzed in 
this section.
4�5�1 Definition and examples
Though widely used in the literature, the concept of development 
pathway has rarely been defined.4 According to AR4, a development 
path is “an evolution based on an array of technological, economic, 
social, institutional, cultural, and biophysical characteristics that deter-
mine the interactions between human and natural systems, including 
consumption and production patterns in all countries, over time at a 
4 Development path and development pathway are synonymous. 
particular scale” (WGIII, AR4, Glossary, p. 813). AR4 also indicates that 
“alternative development paths refer to different possible trajectories 
of development, the continuation of current trends being just one of 
the many paths”. Though AR4 defines development pathways as 
global, the concept has also been used at regional (e. g., Li and Zhang, 
2008), national (e. g.,Poteete, 2009) and subnational scales (e. g. Dusyk 
et al., 2009) at provincial scale and (Yigitcanlar and Velibeyoglu, 2008) 
at city scale. In the present report, a development pathway character-
izes all the interactions between human and natural systems in a par-
ticular territory, regardless of scale.
The concept of development pathway is holistic. It is broader than the 
development trajectory of a particular sector, or of a particular group 
of people within a society. Thus, a wide range of economic, social, and 
environmental indicators are necessary to describe a development 
pathway, not all of which may be amenable to quantitative represen-
tation. As defined by AR4, however, a “pathway” is not a random col-
lection of indicators. It has an internal narrative and causal consistency 
that can be captured by the determinants of the interactions between 
human and natural systems. The underlying assumption is that the 
observed development trajectory — as recorded by various economic, 
social, and environmental indicators — can be explained by identifiable 
drivers. This roots the concept of development pathway in the (domi-
nant) intellectual tradition according to which history has some degree 
of intelligibility (while another tradition holds that history is a chaotic 
set of events that is essentially not intelligible (Schopenhauer, 1819). 
The literature on development pathways has two main branches. A 
‘backward-looking’ body of work describes past and present develop-
ment trajectories for given territories and explores their determinants. 
For example, most of the growth literature as well as a large part of 
the (macro) development literature fall into this category.5 This body 
of work is discussed in Section 4.3 as well as in several other chapters. 
In particular, Section 5.3.1 reviews the determinants of GHG emissions, 
Section 12.2 reviews past trajectories of human settlements, and Sec-
tion 14.3 discusses past trajectories of development at regional scale. 
In addition, ‘forward-looking’ studies construct plausible development 
pathways for the future and examine the ways by which development 
might be steered towards one pathway or another. Box 4.3 briefly 
reviews the main forward-looking development pathways published 
since AR4. Most of Chapter 6 is devoted to forward-looking studies.
5 This literature can itself be divided in two main groups: papers aimed at identify-
ing individual mechanisms that drive development trajectories, and papers aimed 
at identifying broad patterns of development. One example of the former is the 
literature on the relationships between GDP and emissions, discussed in Chapter 
5, and in Section 4.4. One example of the latter is the so-called “investment 
development path” literature, which, following Dunning (1981), identifies stages 
of development for countries based on the direction of foreign direct investment 
flows and the competitiveness of domestic firms on international markets.
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4�5�2 Transition between pathways
Backward-looking studies reveal that past development pathways 
have differed in many respects, notably in terms of GHG emissions 
because of differences in, inter alia, fuel supply mix, location patterns, 
structure of economic activity, composition of household demand, 
etc. — even across countries with otherwise very similar economic 
characteristics. Similarly, forward-looking studies point to very con-
trasted, yet equally plausible, futures in terms of GHG emissions. Shift-
ing from a high- to a low-emissions development pathway requires 
modifying the trajectory of the system that generates (among others) 
GHG emissions. It thus requires time as well as action over multiple 
dimensions of development (location, technology, lifestyles, etc.). Yet, 
shifting from a high- to a low-emissions development pathway could 
potentially be as important for climate change mitigation as imple-
menting ‘climate’ policies (Halsnaes et al., 2011).
A central theme of the present report is to explore the conditions of a 
transition towards development pathways with lower emissions, glob-
ally (Chapter 6), sectorally (Chapters 7 – 12), and regionally (Chapters 
13 – 15). To frame these subsequent discussions, the present section 
does two things. First, it discusses the obstacles to changing course by 
introducing the key notions of path dependence and lock-ins (4.5.2.1 ). 
Second, examples and lessons from the technology transition literature 
are discussed (4.5.2.2 ). The policy and institutional aspects of building 
strategies to transition between pathways are discussed in the subse-
quent chapters.6 
4�5�2�1 Path dependence and lock-ins
Path dependence is the tendency for past decisions and events to self-
reinforce, thereby diminishing and possibly excluding the prospects for 
alternatives to emerge. Path dependence is important for analyzing 
transitions between development pathways. For example, develop-
ment of inter-city highways may make further extension of the road 
network more likely (if only for feeder roads) but also make further 
extension of rail networks less cost-effective by drawing out traffic and 
investment financing (see Section 12.5), thereby diminishing the pros-
pects for alternative transportation investments.
Chief among the mechanisms that underlie path-dependence are 
‘increasing returns’ mechanisms (Page, 2006) — in which an outcome 
in one period increases the probability of generating that same out-
come in the next period. Increasing returns is a large group that com-
6 The key point, as emphasized in AR4, is that a development pathway results from 
the interactions of decisions by multiple agents, at all levels. Thus in general public 
policies alone cannot trigger changes in pathways, and cooperation between 
governments, markets, and civil societies are necessary (Sathaye et al., 2007).
Box 4�3 | Forward-Looking Development Pathways: new developments since AR4
Forward-looking development pathways aim at illuminating 
possible futures, and at providing a sense of how these futures 
might be reached (or avoided). Forward-looking pathways can be 
constructed using various techniques, ranging from simulations 
with numerical models to qualitative scenario construction or 
group forecasting exercises (van Notten et al., 2003). 
New sets of forward-looking development pathways have 
been proposed since the AR4 review (in Sathaye et al. (2007), 
Section 12.2.1.2). At the global scale, they include, inter alia, 
the climate smart pathway (World Bank, 2010), the Tellus 
Institute scenarios (Raskin et al., 2010), and degrowth strate-
gies (Martínez-Alier et al., 2010) or the scenarios developed 
under the Integrated Assessment Modelling Consortium 
(IAMC) umbrella (Moss et al., 2010) to update the 2000 SRES 
scenarios (IPCC, 2000). Pathways have also been proposed for 
specific sectors, such as health ( Etienne and Asamoa-Baah, 
2010), agriculture (Paillard et al., 2010), biodiversity (Leadley 
et al., 2010; Pereira et al., 2010), and energy (Ayres and Ayres, 
2009).
At the national and regional levels, the emergence of the “green 
growth” agenda (OECD, 2011) has spurred the development of 
many short- to medium-term exercises (e. g. Republic of Korea, 
2009; Jaeger et al., 2011); as well as renewed discussions on SD 
trajectories (e. g. Jupesta et al., 2011). Similarly, there is growing 
research on the ways by which societies can transition towards 
a “low carbon economy”, considering not only mitigation and 
adaptation to climate change, but also the need for social, 
economic, and technological (Shukla et al., 2008) (see Section 
6.6.2 for a broader review). For instance, studies in China show 
that controlling emissions without proper policies to counteract 
the negative effects will have an adverse impact on the country’s 
economic development, reducing its per capita income and the 
living standards of both urban and rural residents (Wang Can 
et al., 2005; Wang Ke, 2008). China is developing indicators for 
low-carbon development and low-carbon society (UN (2010), with 
many citations) with specific indicators tested on selected cities 
and provinces (Fu, Jiafeng et al., 2010), providing useful data on 
challenges and gaps as well as the need for clearly defined goals 
and definitions of “low-carbon” and its SD context.
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prises, inter alia, increasing returns to scale, learning by doing, induced 
technological change, or agglomeration economies. As Shalizi and 
Lecocq (2013) note, the concept of increasing returns has a long tra-
dition in economic history, and the implications of increasing returns 
mechanisms have been systematically explored over the past three 
decades or so, notably around issues of monopolistic competition 
(Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977), international trade (Krugman, 1979), eco-
nomic geography (Fujita et al., 1999), economic growth (Romer, 1990), 
industrial organizations, or adoption of technologies (Arthur, 1989).
Yet increasing returns are neither sufficient nor necessary to generate 
path-dependence. They are not sufficient because competing increas-
ing returns can cancel out. And they are not necessary because other 
mechanisms might generate path-dependence. For example, deci-
sions that involve the use of scarce resources, such as land, labour or 
exhaustible natural resources constrain future agents’ options, either 
temporarily (for labour) or permanently (for exhaustible resources). 
Similarly, in the presence of switching costs — e. g., costs attached to 
premature replacement of long-lived capital stock — decisions made at 
one point in time can partially or totally lock-in decision makers’ sub-
sequent choices (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). Also, path-dependence 
can emerge from coordination failures in complex systems that require 
high degree of articulation between actors (Yarime, 2009). The key 
message is that it is essential to look broadly for mechanisms that may 
generate path-dependence when analyzing the determinants of path-
ways (past or anticipated) (Shalizi and Lecocq, 2013).
Lock-in is the most extreme manifestation of path dependence, when 
it becomes extremely costly or impossible to shift away from the cur-
rent pathway. Lock-ins can emerge in many domains, with examples 
ranging from end-use technology standards (e. g. the competition 
between the AZERTY and the QWERTY keyboards, or between the VHS 
and BETAMAX video standards), energy supply networks to expan-
sion pathways of regions once initial choices are made (Fujita et al., 
1999). Lock-ins are not ‘good’ or ‘bad’ per se (Shalizi and Lecocq, 
2013), but identifying risks of ‘bad’ lock-ins and taking advantage of 
possible ‘good’ lock-ins matters for policymaking, so that ex ante deci-
sions are not regretted ex post (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1995). The lit-
erature, however, underlines that lock-ins do not stem only from lack 
of information. There are also many cases in which rational agents 
might make decisions based only on part of the information available, 
because of, inter alia, differences between local and global optimum, 
time and resource constraints on the process or information symmetry 
(Foray, 1997); which points to the process of decision making (see Sec-
tion 4.3.2 on Governance and Political Economy).
4�5�2�2 Examples and lessons from the technology 
transition literature
Part of the literature on innovation (reviewed in Sections 3.11 and 
4.3.6; technological change is reviewed in Section 5.6) adopts a broad, 
systemic perspective to try to explain how new technologies emerge. 
It thus provides examples of, and insights on how transition between 
pathways can occur. In fact, changes in technologies, their causes, and 
their implications for societies have been actively studied in social sci-
ences since the late 18th century by historians, economists, and sociolo-
gists. A common starting point is the observation that “technological 
change is not a haphazard process, but proceeds in certain directions” 
(Kemp, 1994). For example, processors tend to become faster, planes 
to become lighter, etc. To characterize these regularities, scholars have 
developed the concepts of technological regime (Nelson and Win-
ter, 2002) and technological paradigms (Dosi, 1982; Dosi and Nelson, 
1994). Technological regimes refer to shared beliefs among technicians 
about what is feasible. Technological paradigms refer to the selected 
set of objects engineers are working on, and to the selected set of prob-
lems they choose to address. How technological regimes may change 
(such as with the development of information technologies) is a sub-
ject of intense research. Radical innovations (e. g., the steam engine) 
are seen as a necessary condition. But the drivers of radical innovation 
themselves are not clearly understood. In addition, once an innovation 
is present, the shift in technological regime is not a straightforward pro-
cess: the forces that maintain technological regimes (e. g., increasing 
returns to scale, vested interests, network externalities) are not easy to 
overcome — all the more so that new technologies are often less effi-
cient, in many respects, than existing ones, and competing technologies 
may coexist for a while. History thus suggests that the diffusion of new 
technologies is a slow process (Kemp, 1994; Fouquet, 2010).
More recent research over the past 20 years has yielded two major 
perspectives on technology transitions (Truffer and Coenen, 2012): the 
multi-level perspective on socio-technical systems (Geels, 2002) and 
the concept of technological innovations systems (Bergek et al., 2008). 
The multi-level perspective distinguishes three levels of analysis: 
niche innovations, socio-technical regimes, and socio-technical land-
scape (Geels, 2002). A technological niche is the micro-level where 
radical innovations emerge. Socio-technical regimes correspond to an 
extended version of the technological regime discussed above. The 
socio-technical landscape corresponds to the regulatory, institutional, 
physical, and behavioural environment within which innovations 
emerge. There is considerable inertia at this third level. Changes in 
socio-technical regimes emerge from the interactions between these 
three levels. According to Geels and Schot’s typology (2007), changes 
in socio-technical regimes can follow four different paths. Transfor-
mation corresponds to cases in which moderate changes in the land-
scape occur at a time when niche innovations are not yet developed, 
thus resulting in a relatively small change of direction of the develop-
ment pathway. An example of transformation occurred when munici-
pal sewer systems were implemented in Dutch cities (Geels, 2006). 
De-alignment and realignment correspond to sudden changes in the 
landscape that cause actors to lose faith in the regime. If no clear 
replacement is ready yet, a large range of technologies may compete 
until one finally dominates and a new equilibrium is reached. One 
example is the transition from horse-powered vehicles to cars. If new 
technologies are already available, on the other hand, a transition 
substitution might occur, as in the case of the replacement of sailing 
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ships by steamships between 1850 and 1920. Finally, a reconfigura-
tion occurs when innovations initially adopted as part of the current 
regime progressively subvert it into a new one, an example of which 
is the transition from traditional factories to mass production in the 
United States.
The technological innovation systems approach (Bergek et  al., 2008) 
adopts a systemic perspective by considering all relevant actors, their 
interactions, and the institutions relevant for innovation. Early work 
in this approach argues that beside market failures, ‘system failures’ 
such as, inter alia, actor deficiencies, coordination deficits or conflicts 
with existing institutional structures (institutional deficits) can explain 
unsuccessful innovation (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011). More recent 
analysis focuses on core processes critical for innovation, such as 
presence of entrepreneurial activities, learning, knowledge diffusion 
through networks, etc. The technological innovation systems concept 
was developed to inform public policy on how to better support tech-
nologies deemed sustainable with an increasing focus on ‘system inno-
vations’ as opposed to innovation in single technologies or products 
(Truffer and Coenen, 2012).
4�5�2�3 Economic modelling of transitions between 
pathways
As noted above (4.5.1), economic modelling is a major tool for analyz-
ing future development pathways. Models provide different types of 
information about transition, depending on their features and on how 
they are used. The present sub-section reviews the use of models for 
studying transitions. See Section 6.2 for a review of modelling tools for 
integrated assessment.
There are four increasingly complex ways of using economic mod-
els to analyze transitions between development pathways. The first 
option — static modelling — consists of building plausible images of 
the future at a given date and comparing them (comparative stat-
ics). The focus is on the internal consistency of each image, and on 
the distance between them. Models without explicit representation 
of time (e. g., input-output, partial equilibrium, or static general equi-
librium models) are sufficient. Static models can provide insights on 
the sustainable character of the long-term images, to the extent that 
the model captures critical variables for sustainability such as natural 
resources use or impact of economic activity on the environment (e. g., 
GHG emissions). However, national accounts typically add up multiple 
products with very different material content, very different energy 
contents, and very different prices. Thus, constructing robust relation-
ships between aggregate monetary indicators and physical flows 
requires in-depth analysis. Similarly, static models can provide insights 
on the social components of sustainability to the extent they include 
some form of representation of the distribution of economic activity 
within the society, notably across income groups (see Section 4.4.1). 
Again, the associated data challenge is significant. By construction, on 
the other hand, static models do not provide insights on the pathways 
from the present on to each possible future, let alone on the transitions 
between pathways.
Dynamic models are needed to depict the pathway towards desirable 
(or undesirable) long-term futures. Still, the relevance of dynamic mod-
els for discussing transitions depends on their structure, content, and 
way they are used. A large part of the modelling literature on climate 
change mitigation relies on neoclassical growth models with exog-
enous (Swan, 1956; Solow, 1956) or endogenous (Koopmans, 1965; 
Cass, 1965) savings rate. In those models, long-term growth is ulti-
mately driven by the sum of population growth and exogenous total 
factor productivity growth (exogenous technical change). In the sim-
plest version of the neoclassical model, there is thus only one ‘path-
way’ to speak of, as determined by human fertility and human inge-
nuity. Any departure from this pathway resorbs itself endogenously 
through adjustment of the relative weights of capital and labour in 
the production function, and through adjustment of the savings rate 
(when endogenous). Empirically, neoclassical growth models have 
limited ability to explain observed short-term growth patterns (e. g., 
Easterly, 2002). 
Modelling of processes is needed to enrich discussions about transi-
tions by differentiatiating short-term economic processes from long-
term processes. The general point is that the technical, economic, and 
social processes often exhibit more rigidities in the short- than in the 
long-run. As Solow (2000) suggests, at short-term scales, “something 
sort of ‘Keynesian’ is a good approximation, and surely better than 
anything straight ‘neoclassical’. At very long time scales, the interesting 
questions are best studied in a neoclassical framework and attention 
to the Keynesian side of things would be a minor distraction”. There is 
a long tradition of debates in economics on the degree to which pro-
duction technologies and wages should be considered flexible or rigid 
in the short- and medium-run, with potentially very different results 
for the assessment of mitigation policies (Rezai et al., 2013), (Guivarch 
et  al., 2011). Other important rigidities include, inter alia, long-lived 
physical capital, the premature replacement of which is typically very 
costly, and the dynamics of which have important implications for the 
costs, timing, and direction of climate policies (e. g. Lecocq et al., 1998; 
Wing, 1999); rigidities associated with the location of households and 
firms, changes of which take time; or rigidities associated with prefer-
ences of individuals and with institutions. Presence of rigidities may 
also lead to bifurcations towards different long-term outcome (i. e., 
equilibrium-dependence and not just path-dependence as in section 
4.5.2) (See e. g. Hallegatte et al., 2007).
Recognizing uncertainty is a further key element for enriching the 
analysis of transitions, relaxing the full information hypothesis under 
which many models are run. If information increases over time, there is 
a rationale for a sequential decision making framework (Arrow et al., 
1996), in which choices made at one point can be re-considered in light 
of new information. Thus, the issue is no longer to select a pathway 
once and for all, but to make the best first-step (or short-term) deci-
sion, given the structure of uncertainties and the potential for increa-
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sing information over time — factors which are especially relevant in 
the context of climate change. Inertia plays an especially important 
role in this context, as the more choices made at one point constrain 
future opportunity sets, the more difficult it becomes to make advan-
tage of new information (e. g.,Ha-Duong et al., 1997). Another way by 
which uncertainty can be captured in models is to abandon the inter-
temporal optimization objective altogether and use simulation models 
instead, with decisions made at any time based on imperfect expecta-
tions (Scrieciu et al., 2013). Such shift has major implications for the 
transition pathway (Sassi et al., 2010), but results strongly depend on 
how expectations and decisions under uncertainty are represented. 
Ideally, models that produce development pathways should thus (1) 
be framed in a consistent macroeconomic framework (since a path-
way is holistic), (2) impose relevant technical constraints in each sector, 
such as assumptions about the process of technical change, (3) capture 
the key relationships between economic activity and the environment, 
e. g., energy and natural resources consumption or greenhouse gases 
emissions, (4) have a horizon long enough to assess ‘sustainability’ — a 
long-term horizon which also implies, incidentally, that the model must 
be able to represent structural and technical change — yet (5) recog-
nize short-term economic processes critical for assessing transition 
pathways, such as market imbalance and rigidities, all this while (6) 
providing an explicit representation of how economic activity is distrib-
uted within the society, and how this retrofits into the growth pattern, 
and (7) representing key uncertainties. 
No model today meets all these specifications. Current models can be 
classified along two major fault lines: bottom-up vs. top-down, and 
long-term vs. short-term. By design, computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) models provide a comprehensive macroeconomic framework, 
and they can be harnessed to analyze distributional issues, at least 
amongst income groups, but they typically fail to incorporate key techni-
cal constraints. Conversely, bottom-up engineering models provide a 
detailed account of technical potentials and limitations, but their macro-
engine, if at all, is most often rudimentary. Emerging ‘hybrid’ models 
developed in the context of climate policy assessment are steps towards 
closing this gap (Hourcade et al., 2006). A similar rift occurs with regard 
to time horizon. Growth models like Solow’s are designed to capture 
key features of long-term development pathways, but they do not 
include short- or medium-term economic processes such as market 
rigidities. On the other hand, short-term models (econometric or struc-
tural) will meet this requirement but are not designed to look deep in 
the future. Again, emerging models include short- / medium-term pro-
cesses into analysis of growth in the long-run (see e. g., Barker and Ser-
ban Scrieciu, 2010), but this pretty much remains an open research field.
4.6 Mitigative capacity and 
mitigation, and links 
to adaptive  capacity 
and adaptation 
4�6�1 Mitigation and adaptation measures, 
capacities, and development pathways
Even though adaptation and mitigation are generally approached as 
distinct domains of scientific research and practice (Biesbroek et  al., 
2009) (as reflected, for example, in the IPCC separate Working Groups 
II and III), a recognition of the deep linkages between mitigation and 
adaptation has gradually emerged. Initially, mitigation and adaptation 
were analyzed primarily in terms of techno-economic considerations. 
But growing attention has been directed at the underlying capacities, 
first with respect to adaptation, and later -and less fully- with respect 
Box 4�4 | Characterizing the sustainability of development pathways
Constructing and modelling forward-looking development path-
ways is one thing, evaluating how they fare in terms of sustain-
ability within and beyond the time horizon of the modelling is 
another. Two questions can actually be distinguished (Asheim, 
2007). One is to predict whether the current situation (welfare, 
environment) will be preserved in the future: are we on a sus-
tained development pathway, i. e., a pathway without downturn 
in welfare or environmental objectives? This question is answered 
by looking at the evolution of the target variables within the 
time horizon of the scenario, and what happens beyond the 
horizon remains undetermined. Another question is to determine 
whether the current generation’s decisions leave it possible for 
future generations to achieve a sustained pathway: is a sustained 
development pathway possible given what the current genera-
tion does? Unlike the former question, the latter does not require 
predicting the future generations’ decisions, only their future 
constraints and opportunities. Showing the existence of a sus-
tained pathway is then an argument in favour of the compatibility 
of current decisions with future sustainability. Some indicators of 
sustainability such as genuine savings (see Box 4.2) are meant to 
provide an answer based on the current evolution of (economic, 
social, environmental) capital stocks and can also be used for the 
evaluation of scenarios that depict these stocks. In practice, sus-
tainability analysis (of either type) is not frequent in the scenario-
building community, though multi-criteria analysis of scenarios 
has been gaining ground in recent years (see e. g.,GEA, 2012).
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to mitigation, (Grothmann and Patt, 2005; Burch and Robinson, 2007; 
Winkler et al., 2007; Goklany, 2007; Pelling, 2010).
This attention has necessitated a broadening of the scope of analy-
sis well beyond narrow techno-economic considerations, to the social, 
political, economic, and cultural domains, as ultimately, this is where 
the underlying determinants of mitigative and adaptive capacity lie. 
Following the literature enumerated above, a non-exhaustive list of 
these underlying determinants include: the level and distribution of 
wealth, robustness and legitimacy of institutions, availability of cred-
ible information, existence and reliability of infrastructure, access to 
and adequacy of technologies and systems of innovation, effective 
governance, social cohesion and security, distribution of decision-
making power among actors, conditions of equity and empowerment 
among citizens, and the opportunity costs of action, as well as individ-
ual cognitive factors, including relevant skills, knowledge and cultural 
framings. The fact that mitigative and adaptive capacities share and 
are similarly affected by these underlying determinants highlights their 
similarity, blurring the distinction between them and leading some 
scholars to argue that there is simply ‘response capacity’ (Tompkins 
and Adger, 2005; Wilbanks, 2005; Burch and Robinson, 2007). Because 
response capacity is directly shaped by these underlying technological, 
economic, institutional, socio-cultural, and political determinants, it is 
in other words directly shaped by the overall development pathway, 
which is the combined product of those same inter-related determi-
nants. This dependence of response capacity on development pathway 
is underscored by the strong parallel between its determinants (out-
lined above) and the defining dimensions of a development pathway 
(discussed in Sections 4.3 and 4.5). Indeed, response capacity is deter-
mined much more by the overall development pathway than by tar-
geted climate-specific policies. The academic consensus on this point 
has been clearly reflected in the AR4 (IPCC, 2007), in WGI Chapter 12 
in the case of mitigative capacity, and WGII Chapter 18 in the case of 
adaptive capacity. Of course, more nuanced and site-specific assess-
ments of the determinants of such capacity can provide further useful 
insight (see e. g., Keskitalo et al, 2011). 
Moreover, there is consensus that an effective transition toward a SD 
pathway in particular can more effectively foster response capacity 
(IPCC, 2007; Matthew and Hammill, 2009; Parry, 2009; Halsnaes et al., 
2011; Harry and Morad, 2013). There are various elements of fostering 
a transition toward SD that naturally accord with the creation of miti-
gative and adaptive capacity, including, for example, the establishment 
of innovation systems that are supportive of environmental and social 
priorities, the support for adaptive ecosystem management and con-
servation, the strengthening of institutions and assets to support food 
and water security and public health, and the support for procedurally 
equitable systems of governance (Banuri, 2009; Barbier, 2011; Bowen 
et  al., 2011; Bowen and Friel, 2012). Mitigation and adaptation out-
comes can of course still be expected to depend on the extent to which 
explicit efforts are taken to implement and mainstream climate change 
policies and measures, as well as on the manner in which a particular 
SD approach may evolve — with more or less emphasis on economic, 
social, or environmental objectives (Giddings et  al., 2002; Beg et  al., 
2002; Grist, 2008; Halsnæs et al., 2008). 
The centrality of mitigative and adaptive capacity to SD is highlighted 
by the growing attention to the idea that the Earth system has moved 
from the Holocene into the Anthropocene (Steffen et al., 2011), where 
societies are the most important drivers of the Earth’s dynamics. Miti-
gative and adaptive capacity can be seen in general terms, i. e., not just 
with respect to GHG emissions and climate impacts, but all anthropo-
genic environmental pressures and impacts from ecosystem degrada-
tion. In this view, mitigative and adaptive capacity are central to sus-
tainable ecosystem management (Holling, 1978; Walters and Holling, 
1990; McFadden et al., 2011; Williams, 2011), and thus fundamental 
to SD (Chapin et  al., 2010; Folke et  al., 2011b; Polasky et  al., 2011; 
Biermann et al., 2012). Some scholars interpret this as a fundamental 
redefinition of development calling for transformational shifts based 
on re-imagining possibilities for future development pathways (Pelling, 
2010; Jackson, 2011a; Kates et al., 2012; Ehrlich et al., 2012).
Scholarship exploring the links between mitigation, adaptation, socio-
ecological resilience and SD more generally, has generally pointed 
toward the existence of (potential) synergies and tradeoffs within and 
across policy sectors and across implementation measures (Gallopín, 
2006; Rosenzweig and Tubiello, 2007; Vogel et al., 2007; Boyd et al., 
2009; Thornton and Gerber, 2010; Adger et  al., 2011; Warren, 2011; 
Lal et al., 2011; Vermeulen et al., 2012; Denton and Wilbanks, 2014; 
Hill, 2013). These studies show that, in spite of mitigative and adap-
tive capacities being so closely intertwined with each other and with 
SD, the relationship between mitigation and adaptation measures is 
more ambiguous and, in line with the AR4, suggest that outcomes are 
highly dependent on the measures and the context in which they are 
undertaken, with some policy sectors being more conducive to syner-
gies than others. 
In the agricultural sector, for example, scholars have for many years 
highlighted the potential of fostering both mitigation and adapta-
tion by supporting traditional and biodiverse agro-ecological sys-
tems around the world (Campbell, 2011; Altieri and Nicholls, 2013, 
and see Section 11.5). A recent modelling exercise suggests that 
investing substantially in adapting agriculture to climate change in 
some regions — Asia and North America — can result in substantial 
mitigation co-benefits, while the latter may be insignificant in Africa 
(Lobell et  al., 2013). There are empirical studies where interventions 
in agricultural systems have led to positive mitigation and adaptation 
outcomes — or vice versa — (Kenny, 2011; Wollenberg, 2012; Bryan 
et  al., 2012), or where synergies between adaptation and mitiga-
tion have not materialized due to, for example, limited scientific and 
policy knowledge, as well as institutional and farmers’ own financial 
and cognitive constraints (Haden et al., 2012; Arbuckle Jr. et al., 2013; 
Bryan et al., 2013). In forestry, the links between fostering mitigation 
strategies, e. g., through planting trees, developing agro-forestry sys-
tems or conserving diverse ecosystems, and the adaptation of both 
forests and people to climate change have been widely acknowledged 
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and the possibility of effective linkages in policy and action have also 
been identified (Locatelli et al., 2011; Schoeneberger et al., 2012; Mori 
et al., 2013). Methods for identifying tradeoffs between mitigation and 
adaptation at policy and implementation levels and to foster legiti-
mate decision making have also been recently developed (Laukkonen 
et al., 2009; Janetos et al., 2012). 
This evolving literature highlights the need to examine adaptation 
and mitigation for their SD implications, and ultimately to mainstream 
them in broader development policy. It also explains the parallel emer-
gence of environmental governance research about reforming existing 
or developing institutions in different policy domains to meet this need 
(Folke et al., 2005; Folke, 2007; Brunner and Lynch, 2010). Recent stud-
ies highlight the organizational, institutional, financial, and knowledge 
barriers to the development of effective governance for mitigation 
and adaptation in general government policy (Picketts et  al., 2012), 
as well as in particular policy sectors, e. g., in forestry (Johnston and 
Hesseln, 2012); in health (Bowen et  al., 2013); or in urban planning 
(Barton, 2013). Others identify the multi-scale, inter-connected, and 
dynamic nature of many climate issues and their associated responses 
as a key barrier to action, particularly at local level (Romero-Lankao, 
2012). Analyses of the effectiveness of public-private partnerships and 
other forms of multi-actor cooperation to mainstream both mitigation 
and adaptation measures in a given sector and context also reveal 
the challenging nature of such endeavour (Pattberg, 2010; Pinkse and 
Kolk, 2012). 
There is ample scope to improve response capacity in nations and 
communities by putting SD at the core of development priorities, 
despite the considerable governance challenges to mainstreaming 
mitigation and adaptation measures across policy sectors, collective 
and individual behaviour, and to exploit possible synergies and con-
front tradeoffs. Nonetheless, it remains the case that the variation 
of mitigative and adaptive capacity between different nations — and 
communities within them — is a function of the vast disparities in the 
determinants of such capacity. These differences in capacity are in turn 
driven to a significant degree by differences in development pathways 
and, specifically, level of development. This is a primary reason why 
the issue of burden sharing among nations features so prominently in 
consideration of international cooperation on climate change gener-
ally, and the UNFCCC in particular, as discussed further in the follow-
ing section. 
4�6�2 Equity and burden sharing in the 
c ontext of international cooperation on 
climate
Chapter 3 (Sections 3.2 to 3.5) introduced the general equity principles 
in the philosophical literature and their relevance to climate change 
including burden sharing. This section briefly reviews the extensive lit-
erature regarding burden sharing in a global climate regime. If focuses 
first on the equity principles as they are invoked in the literature, which 
emphasises those laid out in the UNFCCC. It then reviews several cat-
egories of burden sharing frameworks. While the academic literature 
uses the term ‘burden sharing’, it is understood that mitigation action 
entails not only burdens but also benefits.
4�6�2�1 Equity principles pertinent to burden sharing in 
an international climate regime
The UNFCCC clearly invokes the vision of equitable burden sharing 
among Parties toward achieving the Convention’s objective. While 
Parties had not articulated a specific burden sharing arrangement in 
quantified detail, they had established an initial allocation of obliga-
tions among countries with explicit references to the need for equi-
table contributions. All Parties adopted general commitments to miti-
gate, adapt, and undertake other climate-related actions, but distinct 
categories of countries reflecting level of development were identi-
fied and assigned specific obligations. Developed countries (listed in 
Annex I) were distinguished from developing countries and obliged to 
“take the lead on combating climate change and the adverse effects 
thereof” (Article 3.1), noting “the need for equitable and appropriate 
contributions by each of these Parties to the global effort regarding 
[the UNFCCC] objective” (Article 4.2(a)). A subset of Annex I coun-
tries consisting of the wealthier developed countries (listed in Annex 
II) were further obliged to provide financial and technological support 
“to developing countries to enable them to effectively implement their 
UNFCCC commitments” (Article 4.7), noting that they “shall take into 
account … the importance of appropriate burden sharing among the 
developed country Parties”. 
While Parties’ equitable contributions are elaborated further in subse-
quent UNFCCC decisions and under the Durban Platform for Enhanced 
Action, an explicit arrangement for equitable burden sharing remains 
unspecified. Because there is no absolute standard of equity, countries 
(like people) will tend to advocate interpretations which tend to favour 
their (often short term) interests (Heyward, 2007; Lange et al., 2010; 
Kals and Maes, 2011). It is thus tempting to say that no reasoned reso-
lution is possible and to advocate a purely procedural resolution (Mül-
ler, 1999). However, there is a basic set of shared ethical premises and 
precedents that apply to the climate problem, and impartial reasoning 
(as behind a Rawlsian (Rawls, 2000) “veil of ignorance”) can help put 
bounds on the plausible interpretations of equity in the burden sharing 
context. Even in the absence of a formal, globally agreed burden shar-
ing framework, such principles are important in establishing expec-
tations of what may be reasonably required of different actors. They 
influence the nature of the public discourse, the concessions individu-
als are willing to grant, the demands citizens are inclined to impose on 
their own governments, and the terms in which governments represent 
their negotiating positions both to other countries and to their own 
citizens. From the perspective of an international climate regime, many 
analysts have considered principles for equitable burden sharing, (Rose 
1990; Hayes and Smith 1993; Baer et  al. 2000; B. Metz et  al. 2002; 
Ringius, Torvanger, and Underdal 2002; Aldy, Barrett, and Stavins 2003; 
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Ghersi, Hourcade, and Criqui 2003; Gardiner 2004; Caney 2005; Caney 
2009; Caney 2010; Heyward 2007; E. A. Page 2008; Vanderheiden 
2008; Klinsky and Dowlatabadi 2009; Winkler et al. 2011). Equitable 
burden sharing has been most frequently applied to costs of mitiga-
tion, though similar issues arise with regard to adaptation (Baer, 2006; 
Paavola and Adger, 2006; Adger, 2006; Jagers and Duus-Otterstrom, 
2008; Dellink et al., 2009; Grasso, 2010; Hartzell-Nichols, 2011). Here 
these equity principles are given along four key dimensions — respon-
sibility, capacity, equality, and the right to sustainable development, 
expanding on the philosophical arguments in Sections 3.2 – 3.4. 
Responsibility 
In the climate context, responsibility is widely taken as a fundamental 
principle relating responsibility for contributing to climate change (via 
emissions of GHGs) to the responsibility for solving the problem. The 
literature extensively discusses it, distinguishing moral responsibility 
from causal responsibility, and considering the moral significance of 
knowledge of harmful effects (Neumayer, 2000; Caney, 2005; Müller 
et al., 2009). Common sense ethics (and legal practice) hold persons 
responsible for harms or risks they knowingly impose or could have 
reasonably foreseen, and, in certain cases, regardless of whether they 
could have been foreseen. The notion of responsibility is thus closely 
connected to the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP), and burden sharing 
principles that derive from it hold that countries should be accountable 
for their greenhouse gas emissions. This is a common interpretation of 
the UNFCCC phrase “common but differentiated responsibilities” (Har-
ris, 1999; Rajamani, 2000), given its similarity to the more explicit Rio 
Declaration (see Section 4.1).
Responsibility is taken by some to include present and past emissions 
(Grübler and Fujii, 1991; Smith, 1991; Neumayer, 2000; Rive et  al., 
2006; Wei et al., 2012). This has been justified on three main grounds. 
First, climate change results from the stock of accumulated historic 
emissions. Second, the total amount of greenhouse gases that can 
be emitted to the atmosphere must be constrained (to a level deter-
mined by society’s choice of global climate stabilization goal (see WGI 
AR5), and thus constitutes a finite common resource (often loosely 
referred to as the ‘atmospheric space’ or the ‘carbon budget’). Users of 
this resource — whether current or historical — should be accountable 
for depleting the resource and precluding the access of others. Third, 
historical emissions reflect the use of a resource from which benefits 
have been derived, i. e., wealth, fixed capital, infrastructure, and other 
assets. These benefits constitute a legacy based in part on consum-
ing a common resource that (1) should be paid for, and (2) provides 
a basis for mitigative capacity (Shue, 1999; Caney, 2006, 2010). The 
latter argument carries the notion of responsibility further back in time, 
assigning responsibility for the emissions of previous generations, to 
the extent that present generations have inherited benefits. This argu-
ment links responsibility with the capacity principle discussed below 
(Meyer and Roser, 2010; Gardiner, 2011a; Meyer, 2012). If conventional 
development continues, the relative responsibility of some nations that 
currently have relatively low cumulative emissions would match and 
exceed by mid-century the relative responsibility of some nations who 
currently have high responsibility (Höhne and Blok, 2005; Botzen et al., 
2008), on an aggregate — if not per capita — basis. Such projections 
illustrate that the relative distribution of responsibility among coun-
tries can vary substantially over time, and that a burden sharing frame-
work must dynamically reflect evolving realities if they are to faithfully 
reflect ethical principles. They also may provide a basis for understand-
ing where mitigation might productively be undertaken, though not 
necessarily who should be obliged to bear the costs.
Each nation’s responsibility for emissions is typically defined (as 
in IPCC inventory methodologies) in terms of emissions within the 
nation’s territorial boundary. An alternative interpretation (Fermann, 
1994), which has become more salient as international trade has 
grown more important, is to include emissions embodied in interna-
tionally traded goods consumed by a given nation. Recent studies 
(Lenzen et al., 2007; Pan et al., 2008; Peters et al., 2011) have provided 
a quantitative basis for better understanding the implications of a con-
sumption-based approach to assessing responsibility. In general, at the 
aggregate level, developed countries are net importers of emissions, 
and developing countries are net exporters (see Sections 5.3.3.2 and 
14.3.4). The relevance of this to burden sharing may depend on further 
factors, such as the distribution between the exporting and importing 
countries of the benefits of carbon-intensive production, and the pres-
ence of other climate policies such as border carbon tariffs (see Section 
13.8.1 and 14.4.1), as well as the development of the relevant data 
sources (see also Sections 3.9 and 4.4). Many analysts have suggested 
that all emissions are not equivalent in how they translate to respon-
sibility, distinguishing the categories of ‘survival emissions’, ‘develop-
ment emissions’, and ‘luxury’ emissions (Agarwal and Narain, 1991; 
Shue, 1993; Baer et al., 2009; Rao and Baer, 2012). 
Determining responsibility for emissions in order to allocate respon-
sibility raises methodological questions. In addition to the stan-
dard questions about data availability and reliability, there are also 
equity-related questions. For instance, there are various rationales 
for determining how far in the past to include historical emissions. 
One rationale is that the 1990s should be the earliest date, reflect-
ing the timing of the FAR and the creation of a global regime that 
imposed obligations to curb emissions (Posner and Sunstein, 2007). 
Some argue that the date should be earlier, corresponding to the time 
that climate change became reasonably suspected of being a prob-
lem, and greenhouse gas emissions thus identifiable as a pollutant 
worthy of policy action. For example, one might argue for the 1970s 
or 1960s, based on the published warnings issued by scientific advi-
sory panels to the United States presidents Johnson (U. S. National 
Research Council Committee on Atmospheric Sciences, 1966) and 
Carter (MacDonald et  al., 1979), and the first G7 Summit Declara-
tion highlighting climate change as a problem and seeking to prevent 
further increases of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (Group of 7 
Heads of State, 1979). Others argue that a still earlier date is appro-
priate because the damage is still caused, the stock depleted, and the 
benefits derived, regardless of whether there is a legal requirement 
or knowledge. 
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Another issue is the question of accounting for the residence time of 
emissions into the atmosphere, as an alternative to simply considering 
cumulative emissions over time. In the case of carbon dioxide, respon-
sibility could include past emissions even when they are no longer resi-
dent in the atmosphere, on the grounds that those emissions (1) have 
contributed to the warming and climate damages experienced so far, 
and upon which further warming and damages will be additive, and (2) 
have been removed from the atmosphere predominantly to the oceans, 
where they are now causing ocean acidification, which is itself an envi-
ronmental problem (See WGI AR5, Chapters 3 and 6). 
Capacity (or, Ability to Pay)
A second principle for allocating effort arises from the capacity to con-
tribute to solving the climate problem (Shue, 1999; Caney, 2010). Gen-
erally, capacity is interpreted to mean that the more one can afford to 
contribute, the more one should, just as societies tend to distribute the 
costs of preserving or generating societal public goods; i. e., most soci-
eties have progressive income taxation. This view can be applied at the 
level of countries, or at a lower level, recognizing inequalities between 
individuals. Smith et  al. (1993) suggested GDP as an income-based 
measure of ability-to-pay, subject to a threshold value, determined by 
an indicator of quality of life. This was developed in Kartha et al. (2009) 
and Baer et al. (2010), taking into account intra-national disparities. 
As discussed in Section 4.6.1, response capacity refers to more than 
just financial wherewithal, encompassing also other characteristics 
that affect a nation’s ability to contribute to solving the climate prob-
lem. It recognizes that effective responses require not only financial 
resources, but also technological, institutional, and human capacity. 
This issue has been treated by Winkler, Letete, and Marquard (2011) by 
considering the Human Development Index as a complement to income 
in considering capacity. Capacity, even in this broader sense, can be 
distinguished from mitigation potential, which refers to the presence 
of techno-economic opportunities for reducing emissions due to, for 
example, having renewable energy resources that can be exploited, a 
legacy of high-carbon infrastructure that can be replaced, or a rapidly 
growing capital stock that can be built based on low-carbon invest-
ments. Mitigation potential is a useful characteristic for determining 
where emissions reductions can be located geographically for reasons 
of cost-effectiveness, but this can be distinguished from burden shar-
ing per se, in the sense of determining on normative grounds which 
country should pay for those reductions. This distinction is reflected 
in the economist’s notion that economic efficiency can be decoupled 
from equity (Coase, 1960; Manne and Stephan, 2005).
Equality 
Equality means many things, but a common understanding in interna-
tional law is that each human being has equal moral worth and thus 
should have equal rights. Some argue this applies to access to common 
global resources, expressed in the perspective that each person should 
have an equal right to emit (Grubb, 1989; Agarwal and Narain, 1991). 
This equal right is applied by some analysts to current and future flows, 
and by some to the cumulative stock as well. (See further below.) 
Some analysts (Caney, 2009) have noted, however, that a commitment 
to equality does not necessarily translate into an equal right to emit. 
Egalitarians generally call for equality of a total package of ‘resources’ 
(or ‘capabilities’ or ‘opportunities for welfare’) and thus may support 
inequalities in one good to compensate for inequalities in other goods 
(Starkey, 2011). For example, one might argue that poor people who 
are disadvantaged with respect to access to resources such as food 
or drinking water may be entitled to a greater than per capita share 
of emissions rights. Second, some individuals may have greater needs 
than others. For example, poorer people may have less access to alter-
natives to fossil fuels (or unsustainably harvested wood fuel) because 
of higher cost or less available technologies, and thus be entitled to a 
larger share of emission rights.
Others have suggested that equality can be interpreted as requir-
ing equal sacrifices, either by all parties, or by parties who are equal 
along some relevant dimension. Then, to the extent that parties are 
not equal, more responsibility (Gonzalez Miguez and Santhiago de 
Oliveira, 2011) or capacity (Jacoby et al., 2009) would imply more obli-
gation, all else being equal. 
Right to development 
The right to development appears in international law in the UN Dec-
laration on the Right to Development, the Rio Declaration, and the 
Vienna Declaration, and is closely related to the notion of need as an 
equity principle, in that it posits that the interests of poor people and 
poor countries in meeting basic needs are a global priority (Andre-
assen and Marks, 2007). The UNFCCC acknowledges a right to pro-
mote sustainable development, and “the legitimate priority needs 
of developing countries for the achievement of sustained economic 
growth and the eradication of poverty” (UNFCCC, 2002) and recog-
nizes that “economic and social development and poverty eradica-
tion are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country 
Parties” (p. 3).
In the context of equitable burden sharing, a minimalist interpretation 
of a right to development is a right to an exemption from obligations 
for poor Parties (Ringius et al., 2002) on the basis that meeting basic 
needs has clear moral precedence over the need to solve the climate 
problem, or, at the very least, it should not be hindered by measures 
taken to address climate change. 
4�6�2�2 Frameworks for equitable burden sharing
There are various ways of interpreting the above equity principles and 
applying them to the design of burden sharing frameworks. It is helpful 
to categorize them into two broad classes. ‘Resource-sharing’ frame-
works are aimed at applying ethical principles to establish a basis 
for sharing the agreed global ‘carbon budget’. ‘Effort-sharing’ frame-
works are aimed at sharing the costs of the global climate response. 
The resource-sharing frame is the natural point of departure if climate 
change is posed as a tragedy of the commons type of collective action 
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problem; if it is posed as a free-rider type of collective action prob-
lem, the effort-sharing perspective is more natural. Neither of these 
framings is objectively the ‘correct’ one, just as neither collective action 
framing of the climate change problem is correct. Both can inform poli-
cymakers’ judgments in different ways. Indeed, the two approaches 
are complementary: any given resource-sharing framework implies a 
particular distribution of the effort, and conversely the opposite is true. 
In either case, burden sharing frameworks are typically formulated as 
emission entitlements to be used in trading system or global climate 
fund, which enables a cost-effective distribution of the actual miti-
gation efforts. Through such mechanisms, countries with obligations 
greater than their domestic mitigation potential can fund reductions in 
countries with obligations that are less than their domestic mitigation 
potential (see Sections 6.3.6 and 13.4.3).
One important dimension along which both resource-sharing and 
effort-sharing proposals can be compared is the number of categories 
into which countries are grouped. The UNFCCC in fact had three cat-
egories — Annex I, Annex II (the OECD countries within Annex I), and 
non-Annex I. Many of the proposals discussed below reproduce these 
distinctions. Others increase the number of ‘bins’, to as many as six 
(Winkler et  al., 2006). Finally, many others eliminate any qualitative 
categories, instead allocating emissions rights or obligations on the 
basis of a continuous index. 
Resource sharing approaches
The resource-sharing approach starts by acknowledging that the 
global ‘carbon budget’ is bounded, with its size defined by the agreed 
climate stabilization target. The most straightforward resource-shar-
ing approach is an equal per capita approach (Grubb, 1990; Agarwal 
and Narain, 1991; Jamieson, 2001), which is premised on the equal 
rights to the atmospheric commons to all individuals, and allocates 
emission allowances to each country in proportion to its population. 
In response to the concern that an equal per capita allocation would 
provide an incentive for more rapid population growth, some ana-
lysts have argued that the effect would be negligible in comparison 
to other factors affecting population, and others have proposed solu-
tions such as holding population constant as of some agreed date 
(Jamieson, 2001), establishing standardized growth expectations 
(Cline, 1992), or allocating emission in proportion only to adult popu-
lation (Grubb, 1990). 
In response to the concern that unrealistically rapid reductions would 
be required in those countries whose current emissions are far above 
the global average, some have proposed a period of transition from 
grandfathered emission rights (i. e., allocated in proportion to current 
emissions) to equal per capita emission rights (Grubb and Sebenius, 
1992; Welsch, 1993; Meyer, 2004). This rationale applies specifically 
to a framework intended to determine actual emission pathways, in 
which case an immediate per capita distribution would impose unreal-
istically abrupt changes from present emission levels. For a framework 
intended to assign transferable rights to emit, rather than actual emis-
sions, the rationale is questionable: the opportunity to acquire addi-
tional allocations through emissions trading or some other transfer 
system would allow a cost-effective transition and lessen, though not 
eliminate, the political challenges of an immediate equal per capita 
allocation. 
A variant on the above that aims to address the concern that many 
developing countries would have to reduce their emissions from 
already very low levels is “Common but Differentiated Convergence” 
(Höhne et al., 2006), under which a developing country is required to 
begin converging only once its per capita emissions exceed a specified 
(and progressively declining) threshold. Chakravarty et al. (2009) put 
forward a variant that looked beyond average national indicators of 
emissions by examining the distribution of emissions across individuals 
at different income levels within countries. 
Extending the concept of equal per capita rights to include both the 
historical and future carbon budget gives the “equal cumulative per 
capita emission rights” family of frameworks (Bode, 2004; den Elzen 
et al., 2005; German Advisory Council on Global Change, 2009; Ober-
heitmann, 2010; Höhne et  al., 2011; CASS / DRC Joint Project Team, 
2011; Jayaraman et al., 2011; Pan et al., 2013). These frameworks vary, 
for example, in their choice of the initial date for historical emissions, 
the way they deal with growing populations, their treatment of luxury 
versus survival emissions, and their way of distributing a budget over 
time. As some countries (which tend to be higher income countries 
that industrialized earlier) have consumed more than their equal per 
capita share of the historical global budget, this excess use is offered 
as an argument for obliging them to provide financial and technologi-
cal resources to other countries that have used less than their historical 
share. This obligation has been linked to the notion of a ‘carbon debt’ 
or ‘climate debt’ (Pickering and Barry, 2012), and framed as a sub-
set of a larger ‘ecological debt’ (Roberts and Parks, 2009; Goeminne 
and Paredis, 2010), which some analyses have attempted to quantify 
(Smith, 1991; Srinivasan et al., 2008; Cranston et al., 2010). 
Effort sharing approaches
‘Effort sharing’ frameworks seek to fairly divide the costs of reducing 
emissions to an agreed level. (Effort sharing approaches can also be 
applied to adaptation costs whereas resource sharing approaches can-
not.) Many of the philosophers engaged with the question of burden 
sharing in the climate regime have argued that obligations should be 
proportional in some fashion to responsibility and capacity (see, for 
example the analyses of Shue, 1993; or Caney, 2005).
An early effort-sharing approach was the Brazilian proposal using 
historic responsibility for emissions and thus global temperature rise 
as a basis for setting Kyoto targets. This approach has been quantita-
tively analyzed (Höhne and Blok, 2005) and recently discussed in the 
global political context (Gonzalez Miguez and Santhiago de Oliveira, 
2011). Other approaches have used capacity based on indicators such 
as GDP per capita (Wada et al., 2012) as a basis for effort-sharing, or 
have combined capacity and responsibility (Winkler et al., 2006). Some 
have included minimal form of a right to development by identifying 
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a threshold of development below which income and emissions are 
not included in a nation’s capacity or responsibility (Cao, 2008; Kartha 
et al., 2009; Yue and Wang, 2012). 
The quantitative implications of a number of burden sharing frame-
works are presented for several regions in Section 6.3.6.6. The frame-
works are grouped into six categories, corresponding either to one 
of the underlying burden sharing principles (responsibility, capability, 
equality, right to development), or a combination of them. It is impor-
tant to note that several of the approaches are based on consider-
ations other than equity principles. For example, several allocate allow-
ances based on grandfathered emissions levels, with a transition to 
an equity-based allocation only over several decades or in some cases 
with no such transition. Others allocate allowances in proportion to 
GDP, while others include mitigation potential as one basis in addition 
to equity principles.
4.7 Integration of framing 
issues in the context of 
sustainable development 
Chapters 2 and 3 of this report review the framing issues related to risk 
and uncertainty (Chapter 2) and social, economic, and ethical consider-
ations guiding policy (Chapter 3). They examine how these issues bear 
on climate policy, both on the mitigation and on the adaptation side of 
our response to the challenge of climate change. Their general analysis 
is also directly relevant to the understanding of SD and equity goals. 
This section briefly examines how the concepts reviewed in these 
chapters shed light on the topic of the present chapter. 
4�7�1 Risk and uncertainty in sustainability 
evaluation
The sustainability ideal seeks to minimize risks that compromise future 
human development (Sections 4.2 and 4.5). This objective is less ambi-
tious than maximizing an expected value of social welfare over the 
whole future. It focuses on avoiding setbacks on development, and is 
therefore well in line with Chapter 2 (Section 2.5.1) highlighting the dif-
ficulty of applying the standard decision model based on expected util-
ity in the context of climate policy. It is directly akin to the methods of 
risk management listed there (Sections 2.5.2 – 2.5.7), in particular those 
focusing on worst-case scenarios. The literature on adaptation has simi-
larly emphasized the concept of resilience, which is the ability of a sys-
tem to preserve its functions in a risky and changing environment (WGII 
Section 2.5 and Sections 20.2 – 20.6; Folke et al., 2010; Gallopin, 2006).
This chapter has reviewed the actors and determinants of support 
for policies addressing the climate challenge (Sections 4.3 and 4.6). 
Among the relevant considerations, one must include how risk percep-
tions shape the actors’ understanding of threats to sustainability and 
willingness to take action. Chapter 2 (Section 2.4) has described how 
framing and affective associations can be effective and manipulative, 
how absence or presence of a direct experience of climate extremes 
makes individuals distort probabilities, and how gradual changes are 
easy to underestimate. 
Risk and uncertainty are also relevant to the dimension of equity, in 
relation to sustainability, because various regions of the world and 
communities within those regions experience unequal degrees of cli-
mate risk and uncertainty. Better information about the distribution of 
risks between regions and countries would affect the policy response 
and negotiations. Lecocq and Shalizi (2007) argue that the absence of 
information about the location and extent of impacts raises incentives 
for mitigation, and Lecocq and Hourcade (2012) show that the optimal 
level of mitigation may also increase. 
Incorporating risk in the evaluation of sustainability of a development 
pathway is challenging and has been analyzed in a small literature. In 
particular, Baumgärtner and Quaas (2009) and Martinet (2011) propose 
to define thresholds for well-being or for various natural or man-made 
stocks and to assess sustainability by the probability that thresholds will 
be crossed in the foreseeable future. However, a decision maker may 
not find it sufficient to check that the risk of unsustainability is below a 
given threshold, and may also want to know the likelihood of the bad 
scenarios and the harm incurred by the population in these scenarios. 
4�7�2 Socio-economic evaluation
Chapter 3 has reviewed the principles of social and economic evalu-
ation and equity in a general way. In 3.6.1 it recalls that there is now 
a consensus that methods of cost-benefit analysis that simply add up 
monetary-equivalent gains and losses are consistent and applicable 
only under very specific assumptions (constant marginal utility of 
income and absence of priority for the worse off) which are empiri-
cally dubious and ethically controversial. It is thus necessary to intro-
duce weights in such summations (see Equation 3.6.2) that embody 
suitable ethical concerns and restore consistency of the evaluation. 
Adler (2011) makes a detailed argument in favour of this ‘social 
welfare function’ approach to cost-benefit analysis. This approach 
is followed by Anthoff et al. (2009), refining previous use of equity 
weights by Fankhauser et  al. (1997) and Tol (1999). An advantage 
of a well-specified methodology for the choice of equity weights is 
the ability to reach more precise conclusions than when all possible 
weights are spanned. It also makes it possible to transparently relate 
conclusions to ethical assumptions such as the degree of priority to 
the worse off.
Chapter 3 (Section 3.4) describes the general concepts of social wel-
fare and individual well-being. In applications to the assessment of 
development paths and sustainability, empirical measures are needed. 
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Several methods are discussed in Stiglitz et al. (2009) and Adler (2011). 
In particular, the capability approach (Sen, 2001, 2009) is well known 
for its broad measure of well-being that synthesizes multiple dimen-
sions of human life and incorporates considerations of autonomy 
and freedom. Most applications of it do not directly rely on individual 
preferences (Alkire, 2010). Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013) defend an 
approach that relies on individual preferences, in a similar fashion as 
money-metric utilities. Some authors (e. g., Layard et  al., 2008) even 
propose to use satisfaction levels obtained from happiness surveys 
directly as utility numbers. This is controversial because different indi-
viduals use different standards when they answer questions about 
their satisfaction with life (Graham, 2009).
One reason why well-being may be useful as a guiding principle in the 
assessment of sustainability, as opposed to a more piecemeal analy-
sis of each pillar, is that it helps evaluate the weak versus strong sus-
tainability distinction. As explained in Section 4.2, weak sustainability 
assumes that produced capital can replace natural capital, whereas 
strong sustainability requires natural capital to be preserved. From the 
standpoint of well-being, the possibility to substitute produced capital 
for natural capital depends on the consequences on living beings. If 
the well-being of humans depends directly on natural capital, if there 
is option value in preserving natural capital because it may have use-
ful properties that have yet to be discovered, or if non-human living 
beings depend on natural capital for their flourishing, this gives power-
ful reasons to support a form of strong sustainability. 
Additionally, Chapter 3 (in particular Sections 3.3 and 3.5) mentions 
other aspects of equity that are relevant to policy debates and inter-
national negotiations on climate responses. Chapter 3 discusses these 
issues at the level of ethical principles, and given the importance of 
such issues in policy debates about mitigation efforts, Section 4.6 
develops how these principles have been applied to the issue of bur-
den sharing in climate regime.
4.8 Implications for 
 subsequent chapters
The primary implication of this chapter as a framing for subsequent 
chapters is to underscore the importance of explicitly scrutinizing the 
candidate mitigation technologies, measures, and policies for their 
broader equity and sustainability implications. Indeed, the relevant 
stakeholders and decision makers have various priorities, in particular 
regarding economic and human development, which may align or con-
flict with prospective climate actions. Equitable and sustainable devel-
opment provides a broader overarching framework within which to 
examine climate strategies as one of the multiple interacting challenges 
confronting society. Ultimately, it is a framework within which society 
can consider the fundamental question of its development pathway. 
4�8�1 Three levels of analysis of 
 sustainability consequences of climate 
policy options
Various definitions and indicators of SD have been introduced in this 
chapter (in particular in Section 4.2, 4.5). This subsection offers a sim-
ple taxonomy of approaches for the assessment of sustainability.
Long-term evolution of the three pillars� The outcomes of climate 
policy options can generally be observed in the three spheres related 
to the three pillars of SD: the economic, the social, and the environ-
mental sphere. Sustainability in the economy refers to the preservation 
of standards of living and the convergence of developing economies 
toward the level of developed countries. Sustainability in the social 
sphere refers to fostering the quality of social relations and reducing 
causes of conflicts and instability, such as excessive inequalities and 
poverty, lack of access to basic resources and facilities, and discrimina-
tions. Sustainability in the environmental sphere refers to the conser-
vation of biodiversity, habitat, natural resources, and to the minimiza-
tion of ecosystem impacts more generally. 
Long-term evolution of well-being� The way the three spheres (and 
pillars) flourish can be viewed as contributing to sustaining well-being 
for humans as well as for other living creatures. Human well-being 
depends on economic, social, and natural goods, and the other living 
beings depend on the quality of the ecological system. It may therefore 
be convenient to summarize the multiple relevant considerations by say-
ing that the ultimate end result, for sustainability assessment, is the well-
being of all living beings. Measuring well-being is considered difficult 
for humans because there are controversies about how best to depict 
individual well-being, and about how to aggregate over the whole popu-
lation. However, as explained in Sections 3.4 and 4.7, many of the diffi-
culties have been exaggerated in the literature, and practical methodolo-
gies have been developed. Truly enough, it still remains difficult to assess 
the well-being of all living beings, humans and non-humans together. 
But, even if current methodologies fall short of operationalizing com-
prehensive measures of well-being of that sort, it is useful for experts 
who study particular sectors to bear in mind that a narrow notion of 
living standards for humans does not cover all the aspects of well-
being for the purposes of assessing sustainability. It is also useful to 
try to assess how various interactions between the three spheres can 
impact on well-being. When there are tradeoffs between different 
aspects of the economic, social, and ecological dimensions, one has to 
make an assessment of their relative priorities. Well-being is the over-
arching notion that helps thinking about such issues.
Current evolution of capacities� Sustainability can also be assessed 
in terms of capital or capacities, as suggested by some indicators such 
as genuine savings (Section 4.2). Preserving the resources transmitted 
to the future generation is a key step in guaranteeing a sustainable 
path. Again, it is useful to think of the capacities underlying the func-
tioning of the three spheres: economic, social, environmental. The eco-
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nomic sphere needs various forms of productive capital and raw mate-
rials, infrastructures, and a propitious environment, but also human 
capital, institutions, governance, and knowledge. The social sphere 
needs various forms of institutions and resources for sharing goods 
and connecting people, which involve certain patterns of distribution 
of economic resources, transmission of knowledge, and forms of inter-
action, coordination, and cooperation. The ecological sphere needs to 
keep the bases of its health, including habitat, climate, and biological 
integrity. In general, climate policy options can affect capacities in all 
of these spheres, to varying degrees. 
4�8�2 Sustainability and equity issues in 
 subsequent chapters
As discussed in this chapter (Sections 4.2 and 4.5), sustainability is a 
property of a development pathway as a whole. And some of the lit-
erature reviewed in the subsequent chapters (6 – 16) actually discusses 
development pathways and the sustainability thereof. In addition, 
Chapters 6 – 16 discuss individual issues relevant to SD and equity. 
Based on a detailed description of SD and equity issues (rooted in the 
‘three pillars’ approach for SD, see Section 4.8.1), this section provides 
Table 4�1 | Overview of SD and equity issues as addressed in Chapters 5 – 16 of the WGIII AR5. 
SD and equity issues
Chapter
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
EQUITY
•	Distribution (within and between 
countries and generations)





•	Procedural equity (Participation  / 














•	Standards of living 5.3.3 6.3.1.2 7.10.2 8.2.2.1 9.7.2.5 10.8.1 11.7.1 12.5.2.1
•	Financing 7.10.2 9.10.3.3 11.7.1 12.6.2 13.11.1 14.3.7 
14.4.4
16.8
•	 Innovation 5.6.1 6.5.1 7.9.1 8.7.3 10.8.4 11.3.1 
11.13.6
12.2.1.3 13.9 14.3.6 15.6




8.4 9.4.3 11.3.2 12.3.2.1 
12.4.1
14.3.2
•	Energy Security 5.3.4 6.6.2.2 7.9.1 8.7.1 9.7.2.2 10.8.1 11.13.6 12.8.2 14.4.3
SOCIAL
•	Poverty (alleviation) 6.6.2.3 7.9,1 
7.10.3




•	Access to and affordability of basic 
services
6.6.2.3 7.9.1 8.7.1 9.7.1 11.A.6 12.4.2.4 
12.5.2.1
14.3.2.1
•	Food security 5.3.5 
5.7.2
6.3.5 7.9.4 11.7.1 
11.13.6 / 7
•	Education and learning 7.9.1 13.10 15.10 16.3








•	Displacements 7.9.4 10.8.1 11.7.1  
11.13.6
•	Quality of life 7.9.4 8.7.1 9.7.1 10.8.1 11.A.6 12.8.2 / 3
•	Gender Impacts 7.9.1 
(Box)
9.7.1 11.7  
11.13.5
ENVIRONMENTAL
•	Ecosystem impacts and biodiversity 
conservation





•	Water, soils, and other natural 
resources
5.5.2 6.6.2.5 7.9.2; 
7.9.3
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a map and a reader’s guide for the report from the SD and equity per-
spective. Table 4.1 shows where those issues are addressed throughout 
the report. It is supplemented in this section by a brief outline of how 
each chapter from 6 – 16 deals with them.
The present section is broader than, and a complement to, Section 6.6 
and Table 6.7, which sum up and discuss key co-benefits and adverse 
side-effects in Chapters 7 – 12. It is broader in two ways. First, the pres-
ent section covers all chapters, not just the sectoral chapters. Second, 
the present section reviews not only where co-benefits and adverse 
side-effects are discussed (the “development in the climate lens” 
approach as in Sathaye et al., 2007), but also where the implications 
of key development policies for mitigation and mitigative capacity are 
discussed (“climate in the development lens”), and where integrated 
development paths, including but not limited to climate mitigation, are 
analyzed. On the other hand, Section 6.6 and Table 6.7 provide a more 
detailed description of many sorts of co-benefits and adverse side-
effects (not all of which directly bear on SD). 
The review conducted in the present section leads to three key mes-
sages. First, SD and equity issues are pervasive throughout the chap-
ters, reflecting growing literature and attention paid to the topic. 
Second, a large part of the discussion remains framed within the 
framework of co-benefits and adverse side-effects. Although extremely 
important and useful, it has been noted above (Section 4.2) that co-
benefits and adverse side-effects are only a building block towards a 
full SD assessment — which is about integrating the different dimen-
sions in a comprehensive pathway framework. Third, while some top-
ics, such as health co-benefits and adverse side-effects associated with 
mitigation policies, appear already well covered in the literature, oth-
ers remain scarcely addressed. In particular, distributional issues (both 
distributional implications of mitigation policies and implications of 
different distributional settings for climate policies), employment, and 
social cohesiveness, have limited coverage — despite being among the 
key SD goals that policymakers will consider.
The following paragraphs briefly describe how each chapter (from 5 to 
16) deals with SD and equity issues. Chapter 5 analyzes the drivers of 
GHG emissions, and many of these drivers have to do with basic char-
acteristics of the development pathway (population, economic growth, 
behaviours, technology) that impact sustainability perspectives (5.3, 
5.5, 5.6). It also provides a brief overview of co-benefits (in particular 
in health) and adverse side-effects (5.7) and takes a system perspec-
tive to understand the linkages between emissions and the various 
drivers (5.8) — such a systemic view is congenial to the comprehensive 
approach to SD discussed in 4.2.
Chapter 6 analyzes distributional consequences of different interna-
tional burden sharing regimes (6.3.6.6). This chapter also highlights 
the contrast between the literature suggesting that mitigation might 
increase the rural-urban gap and deteriorate the living standards of 
large sections of the population in developing countries, and the SD lit-
erature stating that policy and measures aligned to ‘development’ and 
‘climate’ objectives can deliver substantial co-benefits (Box 6.2). Sec-
tion 6.5.2 discusses underlying factors that enable or prevent mitiga-
tion. Section 6.6.1 summarizes Chapters 7 – 12 information on co-bene-
fits and adverse side-effects, while 6.6.2 attempts to link transformation 
pathway studies with other key development priorities, including air 
pollution and health (6.6.2.1), energy security (6.6.2.2), energy access 
(6.6.2.3), employment (6.6.2.4), biodiversity (6.6.2.5), water use 
(6.6.2.6). Section 6.6.2.7 reviews scenario studies analyzing the inter-
actions between mitigation, air quality, and energy security objectives.
Chapter 7 reviews the literature on the co-benefits, risks, and spillovers 
of mitigation in the energy sector, with emphasis on employment, 
energy security and energy access (7.9.1), and health and environmen-
tal issues (7.9.2). It also puts energy mitigation options into a broader 
development context, notably by examining how special mechanisms 
such as microfinance can help lifting rural populations out of the 
energy poverty trap and increase the deployment of low carbon energy 
technologies (7.10.2). It stresses that poverty itself is shaping energy 
systems in Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and creating obstacles 
(e. g., legal barriers, or vandalism, in informal settlements) to the distri-
bution of electricity (7.10.3). It also highlights the implications of the 
long life duration of energy supply fixed capital stock (7.10.5).
Chapter 8 emphasizes the importance of the transport sector both for 
human development and for mitigation (8.1.1). There are many poten-
tial co-benefits associated with mitigation actions in the transport 
sector, with respect to equitable mobility access, health and local air 
pollution, traffic congestion, energy security, and road safety (8.7.1). 
It is, however, difficult to assess the social value of such benefits, and 
there are risks and uncertainties (8.7.2). The chapter analyzes the spe-
cial uncertainties and concerns of developing countries, where efforts 
are made to develop or improve institutional effectiveness to support 
integrated planning (involving transportation, land use, energy, 
agriculture and public health authorities) that uses transportation as 
a driver for developing economic and social resilience (8.9.2). Finally, 
Chapter 8 mentions the concerns with market-based policies having 
differential impacts across population groups (8.10.1).
Chapter 9 lists the co-benefits and adverse side-effects associated 
with buildings, notably in terms of employment (9.7.2.1), energy secu-
rity (9.7.2.2), fuel poverty alleviation (9.7.2.5), and health (9.7.3.1 
and 9.7.3.2). Detailed analysis is also conducted on path dependence 
and lock-in effects associated with the building stock (9.4.2) and with 
financing issues, as they relate to the particular situations of develop-
ing countries (9.10.4).
Chapter 10 discusses the co-benefits and adverse side-effects associ-
ated with mitigation actions in the industry sector, focusing mostly on 
macroeconomic and health benefits (10.8.1). The chapter also focuses 
on employment impacts of eco-innovation and investment, noting 
that substantial impacts require job support mechanisms, and that the 
distributional effects of these policies and across different countries 
remain unclear (10.10.2). 
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Chapter 11 frames the discussion of mitigation options in the Agricul-
ture, Forestry, and Other Land Use (AFOLU) sector within a systemic 
development context (11.4.1). It thoroughly examines the socio-eco-
nomic impacts of changes in land use (11.7.1). Increasing land rents 
and food prices due to a reduction in land availability for agricul-
ture, and increasing inequity and land conflicts are serious concerns 
(11.7.1). Special care for small holders and equity issues, including 
gender, should accompany mitigation projects (Box 11.6). Bioenergy 
deployment can have strong distributional impacts, mediated by 
global market dynamics, including policy regulations and incentives, 
the production model and deployment scale, and place-specific fac-
tors such as land tenure security, labour and financial capabilities. It 
can raise and diversify farm incomes and increase rural employment, 
but can also cause smallholders, tenants and herders to lose access 
to productive land, while other social groups such as workers, inves-
tors, company owners, biofuels consumers, would benefit (bioenergy 
appendix).
Chapter 12 naturally adopts a systemic perspective in dealing with 
human settlements (12.1, 12.4, 12.5.1), and discusses procedural 
equity issues in the context of city governance (12.6). It notes that 
a high-density city, depending heavily upon land-based public-pri-
vate financing, faces issues of real estate speculation and housing 
affordability (12.6.2). Adapted tax policies can help integrate market 
incentives with policy objectives such as sustainable transit financ-
ing, affordable housing, and environmental protection. Section 12.8 
focuses more specifically on the co-benefits of mitigation options in 
human settlements, notably in terms of improved health, but also 
regarding quality of life (noise, urban heat island effect) and energy 
security and efficiency.
Chapter 13 provides a detailed examination of various international 
agreements and mechanisms through the lens of distributional 
impacts, noting the complex interaction between equity and participa-
tion in voluntary cooperation processes (13.2). The chapter discusses 
the distributional impacts of the Kyoto Protocol as well as various pro-
posals for multilateral systems (global permit market, global tax, tech-
nology-oriented schemes) (13.13), linkages (13.7.2), and more decen-
tralized initiatives such as trade sanctions (13.8) and geo-engineering 
(13.4.4). Chapter 13 further discusses advantages and limitations of 
linking negotiations on mitigation and negotiations on other develop-
ment objectives (13.3.3). Links with policies and institutions related to 
other development goals are not discussed, except for relationships 
between mitigation and international trade regulation (13.8). Finally, 
human rights and rights of nature are discussed in so far as they might 
support legal challenges to greenhouse gases emissions (13.5.2.2).
Chapter 14 firmly embeds its analysis of climate policies at the regional 
level within the context of possible development paths, highlighting 
significant regional differences (14.1.2, 14.1.3). Given heterogeneity of 
capacities between countries, it argues that regional cooperation on 
climate change can help to foster mitigation that considers distribu-
tional aspects. In particular, high inequalities in poor regions raise dif-
ficult distributional questions regarding the costs and benefits of miti-
gation policies (14.1.3). Mitigation opportunities are discussed in the 
context of the broader development objectives, with regard to energy 
access (14.3.2), urbanization (14.3.3), consumption patterns (14.3.4), 
agriculture and land-use (14.3.5), and technological development 
(14.3.6). Relationships between mitigation options and regional trade 
agreements — not a development objective per se but an instrument 
for achieving economic growth — are also examined (14.4.2). Finally, 
Chapter 14 examines the geographical concentration of CDM projects 
(14.3.7).
In analyzing policies at the national and subnational level, Chapter 
15 provides a detailed analysis of the relationships between climate 
change mitigation and other development goals. While it notes the 
practical importance of co-benefits in the design of climate policies 
(15.2.4), it also shows that certain measures set up with primarily 
other development objectives have important implications for climate 
change mitigation, either directly in terms of emission reductions, or 
indirectly in terms of provision of public goods necessary for mitiga-
tion policies to be effective (15.3.4, 15.5.2, 15.5.6). In addition, the 
chapter highlights the importance of designing policy packages that 
jointly address different development objectives, and discusses in 
depth the opportunities but also the difficulties of such association 
(15.7.2, 15.11). Chapter 15 insists on the fact that whether a policy 
is adopted or not, and what outcome it finally has strongly depends 
on local circumstances (notably institutions), and on the process by 
which the decision is made (15.8.2, 15.9). Finally, this chapter notes 
that while the distributional incidence of taxes has been studied quite 
extensively, much less is known about the distributional incidence of 
other policies (15.13).
Availability of resources for investment is critical for supporting any 
development path. The literature reviewed in Chapter 16 notes that 
there are barriers to investment in many countries, not specific to 
mitigation — although mitigation activities have specific characteristics 
(size, perceived risks, etc.) that make their financing even more diffi-
cult (16.8). However, Chapter 16 notes that the literature on financing 
remains limited, and focuses quite narrowly on energy mitigation poli-
cies. There is very little evaluation, both at the micro and macro level, 
of how investment flows in other sectors (such as transportation or 
housing), could be redirected in relation with mitigation.
4.9 Gaps in  knowledge 
and data 
The current literature and data in the area of sustainable development 
and equity has gaps that could be better addressed. The points below 
highlight questions and connections that may serve as openings for 
future research.
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•	 The relationship between countries’ human capital levels and their 
national and international engagement in climate change policy 
would benefit from additional studies. 
•	 There are many open questions about how developing countries 
can best pull together the resources and capabilities to achieve SD 
and mitigation objectives and how to leverage international coop-
eration to support this process.
•	 Not much is known about the desirability and feasibility of various 
economic and policy frameworks for the compensation of foregone 
benefits from exploiting fossil fuels in resource-rich countries.
•	 In the efforts made toward an evaluation of funding necessary to 
implement UNFCCC mitigation and adaptation activities, harmo-
nized and clear methodologies and processes are still missing as a 
basis for accurate estimates. 
•	 It is still difficult to assess the unrealized potential for reducing the 
environmental impact of economic activity and to understand how 
this potential can be realized. 
•	 For technology transitions, knowledge remains insufficient for a 
comparative assessment of alternative innovation and diffusion 
systems and an assessment of the interplay between property 
rights, markets and government action, taking account of local cir-
cumstances and constraints.
•	 The relative importance in a SD transition of changes in values, as 
opposed to standard economic instruments influencing behaviours 
and economic activity, remains hard to assess. 
•	 Not much is known about the relative potential of frugality (life-
styles and consumption patterns involving lower expenditures 
on goods and services) versus ecologically-conscious behaviour 
(lifestyles and consumption patterns involving fewer material 
resources and less environmental harm without necessarily reduc-
ing expenditure) for promoting SD and equity.
•	 The non-economic motivations for climate-friendly behaviours are 
not well understood, particularly with regard to the respective role 
of social considerations or values (e. g. universalism regarding fel-
low human beings) versus ecological considerations (universalism 
regarding the environment), and the extent to which these drivers 
can be separated.
•	 The predictive power of values regarding ecologically conscious 
consumer behaviour is often low, typically less than 20 %, due to 
a range of factors operating at different levels. The causes of this 
‘value-action gap’ regarding, especially, behaviours that increase 
or limit GHG emissions are not well understood.
•	 The measurement of well-being, for the purpose of public policy, 
remains a controversial field, which suggests a need to further 
explore the potential uses of subjective data, and also seek ways 
to improve the quality of data on well-being. 
•	 The empirical economic models used in the context of climate 
policy could substantially improve by integrating transition issues 
(short-medium term) into long-term analysis, and also by adopt-
ing a sequential structure compatible with the resolution of uncer-
tainty over time.
•	 The current methodologies for the construction of scenarios do not 
yet deliver sufficiently detailed and sufficiently long-term data in 
order to assess development paths at the bar of sustainability and 
equity. The studies of SD impacts of sectoral measures in terms of 
co-benefits are seldom integrated into a comprehensive assess-
ment of sustainability of the general development path.
•	 A better understanding of the distributional impacts of prospec-
tive climate policies would provide guidance for designing equi-
table policies, and insight into the present political economic 
landscape wherein some actors support climate action and others 
oppose it.
4.10 Frequently Asked 
Questions
FAQ 4�1 Why does the IPCC need to think about 
sustainable development? 
Climate change is one among many (some of them longstanding) 
threats to SD, such as the depletion of natural resources, pollution 
hazards, inequalities, or geopolitical tensions. As policymakers are 
concerned with the broader issues of SD, it is important to reflect on 
how climate risks and policies fit in the general outlook. This report 
studies the interdependence between policy objectives via the analy-
sis of co-benefits and adverse side-effects. More broadly, it examines 
how climate policy can be conceived as a component of the transition 
of nations toward SD pathways (Sections 4.2, 4.6, 4.8). Many factors 
determine the development pathway. Among the main factors that can 
be influenced by policy decisions, one can list governance, human and 
social capital, technology, and finance. Population size, behaviours and 
values are also important factors. Managing the transition toward SD 
also requires taking account of path dependence and potential favour-
able or unfavourable lock-ins (e. g., via infrastructures), and attention 
to the political economy in which all of these factors are embedded 
(Sections 4.3, 4.4, 4.5).
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FAQ 4�2 The IPCC and UNFCCC focus primarily 
on GHG emissions within countries� How 
can we properly account for all emissi-
ons related to consumption activities, 
even if these emissions occur in other 
countries? 
For any given country, it is possible to compute the emissions embod-
ied in its consumption or those emitted in its productive sector. The 
consumption-based framework for GHG emission accounting allocates 
the emissions released during the production and distribution (i. e., 
along the supply chain) of goods and services to the final consumer 
and the nation (or another territorial unit) in which they resides, irre-
spective of the geographical origin of these products. The territorial or 
production-based framework allocates the emissions physically pro-
duced within a nation’s territorial boundary to that nation. The differ-
ence in emissions inventories calculated based on the two frameworks 
are the emissions embodied in trade. Consumption-based emissions 
are more strongly associated with GDP than are territorial emissions. 
This is because wealthier countries satisfy a higher share of their final 
consumption of products through net imports compared to poorer 
countries. (Section 4.4)
FAQ 4�3 What kind of consumption has the 
 greatest environmental impact?
The relationship between consumer behaviours and their associated 
environmental impacts is well understood. Generally, higher con-
sumption lifestyles have greater environmental impact, which con-
nects distributive equity issues with the environment. Beyond that, 
research has shown that food accounts for the largest share of con-
sumption-based GHG emissions (carbon footprints) with nearly 20 % 
of the global carbon footprint, followed by housing, mobility, services, 
manufactured products, and construction. Food and services are more 
important in poor countries, while mobility and manufactured goods 
account for the highest carbon footprints in rich countries. (Section 
4.4)
FAQ 4�4 Why is equity relevant in climate 
 negotiations?
The international climate negotiations under the UNFCCC are work-
ing toward a collective global response to the common threat of cli-
mate change. As with any cooperative undertaking, the total required 
effort will be allocated in some way among countries, including both 
domestic action and international financial support. At least three 
lines of reasoning have been put forward to explain the relevance 
of equity in allocating this effort: (1) a moral justification that draws 
upon widely applied ethical principles, (2) a  legal  justification that 
appeals to existing treaty commitments and soft law agreements to 
cooperate on the basis of stated equity principles, and (3) an effec-
tiveness  justification that argues that an international collective 
arrangement that is perceived to be fair has greater legitimacy and 
is more likely to be internationally agreed and domestically imple-
mented, reducing the risks of defection and a cooperative collapse. 
(Sections 4.2, 4.6)
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Chapter 5 analyzes the anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emission 
trends until the present and the main drivers that explain those trends. 
The chapter uses different perspectives to analyze past GHG-emissions 
trends, including aggregate emissions flows and per capita emissions, 
cumulative emissions, sectoral emissions, and territory-based vs. con-
sumption-based emissions. In all cases, global and regional trends are 
analyzed. Where appropriate, the emission trends are contextualized 
with long-term historic developments in GHG emissions extending 
back to 1750.
GHG-emissions trends
Anthropogenic GHG emissions have increased from 27 (± 3�2) 
to 49 (± 4�5) GtCO2eq / yr (+80 %) between 1970 and 2010; GHG 
emissions during the last decade of this period were the high-
est in human history (high confidence).1 GHG emissions grew on 
average by 1 GtCO2eq (2.2 %) per year between 2000 and 2010, com-
pared to 0.4 GtCO2eq (1.3 %) per year between 1970 and 2000. [Sec-
tion 5.2.1]
CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and industrial pro-
cesses contributed about 78 % of the total GHG emission increase 
from 1970 to 2010, with similar percentage contribution for the 
period 2000 – 2010 (high confidence). Fossil fuel-related CO2 emis-
sions for energy purposes increased consistently over the last 40 years 
reaching 32 (± 2.7) GtCO2 / yr, or 69 % of global GHG emissions in 2010.2 
They grew further by about 3 % between 2010 and 2011 and by about 
1 – 2 % between 2011 and 2012. Agriculture, deforestation, and other 
land use changes have been the second-largest contributors whose 
emissions, including other GHGs, have reached 12 GtCO2eq / yr (low con-
fidence), 24 % of global GHG emissions in 2010. Since 1970, CO2 emis-
sions increased by about 90 %, and methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide 
(N2O) increased by about 47 % and 43 %, respectively. Fluorinated gases 
(F-gases) emitted in industrial processes continue to represent less than 
2 % of anthropogenic GHG emissions. Of the 49 (± 4.5) GtCO2eq / yr in 
total anthropogenic GHG emissions in 2010, CO2 remains the major 
anthropogenic GHG accounting for 76 % (38± 3.8 GtCO2eq / yr) of total 
anthropogenic GHG emissions in 2010. 16 % (7.8± 1.6 GtCO2eq / yr) 
come from methane (CH4), 6.2 % (3.1± 1.9 GtCO2eq / yr) from nitrous 
oxide (N2O), and 2.0 % (1.0± 0.2 GtCO2eq / yr) from fluorinated gases. 
[5.2.1]
Over the last four decades GHG emissions have risen in every 
region other than Economies in Transition, though trends in 
the different regions have been dissimilar (high confidence). 
In Asia, GHG emissions grew by 330 % reaching 19  GtCO2eq / yr in 
1 Values with ± provide uncertainty ranges for a 90 % confidence interval.
2 Unless stated otherwise, all emission shares are calculated based on global 
warming potential with a 100-year time horizon. See also Section 3.9.6 for more 
information on emission metrics.
2010, in Middle East and Africa (MAF) by 70 %, in Latin America 
(LAM) by 57 %, in the group of member countries of the Organ-
isation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-
1990) by 22 %, and in Economies in Transition (EIT) by 4 %.3 
Although small in absolute terms, GHG emissions from international 
transportation are growing rapidly. [5.2.1]
Cumulative fossil CO2 emissions (since 1750) more than tripled 
from 420 GtCO2 by 1970 to 1300  GtCO2 (± 8 %) by 2010 (high 
confidence). Cumulative CO2 emissions associated with agriculture, 
deforestation, and other land use change (AFOLU) have increased 
from about 490 GtCO2 in 1970 to approximately 680 GtCO2 (± 45 %) 
in 2010. Considering cumulative CO2 emissions from 1750 to 2010, the 
OECD-1990 region continues to be the major contributor with 42 %; 
Asia with 22 % is increasing its share. [5.2.1]
In 2010, median per capita emissions for the group of high-
income countries (13 tCO2eq / cap) is almost 10 times that of 
low-income countries (1�4 tCO2eq / cap) (robust evidence, high 
agreement). Global average per capita GHG emissions have shown a 
stable trend over the last 40 years. This global average, however, masks 
the divergence that exists at the regional level; in 2010 per capita GHG 
emissions in OECD-1990 and EIT are between 1.9 and 2.7 times higher 
than per capita GHG emissions in LAM, MAF, and Asia. While per cap-
ita GHG emissions in LAM and MAF have been stable over the last four 
decades, in Asia they have increased by more than 120 %. [5.2.1]
The energy and industry sectors in upper-middle income countries 
accounted for 60 % of the rise in global GHG emissions between 
2000 and 2010 (high confidence). From 2000 – 2010, GHG emissions 
grew in all sectors, except in AFOLU where positive and negative emis-
sion changes are reported across different databases and uncertainties 
in the data are high: energy supply (+36 %, to 17 GtCO2eq / yr), indus-
try (+39 %, to 10 GtCO2eq / yr), transport (+18 %, to 7.0 GtCO2eq / yr), 
buildings (+9 %, to 3.2 GtCO2eq / yr), AFOLU (+8 %, to 12 GtCO2eq / yr).4 
Waste GHG emissions increased substantially but remained close to 
3 % of global GHG emissions. [5.3.4, 5.3.5]
In the OECD-1990 region, territorial CO2 emissions slightly 
decreased between 2000 and 2010, but consumption-based 
CO2 emissions increased by 5 % (robust evidence, high agreement). 
In most developed countries, both consumption-related emissions 
and GDP are growing. There is an emerging gap between territorial, 
3 The country compositions of OECD-1990, EIT, LAM, MAF, and ASIA are defined 
in Annex II.2 of the report. In Chapter 5, both ‘ASIA’ and ‘Asia’ refer to the same 
group of countries in the geographic region Asia. The region referred to excludes 
Japan, Australia and New Zealand; the latter countries are included in the OECD-
1990 region.
4 These numbers are from the Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research 
(EDGAR) database (JRC / PBL, 2013). These data have high levels of uncertainty 
and differences between databases exist.
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production-related emissions, and consumption-related emissions that 
include CO2 embedded in trade flows. The gap shows that a consider-
able share of CO2 emissions from fossil fuels combustion in developing 
countries is released in the production of goods exported to developed 
countries. By 2010, however, the developing country group has over-
taken the developed country group in terms of annual CO2 emissions 
from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes from both produc-
tion and consumption perspectives. [5.3.3]
The trend of increasing fossil CO2 emissions is robust (very high 
confidence). Five different fossil fuel CO2 emissions datasets — harmo-
nized to cover fossil fuel, cement, bunker fuels, and gas flaring — show 
± 4 % differences over the last three decades. Uncertainties associated 
with estimates of historic anthropogenic GHG emissions vary by type 
of gas and decrease with the level of aggregation. Global CO2 emis-
sions from fossil fuels have relatively low uncertainty, assessed to be 
± 8 %. Uncertainty in fossil CO2 emissions at the country level reaches 
up to 50 %. [5.2.1, 5.2.3]
GHG-emissions drivers 
Per capita production and consumption growth is a major driver 
for worldwide increasing GHG emissions (robust evidence, high 
agreement). Global average economic growth, as measured through 
GDP per capita, grew by 100 %, from 4800 to 9800 Int$2005 / cap yr 
between 1970 and 2010, outpacing GHG-intensity improvements. At 
regional level, however, there are large variations. Although different in 
absolute values, OECD-1990 and LAM showed a stable growth in per 
capita income of the same order of magnitude as the GHG-intensity 
improvements. This led to almost constant per capita emissions and 
an increase in total emissions at the rate of population growth. The EIT 
showed a decrease in income around 1990 that together with decreas-
ing emissions per output and a very low population growth led to a 
decrease in overall emissions until 2000. The MAF showed a decrease 
in GDP per capita, but a high population growth rate led to an increase 
in overall emissions. Emerging economies in Asia showed very high 
economic growth rates at aggregate and per capita levels leading to 
the largest growth in per capita emissions despite also having the 
highest emissions per output efficiency improvements. [5.3.3]
Reductions in the energy intensity of economic output dur-
ing the past four decades have not been sufficient to offset 
the effect of GDP growth (high confidence). Energy intensity has 
declined in all developed and large developing countries due mainly to 
technology, changes in economic structure, the mix of energy sources, 
and changes in the participation of inputs such as capital and labour 
used. At the global level, per capita primary energy consumption rose 
by 30 % from 1970 – 2010; due to population growth, total energy use 
has increased by 130 % over the same period. Countries and regions 
with higher income per capita tend to have higher energy use per cap-
ita; per capita energy use in the developing regions is only about 25 % 
of that in the developed economies on average. Growth rates in energy 
use per capita in developing countries, however, are much higher than 
those in developed countries. [5.3.4]
The decreasing carbon intensity of energy supply has been 
insufficient to offset the increase in global energy use (high 
confidence). Increased use of coal since 2000 has reversed the slight 
decarbonization trends exacerbating the burden of energy-related 
GHG emissions. Estimates indicate that coal, and unconventional gas 
and oil resources are large, suggesting that decarbonization would not 
be primarily driven by the exhaustion of fossil fuels, but by economics 
and technological and socio-political decisions. [5.3.4, 5.8]
Population growth aggravates worldwide growth of GHG emis-
sions (high confidence). Global population has increased by 87 % from 
1970 reaching 6.9 billion in 2010. The population has increased mainly 
in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, but the emissions increase for an 
additional person varies widely, depending on geographical location, 
income, lifestyle, and the available energy resources and technologies. 
The gap in per capita emissions between the top and bottom countries 
exceeds a factor of 50. The effects of demographic changes such as 
urbanization, ageing, and household size have indirect effects on emis-
sions and smaller than the direct effects of changes in population size. 
[5.3.2]
Technological innovation and diffusion support overall eco-
nomic growth, and also determine the energy intensity of 
economic output and the carbon intensity of energy (medium 
confidence). At the aggregate level, between 1970 and 2010, techno-
logical change increased income and resources use, as past techno-
logical change has favoured labour-productivity increase over resource 
efficiency [5.6.1]. Innovations that potentially decrease emissions can 
trigger behavioural responses that diminish the potential gains from 
increased efficiency, a phenomenon called the ‘rebound effect’ [5.6.2]. 
Trade facilitates the diffusion of productivity-enhancing and emissions-
reducing technologies [5.4].
Infrastructural choices have long-lasting effects on emissions 
and may lock a country in a development path for decades 
(medium evidence, medium agreement). As an example, infrastructure 
and technology choices made by industrialized countries in the post-
World War II period, at low-energy prices, still have an effect on current 
worldwide GHG emissions. [5.6.3]
Behaviour affects emissions through energy use, technological 
choices, lifestyles, and consumption preferences (robust evidence, 
high agreement). Behaviour is rooted in individuals’ psychological, cul-
tural, and social orientations that lead to different lifestyles and con-
sumption patterns. Across countries, strategies and policies have been 
used to change individual choices, sometimes through changing the 
context in which decisions are made; a question remains whether such 
policies can be scaled up to macro level. [5.5]
Co-benefits may be particularly important for policymakers 
because the benefits can be realized faster than can benefits 
from reduced climate change, but they depend on assumptions 
about future trends (medium evidence, high agreement). Policies 
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addressing fossil fuel use may reduce not only CO2 emissions but also 
sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions and other pollutants that directly affect 
human health, but this effect interacts with future air pollution poli-
cies. Some mitigation policies may also produce adverse side-effects, 
by promoting energy supply technologies that increase some forms 
of air pollution. A comprehensive analysis of co-benefits and adverse 
side-effects is essential to estimate the actual costs of mitigation poli-
cies. [5.7]
Policies can be designed to act upon underlying drivers so 
as to decrease GHG emissions (limited evidence, medium agree-
ment). Policies can be designed and implemented to affect underly-
ing drivers. From 1970 – 2010, in most regions and countries, policies 
have proved insufficient in influencing infrastructure, technological, or 
behavioural choices at a scale that curbs the upward GHG-emissions 
trends. [5.6, 5.8]
5.1 Introduction and 
overview
The concentration of greenhouse gases, including CO2 and methane 
(CH4), in the atmosphere has been steadily rising since the beginning 
of the Industrial Revolution (Etheridge et al., 1996, 2002; NRC, 2010). 
Anthropogenic CO2 emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels 
have been the main contributor to rising CO2-concentration levels in 
the atmosphere, followed by CO2 emissions from land use, land use 
change, and forestry (LULUCF).
Chapter 5 analyzes the anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG)-emission 
trends until the present and the main drivers that explain those trends. 
This chapter serves as a reference for assessing, in following chapters, 
the potential future emissions paths, and mitigation measures.
For a systematic assessment of the main drivers of GHG-emission 
trends, this and subsequent chapters employ a decomposition analysis 
based on the IPAT and Kaya identities (see Box 5.1). 
Chapter 5 first considers the immediate drivers, or factors in the 
decomposition, of total GHG emissions. For energy, the factors are 
population, gross domestic product (GDP) (production) and gross 
national expenditure (GNE) (expenditures) per capita, energy inten-
sity of production and expenditures, and GHG-emissions intensity 
of energy. For other sectors, the last two factors are combined into 
GHG-emissions intensity of production or expenditures. Secondly, it 
considers the underlying drivers defined as the processes, mecha-
nisms, and characteristics of society that influence emissions through 
the factors, such as fossil fuels endowment and availability, consump-
tion patterns, structural and technological changes, and behavioural 
choices. 
Underlying drivers are subject to policies and measures that can be 
applied to, and act upon them. Changes in these underlying drivers, in 
turn, induce changes in the immediate drivers and, eventually, in the 
GHG-emissions trends.
The effect of immediate drivers on GHG emissions can be quantified 
through a straight decomposition analysis; the effect of underlying 
drivers on immediate drivers, however, is not straightforward and, for 
that reason, difficult to quantify in terms of their ultimate effects on 
GHG emissions. In addition, sometimes immediate drivers may affect 
underlying drivers in a reverse direction. Policies and measures in turn 
affect these interactions. Figure 5.1 reflects the interconnections 
among GHG emissions, immediate drivers, underlying drivers, and poli-
cies and measures as well as the interactions across these three groups 
through the dotted lines.
Past trends in global and regional GHG emissions from the beginning 
of the Industrial Revolution are presented in Section 5.2, Global trends 
in greenhouse gases and short-lived species; sectoral breakdowns of 
emissions trends are introduced later in Section 5.3.4, Energy demand 
and supply, and Section 5.3.5, Other key sectors, which includes trans-
port, buildings, industry, forestry, agriculture, and waste sectors.
The decomposition framework and its main results at both global and 
regional levels are presented in Section 5.3.1, Drivers of global emis-
sions. Immediate drivers or factors in the decomposition identity are 
discussed in Section 5.3.2, Population and demographic structure, 
Section 5.3.3, Economic growth and development, and Section 5.3.4, 
Energy demand and supply. Past trends of the immediate drivers are 
identified and analyzed in these sections.
At a deeper level, the underlying drivers that influence immediate 
drivers that, in turn, affect GHG emissions trends, are identified and 
discussed in Section 5.4, Production and trade patterns, Section 5.5, 
Consumption and behavioural change, and Section 5.6, Technological 
change. Underlying drivers include individual and societal choices as 
well as infrastructure and technological changes.
Section 5.7, Co-benefits and adverse side-effects of mitigation actions, 
identifies the effects of mitigation policies, measures or actions on 
other development aspects such as energy security, and public health.
Section 5.8, The system perspective: linking sectors, technologies and 
consumption patterns, synthesizes the main findings of the chapter 
and highlights the relevant interactions among and across immediate 
and underlying drivers that may be key for the design of mitigation 
policies and measures.
Finally, Section 5.9, Gaps in knowledge and data, addresses shortcom-
ings in the dataset that prevent a more thorough analysis or limit the 
time span of certain variables. The section also discussed the gaps in 



































Figure 5�1 | Interconnections among GHG emissions, immediate drivers, underlying drivers, and policies and measures. Immediate drivers comprise the factors in the decomposi-
tion of emissions. Underlying drivers refer to the processes, mechanisms, and characteristics that influence emissions through the factors. Policies and measures affect the underlying 
drivers that, in turn, may change the factors. Immediate and underlying drivers may, in return, influence policies and measures.
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5.2 Global trends in stocks and 
flows of greenhouse gases 
and short-lived species
5�2�1 Sectoral and regional trends in GHG 
emissions
Between 1970 and 2010, global warming potential (GWP)-weighted 
territorial GHG emissions increased from 27 to 49 GtCO2eq, an 80 % 
increase (Figure 5.2). Total GHG emissions increased by 8  GtCO2eq 
over the 1970s, 6 GtCO2eq over the 1980s, and by 2 GtCO2 over the 
1990s, estimated as linear trends. Emissions growth accelerated in the 
2000s for an increase of 10 GtCO2eq. The average annual GHG-growth 
rate over these decadal periods was 2.0 %, 1.4 %, 0.6 %, and 2.2 %.5 
The main regional changes underlying these global trends were the 
reduction in GHG emissions in the Economies in Transition (EIT) region 
5 Note that there are different methods to calculate the average annual growth 
rate. Here, for convenience of the reader, we take the simple linear average of the 
annual growth rates  g t within the period considered.
Underlying drivers are subject to policies and measures that can be 
applied to, and act upon them. Changes in these underlying drivers, in 
turn, induce changes in the immediate drivers and, eventually, in the 
GHG-emissions trends.
The effect of immediate drivers on GHG emissions can be quantified 
through a straight decomposition analysis; the effect of underlying 
drivers on immediate drivers, however, is not straightforward and, for 
that reason, difficult to quantify in terms of their ultimate effects on 
GHG emissions. In addition, sometimes immediate drivers may affect 
underlying drivers in a reverse direction. Policies and measures in turn 
affect these interactions. Figure 5.1 reflects the interconnections 
among GHG emissions, immediate drivers, underlying drivers, and poli-
cies and measures as well as the interactions across these three groups 
through the dotted lines.
Past trends in global and regional GHG emissions from the beginning 
of the Industrial Revolution are presented in Section 5.2, Global trends 
in greenhouse gases and short-lived species; sectoral breakdowns of 
emissions trends are introduced later in Section 5.3.4, Energy demand 
and supply, and Section 5.3.5, Other key sectors, which includes trans-
port, buildings, industry, forestry, agriculture, and waste sectors.
The decomposition framework and its main results at both global and 
regional levels are presented in Section 5.3.1, Drivers of global emis-
sions. Immediate drivers or factors in the decomposition identity are 
discussed in Section 5.3.2, Population and demographic structure, 
Section 5.3.3, Economic growth and development, and Section 5.3.4, 
Energy demand and supply. Past trends of the immediate drivers are 
identified and analyzed in these sections.
At a deeper level, the underlying drivers that influence immediate 
drivers that, in turn, affect GHG emissions trends, are identified and 
discussed in Section 5.4, Production and trade patterns, Section 5.5, 
Consumption and behavioural change, and Section 5.6, Technological 
change. Underlying drivers include individual and societal choices as 
well as infrastructure and technological changes.
Section 5.7, Co-benefits and adverse side-effects of mitigation actions, 
identifies the effects of mitigation policies, measures or actions on 
other development aspects such as energy security, and public health.
Section 5.8, The system perspective: linking sectors, technologies and 
consumption patterns, synthesizes the main findings of the chapter 
and highlights the relevant interactions among and across immediate 
and underlying drivers that may be key for the design of mitigation 
policies and measures.
Finally, Section 5.9, Gaps in knowledge and data, addresses shortcom-
ings in the dataset that prevent a more thorough analysis or limit the 
time span of certain variables. The section also discussed the gaps in 



































Figure 5�1 | Interconnections among GHG emissions, immediate drivers, underlying drivers, and policies and measures. Immediate drivers comprise the factors in the decomposi-
tion of emissions. Underlying drivers refer to the processes, mechanisms, and characteristics that influence emissions through the factors. Policies and measures affect the underlying 
drivers that, in turn, may change the factors. Immediate and underlying drivers may, in return, influence policies and measures.
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impact of a change in index values is on the weight given to methane, 
whose emission trends are particularly uncertain (Section  5.2.3; 
Kirschke et al., 2013).
Global per capita GHG emissions (Figure 5.2, right panel) have shown 
little trend over the last 40 years. The most noticeable regional trend 
over the last two decades in terms of per capita GHG emissions is the 
increase in Asia. Per capita emissions in regions other than EIT were 
fairly flat until the last several years when per capita emissions have 
decreased slightly in Latin America (LAM) and the group of member 
countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment in 1990 (OECD-1990).
Fossil CO2 emissions have grown substantially over the past two cen-
turies (Figure 5.3, left panels). Fossil CO2 emissions over 2002 – 2011 
were estimated at 30 ± 8 % GtCO2 / yr (Andres et al., 2012), (90 % confi-
dence interval). Emissions in the 2000s as compared to the 1990s were 
higher in all regions, except for EIT, and the rate of increase was largest 
in ASIA. The increase in developing countries is due to an industrial-
ization process that historically has been energy-intensive; a pattern 
similar to what the current OECD countries experienced before 1970. 
The figure also shows a shift in relative contribution. The OECD-1990 
countries contributed most to the pre-1970 emissions, but in 2010 the 
developing countries and ASIA in particular, make up the major share 
of emissions.
Figure 5�2 | Left panel: GHG emissions per region over 1970 – 2010. Emissions include all sectors, sources and gases, are territorial (see Box 5.2), and aggregated using 100-year 
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starting in the 1990s and the rapid increase in GHG emissions in Asia 
in the 2000s. Emissions values in Section 5.2 are from the Emissions 
Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR) (JRC / PBL, 2013) 
unless otherwise noted. As in previous assessments, the EDGAR inven-
tory is used because it provides the only consistent and comprehensive 
estimate of global emissions over the last 40 years. The EDGAR emis-
sions estimates for specific compounds are compared to other results 
in the literature below.
Similar trends were seen for fossil CO2 emissions, where a longer 
record exists. The absolute growth rate over the last decade was 
8 GtCO2 / decade, which was higher than at any point in history (Boden 
et  al., 2012). The relative growth rate for per capita CO2 emissions 
over the last decade is still smaller than the per capita growth rates 
at previous points in history, such as during the post-World War II eco-
nomic expansion. Absolute rates of CO2 emissions growth, however, 
are higher than in the past due to an overall expansion of the global 
economy due to population growth.
Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the largest component of anthropogenic GHG 
emissions (Figure 1.3 in Chapter 1). CO2 is released during the combus-
tion of fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and gas as well as the production of 
cement (Houghton, 2007). In 2010, CO2, including net land-use-change 
emissions, comprised over 75 % (38± 3.8 GtCO2eq / yr) of 100-year 
GWP-weighted anthropogenic GHG emissions (Figure 1.3). Between 
1970 – 2010, global anthropogenic fossil CO2 emissions more than 
doubled, while methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) each increased 
by about 45 %, although there is evidence that CH4 emissions may 
not have increased over recent decades (see Section 5.2.3). In 2010, 
their shares in total GHG emissions were 16 % (7.8± 1.6 GtCO2eq / yr) 
and 6.2 % (3.1± 1.9 GtCO2eq / yr) respectively. Fluorinated gases, 
which represented about 0.4 % in 1970, increased to comprise 2 % 
(1.0± 0.2 GtCO2eq / yr) of GHG emissions in 2010. Some anthropogenic 
influences on climate, such as chlorofluorocarbons and aviation con-
trails, are not discussed in this section, but are assessed in the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Working Group I (WGI) 
contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) (Boucher and Ran-
dall, 2013; Hartmann et  al., 2013). Forcing from aerosols and ozone 
precursor compounds are considered in the next section.
Following general scientific practice, 100-year GWPs from the IPCC 
Second Assessment Report (SAR) (Schimel et al., 1996) are used as the 
index for converting GHG emission estimates to common units of CO2-
equivalent emissions in this section (please refer to Annex II.9.1 for the 
exact values). There is no unique method of comparing trends for dif-
ferent climate-forcing agents (see Sections 1.2.5 and 3.9.6). A change 
to 20- or 500-year GWP values would change the trends by ± 6 %. 
Similarly, use of updated GWPs from the IPCC Fourth Assessment 
Report (AR4) or AR5, which change values by a smaller amount, would 
not change the overall conclusions in this section. The largest absolute 
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impact of a change in index values is on the weight given to methane, 
whose emission trends are particularly uncertain (Section  5.2.3; 
Kirschke et al., 2013).
Global per capita GHG emissions (Figure 5.2, right panel) have shown 
little trend over the last 40 years. The most noticeable regional trend 
over the last two decades in terms of per capita GHG emissions is the 
increase in Asia. Per capita emissions in regions other than EIT were 
fairly flat until the last several years when per capita emissions have 
decreased slightly in Latin America (LAM) and the group of member 
countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment in 1990 (OECD-1990).
Fossil CO2 emissions have grown substantially over the past two cen-
turies (Figure 5.3, left panels). Fossil CO2 emissions over 2002 – 2011 
were estimated at 30 ± 8 % GtCO2 / yr (Andres et al., 2012), (90 % confi-
dence interval). Emissions in the 2000s as compared to the 1990s were 
higher in all regions, except for EIT, and the rate of increase was largest 
in ASIA. The increase in developing countries is due to an industrial-
ization process that historically has been energy-intensive; a pattern 
similar to what the current OECD countries experienced before 1970. 
The figure also shows a shift in relative contribution. The OECD-1990 
countries contributed most to the pre-1970 emissions, but in 2010 the 
developing countries and ASIA in particular, make up the major share 
of emissions.
CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes 
made up the largest share (78 %) of the total emission increase 
from 1970 to 2010, with a similar percentage contribution between 
2000 and 2010. In 2011, fossil CO2 emissions were 3 % higher than 
in 2010, taking the average of estimates from Joint Research Centre 
(JRC) / Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL) (Olivier 
et al., 2013), U. S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), and Car-
bon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC) (Macknick, 2011). 
Preliminary estimates for 2012 indicate that emissions growth has 
slowed to 1.4 % (Olivier et al., 2013) or 2 % (BP, 2013), as compared 
to 2012.
Land-use-change (LUC) emissions are highly uncertain, with emis-
sions over 2002 – 2011 estimated to be 3.3 ± 50 – 75 % GtCO2 / yr 
(Ciais et al., 2013). One estimate of LUC emissions by region is shown 
in Figure 5.3, left panel (Houghton et al., 2012), disaggregated into 
sub-regions using Houghton (2008), and extended to 1750 using 
regional trends from Pongratz et al. (2009). LUC emissions were com-
parable to or greater than fossil emissions for much of the last two 
centuries, but are of the order of 10 % of fossil emissions by 2010. 
LUC emissions appear to be declining over the last decade, with 
some regions showing net carbon uptake, although estimates do not 
agree on the rate or magnitude of these changes (Figure 11.6). 
Uncertainty estimates in Figure 5.3 follow Le Quéré et al.(2012) and 
WGI (Ciais et al., 2013). 
Figure 5�2 | Left panel: GHG emissions per region over 1970 – 2010. Emissions include all sectors, sources and gases, are territorial (see Box 5.2), and aggregated using 100-year 
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Figure 5�3 | Upper-left panel: CO2 emissions per region over 1750 – 2010, including emissions from fossil fuel combustion, cement production, and gas flaring (territorial, Boden 
et al., 2012). Lower-left panel: an illustrative estimate of CO2 emissions from AFOLU over 1750 – 2010 (Houghton e al., 2012). Right panels show cumulative CO2 emissions over 
selected time periods by region. Whisker lines give an indication of the range of emission results. Regions are defined in Annex II.2.
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Cumulative CO2 emissions, which are a rough measure of the 
impact of past emissions on atmospheric concentrations, are also 
shown in Figure 5.3 (right panels). About half of cumulative fossil 
CO2 emissions to 2010 were from the OECD-1990 region, 20 % from 
the EIT region, 15 % from the ASIA region, and the remainder from 
LAM, MAF, and international shipping (not shown). The cumulative 
contribution of LUC emissions was similar to that of fossil fuels until 
the late 20th century. By 2010, however, cumulative fossil emis-
sions are nearly twice that of cumulative LUC emissions. Note that 
the figures for LUC are illustrative, and are much more uncertain 
than the estimates of fossil CO2 emissions. Cumulative fossil CO2 
emissions to 2011 are estimated to be 1340 ± 110 GtCO2, while 
cumulative LUC emissions are 680 ± 300 GtCO2 (WGI Table 6.1). 
Cumulative uncertainties are, conservatively, estimated across time 
periods with 100 % correlation across years. Cumulative per capita 
emissions are another method of presenting emissions in the con-
text of examining historical responsibility (see Chapters 3 and 13; 
Teng et al., 2011).
Methane is the second most important greenhouse gas, although its 
apparent impact in these figures is sensitive to the index used to convert 
to CO2 equivalents (see Section 3.9.6). Methane emissions are due to 
a wide range of anthropogenic activities including the production and 
transport of fossil fuels, livestock, and rice cultivation, and the decay of 
organic waste in solid waste landfills. The 2005 estimate of CH4 emissions 
from JRC / PBL (2013) of 7.3 GtCO2eq is 7 % higher than the 6.8 GtCO2eq 
estimates of US EPA (2012) and Höglund-Isaksson et al. (2012), which is 
well within an estimated 20 % uncertainty (Section 5.2.3).
The third most important anthropogenic greenhouse gas is N2O, which 
is emitted during agricultural and industrial activities as well as dur-
ing combustion and human waste disposal. Current estimates are that 
about 40 % of total N20 emissions are anthropogenic. The 2005 esti-
mate of N2O emissions from JRC / PBL (2013) of 3.0 GtCO2eq is 12 % 
lower than the 3.4 GtCO2 estimate of US EPA (2012), which is well 
within an estimated 30 to 90 % uncertainty (Section 5.2.3).
In addition to CO2, CH4, and N2O, the F-gases are also greenhouse 
gases, and include hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulphur 
hexafluoride. These gases, sometimes referred to as High Global Warm-
ing Potential gases (‘High GWP gases’), are typically emitted in smaller 
quantities from a variety of industrial processes. Hydrofluorocarbons are 
mostly used as substitutes for ozone-depleting substances (i. e., chloro-
fluorocarbons (CFCs), hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), and halons). 
Emissions uncertainty for these gases varies, although for those gases 
with known atmospheric lifetimes, atmospheric measurements can be 
inverted to obtain an estimate of total global emissions. Overall, the 
uncertainty in global F-gas emissions have been estimated to be 20 % 
(UNEP, 2012, appendix), although atmospheric inversions constrain 
emissions to lower uncertainty levels in some cases (Section 5.2.3).
Greenhouse gases are emitted from many societal activities, with 
global emissions from the energy sector consistently increasing the 
most each decade over the last 40 years (see also Figure 5.18). A nota-
ble change over the last decade is high growth in emissions from the 
industrial sector, the second highest growth by sector over this period. 
Subsequent sections of this chapter describe the main trends and driv-
ers associated with these activities and prospects for future mitigation 
options.
5�2�2 Trends in aerosols and aerosol / tropos-
pheric ozone precursors
In addition to GHGs, aerosols and tropospheric ozone also contribute 
to trends in climate forcing. Because these forcing agents are shorter 
lived and heterogeneous, their impact on climate is not discussed in 
terms of concentrations, but instead in terms of radiative forcing, 
which is the change in the radiative energy budget of the Earth 
(Myhre et al., 2014). A positive forcing, such as that due to increases 
in GHGs, tends to warm the system while a negative forcing repre-
sents a cooling effect. Trends for the relevant emissions are shown in 
the Figure 5.4. 
Aerosols contribute a net negative, but uncertain, radiative forc-
ing (IPCC, 2007a; Myhre et al., 2014) estimated to total – 0.90 W / m2 
(5 – 95 % range: – 1.9 to – 0.1 W / m2). Trends in atmospheric aerosol 
loading, and the associated radiative forcing, are influenced primar-
ily by trends in primary aerosol, black carbon (BC) and organic car-
bon (OC), and precursor emissions (primarily sulphur dioxide (SO2)), 
although trends in climate and land-use also impact these forcing 
agents. 
Sulphur dioxide is the largest anthropogenic source of aerosols, and is 
emitted by fossil fuel combustion, metal smelting, and other industrial 
processes. Global sulphur emissions peaked in the 1970s, and have 
generally decreased since then. Uncertainty in global SO2 emissions 
over this period is estimated to be relatively low (± 10 %), although 
regional uncertainty can be higher (Smith et al., 2011). 
A recent update of carbonaceous aerosol emissions trends (BC and 
OC) found an increase from 1970 through 2000, with a particularly 
notable increase in BC emissions from 1970 to 1980 (Lamarque et al., 
2010). A recent assessment indicates that BC and OC emissions may 
be underestimated (Bond et al., 2013). These emissions are highly sen-
sitive to combustion conditions, which results in a large uncertainty 
(+100 % / – 50 %; Bond et  al., 2007). Global emissions from 2000 to 
2010 have not yet been estimated, but will depend on the trends in 
driving forces such as residential coal and biofuel use, which are poorly 
quantified, and petroleum consumption for transport, but also changes 
in technology characteristics and the implementation of emission 
reduction technologies. 
Because of the large uncertainty in aerosol forcing effects, the trend in 
aerosol forcing over the last two decades is not clear (Shindell et al., 
2013).
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Figure 5�4 | Left panel: Global trends for air pollutant and methane emissions from anthropogenic and open burning, normalized to 1970 values. Short-timescale variability, in 
carbon monoxide (CO) and non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOC) in particular, is due to grassland and forest burning. Data from JRC / PBL (2013), except for SO2 
(Smith et al., 2011; Klimont et al., 2013), and BC / OC (Lamarque et al., 2010). Right panel: contribution of each emission species in terms of top of the atmosphere radiative forcing 
(adapted from Myhre et al., 2014, Figure 8.17). The aerosol indirect effect is shown separately as there is uncertainty as to the contribution of each species. Species not included in 
the left panel are shown in grey (included for reference).
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Tropospheric ozone contributes a positive forcing and is formed by 
chemical reactions in the atmosphere. Ozone concentrations are 
impacted by a variety of emissions, including CH4, nitrogen oxides 
(NOx), carbon monoxide (CO), and volatile organic hydrocarbons (VOC) 
(Myhre et al., 2014). Global emissions of ozone precursor compounds 
are also thought to have increased over the last four decades. Global 
uncertainty has not been quantified for these emissions. An uncertainty 
of 10 – 20 % for 1990 NOx emissions has been estimated in various 
European countries (Schöpp et al., 2005). 
5�2�3 Emissions uncertainty
5�2�3�1 Methods for emissions uncertainty estimation
There are multiple methods of estimating emissions uncertainty (Mar-
land et  al., 2009), although almost all methods include an element 
of expert judgement. The traditional uncertainty estimation method, 
which compares emissions estimates to independent measurements, 
fails because of a mismatch in spatial and temporal scales. The data 
required for emission estimates, ranging from emission factors to 
fuel consumption data, originate from multiple sources that rarely 
have well characterized uncertainties. A potentially useful input to 
uncertainty estimates is a comparison of somewhat independent esti-
mates of emissions, ideally over time, although care must be taken to 
assure that data cover the same source categories (Macknick, 2011; 
Andres et al., 2012). Formal uncertainty propagation can be useful as 
well (UNEP, 2012; Elzen et al., 2013) although one poorly constrained 
element of such analysis is the methodology for aggregating uncer-
tainty between regions. Uncertainties in this section are presented as 
5 – 95 % confidence intervals, with values from the literature converted 
to this range where necessary assuming a Gaussian uncertainty dis-
tribution.
Total GHG emissions from EDGAR as presented here are up to 5 – 10 % 
lower over 1970 – 2004 than the earlier estimates presented in AR4 
(IPCC, 2007a). The lower values here are largely due to lower estimates 
of LUC CO2 emissions (by 0 – 50 %) and N2O emissions (by 20 – 40 %) 
and fossil CO2 emissions (by 0 – 5 %). These differences in these emis-
sions are within the uncertainty ranges estimated for these emission 
categories.
5�2�3�2 Fossil carbon dioxide emissions uncertainty
Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels and cement production 
are considered to have relatively low uncertainty, with global uncer-
tainty recently assessed to be 8 % (Andres et al., 2012). Uncertainties 
in fossil-fuel CO2 emissions arise from uncertainty in fuel combustion 
or other activity data and uncertainties in emission factors, as well as 
assumptions for combustion completeness and non-combustion uses. 
Default uncertainty estimates (two standard deviations) suggested 
by the IPCC (2006) for fossil fuel combustion emission factors are 
lower for fuels that have relatively uniform properties (– 3 % / +5 % 
for motor gasoline, – 2 % / +1 % for gas / diesel oil) and higher for 
most each decade over the last 40 years (see also Figure 5.18). A nota-
ble change over the last decade is high growth in emissions from the 
industrial sector, the second highest growth by sector over this period. 
Subsequent sections of this chapter describe the main trends and driv-
ers associated with these activities and prospects for future mitigation 
options.
5�2�2 Trends in aerosols and aerosol / tropos-
pheric ozone precursors
In addition to GHGs, aerosols and tropospheric ozone also contribute 
to trends in climate forcing. Because these forcing agents are shorter 
lived and heterogeneous, their impact on climate is not discussed in 
terms of concentrations, but instead in terms of radiative forcing, 
which is the change in the radiative energy budget of the Earth 
(Myhre et al., 2014). A positive forcing, such as that due to increases 
in GHGs, tends to warm the system while a negative forcing repre-
sents a cooling effect. Trends for the relevant emissions are shown in 
the Figure 5.4. 
Aerosols contribute a net negative, but uncertain, radiative forc-
ing (IPCC, 2007a; Myhre et al., 2014) estimated to total – 0.90 W / m2 
(5 – 95 % range: – 1.9 to – 0.1 W / m2). Trends in atmospheric aerosol 
loading, and the associated radiative forcing, are influenced primar-
ily by trends in primary aerosol, black carbon (BC) and organic car-
bon (OC), and precursor emissions (primarily sulphur dioxide (SO2)), 
although trends in climate and land-use also impact these forcing 
agents. 
Sulphur dioxide is the largest anthropogenic source of aerosols, and is 
emitted by fossil fuel combustion, metal smelting, and other industrial 
processes. Global sulphur emissions peaked in the 1970s, and have 
generally decreased since then. Uncertainty in global SO2 emissions 
over this period is estimated to be relatively low (± 10 %), although 
regional uncertainty can be higher (Smith et al., 2011). 
A recent update of carbonaceous aerosol emissions trends (BC and 
OC) found an increase from 1970 through 2000, with a particularly 
notable increase in BC emissions from 1970 to 1980 (Lamarque et al., 
2010). A recent assessment indicates that BC and OC emissions may 
be underestimated (Bond et al., 2013). These emissions are highly sen-
sitive to combustion conditions, which results in a large uncertainty 
(+100 % / – 50 %; Bond et  al., 2007). Global emissions from 2000 to 
2010 have not yet been estimated, but will depend on the trends in 
driving forces such as residential coal and biofuel use, which are poorly 
quantified, and petroleum consumption for transport, but also changes 
in technology characteristics and the implementation of emission 
reduction technologies. 
Because of the large uncertainty in aerosol forcing effects, the trend in 
aerosol forcing over the last two decades is not clear (Shindell et al., 
2013).
Radiative Forcing Components
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Figure 5�4 | Left panel: Global trends for air pollutant and methane emissions from anthropogenic and open burning, normalized to 1970 values. Short-timescale variability, in 
carbon monoxide (CO) and non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOC) in particular, is due to grassland and forest burning. Data from JRC / PBL (2013), except for SO2 
(Smith et al., 2011; Klimont et al., 2013), and BC / OC (Lamarque et al., 2010). Right panel: contribution of each emission species in terms of top of the atmosphere radiative forcing 
(adapted from Myhre et al., 2014, Figure 8.17). The aerosol indirect effect is shown separately as there is uncertainty as to the contribution of each species. Species not included in 
the left panel are shown in grey (included for reference).
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fuels with more diverse properties (– 15 % / +18 % petroleum coke, 
– 10 % / +14 % for lignite). Some emissions factors used by country 
inventories, however, differ from the suggested defaults by amounts 
that are outside the stated uncertainty range because of local fuel 
practices (Olivier et al., 2011). In a study examining power plant emis-
sions in the United States, measured CO2 emissions were an average 
of 5 % higher than calculated emissions, with larger deviations for 
individual plants (Ackerman and Sundquist, 2008). A comparison of 
five different fossil fuel CO2 emissions datasets, harmonized to cover 
most of the same sources (fossil fuel, cement, bunker fuels, gas flar-
ing) shows ± 4 % differences over the last three decades (Macknick, 
2011). Uncertainty in underlying energy production and consumption 
statistics, which are drawn from similar sources for existing emission 
estimates, will contribute further to uncertainty (Gregg et al., 2008; 
Guan et al., 2012).
Uncertainty in fossil CO2 emissions increases at the country level (Mar-
land et al., 1999; Macknick, 2011; Andres et al., 2012), with differences 
between estimates of up to 50 %. Figure 5.5 compares five estimates 
of fossil CO2 emissions for several countries. For some countries the 
estimates agree well while for others more substantial differences 
exist. A high level of agreement between estimates, however, can arise 
due to similar assumptions and data sources and does not necessarily 
imply an equally low level of uncertainty. Note that differences in 
treatment of biofuels and international bunker fuels at the country 








































































































Figure 5�5 | Upper panels: five estimates of CO2 emissions for the three countries with the largest emissions (and complete time series), including fossil fuel combustion, cement 
production, and gas flaring. Middle panels: the three countries with the largest percentage variation between estimates. Lower panel: global emissions (MtCO2). Emissions data are 
harmonized data from Macknick (2011; downloaded Sept 2013), IEA (2012) and JRC / PBL (2013). Note that the vertical scales differ significantly between plots.
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5�2�3�3 Other greenhouse gases and non-fossil fuel 
carbon dioxide
Uncertainty is particularly large for sources without a simple relation-
ship to activity factors, such as emissions from LUC (Houghton et al., 
2012; see also Chapter 11 for a comprehensive discussion), fugitive 
emissions of CH4 and fluorinated gases (Hayhoe et al., 2002), and bio-
genic emissions of CH4 and N2O, and gas flaring (Macknick, 2011). 
Formally estimating uncertainty for LUC emissions is difficult because 
a number of relevant processes are not characterized well enough to 
be included in estimates (Houghton et al., 2012). 
Methane emissions are more uncertain than CO2, with fewer global 
estimates (US EPA, 2012; Höglund-Isaksson et  al., 2012; JRC / PBL, 
2013). The relationship between emissions and activity levels for CH4 
are highly variable, leading to greater uncertainty in emission esti-
mates. Leakage rates, for example, depend on equipment design, envi-
ronmental conditions, and maintenance procedures. Emissions from 
anaerobic decomposition (ruminants, rice, landfill) also are dependent 
on environmental conditions.
Nitrogen oxide emission factors are also heterogeneous, leading to 
large uncertainty. Bottom-up (inventory) estimates of uncertainty of 
25 % (UNEP, 2012) are smaller than the uncertainty of 60 % estimated 
by constraining emissions with atmospheric concentration observation 
and estimates of removal rates (Ciais et al., 2013). 
Unlike CO2, CH4, and N2O, most fluorinated gases are purely anthropo-
genic in origin, simplifying estimates. Bottom up emissions, however, 
depend on assumed rates of leakage, for example, from refrigeration 
units. Emissions can be estimated using concentration data together 
with inverse modelling techniques, resulting in global uncertainties of 
20 – 80 % for various perfluorocarbons (Ivy et  al., 2012), 8 – 11 % for 
sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) (Rigby et al., 2010), and ± 6 – 11 % for HCFC-
22 (Saikawa et al., 2012).6
5�2�3�4 Total greenhouse gas uncertainty
Estimated uncertainty ranges for GHGs range from relatively low for 
fossil fuel CO2 (± 8 %), to intermediate values for CH4 and the F-gases 
(± 20 %), to higher values for N2O (± 60 %) and net LUC CO2 (50 – 75 %). 
Few estimates of total GHG uncertainty exist, and it should be noted 
that any such estimates are contingent on the index used to convert 
emissions to CO2 equivalent values. The uncertainty estimates quoted 
here are also not time-dependent. In reality, the most recent data is 
generally more uncertain due to the preliminary nature of much of the 
information used to calculate estimates. Data for historical periods can 
also be more uncertain due to less extensive data collection infrastruc-
ture and the lack of emission factor measurements for technologies no 
6 HCFC-22 is regulated under the Montreal Protocol but not included in fluorinated 
gases totals reported in this chapter as it is not included in the Kyoto Protocol.
longer in use. Uncertainty can also change over time due to changes in 
regional and sector contributions.
An illustrative uncertainty estimate of around 10 % for total GHG 
emissions can be obtained by combining the uncertainties for each gas 
assuming complete independence (which may underestimate actual 
uncertainty). An estimate of 7.5 % (90 percentile range) was provided 
by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Gap Report 
(UNEP, 2012, appendix), which is lower largely due to a lower uncer-
tainty for fossil CO2.
5�2�3�5 Sulphur dioxide and aerosols
Uncertainties in SO2 and carbonaceous aerosol (BC and OC) emissions 
have been estimated by Smith et  al. (2011) and Bond et  al. (2004, 
2007). Sulphur dioxide emissions uncertainty at the global level is rela-
tively low because uncertainties in fuel sulphur content are not well 
correlated between regions. Uncertainty at the regional level ranges 
up to 35 %. Uncertainties in carbonaceous aerosol emissions, in con-
trast, are high at both regional and global scales due to fundamental 
uncertainty in emission factors. Carbonaceous aerosol emissions are 
highly state-dependent, with emissions factors that can vary by over 
an order of magnitude depending on combustion conditions and emis-
sion controls. A recent assessment indicated that BC emissions may be 
substantially underestimated (Bond et al., 2013), supporting the litera-
ture estimates of high uncertainty for these emissions.
5�2�3�6 Uncertainties in emission trends
For global fossil CO2, the increase over the last decade as well as previ-
ous decades was larger than estimated uncertainties in annual emis-
sions, meaning that the trend of increasing emissions is robust. Uncer-
tainties can, however, impact the trends of fossil emissions of specific 
countries if increases are less rapid and uncertainties are sufficiently 
high. 
Quantification of uncertainties is complicated by uncertainties not only 
in annual uncertainty determinations but also by potential year-to-year 
uncertainty correlations (Ballantyne et al., 2010, 2012). For fossil CO2, 
these correlations are most closely tied to fuel use estimates, an inte-
gral part of the fossil CO2 emission calculation. For other emissions, 
errors in other drivers or emission factors may have their own temporal 
trends as well. Without explicit temporal uncertainty considerations, 
the true emission trends may deviate slightly from the estimated ones. 
In contrast to fossil-fuel emissions, uncertainties in global LUC emis-
sions are sufficiently high to make trends over recent decades uncer-
tain in direction and magnitude (see also Chapter 11). 
While two global inventories both indicate that anthropogenic meth-
ane emissions have increased over the last three decades, a recent 
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assessment combining atmospheric measurements, inventories, and 
modelling concluded that anthropogenic methane emissions are 
likely to have been flat or have declined over this period (Kirschke 
et al., 2013). The EDGAR inventory estimates an 86-Mt-CH4 (or 30 %) 
increase over 1980 – 2010 and the EPA (2012) historical estimate has 
a 26-Mt-CH4 increase from 1990 – 2005 (with a further 18-Mt-CH4 pro-
jected increase to 2010). (Kirschke et al., 2013) derives either a 5-Mt 
increase or a net 15-Mt decrease over this period, which indicates 
the inventories may be overestimating the increase in anthropogenic 
methane emissions. These results suggest that estimates of methane 
emission uncertainties of 20 % (UNEP, 2012; Kirschke et  al., 2013) 
for anthropogenic emissions may be too low, since the differences in 
trend between inventories and the inversion synthesis are of this mag-
nitude.
Overall, global SO2 emissions have decreased over the last two 
decades, decreasing again in recent years following an increase from 
about 2000 – 2005 (Klimont et  al., 2013). Global trends in carbona-
ceous aerosols over the past decade have not been estimated, how-
ever, BC and OC emissions from fuel combustion in China and India 
were estimated to have increased over 2000 – 2010 (Lu et al., 2011).
5�2�3�7 Uncertainties in consumption-based carbon 
dioxide emission accounts
Consumption-based CO2 emission accounts reallocate part of the ter-
ritorial CO2 emissions associated with the production of exports to 
the countries where they are eventually consumed (Peters, 2008; Minx 
et al., 2009). Different techniques and assumptions have been applied 
in modelling consumption-based CO2 emissions including aggregation 
or disaggregation of production sectors (Lenzen, 2011; Lindner et al., 
2012, 2013); consideration of price and deflation effects (Dietzen-
bacher and Hoen, 1998; Dietzenbacher and Wagener, 1999); use of bal-
ancing techniques for data discrepancies (Rey et al., 2004; Lenzen et al., 
2009, 2010); simplifying multi-regional input-output models (Nansai 
et al., 2009a); and use of domestic production structure as a proxy for 
imports (Suh, 2005). Different models and assumptions result in sub-
stantially different estimates of consumption-based CO2 emissions, but 
a direct comparison between these remains a gap in the literature.
Uncertainties in consumption-based emission accounts arise from 
various sources (Lenzen et al., 2010) including (1) uncertainty in the 
territory-based emission estimates (see previous sections); (2)  uncer-
tainties in input-output and international trade statistics (Lenzen et al., 
2010); and (3) uncertainties in the definitions, level of aggregation, and 
assumptions underlying the model (Peters and Solli, 2010; Kanemoto 
et al., 2012; Andres et al., 2012). 
There has been little quantitative analysis of this at the global level, 
with only a few comparisons across different versions of the same 
dataset (Andrew and Peters, 2013) and direct comparisons between 
studies (Andres et al., 2012). However, there have been detailed stud-
ies at the country level (Lenzen et al., 2010) and many of the mecha-
nisms of uncertainty are understood. 
The few quantitative studies on the uncertainty and model spread in 
global analyses confirm that the uncertainty in consumption-based 
emissions are larger than territorial emissions, though trends over time 
are likely to be robust (Andres et al., 2012). The uncertainty in territorial 
emission estimates is a key driver for the uncertainty in consumption-
based emissions, and differences in definition and system boundaries 
can lead to important differences (Peters and Solli, 2010). A detailed 
assessment of the uncertainty due to different supply chain models is 
lacking, and this remains a large gap in the literature. Based on model 
comparisons, particularly for large countries or regions, the uncertain-
ties may be less important than the uncertainties in territorial emission 
estimates used as inputs.
5.3 Key drivers of 
global change
5�3�1 Drivers of global emissions
This section analyzes drivers of the global trends in GHG emissions 
that were discussed in Section 5.2. In general, drivers are the elements 
that directly or indirectly contribute to GHG emissions. While there is 
no general consensus in the literature, some researchers distinguish 
proximate versus underlying or ultimate drivers (see e. g., Angel et al., 
1998; Geist and Lambin, 2002), where proximate drivers are generally 
the activities that are directly or closely related to the generation of 
GHGs and underlying or ultimate drivers are the ones that motivate 
the proximate drivers. 
There is neither a unique method to identify the drivers of climate 
change, nor can the drivers always be objectively defined: human 
activities manifest themselves through a complex network of inter-
actions, and isolating a clear cause-and-effect for a certain phenom-
enon purely through the lens of scientific observation is often difficult. 
Therefore, the term, ‘driver’ may not represent an exact causality but is 
used to indicate an association to provide insights on what constitutes 
overall changes in global GHG emissions.
In the literature, studies recognize various factors as main drivers to 
GHG emissions including consumption (Morioka and Yoshida, 1995; 
Munksgaard et al., 2001; Wier et al., 2001; Hertwich and Peters, 2009), 
international trade (Weber and Matthews, 2007; Peters and Hertwich, 
2008; Li and Hewitt, 2008; Yunfeng and Laike, 2010; Peters et al., 2011; 
Jakob and Marschinski, 2013), population growth (Ehrlich and Holdren, 
1971; O’Neill et al., 2010), economic growth (Grossman and Krueger, 
1994; Arrow et al, 1996; Stern et al., 1996; Lim et al., 2009; Blodgett 
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Figure 5�6 | Territorial GHG emissions per region over 1970 – 2010.  Note that only the bottom-right panel for the World has a different scale for its vertical axis. Fossil energy CO2 
indicates emissions from fossil fuel combustion. Emissions are aggregated using 100-year GWP values. Data from JRC / PBL (2013) and IEA (2012). Regions are defined in Annex 
II.2 | The direct emission data from JRC / PBL (2013) (see Annex II.9) represents land-based CO2 emissions from forest and peat fires and decay that approximate to CO2 flux from 
anthropogenic emission sources in the FOLU sub-sector. For a more detailed representation of Agriculture and FOLU (AFOLU) GHG flux, see Section 11.2 and Figures 11.2 and 11.6.
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ies at the country level (Lenzen et al., 2010) and many of the mecha-
nisms of uncertainty are understood. 
The few quantitative studies on the uncertainty and model spread in 
global analyses confirm that the uncertainty in consumption-based 
emissions are larger than territorial emissions, though trends over time 
are likely to be robust (Andres et al., 2012). The uncertainty in territorial 
emission estimates is a key driver for the uncertainty in consumption-
based emissions, and differences in definition and system boundaries 
can lead to important differences (Peters and Solli, 2010). A detailed 
assessment of the uncertainty due to different supply chain models is 
lacking, and this remains a large gap in the literature. Based on model 
comparisons, particularly for large countries or regions, the uncertain-
ties may be less important than the uncertainties in territorial emission 
estimates used as inputs.
5.3 Key drivers of 
global change
5�3�1 Drivers of global emissions
This section analyzes drivers of the global trends in GHG emissions 
that were discussed in Section 5.2. In general, drivers are the elements 
that directly or indirectly contribute to GHG emissions. While there is 
no general consensus in the literature, some researchers distinguish 
proximate versus underlying or ultimate drivers (see e. g., Angel et al., 
1998; Geist and Lambin, 2002), where proximate drivers are generally 
the activities that are directly or closely related to the generation of 
GHGs and underlying or ultimate drivers are the ones that motivate 
the proximate drivers. 
There is neither a unique method to identify the drivers of climate 
change, nor can the drivers always be objectively defined: human 
activities manifest themselves through a complex network of inter-
actions, and isolating a clear cause-and-effect for a certain phenom-
enon purely through the lens of scientific observation is often difficult. 
Therefore, the term, ‘driver’ may not represent an exact causality but is 
used to indicate an association to provide insights on what constitutes 
overall changes in global GHG emissions.
In the literature, studies recognize various factors as main drivers to 
GHG emissions including consumption (Morioka and Yoshida, 1995; 
Munksgaard et al., 2001; Wier et al., 2001; Hertwich and Peters, 2009), 
international trade (Weber and Matthews, 2007; Peters and Hertwich, 
2008; Li and Hewitt, 2008; Yunfeng and Laike, 2010; Peters et al., 2011; 
Jakob and Marschinski, 2013), population growth (Ehrlich and Holdren, 
1971; O’Neill et al., 2010), economic growth (Grossman and Krueger, 
1994; Arrow et al, 1996; Stern et al., 1996; Lim et al., 2009; Blodgett 
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Figure 5�6 | Territorial GHG emissions per region over 1970 – 2010.  Note that only the bottom-right panel for the World has a different scale for its vertical axis. Fossil energy CO2 
indicates emissions from fossil fuel combustion. Emissions are aggregated using 100-year GWP values. Data from JRC / PBL (2013) and IEA (2012). Regions are defined in Annex 
II.2 | The direct emission data from JRC / PBL (2013) (see Annex II.9) represents land-based CO2 emissions from forest and peat fires and decay that approximate to CO2 flux from 
anthropogenic emission sources in the FOLU sub-sector. For a more detailed representation of Agriculture and FOLU (AFOLU) GHG flux, see Section 11.2 and Figures 11.2 and 11.6.
omy (Suh, 2006; Nansai et al., 2009b), and energy consumption (Wier, 
1998; Malla, 2009; Bolla and Pendolovska, 2011). Each of these topics 
will be discussed in more depth, starting in Section 5.3.2. 
Obviously many drivers of GHG emissions are interlinked with each 
other, and furthermore, many of these drivers can be further decom-
posed into various subcomponents. For example, transportation emis-
sions are an important driver of increasing GHG emissions globally. 
But there is a wide regional variation in its significance. Furthermore, 
the increase in vehicle miles driven per capita or changes in fuel econ-
omy of average vehicle fleet can also be referred to as a driver, while 
these drivers are underlying to the higher-level driver, namely changes 
to transportation emissions. Therefore, drivers to GHG emissions can 
only be understood in the context of scale, level of detail, and the 
framework under which the factors contributing to GHG emissions are 
analyzed.
5�3�1�1 Key drivers
Figure 5.6 shows that, globally AFOLU emissions have increased by 
12 % between 1970 and 2010. The AFOLU emissions have been more 
pronounced in non-OECD-1990 regions and dominate total GHG emis-
sions from MAF and LAM regions. Major increases in global GHG emis-
sion have been, however, associated with CO2 emissions from fossil 
energy (+108 % between 1970 and 2010), which has been growing 
more rapidly since AR4 (IPCC, 2007b).
Figure 5.7 shows this increase in fossil energy CO2 decomposed into 
changes in population (+87 %), per capita GDP adjusted with Pur-
chasing Power Parity (PPP) (+103 %), energy intensity in GDP (– 35 %) 
and CO2 intensity of energy (– 15 %) between 1970 and 2010. Over 
the last decade, however, the long trend of decreasing carbon inten-
sity in energy has been broken, and it increased by 1.7 %. In short, the 
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improvements in energy intensity of GDP that the world has achieved 
over the last four decades could not keep up with the continuous 
growth of global population resulting in a closely synchronous behav-
iour between GDP per capita and CO2 emission during the period.
At a regional scale, all regions but Asia show 5 % to 25 % reduction in 
CO2 intensity of energy consumption, while Asia increased CO2 inten-
sity of energy consumption by 44 % between 1970 and 2010. Energy 
intensity of GDP declined significantly in the EIT, ASIA, and OECD-1990 
(39 % – 55 %) and moderately in LAM (9 %), while in MAF it increased by 
41 %. Energy intensity of GDP may increase as an economy enters into 
an industrialization process, while it generally decreases as the indus-
trialization process matures and as the share of service sector in the 
economy grows (Nansai et al., 2007; Henriques and Kander, 2010). In all 
regions, population growth has been a persistent trend. The EIT region 
showed the lowest population growth rate over the last four decades 
(16 %), whereas MAF marked 188 % increase in population during the 
same period. ASIA gained the most to its population from 1.9 billion to 
3.7 billion during the period. Purchasing Power Parity (PPP-) adjusted 
GDP also grew in all regions ranging from 43 % (MAF), about two-fold 
(OECD-1990, EIT, and LAM) to a remarkable six-fold increase (ASIA) over 
the last four decades. In general, the use of PPP-adjusted GDP instead of 
Market Exchange Rate (MER)-based GDP gives more weight to develop-
ing economies and their GDP growth (Raupach et al., 2007).
In summary, the improvements in energy intensity in GDP over the last 
four decades could not keep up with the stable and persistent upward 
trends in GDP per capita and population. In particular, a strong growth 
in GDP per capita in ASIA combined with its population growth has 
been the most significant factors to the increase in GHG emissions dur-
ing the period.
Global CO2 emissions from fossil energy are decomposed into three 
factors using territorial and consumption accounts. Figure 5.8 high-
Figure 5�7 | Four factor decomposition of territorial CO2 emission from fossil fuel combustion at regional level over 1970 – 2010. Note that only the bottom-right panel for the 
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lights the case of ASIA and OECD-1990, where the gap between the 
two approaches is largest, over the 1990 – 2010 period. Based on a ter-
ritorial accounting, OECD-1990 increased its CO2 emissions from fossil 
energy only by 6 % from 1990 to 2010. The increase in CO2 emission 
from fossil energy embodied in consumption by OECD-1990, however, 
is more significant (22 %) during the period. On the other hand, CO2 
emission embodied in consumption by ASIA increased by 175 % during 
the period, while its territorial emissions increased by 197 % during the 
period. Increasing international trade played an important role in this 
result, which will be elaborated in Section 5.4.
The strong correlation between GDP and CO2 emissions can be iden-
tified from the historical trajectories of CO2 emissions and GDP (Fig-
ure 5.9). Although there are notable exceptions (EIT), regional CO2 
emission trajectories are closely aligned with the growth in GDP. On 
average, 1 % of world GDP increase has been associated with 0.39 % 
increase in fossil energy CO2 emission during the 1970 – 2010 period. 
Over the last two decades, however, 1 % of world GDP increase has 
been accompanied with 0.49 % increase in fossil energy CO2 emission 
(1990 – 2010) due largely to the rapid growth of the energy-intensive 
non-OECD Asian economy.
Overall, the growth in production and consumption outpaced the 
reduction in CO2 emissions intensity of production and that embodied 
in consumption. Together with the growth in population, global CO2 
emissions from fossil energy maintained a stable upward trend, which 
characterizes the overall increase in global GHG emissions over the 
last two decades.
Figure 5�8 | Three factor decomposition of consumption-based and territorial CO2 emission from fossil fuel combustion for Asia (left) and OECD (right) over 1990 – 2010. Data from 
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Figure 5�9 | Regional trajectories of territorial CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combus-
tion versus GDP over 1970 – 2010. Data from IEA (2012) and JRC / PBL (2013). Regions 
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5�3�2 Population and demographic structure
5�3�2�1 Population trends
In the second half of the 19th century, global population increased at 
an average annual rate of 0.55 %, but it accelerated after 1900. Popu-
lation size and age composition are driven by fertility and mortality 
rates, which in turn depend on a range of factors, including income, 
education, social norms, and health provisions that keep changing over 
time, partly in response to government policies. Section 4.3.1 discusses 
these processes in depth. Figure 5.10 presents the main outcomes. 
Between 1970 and 2010, global population has increased by 87 %, 
from 3.7 billion to 6.9 billion (Wang et al., 2012a). The underlying pro-
cess is the demographic transition in which societies move from a rela-
tively stable population level at high fertility and mortality rates, 
through a period of declined mortality rates and fast population 
growth, and only at a later stage followed by a decline in fertility rates 
















































Figure 5�10 | Trends in regional and global population growth 1850 – 2010 | Global 
data up to 1950 (grey from (UN, 1999). Regional data from 1950 onwards from UN 
WPP (2012). Regions are defined in Annex II.2.
Box 5�1 | IPAT and Kaya decomposition methods
The IPAT (Ehrlich and Holdren, 1971) and Kaya (Kaya, 1990) identi-
ties provide two common frameworks in the literature for analyzing 
emission drivers by decomposing overall changes in GHG emissions 
into underlying factors. The Kaya identity is a special case of the 
more general IPAT identity (Ehrlich and Holdren, 1971). The IPAT 
identity decomposes an impact (I, e. g., total GHG emissions) into 
population (P), affluence (A, e. g., income per capita) and technol-
ogy (T, e. g., GHG emission intensity of production or consumption). 
The Kaya identity deals with a subset of GHG emissions, namely 
CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion, which is the dominant 
part of the anthropogenic GHG emissions and their changes at a 
global level (Figure 5.6). While global GHG emissions measured 
in GWP 100 have increased in all three categories, namely fossil 
energy CO2, AFOLU, and other over the last four decades, fossil 
energy CO2 dominates the absolute growth of GHG emissions in all 
regions and the world during the period. Two approaches to GHG 
accounting are distinguished in the literature, namely territorial and 
consumption accounts (see Box 5.2 for the definition). The Kaya 
identity for territorial CO2 emissions can be written as: 
(1) Territorial C O 2  emissions =






 ×  
C O 2  emission ____
Energy
 
In other words, CO2 emissions are expressed as a product of 
four underlying factors: (1) population, (2) per capita GDP 
(GDP / population), (3) energy intensity of GDP (Energy / GDP), 
and (4) CO2 intensity of energy (CO2 emissions / energy) (Raupach 
et al., 2007; Steckel et al., 2011). Also even simpler decomposi-
tion forms can be found in the literature (Raupach et al., 2007). 
They are obtained when any two or three adjoining factors in the 
four-factor Kaya identity in equation (1) are merged. For example, 
merging energy intensity of GDP and CO2 intensity of energy into 
CO2 intensity of GDP, a three-factor decomposition can be written 
as:
(2) Territorial C O 2  emissions = 
 population ×  GDP ___ 
population
×  
C O 2  emission ____
GDP
 
Similarly, consumption-based CO2 emissions can be decomposed 
such that
(3) Consumption − based C O 2 emissions =
 population ×  GNE ___ 
population
×  
consumption − based C O 2  emission   _________ 
GNE
 
In this case, consumption-based CO2 emissions are decomposed 
into (1) population, (2) per capita consumption (GNE / popula-
tion; GNE = Gross National Expenditure), and (3) embodied CO2 
intensity of consumption (consumption-based CO2 emission / GNE). 
The Kaya identity can also be expressed as a ratio between two 
time periods to show relative change in CO2 emissions and its 
contributing factors (Raupach et al., 2007).
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Each person added to the global population increases GHG emis-
sions, but the additional contribution varies widely depending on the 
socio-economic and geographic conditions of the additional person. 
There is a 91-fold difference in per capita CO2 emissions from fossil 
fuels between the highest and lowest emitters across the nine global 
regions analyzed by Raupach et al. (2007). Global CO2 emissions from 
fossil fuel combustion have been growing at about the growth rate 
of global population in most of the 1970 – 2010 period, but emissions 
growth accelerated toward the end of the period (Figure 5.7). 
Aggregating population and GHG emissions data according to the five 
IPCC Representative Concentration Pathways (RC) regions (see Annex 
II.2), Figure 5.11 shows that between 1971 and 2010 population growth 
was fastest in the MAF; GHG emissions have increased most in ASIA 
while changes in population and emissions were modest in OECD-1990 
and EIT. The evolution of total population and per capita GHG emissions 
in the same period is shown in Figure 5.11. With some fluctuations, per 
capita emissions have declined slightly from rather high levels in the 
OECD-1990 countries and the EIT, decreased somewhat from relatively 
lower levels in LAM and especially in the MAF, while more than doubled 
in ASIA. These trends raise concerns about the future: per capita emis-
sions decline slowly in high-emission regions (OECD-1990 and EIT) 
while fast increasing per capita emissions are combined with relatively 
fast population and per capita income growth in ASIA (JRC / PBL, 2013).
There is a substantial number of empirical econometric studies that 
assess the role of various demographic attributes; an early example is 
(Dietz and Rosa, 1997). Those reviewed by O’Neill et al. (2012) confirm 
earlier observations that GHG emissions increase with the population 
size, although the elasticity values (percent increase in emissions per 
1 % increase in population size) vary widely: from 0.32 (Martínez-Zar-
zoso and Maruotti, 2011) to 2.78 (Martínez-Zarzoso et al., 2007) (for 
the eight new European Union countries of Central Europe). Differences 
in statistical estimation techniques and data sets (countries included, 
time horizon covered, the number and kind of variables included in 
the regression model and their possible linkages to excluded variables) 
explain this wide range. Most recent studies find more than propor-
tional increase of emissions triggered by the increase in population. Yet 
the literature presents contradicting results concerning whether popu-
lation growth in rich or poor countries contributes more to increasing 
GHG emissions: Poumanyvong and Kaneko (2010) estimate elasticities 
ranging from 1.12 (high-income) to 1.23 (middle-income) to 1.75 (low-
income) countries while Jorgenson and Clark (2010) find a value of 
1.65 for developed and 1.27 for developing groups of countries. 
5�3�2�2 Trends in demographic structure
Urbanization
Income, lifestyles, energy use (amount and mix), and the resulting GHG 
emissions differ considerably between rural and urban populations. The 
global rate of urbanization has increased from 13 % (1900) to 36 % 
(1970) to 52 % (2011), but the linkages between urbanization and 
GHG-emissions trends are complex and involve many factors includ-
ing the level of development, rate of economic growth, availability of 


























































































































































Figure 5�11 | Regional trends in population and GHG emissions (left panel) and for each region the four most populous countries in 2010 (right panel). Regions are defined in 
Annex II.2 | Grey diagonals connect points with constant emission intensity. Major GHG-emitting regions or countries are in the upper half. A shift to the right presents population 
growth. A steep line presents a growth in per capita emissions, while a flat line presents decreasing per capita emissions between 1971 and 2010 | Right panel: The small labels 
refer to 1970, the large labels to 2010 | Data from JRC / PBL (2013) and IEA (2012). (Note the log-log plot.)
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Comparable direct measures of the effect of urbanization on emissions 
remain difficult due to challenges of defining consistent system bound-
aries, including administrative or territorial, functional or economic, 
and morphological or land use boundaries. Moreover, because urban 
areas are typically much smaller than the infrastructure (e. g., trans-
port, energy) in which they are embedded, strict territorial emissions 
accounting such as that used for nations, omits important emissions 
sources such as from energy production (Chavez and Ramaswami, 
2013). An alternative is to measure the effect of urbanization indirectly, 
through statistical analysis of national emission data and its relation 
to national urbanization trends. An analysis of the effects of urbaniza-
tion on energy use and CO2 emissions over the period 1975 – 2005 for 
99 countries, divided into three groups based on GDP per capita, and 
explicitly considering the shares of industry and services and the energy 
intensity in the CO2 emissions, concludes that the effects depend on 
the stage of development. The impact of urbanization on energy use is 
negative (elasticity of – 0.132) in the low-income group, while positive 
(0.507) in the medium-income group, and strongly positive (0.907) in 
the high-income group. Emissions (for given energy use) are positively 
affected in all three income groups (between 0.358 and 0.512) (Pou-
manyvong and Kaneko, 2010). Consistent with this conclusion, a set of 
multivariate decomposition studies reviewed by O’Neill et  al. (2012) 
estimate elasticity values between 0.02 and 0.76, indicating almost 
negligible to significant but still less than proportional increases in 
GHG emissions as a result of urbanization. In China, between 1992 
and 2007, urbanization and the related lifestyle changes contributed 
to increasing energy-related CO2 emissions (Minx et al., 2011).
Many studies observe that GHG emissions from urban regions vary 
significantly between cities, but that measurements are also widely 
dispersed due to differences in accounting methods, the coverage of 
GHGs and their sources, and the definition of urban areas (Dhakal, 
2009). A comparison of GHG emissions in 10 global cities by consid-
ering geophysical characteristics (climate, resources, gateway status 
(port of entry and distribution centre for larger regions due to its geo-
graphic location), and technical features (urban design, electricity gen-
eration, waste processing) finds various outstanding determinants. For 
example, the level of household income is important because it affects 
the threshold temperature for heating and cooling of the residential 
area. The use of high versus low-carbon sources for electricity pro-
duction, such as nuclear power, is an important determinant of urban 
GHG emissions in several global cities in the examined sample. Other 
determinants include connectivity, accessibility of destination and ori-
gin, and ability to use alternative transportation modes including mass 
transit, bicycling, or walking. GHG emissions associated with aviation 
and marine fuels reflect the gateway status of cities that, in turn, is 
linked to the overall urban economic activity (Kennedy et al., 2009).
An extended analysis of the urbanization-emissions linkage in 88 
countries between 1975 and 2003 finds a diverse picture. In 44 coun-
tries, urbanization is found to be not a statistically significant con-
tributor to emissions. In the other 44 countries, all other things equal, 
in the early phase of urbanization (at low-urbanization levels) emis-
sions increased, while further urbanization at high-urbanization lev-
els was associated with decreasing emissions (Martínez-Zarzoso and 
Maruotti, 2011). This also confirms that in fast-growing and urban-
izing developing countries, urban households tend to be far ahead of 
rural households in the use of modern energy forms and use much 
larger shares of commercial energy. Urbanization thereby involves 
radical increases in household electricity demand and in CO2 emis-
sions as long as electricity supply comes from fossil fuelled, especially 
coal based power plants. Transition from coal to low-carbon electricity 
could mitigate the fast increasing CO2 emissions associated with the 
combination of fast urbanization and the related energy transition in 
these countries. 
The literature is divided about the contribution of urbanization to GHG 
emissions. Most top-down studies find increasing emissions as urban-
ization advances, while some studies identify an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between the two. Bottom-up studies often identify eco-
nomic structure, trade typology, and urban form as central determi-
nants that are more important than the fraction of people in urban 
areas (see Chapter 12). These findings are important to consider when 
extrapolating past emission trends, based on past urbanization, to the 
future, together with other related aspects.
Age structure and household size
Studies of the effect of age structure (especially ageing) on GHG 
emissions fall into two main categories with seemingly contradicting 
results: overall macroeconomic studies, and household-level consump-
tion and energy use patterns of different age groups. A national-scale 
energy-economic growth model calculates for the United States that 
ageing tends to reduce long-term CO2 emissions significantly relative 
to a baseline path with equal population levels (Dalton et al., 2008). 
Lower labour force participation and labour productivity would slow 
economic growth in an ageing society, leading to lower energy con-
sumption and GHG emissions (O’Neill et al., 2010). In contrast, studies 
taking a closer look at the lifestyles and energy consumption of differ-
ent age groups find that older generations tend to use more energy 
and emit above average GHGs per person. A study of the impacts of 
population, incomes, and technology on CO2 emissions in the period 
1975 – 2000 in over 200 countries and territories finds that the share of 
the population in the 15 – 64 age group has a different impact on emis-
sions between different income groups: the impact is negative for high-
income countries and positive for lower-income levels (Fan et al., 2006). 
This is consistent with the finding that (in the United States) energy 
intensity associated with the lifestyles of the 20 – 34 and the above 65 
retirement-age cohorts tends to be higher than that of the 35 – 64 age 
group, largely explained by the fact that this middle-age cohort tends 
to live in larger households characterized by lower-energy intensity on 
a per person basis and that residential energy consumption and elec-
tricity consumption of the 65+ age group tends to be higher (Liddle 
and Lung, 2010). Similar results emerge for 14 ‘foundational’ European 
Union countries between 1960 and 2000: an increasing share of the 
65+ age group in the total population leads to increasing energy con-
sumption although the aggregated data disguise micro-level processes: 
371
Drivers, Trends and Mitigation
5
Chapter 5
ageing may well influence the structure of production, consumption, 
transport, social services, and their location (York, 2007). Several stud-
ies assessed above indicate that part of the increasing emissions with 
age is due to the differences in household size. A five-country multi-
variate analysis of household energy requirement confirms this (Lenzen 
et al., 2006). Immigration is not explicitly considered in these studies, 
probably because it does not make much difference.
It remains an open question by how much the household-level effects of 
increasing CO2 emissions as a result of ageing population will counter-
balance the declining emissions as a result of slower economic growth 
caused by lower labour force participation and productivity. The balance 
is varied and depends on many circumstances. The most important is 
changes in labour participation: increasing retirement age in response 
to higher life expectancy will keep former retirement-age cohorts (60+) 
economically active, which means that the implications of ageing for 
incomes, lifestyles, energy use, and emissions are ‘postponed’ and the 
ratio of active / retired population changes less. Other important aspects 
include the macroeconomic structure, key export and import commodity 
groups, the direction and magnitude of financial transfers on the macro 
side, and on the health status, financial profile, and lifestyle choices and 
possibilities of the elderly at the household level. This makes it difficult 
to draw firm conclusions about the ageing-emissions linkages.
Despite the widely varying magnitudes and patterns of household 
energy use due to differences in geographical and technological char-
acteristics, lifestyles, and population density, most studies tend to indi-
cate that past trends of increasing age, smaller household size, and 
increasing urbanization were positive drivers for increasing energy use, 
and associated GHG emissions.
5�3�3 Economic growth and development
5�3�3�1 Production trends
This section reviews the role of income per capita as a driver of emis-
sions while reserving judgement on the appropriateness of GDP per 
capita as an indicator of development or welfare (see Kubiszewski 
et al., 2013). Global trends in per capita GDP and GHG emissions vary 
dramatically by region as shown in Figure 5.12. Economic growth was 
strongest in ASIA averaging 5.0 % per annum over the 1970 – 2010 
period. Economic growth averaged 1.9 % p. a. in the OECD-1990, but 
was below the global average of 1.8 % in the remaining regions. The 
MAF and the reforming economies saw setbacks in growth related to 
the changing price of oil and the collapse of the centrally planned 
economies, respectively. However, all regions showed a decline in 
emissions intensity over time. Emissions per capita grew in ASIA and 
were fairly constant in LAM, OECD-1990, and EIT, as well as globally, 
and declined in MAF. The levels of GDP and emissions per capita also 
vary tremendously globally as shown in Figure 5.12.
Per capita emissions are positively correlated with per capita income. 
But per capita emissions have declined in all regions but ASIA over 
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Figure 5�12 | Regional trends in per capita production and GHG emissions (left panel), and for each region the four most populous countries in 2010 (right panel). Regions 
are defined in Annex II.2. Grey diagonals connect points with constant emission intensity (emissions / GDP). A shift to the right presents income growth. A flat or downwards line 
presents a decrease in energy intensity, 1971 and 2010. Right panel: The small labels refer to 1970, the large labels to 2010. The figure shows a clear shift to the right for some 
countries: increasing income at similar per capita emission levels. The figures also show the high income growth for Asia associated with substantial emissions increase. Data from 
JRC / PBL (2013) and IEA (2012).
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emissions over time. Despite this convergence, there is still a wide 
variation in per capita emissions levels among countries at a common 
level of income per capita due to structural and institutional differ-
ences (Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2006; Matisoff, 2008; Stern, 2012).
The nature of the relationship between growth and the environ-
ment and identification of the causes of economic growth are both 
uncertain and controversial (Stern, 2011). The sources of growth are 
important because the degree to which economic growth is driven by 
technological change versus accumulation of capital and increased 
use of resources will strongly affect its impact on emissions. In par-
ticular, growth in developing countries might be expected to be more 
emissions-intensive than growth through innovation in technologically 
leading developed economies (Jakob et  al., 2012). However, despite 
this, energy use per capita is strongly linearly correlated with income 
per capita across countries (Krausmann et  al., 2008; see also Figure 
5.15). The short-run effects of growth are slightly different; it seems 
that energy intensity rises or declines more slowly in the early stages 
of business cycles, such as in the recovery from the global financial 
crisis in 2009 – 2010, and then declines more rapidly in the later stages 
of business cycles (Jotzo et al., 2012).
Mainstream economic theory (Aghion and Howitt, 2009), and empiri-
cal evidence (e. g., Caselli, 2005) point to technological change and 
increases in human capital per worker as the key underlying drivers 
of per capita economic output growth in the long run. Technologi-
cal change encompasses both quality improvements in products and 
efficiency improvements in production. Human capital is increased 
through improving workers’ skills through education and training. 
While mainstream growth and development economics does not allo-
cate much role for increasing energy and resource use as drivers of 
economic growth (Toman and Jemelkova, 2003), many researchers in 
energy and ecological economics do (Stern, 2011).
Productivity is lower in developing countries than developed coun-
tries (Caselli, 2005; Parente and Prescott, 2000). Developing countries 
can potentially grow faster than developed countries by adopting 
technologies developed elsewhere and ‘catch up’ to the productivity 
leaders (Parente and Prescott, 2000). Income per capita has risen in 
most countries of the world in the last several decades but there is 
much variation over time and regions, especially among low- and 
middle-income countries (Durlauf et  al., 2005). The highest growth 
rates are found for countries that are today at middle-income levels 
such as China and India (and before them Singapore, South Korea, 
etc.), which are in the process of converging to high-income levels. 
But many developing countries have not participated in convergence 
to the developed world and some have experienced negative growth 
in income per capita. Therefore, there is both convergence among 
some countries and divergence among others and a bi-modal distri-
bution of income globally (Durlauf et  al., 2005). A large literature 
attempts to identify why some countries succeed in achieving eco-
nomic growth and development and others not (Durlauf et al., 2005; 
Caselli, 2005; Eberhardt and Teal, 2011). But there seems to be little 
consensus as yet (Eberhardt and Teal, 2011). A very large number of 
variables could have an effect on growth performance and disentan-
gling their effects is statistically challenging because many of these 
variables are at least partially endogenous (Eberhardt and Teal, 2011). 
This incomplete understanding of the drivers of economic growth 
makes the development of future scenarios on income levels a diffi-
cult task. 
Ecological economists such as Ayres and Warr (2009) often ascribe to 
energy the central role in economic growth (Stern, 2011). Some eco-
nomic historians, such as Wrigley (2010), Allen (2009), and to some 
degree Pomeranz (2000), argue that limited availability of energy 
resources can constrain economic growth and that the relaxation of 
the constraints imposed by dependence of pre-industrial economies on 
biomass energy and muscle power sources alone, with the adoption of 
fossil energy was critical for the emergence of the Industrial Revolu-
tion in the 18th and 19th centuries. Stern and Kander (2012) develop 
a simple growth model including an energy input and econometri-
cally estimate it using 150 years of Swedish data. They find that since 
the beginning of the 19th century constraints imposed on economic 
growth by energy availability have declined as energy became more 
abundant, technological change improved energy efficiency, and the 
quality of fuels improved. A large literature has attempted using time 
series analysis to test whether energy use causes economic growth or 
vice versa, but results are significantly varied and no firm conclusions 
can be drawn yet (Stern, 2011). 
Figure 5�13 | Growth rates of per capita income and GHG emissions. The figure shows 
the correlation between the average annual growth rate of per capita income and per 
capita emissions from 1970 – 2010, for all countries with more than 1 million people by 
2010 | Points along the grey lines have either constant emissions intensity or emissions 
intensity declining at 2 %, 4 % or 6 % per annum. The size of the circles is proportional 
to countries’ emissions. The figure shows that fast growing economies also tend to 
have increasing emissions, while slower growing economies tend to have declining per 
capita emissions. This is despite quite rapidly declining emissions intensity in some fast 
growing economies (upper right corner). Regions are defined in Annex II.2 | Data from 
JRC / PBL (2013) and IEA (2012).











































































-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8
Per Capita GDP Annual Growth 1970−2010 [%/yr]
373
Drivers, Trends and Mitigation
5
Chapter 5
The effect of economic growth on emissions is another area of uncer-
tainty and controversy. The environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis pro-
poses that environmental impacts tend to first increase and then even-
tually decrease in the course of economic development (Grossman and 
Krueger, 1994). This theory has been very popular among economists but 
the econometric evidence has not been found to be very robust (Wag-
ner, 2008; Gallagher, 2009; Vollebergh et al., 2009; Stern, 2010) and in 
any case, even early studies found that carbon emissions continue to 
rise with increasing income (e. g., Shafik, 1994). More recent research 
(Brock and Taylor, 2010) has attempted to disentangle the effects of 
economic growth and technological change. Rapid catch-up growth in 
middle-income countries tends to overwhelm the effects of emissions-
reducing technological change resulting in strongly rising emissions. But 
in developed countries economic growth is slower and hence the effects 
of technological change are more apparent and emissions grow slower 
or decline. This narrative is illustrated by Figure 5.13. Almost all countries 
had declining emissions intensity over time but in more rapidly growing 
economies, this was insufficient to overcome the effect of the expansion 
of the economy. As a result, though there is much variation in the rate 
of decline of emissions intensity across countries, there is, in general, 
a strong positive correlation between the rates of growth of emissions 
and income per capita. The rapidly growing countries tend to be middle- 
and lower-income countries and hence there is a tendency for per capita 
emissions to grow in poorer countries and decline in wealthier ones 
(Brock and Taylor, 2010).
In conclusion, while economic growth increases the scale of the econ-
omy in the Kaya decomposition and, therefore, should increase emis-
sions, the technological change that is the main underlying driver of 
growth tends to reduce emissions. This has resulted in a tendency for 
slower growing or declining emissions per capita in wealthier, slower 
growing, economies, and global convergence in emissions per capita.
5�3�3�2 Consumption trends
Production and consumption are closely connected, but when we study 
their effect on GHG emissions, we find subtle but important differ-
ences. Box 5.2 presents two methods: one for allocating GHG emis-
sions to production (territories), and the other to consumption. 
Between 1990 and 2010, emissions from Annex B countries decreased 
by 8 % when taking a territorial perspective (production) to carbon 
accounting, while over the same period, emissions related to consump-
tion in Annex B increased by 5 % (Wiedmann et al., 2010; Peters et al., 
2011, 2012; Caldeira and Davis, 2011; Andrew et al, 2013). In a similar 
vein, as Figure 5.14 shows, while territorial emissions from non-OECD 
Asian countries together surpassed those of the OECD-1990 countries 
in 2009, for consumption-based emissions, the OECD countries as a 
group contributed more than all non-OECD Asian countries together 
for every year between 1990 and 2010. The difference between the 
two methods also shows up in the trends for the per capita emissions. 
The OECD-1990 territorial per capita emissions declined over 
1990 – 2010, while consumption-based emissions increased. By 2010, 
per capita territorial emissions for OCED countries are three times 
those for non-OECD Asian countries, but per capita consumption-
related emissions differ by a factor of five. The overall picture shows a 
Box 5�2 | Definitions of territorial and consumption-based emissions
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) requires countries to submit, following the IPCC 
guidelines, annual National GHG Emissions Inventories to assess 
the progress made by individual countries on GHG emissions and 
removals taking place within national (including administered) 
territories and offshore areas over which the country has jurisdic-
tion (IPCC, 1997; House of Commons, 2012). These inventories are 
called ‘territorial-based emission inventories’.
Consumption-based emissions allocate emissions to the consum-
ers in each country, usually based on final consumption as in the 
System of National Accounting but also as trade-adjusted emis-
sions (Peters and Hertwich, 2008; DEFRA, 2012). Conceptually, 
consumption-based inventories can be thought of as consumption 
equals production minus emissions from the production of exports 
(see reviews by (Wiedmann et al., 2007; Wiedmann, 2009; Barrett 
et al., 2013). The methodology employed is predominately ‘Multi-
Regional Input-Output Analysis’ (MRIO). 
Note on Uncertainty – There is increased uncertainty in consump-
tion-based emission estimates. MRIO datasets combine data from 
different data sets, often large and incoherent. As a result, uncer-
tainties arise in relation to calibration, balancing, and harmonisa-
tion; use of different time periods; different currencies; different 
country classifications; levels of disaggregation, inflation, and raw 
data errors (Lenzen et al., 2004, 2010; Peters, 2007; Weber and 
Matthews, 2008; Peters et al., 2012). Production-based emissions 
data are a key input to the MRIO models that can vary for some 
countries significantly between databases (Peters et al., 2012). 
A process of harmonization can greatly reduce the necessary 
manipulations, and hence, uncertainties reflected in inconsistent 
reporting practices in different countries and regions (Peters and 
Solli, 2010; House of Commons, 2012; Barrett et al., 2013). For a 
detailed description in the variation of MRIO models, please read 
Peters et al.(2012). Peters et al (2012) concludes that estimates 
from different studies are robust and that the variation between 
estimates relates to different input data and approaches to assign 
emissions to trade and not uncertainty.
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substantial gap between territorial and consumption-based emissions, 
due to emissions embedded in trade. For the OECD-1990 countries, the 
gap amounts to 2.6 GtCO2 in 2010. The data shows that the reduction 
in territorial emissions that has been achieved in the OECD-1990 coun-
tries has been more than negated by an increase in emissions in other 
countries, but related with consumption in OECD-1990 countries. Fur-
thermore, while countries with a Kyoto Protocol commitment did 
reduce emissions over the accounting period by 7 %, their share of 
imported over domestic emissions increased by 14 % (Peters et  al., 
2011; Aichele and Felbermayr, 2012).
Numerous studies have used a structural decomposition analysis to 
quantify the factors for changes in GHG emissions over time in both 
developed and developing countries (De Haan, 2001; Peters et  al., 
2007; Baiocchi and Minx, 2010; Wood, 2009; Weber, 2009). The analy-
sis has been used to separate factors such as the intensity per output, 
shifts in production structure, as well as changes in the composition 
and the level of consumption. In all of these studies, increasing levels 
of consumption is the main contributor to increasing emissions. Specif-
ically, all the studies show that reductions in emissions resulting from 
improvements in emissions intensity and changes in the structure of 
production and consumption have been offset by significant increases 
in emissions, resulting from the volume of consumption, resulting in 
an overall increase in emissions (De Haan, 2001; Peters et al., 2007; 
Baiocchi and Minx, 2010). For example, De Haan (2001) demonstrates 
for the Netherlands that final demand increased by 31 % over 11 years 
(1987 – 1998), Peters et  al. (2007) demonstrate an increase of con-
sumption by 129 % over 10 years for China, and Baiocchi and Minx 
(2010) show for the United Kingdom that final demand increased by 
49 % between 1992 and 2004. In all these cases, the increase in final 
demand was greater than the emission reduction caused by structural 
change and efficiency improvements, leading to an overall increase in 
consumption-related emissions.
Calculating emissions based on a consumption-based approach 
sketches a more negative view on the decoupling of economic growth 
from greenhouse gas emissions. According to York (2007), territorial 
emissions showed a relative decoupling; emissions grew by 0.73 % for 
every 1 % increase in GDP per capita from 1960 – 2008. However, the 
elasticity of consumption-based emissions with respect to economic 
Figure 5�14 | Territory-based versus consumption-based CO2 emissions in five world regions, from 1990 to 2010 | The left panel presents total emissions, while the right panel 
presents per capita emissions. The blue areas indicate that a region is a net importer of embodied CO2 emissions. The yellow area indicates a region is a net exporter of embodied 
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growth will have to be revised upwards for OECD-1990 countries, 
given that their consumption emissions grew at a faster rate than ter-
ritorial ones (Peters et al., 2011). In this sense, there is less decoupling 
in industrialized nations.
5�3�3�3 Structural change
Changes in the structure of the economy — shares of each economic or 
industry sector in the output of the economy — might also affect emis-
sions. Over the course of economic development, as income grows, 
the share of agriculture in the value of production and employment 
tends to decline and the share of services increases (Syrquin and Chen-
ery, 1989). The share of manufacturing tends to follow an inverted 
U-shaped path (Hettige et al., 2000). The income levels at which these 
transitions occur differ across countries. For example, China’s share 
of services in GDP and employment is small and its agriculture share 
large, given its income level (World Bank, 2011), while India has a rela-
tively large service sector (Deb Pal et  al., 2012). Between 1970 and 
2010 the global share of agriculture in GDP has declined from 9 % to 
3 % while the share of services increased from 53 % to 71 %. Industry 
declined from 38 % to 26 % of GDP (World Bank, 2011). Schäfer (2005) 
shows that there are similar changes in the sectoral composition of 
energy use. The share of total energy use used in services increases in 
the course of economic development while that of industry follows an 
inverted U-shaped curve. The share of residential energy use declines 
with rising per capita income.
The shift from the industrial sector to services reduces energy use 
and emissions less than commonly thought. Partly, this is due to 
strong gains in productivity in manufacturing. The productivity gain 
can be observed through the price of manufactured goods, which 
has historically fallen relative to the price of services. Because of the 
price decline, it appears that the share of manufacturing industry 
in the economy is falling when, in real output terms, it is constant 
or increasing (Kander, 2005). Part of the productivity gain in manu-
facturing is due to improvements in energy efficiency, which reduce 
energy intensity in the sector (Kander, 2005). Also, not all service sec-
tors are low in energy intensity. Transport is clearly energy-intensive 
and retail and other service sectors depend on energy-intensive infra-
structure. 
In Austria and the United Kingdom, the transition of the industrial 
society into a service economy or post-industrial society did not lead 
to dematerialization (Krausmann et  al., 2008), but instead it was 
systematically linked to an increase in per capita energy and mate-
rial consumption as all parts of the economy shifted from traditional 
to modern methods of production. Further evidence (Henriques and 
Kander, 2010) for 10 developed countries (United States, Japan, and 
eight European countries), and three emerging economies (India, 
Brazil, and Mexico), indicates a minor role for structural change in 
reducing energy intensity, while the decline in energy intensity within 
industries is found to be the main driver of aggregate energy inten-
sity. Yet the decomposition is sensitive to the level of disaggregation. 
A classic result in the growth-accounting literature (Jorgenson and 
Griliches, 1967) is that a finer disaggregation of inputs and outputs 
leads to lower estimates for technological change and a larger role for 
substitution between inputs and structural change. This is confirmed 
by Wing (2008), who found that structural change between industries 
explained most of the decline in energy intensity in the United States 
(1958 – 2000), especially before 1980 (Stern, 2011). An alternative per-
spective is provided by the literature on consumption-based emissions 
(see Section  5.3.3.2). Baiocchi and Minx (2010) show that the shift 
to a service economy in the United Kingdom was partly achieved by 
off-shoring emissions-intensive industrial activities and thus reducing 
industrial activity, and that the service sector uses imported emissions-
intensive goods. Both of these offset the reduction in emissions from 
shifting toward the service sector in the United Kingdom. Likewise, Suh 
(2006) and Nansai et al. (2009b) show that if the entire supply chain 
is considered, the emissions intensity of services is much higher than if 
only the final production of services is considered.
The reform of centrally planned economies has been an important 
factor driving changes in GHG emissions. Emissions and energy inten-
sity were high in China, the former Soviet Union, and many Eastern 
European countries prior to reform, and declined as their economies 
were reformed. China serves as a case in point. Its energy intensity 
was very high compared to similar but market-oriented countries 
before 1980, but China’s energy intensity decreased sharply between 
1980 and 2000, as it opened its economy through market-based 
reforms (Ma and Stern, 2008). Energy and emissions intensity rose 
and then fell again from 2000 to the present as at first easy options 
for energy efficiency improvements were exhausted and later new 
policies to improve energy and carbon intensity were put in place. 
On the other hand, China’s carbon intensity of energy supply has 
increased steadily since at least 1970 (Stern and Jotzo, 2010). Sec-
toral shifts played only a small role in these large movements of the 
past three decades (Ma and Stern, 2008; Steckel et al., 2011), though 
they were important in the rise in emissions intensity from 2000 to 
2005 (Minx et al., 2011).
In conclusion, the role of an increase in share of the service sector in 
output in reducing emissions is probably quite small, but finer-grained 
structural change could be important and economy-wide reforms con-
tribute much to the adoption of more energy- and emissions-efficient 
production processes.
5�3�4 Energy demand and supply
5�3�4�1 Energy demand
Globally, per capita primary energy use, as estimated by the Interna-
tional Energy Agency (IEA) method (see Annex II.9), rose by 31 % 
from 1971 – 2010; however the five world regions exhibited two dif-
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ferent pathways during this period, as seen in Figure 5.15 (left). In the 
 OECD-1990 and EIT, energy use per capita rose by 13 – 14 %, while the 
other regions increased their per capita energy use at a much higher 
rate: LAM by 60 %, MAF by 90 %, and ASIA by 200 %. Nevertheless, 
the 2010 per capita energy use in these three regions still remains at 
less than half of the OECD-1990 and EIT countries 40 years ago.
The two pathways in per capita energy use are also reflected when 
looking at energy intensity over time (Figure 5.15 right). The measure-
ment of energy intensity, i. e., ratio of energy use per unit of GDP and 
its limitations, are discussed in the following section. The differences 
in pathways between the OECD-1990 and EIT versus ASIA, LAM, and 
MAF illustrate the energy intensity gap between the industrialized 
and developing countries. In Figure 5.16, we show a similar chart for 
individual countries. Combining the left and right panels, we see that 
improvements in energy intensity have slowed the growth in energy 
use substantially, but have been insufficient to offset the growth in the 
scale of the economy (Stern, 2012).
The effects of the oil price shocks in 1973 and 1979 and perhaps 2008 
(Hamilton, 2009) are particularly visible as dips in the OECD trend. 
These price shocks do not appear, however, to have reversed the 
upward trend in per capita primary energy use in the regions. In the 
long run, per capita energy consumption has increased with income 
and over time since the onset of the Industrial Revolution in Northern 
Europe (Gales et al., 2007) and the United States (Grübler, 2008; Tol 
et al., 2009) and since the Second World War in southern Europe (Gales 
et al., 2007). 
Changes in total energy use can be decomposed to reflect the effects 
of growth in population and income per capita and changes in energy 
intensity, all of which are discussed in detail in other sections of this 
chapter as well as in Chapter 7. 
The relationship between economic growth and energy use is com-
plicated and variable over time. The provision of energy services is 
one of the necessary conditions for economic growth, yet in turn, 
economic growth increases the demand for energy services (Grübler 
et al., 2012). As income increases, so does energy use. This phenom-
enon, coupled with population growth, has resulted in global total 
primary energy use increasing by 130 % between 1971 and 2010, 
and almost 50 times since 1800 (Nakicenovic et al., 1998; Grübler, 
2008). 
5�3�4�2 Energy efficiency and Intensity
Energy efficiency can be defined as the ratio of the desired (usable) 
energy output for a specific task or service to the energy input for 
the given energy conversion process (Nakicenovic et  al., 1996). For 
example, for an automobile engine, this is the mechanical energy at 
the crankshaft or the wheels divided by the energy input of gasoline. 
This definition of energy efficiency is called the first-law efficiency. 
Other approaches often define energy efficiency in relative terms, such 
as the ratio of minimum energy required by the current best prac-
tice technology to actual energy use, everything else being constant 
(Stern, 2012). 
Figure 5�15 | Historical trend (1971 – 2010) by region in per capita primary energy (left panel), and primary energy intensity of GDP (right panel), against GDP per capita on the 
horizontal axis. Grey diagonals connect points with constant energy intensity (left panel) and constant per capita primary energy use (right panel). Note that both axes are logarith-
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In 2005, the global first-law efficiency of converting primary energy 
sources (such as coal or natural gas) to final energy forms (such as 
electricity or heat) was about 67 % (i. e., 330 EJ over 496 EJ). The effi-
ciency of further converting final energy forms into useful energy is 
lower, with an estimated global average of 51 % (i. e., 169 EJ over 330 
EJ). Thus, approximately one-third of global primary energy use is dis-
sipated to the environment in the form of waste heat or what is collo-
quially termed energy ‘losses’ (Grübler et al., 2012).
The theoretical potential for efficiency improvements is thus very large 
(Grübler et  al., 2012). However, efficiency improvements can lead to 
additional demand, a side-effect called the rebound effect, discussed 
later in Section 5.6.2, which needs to be taken into account (Pao and 
Tsai, 2010). 
Economic studies, including those based on the Kaya identity (Naki-
cenovic and Swart, 2000), often use energy intensity — the ratio of 
energy use per dollar of GDP — as an indicator of how effectively 
energy is used to produce goods and services, also known as its 
inverse: the energy productivity. However, energy intensity depends 
on many factors other than technical efficiencies, as discussed in the 
remainder of this section, and is not an appropriate proxy of actual 
energy (conversion) efficiency (Ang, 2006; Filippini and Hunt, 2011; 
Stern, 2012; Grübler et al., 2012).
Energy intensity metrics yield valuable insights into potentials for 
efficiency improvements related to various activities (Fisher and Naki-
cenovic, 2008; Grübler et al., 2012). Energy intensity measured at the 
economy-wide level is an attractive indicator because of its simplic-
ity and ease of comparability across systems and time (e. g., national 
economies, regions, cities, etc.). However, the indicator is affected by 
a number of issues, including in relation to the way definitions are 
made and measurements are performed (Ang, 2006; Filippini and Hunt, 
2011). Many factors besides technical efficiency drive energy intensity 
differences. 
Energy intensities are strongly affected by energy and economic 
accounting conventions, which are not always disclosed prominently in 
the reporting reference. For energy, the largest influences on the met-
rics are whether primary or final energy are used in the calculations, 
and whether or not non-commercial energy7 is included (Grübler et al., 
2012; see Figure 5.16).
Figure 5.16 illustrates these differences in the evolution of historical 
primary energy intensity for four major world economies: China, India, 
Japan, and the United States. It shows the different ways energy inten-
sity of GDP can be measured. 
To see how the inclusion of non-commercial energy affects energy 
intensity, we take the United States as an example, as its PPP and MER 
GDP are the same by definition. The thin green curve shows United 
States commercial energy intensity. According to Grübler et al. (2012), 
commercial energy intensities increase during the early phases of 
industrialization, as traditional, less-efficient energy forms are replaced 
by commercial energy. Once this substitution is completed, commer-
cial energy intensity peaks and starts to decline. This phenomenon is 
sometimes called the ‘hill of energy intensity’ (Grübler et  al., 2012). 
These peaks are observed to be lower for countries reaching this tran-
sition stage now, promising lower energy intensity in developing coun-
tries that still have to reach the peak (Gales et al., 2007; Lescaroux, 
2011; Reddy and Goldemberg, 1990; Nakicenovic et al., 1998). More 
important than this ‘hill’ in commercial energy intensities is, however, 
a pervasive trend toward overall lower total energy (including also 
non-commercial energy) intensities over time and across all countries 
(Grübler et  al., 2012). It is interesting to note that despite the rela-
tively wide upper and lower bounds of initial energy intensity among 
the investigated countries, they all exhibit very similar rates of energy 
7 Non-commercial energy is energy that is not commercially traded such as the 
traditional biomass or agricultural residues, which are of particular importance in 
developing countries.
Figure 5�16 | Energy intensity improvements and per capita GDP — USA (1800 – 2008), 
Japan (1885 – 2008), India (1950 – 2008), and China (1970 – 2008). Source: Grübler 
et al., 2012. Note: Energy intensities (in MJ per USD) are always shown for total primary 
energy (bold lines), and commercial primary energy only (thin lines), and per unit of GDP 
expressed at market exchange rates (MER in USD2005), and for China, India, and Japan 
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intensity improvements independent of whether they are on a more or 
less energy-intensive development trajectory.
The most important accounting factor is the exchange rate used for 
converting income measured in local national currencies to inter-
nationally comparable currency units based on either MER or PPP 
exchange rates (both illustrated in Figure 5.16) (Grübler et al., 2012). 
In the cases of India and China, MER energy intensities are very high, 
similar to the energy intensities of the industrialized countries more 
than 100 years ago. This gives the appearance of very high energy 
intensity of GDP in developing countries. However, China and India’s 
PPP-measured GDPs are much higher, meaning that with the same dol-
lar amount, a Chinese or Indian consumer can purchase more goods 
and services in developing countries than in industrialized countries. 
The PPP-measured energy intensities are thus much lower for devel-
oping countries, indicating substantially higher energy effectiveness in 
these countries than would be calculated using MER (Grübler et  al., 
2012). A further limitation of GDP accounting, especially for develop-
ing countries, is the exclusion of ‘grey economies’ in official statistics, 
which would increase GDP.
Countries with long-term statistical records show improvements in 
total energy intensities by a factor of five or more since 1800, corre-
sponding to an global annual average decline of total energy intensi-
ties of about 0.75 – 1 % (Gilli et al., 1990; Fouquet, 2008). Improvement 
rates can be much faster over periods of a few decades, as illustrated 
in the case of China, which exhibited a steep decline (2 – 3 % / year for 
PPP- and MER-based energy intensities, respectively) between 1979 
and 2000 before the trend flattened (Stern and Jotzo, 2010). Faster 
economic growth leads to a faster turnover of the capital stock of an 
economy, thus offering more opportunities to switch to more energy-
efficient technologies. The reverse also applies for the economies in 
transition (Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the 1990s) 
or recession; that is, with declining GDP, energy intensities increase.
Energy intensity has declined globally in all developed and major 
developing countries including India and China (Steckel et al., 2011). 
When traditional (non-commercial) biomass fuels are included in the 
measure of energy input, energy intensity has declined over time in 
most investigated countries (Gales et  al., 2007). However, historical 
improvements in energy intensities have not been sufficient to fully 
offset GDP growth, resulting in increased energy consumption over 
time (Bruckner et al., 2010). The literature indicates some albeit incon-
sistent convergence in energy intensities among developed economies, 
but not for both developed and developing countries (Le Pen and Sévi, 
2010; Mulder and de Groot, 2012).
Changes in energy intensity over time can be decomposed into the 
effects of structural change (the shift to more or less energy-inten-
sive industries), changes in the mix of energy sources, technological 
change, and the quantities of other inputs such as capital and labour 
used (Stern, 2012; Wang, 2011). Globally, structural changes play a 
smaller role in determining trends in energy use and CO2 emissions, 
though they can be important in individual countries (Cian et  al., 
2013). More generally for countries and regions, energy intensity is 
also affected by the substitution of capital and other inputs for energy 
(Stern, 2012). The drivers of energy intensity trends are difficult to 
isolate. For example, in the United States, most researchers find that 
technological change has been the dominant factor in reducing energy 
intensity (Metcalf, 2008). Similar results have been found for Sweden 
(Kander, 2005) and China (Ma and Stern, 2008; Steckel et al., 2011). 
However, Wing (2008) finds that structural change explained most of 
the decline in energy intensity in the United States (1958 – 2000), espe-
cially before 1980, and Kaufmann (2004) attributes the greatest part 
of the decline to substitution towards higher-quality energy sources, 
in particular electricity that produces more output per Joule. Similarly, 
Liao et al. (2007) conclude that structural change, instead of techno-
logical change, is the most dominant factor in reducing energy inten-
sity in China.
Some differences in energy intensity among countries are easily 
explained. Countries with cold winters and formerly centrally planned 
economies tend to be more energy-intensive economies, though the 
latter have improved energy intensities significantly in recent decades 
through reform of energy markets (Stern, 2012). The role of economic 
structure, resource endowments, and policies explain much of the dif-
ferences in energy intensities (Ramachandra et  al., 2006; Matisoff, 
2008; Wei et  al., 2009; Stern, 2012; Davidsdottir and Fisher, 2011). 
There is no clear one-to-one link between overall energy intensity and 
energy efficiency in production (Filippini and Hunt, 2011), though there 
is evidence for the role of energy prices. Higher energy prices are asso-
ciated with lower levels of energy consumption and are significantly 
determined by policy. Countries that have high electricity prices tend 
to have lower demand for electricity, and vice-versa (Platchkov and 
Pollitt, 2011), with a price elasticity of demand for total energy use 
between – 0.2 and – 0.45 for the OECD countries between 1978 and 
2006 (Filippini and Hunt, 2011).
5�3�4�3 Carbon-intensity, the energy mix, and resource 
availability
Carbon intensity is calculated as the ratio of emissions of CO2 per unit 
of primary or final energy, whereas decarbonization refers to the rate 
at which the carbon intensity of energy decreases. Throughout the 20th 
century, the choice of fossil-fuels for energy has progressed towards 
less carbon intensive fuels and to conversion of energy to more usable 
forms (e. g., electricity) (Grübler et  al., 2012). Hydrogen-rich fuels 
release, during combustion, more energy for every carbon atom that is 
oxidized to CO2 (Grübler et al., 1999). The result is a shift from fuels 
such as coal with a high-carbon content to energy carriers with a 
lower-carbon content such as natural gas8, as well as the introduction 
of near-zero carbon energy sources, such as renewables, including sus-
8 For further detailed information on carbon emissions for various combustible fuels, 
see IPCC (1997) and IPCC (2006).
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tainably managed biomass (biogenic carbon is reabsorbed through 
new growth), and nuclear, and consequently further decarbonization of 
energy systems (Grübler and Nakićenović, 1996; Grübler, 2008). Decar-
bonization can also affect the emissions of other GHGs and radiatively 
active substances such as aerosols. Figure 5.17 (left panel) shows the 
historical dynamics of primary energy. It indicates that the changes in 
primary energy are very slow, because it took more than half a century 
to replace coal as the dominant source of energy.
Figure 5.17 (right panel) illustrates the historical trend of global 
decarbonization of primary energy since 1850 in terms of the aver-
age carbon emissions per unit of primary energy (considering all pri-
mary energy sources, commercial energy sources with and without 
biomass). Historically, traditional biomass emissions related to LUCs, 
i. e., from deforestation to land for food and energy crops, have far 
exceeded carbon releases from energy-related biomass burning, which 
indicates that in the past, biomass, like fossil fuels, has also contrib-
uted significantly to increases in atmospheric concentrations of CO2 
(Grübler et al., 2012).
The global rate of decarbonization has been on average about 0.3 % 
annually, about six times too low to offset the increase in global 
energy use of approximately 2 % annually (Grübler et al., 2012). A sig-
nificant slowing of decarbonization trends since the energy crises of 
the 1970s is noteworthy, particularly the rising carbon intensities as a 
result of increased use of coal starting in 2000 (IEA, 2009; Stern and 
Jotzo, 2010; Steckel et  al., 2011). Recent increases in natural gas, in 
particular shale gas use, will tend to partially offset the carbonization 
trends.
Some future scenarios foresee continuing decarbonization over the 
next several decades as natural gas and non-fossil energy sources 
increase their share in total primary energy use. Other scenarios antici-
pate a reversal of decarbonization in the long term as more easily 
accessible sources of conventional oil and gas are replaced by more 
carbon-intensive alternatives such as coal and unconventional oil and 
gas (Fisher et al., 2007). Nonetheless, almost all scenarios anticipate an 
increase in future demand for energy services. The increase in energy 
demand means higher primary energy requirements and, depending on 
the rates of future energy-efficiency improvements, higher emissions. 
Therefore, energy-efficiency improvements alone will not be sufficient 
to significantly reduce GHG emissions, and it is thus essential to accel-
erate the worldwide rate of decarbonization. Current evidence indi-
cates that further decarbonization will not be primarily driven by the 
exhaustion of fossil fuels, but rather by economics, technological and 
scientific advances, socio-political decisions, and other salient driving 
forces. Furthermore, new information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) can help reduce the energy needs and associated emissions to 
improve the efficiency measures as a result of better management of 
energy generation and end-use, e. g., emergence of smart grids and 
better control of end-use devices. 
Fossil fuel reserves and resources make up the hydrocarbon endow-
ments, which as a whole are not known with a high degree of cer-
tainty. Reserves are the part of global fossil occurrences that are 
known with high certainty and can be extracted using current tech-
nologies at prevailing prices. Thus, the quantification and classification 
of reserves relies on the dynamic balance between geological assur-
ance, technological possibilities, and economic feasibility. There is little 
controversy that oil and gas occurrences are abundant, whereas the 
reserves are more limited, with some 50 years of production for oil 
and about 70 years for natural gas at the current rates of extraction 
(Rogner et al., 2012). Reserve additions have shifted to inherently more 
challenging and potentially costlier locations, with technological prog-
ress outbalancing potentially diminishing returns (Nakicenovic et  al., 
1998; Rogner et al., 2012).
Figure 5�17 | Left Panel: Structural change in world primary energy (in percent) over 1850 – 2008 illustrating the substitution of traditional biomass (mostly non-commercial) by 
coal and later by oil and gas. The emergence of hydro, nuclear and new renewables is also shown. Source: Nakicenovic et al. (1998) and Grübler (2008). Right panel: Decarboniza-
tion of primary energy (PE) use worldwide over 1850 – 2008 (kg of CO2 emitted per GJ). The black line shows carbon intensities of all primary energy sources, orange line of com-
mercial energy sources without biomass CO2 emissions, assuming they have all been taken up by the biosphere under a sustainable harvesting regime (biomass re-growth absorbing 
the CO2 released from biomass burning) and the green line shows global decarbonization without biomass and its CO2 emissions. Note: For comparison, the specific emission 
factors (OECD / IPCC default emission factors, lower-heating value (LHV) basis) for biomass (wood fuel), coal, crude oil, and natural gas are also shown (coloured squares). Source: 
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In general, estimates of the resources of unconventional gas, oil, 
and coal are huge (GEA, 2012; Rogner et al., 2012) ranging for oil 
resources to be up to 20,000 EJ or almost 120 times larger than cur-
rent global production; natural gas up to 120,000 EJ or 1300 times 
current production, whereas coal resources might be as large as 
400,000 EJ or 3500 times larger than current production. However, 
global resources are unevenly distributed and are concentrated in 
some regions and not others (U. S. Energy Information Administra-
tion, 2010). These upper estimates of global hydrocarbon endow-
ments indicate that their ultimate depletion cannot be the relied 
upon to limit global CO2 emissions. For example, the carbon embed-
ded in oil and gas reserves exceeds the current carbon content of the 
atmosphere. The emissions budget for stabilizing climate change at 
2 °C above pre-industrial levels is about the same as the current car-
bon content of the atmosphere, meaning that under this constraint 
only a small fraction of reserves can be exploited (Meinshausen 
et al., 2009). Chapter 7 of this report discusses in detail the current 
and future availability of global energy resources (see also Table 
7.2).
5�3�5 Other key sectors
This section briefly describes GHG emission trends for the other main 
economic sectors (transport, buildings, industry, AFOLU, and waste) 
and the correlation between emissions and income, showing marked 
differences between sectors and countries. The following sections pro-
vide short discussions of trends and drivers by sector, while the follow-
ing chapters (7 – 11) provide detailed analyses. Note that in Chapter 
5, we consider only direct emissions for the buildings sector, whereas 
Chapter 9 also includes indirect emissions.
GHG emissions grew in all sectors, except in AFOLU where positive 
and negative emission changes are reported across different data-
bases and uncertainties in the data are high (see Section 11.2). As is 
clear from Figure 5.18, high-income countries contribute mostly to 
emissions associated with transport (Chapter 8) and buildings 
(Chapter 9). Low and lower middle-income countries contribute the 
largest share of emissions associated with AFOLU (Chapter 11). 
Between 2000 and 2010, emissions by upper middle-income coun-
tries from energy (+3.5 GtCO2e / yr) and industry (+2.4 GtCO2e / yr) 
more than doubled, and by 2010, emissions from industry in upper 
middle-income countries have passed those from high-income coun-
tries.
The large increase in energy and industry emissions in upper middle-
income countries is consistent with the observed income growth and 
the correlation between emissions and income for these sectors (Fig-
ure 5.19). There is a robust positive relation between income and emis-
sions, particularly for annual income levels between 1000 and 10,000 
Int$2005 / cap, while for transport, the correlation between income and 
emissions continues into higher-income levels. We find no positive cor-
relation between income and emissions for AFOLU.
In 2010, the typical high-income country (median of the high-
income group, population-weighted) had per capita emissions of 13 
tCO2e q/ cap yr, while per capita emissions in the typical low-income 
country were only about one-tenth of that value, at 1.4 tCO2eq / cap yr. 
But, there is a large variation among countries that have similar 
income levels. The per capita emissions in high-income countries range 
from 8.2 to 21 tCO2eq / cap yr, for the (population weighted) 10 and 90 
percentile, respectively. Many low-income countries (median income 
of 1,200 Int$2005 / cap) have low per capita emissions (median of 1.4 
tCO2eq / yr), but for the low-income country group, average per capita 
emissions (4.3 tCO2e q/ yr) are pulled up by a few countries with very 
high emissions associated with land-use.
5�3�5�1 Transport
Global transport GHG emissions9 grew from 2.8 GtCO2eq in 1970 to 
7 GtCO2eq in 2010 (JRC / PBL, 2013). The OECD-1990 countries con-
tributed the largest share of the emissions (i. e., 60 % in 1970, 56 % 
in 1990, and 46 % in 2010) but the highest growth rates in transport 
emissions were in the upper middle-income countries and interna-
tional bunkers. The overall picture shows that transport emissions have 
steadily increased but show a marked decrease around 2008 / 2009. 
Increasing demand for passenger and freight transport, urban develop-
ment and sprawl, lack of rail and bus transit and cycle infrastructure in 
many regions, transport behaviour constrained by lack of modal choice 
in some regions, a high fuel-consuming stock of vehicles, relatively low 
oil prices, and the limited availability of low-carbon fuels have been the 
principal drivers of transport sector CO2 emission growth over the past 
few decades (Jolley, 2004; Davies et al., 2007; IPCC, 2007; Timilsina and 
Shrestha, 2009; Ubaidillah, 2011; Wang et al., 2011 Chapter 8).
The marked growth rate of international transport emissions after 
2002 coincides with growth in Chinese exporting industries sugges 
3ting an influence of trade policies and world trade agreements on 
transport emissions (Olivier et al., 2011). 
The high oil prices of 2008 and the global recession in 2009 both 
resulted in a decrease in fossil fuel consumption for the OECD coun-
tries, with CO2 emissions declining by 2.0 % in 2008, and an esti-
mated 6.3 % in 2009. GHG emissions in non-OECD countries were not 
affected (US EIA, 2011).
There is a strong correlation between per capita transport emissions 
and per capita incomes and alignment of the two variables is sharper 
in the high-income countries (Figure 5.19) as the demand for personal 
transportation increases as standards of living rise and economic activ-
ity increases (US EIA, 2011). 
9 Consisting of direct  CO 2 ,  CH 4 ,  N 2 O, and F-gases (Freight Vision, 2009).
Figure 5�18 | Regional and sector distribution of GHG emission trends. Regions are defined in Annex II.2 | The figure shows annual GHG emissions for the six key sectors discussed 
in Sections 5.3.4 and 5.3.5 | The left-lower panel presents global sector emissions to assess the relative contribution. Decadal growth rates are projected on the charts for emissions 
exceeding 0.2 GtCO2eq / yr. The direct emission data from JRC / PBL (2013) and IEA (2012) (see Annex II.9) represents land-based CO2 emissions from forest and peat fires and decay 
that approximate to CO2 flux from anthopogenic emission sources in the Forestry and Other Land Use (FOLU) sub-sector. For a more detailed representation of Agriculture and FOLU 
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In general, estimates of the resources of unconventional gas, oil, 
and coal are huge (GEA, 2012; Rogner et al., 2012) ranging for oil 
resources to be up to 20,000 EJ or almost 120 times larger than cur-
rent global production; natural gas up to 120,000 EJ or 1300 times 
current production, whereas coal resources might be as large as 
400,000 EJ or 3500 times larger than current production. However, 
global resources are unevenly distributed and are concentrated in 
some regions and not others (U. S. Energy Information Administra-
tion, 2010). These upper estimates of global hydrocarbon endow-
ments indicate that their ultimate depletion cannot be the relied 
upon to limit global CO2 emissions. For example, the carbon embed-
ded in oil and gas reserves exceeds the current carbon content of the 
atmosphere. The emissions budget for stabilizing climate change at 
2 °C above pre-industrial levels is about the same as the current car-
bon content of the atmosphere, meaning that under this constraint 
only a small fraction of reserves can be exploited (Meinshausen 
et al., 2009). Chapter 7 of this report discusses in detail the current 
and future availability of global energy resources (see also Table 
7.2).
5�3�5 Other key sectors
This section briefly describes GHG emission trends for the other main 
economic sectors (transport, buildings, industry, AFOLU, and waste) 
and the correlation between emissions and income, showing marked 
differences between sectors and countries. The following sections pro-
vide short discussions of trends and drivers by sector, while the follow-
ing chapters (7 – 11) provide detailed analyses. Note that in Chapter 
5, we consider only direct emissions for the buildings sector, whereas 
Chapter 9 also includes indirect emissions.
GHG emissions grew in all sectors, except in AFOLU where positive 
and negative emission changes are reported across different data-
bases and uncertainties in the data are high (see Section 11.2). As is 
clear from Figure 5.18, high-income countries contribute mostly to 
emissions associated with transport (Chapter 8) and buildings 
(Chapter 9). Low and lower middle-income countries contribute the 
largest share of emissions associated with AFOLU (Chapter 11). 
Between 2000 and 2010, emissions by upper middle-income coun-
tries from energy (+3.5 GtCO2e / yr) and industry (+2.4 GtCO2e / yr) 
more than doubled, and by 2010, emissions from industry in upper 
middle-income countries have passed those from high-income coun-
tries.
The large increase in energy and industry emissions in upper middle-
income countries is consistent with the observed income growth and 
the correlation between emissions and income for these sectors (Fig-
ure 5.19). There is a robust positive relation between income and emis-
sions, particularly for annual income levels between 1000 and 10,000 
Int$2005 / cap, while for transport, the correlation between income and 
emissions continues into higher-income levels. We find no positive cor-
relation between income and emissions for AFOLU.
Figure 5�18 | Regional and sector distribution of GHG emission trends. Regions are defined in Annex II.2 | The figure shows annual GHG emissions for the six key sectors discussed 
in Sections 5.3.4 and 5.3.5 | The left-lower panel presents global sector emissions to assess the relative contribution. Decadal growth rates are projected on the charts for emissions 
exceeding 0.2 GtCO2eq / yr. The direct emission data from JRC / PBL (2013) and IEA (2012) (see Annex II.9) represents land-based CO2 emissions from forest and peat fires and decay 
that approximate to CO2 flux from anthopogenic emission sources in the Forestry and Other Land Use (FOLU) sub-sector. For a more detailed representation of Agriculture and FOLU 
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Building sector emissions grew from 2.5 GtCO2eq in 1970 to 
3.2 GtCO2eq in 2010 with emissions growth rates in OECD-1990 coun-
tries being largely negative. Positive-emission growth rates were reg-
istered in the upper and lower middle-income countries, although the 
largest contribution to buildings emissions still came from OECD-1990 
countries (Figure 5.18).
Per capita buildings emissions and per capita income are positively 
correlated. Considering a life-cycle assessment starting with manufac-
turing of building materials to demolition, over 80 % of GHG emissions 
take place during the building operation phase (UNEP, 2009) largely 
from consumption of electricity for heating, ventilation, and air condi-
tioning (HVAC), water heating, lighting, and entertainment (US DOE, 
2008). On average, most residential energy in developed countries is 
consumed for space heating, particularly in cold climates. 58 % of the 
demand for energy in buildings was contributed by space heating in 
1990 and 53 % in 2005, while water heating contributed 17 % in 1990 
and 16 % in 2005, appliances 16 % and 21 %, respectively, and cook-
ing and lighting about 5 % (IEA, 2008; UNEP, 2009). In low-income 
countries, a large proportion of operational energy is derived from pol-
luting fuels, mainly wood and other biomass, such as dung and crop 
residues, and a high number of people (2.4 billion) still use biomass for 
cooking and heating (International Energy Agency, 2002, 2006).
5�3�5�3 Industry
Direct emissions from industry (excluding waste / waste water 
and AFOLU contributions10) grew from 5.4 GtCO2eq / yr in 1970 to 
8.8 GtCO2eq / yr in 2010. The contribution of OECD countries dominated 
these emissions at the start of the period with over 57 % of the total 
but declined to 24 % of the total in 2010. The middle-income coun-
tries have become the major emitters, particularly after 2000 (Figure 
5.18) when the annual growth rate in emissions increased very sig-
nificantly in the middle income countries. There is a positive correlation 
between per capita emissions from industry and per capita income up 
to an income level of 10,000 Int$2005 / cap. Beyond that income level, the 
correlation decreases due to improvements in energy efficiency in the 
industrialized OECD countries (European Environment Agency, 2009).
10 Industry emissions including emissions from waste and waste water are reported 
in Section 10.2 in Chapter 10.
Energy use in industry, which is the major source of emissions from 
the sector, has grown in both absolute and relative terms in the OECD-
1990 region and in relative terms in EIT countries driven by changes 
in income, the level of industrial output, fuel switching, and structural 
changes (International Energy Agency, 2003). There has also been a 
complex restructuring and relocation of the production and consump-
tion of goods and supply of services that has shaped the location of 
industrial emissions, resulting in the shift of emissions to some non-
OECD Asian economies (De Backer and Yamano, 2012; Backer and 
Yamano, 2007).
The production of energy-intensive industrial goods including cement, 
steel, aluminium has grown dramatically. From 1970 to 2012, global 
annual production of cement increased 500 %; aluminium 400 %; 
steel 150 %, ammonia 250 %; and paper 200 % (USGS, 2013); with 
energy-intensive industries increasingly being located in developing 
nations (IPCC, 2007a). Rapid growth in export industries has also 
driven emissions growth, and since 2001, China dominates in produc-
tion of goods for own consumption and export (Weber et al., 2008; 
see Chapter 10).
Non-energy industrial emissions such as perfluorocarbon (PFC) emis-
sions have declined in many OECD countries, while trends in SF6 
emissions vary and HFC emissions have increased very rapidly, driven 
more by use in refrigeration equipment (International Energy Agency, 
2003).
5�3�5�4 Agriculture, Forestry, Other Land Use 
Emission of GHGs in the AFOLU sector increased by 20 % from 
9.9 GtCO2eq in 1970 to 12 GtCO2eq in 2010 (Figure 5.18) contrib-
uting about 20 – 25 % of global emissions in 2010 (JRC / PBL, 2013). 
Both the agriculture sub-sector and the FOLU sub-sector showed 
an increase in emissions during the period 1970 – 2010, but there is 
substantial uncertainty and variation between databases (see Sec-
tion  5.2.3); Chapter 11 provides an overview of other estimates. In 
the agriculture sub-sector, CH4 from enteric fermentation and rice 
cultivation, and nitrous oxide (N2O) mainly from soil, application of 
synthetic fertilizer and manure, and manure management made the 
largest contribution (≥  80 %) to total emissions in 2010. Between 
1970 and 2010, emissions of CH4 increased by 20 %, whereas emis-
sions of N2O increased by 45 – 75 %. Though total global emissions 
increased, per capita emissions went down from 2.5 tonnes in 1970 
to 1.7 tonnes in 2010 because of growth in population. Per capita 
Figure 5�19 | The relation between income and GHG emissions for the six key sectors discussed in Sections 5.3.4 and 5.3.5 | The left-lower panel presents the relation for emis-
sions aggregated over all sectors. Each circle is one country, for the year 2010 | The area of a circle is proportional to the aggregate emissions for that country and sector, using 
the same scale consistently over all panels. The bubble size is bounded from below for visual ease. Note the logarithmic scales on both x and y axes. For most sectors apart from 
AFOLU, there is a clear positive relation between income and emissions. Data from JRC / PBL (2013) and IEA (2012). The direct emission data from JRC / PBL (2013) (see Annex II.9) 
represents land-based CO2 emissions from forest and peat fires and decay that approximate to CO2 flux from anthopogenic emission sources in the Forestry and Other Land Use 
(FOLU) sub-sector. For a more detailed representation of Agriculture and FOLU (AFOLU) GHG flux see Section 11.2 and Figures 11.2 and 11.6 | Regions are defined in Annex II.2.
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emissions decreased in LAM, MAF, and EIT countries, whereas in ASIA 
and OECD-1990 countries, it remained almost unchanged. There was 
no clear relation between emissions in the AFOLU sector and per cap-
ita income (Figure 5.19).
Between 2000 and 2010, emission in the AFOLU sector marginally 
increased from 11.0 GtCO2eq to 11.9 GtCO2eq (Figure 5.18), but per 
capita emissions marginally decreased from 1.8 tCO2eq / cap yr to 1.7 
tCO2eq / cap yr (JRC / PBL, 2013).
Drivers of emissions included increased livestock numbers linked to 
increased demand for animal products, area under agriculture, defor-
estation, use of fertilizer, area under irrigation, per capita food avail-
ability, consumption of animal products, and increased human and 
animal populations. Global agricultural land increased by 7 %, from 
4560 Mha to 4900 Mha between 1970 and 2010 (FAOSTAT, 2013). 
Global population increased by about 90 % from 3.6 to 6.9 billion dur-
ing the period. As a result, per capita cropland availability declined by 
about 50 %, from 0.4 ha to 0.2 ha. On the other hand, crop productiv-
ity increased considerably during the period. For example, cereal pro-
duction has doubled from 1.2 Gt to 2.5 Gt and the average yield of 
cereals increased from 1600 kg ha– 1 to 3000 kg ha– 1. To enable this 
increase, use of nitrogenous fertilizer increased by 230 % from 32 Mt 
in 1970 to 106 Mt in 2010 (FAOSTAT, 2013), which was a major driver 
for increased N2O emission (Spark et  al., 2012). During the past 40 
years, there has been increase in irrigated cropped area (Foley et al., 
2005). Population of cattle, sheep, and goats increased 1.4-fold and 
that of pigs and poultry 1.6 and 3.7-fold, respectively (FAOSTAT, 2014). 
This has increased GHG emissions directly and also through manure 
production (Davidson, 2009). Global per capita food availability and 
consumption of animal products increased, particularly in Asia (FAO-
STAT, 2013). 
Emissions in the AFOLU sector increased during the last four decades 
with marginal increase in the last decade (2000 – 2010). The continued 
growth in world population causing greater demand for food with 
reduced per capita land availability will have significant impact on 
emission. Further details of emissions, more on forestry and land use, 
and opportunities for mitigation in the AFOLU sector are discussed in 
Chapter 11.
Box 5�3 | Trends and drivers of GHG emissions in Least Developed Countries
Almost 90 % of 1970 – 2010 GHG emissions in the Least Devel-
oped Countries (LDCs) are generated by agriculture, forestry, and 
other land use activities (AFOLU) (Figure 5.20), and emissions 
have increased by 0.6 % per year in these countries during the last 
four decades. For the LDCs, the primary activities within AFOLU 
include subsistence farming and herding, and use of wood as 
fuel for cooking and heating (Golub et al., 2008; Dauvergne and 
Neville, 2010; Erb et al., 2012).
The effects of population growth on energy use and emissions 
are, in relative terms, greater in the LDCs and developing coun-
tries than in the developed countries (Poumanyvong and Kaneko, 
2010). The dominance of AFOLU over buildings, industry, and 
transport as sources of emissions for LDC (Figure 5.20) suggests 
population growth as a major contributor to the growth in LDC 
emissions. Yet the low historic emissions growth of 0.6 % annu-
ally is substantially below population growth of 2.5 % annually. 
Changes in land use with regard to biofuels (Ewing and Msangi, 
2009) and agricultural practices (Mann et al., 2009; Bryan et al., 
2013) may also have affected the increase in emissions.
Changes in future trends of GHG emissions in LDCs will depend on 
the pace of urbanization and industrialization in the LDCs. 
Although currently most LDCs continue to have a large share of 
rural population, the rate of urbanization is progressing rapidly. 
This pattern is expected to lead to increasing access to and use of 
energy and emissions (Parikh and Shukla, 1995; Holtedahl and 
Joutz, 2004; Alam et al., 2008; Liu, 2009) particularly since early 
stages of urbanization and industrialization are associated with 
higher emissions than later stages (Martínez-Zarzoso and 
Maruotti, 2011).
Figure 5�20 | Territorial GHG emissions per sector in LDCs over 1970 – 2010 
aggregated using 100-year GWP values. The figure shows that for all sectors apart 
from AFOLU, emissions have increased sharply in relative terms. Yet AFOLU pres-
ents the largest share of emissions. Data from JRC / PBL (2013) and IEA (2012). The 
direct emission data from JRC / PBL (2013) (see Annex II.9) represents land-based 
CO2 emissions from forest and peat fires and decay that approximate to CO2 flux 
from anthopogenic emission sources in the Forestry and Other Land Use (FOLU) 
sub-sector. For a more detailed representation of Agriculture and FOLU (AFOLU) 




































Total global emissions from waste almost doubled from 1970 – 2010 
(Figure 5.18), while in the period 2000 – 2010, the increment was 13 % 
(1278 MtCO2eq vs. 1446 MtCO2eq) (JRC / PBL, 2013). In 2010 GHG emis-
sions from waste represented 3.0 % of total GHG emissions from all 
sources (1446 MtCO2eq), compared to 2.6 % in 1970 (734  MtCO2eq) 
(JRC / PBL, 2013). The main sources of waste GHG emissions were solid 
waste disposal on land (46 % of total waste GHG emissions in 1970 
and 43 % in 2010) and wastewater handling (51 % of total waste GHG 
emissions in 1970 and 54 % in 2010), waste incineration (mainly CO2) 
and other sources are of minor importance (JRC / PBL, 2013). 
Since 1998 waste GHG emissions from ASIA are greater than from 
OECD-1990 countries (mainly wastewater emissions). While in 1970 
emissions from OECD-1990 countries represented 50 % of emissions 
(364 MtCO2eq) and ASIA 27 % (199 MtCO2eq), in 2010 ASIA repre-
sented 41 % of waste GHG emissions (596 MtCO2eq) and OECD-1990 
27 % (391 MtCO2eq) (Figure 5.18) (JRC / PBL, 2013). The main GHG 
from waste is CH4 — mainly emitted from municipal solid waste dis-
posal on land and from wastewater — representing 91 % of the total 
in 1970 (90 % in 2010), followed by N2O (7 % in 1970, 8 % in 2010) 
(Monni et al., 2006; JRC / PBL, 2013).
Waste generation is closely related to population, urbanization, and 
affluence (see also Section 10.14). Waste generation rates are corre-
lated with different indicators of affluence, including GDP per capita, 
energy consumption per capita, and private final consumption per cap-
ita (Monni et al., 2006; Bogner et al., 2008). Similarly Sjöström and Öst-
blom (2009) remark that waste quantities have grown steadily along 
with GDP over recent decades. Moreover they report that the total 
quantity of municipal waste per capita increased by 29 % in North 
America, 35 % in OECD, and 54 % in the EU15 from 1980 to 2005 
(Sjöström and Östblom, 2009).
There are many uncertainties concerning estimation of past, current, 
and future emissions, as well as the mitigation potential in the waste 
sector, the most important relating to the poor quality of the activity 
data needed for estimation of emissions (Monni et al., 2006; Bogner 
et al., 2008).
5.4 Production and 
trade patterns
5�4�1 Embedded carbon in trade
Between 1971 and 2010, world trade has grown by 6 % a year on 
average, meaning it doubled nearly every 12 years (World Trade Organ-
isation, 2011), outpacing the growth of world GDP, which was 3.1 % 
per year on average. The ratio of world exports of goods and commer-
cial services to GDP in real terms has increased substantially; steadily 
since 1985, and by nearly one-third between 2000 and 2008, before 
dropping in 2009 as world trade fell as a result of the Global Financial 
Crisis (World Trade Organisation, 2011). While information on the size 
of physical trade is more limited, Dittrich and Bringezu (2010) estimate 
that between 1970 and 2005, the physical tonnage of international 
trade grew from 5.4 to 10 Gt. Statistics on CO2 emissions associated 
with international shipping support these findings (Heitmann and 
Khalilian, 2011); international shipping has grown at a rate of 3.1 % 
per annum for the past three decades (Eyring et al., 2010), and there 
is evidence of a recent acceleration in seaborne trade suggesting that 
trade, measured in ton-miles has increased by 5.2 % per annum (on 
average) between 2002 and 2007. This is further supported by van 
Renssen (2012), who observes a doubling of shipping and aviation 
emissions between 1990 and 2010.
Trade has increased the developing countries’ participation in the 
global economy. According to the World Trade Organization, “From 
1990 to 2008, the volume of exports from developing countries grew 
consistently faster than exports from developed countries, as did the 
share of developing countries’ exports in the value of total world 
exports”. Between 2000 and 2008, the volume of developing coun-
tries’ exports almost doubled, while world exports increased by 50 %. 
Non-OECD Asia is by far the most important exporting region in the 
developing country group, with a 10 % share of world exports in 1990 
(USD 335 million), which increased to 21 % (USD 2603 million) in 2009 
(World Trade Organisation, 2011).
The consumption accounts presented in Section 5.3.3.2 showed that 
between 1990 and 2000, global CO2 emissions increased by about 10 %, 
and by a further 29 % between 2000 and 2008 (Le Quere et al., 2009; 
Peters et al., 2011). Over the full period, all of the growth in CO2 emis-
sions occurred in non-Annex B countries while CO2 emissions in Annex 
B countries stabilized. Partly, this was due to the collapse of the for-
mer Soviet Union in the early 1990s, which reduced emissions in these 
countries between 1990 and 2000. But the pattern also relates to the 
rapid increase in international trade between Annex B and non-Annex 
B countries. Twenty percent of the growth in CO2 emissions in non-
Annex B countries can, through trade, be attributed to the increased 
demand for products by Annex B countries (Peters et al., 2011). 
In 1990, the global CO2 emissions associated with exported products 
was 4.3 GtCO2 (Peters et al., 2011). This figure includes the CO2 emis-
sions through the whole supply chain associated with the production 
of the final product, using the ‘Environmentally Extended Multi-Region 
Input-Output Analysis’ (Davis and Caldeira, 2010; Minx et al., 2009). In 
2008, this figure had increased to 7.8 GtCO2, (average annual increase 
of 4.3 %) (Peters et al., 2011). Between 1990 and 2000, the growth in 
the embedded CO2 emissions of products being traded grew by 10 %. 
Between 2000 and 2008, CO2 emissions embedded in trade grew by a 
further 26 %, demonstrating a more recent and rapid increase (Peters 
et al., 2011). In 2005, China accounted for 25 % of the total global CO2 
386
Drivers, Trends and Mitigation
5
Chapter 5
emissions embedded in exports, with China’s exported emissions at 
1.7 Gt (Weber et  al., 2008) compared to the global total of 6.8 Gt 
(Peters et al., 2011). In terms of total CO2 emissions due to the produc-
tion of goods and services that were finally consumed in another coun-
try, a number of papers suggest that this represents between 20 % and 
26 % of total global emissions in 2004 (Davis and Caldeira, 2010; 
Peters et al., 2011).
Trade explains the divergence between territorial and consumption-
based emissions in OECD countries to the extent that it has resulted 
in an increase of emissions in the exporting countries. The associated 
increase in emissions in exporting countries (mostly non Annex B) is 
often defined in the literature as ‘weak leakage’ (see Box 5.4) (Davis and 
Caldeira, 2010; Rothman, 2000; Peters and Hertwich, 2008; Weber and 
Peters, 2009; Strømman et  al., 2009; Peters, 2010; Yunfeng and Laike, 
2010). Lenzen et  al. (2010) confirm these findings along with numer-
ous national-level studies (Wiedmann et al., 2010; Hong et al., 2007; Liu 
et al., 2011; Ackerman et al., 2007; Weber and Matthews, 2007; Mäen-
pää and Siikavirta, 2007; Muñoz and Steininger, 2010; Minx et al., 2011). 
Trade has allowed countries with a higher than global average emis-
sion intensity to import lower emission intensity goods and vice versa. 
For example, exports from China have a carbon intensity four times 
higher than exports from the United States (Davis and Caldeira, 2010). 
Net exports of carbon could occur due to (i) a current account sur-
plus, (ii) a relatively high energy intensity of production, (iii) a relatively 
high carbon intensity of energy production, and (iv) specialization in 
the export of carbon-intensive products (Jakob et  al., 2013). Jakob 
and Marchinski (2013) argue that further analysis is required to better 
understand the gap in consumption and territorial emissions, and to 
assess the validity of possible but different causes.
Calculating emissions embodied in trade tells us the amount of emis-
sions generated to produce goods and services that are consumed 
elsewhere, but it doesn’t allow us to establish a causal interpretation. 
In particular, it doesn’t allow identifying which fraction of observed 
changes in regional emissions can be attributed to regulatory changes 
undertaken elsewhere, such as adoption of climate measures in one 
region (often called ‘strong carbon leakage’ in the literature). Due to 
the sparse data available, only a few empirical studies exist. (Aichele 
and Felbermayr, 2012, 2013) provide evidence for a strong carbon 
leakage effect resulting from the Kyoto protocol. Most estimates of 
how GHG emissions could react to regional regulatory changes have 
so far relied on numerical modelling. These studies find a wide variety 
of rates of leakage (i. e., the fraction of unilateral emission reductions 
that are offset by increases in other regions), with one study demon-
strating that under some specific assumptions, leakages rates could 
even exceed 100 % (Babiker, 2005). However, it has also been pointed 
out that energy represents a small fraction of the total cost for most 
industries and therefore leakage should not be expected to render 
unilateral climate policies grossly ineffective (Hourcade et al., 2008; 
Jakob, 2011). This is confirmed by recent model comparison of 12 
computable general equilibrium models. Boehringer et al. (2012) finds 
leakage rates between 5 % and 19 %, with a mean value of 12 %. 
However, taking into account (non-energy related) industrial process 
emissions, which are not included in the latter model comparison, 
may result in higher leakage rates, as some of the most energy — as 
well as trade-intensive sectors are also important sources of industrial 
process emissions (Bednar-Friedl et al., 2012) find that accounting for 
industrial process emissions raises the leakage rate by one-third.
5�4�2 Trade and productivity
Trade does not only affect emissions through its effect on consumption 
patterns, the relocation of production, and emissions for international 
transport, it also affects emissions through its effect on innovation and 
the exchange of technologies between trading partners. Section 5.6 
Box 5�4 | Definition of carbon leakage
Carbon leakage refers to phenomena whereby the reduction in 
emissions (relative to a benchmark) are offset by an increase 
outside the jurisdiction (Peters and Hertwich, 2008; Barrett et al., 
2013). Leakage can occur at a number of levels, be it a project, 
state, province, nation, or world region. This can occur through:
•	 Changes in the relative prices whereby national climate 
regulation reduces demand for fossil fuels, thereby causing a 
fall in world prices resulting in an increase in demand outside 
the jurisdiction
•	 Relocation of industry where a firm relocates their opera-
tion to another nation due to less favourable financial benefits 
in the original jurisdiction brought about by the reduction 
measures
•	 Nested regulation where, for example, the European Union 
imposes an aggregate cap on emissions meaning that the 
efforts of individual countries exceed the cap freeing up allow-
ances in other country under the scheme
•	 Weak consumption leakage describes the increase of emis-
sions in one country as a consequence of actions or policies 
that are unrelated to climate policy (such as a changed quan-
tity or composition of imports) in another country.
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assesses the literature on innovation while this section assesses the 
theoretical and empirical literature on channels through which trade 
(broadly defined as trade in goods and foreign direct investment) 
affects productivity (Havrylyshyn, 1990). 
At the aggregate level, trade can improve productivity through 
increased allocative efficiency. Furthermore, trade increases the inter-
national flow of intermediate goods (Hummels et al., 2001; Koopman 
et al., 2008), allowing for the production of higher-quality final prod-
ucts with the same amount of emissions and other inputs (Ruther-
ford and Tarr, 2002). Though, trade may impede productivity growth 
in developing countries if it causes them to specialize in low-tech 
labour and energy intensive sectors with little scope for productivity 
improvements. Trade can also increase income inequality in develop-
ing countries. For example, because the least skill-intensive industries 
in developed countries often become the most skill-intensive sectors 
in developing countries (Zhu and Trefler, 2005; Meschi and Vivarelli, 
2009), developing countries can experience a negative impact on pro-
ductivity growth (Persson and Tabellini, 1994).
At the sector level, trade liberalization increases competition in import-
competing sectors, and causes the least-productive firms in these 
sectors to collapse or exit (Pavcnik, 2002). Therefore, through this 
mechanism, trade liberalization can cause job losses, especially for 
those working in the previously protected sectors. At the same time, 
trade can also increase productivity, energy-efficiency, and research 
and development (R&D) incentives in import-competing sectors: trade 
intensifies import-competition and increases the remaining firms’ 
domestic market shares, both of which are associated with higher R&D 
efforts — possibly because firms with large market shares use innova-
tion to deter entry (Blundell et al., 1999).
Aside allocation and competition effects, trade can increase produc-
tivity growth through knowledge spillovers. Multinationals do more 
R&D than purely domestic firms, thus Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
can increase the knowledge stock of the recipient country. Moreover, 
the entry of foreign multinationals facilitates the diffusion of energy-
saving technologies if domestic firms reverse-engineer their products 
or hire away their employees (Keller and Yeaple, 2009). In addition to 
these horizontal spillovers, foreign entrants have an incentive to share 
their knowledge with domestic suppliers and customers to improve 
the quality of domestically sourced inputs and to enable domestic 
customers to make better use of their products (Javorcik, 2004).
Turning to empirical analyses, there are many studies that estimate 
the effect of trade on sector overall productivity or the international 
diffusion of specific technologies, but little that quantify the effect 
of trade, through productivity, on emissions. Empirical work, mostly 
focusing on labour and total factor productivity, suggests that trade 
openness indeed enhances productivity. Coe and Helpman (1995) 
and Edwards (2001) find that foreign R&D has a larger positive 
effect for countries with a higher import volume, and that for small 
countries, foreign R&D matters more for domestic productivity than 
domestic R&D. Keller (2000) finds that imports from high-productivity 
countries lead to more productivity growth than imports from low-
productivity countries. According to Kim (2000), trade liberalization 
increased total factor productivity growth by 2 percentage points in 
Korea between 1985 – 1988. For United States firms, FDI spillovers 
accounted for 14 % of productivity growth between 1987 – 1996 
(Keller and Yeaple, 2009).
With regards to specifically environmental applications, Verdolini and 
Galeotti (2011a) and Bosetti and Verdolini (2012) constructed and 
tested a model to show that the factors that impede international 
trade in physical goods, such as geographic distance, also hinder the 
diffusion of environmentally benign technologies. Reppelin-Hill (1998) 
finds that the Electric Arc Furnace, a technology for cleaner steel pro-
duction, diffused faster in countries that are more open to trade. Trade 
reduces global energy efficiency if it relocates production to countries 
that have a comparative advantage in unskilled labour but low-energy 
efficiency (Li and Hewitt, 2008). Lastly, Mulder and De Groot (2007) 
document a convergence of energy-productivity across OECD coun-
tries over time. The results may be attributable to knowledge diffusion 
through trade, but the authors do not estimate a link between conver-
gence and trade.
5.5 Consumption and 
behavioural change
Behaviour is an underlying driver affecting the factors in the decom-
position of anthropogenic GHG emissions. Although it is difficult to 
delineate and attribute the effects of behaviour unambiguously, there 
is empirical evidence of variation in behaviour and consumption pat-
terns across regions, social groups, and over time, and its connection 
to, e. g., energy and emission intensity of consumption.
This section reviews the evidence of how behaviour affects energy use 
and emissions through technological choices, lifestyles, and consump-
tion preferences. It focuses on behaviour of consumers and produc-
ers, delineates the factors influencing behaviour change, and reviews 
policies and measures that have historically been effective in changing 
behaviour for the benefit of climate change mitigation.
5�5�1 Impact of behaviour on consumption 
and emissions
Consumer choices with regard to food, mobility, and housing, and 
more generally consumption patterns affect the environmental impact 
and GHG emissions associated with the services (Faber et al., 2012). 
Consumption patterns are shaped not only by economic forces, but 
also by technological, political, cultural, psychological, and environ-
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mental factors. For example, domestic energy use and travel choices 
are intrinsically related to social identity, status, and norms (Layton 
et  al., 1993; Black et  al., 2001; Steg et  al., 2001; Exley and Christie, 
2002). Senses of security, clean environment, family ties, and friend-
ships are also viewed as important factors in determining consump-
tion patterns (Chitnis and Hunt, 2012). The cultural context in which 
an individual lives and the inherent values of a society also shape the 
intrinsic motivation underlying consumer choices (Fuhrer et al., 1995; 
Chawla, 1998, 1999). As an example, the high proportion of people fol-
lowing a vegetarian diet in India can be attributed to its cultures and 
religions, resulting in lower GHG emissions per caloric intake (Ghosh, 
2006). Similar explanations are given for India’s relatively low levels 
of waste generation coupled with higher levels of waste recycling and 
re-use (Ghosh, 2006). Cross-cultural differences are also revealed at 
higher-income levels. In some high-income countries people appreciate 
high-density neighbourhoods and public transport more as compared 
to other countries (Roy and Pal, 2009).
Studies indicate that approximately one-third of food produced for 
human consumption (about 1.3  billion tonnes per year) is wasted 
globally, adding to GHG emissions for food production (Gustavsson 
et al., 2011). It is estimated that substantially more food is wasted 
in the developed countries than in developing countries. In Europe 
and North America, per capita food waste by consumers is estimated 
at 95 – 115 kg / year, while in sub-Saharan Africa and South / South-
east Asia is about 6 – 11 kg / year (Gustavsson et al., 2011). There is 
significant inter-regional variation with regard to the stage of the 
food chain at which wastage occurs. About 40 % of food wastage in 
medium- and high-income countries is generated at the consumer 
and retail stages, while in low-income countries food waste at the 
consumer level is much smaller and food waste in the early and mid-
dle stages of the food supply chain reaches about 40 %. Food losses 
and waste in low-income countries are attributed to financial, mana-
gerial, and technical limitations, while consumer behaviour and lack 
of coordination between different actors in the supply chain influ-
ence food wastage in the high-income countries (Gustavsson et al., 
2011).
Empirical evidence indicates that per capita energy consumption var-
ies widely across regions (see Sections 5.3 and 5.4), resulting in sig-
nificantly different CO2 emissions in per capita terms and per unit 
economic activity, but that GDP per capita does not explain all varia-
tion (see Figures 5.16 and 5.19). While part of this variability can be 
attributed, inter alia, to population density, infrastructure and resource 
endowments, social and cultural predispositions, such as lifestyle, also 
influence the choice and consumption levels of energy and materials 
(Marechal, 2009; Tukker et al., 2010; Sovacool and Brown, 2010). His-
toric data show a clear increase at the global level of key consumption 
activities of households that contribute to emissions, such as personal 
travel by car, intake of meat and fossil fuel consumption (Mont and 
Plepys, 2008). Energy intensity, which depends on behaviour at the 
individual and economy-wide level, is therefore one of the key determi-
nants of emissions in the decomposition analysis. Behaviour is not only 
an implicit and relevant driver of emissions, but also equally important 
a potential agent for change in emissions. 
Apart from individuals and households, companies and organizations 
also contribute to emissions, through both direct and indirect use of 
energy. Businesses, policy makers, as well as non-governmental con-
sumer organizations also play a role in inducing behaviour change and 
therefore indirectly changing emissions. Studies show that environ-
mental values are important determinants of willingness to accept cli-
mate change policy measures, and that values and norms are required 
for climate policy support within public and private organizations (Biel 
and Lundqvist, 2012). 
Technological solutions directed at improving resource productivity 
may not be sufficient for curbing the environmental impact of con-
sumption (Hunt and Sendhil, 2010). Complementary to eco-efficiency 
in production, sustainable development strategies may need to sup-
port sufficiency in consumption, shifting from a culture of consumerism 
without limits to a society with less materialistic aspirations (Mont and 
Plepys, 2008). This implies an addition to the focus on more environ-
mentally sound products and services; finding happiness with lower 
levels of material consumption, especially in higher-income countries 
(Hunt and Sendhil, 2010).
5�5�2 Factors driving change in 
 behaviour
The literature differentiates between efficiency behaviours, (1) the 
purchase of more or less energy-efficient equipment (e. g., insula-
tion), and (2) curtailment behaviours that involve repetitive efforts to 
reduce energy use, such as lowering thermostat settings (Gardner and 
Stern, 1996). It is suggested that the energy saving potential through 
efficiency behaviour is greater than that through curtailment behav-
iour. However, energy-efficient appliances can lead to an increase in 
demand for the service due to the lower cost of these services, dis-
cussed in Section 5.6.2.
Behavioural economics studies anomalies in consumer’s energy 
choices but it is also used to design approaches aimed at influencing 
and modifying those behaviours (see Sections 2.4 and 3.10.1). There 
is evidence that consumers consistently fail to choose appliances that 
offer energy savings, which, according to engineering estimates, more 
than compensate for their higher capital cost. In analyses of appliance 
choices, Hausman (1979) and subsequent studies found implicit con-
sumer discount rates ranging from 25 % to over 100 % (Train, 1985; 
Sanstad et  al., 2006). A variety of explanations have been offered, 
including consumer uncertainty regarding savings, lack of liquidity 
and financing constraints, other hidden costs, and the possibility that 
the engineering estimates may overstate energy savings in practice. 
Recent ideas draw on bounded rationality, the notion that consum-
ers ‘satisfice’ rather than ‘optimize’ (Simon, 1957), the importance of 
non-price product attributes and consumers’ perceptions thereof (Lan-
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caster, 1965; Van den Bergh, 2008), and asymmetric information and 
the principal-agent problem (Akerlof, 1970; Stiglitz, 1988). From psy-
chology and behavioural economics come notions such as loss aver-
sion (consumers place more weight on avoiding a loss than on secur-
ing a gain of the same magnitude (Kahneman et al., 1982); see Greene 
(2011) for an application to energy efficiency), attention11 and the role 
of salience12 (Fiske and Morling, 1996), priming (Richardson-Klavehn 
and Bjork, 1988), affect (Slovic et al., 2002), norms13 (Axelrod, 2006), 
a present-bias in inter-temporal decision making (O’Donoghue and 
Rabin, 2008; DellaVigna, 2009), and mental accounts (separate deci-
sion making for subsets of commodities; Thaler, 1999). The literature is 
not unanimous, though, regarding the magnitude of the ‘energy effi-
ciency gap’ (Allcott and Greenstone, 2012).
Ayres et al. (2009) estimate that non-price, peer-comparison interven-
tions can induce a consumption response equivalent to a 17 – 29 % 
price increase.14 Newell et al. (1999) provides evidence that the United 
States room air conditioners energy efficiency gain since 1973 is only 
about one quarter induced by higher energy prices, while another 
quarter is due to raised government standards and labelling. 
Behavioural interventions can be aimed at voluntary behavioural 
change by targeting an individual’s perceptions, preferences, and 
abilities, or at changing the context in which decisions are made. 
Such non-price context interventions have been used across coun-
tries with varying degrees of success to bring about behaviour change 
in consumption choices and patterns of energy use. These include 
antecedent strategies (involving commitment, goal setting, informa-
tion or modelling) and consequence strategies (feedback or rewards) 
(Abrahamse et al., 2005; Fischer, 2008). As an example, the Property 
Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) program tackles the high-discount 
rate that residential energy users ascribe to investments associated 
with energy-efficiency retrofits of buildings through providing local 
governments financing for retrofits of buildings repayable through 
a supplement to property taxes (Ameli and Kammen, 2012). Various 
United States and United Kingdom government agencies and the pri-
vate sector, including some electric and water utilities, have developed 
strategies collected under the rubrics Nudge (Thaler and Sunstein, 
2009) and Mindspace (Dolan et al., 2012). These programs involve ele-
ments such as increasing the salience of financial incentives, invok-
ing norms, providing information on social comparisons, and modify-
ing the choice architecture (the structure of the choice) including the 
default alternative.15 Laboratory studies and small-scale pilots have 
11 For example, Allcott (2011) indicates that 40 % of US consumers do not consider a 
vehicle’s gasoline consumption when purchasing a car.
12 Chetty et al. (2009) show that consumers’ reaction to taxes depends on the vis-
ibility and salience of the tax.
13 Responsiveness to norm-based messages has been demonstrated in a number of 
domains (e. g., Frey and Meier, 2004; Cialdini et al., 2006; Salganik et al., 2006; 
Goldstein et al., 2008; Cai et al., 2009).
14 Similarly, with household water use, Ferraro and Price (2011) find that the social-
comparison effect is equivalent to what would be expected if average prices were 
to increase by 12 % to 15 %.
15 UK Cabinet Office (2012).
demonstrated a potential role for behavioural interventions, but there 
is uncertainty on the scalability of these interventions and the level of 
impacts they can achieve (Hunt and Sendhil, 2010). 
The state of awareness and concern about climate change and the will-
ingness to act is an important underlying driver for voluntary reduction 
in energy consumption by individuals. Some studies indicate that the 
provision of information, or awareness creation by itself, is unlikely to 
bring about significant change in consumption behaviour and reduc-
tion in emissions (Van Houwelingen and Van Raaij, 1989; Kollmuss and 
Agyeman, 2002; Jackson, 2005). Other studies indicate that awareness 
creation and provision of information facilitates the deployment of 
energy-efficient technologies. The establishing of benchmarks for the 
energy consumption of homes and commercial buildings may con-
tribute to reduce information asymmetries in the marketplace and to 
lower the discount rates used by consumers to evaluate future effi-
ciency gains (Cox et al., 2013). Coller and Williams (1999) suggest that 
information about energy consumption will result in a 5 % decline in 
discount rates for energy decisions made by the median population, an 
estimate that is adopted by Cox et al. (2013).
Rewards are seen to have effectively encouraged energy conservation, 
though with possibly short-lived effects (Dwyer and Leeming, 1993; 
Geller, 2002). Feedback has also proven to be useful, particularly when 
given frequently (Becker et  al., 1981), while a combination of strat-
egies is generally found to be more effective than applying any one 
strategy (Abrahamse et al., 2005).
Ability to change, or opportunities, is also essential, and can be con-
strained by institutional and physical structures. Old habits are also seen 
as a strong barrier to changing energy behaviours (Pligt, 1985; Kollmuss 
and Agyeman, 2002; Mont and Plepys, 2008; Whitmarsh, 2009).
5.6 Technological change
5�6�1 Contribution of technological change to 
mitigation
The AR4 acknowledged the importance of technological change as 
a driver for climate change mitigation (IPCC, 2007a). It also gave an 
extensive review of technological change and concluded, among other 
things, that there is a relationship between environmental regulation 
and innovative activity on environmental technologies, but that policy 
is not the only determinant for technological change. It also discussed 
the debate around technology push and market pull for technologi-
cal change, the role of different actors and market failures around 
technological innovation. Since 2007, more studies have documented 
improvements of energy efficiency and the impact of different drivers, 
including technological change, on energy intensity (e. g., Fan and Xia; 
Sheinbaum et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2012). 
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5�6�1�1 Technological change: a drive towards higher or 
lower emissions?
Previous assessment reports have focused on the contribution of 
technological change in reducing GHG emissions. The rising emissions 
in emerging economies and accompanied rapid technological change, 
however, point at a question of whether technological change might 
also lead to rising emissions — in developed and developing coun-
tries. Due to a combination of rebound effects (see Section 5.6.2) and 
an observed tendency towards cost-saving innovations, the rebound 
effect could be enhanced so much that energy-saving technological 
change could indirectly lead to an increase in emissions (Fisher-Van-
den and Ho, 2010). Probably more importantly, technological change 
may favour non-mitigation issues over reduction of GHG emissions. 
For example, compact cars in the 1930s have a similar fuel consump-
tion rate to compact cars in the 1990s, but have far advanced in 
terms of speed, comfort, safety, and air pollution (Azar and Dowla-
tabadi, 1999). 
The energy sector is of great importance to technological change and 
climate change mitigation. Changes in the energy intensity that are 
not related to changes in the relative price of energy are often called 
changes in the autonomous energy-efficiency index (Kaufmann, 2004; 
Stern, 2011). How do macro-economic factors affect differences in 
energy efficiency between countries and changes over time? Using 
country-based case study approach, the general trend at the macro-level 
over the 20th century in the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, 
and Austria has been to greater energy efficiency (Warr et al., 2010). 
Recent research investigates the factors that affect the adoption of 
energy-efficiency policies or energy-efficiency technology (Matisoff, 
2008; Fredriksson et  al., 2004; Gillingham et  al., 2009; Linares and 
Labandeira, 2010; Wei et  al., 2009; Popp, 2011; Stern, 2011). Differ-
ences in endowments, preferences, or the state of technology create 
differences in the adoption of energy-efficiency technologies across 
countries and among individuals over time. The rate of adoption may 
also be influenced by market failures such as environmental externali-
ties, information access, and liquidity constraints in capital markets, 
and behavioural factors. Behavioural factors are discussed in Section 
5.5.2. The variation of implementation of energy-efficiency measures 
varies greatly, both between countries and between sectors and indus-
tries, especially if developing countries are taken into account (Sanstad 
et al., 2006).
5�6�1�2 Historical patterns of technological change
There is ample evidence from historical studies, for instance in the 
United States, Germany, and Japan, that technological change can 
affect energy use (Carley, 2011b; Welsch and Ochsen, 2005; Unruh, 
2000). In Japan, it has also shown to be a driver for reduction of CO2 
emissions (Okushima and Tamura, 2010). Technological change is also 
a dominant factor in China’s fast-declining energy intensity until 2003 
(Ma and Stern, 2008); but between 2003 and 2010, energy intensity 
declined only slightly (IEA, 2012).
Technological change in the energy sector is best studied. Several 
studies find that technological change in energy was particularly 
pronounced in periods with a great political sense of urgency and / or 
energy price hikes, such as during oil crises (Okushima and Tamura, 
2010; Karanfil and Yeddir-Tamsamani, 2010). Wilbanks (2011) ana-
lyzes the discovery of innovations and argues that only with a national 
sense of threat and the entailing political will it is worthwhile and 
possible to set up an “exceptional R&D” effort in the field of climate 
change mitigation. Aghion et al. (2012) conclude an increase in clean 
technology patenting in the auto industry as a consequence of policy-
induced increases in energy prices. In a study on 38 countries, Verdolini 
and Galeotti (2011b) find that technological opportunity and policy, 
proxied by energy prices, affect the flow of knowledge and technologi-
cal spillovers. 
There is more evidence supporting the conclusion that policy matters 
as a part of systemic developments. Dechezleprêtre (2008) find that 
the Kyoto Protocol has a positive impact on patenting and cross-border 
technology transfer, although they did not evaluate the impact of those 
on emissions. In a study on photovoltaic (PV) technology in China, a 
policy-driven effort to catch up in critical technological areas related to 
manufacturing proved successful, although it also mattered that capa-
bilities could be built through the returning of a Chinese diaspora (de 
la Tour et  al., 2011). Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2012) show that the 
European Union Emissions Trading System led to an increase in climate 
technology-related patents in the European Union.
5�6�2 The rebound effect
Section 3.9.5 distinguishes between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ rebound 
effects. Direct rebounds appear when, for example, an energy-efficient 
car has lower-operating costs encouraging the owner to drive fur-
ther (Sorrell, 2007). In addition, this could apply to a company where 
new, more energy efficient technology reduces costs and leads to an 
increase in production. Indirect rebounds (Lovins, 1988; Sorrell, 2007) 
appear when increased real income is made available by saving energy 
costs that are then used to invest or purchase other goods and services 
that emit GHG emissions (Berkhout et al., 2000; Thomas and Azevedo, 
2013). For example, savings in fuel due to a more-efficient car pro-
vides more disposable income that could be spent on an additional 
holiday. These could include substitution or income effects or changes 
in consumption patterns (Thomas and Azevedo, 2013). Economy-wide 
changes include market price effects, economic growth effects, and 
adjustments in capital stocks that result in further increases in long-
run demand response for energy (Howarth, 1997).
Rebound effects are context-specific, making it difficult to generalize 
on their relative size and importance. Being context-specific means 
that there is evidence of both negative rebound effects where further 
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energy saving is induced beyond the initial savings and ‘backfire’ where 
the rebound effects exceed the initial saving (Gillingham et al., 2013; 
Chakravarty et al., 2013; Saunders, 2013). There is much debate on the 
size of the rebound effect with considerably more evidence on direct 
rebounds than on indirect rebounds. There are numerous studies rely-
ing predominately on econometric techniques to evaluate rebounds. A 
comprehensive review of 500 studies suggests that direct rebounds are 
likely to be over 10 % and could be considerably higher (i. e., 10 % less 
savings than the projected saving from engineering principles). Other 
reviews have shown larger ranges with Thomas and Azevedo (2013) 
suggesting between 0 and 60 %. For household-efficiency measures, 
the majority of studies show rebounds in developed countries in the 
region of 20 – 45 % (the sum of direct and indirect rebound effects), 
meaning that efficiency measures achieve 65 – 80 % of their original 
purposes (Greening et al., 2000; Bentzen, 2004; Sorrell, 2007; Sorrell 
et al., 2009; Haas and Biermayr, 2000; Berkhout et al., 2000; Schipper 
and Grubb, 2000; Freire González, 2010). For private transport, there 
are some studies that support higher rebounds, with Frondel et  al. 
(2012) findings rebounds of between 57 and 62 %.
There is evidence to support the claim that rebound effects can be higher 
in developing countries (Wang et al., 2012b; Fouquet, 2012; Chakravarty 
et al., 2013). Roy (2000) argues that rebound effects in the residential 
sector in India and other developing countries can be expected to be 
larger than in developed economies because high-quality energy use is 
still small in households in India and demand is very elastic (van den 
Bergh, 2010; Stern, 2011; Thomas and Azevedo, 2013). However, there 
is considerable uncertainty of the precise scale of rebound effects in 
developing countries with more research required (Thomas and Aze-
vedo, 2013; Chakravarty et al., 2013). In terms of developed countries, 
Fouquet (2012) provides evidence on diminishing rebound effects in 
developed countries due to less inelastic demand for energy.
While generalization is difficult, a circumstance where rebounds are 
high is when energy costs form a large proportion of total costs (Sor-
rell, 2007). Rebounds effects are often diminished where energy-effi-
ciency improvements are coupled with an increase in energy prices. 
For industry, targeted carbon-intensity improvements can reduce costs 
and therefore prices and subsequently increase output (Barker et al., 
2007). Therefore, the relative scale of the saving is a good indicator 
of the potential size of the rebound effect. In conclusion, rebound 
effects cannot be ignored, but at the same time do not make energy-
efficiency measures completely redundant. By considering the size of 
the rebound effect, a more-realistic calculation of energy-efficiency 
measures can be achieved providing a clearer understanding of their 
contribution to climate policy. Particular attention is required where 
efficiency saving are made with no change in the unit cost of energy.
5�6�3 Infrastructure choices and lock in
Infrastructure in a broad sense covers physical, technological, and insti-
tutional categories but is often narrowed down to long-lasting and 
capital-intensive physical assets to which public access is allowed, such 
as transport infrastructure (Ballesteros et al., 2010; Cloete and Venter, 
2012). The assessment in this part focuses on the narrower physical 
part. Among physical infrastructure are buildings, roads and bridges, 
ports, airports, railways, power, telecom, water supply and waste water 
treatment, irrigation systems, and the like. Energy consumption and 
CO2 emissions vary greatly between different types of infrastructure. 
Infrastructure choices reflect the practice at the time of investment but 
they have long-lasting consequences. The infrastructure and technol-
ogy choices made by industrialized countries in the post-World War II 
period, at low energy prices, still have an effect on current worldwide 
GHG emissions. Davis et al. (2010) estimate the commitment to future 
emissions and warming by existing CO2-emitting devices, totalling to 
500 (280 – 700) GtCO2 between 2010 and 2060, and an associated 
warming of 1.3 °C (1.1 °C to 1.4 °C). 
Transport is a case in point. Air, rail, and road transport systems all rely 
on a supporting infrastructure, and compete for distances in the range 
of 1500 km. Of these options, railways typically have the lowest emis-
sions, but they require substantial infrastructure investments. Similarly, 
for urban transport, public transport requires substantial infrastructure 
investments to provide mobility with relatively low-emission intensi-
ties. At the same time, existing roads are designed for use for decades 
and consequently automobiles remain a major means for mobility. In 
United States cities, 20 – 30 % of the land-area is used for roads, the 
corresponding share for major cities in Asia is 10 – 12 % (Banister and 
Thurstain-Goodwin, 2011; Banister, 2011a; b). But the emerging mega-
cities around the world are associated with population expansion and 
large-scale increase in infrastructure supply. Investment in urban phys-
ical investment in these emerging megacities will have a significant 
long-lasting impact on GHG emissions. Investment in waste disposal 
facilities (incinerators) is an example of a path dependency and lock-in 
of an industry barrier that will prevent material efficiency strategies 
for a long period of time. A recent study proves how this lock-in effect 
in places such as Denmark, Sweden, Germany, or the Netherlands is 
threatening recycling and encouraging the shipment of waste that oth-
erwise could be treated locally with less environmental cost (Sora and 
Ventosa, 2013).
Carley (2011a) provides historical evidence from the United States 
electricity sector indicating that crucial drivers — market, firm, govern-
ment, and consumer — can work together to improve efficiency, but 
that they can also lead to ‘‘persistent market and policy failures that 
can inhibit the diffusion of carbon-saving technologies despite their 
apparent environmental and economic advantages” (Unruh, 2000, 
2002). 
Avoiding the lock-in in emission-intensive physical infrastructure is 
highly important to reduce emissions not only in the short run but also 
far into the future. At the planning stage, when choice of materials and 
construction are made, a forward-looking life-cycle assessment can 
help to reduce undesired lock-in effects with respect to the construc-
tion and operation of large physical infrastructure.
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5.7 Co-benefits and 
adverse side-effects of 
 mitigation actions
The implementation of mitigation policies and measures can have 
positive or negative effects on broader economic, social, and / or 
environmental objectives−and vice versa. As both co-benefits and 
adverse side-effects occur, the net effect is sometimes difficult to 
establish (Holland, 2010).16 The extent to which co-benefits and 
adverse side-effects will materialize in practice as well as their net 
effect on social welfare differ greatly across regions, and is strongly 
dependent on local circumstances, implementation practices, as well 
as the scale and pace of the deployment of the different mitigation 
measures (see Section 6.6). Section 4.8 relates co-benefits to sustain-
able development, Section 5.2 covers the historic emission trends of 
many substances related to air quality co-benefits and adverse side-
effects, Section 6.6 covers the forward-looking perspective, and the 
sectoral dimensions are discussed in Sections 7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 10.8, and 
11.7. While Section 12.8 focuses on co-effects in cities, Chapter 15 
considers the policy implications. This section looks at co-benefits 
and adverse effects from a macro-perspective to understand their 
role in decision making for climate change mitigation and sustain-
able development. We focus on cross-sectoral air pollution literature 
and the role of pollutant emission trends and briefly discuss the dif-
ficulty for assessing the role of co-benefits and adverse effects as 
an underlying driver when it plays a role for GHG-mitigation deci-
sions. Figure 5.21 offers a picture of the connection between cli-
mate change and other social and environmental objectives through 
policies affecting the emissions of various substances. The following 
chapters will assess many of these interactions between air pollut-
ants associated with the combustion of fossil fuels and their direct 
and indirect impacts.
The quantitative key findings of the AR4 were three-fold: First, the 
reduction of fossil fuel combustion will lead to the reduction of a num-
ber of air pollutants that interact with a number of policy objectives 
(see Figure 7.8). Second, the policy costs of achieving air pollution 
objectives through direct control measures decrease as a result of miti-
gation policies. Third, monetized health benefits counterbalance a sub-
stantial fraction of mitigation costs, even exceeding them in certain 
cases, particularly in developing countries (Barker et  al., 2008). The 
next section will assess new literature that relates to the third finding 
while the post-AR4 literature on the first two findings is presented in 
the sector chapters and summarized in Section 6.6.
16 Co-benefits and adverse side-effects describe co-effects without yet evaluating 
the net effect on overall social welfare. Please refer to Sections 3.6.3 and 4.8.2 as 
well as to the glossary in Annex I.
5�7�1 Co-benefits
A substantial share of estimated co-benefits is related to improving 
health through limiting air pollution while reducing GHG emissions. 
Estimates in the literature for the monetized air quality co-benefits 
from climate change mitigation range from 2 to 930 USD2010 / tCO2, and 
co-benefits in developing countries around twice those in industrialized 
countries (see Nemet et al., 2010a) for a review and (West et al., 2013) 
for the high estimate. The gap between developing and industrialized 
countries results from lower levels of air pollution control and higher 
pollution levels in the former countries, and thus the greater potential 
for improving health, particularly in the transport and household energy 
demand sectors (Markandya et  al., 2009; Nemet et  al., 2010b; West 
et  al., 2013; Shukla and Dhar, 2011). In industrialized countries, sub-
stantial reductions in air pollutant emissions have already occurred in 
the absence of climate policy and further tightening of air regulations is 
underway (Rao et al., 2013). If climate policy provides only small incre-
mental reductions, then the co-benefit is small (see Section 3.6.3), 
while large emission reductions are expected to yield substantial air 
quality co-benefits and associated cost savings (see Section 6.6.2).
Much of the literature assessed in AR4 did not explicitly analyze poli-
cies targeted at reducing air pollution−thereby neglecting the associ-
ated opportunity costs of mitigation polices (Bollen et al., 2009; Eden-
hofer et al., 2013). But for countries and regions that do not have or do 
not enforce current air quality regulations, it is important to consider 
expected future air pollution policies. Rapidly industrializing develop-
ing countries may follow the pattern of developed countries and adopt 
regulations to improve local air quality (and provide immediate local 
Figure 5�21 | Impacts of and links between selected substances emitted to the atmo-





























Figure 5�22 | Trends for SO2 per CO2 emissions per region over 2000 – 2010 | For CO2: 
territorial, excluding AFOLU and Waste. Data Source: JRC / PBL, 2013. For SO2, data 
source: Klimont et al., 2013. Regions are defined in Annex II.2.
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health and environmental benefits) before focusing on climate policy 
(Nemet et al., 2010b; Klimont et al., 2013). If this is indeed the case, 
the co-benefits of climate policy will be much smaller. Figure 5.22 
shows the declining trend in SO2-emission intensity per CO2 emissions 
(see Section 5.2 for trends in global SO2 emissions). It shows that 
assumptions about the extrapolation of the historic trends into the 
future will be a major determinant of future co-benefits estimates 
(Burtraw and Evans, 2003; Bell et al., 2008), see Section 6.6.2.7 for an 
example from the scenario literature).
Due to a lack of a counterfactual historic baseline for other policies, it 
is not possible to determine a clean ex-post measure for the co-ben-
efits of climate policies such as the Kyoto Protocol. But it is clear that 
drivers for fossil fuel combustion affect both CO2 emissions and SO2 
emissions (see van Vuuren et al., 2006).
5�7�2 Adverse side-effects
There are also adverse side-effects associated with mitigation. A com-
prehensive discussion is given in the following chapters (6 – 12), while 
this section presents some examples in the context of air pollution. 
While many low-carbon energy supply technologies perform better 
than pulverized coal technologies for most air pollutants, some solar 
energy technologies, for example, have comparable or even higher 
life-cycle emissions of SO2 (see Figure 7.8 in Section 7.9.2). Desul-
phurization of existing coal power plants, however, requires additional 
consumption of coal in the thermal power sector implying higher CO2 
emissions for a given electricity output (Pan, 2013). While CO2 capture 
processes reduce SO2 emissions at the same time, some carbon diox-
ide capture and storage (CCS) technologies would imply an increase in 
NOx and / or ammonia (NH3) emissions (Koornneef et al., 2012).
For the displacement of fossil-based transport fuels with biofuels, 
many studies indicate lower carbon monoxide and hydrocarbon emis-
sions, but NOx emissions are often higher. Next-generation biofuels are 
expected to improve performance, such as the low particulate matter 
emissions from lignocellulosic ethanol (see Hill et  al., 2009; Sathaye 
et al., 2011; and Sections 8.7 and 11. A.6). In the buildings sector, the 
most important health risks derive from insufficient ventilation prac-
tices in air-tight buildings (Section 9.7).
5�7�3 Complex issues in using co-benefits and 
adverse side-effects to inform policy
Mitigation options that improve productivity of energy, water, or land 
use yield, in general, positive benefits. The impact of other mitigation 
actions depend on a wider socio-economic context within which the 
action is implemented (Sathaye et al., 2007). A complete incorporation 
of co-benefits and adverse side-effects into climate policy is compli-
Box 5�5 | The Chinese experience with co-benefits from a cross-sectoral perspective1
Pan et al. (Pan et al., 2011) estimate the amount of green jobs in 
three sectors (energy, transportation, and forestry) and the result 
suggests a number at least 4.5 million in 2020 in China. The wind 
power industry in China, including power generation and turbine 
manufacturing, has created 40,000 direct jobs annually between 
2006 and 2010 (Pan et al., 2011). Beijing’s ambitious metro-
system plan, which includes 660 km by 2015 and another 340 
km during 2016 – 2020,could bring more than 437,000 jobs each 
year (Pan et al., 2011). China’s forestation activities could create 
as many as 1.1 million direct and indirect jobs annually during 
2011 – 2020 to achieve its 2020 goals (Pan et al., 2011).
In 2007, China called for a more environmentally friendly and 
resource-saving models of production and consumption (Pan, 
2012). Twelve out of 17 mandatory targets in the 12th five-
year (2011 – 2015) plan are related to the protection of natural 
resources and the environment; the rest are related to the 
improvement of social welfare (Pan, 2012). The actions taken 
under the five-year plan include progressive pricing for electric-
ity consumption; implementation of energy consumption quota, 
disaggregated emission targets; emissions-trading schemes; initia-
tives for eco-cities and low-carbon cities; and upgraded building 
codes with improved enforcement (Pan, 2012).
1 See Sections 7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 10.9, and 11.8 for sectoral effects.
5�7�1 Co-benefits
A substantial share of estimated co-benefits is related to improving 
health through limiting air pollution while reducing GHG emissions. 
Estimates in the literature for the monetized air quality co-benefits 
from climate change mitigation range from 2 to 930 USD2010 / tCO2, and 
co-benefits in developing countries around twice those in industrialized 
countries (see Nemet et al., 2010a) for a review and (West et al., 2013) 
for the high estimate. The gap between developing and industrialized 
countries results from lower levels of air pollution control and higher 
pollution levels in the former countries, and thus the greater potential 
for improving health, particularly in the transport and household energy 
demand sectors (Markandya et  al., 2009; Nemet et  al., 2010b; West 
et  al., 2013; Shukla and Dhar, 2011). In industrialized countries, sub-
stantial reductions in air pollutant emissions have already occurred in 
the absence of climate policy and further tightening of air regulations is 
underway (Rao et al., 2013). If climate policy provides only small incre-
mental reductions, then the co-benefit is small (see Section 3.6.3), 
while large emission reductions are expected to yield substantial air 
quality co-benefits and associated cost savings (see Section 6.6.2).
Much of the literature assessed in AR4 did not explicitly analyze poli-
cies targeted at reducing air pollution−thereby neglecting the associ-
ated opportunity costs of mitigation polices (Bollen et al., 2009; Eden-
hofer et al., 2013). But for countries and regions that do not have or do 
not enforce current air quality regulations, it is important to consider 
expected future air pollution policies. Rapidly industrializing develop-
ing countries may follow the pattern of developed countries and adopt 
regulations to improve local air quality (and provide immediate local 
Figure 5�22 | Trends for SO2 per CO2 emissions per region over 2000 – 2010 | For CO2: 
territorial, excluding AFOLU and Waste. Data Source: JRC / PBL, 2013. For SO2, data 
source: Klimont et al., 2013. Regions are defined in Annex II.2.
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cated, but it is part of a shift of the development paradigm towards 
sustainability (Pan, 2012).
Co-benefits are pervasive and inseparable (Grubb et al., 2013). It is 
not possible to ‘separate’ each benefit with different decisions: both 
technically and politically, most decisions involve multiple dimensions. 
In addition, most suggested policy changes involve large changes 
in the policy environment as opposed to the concept of marginal 
changes (see also Section 3.6.3). Finally, many effects are measured 
in very different metrics or are not quantified at all. As an example, 
whereas local air quality co-benefits are measured in health terms, 
energy security is typically measured with indicators of the sufficiency 
of domestic resources (e. g., dependence on fossil fuel imports) and 
resilience of energy supply (see Sections 6.6 and 7.9 for details). All 
these characteristics make a comprehensive analysis of co-benefits 
and adverse side-effects of a particular policy or measure challenging. 
This is why a synthesis of results from different research communities 
is crucial for robust decision making (see Section 6.6).
Despite the difficulties, side-effects from climate policy are important 
for policy design (see Section 15.2.4). Costs of mitigation policies are 
over- or under-estimated when co-benefits and adverse side-effects are 
not included (see Sections 3.6.3 and 6.3.6). Co-benefits estimates are 
particularly important for policymakers because most of the climate 
benefits are realized decades into the future while most co-benefits, 
such as improvement in air quality, are realized immediately (Barker 
et al., 2008; Nemet et al., 2010b; Shindell et al., 2012; Jack and Kinney, 
2010; Henriksen et al., 2011).
5.8 The system  perspective: 
linking sectors, 
 technologies and 
 consumption patterns
Between 1970 and 2010 global greenhouse gas emissions have 
increased by approximately 80 %. The use of fossil fuels for energy 
purposes has been the major contributor to GHG emissions. Emissions 
growth can be decomposed in population growth and per capita emis-
sions growth. Population growth is a major immediate driver for global 
GHG-emissions trends. Global population grew from 3.7 to 6.9 billion. 
The largest growth rates are found in MAF.
GHG emissions can be attributed to regions according to the territo-
rial location of emissions, or alternatively emissions can be attributed 
to the consumption of goods and services, and located to regions 
where consumption takes place. There is an emerging gap between 
territorial and consumption-based emissions, signalling a trend where 
a considerable share of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion in 
developing countries is released in the production of goods and ser-
vices exported to developed countries. At a regional level, OECD-1990 
is the largest net importer of CO2 embedded in trade, while ASIA is 
the largest net exporter. This emerging gap opens questions about the 
apparent decoupling between economic growth and GHG emissions 
in several Annex I countries; when consumption-related emissions are 
taking into account both GDP and GHG emissions have grown. Yet, a 
robust result is that, between 2000 and 2010, the developing country 
group has overtaken the developed country group in terms of annual 
CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes, 
from both territorial and consumption perspectives.
When considering per capita emissions, rather than aggregate GHG 
emissions, other trends become visible. Global average per capita GHG 
emissions have shown a rather stable trend over the last 40  years. 
This global average, however, masks differences between regions and 
sectors. A strong correlation appears between per capita income and 
per capita GHG emissions both from a cross-country comparison on 
income and emission levels, and when considering income and emis-
sions growth. The relation is most clearly for the sectors’ energy, 
industry, and transport (Section 5.3.5), and holds despite the reduc-
tion in the average emission intensity of production, from 1.5 to 
0.73 kgCO2eq / Int$2005 over the same 40-year period.
ASIA had low per capita emission levels in 1970, but these increased 
steadily, by more than 150 %. The EIT region showed a rapid increase in 
per capita emissions between 1970 and 1990, and a sharp drop imme-
diately after 1990. In 2010, per capita emissions are comparable in 
ASIA, LAM, and MAF (5.2, 6.4, and 5.4 tCO2eq / yr, respectively) but per 
capita GHG emissions in OECD-1990 and EIT are still higher by a factor 
of 2 to 3 (14.1 and 11.9 tCO2eq / yr, respectively). Also, between 1970 
and 2010, per capita land-use related emissions decreased, but fossil 
fuel-related emissions increased. Regions vary greatly with respect to 
the income trends. The OECD-1990 and LAM countries showed a stable 
growth in per capita income, which was in the same order of magni-
tude as the GHG-intensity improvements, so that per capita emissions 
remained almost constant and total emissions increased by the rate of 
population growth. The EIT showed a decrease in income around 1990, 
which together with decreasing emissions per output and a very low 
population growth led to a robust decrease in overall emissions. The 
MAF sector also shows a decrease in GDP per capita but a high popu-
lation growth led to a robust increase in overall emissions. Emerging 
economies in Asia showed very high economic growth rates; rapidly 
expanding industries resulted in sharply increasing emissions. In 2010, 
ASIA emitted more than half of worldwide industry-related emissions. 
ASIA showed both the highest economy-wide efficiency improvements 
measured as output per emissions, and the largest growth in per capita 
emissions.
The underlying drivers for economic growth are diverse and vary 
among regions and countries. Technological change and human capital 
are key underlying drivers, but some authors also underscore the avail-
ability of energy resources to play a central role in economic growth. 
Economic growth is strongly correlated to growth in energy use, and 
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the direction of causality is not clearly established. At the global level, 
per capita primary energy consumption rose by 29 % from 1970 to 
2010, but due to population growth total energy use has increased 
much more−140 % over the same period.
Energy-related GHG emissions can be further decomposed in two addi-
tional immediate drivers: energy intensity and carbon intensity. Energy 
intensity has declined globally in all developed and major develop-
ing countries including India and China. This decline can be explained 
through technological changes, the effects of structural changes, and 
the substitution of other inputs such as capital and labour used. These 
historical improvements in energy intensities, however, have not been 
enough to compensate the effect of GDP growth, thus, increasing 
energy consumption over time as a result.
In addition, energy resources have historically become less carbon-
intensive, though increased use of coal, relative to other resources, 
since 2000 has changed the trends exacerbating the burden of energy-
related GHG emissions. Estimates of the resources of coal and conven-
tional plus unconventional gas and oil are very large; indicating that 
resource scarcity has not been and will not be an underlying driver for 
decarbonization.
The immediate drivers that directly affect GHG emissions, namely 
population, GDP per capita, energy intensity and carbon intensity, are 
affected, in turn, by underlying drivers as described in Figure 5.1. These 
underlying drivers include resource availability, development status 
and goals, level of industrialization and infrastructure, international 
trade, urbanization, technological changes, and behavioural choices. 
Among these, infrastructure, technological changes and behavioural 
choices appear to be critical but, even though their influences on other 
drivers is well established, the magnitude of this impact remains dif-
ficult to quantify. 
Co-benefits have large potential to contribute to emission reductions, 
but its historic contribution is not established. Infrastructural choices 
have long-lasting effects directing the development path to higher 
or lower energy and carbon intensities. Infrastructure also guides the 
choices in technological innovation. Technological change affects both 
income and emission intensity of income; it can lead to both increasing 
and decreasing GHG emissions. Historically, innovation increased income 
but also resource use, as past technological change has favoured labour 
productivity increase over resource efficiency. There is clear empirical 
evidence that prices and regulation affect the direction of innovations. 
Innovations that increase energy efficiency of appliances often also lead 
to increased use of these appliances, diminishing the potential gains 
from increased efficiency, a process called ‘rebound effect’. 
Behaviour and life-styles are important underlying drivers affecting the 
emission intensity of expenditures through consumption choices and 
patterns for transportation modes, housing, and food. Behaviour and 
lifestyles are very diverse, rooted in individuals' psychological traits, 
cultural, and social context, and values that influence priorities and 
actions concerning climate change mitigation. Environmental values 
are found to be important for the support of climate change policies 
and measures. Chapter 4 discusses formal and civil institutions and 
governance in the context of incentivizing behavioural change. There 
are many empirical studies based on experiments showing behavioural 
interventions to be effective as an instrument in emission reductions, 
but not much is known about the feasibility of scaling up experiments 
to the macro economy level.
As described across the different sections of the chapter, factors and 
drivers are interconnected and influence each other and, many times, 
the effects of an individual driver on past GHG emissions are difficult 
to quantify. Yet historic trends reveal some clear correlations. Histori-
cally, population growth and per capita income growth have been 
associated with increasing energy use and emissions. Technological 
change is capable to substantially reduce emissions, but historically, 
labour productivity has increased more compared to resource produc-
tivity leading to increased emissions. Regulations and prices are estab-
lished as directing technological change towards lower emission inten-
sities. Behavioural change is also established as a potentially powerful 
underlying driver, but not tested at the macro level. Policies and mea-
sures can be designed and implemented to affect drivers but at the 
same time these drivers influence the type of policies and measures 
finally adopted. Historic policies and measures have proved insufficient 
to curb the upward GHG emissions trends in most countries. Future 
policies need to provide more support for emission reductions com-
pared to policies over the period 1970 – 2010, if the aim is to change 
the future GHG emissions trends.
5.9 Gaps in  knowledge 
and data
•	 There is a need for a more timely and transparent update 
of emission estimates� The collection and processing of statistics 
of territorial emissions for almost all countries since 1970, as used 
in Section 5.2, is far from straightforward. There are multiple data 
sources, which rarely have well-characterized uncertainties. Uncer-
tainty is particularly large for sources without a simple relationship 
to activity factors, such as emissions from LUC, fugitive emissions, 
and gas flaring. Formally estimating uncertainty for LUC emissions 
is difficult because a number of relevant processes are not well-
enough characterized to be included in estimates. Additionally, the 
dependence of the attribution of emissions to sectors and regions 
on the relative weight given to various GHGs is often not specified.
•	 The calculation of consumption-based emissions (in addition 
to territorial emissions) is dependent on strong assumptions� 
The calculations require an additional layer of processing on top of 
the territorial emissions, increasing uncertainties without a clear 
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characterization of the uncertainties. The outcomes presented in 
Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.3.2 are only available for years since 1990. 
•	 Empirical studies that connect GHG emissions to specific 
policies and measures or underlying drivers often cannot be 
interpreted in terms of causality, have attribution problems, 
and provide competing assessments� Statistical association 
is not the same as a chain of causality, and there are competing 
explanations for correlations. Studies can attribute changes in 
emissions to changes of activities when all other things are kept 
equal, but historically, all other things rarely are equal. Section 5.3 
identifies population, income, the economic structure, the choice of 
energy sources related to energy resource availability and energy 
price policies as proximate and underlying drivers for greenhouse 
gas emissions. But for most demography variables other than the 
population level, the literature provides competing assessments; 
different studies find different significant associations, and at dif-
ferent levels. Underlying drivers work in concert and cannot be 
assessed independently. From a cause-effect perspective, there 
is, for instance, no conclusive answer whether ageing, urbaniza-
tion, and increasing population density as such lead to increasing 
or decreasing emissions; this depends on other underlying drivers 
as well. The results from the literature are often limited to a spe-
cific context and method. Our understanding could benefit from a 
rigorous methodological comparison of different findings (Sections 
5.3.2, 5.6, 5.7).
•	 It is debated whether greenhouse gas emissions have an 
‘autonomous’ tendency to stabilize at higher income lev-
els (Section 5.3.3.1). It is agreed that economic growth increases 
emissions at low- and middle-income levels. With respect to 
energy, there are competing views whether energy availability is 
a driver for economic growth, or inversely that economic growth 
jointly with energy prices drives energy use, or that the causality 
depends on the stage of development (Sections 5.3.3.1 and 5.3.4).
•	 The net effect of trade, behaviour, and technological change 
as a determinant of a global increase or decrease of emis-
sions is not established (Sections 5.4.2, 5.6.1, 5.7). There is 
evidence that the social, cultural, and behavioural context is an 
important underlying driver, and there are case studies that iden-
tify emission reductions for specific policies and technologies. For 
technology, empirical studies that ask whether innovations have 
been emission-saving or emission-increasing are limited in scope 
(Section 5.6.1). There is a rich theory literature on the potential 
of innovations to make production energy — or emission effi-
cient — but evidence on the macro-effects and the rebound effect 
is still context-dependent (Section  5.6.2). How much carbon is 
exactly locked in existing physical infrastructure is uncertain and 
gaps of knowledge exist in how long physical infrastructure like 
housing, plants, and transport infrastructure typically remains in 
place in which geographical context (Section 5.6.3). Finally, most if 
not all of the literature on co-benefits and risk tradeoffs focuses on 
future potential gains. There is a total absence of empirical assess-
ment about the role that co-benefits and adverse sideeffects have 
played, historically, in policy formation and GHG emissions (Sec-
tion 5.7).
5.10 Frequently Asked 
Questions
FAQ 5�1 Based on trends in the recent past, are 
GHG emissions expected to continue to 
increase in the future, and if so, at what 
rate and why?
Past trends suggest that GHG emissions are likely to continue to 
increase. The exact rate of increase cannot be known but between 1970 
and 2010, emissions increased 79 %, from 27 Gt of GHG to over 49 Gt 
(Figure 5.2). Business-as-usual would result in that rate continuing. 
The UN DESA World Population Division expects human population to 
increase at approximately the rate of recent decades (Section 5.3.2.1) 
of this report. The global economy is expected to continue to grow 
(Sections 5.3.3 and 5.4.1), as well as energy consumption per person 
(Sections 5.3.4.1 and 5.5.1). The latter two factors already vary greatly 
among countries (Figure 5.16), and national policies can affect future 
trajectories of GHG emissions directly as well as indirectly through 
policies affecting economic growth and (energy) consumption (Section 
5.5). The existing variation and sensitivity to future policy choices make 
it impossible to predict the rate of increase in GHG emissions accu-
rately, but past societal choices indicate that with projected economic 
and population growth, emissions will continue to grow (Section 5.8).
FAQ 5�2 Why is it so hard to attribute causation 
to the factors and underlying drivers 
influencing GHG emissions?
Factors influencing GHG emissions interact with each other directly 
and indirectly, and each factor has several aspects. Most things people 
produce, consume, or do for recreation result in GHG emissions (Sec-
tions 5.3 and 5.5). For example, the food chain involves land use, infra-
structure, transportation, and energy production systems (Section 5.3). 
At each stage, emissions can be influenced by available agricultural 
and fishing technologies (Section 5.6), by intermediaries along the 
supply chain (Section 5.4), by consumers and by technology choices 
(Section 5.5). Technology and choice are not independent: available 
technologies affect prices, prices affect consumer preferences, and con-
sumer preferences can influence the development and distribution of 
technologies (Sections 5.5). Policies, culture, traditions, and economic 
factors intervene at every stage. The interaction of these factors makes 
it difficult to isolate their individual contributions to carbon emissions 
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growth or mitigation (Section 5.8). This interaction is both a cause for 
optimism, because it means there are many pathways to lower emis-
sions, and a challenge because there will be many potential points of 
failure in even well-designed plans for mitigation.
FAQ 5�3 What options, policies, and measures 
change the trajectory of GHG emissions?
The basic options are to have individuals consume less, consume things 
that require less energy, use energy sources that have lower-carbon 
content, or have fewer people. Although inhabitants of the most devel-
oped countries have the option to consume less, most of the human 
population is located in less-developed countries and economies in 
transition where population growth is also higher (Section 5.3.2). In 
these countries, achieving a ‘middle-class lifestyle’ will involve con-
suming more rather than less (Section 5.3.3.2). Accepting that popula-
tion will continue to grow, choices will involve changes in technology 
and human behaviour, so that the production and use of products and 
services is associated with lower rates of GHG emissions (technology 
Section 5.6), and consumers choose products, services, and activities 
with lower-unit GHG emissions (behaviour Section 5.5).
FAQ 5�4 What considerations constrain the range 
of choices available to society and their 
willingness or ability to make choices 
that would contribute to lower GHG 
emissions?
Choices are constrained by what is available, what is affordable, and 
what is preferred (Section 5.3.3). For a given product or service, less 
carbon-intensive means of provision need to be available, priced 
accessibly, and appeal to consumers (Section 5.3.4.2). Availability is 
constrained by infrastructure and technology, with a need for options 
that are energy-efficient and less-dependent on fossil fuels (Section 
5.3.5). The choice of what to consume given the availability of acces-
sible and affordable options is constrained by preferences due to cul-
ture, awareness, and understanding of the consequences in terms of 
emissions reduction (Sections 5.5.1, 5.5.2). All of these constraints can 
be eased by the development of alternative energy generation tech-
nologies and distribution systems (Section 5.6), and societies that are 
well-informed about the consequences of their choices and motivated 
to choose products, services, and activities that will reduce GHG emis-
sions (Sections 5.5.3, 5.7).
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Stabilizing greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations will require large-
scale transformations in human societies, from the way that we pro-
duce and consume energy to how we use the land surface. A natural 
question in this context is what will be the ‘transformation pathway’ 
towards stabilization; that is, how do we get from here to there? The 
topic of this chapter is transformation pathways. The chapter is pri-
marily motivated by three questions. First, what are the near-term and 
future choices that define transformation pathways, including the goal 
itself, the emissions pathway to the goal, technologies used for and 
sectors contributing to mitigation, the nature of international coordi-
nation, and mitigation policies? Second, what are the key characteris-
tics of different transformation pathways, including the rates of emis-
sions reductions and deployment of low-carbon energy, the magnitude 
and timing of aggregate economic costs, and the implications for other 
policy objectives such as those generally associated with sustainable 
development? Third, how will actions taken today influence the options 
that might be available in the future? As part of the assessment in this 
chapter, data from over 1000 new scenarios published since the IPCC 
Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) were collected from integrated mod-
elling research groups, many from large-scale model intercomparison 
studies. In comparison to AR4, new scenarios, both in this AR5 dataset 
and more broadly in the literature assessed in this chapter, consider 
more ambitious concentration goals, a wider range of assumptions 
about technology, and more possibilities for delays in additional global 
mitigation beyond that of today and fragmented international action. 
Atmospheric concentrations in baseline scenarios collected for 
this assessment (scenarios without additional efforts to con-
strain emissions beyond those of today) all exceed 450 parts 
per million (ppm) carbon dioxide-equivalent (CO2eq) by 2030 
and lie above the RCP  6�0 representative concentration path-
way in 2100 (770 ppm CO2eq in 2100); the majority lie below 
the RCP  8�5 concentration pathway in 2100 (1330 ppm CO2eq 
in 2100) (high confidence). The scenario literature does not system-
atically explore the full range of uncertainty surrounding development 
pathways and the possible evolution of key drivers such as popula-
tion, technology, and resources. However, the baseline scenarios do 
nonetheless strongly suggest that absent explicit efforts at mitigation, 
cumulative CO2 emissions since 2010 will exceed 700 GtCO2 by 2030, 
exceed 1500 GtCO2 by 2050, and potentially be well over 4000 GtCO2 
by 2100. [Section 6.3.1]
Scenarios can be distinguished by the long-term concentration 
level they reach by 2100; however, the degree to which concen-
trations exceed (overshoot) this level before 2100 is also impor-
tant (high confidence). The large majority of scenarios produced in the 
literature that reach about 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100 are characterized 
by concentration overshoot facilitated by the deployment of carbon 
dioxide removal (CDR) technologies. Many scenarios have been con-
structed to reach about 550 ppm CO2eq by 2100 without overshoot. 
Scenarios with more overshoot exhibit less mitigation today, but they 
often rest on the assumption that future decision makers deploy CDR 
technologies at large scale. An assessment in this chapter of geophysi-
cal climate uncertainties consistent with the dynamics of Earth System 
Models assessed in Working Group I (WG I) provides estimates of the 
temperature implications of different emissions pathways. This assess-
ment found that the likelihood of exceeding temperature goals this 
century increases with peak concentration levels, which are higher in 
overshoot scenarios. [6.3.2]
All major-emitting regions make substantial reductions from 
their baseline CO2eq emissions over the century in scenarios 
that bring atmospheric concentrations to about 550 ppm CO2eq 
or below by 2100 (high confidence). In most scenarios collected for 
this assessment that reach concentrations of about 550 ppm CO2eq by 
2100, global CO2eq emissions are reduced by more than 50 %, and in 
some cases by more than 100 %, by the end of the century relative to 
2010 levels. The CO2eq emissions are brought to near or below zero 
by 2100 in the majority of the scenarios reaching concentrations of 
about 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100. In large part because baseline emis-
sions from the countries not part of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) in 1990 are projected to outstrip 
those from the OECD-1990 countries, the total CO2eq reductions from 
baseline occurring in the non-OECD-1990 countries are larger than in 
the OECD-1990 countries, particularly in scenarios that cost-effectively 
allocate emissions reductions across countries. Emissions peak earlier 
in the OECD-1990 countries than in the non-OECD-1990 countries in 
these cost-effective scenarios. [6.3.2]
Bringing concentrations to about 550 ppm CO2eq or below by 
2100 will require large-scale changes to global and national 
energy systems, and potentially to the use of land; these 
changes are inconsistent with both long- and short-term trends 
(high confidence). Accelerated electrification of energy end use, cou-
pled with decarbonization of the majority of electricity generation by 
2050 and an associated phaseout of freely emitting coal generation, 
is a common feature of scenarios reaching about 550 ppm CO2eq or 
less by 2100. Scenarios suggest that sectors currently using liquid fuel 
are more costly to decarbonize than electricity and may be among the 
last sectors to be decarbonized for deep CO2 emissions reductions. 
Scenarios articulate very different changes in the land surface, reflect-
ing different assumptions about the potential for bioenergy produc-
tion, afforestation, and reduced deforestation. Studies indicate a large 
potential for energy use reductions, but also demonstrate that these 
reductions will not be sufficient by themselves to constrain GHG emis-
sions. [6.3.4, 6.3.5, 6.8]
Estimates of the aggregate economic costs of mitigation vary 
widely, but increase with stringency of mitigation (high confi-
dence). Most scenario studies collected for this assessment that are 
based on the idealized assumptions that all countries of the world begin 
mitigation immediately, there is a single global carbon price applied to 





that reaching about 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100 would entail global con-
sumption losses of 1 – 4 % in 2030 (median of 1.7 %), 2 – 6 % in 2050 
(median of 3.4 %), and 3 – 11 % in 2100 (median of 4.8 %) relative to 
what would happen without mitigation. These consumption losses cor-
respond to an annual average reduction of consumption growth of 0.06 
to 0.20 percentage points from 2010 to 2030 (median of 0.09), 0.06 
to 0.17 percentage points through 2050 (median of 0.09), and 0.04 to 
0.14 percentage points over the century (median of 0.06). To put these 
losses in context, studies assume annual average consumption growth 
rates without mitigation between 1.9 % and 3.8 % per year until 2050 
and between 1.6 % and 3.0 % per year over the century. These growth 
rates correspond to increases in total consumption from roughly four-
fold to over ten-fold over the century. Costs for maintaining concen-
trations at around 550 ppm  CO2eq are estimated to be roughly one-
third to two-thirds lower. Substantially higher and lower cost estimates 
have been obtained based on assumptions about less idealized policy 
implementations, interactions with pre-existing distortions, non-climate 
market failures, or complementary policies. (Limits on technology and 
delayed mitigation are discussed below.) [6.3.6]
Effort-sharing frameworks could help address distributional 
issues and decouple regional mitigation investments from 
financial burdens, but could be associated with significant inter-
national financial flows (medium confidence). In the absence of 
effort-sharing frameworks, cost-effectively allocating emissions across 
countries would yield an uneven distribution of mitigation costs. Sce-
narios indicate that this would lead to higher relative costs in develop-
ing economies as well as for many fossil fuel exporters. Studies explor-
ing effort-sharing frameworks in the context of a global carbon market 
estimate that the financial flows to ameliorate this asymmetry could 
be on the order of hundreds of billions of USD per year before mid-cen-
tury to bring concentrations to about 450 ppm CO2eq in 2100. [6.3.6]
Emissions through 2030 will have strong implications for the 
challenges of, and options for, bringing concentrations to about 
450 to about 500 ppm CO2eq by the end of the twenty-first cen-
tury (high confidence). The vast majority of cost-effective scenarios 
leading to 2100 concentrations of about 450 to about 500 ppm CO2eq 
are characterized by 2030 emissions roughly between 30  GtCO2eq 
and 50 GtCO2eq. Scenarios with emissions above 55 GtCO2eq in 2030 
are predominantly driven by delays in additional mitigation relative 
to what would be most cost-effective. These scenarios are character-
ized by substantially higher rates of emissions reductions from 2030 
to 2050, a larger reliance on CDR technologies in the long term, and 
higher transitional and long-term economic impacts. Due to these 
challenges, many models with 2030 emissions in this range could not 
produce scenarios reaching about 450 ppm CO2eq in 2100. Studies 
confirm that delaying additional mitigation through 2030 has substan-
tially larger influence on the subsequent challenges of mitigation than 
delaying only through 2020. [6.3.2, 6.4]
The availability of key technologies and improvements in the 
cost and performance of these technologies will have important 
implications for the challenge of achieving concentration goals 
(high confidence). Many models in recent multi-model comparisons 
could not produce scenarios reaching approximately 450 ppm CO2eq 
by 2100 with broadly pessimistic assumptions about key mitigation 
technologies. Large-scale deployment of CDR technologies in particular 
is relied upon in many of these scenarios in the second-half of the cen-
tury. For those models that could produce such scenarios, pessimistic 
assumptions about important technologies for decarbonizing non-elec-
tric energy supply significantly increased the discounted global mitiga-
tion costs of reaching about 450 ppm and about 550 ppm CO2eq by 
the end of the century, with the effect being larger for more stringent 
goals. These studies also showed that reducing energy demand can 
potentially decrease mitigation costs significantly. [6.3.2, 6.3.4, 6.3.6, 
6.4]
Mitigation efforts will influence the costs of meeting other 
policy objectives� Recent studies indicate that climate policies 
significantly reduce the costs of reaching energy security and 
air quality objectives (medium evidence, high agreement). The asso-
ciated economic implications for these objectives are not taken into 
account in most scenario studies. Sectoral studies suggest that the 
potential for co-benefits of energy end-use mitigation measures out-
weighs the potential for adverse side-effects, whereas the evidence 
suggests this may not be the case for all supply-side and AFOLU mea-
sures. The overall welfare implications associated with these additional 
objectives have not been assessed thoroughly in the literature. [6.6]
There is uncertainty about the potential of geoengineering by 
CDR or solar radiation management (SRM) to counteract climate 
change, and all techniques carry risks and uncertainties (high 
confidence). A range of different SRM and CDR techniques has been 
proposed, but no currently existing technique could fully replace miti-
gation or adaptation efforts. Nevertheless, many low-GHG concentra-
tion scenarios rely on two CDR techniques, afforestation and biomass 
energy with carbon dioxide capture and storage (BECCS), which some 
studies consider to be comparable with conventional mitigation meth-
ods. Solar radiation management could reduce global mean tempera-
tures, but with uneven regional effects, for example on temperature and 
precipitation, and it would not address all of the impacts of increased 
CO2 concentrations, such as ocean acidification. Techniques requiring 
large-scale interventions in the earth system, such as ocean fertilization 
or stratospheric aerosol injections, carry significant risks. Although pro-
posed geoengineering techniques differ substantially from each other, 
all raise complex questions about costs, risks, governance, and ethical 
implications of research and potential implementation. [6.9]
Despite the advances in our understanding of transformation path-
ways since AR4, many avenues of inquiry remain unanswered. Impor-
tant future research directions include the following: development of 
a broader set of socioeconomic and technological storylines to sup-
port development of scenarios; scenarios explicitly pursuing a wider 
set of climate goals, including those related to temperature change; 





to, a changing climate, including energy and land use systems critical 
for mitigation; expanded treatment of the benefits and risks of CDR 
and SRM options; expanded treatment of co-benefits and adverse 
side-effects of mitigation pathways; improvements in the treatment 
and understanding of mitigation options and responses in end-use sec-
tors in transformation pathways; and more sophisticated treatments 
of land use and land use-based mitigation options in mitigation sce-
narios. [6.10]
6.1 Introduction
6�1�1 Framing and evaluating transformation 
pathways 
Stabilizing greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations at any level will 
require deep reductions in GHG emissions. Net global CO2 emissions, 
in particular, must eventually be brought to or below zero. Emissions 
reductions of this magnitude will require large-scale transformations in 
human societies, from the way that we produce and consume energy 
to how we use the land surface. The more ambitious the stabilization 
goal, the more rapid this transformation must occur. A natural question 
in this context is what will be the transformation pathway toward sta-
bilization; that is, how do we get from here to there?
The topic of this chapter is transformation pathways. The chapter is 
motivated primarily by three questions. First, what are the near-term 
and future choices that define transformation pathways including, for 
example, the goal itself, the emissions pathway to the goal, the tech-
nologies used for and sectors contributing to mitigation, the nature 
of international coordination, and mitigation policies? Second, what 
are the key decision making outcomes of different transformation 
pathways, including the magnitude and international distribution of 
economic costs and the implications for other policy objectives such 
as those associated with sustainable development? Third, how will 
actions taken today influence the options that might be available in 
the future?
Two concepts are particularly important for framing any answers to 
these questions. The first is that there is no single pathway to stabiliza-
tion of GHG concentrations at any level. Instead, the literature eluci-
dates a wide range of transformation pathways. Choices will govern 
which pathway is followed. These choices include, among other things, 
the long-term stabilization goal, the emissions pathway to meet that 
goal, the degree to which concentrations might temporarily overshoot 
the goal, the technologies that will be deployed to reduce emissions, 
the degree to which mitigation is coordinated across countries, the 
policy approaches used to achieve these goals within and across coun-
tries, the treatment of land use, and the manner in which mitigation is 
meshed with other policy objectives such as sustainable development. 
The second concept is that transformation pathways can be distin-
guished from one another in important ways. Weighing the character-
istics of different pathways is the way in which deliberative decisions 
about transformation pathways would be made. Although measures of 
aggregate economic implications have often been put forward as key 
deliberative decision making factors, these are far from the only char-
acteristics that matter for making good decisions. Transformation path-
ways inherently involve a range of tradeoffs that link to other national 
and policy objectives such as energy and food security, the distribu-
tion of economic costs, local air pollution, other environmental factors 
associated with different technology solutions (e. g., nuclear power, 
coal-fired carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS)), and economic 
competitiveness. Many of these fall under the umbrella of sustainable 
development.
A question that is often raised about particular stabilization goals 
and transformation pathways to those goals is whether the goals or 
pathways are ‘feasible’. In many circumstances, there are clear physi-
cal constraints that can render particular long-term goals physically 
impossible. For example, if additinional mitigation beyond that of 
today is delayed to a large enough degree and carbon dioxide removal 
(CDR) options are not available (see Section 6.9), a goal of reaching 
450 ppm CO2eq by the end of the 21st century can be physically impos-
sible. However, in many cases, statements about feasibility are bound 
up in subjective assessments of the degree to which other character-
istics of particular transformation pathways might influence the ability 
or desire of human societies to follow them. Important characteristics 
include economic implications, social acceptance of new technolo-
gies that underpin particular transformation pathways, the rapidity 
at which social and technological systems would need to change to 
follow particular pathways, political feasibility, and linkages to other 
national objectives. A primary goal of this chapter is to illuminate these 
characteristics of transformation pathways.
6�1�2 New mitigation scenarios since 
AR4
Since the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), the integrated mod-
elling community has produced a range of new transformation path-
way scenarios. Major advances include an increase in the number of 
scenarios exploring the following: low-concentration goals such as 
450 ppm CO2eq; overshoot emissions trajectories with and without 
CDR technologies; a variety of international mitigation policy configu-
rations, including fragmented action and delays in additional mitiga-
tion beyond that of today; and the implications of variations in tech-
nology cost, performance, and availability. The literature also includes 
a small but growing set of scenarios and research exploring the link-
age between mitigation and other policy objectives, an increasingly 
sophisticated treatment of the role of land use in mitigation, and sce-
narios exploring non-market approaches to mitigation. Two particularly 
important categories for the discussion in this chapter are non-ideal-





on technology cost, performance, or availability. These categories of 
scenarios are discussed in more detail below.
6�1�2�1 Non-idealized international implementation 
scenarios
At the time of AR4, the majority of mitigation scenarios were based on 
the idealized assumption that mitigation is undertaken where and 
when it is least expensive. Such ‘idealized implementation’ scenarios 
assume the imposition of a global price on carbon that reaches across 
countries, permeates all economic sectors within countries, and rises 
over time in a way that will minimize discounted economic costs over 
a long period of time, typically through 2100. These are often referred 
to as ‘cost-effective’ scenarios, because they lead to the lowest aggre-
gate global mitigation costs under idealized assumptions about the 
functioning of markets and economies (see Section  6.3.6). However, 
the reality of international strategies for mitigation is one of different 
countries taking on mitigation at different times and using different 
and independent implementation approaches. Responding to this real-
ity, the research community has produced a large set of ‘non-idealized’ 
international implementation scenarios for reaching long-term concen-
tration goals. Often, but not always, non-idealized implementation is 
focused on the coming decades, with a transition toward idealized 
implementation in the long run. In addition to individual papers (for 
example, Richels et  al., 2007; Edmonds et  al., 2008; Luderer et  al., 
2014b; Rogelj et al., 2013a), there have been a number of multi-model 
projects exploring non-idealized implementation scenarios (Table 6.1). 
This chapter relies heavily on those multi-model studies. 
There are a number of ways that scenarios may deviate from the ideal-
ized implementation, but two are most prominent in the new litera-
ture. One set of scenarios includes those in which near-term mitigation 
is inconsistent with — typically less than — what would be called for to 
minimize the discounted, century-long costs of meeting a long-term 
goal such as 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100. These scenarios are intended to 
capture the implications of ‘delayed action’ or ‘delayed mitigation’ or 
‘constrained near-term ambition’. Mitigation is not undertaken ‘when’ 
it would be least expensive. The other set of scenarios includes those 
in which the price on carbon is not consistent across countries. Some 
countries reduce emissions more aggressively than others, particularly 
in the near-term, so that mitigation is not undertaken ‘where’ it is least 
expensive. These scenarios are intended to capture the implications 
of ‘fragmented action’ or ‘delayed participation’. Non-idealized inter-
national implementation scenarios may include one or both of these 
deviations.
6�1�2�2 Limited technology scenarios
Scenario research prior to AR4 emphasized the importance of tech-
nology in constraining the costs of mitigation. A range of individual 
papers had made initial explorations of this space for more than a 
decade before AR4. Since AR4, however, a range of new studies have 
emerged including large model intercomparison studies, that have 
focused on the implications of limitations on technology cost, per-
formance, availability on the cost and other characteristics of meet-
ing concentration goals such as 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100. The large 
model intercomparison studies include Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) 
27 (Krey et al., 2014; Kriegler et al., 2014a), ADAM (Adaptation and 
Mitigation Strategies: Supporting European Climate Policy) (Edenhofer 
et al., 2010), RECIPE (Report on Energy and Climate Policy in Europe) 
(Luderer et al., 2012a; Tavoni et al., 2012), and AMPERE (Assessment 
of Climate Change Mitigation Pathways and Evaluation of the Robust-
ness of Mitigation Cost Estimates) (Riahi et  al., 2014). In addition 
to the large model intercomparison studies, a number of individual 
Table 6�1 | Multi-model studies exploring non-idealized international implementation
Multi-Model Study Description
EMF 22 (Clarke et al., 2009) Delayed participation (fragmented action) scenarios in which Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries begin mitigation immediately; Brazil, Russia, India, and China begin after 2030; remaining countries begin after 
2050. Scenarios meet various 2100 concentration goals, with and without overshooting the concentration goal. 
EMF 27 (Blanford et al., 2014; 
Kriegler et al., 2014a) 
Delayed and limited participation scenario with Annex I adopting 80 % emissions reductions until 2050, non-Annex I adopting a global 
50 % emissions reduction by 2050 after 2020, and resource exporting countries not undertaking emissions reductions. 
AMPERE (Kriegler et al., 
2014c; Riahi et al., 2014) 
Two studies: AMPERE WP2 focused on delayed mitigation scenarios with the world following moderate 
mitgation until 2030, and adopting long-term concentration goals thereafter. 
AMPERE WP3 focused on delayed participation scenarios with EU27 or EU27 and China acting immediately and the remaining countries 
transitioning from moderate policies to a global carbon pricing regime (without mitigation goal) between 2030 and 2050.
LIMITS (Kriegler et al., 2013b; 
Tavoni et al., 2013)
Delayed mitgation scenarios with the world following two levels of moderate fragmented action through 2020 or 2030, and 
adopting two long-term concentration goals thereafter. Three different effort-sharing schemes are considered. 
RoSE (Luderer et al., 2014a) Delayed mitgation scenarios with the world following moderate fragmented action in the near 
term and adopting a long-term concentration goal after 2020 or 2030.
Note: The Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) 27, AMPERE (Assessment of Climate Change Mitigation Pathways and Evaluation of the Robustness of Mitigation Cost Estimates), LIMITS 
(Low Climate Impact Scenarios and the Implications of Reguired Tight Emission Control Strategies), and RoSE (Roadmaps Towards Sustainable Energy Futures) studies also included 





research papers and reports have explored this space since AR4, typi-
cally constrained to a single model (Richels et al., 2007; Calvin et al., 
2009a; Krey and Riahi, 2009; van Vliet et al., 2009; Riahi et al., 2012; 
Luderer et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2013b). In many cases, these stud-
ies have simply assumed that particular technologies, such as CCS 
or nuclear power, may not be available. In others, studies have put 
constraints on resource supplies, for example, the supply of bioenergy. 
In others, they have called for variations in cost and performance of 
different technologies. Many have also explored the implications of 
energy end-use improvements.
6.2 Tools of analysis
6�2�1 Overview of integrated modelling tools
The long-term scenarios assessed in this chapter were generated 
primarily by large-scale, integrated models that can project key char-
acteristics of transformation pathways to mid-century and beyond. 
These models represent many of the most relevant interactions among 
important human systems (e. g., energy, agriculture, the economic 
system), and often represent important physical processes associated 
with climate change (e. g., the carbon cycle). Other approaches to 
explore transformation pathways include qualitative scenario methods 
and highly aggregated modelling tools, such as those used for cost-
benefit analysis (see Box 6.1 on cost-benefit analysis, p. 394). These 
other approaches provide a different level of quantitative information 
about transformation pathways than scenarios from large-scale inte-
grated models. 
All integrated models share some common traits. Most fundamentally, 
integrated models are simplified, stylized, numerical approaches to 
represent enormously complex physical and social systems. They take 
in a set of input assumptions and produce outputs such as energy 
system transitions, land-use transitions, economic effects of mitiga-
tion, and emissions trajectories. Important input assumptions include 
population growth, baseline economic growth, resources, technologi-
cal change, and the mitigation policy environment. The models do not 
structurally represent many social and political forces that can influ-
ence the way the world evolves (e. g., shocks such as the oil crisis of 
the 1970s). Instead, the implications of these forces enter the model 
through assumptions about, for example, economic growth and 
resource supplies. The models use economics as the basis for decision 
making. This may be implemented in a variety of ways, but it funda-
mentally implies that the models tend toward the goal of minimizing 
the aggregate economic costs of achieving mitigation outcomes, unless 
they are specifically constrained to behave otherwise. In this sense, the 
scenarios tend towards normative, economics-focused descriptions of 
the future. The models typically assume fully functioning markets and 
competitive market behavior, meaning that factors such as non-market 
transactions, information asymmetries, and market power influencing 
decisions are not effectively represented. Maintaining a long-term, 
integrated, and often global perspective involves tradeoffs in terms 
of the detail at which key processes can be represented in integrated 
models. Hence, the models do not generally represent the behaviour 
of certain important system dynamics, such as economic cycles or the 
operation of electric power systems important for the integration of 
solar and wind power, at the level of detail that would be afforded by 
analyses that the focus exclusively on those dynamics. 
Beyond these and other similarities, integrated modelling approaches 
can be very different, and these differences can have important impli-
cations for the variation among scenarios that emerge from different 
models. The following paragraphs highlight a number of key differ-
ences in model structure. To provide insight into the implications of 
these tradeoffs, potential implications for aggregate economic costs 
are provided as examples, when appropriate.
Economic coverage and interactions� Models differ in terms of the 
degree of detail with which they represent the economic system and 
the degree of interaction they represent across economic sectors. Full-
economy models (e. g., general equilibrium models) represent inter-
actions across all sectors of the economy, allowing them to explore 
and understand ripple effects from, for example, the imposition of 
a mitigation policy, including impacts on overall economic growth. 
Partial-economy models, on the other hand, take economic activ-
ity as an input that is unresponsive to policies or other changes such 
as those associated with improvements in technology. These models 
tend to focus more on detailed representations of key systems such 
as the energy system. All else equal, aggregate economic costs would 
tend to be higher in full-economy models than in partial-economy 
models because full-economy models include feedbacks to the entire 
economy. On the other hand, full-economy models may include more 
possibilities for substitution in sectors outside of those represented in 
partial-economy models, and this would tend to reduce aggregate eco-
nomic costs.
Foresight� Perfect-foresight models (e. g., intertemporal optimization 
models) optimize over time, so that all future decisions are taken into 
account in today’s decisions. In contrast, recursive-dynamic models 
make decisions at each point in time based only on the information in 
that time period. In general, perfect-foresight models would be likely to 
allocate emissions reductions more efficiently over time than recursive-
dynamic models, which should lead to lower aggregate costs.
Representation of trade� Models differ in terms of how easy it is 
for goods to flow across regions. On one end of the spectrum are 
models assuming goods are homogeneous and traded easily at one 
world price (Heckscher-Ohlin) or that there is one global producer 
(quasi-trade). On the other end of the spectrum are models assuming 
a preference for domestic goods over imported goods (Armington) or 
models without explicit trade across regions (e. g., models with import 





lower-aggregate mitigation costs because the global economy is more 
flexible to undertake mitigation where it is least expensive. More gen-
erally, many partial-equilibrium models include trade only in carbon 
permits and basic energy commodities. These models are not capable 
of exploring the full nature of carbon leakage that might emerge from 
mitigation policies, and particularly those associated with fragmented 
international action.
Model flexibility� The flexibility of models describes the degree 
to which they can change course. Model flexibility is not a single, 
explicit choice for model structure. Instead, it is the result of a range 
of choices that influence, for example, how easily capital can be reallo-
cated across sectors including the allowance for premature retirement 
of capital stock, how easily the economy is able to substitute across 
energy technologies, whether fossil fuel and renewable resource con-
straints exist, and how easily the economy can extract resources. The 
complexity of the different factors influencing model flexibility makes 
clear delineations of which models are more or less flexible difficult. 
Evaluation and characterization of model flexibility is an area of cur-
rent research (see Kriegler et al., 2014b). Greater flexibility will tend to 
lower mitigation costs.
Sectoral, regional, technology, and GHG detail� Models differ dra-
matically in terms of the detail at which they represent key sectors and 
systems. These differences influence not only the way that the models 
operate, but also the information they can provide about transforma-
tion pathways. Key choices include the number of regions, the degree 
of technological detail in each sector, which GHGs are represented and 
how, whether land use is explicitly represented, and the sophistica-
tion of the model of earth system process such as the carbon cycle. 
Some models include only CO2 emissions, many do not treat land-use 
change (LUC) and associated emissions, and many do not have sub-
models of the carbon cycle necessary to calculate CO2 concentrations. 
In addition, although the scenarios in this chapter were generated 
from global models that allow for the implications of mitigation for 
international markets to be measured, regional models can provide 
finer detail on the implications for a specific region’s economy and dis-
tributional effects. The effects of detail on aggregate mitigation costs 
are ambiguous 
Representation of technological change� Models can be catego-
rized into two groups with respect to technological change. On one 
end of the spectrum, models with exogenous technological change 
take technology as an input that evolves independently of policy mea-
sures or investment decisions. These models provide no insight on 
how policies may induce advancements in technology. On the other 
end of the spectrum, models with endogenous technological change 
(also known as induced technological change) allow for some por-
tion of technological change to be influenced by deployment rates 
or investments in research and development (R&D). Models featuring 
endogenous technological change are valuable for understanding how 
the pace of technological change might be influenced by mitigation 
policies.
6�2�2 Overview of the scenario ensemble for 
this assessment
The synthesis in this chapter is based on a large set of new scenarios 
produced since AR4. The number of models has increased and model 
functionality has significantly improved since AR4, allowing for a 
broader set of scenarios in the AR5 ensemble. The majority of these 
scenarios were produced as part of multi-model comparisons. Most 
model intercomparison studies produce publicly available databases 
that include many of the key outputs from the studies. Although crucial 
for our understanding of transformation pathways, these intercompari-
son exercises are not the only source of information on transformation 
pathways. A range of individual studies has been produced since AR4, 
largely assessing transformation pathways in ways not addressed in 
the model intercomparison exercises. For the purposes of this assess-
ment, an open call was put forward for modellers to submit scenarios 
not included in the large model intercomparison databases. These 
scenarios, along with those from many of the model intercomparison 
studies, have been collected in a database that is used extensively in 
this chapter. A summary of the models and model intercomparison 
exercises that generated the scenarios referenced in this chapter can 
be found in Annex II.10.
6�2�3 Uncertainty and the interpretation of 
large scenario ensembles 
The interpretation of large ensembles of scenarios from different mod-
els, different studies, and different versions of individual models is a 
core component of the assessment of transformation pathways in this 
chapter. Indeed, many of the tables and figures represent ranges of 
results across all these dimensions. 
There is an unavoidable ambiguity in interpreting ensemble results in 
the context of uncertainty. On the one hand, the scenarios assessed in 
this chapter do not represent a random sample that can be used for 
formal uncertainty analysis. Each scenario was developed for a specific 
purpose. Hence, the collection of scenarios included in this chapter does 
not necessarily comprise a set of ‘best guesses.’ In addition, many of 
these scenarios represent sensitivities, particularly along the dimensions 
of future technology availability and the timing of international action 
on climate change, and are therefore highly correlated. Indeed, most of 
the scenarios assessed in this chapter were generated as part of model 
intercomparison exercises that impose specific assumptions, often 
regarding long-term policy approaches to mitigation, but also in some 
cases regarding fundamental drivers like technology, population growth, 
and economic growth. In addition, some modelling groups have gener-
ated substantially more scenarios than others, introducing a weighting 
of scenarios that can be difficult to interpret. At the same time, however, 
with the exception of pure sensitivity studies, the scenarios were gen-
erated by experts making informed judgements about how key forces 
might evolve in the future and how important systems interact. Hence, 





provide real and often clear insights about our lack of knowledge about 
key forces that might shape the future (Fischedick et al., 2011; Krey and 
Clarke, 2011). The synthesis in this chapter does not attempt to resolve 
the ambiguity associated with ranges of scenarios, and instead focuses 
simply on articulating the most robust and valuable insights that can 
be extracted given this ambiguity. However, wherever possible, scenario 
samples are chosen in such a way as to reduce bias, and these choices 
are made clear in the discussion and figure legends.
6�2�4 Interpretation of model inability to 
 produce particular scenarios 
A question that is often raised about particular stabilization goals and 
transformation pathways is whether the goals or pathways are ‘fea-
sible’ (see Section 6.1). Integrated models can be helpful in informing 
this question by providing information about key elements of transfor-
mation pathways that might go into assessments of feasibility, such 
as rates of deployment of energy technologies, rates of reductions 
in global and regional emissions, aggregate economic costs, finan-
cial flows among regions, and links to other policy objectives such as 
energy security or energy prices. However, beyond cases where physi-
cal laws might be violated to achieve a particular scenario (for exam-
ple, a 2100 carbon budget is exceeded prior to 2100 with no option for 
negative emissions), these integrated models cannot determine feasi-
bility in an absolute sense. 
This is an important consideration when encountering situations in 
which models are incapable of producing scenarios. Many models 
have been unable to achieve particularly aggressive concentration 
goals such as reaching 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100, particularly under 
challenging technological or policy constraints. In some cases, this 
may be due to the violation of real physical laws, the most common of 
which is when the cumulative carbon budget associated with meeting 
a long-term goal is exceeded without options to remove carbon from 
the atmosphere. Frequently, however, instances of model infeasibility 
arise from pushing models beyond the boundaries of what they were 
built to explore, for example, rates of change in the energy system that 
exceed what the model can represent, or carbon prices sufficiently 
high that they conflict with the underlying computational structure. 
Indeed, in many cases, one model may be able to produce scenarios 
while another will not, and model improvements over time may result 
in feasible scenarios that previously were infeasible. Hence, although 
these model infeasibilities cannot generally be taken as an indicator of 
feasibility in an absolute sense, they are nonetheless valuable indica-
tors of the challenge associated with achieving particular scenarios. 
For this reason, whenever possible, this chapter highlights those situa-
tions where models were unable to produce scenarios.
Unfortunately, this type of result can be difficult to fully represent in 
an assessment because, outside of model intercomparison studies 
intended explicitly to identify these circumstances, only scenarios that 
could actually be produced (as opposed that could not be produced) 
are generally published. Whether certain circumstances are under-
represented because they have been under-examined or because they 
have been examined and the scenarios failed is a crucial distinction, 
yet one that it is currently not possible to fully report. Model infeasibili-
ties can bias results in important ways, for example, the costs of miti-
gation, because only those models producing scenarios can provide 
estimated costs (Tavoni and Tol, 2010). 
6.3 Climate stabilization: 
Concepts, costs and 
 implications for the macro 
economy, sectors and 
technology  port folios, 
taking into account 
 differences across regions
6�3�1 Baseline scenarios
6�3�1�1 Introduction to baseline scenarios
Baseline scenarios are projections of GHG emissions and their key driv-
ers as they might evolve in a future in which no explicit actions are 
taken to reduce GHG emissions. Baseline scenarios play the important 
role of establishing the projected scale and composition of the future 
energy, economic, and land-use systems as a reference point for mea-
suring the extent and nature of required mitigation for a given climate 
goal. Accordingly, the resulting estimates of mitigation effort and costs 
in a particular mitigation scenario are always conditional upon the 
associated baseline. 
Although the range of emissions pathways across baseline scenarios in 
the literature is broad, it may not represent the full potential range of 
possibilities. There has been comparatively little research formally con-
structing or eliciting subjective probabilities for comprehensive ranges 
of the key drivers of baseline emissions in a country-specific context, 
and this remains an important research need for scenario develop-
ment. As discussed in Section 6.2, although the range of assumptions 
used in the literature conveys some information regarding modellers’ 
expectations about how key drivers might evolve and the associated 
implications, several important factors limit its interpretation as a true 
uncertainty range. An important distinction between scenarios in this 
regard is between those that are based on modellers’ ‘default’ assump-
tions and those that are harmonized across models within specific 
studies. The former can be considered a better, although still imperfect, 
representation of modellers’ expectations about the future, while, as is 
discussed below, the latter consider specific alternative views that in 





6�3�1�2 The drivers of baseline energy-related emissions
As discussed in Chapter 5, the drivers of the future evolution of energy-
related emissions in the baseline can be summarized by the terms of 
the Kaya identity: population, per capita income, energy intensity of 
economic output, and carbon intensity of energy. At the global level, 
baseline projections from integrated models are typically characterized 
by modest population growth stabilizing by the end of the century, fast 
but decelerating growth in income, decline in energy intensity, and 
modest changes in carbon intensity with ambiguous sign (Figure 6.1).
There is comparatively little variation across model scenarios in pro-
jected population growth, with virtually all modelling studies relying 
on central estimates (UN, 2012). One exception is the RoSE project 
(Bauer et al., 2014b; Calvin et al., 2014b; De Cian et al., 2014), which 
explicitly considers high population scenarios, as well as the storyline 
beneath the representative concentration pathways (RCP) 8.5 scenario. 
Among the majority of default population projections, there are some 
minor differences across models, for example, the extent to which 
declining rates for certain regions in coming decades are incorporated. 
On the other hand, there is substantially more variation in model pro-
jections of per capita income, with a few scenarios harmonized at both 
the low and high ends of the range, and energy intensity, for which 
two studies (AMPERE and EMF27) specified alternative ‘fast’ decline 
baselines. Still, the interquartile range of default assumptions for both 
indicators is narrow, suggesting that many scenarios are based on a 
Figure 6�1 | Global baseline projection ranges for Kaya factors. Scenarios harmonized with respect to a particular factor are depicted with individual lines. Other scenarios are 
depicted as a range with median emboldened; shading reflects interquartile range (darkest), 5th — 95th percentile range (lighter), and full range (lightest), excluding one indi-
cated outlier in panel a) Scenarios are filtered by model and study for each indicator to include only unique projections. Model projections and historic data are normalized to 
1 in 2010. Gross domestic product (GDP) is aggregated using base-year market exchange rates. Energy and carbon intensity are measured with respect to total primary energy. 
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similar underlying narrative. Models project a faster global average 
growth rate in the future as dynamic emerging economies constitute 
an increasing share of global output. Energy intensity declines more 
rapidly than in the past, with an especially marked departure from the 
historical trend for ‘fast’ energy intensity decline scenarios. Carbon 
intensity, typically viewed as a model outcome driven by resource and 
technology cost assumptions, is projected in most baseline scenarios to 
change relatively little over time, but there are exceptions in both 
directions. Declining carbon intensity could result from rapid improve-
ments in renewable technologies combined with rising fossil fuel 
prices. Conversely, the fossil share in energy could rise with favourable 
resource discoveries, or the fossil mix could become more carbon 
intensive, for example, due to replacement of conventional petroleum 
with heavier oil sands or coal-to-liquids.
While all models assume increasing per capita income and declin-
ing energy intensity, broad ranges are projected and high uncer-
tainty remains as to what rates might prevail. Most models describe 
income growth as the result of exogenous improvement over time in 
labour productivity. The processes of technological advance by which 
such improvement occurs are only partially understood. Changes 
in aggregate energy intensity over time are the net result of several 
trends, including both improvements in the efficiency of energy end-
use technology and structural changes in the composition of energy 
demand. Structural changes can work in both directions: there may be 
increased demand for energy-intensive services such as air-condition-
ing as incomes rise, while on the production side of the economy, there 
may be shifts to less energy-intensive industries as countries become 
wealthier. Although increasing energy intensity has been observed for 
some countries during the industrialization stage, the net effect is usu-
ally negative, and in general energy intensity has declined consistently 
over time. Both efficiency improvements and structural change can be 
driven by changes in energy prices, but to a significant extent both are 
driven by other factors such as technological progress and changing 
preferences with rising incomes. Most integrated models are able to 
project structural and technological change only at an aggregate level, 
although some include explicit assumptions for certain sectors (Sugi-
yama et al., 2014). 
Because of limited variation in population and carbon-intensity projec-
tions, the relative strength of the opposing effects of income growth 
and energy intensity decline (summarized by changes in per capita 
energy), plays the most important role in determining the growth of 
emissions in the baseline scenario literature (see Blanford et al., 2012). 
Assumptions about the evolution of these factors vary strongly across 
regions. In general, rates of change in population, income, energy 
intensity, and per capita energy are all expected to be greater in devel-
oping countries than in currently developed countries in coming 
decades, although this pattern has not necessarily prevailed in the 
past 40 years, as non-OECD-1990 countries had slower energy inten-
sity decline than OECD-1990 countries (Figure 6.2). Among default 
energy-intensity scenarios, assumed rates of change appear to be pos-
itively correlated between income and energy intensity, so that equiv-
alent per capita energy outcomes are realized through varying combi-
nations of these two indicators. The harmonized shift in the energy 
intensity decline rate leads to very low per capita energy rates, with 
global per capita energy use declining in a few cases (Figure 6.2). Pro-
jected emissions are essentially the product of per capita energy and 
carbon intensity projections, with most variation in future emissions 
scenarios explained by variation in per capita energy; the highest 
emissions projections arise from instances with high levels in both 
indicators (Figure 6.3).
6�3�1�3 Baseline emissions projections from fossil fuels 
and industry
Based on the combination of growing population, growing per capita 
energy demand, and a lack of significant reductions in carbon intensity 
of energy summarized in the previous section, global baseline emis-
sions of CO2 from fossil fuel and industrial (FF&I) sources are projected 
to continue to increase throughout the 21st century (Figure 6.4, left 
panel). Although most baseline scenarios project a deceleration in 
emissions growth, especially compared to the rapid rate observed 
in the past decade, none is consistent in the long run with the path-
ways in the two most stringent RCP scenarios (Sections 2.6 and 4.5), 
with the majority falling between the 6.0 and 8.5 pathways (see IPCC 
(2013), Chapter 12 for a discussion of the RCP study). The RCP 8.5 
pathway has higher emissions than all but a few published baseline 
scenarios. Projections for baseline FF&I CO2 emissions in 2050 range 
from only slightly higher than current levels (in scenarios with explicit 
assumptions about fast energy intensity decline) to nearly triple cur-
rent levels.
Figure 6�2 | Average rates of change between 2010 and 2050 in baseline scenarios 
for GDP per capita and energy intensity of GDP in OECD-1990 and Non-OECD-1990. 
There are 62 of 77 unique default intensity scenarios and 22 of 24 unique fast inten-
sity scenarios plotted. Omitted are scenarios without OECD-1990 break-out. Sources: 
UN (2012), WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10). Historic data: JRC / PBL 













































Figure 6�4 | Global FF&I CO2 emissions in baseline scenarios with default growth assumptions (grey range) and fast energy intensity decline (gold range) (left panel), and for OECD-
1990 vs. non-OECD-1990 (right panel) from 1970 to 2100. RCP scenarios are shown for comparison with the global baseline ranges. Scenarios are depicted as ranges with median 
emboldened; shading reflects interquartile range (darkest), 5th – 95th percentile range (lighter), and full extremes (lightest). Absolute projections are subject to variation in reported 
base-year emissions arising from different data sources and calibration approaches (Chaturvedi et al., 2012). Some of the range of variation in reported 2010 emissions reflects dif-


























































































Figure 6�3 | Indexed change through 2050 in carbon intensity of energy and per capita energy use in baseline scenarios. Color reflects indexed 2050 global fossil fuel and indus-
trial (FF&I) CO2 emissions according to key in right panel showing histogram of plotted scenarios. For default population projections, emissions are correlated with chart position; 
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A common characteristic of all baseline scenarios is that the major-
ity of emissions over the next century occur among non-OECD-1990 
countries (Figure 6.4, right panel). Because of its large and growing 
population and projected rates of economic growth relatively faster 
than the industrialized OECD-1990 countries, this region is projected to 
have the dominant share of world energy demand over the course of 
the next century. While the range of emissions projected in the OECD-
1990 region remains roughly constant (a few models have higher 
growth projections), nearly all growth in future baseline emissions is 
projected to occur in the non-OECD-1990 countries. It is important to 
note that while a baseline by construction excludes explicit climate 
policies, management of non-climate challenges, particularly in the 
context of sustainable development, will likely impact baseline GHG 
pathways. Many of these policy objectives (but likely not all) are taken 
into account in baseline scenarios, such as reductions in local air pol-
lution and traditional biomass use and fuel switching more generally 
away from solids towards refined liquids and electricity. Section 6.6 
provides more details on this issue.
6�3�1�4 Baseline CO2 emissions from land use and 
emissions of non-CO2 gases
Baseline projections for global land-use related carbon emissions and 
sequestration (also referred to as net Agriculture, Forestry and Other 
Land Use (AFOLU) CO2 emissions) are made by a smaller subset of 
models. Net AFOLU CO2 emissions have greater historical uncertainty 





Houghton et al., 2012). Baseline projections for land-use related CO2 
emissions reflect base-year uncertainty and suggest declining annual 
net CO2 emissions in the long run (Figure 6.5, left panel). In part, 
projections are driven by technological change, as well as projected 
declining rates of agriculture area expansion, a byproduct of decelerat-
ing population growth. Though uncertain, the estimated contribution 
of land-use related carbon over the coming century is small relative 
to emissions from fossil fuels and industry, with some models project-
ing a net sink late in the century. For non-CO2 GHGs, the contribu-
tion in CO2eq terms is larger than land-use CO2 with projected emis-
sions increasing over time (Figure 6.5, left panel). Along with fugitive 
methane and a few industrial sources, land-use related activities are 
projected to be a major driver of non-CO2 emissions, accounting for 
roughly 50 % of total methane (CH4) emissions and 90 % of nitrous 
oxide (N2O) emissions. Total CO2eq emissions are projected as the 
sum of FF&I CO2, land-use related CO2, and non-CO2 (Figure 6.5, right 
panel), with FF&I CO2 constituting around 80 %.
6�3�1�5 Baseline radiative forcing and cumulative carbon 
emissions
The emissions pathways for all of the emissions from the scenarios col-
lected for this assessment were run through a common version of the 
MAGICC model to obtain estimates of CO2eq concentrations (Section 
6.3.2). As a result of projected increasing emissions in the scenarios, 
radiative forcing from all sources continues to grow throughout the 
century in all baseline scenarios, exceeding 550 CO2eq (3.7 W / m2) 
between 2040 and 2050, while 450 CO2eq (2.6 W / m2) is surpassed 
between 2020 and 2030 (Figure 6.6, left panel). Again, the majority of 
baseline forcing scenarios fall below the RCP 8.5 path but above RCP 
6.0. Total forcing projections include the highly uncertain contribution 
of aerosols and other non-gas agents, which are based on the MAGICC 
model’s median estimates of forcing as a function of aerosol emissions 
(for scenarios that do not project emissions of these substances, emis-
sions were prescribed from other sources; see Annex II.10). Due to 
variation in driver assumptions, which may not reflect true uncertainty, 
baseline scenarios could lead to a range of long-term climate out-
comes, with cumulative carbon emissions from 1751 to 2100 reaching 
between 1.5 and 3 TtC (Figure 6.6, right panel). Noting that all of the 
baseline scenarios reviewed here include improvements to technology 
throughout the economy, there is strong evidence that, conditional on 
rates of growth assumed in the literature, technological change in the 
absence of explicit mitigation policies is not sufficient to bring about 
stabilization of GHG concentrations.
6�3�2 Emissions trajectories, concentrations, 
and temperature in transformation 
pathways
6�3�2�1 Linking between different types of scenarios
There are important differences among long-term scenarios that compli-
cate comparison between them. One difference is the nature of the goal 
itself. The majority of long-term scenarios focus on reaching long-term 
radiative forcing or GHG concentration goals. However, scenarios based 
on other long-term goals have also been explored in the literature. This 
includes scenarios focused on specific policy formulations (e. g., goal of 
50 % emission reduction in 2050 (G8, 2009) or the pledges made in the 
context of United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) (UNFCCC, 2011a; b)), those based on cumulative emissions 
goals over a given period, those based on prescribed carbon prices, and 
those resulting from cost-benefit analysis (see Box 6.1 for a discussion 
of cost-benefit analysis scenarios). A second important difference is that 
some scenarios include all relevant forcing agents, while others only 
cover a subset of gases or focus only on CO2. Finally, some scenarios 
Box 6�1 | Cost benefit analysis scenarios 
Cost-benefit studies (e. g. Tol, 1997; Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000; 
Hope, 2008) monetize the impacts of climate change and then 
balance the economic implications of mitigation and climate 
damages to identify the optimal trajectory of emissions reductions 
that will maximize total welfare. There are other frameworks of 
analysis for considering impacts as well (Bradford, 1999; Barrett, 
2008; Keller et al., 2008b). For example, risk assessment is also 
often used to determine overall goals. A theoretical discussion of 
cost-benefit analysis, including models that have conducted these 
analyses, can be found in both Chapters 2 and 3. One important 
characteristic of cost-benefit analyses is that the bulk of research 
in this domain has been conducted using highly-aggregate models 
that do not have the structural detail necessary to explore the 
nature of energy system or agricultural and land-use transitions 
that are the focus of this chapter. For this reason, they are not 
assessed in this chapter. In contrast, the scenarios explored here 
rely on more detailed integrated models and have been imple-
mented in a cost-effectiveness framework, meaning that they are 
designed to find a least-cost approach to meeting a particular 
goal, such as a concentration goal in 2100. Additionally, the 
scenarios and models described in this chapter typically examine 
mitigation independent from potential feedbacks from climate 
impacts and adaptation responses. A discussion of studies that 
do incorporate impacts into their assessment of transformation 
pathways, and a characterization of how these feedbacks might 






Figure 6�5 | Global CO2-equivalent emissions in baseline scenarios by component (left panel) and total (right panel) for baseline scenarios. Net AFOLU CO2 and total non-CO2 (CH4, 
N2O, and F-gases) projections are shown for individual models from EMF27. The FF&I CO2 projections are depicted in detail above (see Fig.6.4); the range is truncated here. FF&I 
CO2 includes CO2 from AFOLU fossil fuel use. Total CO2eq emissions* are shown for all baseline scenarios with full coverage, depicted as a range with median emboldened; shad-
ing reflects interquartile range (darkest), 5th – 95th percentile range (lighter), and full range (lightest). Sources: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10); historic data: JRC / PBL 
(2013), IEA (2012a), see Annex II.9.
Note: In this chapter, CO2eq emissions are constructed using Global Warming Potentials (GWPs) over a 100-year time horizon derived from the IPCC Second Assessment Report 

























































Figure 6�6 | Total radiative forcing (left panel) and cumulative carbon emissions since 1751 (right panel) in baseline scenario literature compared to RCP scenarios. Forcing was 
estimated ex-post from models with full coverage the median output from the MAGICC results. Secondary axis in the left panel expresses forcing in CO2eq concentrations. Scenarios 
are depicted as ranges with median emboldened; shading reflects interquartile range (darkest), 5th – 95th percentile range (lighter), and full range (lightest). Sources: WG III AR5 






















































































allow concentrations to temporarily exceed long-term goals (overshoot 
scenarios), while others are formulated so that concentrations never 
exceed the long-term goal (‘not-to-exceed scenarios’).
Despite these differences, it is necessary for the purposes of assess-
ment to establish comparability across scenarios. To this end, scenarios 
assessed here have been grouped according to several key param-
eters (Table 6.2) (for more detail on this process, see Annex II.10). The 
main criterion for grouping is the full radiative forcing level in 2100, 
expressed in CO2eq concentrations. (Full radiative forcing here includes 
GHGs, halogenated gases, tropospheric ozone, aerosols, and land-use 
related albedo change). Radiative-forcing levels are often used as goal 
in scenarios, and the RCPs have been formulated in terms of this indica-
tor (Moss et al., 2010; van Vuuren et al., 2011a). The scenario catego-
ries were chosen to relate explicitly to the four RCPs. A similar table in 
AR4 (Table 3.5) presented equilibrium values rather than 2100 values. 
Equilibrium values (as presented in AR4) and 2100 concentration and 
temperature values (as presented in this report) cannot easily be com-
pared given the wide range of possible post-2100 trajectories and the 
lags in the physical processes that govern both. In particular, equilib-
rium values assume that concentrations stay constant after 2100, while 
many scenarios in the literature since AR5 show increasing or decreas-
ing concentrations in 2100. Thus, it is more appropriate to focus on 21st 
century values to avoid relying on additional assumptions about post-
2100 dynamics. 
Another issue that complicates comparison across scenarios reported 
in the literature is that the Earth-System components (e. g., the carbon 
cycle and climate system) of integrated models can vary substantially 
(van Vuuren et  al., 2009b). Hence, similar emissions pathways may 
arrive at different 2100 CO2eq concentration levels and climate out-
comes in different models. To provide consistency in this regard across 
the scenarios assessed in the scenario database for AR5 (Annex II.10), 
and to facilitate the comparison with the assessment in Working Group 
I (WG I), the variation originating from the use of different models was 
removed by running all the scenarios in the database with at least 
information on Kyoto gas emissions through a standard reduced-form 
climate model called MAGICC (see Meinshausen et  al., 2011a; b; c; 
Rogelj et al., 2012). For each scenario, MAGICC was run multiple times 
using a distribution of Earth-System parameters, creating an ensemble 
of MAGICC runs. The resulting median concentration from this distribu-
tion was used to classify each scenario (see Section 6.3.2.6 for more on 
this process and a discussion of temperature outcomes). This means 
that the median concentration information reported here does not 
reflect uncertainty by Earth-System components, unless mentioned 
otherwise, and it also means that the concentrations may differ from 
those that were originally reported in the literature for the individual 
models and scenarios.
The consistency of the MAGICC model version used here and the more 
comprehensive general circulation models used in the WGI report 
(IPCC, 2013) is discussed in Section 6.3.2.6, where MAGICC is also 
used to produce probabilistic temperature estimates. The CO2eq con-
centration in 2010 based on the parameters used in this version of 
MAGICC is roughly consistent with the 2011 radiative forcing estimate 
from WGI.
Table 6�2 | Definition of CO2eq concentration categories used in this assessment, the mapping used to allocate scenarios based on different metrics to those categories, and the 
number of scenarios that extend through 2100 in each category. [Note: This table shows the mapping of scenarios to the categories; Table 6.3. shows the resulting characteristics 
of the categories using this mapping. The table only covers the scenarios with information for the full 21st century. The mapping of scenarios based on 2011 – 2050 cumulative total 
CO2eq emissions is described in the Methods and Metrics Annex.
CO2-equivalent concentration in 2100 (ppm 
CO2eq) (based on full radiative forcin g) 1 
Secondary categorization criter ia 2 
Corresponding RC P 3 




(W / m 2 )





2011 – 2100 (GtCO2)
Tota l 4 
With Overshoot 
Greater than  
0�4 W / m 2 
430 – 480 2.3 – 2.9 450 – 500 < 950 RCP 2.6 114 (114) 72 (72)
480 – 530 2.9 – 3.45 500 – 550   950 – 1500 251 (257) 77 (77)
530 – 580 3.45 – 3.9 550 – 600 1500 – 1950 198 (222) 22 (22)
580 – 650 3.9 – 4.5 600 – 670 1950 – 2600
RCP 4.5
102 (109) 8 (8)
650 – 720 4.5 – 5.1 670 – 750 2600 – 3250 27 (27) 0 (0)
720 – 1000 5.1 – 6.8 750 – 1030 3250 – 5250 RCP .6 111 (120) 0 (0)
> 1000   > 6.8 > 1030 > 5250 RCP 8.5 160 (166) 0 (0)
1 Scenarios with information for the full 21st century were categorized in different categories based on their 2100 full radiative forcing / CO2eq concentration level (including 
GHGs and other radiatively active substances). 
2 If insufficient information was available to calculate full forcing, scenarios were categorized, in order of preference, by 2100 Kyoto gas forcing or cumulative CO2 emissions 
in the 2011 – 2100 period. Scenarios extending only through 2050 were categorized based on cumulative CO2 emissions in the 2011 – 2050 period. Those scenarios are not 
included in this table. (See the Methods and Metrics Annex for more information.)
3 The column indicates the corresponding RCP falling within the scenario category based on 2100 CO2 equivalent concentration.
4 Number of scenarios in the respective category, which report at least total CO2 emissions (and potentially other GHGs and other radiatively active substances) to 2100. Numbers 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































To compare scenarios with different coverage of relevant substances or 
goals, a set of relationships was developed to map scenarios with only 
sufficient information to assess Kyoto gas forcing or with information 
only on cumulative CO2 budgets to the full-forcing CO2eq concentra-
tion categories (Table 6.2 and Method and Metrics Annex). Scenarios 
without full forcing information and that extend to the end of the cen-
tury were mapped, in order of preference, by Kyoto gas forcing in 2100 
or by cumulative CO2 budgets from 2011 to 2100. In addition, scenar-
ios that only extend to mid-century were mapped according to cumu-
lative CO2 budgets from 2011 to 2050. These mappings allow for a 
practical, though still imperfect, means to compare between scenarios 
with different constructions. 
The categories leading to CO2eq concentration above 720 ppm con-
tain mostly baseline scenarios and some scenarios with very modest 
mitigation policies (Figure 6.7). The categories from 580 – 720 ppm 
CO2eq contain a small number of baseline scenarios at the upper end 
of the range, some scenarios based on meeting long-term concentra-
tion goals such as 650 ppm CO2eq by 2100, and a number of scenarios 
without long-term concentration goals but based instead on emissions 
goals. There has been a substantial increase in the number of scenarios 
in the two lowest categories since AR4 (Fisher et al., 2007). The RCP 2.6 
falls in the 430 – 480 ppm CO2eq category based on its forcing level by 
2100. A limited number of studies (Rogelj et al 2013a,b; Luderer et 
al, 2013) have explored emissions scenarios leading to concentrations 
below 430 ppm CO2eq by 2100. These scenarios were not submitted to 
the AR5 database. 
This mapping between different types of scenarios allows for roughly 
comparable assessments of characteristics of scenarios, grouped by 
2100 full-forcing CO2eq concentration, across the full database of sce-
narios collected for AR5 (Table 6.3.). The cumulative CO2 budgets from 
2011 to 2100 in each category in Table 6.3 span a considerable range. 
This variation in CO2 budgets results from the range of concentration 
levels assigned to each category, the timing of emission reductions, and 
variation in non-CO2 emissions, including aerosols. Although this leads 
Figure 6�7 | Emissions pathways for total CO2 and Kyoto gases for the various categories defined in Table 6.2. The bands indicate the 10th to 90th percentile of the scenarios 
included in the database. The grey bars to the right of the top panels indicate the 10th to 90th percentile for baseline scenarios (see Section 6.3.1). The bottom panels show for 
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to a wider range of CO2 budgets than for the scenarios used in WG I 
(SPM Figure 10), the central estimates for the period 2011 – 2100 are 
very consistent. (Temperature results are discussed in Section 6.3.2.6).
An important distinction between scenarios is the degree to which con-
centrations exceed the 2100 goal before decreasing to reach it. Table 
6.3 includes subcategories for scenarios in which concentrations exceed 
their 2100 level by more than 0.4 W / m2 and scenarios that sometime 
during the century overshoot the upper-bound concentration level of 
the category. Both subcategories result in different emission profiles 
and temperature outcomes compared to those that do not meet these 
criteria (see Section 6.3.2.6 regarding temperature outcomes).
6�3�2�2 The timing of emissions reductions: The 
influence of technology, policy, and overshoot
There are many different emissions pathways associated with meet-
ing 2100 CO2eq concentrations (Figure 6.7). For all categories below 
a 2100 CO2eq concentration of 720 ppm CO2eq, emissions are reduced 
in the long-run relative to current levels. The decision on timing of 
emission reductions is a complex one. Model scenarios are typically 
designed to find the least-cost pathway to meet a long-term goal, in 
some cases under specific constraints, such as the availability of cer-
tain technologies or the timing and extent of international participa-
tion. Because models differ in, among other things, technology rep-
resentations and baseline assumptions, there are clear differences 
among scenarios with regards to the timing of emissions reductions 
and the allocation of reductions across gases. 
Three interrelated factors are particularly important determinants of 
emissions profiles in the modelling literature: (1) the degree of over-
shoot, (2) technology options and associated deployment decisions, 
and (3) policy assumptions. Overshoot scenarios scenarios entail less 
mitigation today in exchange for greater reductions later (Wigley, 
2005; Meinshausen et al., 2006; den Elzen and van Vuuren, 2007; Nus-
baumer and Matsumoto, 2008). Overshooting a long-term concentra-
tion goal, however, may lead to higher transient temperature change 
than if the goal is never exceeded (Section 6.3.2.6). Overshoot is par-
ticularly important for concentration goals that are close to today’s 
levels. The majority of scenarios reaching 480 ppm CO2eq or below 
by 2100, for instance, rely on overshoot pathways. Those that do not 
include overshoot, need faster emissions reductions (and associated 
energy system changes) during the next 1 – 2 decades (Calvin et  al., 
2009b).
The second consideration is technology. The most critical set of tech-
nologies in the context of the timing of emission reductions is CDR 
technologies, which can be used to generate negative emissions (van 
Vuuren et  al., 2007; Edenhofer et  al., 2010; Azar et  al., 2010, 2013; 
van Vuuren and Riahi, 2011; Tavoni and Socolow, 2013). In most model 
studies in the literature, negative emissions are generated via the use 
of biomass energy with carbon dioxide capture and storage (BECCS), 
and to a lesser extent, afforestation, though in principle other options 
could potentially result in negative emissions as well (see Section 
6.9). CDR technologies have not been applied yet at large scale. The 
potential of afforestation is limited, and the use of BECCS is ultimately 
constrained by the potential for CCS and biomass supply (van Vuuren 
et al., 2013). CDR technologies have two key implications for transfor-
mation pathways. One is that by removing emissions from the atmo-
sphere, CDR technologies can compensate for residual emissions from 
technologies and sectors with more expensive abatement. The second 
is that CDR technologies can create net negative emissions flows, 
which allow faster declines in concentrations in the second half of 
the century and thus facilitate higher near-term emissions, effectively 
expanding the potential scope for overshoot. In model comparison 
studies, many of the models that could not produce scenarios lead-
ing to concentrations of about 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100, particularly 
in combination with delayed or fragmented policy approaches, did 
not include CDR techniques (Clarke et  al., 2009). The vast majority 
of scenarios with overshoot of greater than 0.4 W / m2 (greater than 
20 ppm CO2eq) deploy CDR technologies to an extent that net global 
CO2 emissions become negative. Evidence is still mixed whether CDR 
technologies are essential for achieving very low GHG concentration 
goals (Rose et al., 2013). A limited number of studies have explored 
scenarios with net negative emissions as large as 20 GtCO2 per year or 
more (lower panels Figure 6.7), which allow for very substantial delays 
in emission reductions. However, the majority of studies have explored 
futures with smaller, but often still quite substantial, contributions of 
CDR technologies. Technology portfolio assumptions other than CDR 
technologies (e. g., regarding renewables, CCS, efficiency, and nuclear 
power) can also have implications for emissions trajectories, although 
these are often less pronounced and may in fact shift mitigation earlier 
or later (Rogelj et al., 2012; Eom et al., 2014; Krey et al., 2014; Kriegler 
et al., 2014a; Riahi et al., 2014).
The third consideration is policy structure. Since AR4, scenario studies 
have increasingly focused on the outcomes of fragmented international 
action and global delays in emission reduction (Clarke et al., 2009; van 
Vliet et al., 2012; Kriegler et al., 2013b; Tavoni et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 
2013a; see Riahi et al., 2014). Considering both idealized implementa-
tion and non-idealized implementation scenarios, a considerable range 
of 2020 and 2030 emissions can be consistent with specific long-term 
goals. Although studies show that low long-term concentration goals 
could still be met with near-term emissions above those in idealized 
scenarios, initial periods of delay are typically followed by periods 
rapid reductions in subsequent decades (Kriegler et  al., 2014c; Riahi 
et al., 2014). This has important implications for costs and technology 
transitions, among other things (see Section 6.3.5). In general, delays 
in mitigation decrease the options for meeting long-term goals and 
increase the risk of foreclosing on certain long-term goals (Riahi et al., 
2014). 
The intersection of these three factors — overshoot, CDR technologies, 
and delayed mitigation — can be viewed in the context of emissions 





level in 2030 (Figure 6.8). For a given range of forcing at the end of the 
century, pathways with the lowest levels in 2030 have higher emis-
sions in the long run and slower rates of decline in the middle of the 
century. On the other hand, high emissions in 2030 leads to more rapid 
declines in the medium term and lower or eventually net negative 
emissions in the long-run, with the pattern exaggerated in a few 
extreme scenarios exploring deployment of CDR of 20 GtCO2 / yr or 
more. (See Section 6.4 for a more thorough discussion of the relation-
ship between near-term actions and long-term goals.) Deeper long-
term goals also interact with these factors. For example, scenarios 
leading to concentrations below 430 ppm CO2eq by 2100 (Rogelj et al., 
2013a,b; Luderer et al., 2013) feature large-scale application of CDR 
technologies in the long-term, and most of them have deep emission 
reductions in the near term.
A final observation is that the characteristics of emissions profiles dis-
cussed here are, in many cases, driven by the cost-effectiveness fram-
ing of the scenarios. A more comprehensive consideration of timing 
would also include, among other things, considerations of the tradeoff 
between the risks related to both transient and long-term climate 
change, the risks associated with deployment of specific technologies 
and expectation of the future developments of these technologies, 
short-term costs and transitional challenges, flexibility in achieving 
climate goals, and the linkages between emissions reductions and a 
wide range of other policy objectives (van Vuuren and Riahi, 2011; Krey 
et al., 2014; Riahi et al., 2014).
6�3�2�3 Regional roles in emissions reductions
The contribution of different regions to mitigation is directly related to 
the formulation of international climate policies. In idealized imple-
mentation scenarios, which assume a uniform global carbon price, the 
extent of mitigation in each region depends most heavily on relative 
baseline emissions, regional mitigation potentials, and terms of trade 
effects. All of these can vary significantly across regions (van Vuuren 
et al., 2009a; Clarke et al., 2012; Tavoni et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2014; 
van Sluisveld et  al., 2013). In this idealized implementation environ-
ment, the carbon budgets associated with bringing concentrations to 
between 430 and 530 ppm CO2eq in 2100 are generally highest in Asia, 
smaller in the OECD-1990, and lowest for other regions (Figure 6.9, left 
panel). However, the ranges for each of these vary substantially across 
scenarios. Mitigation in terms of relative reductions from baseline 
emissions is distributed more similarly between OECD-1990, ASIA, and 
Economies in Transition (EIT) across scenarios (Figure 6.9, right panel). 
The Middle East and Africa (MAF) region and especially Latin America 
(LAM) have the largest mitigation potential. In absolute terms, the 
remaining emissions in the mitigation scenarios are largest in Asia 
(Figure 6.9, left panel) as are the absolute emissions reductions (Figure 
6.9, right panel), due to the size of this region. It is important to note 
that the mitigation costs borne by different regions and countries do 
not need to translate directly from the degree of emissions reductions, 
because the use of effort-sharing schemes can reallocate economic 
costs (see Section 6.3.6.6).
Figure 6�8 | Emissions pathways from three model comparison exercises with explicit 2030 emissions goals. Mitigation scenarios are shown for scenarios reaching 430 – 530 ppm 
CO2eq in 2100 (left panel) and 530 – 650 ppm CO2eq in 2100 (right panel). Scenarios are distinguished by their 2030 emissions: < 50 GtCO2eq, 50 – 55 GtCO2eq, and > 55 GtCO2eq. 
Individual emissions pathways with net negative emissions of > 20 GtCO2 / yr in the second-half of the century are shown as solid black lines. The full range of the scenarios in the 
AR5 database is given as dashed black lines. (Source: Scenarios from intermodelling comparisons with explicit interim goals (AMPERE: Riahi et al. (2014); LIMITS: Kriegler et al. 
(2013b), ROSE: Luderer et al. (2014a), and WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10)).
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Figure 6�9 | Regional carbon budget (left panel) and relative mitigation effort (right panel) for mitigation scenarios reaching 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq in 2100, based on cumulative 
CO2 emissions from 2010 to 2100. Carbon budgets below 0 and relative mitigation above 100 % can be achieved via negative emissions. The number of scenarios is reported 
below the regional acronyms. The number of scenarios outside the figure range is noted at the top. Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10), idealized implementation 
and default technology cases.
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Figure 6�9 | Regional carbon budget (left panel) and relative mitigation effort (right panel) for mitigation scenarios reaching 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq in 2100, based on cumulative 
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The transient emission reductions implications also vary across regions 
in idealized implementation scenarios (Table 6.4). In general, emissions 
peak in the OECD-1990 sooner than in other countries with higher 
baseline growth. Similarly, emissions are reduced in the OECD-1990 
countries by 2030 relative to today, but they may increase in other 
regions, particularly the fast-growing Asian and MAF regions.
Deviations from the idealized implementation, either through global 
delays in mitigation or delays by particular countries or regions, will 
lead to different regional contributions to emissions reductions. When 
mitigation is undertaken by a subset of regions, it will have implications 
on other non-participating countries through energy markets, terms of 
trade, technology spillovers, and other leakage channels. Multi model 
ensembles have shown leakage rates of energy-related emissions to 
be relatively contained, often below 20 % (Arroyo-Curras et al., 2014; 
Babiker, 2005; Bauer et  al., 2014a; Blanford et  al., 2014; Böhringer 
et al., 2012; Bosetti and De Cian, 2013; Kriegler et al., 2014c). Policy 
instruments such as border carbon adjustment can effectively reduce 
these effects further (Böhringer et al., 2012). Leakage in land use, on 
the other hand, could be substantial, though fewer studies have quan-
tified it (Calvin et al., 2009).
6�3�2�4 Projected CO2 emissions from land use 
Net AFOLU CO2 emissions (see Figure 6.5) result from an interplay 
between the use of land to produce food and other non-energy prod-
ucts, to produce bioenergy, and to store carbon in land. Land-manage-
ment practices can also influence CO2 emissions (see Section 6.3.5). 
Currently about 10 – 20 % of global CO2 emissions originate from land 
use and LUC. In general, most scenarios show declining CO2 emissions 
from land use as a result of declining deforestation rates, both with 
and without mitigation (see also Section 6.3.1.4). In fact, many scenar-
ios project a net uptake of CO2 as a result of reforestation after 2050 
(Figure 6.10). 
Scenarios provide a wide range of outcomes for the contribution of CO2 
emissions from land use (see Section 11.9 for a sample from a model 
intercomparison study). However, one difficulty in interpreting this 
range is that many scenarios were developed from models that do not 
explicitly look at strategies to reduce net AFOLU CO2 emissions. None-
theless, the spread in net AFOLU emissions still reflects the implications 
of land-use related mitigation activities — bioenergy, avoided defores-
tation, and afforestation — in both models that explicitly represent land 
use and those that do not (see Section 6.3.5 for a detailed discussion). 
Some studies emphasize a potential increase in net AFOLU emissions 
due to bioenergy production displacing forests (van Vuuren et al., 2007; 
Searchinger et al., 2008; Wise et al., 2009; Melillo et al., 2009; Reilly 
et  al., 2012). Others show a decrease in net AFOLU emissions as a 
result of decreased deforestation, forest protection, and / or net affor-
estation enacted as a mitigation measure (e. g. Wise et al., 2009; Popp 
et al., 2011b; Riahi et al., 2011; Reilly et al., 2012). Wise et al. (2009) 
show a range of results from a single model, first focusing mitigation 
policy on the energy sector, thereby emphasizing the bioenergy produc-
tion effect, and then focusing policy more broadly to also encourage 
afforestation and slow deforestation. Reilly et al. (2012) conduct a simi-
lar analysis, but with more policy design alternatives. However, policies 
to induce large-scale land-related mitigation will be challenging and 
actual implementation will affect costs and net benefits (Lubowski and 





6�3�2�5 Projected emissions of other radiatively 
important substances
Beyond CO2, the scenario literature has focused most heavily on the 
mitigation opportunities for the gases covered by the Kyoto protocol, 
including the two most important non-CO2 gases, CH4 and N2O. Atten-
tion is also increasingly being paid to the climate consequences of 
other emissions such as aerosols and ozone precursors (e. g. Shindell 
et  al., 2012; Rose et  al., 2014b). Although several models have pro-
duced projections of aerosol forcing and have incorporated these emis-
sions into the constraint on total forcing, most of them do not have 
specific mitigation measures for these emissions. 
For non-CO2 Kyoto gases, the relative depth and timing of emissions 
reductions are influenced by two primary factors: (1) the abatement 
potential and costs for reducing emissions of different greenhouse forc-
ers, and (2) the strategies for making tradeoffs between them. With 
respect to abatement potential and costs, studies indicate that in the 
short run, there are many low-cost options to reduce non-CO2 gases 
relative to opportunities to reduce CO2 emissions. Partially as a result, 
studies indicate that short-term reduction strategies may rely more 
heavily in the near term on non-CO2 gases than in the long run (Wey-
ant et al., 2006; Lucas et al., 2007). In the longer run, emission reduc-
tions, particularly for CH4 and N2O, are expected to be constrained by 
several hard-to-mitigate sources such as livestock and the application 
of fertilizers. This ultimately results in lower reduction rates than for 
CO2 for the lower concentration categories despite slower growth in 
baseline projections (see Figure 6.11, and also discussed by Lucas et al., 
2007). For scenarios resulting in 430 – 480 CO2eq concentration in 
2100, CH4 reductions in 2100 are about 50 % compared to 2005. For 
Figure 6�10 | Net AFOLU CO2 emissions in mitigation scenarios. The left panel shows cumulative net CO2 emission (2011 – 2100) from energy / industry (horizontal axis) and AFOLU 
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Figure 6�11 | Emissions reductions for different GHGs in 2030, 2050, and 2100. The left panel shows 2010 historic emissions and the bars in the right panel indicate changes 
compared to 2010 (AR5 Scenario Database). FF&I CO2 includes CO2 from AFOLU fossil fuel use. Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10). Historic data: JRC / PBL (2013), 
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Table 6�4 | Regional peak year of CO2 emission and emissions reductions in 2030 over 2010, for 430 – 530 and 530 – 650 ppm CO2eq scenarios. Negative values for emissions 
reductions indicate that 2030 emissions are higher than in 2010. Figures are averages across models. The numbers in parenthesis show the interquartile range across scenarios. 
The number of underlying scenarios is the same as in Figure 6.9. Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10), idealized implementation and default technology scenarios.
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reductions w. r. t. 2010
430 – 530 ppm CO2eq 32 % 
(23 / 40 %)
– 1 % 
(– 15 / 14 %)
35 % 
(16 – 59 %)
8 % 
(– 7 / 18 %)
32 % 
(18 / 40 %)
2030 Emission 
reductions w.r.t. 2010
530 – 650 ppm CO2eq 14 % 
(6 / 21 %)
– 34 % 
(– 43 / – 26 %)
9 % 
(– 17 / 41 %)
– 22 % 
(– 41 / – 12 %)
8 % 
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N2O, the most stringent scenarios result in emission levels just below 
today’s level. For halogenated gases, emission growth is significantly 
reduced for the lower concentration categories, but variation among 
models is large, ranging from a 90 % reduction to a 100 % increase 
compared to 2005. 
Strategies for making tradeoffs across greenhouse forcers must account 
for differences in both radiative effectiveness and atmospheric lifetime 
and the associated impacts on near-term and long-term climate change. 
They must also consider relationships between gases in terms of com-
mon sources and non-climate impacts such as air pollution control. 
Models handle these tradeoffs differently, but there are essentially two 
classes of approaches. Most models rely on exogenous metrics such as 
Global Warming Potentials (GWPs) (discussed further below) and trade 
off abatement among gases based on metric-weighted prices. Other 
models make the tradeoff on the basis of economic optimization over 
time and the physical characterization of the gases within the model 
with respect to a specified goal such as total forcing (e. g. Manne and 
Richels, 2001). Differences both within these classes of approaches 
and among them lead to very different results, especially with respect 
to the timing of mitigation for short-lived substances. Several stud-
ies have looked into the role of these substances in mitigation (Shine 
et al., 2007; Berntsen et al., 2010; UNEP and WMO, 2011; Myhre et al., 
2011; McCollum et al., 2013a; Rose et al., 2014a). Studies can be found 
that provide argument for early emission reduction as well as a more 
delayed response of short-lived forcers. Arguments for early reductions 
emphasize the near-term benefits for climate and air pollution asso-
ciated with ozone and particulate matter. An argument for a delayed 
response is that, in the context of long-term climate goals, reducing 
short-lived forcers now has only a very limited long-term effect (Smith 
and Mizrahi, 2013). 
Model analysis has also looked into the impact of using different sub-
stitution metrics (see Section  3.9.6 for a theoretical discussion the 
implication of various substitution metrics and Section 8.7 of the WGI 
report for the physical aspects of substitution metrics). In most cur-
rent climate policies, emission reductions are allocated on the basis 
of GWPs for a time of horizon of 100 years. Several papers have 
explored the use of metrics other than 100-year GWPs, including 
updated GWP values and Global Temperature Change Potential (GTP) 
values (Smith et al., 2012; Reisinger et al., 2012; Azar and Johansson, 
2014). Quantitative studies show that the choice of metrics is critical 
for the timing of CH4 emission reductions among the Kyoto gases, but 
that it rarely has a strong impact on overall global costs. The use of 
dynamic GTP values (as alternative to GWPs) has been shown to 





estimates for 100-year GWP from the various previous IPCC Assess-
ment Reports has no major impact on transition pathways. 
6�3�2�6 The link between concentrations, radiative 
forcing, and temperature
The assessment in this chapter focuses on scenarios that result in 
alternative CO2eq concentrations by the end of the century. However, 
temperature goals are also an important consideration in policy dis-
cussions. This raises the question of how the scenarios assessed in 
this chapter relate to possible temperature outcomes. One complica-
tion for assessing this relationship is that scenarios can follow differ-
ent concentration pathways to the same end-of-century goal (see 
Section 6.3.2.2), and this will lead to different temperature 
responses. A second complication is that several uncertainties con-
found the relationship between emissions and temperature 
responses, including uncertainties about the carbon cycle, climate 
sensitivity, and the transient climate response (see WG I, Box 12.2). 
This means that the temperature outcomes of different concentra-
tion pathways assessed here (see Section 6.3.2.1) are best expressed 
in terms of a range of probable temperature outcomes (see Chapter 
Figure 6�12 | Comparison of CMIP5 results (as presented in Working Group I) and MAGICC output for global temperature increase. Note that temperature increase is presented 
relative to the 1986 – 2005 average in this figure (see also Figure 6.13). Panel a) shows concentration-driven runs for the RCP scenarios from MAGICC (lines) and one-standard 
deviation ranges from CMIP5 models. Panel b) compares 2081 – 2100 period projections from MAGICC with CMIP5 for scenarios driven by prescribed RCP concentrations (four left-
hand bars of both model categories) and the RCP 8.5 run with prescribed emissions (fifth bar; indicated by a star). Panel c) shows temperature increases for the concentration-driven 
runs of a subset of CMIP5 models against cumulative CO2 emissions back-calculated by these models from the prescribed CO2 concentration pathways (full lines) and temperature 
increase projected by the MAGICC model against cumulative CO2 emissions (dotted lines) (based on WG I Figure SPM.10). Cumulative emissions are calculated from 2000 onwards. 
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2 and Section 6.2.3 for a discussion of evaluating scenarios under 
uncertainty). The definition of the temperature goals themselves 
forms a third complication. Temperature goals might be defined in 
terms of the long-term equilibrium associated with a given concen-
tration, in terms of the temperature in a specific year (e. g., 2100), or 
based on never exceeding a particular level. Finally, the reference 
year, often referred to as ‘pre-industrial’, is ambiguous given both 
the lack of real measurements and the use of different reference 
periods. Given all of these complications, a range of emissions path-
ways can be seen as consistent with a particular temperature goal 
(see also Figure 6.12, 6.13, and 6.14).
Because of the uncertain character of temperature outcomes, probabilis-
tic temperature information has been created for the scenarios in the AR5 
database that have reported information on at least CO2, CH4, N2O and 
sulphur aerosol emissions. Several papers have introduced methods for 
probabilistic statements on temperature increase for emission scenarios 
(Meinshausen, 2006; Knutti et al., 2008; Schaeffer et al., 2008; Zickfeld 
et al., 2009; Allen et al., 2009; Meinshausen et al., 2009; Ramanathan and 
Xu, 2010; Rogelj et al., 2011). For this assessment, the method described 
by Rogelj et al. (2012) and Schaeffer et al. (2014) is used, which employs 
the MAGICC model based on the probability distribution of input param-
eters from Meinshausen (2009) (see also Meinshausen et  al., 2011c). 
Figure 6�13 | Changes in global temperature for the scenario categories above 1850 – 1900 reference level as calculated by MAGICC. (Observed temperatures in the 1985 – 2006 
period were about 0.61 deg C above the reference level — see e. g. WG1 Table SPM.2). Panel a) shows temperature increase relative reference as calculated by MAGICC (10th 
to 90th percentile for median MAGICC outcomes). Panel b) shows 2081 – 2100 temperature levels for the scenario categories and RCPs for the MAGICC outcomes. The bars for 
the scenarios used in this assessment include both the 10th to 90th percentile range for median MAGICC outcomes (colored portion of the bars) and the 16th to 84th percentile 
range of the full distribution of MAGICC outcomes from these scenarios, which also captures the Earth-System uncertainty. The bars for the RCPs are based on the 16th to 84th 
of MAGICC outcomes based on the RCP emissions scenarios, capturing only the Earth-System uncertainty. Panel c) shows relationship between cumulative CO2 emissions in the 
2011 – 2100 period and median 2081 – 2100 temperature levels calculated by MAGICC. Panel d indicates the median temperature development of overshoot (> 0.4 W / m2) and non-
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MAGICC was run 600 times for each scenario. Probabilistic temperature 
statements are based on the resulting distributions (see also the Meth-
ods and Metrics Annex; and the underlying papers cited). Because the 
temperature distribution of these runs is based on a single probability 
distribution in a single modelling framework, resulting probabilistic tem-
perature statements should be regarded as indicative.
An important consideration in the evaluation of this method is the con-
sistency between the distributions of key parameters used here and the 
outcome of the WG I research regarding these same parameters. Carbon-
cycle parameters in the MAGICC model used in this chapter are based on 
Earth-System Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP) 4 model 
results from AR4, and a probability density function (PDF) for climate 
sensitivity is assumed that corresponds to the assessment of IPCC AR4 
(Meehl et al., 2007; Rogelj et al., 2012, Box 10.2). The MAGICC output 
based on this approach has been shown to be consistent with the output 
of the CMIP5 Earth-System models (see also WG I Sections 12.4.1.2 and 
12.4.8). The MAGICC model captures the temperature outcomes of the 
CMIP5 models reasonably well, with median estimates close to the mid-
dle of the CMIP5 uncertainty ranges (see panels a and b in Figure 6.12). 
Figure 6�14 | The probability of staying below temperature levels for the different scenario categories as assessed by the MAGICC model (representing the statistics of 600 dif-
ferent climate realizations for each emission scenario). Panel a) probability in 2100 of being below 2 °C versus probability of staying below 2 °C throughout the 21st century. 
Open dots indicate overshoot scenarios (> 0.4 W / m2). Panel b) probability of staying below 1.5, 2.0, and 2.5 °C (10th to 90th percentile) during 21st century. Panel c) relationship 
between peak concentration and the probability of exceeding 2 °C during the 21st century. Panel d) relationship between 2100 concentration and the probability of exceeding 2 °C 
in 2100. Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10).
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For lower-emission scenarios, the MAGICC uncertainty range is more 
narrow, mainly due to the larger range methodologies representing 
non-CO2 forcings in the CMIP5 models, as well as the fact that MAGICC 
does not reflect all of the structural uncertainty represented by the range 
of CMIP5 models (see panels a and b in Figure 6.12, and WG I Figure 
12.8 and Section 12.4.1.2). Uncertainty ranges are largest for emissions-
driven runs (only available for RCP 8.5 from CMIP5 models), since uncer-
tainties in carbon-cycle feedbacks play a larger role (see also WG I Sec-
tion 12.4.8.1). The relationship between the cumulative CO2 emissions 
and the transient temperature increase from MAGICC is well aligned 
with the CMIP5 model results for the RCP pathways (Figure 6.12 panel 
c, and WG I Section 12.5.4.2, Figure 12.46, TFE.8 Figure 1). WG I has esti-
mated that a cumulative CO2 emissions budget of around 1000 GtCO2 
from 2011 onward is associated with a likely (> 66 %) chance of main-
taining temperature change to less than 2 °C. For the database of sce-
narios assessed here, the majority of scenarios with a greater than 66 % 
chance of limiting temperature change to less than 2 °C, based on the 
MAGICC analysis, are those that reach between 430 and 480 ppm CO2eq, 
and these are associated with cumulative emissions over the century of 
630 – 1180 GtCO2 (Table 6.3). The two budgets are not fully comparable, 
however, since the WG I budget relates to the cumulative emissions at 
the time of peak warming which are higher than the cumulative emis-
sions until 2100 in overshoot scenarios with net negative emissions by 
the end of the century. In addition, the WGI AR5 estimate is based on a 
single scenario for non-CO2 substances, whereas the database assessed 
here considers a much wider range of non-CO2 emissions.
Based on the results of the MAGICC analysis, temperature outcomes 
are similar across all scenarios in the next few decades, in part due 
to physical inertia in the climate system (Figure 6.13, panel a). In the 
second half of the century, however, temperatures diverge. Scenarios 
leading to 2100 concentrations over 1000 ppm CO2eq lead to a tem-
perature increase of about 3 to 6 °C (66th percentile of the distribution 
of temperature outcomes), while scenarios with 2100 concentrations 
between 430 – 480 ppm CO2eq lead to a temperature increase of about 
1.3 to 2.2 °C (66th percentile of the distribution of temperature out-
comes) (Figure 6.13, panels a and b). Cumulative CO2 emissions for all 
scenarios in the database correlate well to the temperature level — see 
also WG I Section 12.5.4 (Figure 6.13, panel c). However, there is some 
variation due to differences in emissions of other forcing agents, in par-
ticular CH4 and sulphur, along with the timing of emissions reduction 
and the associated extent of overshoot. In general, both the 2100 tem-
peratures and the relationship between the cumulative emissions and 
2100 temperature change are roughly consistent with the correlation 
for the RCPs in WG I (Figure 6.13, panel c). Scenarios that overshoot 
the 2100 concentration goal by more than 0.4 W / m2 result in higher 
levels of temperature increase mid-century and prolonged periods of 
relatively rapid rates of change in comparison to those without over-
shoot or with less overshoot (Figure 6.13, panel d). By 2100, however, 
the different scenarios converge. 
Defining temperature goals in terms of the chance of exceeding a par-
ticular temperature this century accounts for both the 2100 concentra-
tion and the pathway to get to this concentration (Figure 6.14). Over-
shoot scenarios of greater than 0.4 W / m2 have a higher probability of 
exceeding 2 °C prior to 2100 than in 2100 (Figure 6.14, panel a). In 
general, the results suggest that the peak concentration during the 21st 
century is a fundamental determinant of the probability of remaining 
below a particular temperature goal (Figure 6.14, panel c). The CO2eq 
concentration in 2100, on the other hand, is a proxy for the probability 
of exceeding end-of-the-century temperature goals (panel d). Based on 
the MAGICC results, only scenarios leading to 2100 concentrations of 
430 – 480 ppm and a small number of scenarios leading to 2100 con-
centrations of 480 – 530 ppm have a probability of greater than 66 % 
probability of maintaining temperature change below 2 °C throughout 
the century. Scenarios that reach 2100 concentrations between 530 
and 580 ppm CO2eq while exceeding this range (that is, exceeding 
580 ppm CO2eq) during the course of the century have less than a 33 % 
probability of limiting transient temperature change to below 2 °C over 
the course of the century, based on the MAGICC results.
Other temperature levels in addition to 2 °C are relevant for mitigation 
strategy. Based on the MAGICC results, scenarios leading to concentra-
tions between 430 and 480 ppm CO2eq have less than a 50 % prob-
ability of maintaining temperature change below 1.5 °C throughout the 
21st century, and many have less than a 33 % probability of achieving 
this goal. As noted in Section 6.3.2.1, there are scenarios in the litera-
ture that reach levels below 430 ppm CO2eq by 2100, but these were 
not submitted to the database used for this assessment. Using the same 
methods for assessing temperature implications of scenarios as used in 
this assessment, the associated studies found that these scenarios have 
a probability (also based on MAGICC) of more than 66 % of remaining 
below 1.5 °C, after peaking earlier in the century (e. g., Luderer et al., 
2013, Rogelj et al., 2013a,b).1 In contrast, the scenarios submitted to 
this assessment that lead to CO2eq concentration below 580 ppm to 
CO2eq by 2100 have more than a 50 % probability of limiting tem-
perature change to below 2.5 °C during the 21st century, based on the 
MAGICC results, and many have more than a 66 % probability. (Section 
6.9 discusses how the use of geoengineering techniques can change 
the relationships between GHG emissions and radiative forcing.)
6�3�3 Treatment of impacts and adaptation in 
transformation pathways
The importance of considering impacts and adaptation responses when 
assessing the optimal level of mitigation in a cost-benefit framework 
has been well studied in highly-aggregated models (see Box  6.1. on 
cost-benefit analysis). However the role impacts and adaptation in sce-
narios from large-scale integrated models has seen far less treatment. 
Mitigation, impacts, and adaptation are interlinked in several important 
1 In these scenarios, the cumulative CO2 emissions range between 680 – 800 GtCO2 
from 2011 to 2050 and between 90 – 310 GtCO2 from 2011 to 2100. Global 
CO2eq emissions in 2050 are between 70 % and 95 % below 2010 emissions, and 





ways and should, ideally, be considered jointly in the context of achiev-
ing concentration goals such as those explored in this chapter. A few 
studies from large-scale integrated models consider mitigation, 
impacts, and adaptation simultaneously in their construction of scenar-
ios (see Reilly et al., 2007; Isaac and van Vuuren, 2009; Chum et al., 
2011; Nelson et al., 2014; Calvin et al., 2013; Zhou et al., 2013; Dowl-
ing, 2013). In the vast majority of cases, however, the scenarios dis-
cussed in this chapter do not consider these linkages, and this is consid-
ered a major gap in the transformation pathways literature. (For a 
summary of integrated models that capture impacts and adaptation, 
see, e. g., Füssel (2010) and Fisher-Vanden et al. (2013). For a compre-
hensive discussion of climate impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability, 
see IPCC WG II AR5). Major efforts are now underway to incorporate 
impacts and adaptation into large-scale integrated models, but these 
efforts must overcome a range of challenges, including incorporating 
the sectoral and regional character of impact and adaptation into inte-
grated models, which have higher spatial aggregation, and a lack of 
data and empirical evidence on impacts and adaptation required for 
model inputs. 
Omitting climate impacts and adaptation responses from scenarios is 
likely to lead to biased results for three main reasons. First, climate 
impacts could influence the effectiveness of mitigation options. For 
instance, electricity production could be affected by changes in cooling 
water availability (Schaeffer et al., 2012) or air temperature, changes 
in precipitation will alter hydroelectric power, and climate change 
could impact biofuel crop productivities (Chum et  al., 2011). Unfor-
tunately, the set of modelling studies that explore these issues is lim-
ited (Fisher-Vanden et al., 2011), so there is insufficient evidence today 
to draw broad conclusions about how the omission of impacts and 
adaptation responses would alter mitigation options and the resulting 
scenarios reviewed in this chapter. Second, adaptation responses to 
climate change could themselves alter emissions from human activi-
ties, either increasing or decreasing the emissions reductions required 
to reach GHG-concentration goals. For example, a warmer climate is 
likely to lead to higher demand for air conditioning (Mansur et  al., 
2008), which will lead to higher emissions if this increased electric-
ity demand is met by electric power generated with fossil fuels. On 
the other hand, a warmer climate will lead to reductions in heating 
demand, which would lower emissions from fuels used in heating. 
Also, impacts could potentially lead to lower economic growth and 
thus lower emissions. Further, because electricity is relatively easier 
to decarbonize than solid, liquid, or gaseous fuels, changing in heat-
ing and cooling demands could reduce the economic costs of mitiga-
tion (Isaac and van Vuuren, 2009; Zhou et al., 2013). Climate change 
will also change the ability of the terrestrial biosphere to store car-
bon. Again, there is a limited number of studies that account for this 
adaptive response to climate change (Bosello et al., 2010b; Eboli et al., 
2010; Anthoff et  al., 2011) or optimal mitigation levels when adap-
tation responses are included (Patt et  al., 2009). Finally, mitigation 
strategies will need to compete with adaptation strategies for scarce 
investment and R&D resources, assuming these occur contemporane-
ously. A number of studies account for competition for investment and 
R&D resources. In a cost benefit framework, several modelling studies 
Figure 6�15 | Cumulative global coal, oil, and gas use between 2010 and 2100 in baseline and mitigation scenarios compared to reserves and resources. Estimates of reserves and 
resources (‘R+R’) are shown as shaded areas and historical cumulative use until 2010 is shown as dashed black line. Dots correspond to individual scenarios, of which the number 
in each sample is indicated at the bottom of each panel. Note that the horizontal distribution of dots does not have a meaning, but avoids overlapping dots. Source: WG III AR5 



















































































































































(Bosello et al., 2010a, 2010b; de Bruin et al., 2009) adaptation, and 
mitigation are both decision variables and compete for investment 
resources. Competition for investment resources is also captured in 
studies measuring the economic impacts of climate impacts, but rather 
than competing with mitigation investments, competition is between 
investment in adaptation and consumption (Bosello et al., 2007) and 
other capital investments (Darwin and Tol, 2001). Some simulation 
studies that estimate the economic cost of climate damages add adap-
tation cost to the cost of climate impacts and do not capture crowd-
ing out of other expenditures, such as investment and R&D (Hope, 
2006). No existing study, however, examines how this crowding out 
will affect an economy’s ability to invest in mitigation options to reach 
concentration goals.
6�3�4 Energy sector in transformation 
pathways 
The fundamental transformation required in the energy system to meet 
long-term concentration goals is a phase-out in the use of freely emit-
ting fossil fuels, the timing of which depends on the concentration goal 
(Fischedick et  al., 2011). Baseline scenarios indicate that scarcity of 
fossil fuels alone will not be sufficient to limit CO2eq concentrations to 
levels such as 450, 550, or 650 ppm by 2100 (Verbruggen and Al Mar-
chohi, 2010; Riahi et al., 2012; Bauer et al., 2014b; Calvin et al., 2014b; 
McCollum et al., 2014a, see also Section 7.4.1). Mitigation scenarios 
indicate that meeting long-term goals will most significantly reduce 
coal use, followed by unconventional oil and gas use, with conven-
tional oil and gas affected the least (Bauer et al., 2014a, 2014b; McCol-
lum et al., 2014a) (Figure 6.15). This will lead to strong re-allocation 
effects on international energy markets (Section 6.3.6.6). 
The reduction in freely emitting fossil fuels necessary for mitigation is 
not necessarily equal to the reduction in fossil fuels more generally, 
however, because fossil resources can be used in combination with 
CCS to serve as a low-carbon energy source (McFarland et al., 2009; 
Bauer et  al., 2014b; McCollum et  al., 2014a, see also Sections 7.5.5 
and 7.11.2). This means that the total use of fossil fuels can exceed the 
use of freely emitting fossil fuels. 
To accommodate this reduction in freely emitting fossil fuels, trans-
formations of the energy system rely on a combination of three high-
level strategies: (1) decarbonization of energy supply, (2) an associated 
switch to low-carbon energy carriers such as decarbonized electric-
ity, hydrogen, or biofuels in the end-use sectors, and (3) reductions in 
energy demand. The first two of these can be illustrated in terms of 
changes in the carbon intensity of energy. The last can be illustrated in 
terms of energy intensity of GDP, energy per capita, or other indexed 
measures of energy demand.
The integrated modelling literature suggests that the first of these two 
(carbon intensity of energy) will make the largest break from past trends 
in the long run on pathways toward concentration goals (Figure 6.16). 
The fundamental reason for this is that the ultimate potential for end-
use demand reduction is limited; some energy will always be required 
to provide energy services. Bringing energy system CO2 emissions down 
toward zero, as is ultimately required for meeting any concentration goal, 
requires a switch from carbon-intensive (e. g., direct use of coal, oil, and 
natural gas) to low-carbon energy carriers (most prominently electricity, 
but also heat and hydrogen) in the end-use sectors in the long run.
At the same time, integrated modelling studies also sketch out a 
dynamic in which energy intensity reductions equal or outweigh decar-
Figure 6�16 | Final energy intensity of GDP (left panel) and carbon intensity of primary energy (right panel) in mitigation and baseline scenarios, normalized to 1 in 2010 showing 
the full scenario range. GDP is aggregated using base-year market exchange rates. Sources: WGIII AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10). Historic data: JRC / PBL (2013), IEA (2012a), 


























bonization of energy supply in the near term when the supply system is 
still heavily reliant on largely carbon-intensive fossil fuels, and then the 
trend is reversed over time (Figure 6.17, see Fisher et al. (2007, Figure 
3.21)). At the most general level, this results directly from assumptions 
about the flexibility to achieve end-use demand reductions relative to 
decarbonization of supply in integrated models (Kriegler et al., 2014b), 
about which there is a great deal of uncertainty (see Section 6.8). More 
specifically, one reason for this dynamic is that fuel-switching takes 
time to take root as a strategy because there is little incentive to 
switch, say, to electricity early on when electricity may still be very 
carbon-intensive. As electricity generation decreases in carbon inten-
sity through the use of low-carbon energy sources (see Section 7.11.3), 
there is an increasing incentive to increase its use relative to sources 
associated with higher emissions, such as natural gas. A second factor 
is that there may be low-cost demand reduction options available in 
the near term, although there is limited consensus on the costs of 
reducing energy demand. Indeed, much of the energy reduction takes 
place in baseline scenarios. Of importance, these trends can be very 
Figure 6�17 | Development of carbon-intensity vs. final energy-intensity reduction relative to 2010 in selected baseline and mitigation scenarios reaching 530 – 580 ppm and 
430 – 480 ppm CO2eq concentrations in 2100 (left panel) and relative to baseline in the same scenarios (right panel). Consecutive dots represent 10-year time steps starting in 2010 
at the origin and going out to 2100. Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10). Sample includes only 2100 scenarios with idealized policy implementation for which a 
baseline, a 530 – 580 ppm and a 430 – 480 ppm CO2eq scenario are available from the same set.
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Figure 6�18 | Global low-carbon primary energy supply (direct equivalent, see Annex II.4) vs. total final energy use by 2030 and 2050 for idealized implementation scenarios. Low-
carbon primary energy includes fossil energy with CCS, nuclear energy, bioenergy, and non-biomass renewable energy. Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10). Sample 
includes baseline and idealized policy implementation scenarios. Historical data from IEA (2012a).
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regional in character. For example, the value of fuel-switching will be 
higher in countries that already have low-carbon electricity portfolios.
The decarbonization of the energy supply will require a significant 
scaleup of low-carbon energy supplies, which may impose significant 
challenges (see Section 7.11.2). The deployment levels of low-carbon 
energy technologies are substantially higher than today in the vast 
majority of scenarios, even under baseline conditions, and particularly 
for the most stringent concentration categories. Scenarios based on an 
idealized implementation approach in which mitigation begins imme-
diately across the world and with a full portfolio of supply options 
indicate a scaleup of anywhere from a modest increase to upwards of 
three times today’s low-carbon energy by 2030 to bring concentrations 
to about 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100. A scaleup of anywhere from roughly 
a tripling to over seven times today’s levels in 2050 is consistent with 
this same goal Figure 6.18, Section 7.11.4). The degree of scaleup 
depends critically on the degree of overshoot, which allows emissions 
reductions to be pushed into the future.
The degree of low-carbon energy scaleup also depends crucially on the 
degree that final energy use is altered along a transformation path-
way. All other things being equal, higher low-carbon energy technology 
deployment tends to go along with higher final energy use and vice 
versa (Figure 6.18, Figure 7.11). Final energy demand reductions will 
occur both in response to higher energy prices brought about by mitiga-
tion as well as by approaches to mitigation focused explicitly on reduc-
ing energy demand. Hence, the relative importance of energy supply-
and-demand technologies varies across scenarios (Riahi et al., 2012).
A major advance in the literature since AR4 is the assessment of sce-
narios with limits on available technologies or variations in the cost 
and performance of key technologies. These scenarios are intended as 
a rough proxy for economic and various non-economic obstacles faced 
by technologies. Many low-carbon supply technologies, such as nuclear 
power, CO2 storage, hydro, or wind power, face public acceptance 
issues and other barriers that may limit or slow down their deployment 
(see Section 7.9.4). In general, scenarios with limits on available tech-
nologies or variations in their cost and performance demonstrate the 
simple fact that reductions in the availability and / or performance or an 
increase in costs of one technology will necessarily result in increases 
in the use of other options. The more telling result of these scenarios is 
that limits on the technology portfolio available for mitigation can sub-
stantially increase the costs of meeting long-term goals. Indeed, many 
models cannot produce scenarios leading to 450 ppm CO2eq when par-
ticularly important technologies are removed from the portfolio. This 
topic is discussed in more detail in Section 6.3.6.3.
Delays in climate change mitigation both globally and at regional levels 
simply alter the timing of the deployment of low-carbon energy sources 
and demand reductions. As noted in Sections 6.3.2 and 6.4, less mitiga-
tion over the coming decades will require greater emissions reductions 
in the decades that follow to meet a particular long-term climate goal. 
The nature of technology transitions follows the emissions dynamic 
directly. Delays in mitigation in the near term will lower the rate of 
energy system transformation over the coming decades but will call for 
a more rapid transformation in the decades that follow. Delays lead 
to higher utilization of fossil fuels, and coal in particular, in the short 
run, which can be prolonged after the adoption of stringent mitigation 
action due to carbon lock-ins. To compensate for the prolonged use of 
fossil fuels over the next decades, fossil fuel use — particularly oil and 
gas — would need to be reduced much more strongly in the long run. 
One study found that this leads to a reduction in overall fossil energy 
use over the century compared to a scenario of immediate mitigation 
(Bauer et  al., 2014a). Another study (Riahi et  al., 2014) found that if 
2030 emissions are kept to below 50 GtCO2eq, then low-carbon energy 
deployment is tripled between 2030 and 2050 in most scenarios reach-
ing concentrations of about 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100. In contrast, if 
emissions in 2030 are greater than 55 GtCO2eq in 2030, then low-car-
bon energy deployment increases by five-fold in most scenarios meet-
ing this same long-term concentration goal (see Section 7.11.4, specifi-
cally Figure 7.15).
Beyond these high-level characteristics of the energy system trans-
formation lie a range of more detailed characteristics and tradeoffs. 
Important issues include the options for producing low-carbon energy 
and the changes in fuels used in end uses, and the increase in electric-
ity use in particular, both with and without mitigation. These issues are 
covered in detail in Section 6.8 and Chapter 7 through 12.
6�3�5 Land and bioenergy in transformation 
pathways
Scenarios suggest a substantial cost-effective, and possibly essential, 
role for land in transformation pathways (Section 6.3.2.4 and Section 
11.9), with baseline land-use emissions and sequestration an impor-
tant uncertainty (Section 6.3.1.4). Changes in land use and manage-
ment will result from a confluence of factors, only some of which are 
due to mitigation. The key forces associated with mitigation are (1) 
the demand for bioenergy, (2) the demand to store carbon in land by 
reducing deforestation, encouraging afforestation, and altering soil 
management practices, and (3) reductions in non-CO2 GHG emissions 
by changing management practices. Other forces include demand for 
food and other products, such as forest products, land for growing 
urban environments, and protecting lands for environmental, aesthetic, 
and economic purposes. Currently, only a subset of models explicitly 
model LUC in scenarios. The development of fully integrated land use 
models is an important area of model development.
Scenarios from integrated models suggest the possibility of very dif-
ferent landscapes relative to today, even in the absence of mitigation. 
Projected global baseline changes in land cover by 2050 typically 
exhibit increases in non-energy cropland and decreases in ‘other’ land, 
such as abandoned land, other arable land, and non-arable land (Fig-
ure 6.19). On the other hand, projected baseline pasture and forest 





non-energy cropland and decreases in forest area through 2050 are 
typically projected to outpace historical changes from the previous 40 
years (+165 and – 105 million hectares of crop and forest area 
changes, respectively, from 1961 – 2005 (Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation of the United Nations (FAO), 2012). Energy cropland is typically 
projected to increase as well, but there is less agreement across sce-
narios. Overall, baseline projections portray large differences across 
models in the amount and composition of the land converted by agri-
cultural land expansion. These baseline differences are important 
because they represent differences in the opportunity costs of land 
use and management changes for mitigation. (See Chapter 11.9 for 
regional baseline, and mitigation, land cover projections for a few 
models and scenarios.)
Mitigation generally induces greater land cover conversion than in 
baseline scenarios, but for a given level of mitigation, there is large 
variation in the projections (Figure 6.19). Projections also suggest 
additional land conversion with tighter concentration goals, but 
declining additional conversion with increased mitigation stringency. 
This is consistent with the declining relative role of land-related miti-
gation with the stringency of the mitigation goal (Rose et al., 2012). 
However, additional land conversion with more stringent goals could 
be substantial if there are only bioenergy incentives (see below). 
A common, but not universal, characteristic of mitigation scenarios is 
an expansion of energy cropland to support the production of mod-
ern bioenergy. There is also a clear tradeoff in the scenarios between 
energy cropland cover and other cover types. Most scenarios project 
reduced non-energy cropland expansion, relative to baseline expan-
sion, with some projections losing cropland relative to today. On the 
other hand, there are projected pasture changes of every kind. Forest 
changes depend on the incentives and constraints considered in each 
scenario. Some of the variations in projected land cover change are 
attributable to specific assumptions, such as fixed pasture acreage, pri-
oritized food provision, land availability constraints for energy crops, 
and the inclusion or exclusion of afforestation options (e. g. Popp et al., 
2014). Others are more subtle outcomes of combinations of model-
ling assumption and structure, such as demands for food and energy, 
land productivity and heterogeneity, yield potential, land-production 
options, and land-conversion costs. 
Which mitigation activities are available or incentivized has important 
implications for land conversion (Figure 6.19). Bioenergy incentives 
alone can produce energy cropland expansion, with increased forest 
and other land conversion (Wise et al., 2009; Reilly et al., 2012). In gen-
eral, forest land contraction results when increased demand for energy 
crops is not balanced by policies that incentivize or protect the storage 
Figure 6�19 | Global land cover change by 2050 from 2005 for a sample of baseline and mitigation scenarios with different technology assumptions. ‘REM-MAg’ = REMIND-
MAgPIE. Sources: EMF27 Study (Kriegler et al., 2014a), Reilly et al. (2012), Melillo et al. (2009), Wise et al. (2009). Notes: default (see Section 6.3.1) fossil fuel, industry, and land 
mitigation technology incentives assumed except as indicated by the following — ‘bioe’ = only land-based mitigation incentive is for modern bioenergy, ‘nobioe’ = land incentives 
but not for modern bioenergy, ‘bioe+land’ = modern bioenergy and land carbon stocks incentives, ‘bioe+agint’ = modern bioenergy incentive and agricultural intensification 
response allowed, ‘lowbio’ = global modern bioenergy constrained to 100 EJ / year, ‘noccs’ = CCS unavailable for fossil or bioenergy use. Other land cover includes abandoned land, 



















































































































































































































































































































































of carbon in terrestrial systems. However, the degree of this forest con-
version will depend on a range of factors, including the potential for 
agricultural intensification and underlying modelling approaches. For 
example, Melillo et al. (2009) find twice as much forest land conversion 
by 2050 when they ignore agricultural intensification responses. Forest 
land expansion is projected when forests are protected, there are con-
straints on bioenergy deployment levels, or there are combined incen-
tives for bioenergy and terrestrial carbon stocks (e. g., Wise et al., 2009; 
Reilly et al., 2012, and GCAM-EMF27 in Figure 6.19). Differences in for-
est land expansion result largely from differences in approaches to 
incorporating land carbon in the mitigation regime. For example, in Fig-
ure 6.19, GCAM-EMF27 (all variants), Wise et al. (2009) (low bioe+land) 
and Reilly et  al. (2012)(low bioe and bioe+land) include an explicit 
price incentive to store carbon in land, which serves to encourage affor-
estation and reduce deforestation of existing forests, and discourage 
energy cropland expansion. In contrast, other scenarios consider only 
avoided deforestation (REMIND-MAgPIE-EMF27), or land conversion 
constraints (IMAGE-EMF27). Both protect existing forests, but neither 
encourages afforestation. In other studies, Melillo et al. (2009) protect 
existing natural forests based on profitability and Popp et al. (2011a) 
(not shown) impose conservation policies that protect forest regardless 
of cost. The explicit pricing of land carbon incentives can lead to large 
land use carbon sinks in scenarios, and an afforestation incentive or 
constraint on bioenergy use can result in less land conversion from bio-
energy, but not necessarily less land conversion as afforestation may 
increase. 
An important issue with respect to bioenergy, and therefore to land 
transformation, is the availability and use of BECCS. As discussed in 
Section 6.3.2, BECCS could be valuable for reaching lower-concentra-
tion levels, in part by facilitating concentration overshoot. The avail-
ability of CCS could therefore also have land-use implications. Con-
straints on the use of CCS would prohibit BECCS deployment. However, 
CCS (for BECCS as well as fossil energy with CCS) may not increase 
land conversion through 2050 relative to scenarios without BECCS. 
Instead, the presence of BECCS could decrease near-term energy crop 
expansion as some models project delayed mitigation with BECCS 
(Rose et al., 2014a, 6.3.2.2). In addition to biomass feedstock require-
ments, BECCS land considerations include bioenergy CCS facility land, 
as well as optimal siting relative to feedstock, geologic storage, and 
infrastructure.
As noted above, land transformation is tightly linked to the role of 
bioenergy in mitigation. To understand bioenergy’s role in transforma-
tion pathways, it is important to understand bioenergy’s role within 
the energy system. The review by Chum et al. (2011) estimated techni-
cal potential for bioenergy of 300 and 500 EJ / year in 2020 and 2050, 
respectively, and deployment of 100 to 300 EJ of biomass for energy 
globally in 2050, while Rose et al. (2012) found bioenergy contribut-
ing up to 15 % of cumulative primary energy over the century under 
climate policies. Rose et al. (2014a) analyze more recent results from 
15 models (Figure 6.20). They find that modelled bioenergy structures 
vary substantially across models, with differences in feedstock assump-
tions, sustainability constraints, and conversion technologies. Nonethe-
less, the scenarios project increasing deployment of, and dependence 
on, bioenergy with tighter climate change goals, both in a given year 
as well as earlier in time. Shares of total primary energy increase under 
climate policies due to both increased deployment of bioenergy and 
Figure 6�20 | Annual global modern biomass primary energy supply and bioenergy share of total primary energy supply (top panels) and BECCS share of modern bioenergy (bot-
tom panels) in baseline, 550 ppm and 450 ppm CO2eq scenarios in 2030, 2050, and 2100. Source: Rose et al. (2014a). Notes: All scenarios shown assume idealized implementation. 










































Total Modern Bioenergy [EJ/yr]
2030
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
Total Modern Bioenergy [EJ/yr]
2050
2100
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350






shrinking energy systems. Bioenergy’s share of total regional electricity 
and liquid fuels is projected to be up to 35 % and 75 %, respectively, 
by 2050. However, there is no single vision about where biomass is 
cost-effectively deployed within the energy system (electricity, liquid 
fuels, hydrogen, and / or heat), due in large part to uncertainties about 
relative technology options and costs over time. (See Chapter 7 for 
more detail on bioenergy’s role in energy supply.) As noted above, the 
availability of CCS, and therefore BECCS, has important implications for 
bioenergy deployment. In scenarios that do include BECCS technolo-
gies, BECCS is deployed in greater quantities and earlier in time the 
more stringent the goal, potentially representing 100 % of bioenergy in 
2050 (Figure 6.20).
Models universally project that the majority of biomass supply for bio-
energy and bioenergy consumption will occur in developing and tran-
sitional economies. For instance, one study (Rose et al., 2014a) found 
that 50 – 90 % of global bioenergy primary energy is projected to come 
from non-OECD countries in 2050, with the share increasing beyond 
2050. Developing and transitional regions are also projected to be the 
home of the majority of agricultural and forestry mitigation.
Finally, a number of integrated models have explicitly modelled land 
use with full emissions accounting, including indirect land cover 
change and agricultural intensification. These models have suggested 
that it could be cost-effective to tradeoff lower land carbon stocks 
from land cover change and increase N2O emissions from agricultural 
intensification for the long-run climate change management benefits 
of bioenergy (Popp et al., 2014; Rose et al., 2014a). 
Overall, the integrated modelling literature suggests opportunities 
for large-scale global deployment of bioenergy and terrestrial carbon 
gains. However, the transformations associated with mitigation will 
be challenging due to the regional scale of deployments and imple-
mentation issues, including institution and program design, land use 
and regional policy coordination, emissions leakage, biophysical and 
economic uncertainties, and potential non-climate social implica-
tions. Among other things, bioenergy deployment is complicated by a 
variety of social concerns, such as land conversion and food security 
(See Section 6.6 and the Chapter 11 Bioenergy Annex). Coordination 
between land-mitigation policies, regions, and activities over time will 
affect forestry-, agricultural-, and bioenergy-mitigation costs and net 
GHG mitigation effectiveness. When land options and bioenergy are 
included in mitigation scenarios, it is typically under the assumption 
of a highly idealized implementation, with immediate, global, and 
comprehensive availability of land-related mitigation options. In these 
cases, models are assuming a global terrestrial carbon-stock incentive 
or global forest-protection policy, global incentives for bioenergy feed-
stocks, and global agriculture-mitigation policies. They also assume no 
uncertainty, risk, or transactions costs. For a discussion of these issues, 
see Lubowski and Rose (2013). The literature has begun exploring 
more realistic policy contexts and found that there is likely less avail-
able mitigation potential in the near term than previously estimated, 
and possibly unavoidable emissions leakage associated with getting 
programs in place, as well as with voluntary mitigation supply mecha-
nisms (Section 11.9, Section 6.8). Additional exploration into the need 
for and viability of large-scale land-based mitigation is an important 
area for future research.
6�3�6 The aggregate economic implications of 
transformation pathways
6�3�6�1 Overview of the aggregate economic 
implications of mitigation
Mitigation will require a range of changes, including behavioural 
changes and the use of alternative technologies. These changes will 
affect economic output and the consumption of goods and services. 
The primary source of information on these costs over multi-decade 
or century-long time horizons are integrated models such as those 
reviewed in this chapter.
Mitigation will affect economic conditions through several avenues, 
only some of which are included in estimates from integrated models. 
To a first-order, mitigation involves reductions in the consumption of 
energy services, and perhaps agricultural products, and the use of more 
expensive technologies. This first-order effect is the predominant fea-
ture and focus of the integrated modelling estimates discussed in this 
chapter and will lead to aggregate economic losses. However, mitiga-
tion policies may interact with pre-existing distortions in labour, capi-
tal, energy, and land markets, and failures in markets for technology 
adoption and innovation, among other things. These interactions might 
increase or decrease economic impacts (Sections 3.6.3 and 6.3.6.5).
Estimates of the potential aggregate economic effects from mitigation 
are generally expressed as deviations from a counter-factual baseline 
scenario without mitigation policies; that is, the difference in economic 
conditions relative to what would have happened without mitigation. 
They can be expressed in terms of changes in these economic condi-
tions at a particular point in time (for example, reductions in total con-
sumption or GDP at a given point in time) or in terms of reductions in 
the growth rates leading to these economic conditions (for example, 
reductions in the rate of consumption or GDP growth). The estimates, 
and those discussed in this section, generally do not include the ben-
efits from reducing climate change, nor do they consider the interac-
tions between mitigation, adaptation, and climate impacts (Section 
6.3.3). In addition, the estimates do not take into account important 
co-benefits and adverse side-effects from mitigation, such as impacts 
on land use and health benefits from reduced air pollution (Sections 
11.13.6 and 6.6).
A wide range of methodological issues attends the estimation of 
aggregate economic costs in integrated models, one of which is 
the metric itself. (For more discussion on these issues in estimating 





rics and Chapter 3.) A change in welfare due to changes in house-
hold consumption is commonly measured in terms of equivalent and 
compensating variation, but other, more indirect cost measures such 
as GDP losses, consumption losses, and area under the marginal 
abatement cost function are more widely used (Paltsev and Capros, 
2013). For consistency, results in this section are presented preferen-
tially in terms of cost measures commonly reported by the models: 
consumption losses and GDP losses for general-equilibrium models, 
and area under the marginal abatement cost function or reduction 
of consumer and producer surplus (in the following summarized with 
the term abatement cost) for partial-equilibrium models. These cost 
metrics differ in terms of whether or not general equilibrium effects 
in the full economy have been taken into account and whether or 
not the direct impact on households or the intermediate impact on 
economic output is measured. They are therefore treated separately 
in this chapter.
Emissions prices (carbon prices) are also assessed in this chapter. How-
ever, they are not a proxy for aggregate economic costs for two pri-
mary reasons. First, emissions prices measure marginal cost, that is, the 
cost of an additional unit of emissions reduction. In contrast, total eco-
nomic costs represent the costs of all mitigation that has taken place. 
Second, emissions prices can interact with other policies and measures, 
such as regulatory policies or subsidies directed at low-carbon tech-
nologies, and will therefore indicate a lower marginal cost than is actu-
ally warranted if mitigation is achieved partly by these other measures.
Different methods can be used to sum costs over time. For this pur-
pose, in the absence of specific information from individual models 
about the discount rate used in studies, the estimates of net pres-
ent value (NPV) costs in this chapter are aggregated ex-post using 
a discount rate of 5 %. This is roughly representative of the aver-
age interest rate that underlies the discounting approach in most 
models (Kriegler et al., 2014a). Other rates could have been used to 
conduct this ex-post aggregation. Since mitigation costs tend to rise 
over time, lower (higher) rates would lead to higher (lower) aggre-
gate costs than what are provided here. However, it is important to 
note that constructing NPV metrics based on other rates is not the 
same as actually evaluating scenarios under alternative discounting 
assumptions and will not accurately reflect aggregate costs under 
such assumptions. 
Estimates of aggregate economic effects from integrated models vary 
substantially. This arises because of differences in assumptions about 
driving forces such as population and economic growth and the policy 
environment in the baseline, as well as differences in the structures 
and scopes of the models (Section 6.2). In addition, aggregate eco-
nomic costs are influenced by the future cost, performance, and avail-
ability of mitigation technologies (Section 6.3.6.3), the nature of inter-
national participation in mitigation (Section 6.3.6.4), and the policy 
instruments used to reduce emissions and the interaction between 
these instruments and pre-existing distortions and market failures 
(Section 6.3.6.5).
6�3�6�2 Global aggregate costs of mitigation in idealized 
implementation scenarios
A valuable benchmark for exploring aggregate economic mitigation 
costs is estimates based on the assumption of a stylized implementa-
tion approach in which a ubiquitous price on carbon and other GHGs 
is applied across the globe in every sector of every country and rises 
over time in a way that minimizes the discounted sum of costs over 
time. These ‘idealized implementation’ scenarios are included in most 
studies as a benchmark against which to compare results based on 
less-idealized circumstances. One reason that these idealized scenarios 
have been used as a benchmark is that the implementation approach 
provides the lowest costs under idealized implementation conditions 
of efficient global markets in which there are no pre-existing distor-
tions or interactions with other, non-climate market failures. For this 
reason, they are often referred to as ‘cost-effective’ scenarios. However, 
the presence of pre-existing market distortions, non-climate market 
failures, or complementary policies means that the cost of the idealized 
approach could be lower or higher than in an idealized implementation 
environment, and that the idealized approach may not be the least-
cost strategy (see Section 6.3.6.5). Most of the idealized implementa-
tion scenarios assessed here consider these additional factors only to 
a limited degree or not at all, and the extent to which a non-idealized 
implementation environment is accounted for varies between them. 
A robust result across studies is that aggregate global costs of mitiga-
tion tend to increase over time and with stringency of the concentration 
goal (Figure 6.21). According to the idealized implementation scenarios 
collected in the WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10), the central 
70 % (10 out of 14) of global consumption loss estimates for reaching 
levels of 430 – 480 ppm CO2eq by 2100 range between 1 % to 4 % in 
2030, 2 % to 6 % in 2050, and 3 % to 11 % in 2100 relative to consump-
tion in the baseline (Figure 6.21, panel c). These consumption losses cor-
respond to an annual average reduction of consumption growth by 0.06 
to 0.20 percentage points from 2010 to 2030 (median of 0.09), 0.06 to 
0.17 percentage points through 2050 (median of 0.09), and 0.04 to 0.14 
percentage points over the century (median of 0.06). To put these losses 
in context, studies assume annual average consumption growth rates 
without mitigation between 1.9 % and 3.8 % per year until 2050 and 
between 1.6 % and 3.0 % per year over the century. These growth rates 
correspond to increases in total consumption by roughly a factor of 2 to 
4.5 by 2050, and from roughly four-fold to over ten-fold over the century 
(values are based on global projections in market exchange rates).
An important caveat to these results is that they do not account for a 
potential model bias due to the fact that higher-cost models may have 
not been able to produce low-concentration scenarios and have there-
fore not reported results for these scenarios (see discussion of model 
failures in Section 6.2, and Tavoni and Tol, 2010). They also do not 
capture uncertainty in model parameter assumptions (Webster et al., 
2012). Since scenario samples for different concentration levels do not 
come from precisely the same models, it is informative to look at the 
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individual models within a given study (Figure 6.22). This can partly 
remove model bias, although the bias from a lack of models that could 
not produce low-concentration scenarios remains. The large majority 
of studies in the scenario database for AR5 report a factor 1.5 to 3 
higher global consumption and GDP losses, and 2 to 4 times higher 
abatement costs, for scenarios reaching 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq by 2100 
compared to the 530 – 650 ppm CO2eq range.
Aggregate economic costs vary substantially, even in idealized scenar-
ios. The variation of cost estimates for individual CO2eq concentration 
ranges can be attributed, among other things, to differences in assump-
tions about driving forces such as population and GDP and differences 
in model structure and scope (see Section 6.2 for a discussion of model 
differences). Diagnostic studies have indicated that the assumed avail-
ability and flexibility of low-carbon technologies to substitute fossil 
energy is a key factor influencing the level of carbon prices for a given 
level of emissions reductions (Kriegler et al., 2014a). The extent to which 
carbon prices translate into mitigation costs through higher energy 
prices is another factor that differs between models. Both the variation 
of carbon prices and the variation of the economic impact of higher 
prices are major determinants of the observed range of aggregate eco-
nomic costs for a given amount of emissions reductions. Assumptions 
about the implementation environment can be another important driver 
of costs. For example, the highest consumption and GDP losses in the 
scenario sample are from a model with an emphasis on market imper-
fections, infrastructure lock-ins, and myopia (Waisman et al., 2012).
It is possible to control for several key sources of variation by relat-
ing mitigation costs to cumulative emissions reductions from baseline 
emissions (Figure 6.23). As expected, carbon prices and mitigation 
costs increase with the amount of mitigation. Since different models 
have different capabilities for deep emissions reductions, the inter-
model spread in carbon price and cost estimates increases as well. In 
other words, scenarios indicate greater consensus regarding the nature 
of mitigation costs at higher-concentration levels than those at lower 
levels. This increase in variation reflects the challenge associated with 
modelling energy and other human systems that are dramatically dif-
ferent than those of today.
6�3�6�3 The implications of technology portfolios for 
aggregate global economic costs
Because technology will underpin the transition to a low-carbon 
economy, the availability, cost, and performance of technologies will 
exert an influence on economic costs. Several multi-model studies and 
a wide range of individual model studies have explored this space 
(see Section 6.1.2.2). A precise understanding of the implications of 
technology availability on costs is confounded by several factors. One 
issue is that the sensitivities among technologies are not necessarily 
comparable across models or scenarios. Some models do not repre-
sent certain technologies such as BECCS and therefore do not exhibit 
a strong cost increase if these options are restricted. These models 
may instead have difficulties in achieving tighter concentration goals 
regardless of the restriction (Krey et al., 2014). In addition, assump-
tions about cost and performance can vary across models, even within 
a single, multi-model study. Moreover, many limited technology sce-
narios are characterized by frequent model infeasibilities, as shown by 
the fraction of models in the EMF27 study (Kriegler et al., 2014a) able 
to meet a particular goal with different technology combinations at 
the bottom of Figure 6.24. (See Section 6.2.4 regarding interpretation 
of model infeasibility). 
Despite these limitations, the literature broadly confirms that mitiga-
tion costs are heavily influenced by the availability, cost, and perfor-
mance of mitigation technologies. In addition, these studies indicate 
that the influence of technology on costs generally increases with 
increasing stringency of the concentration goal (Figure 6.24). The 
effect on mitigation costs varies by technology, however, the ranges 
reported by the different models tend to strongly overlap (Figure 6.24, 
Krey et al., 2014), reflecting the general variation of mitigation costs 
across models (Section 6.3.6.2, Fisher et al., 2007). In general, models 
have been able to produce scenarios leading to about 550 ppm CO2eq 
by 2100, even under limited technology assumptions. However, many 
models could not produce scenarios leading to about 450 ppm CO2eq 
by 2100 with limited technology portfolios, particularly when assump-
tions preclude or limit the use of BECCS (Azar et al., 2006; van Vliet 
et al., 2009; Krey et al., 2014; Kriegler et al., 2014a).
As noted above, the lack of availability of CCS is most frequently 
associated with the most significant cost increase (Edenhofer et  al., 
2010; Tavoni et al., 2012; Krey et al., 2014; Kriegler et al., 2014a; Riahi 
et al., 2014), particularly for concentration goals approaching 450 ppm 
CO2eq, which are characterized by often substantial overshoot. One 
fundamental reason for this is that the combination of biomass with 
CCS can serve as a CDR technology in the form of BECCS (Azar et al., 
2006; Krey and Riahi, 2009; van Vliet et  al., 2009; Edmonds et  al., 
2013; Kriegler et  al., 2013a; van Vuuren et  al., 2013) (see Sections 
6.3.2 and 6.9). In addition to the ability to produce negative emis-
sions when coupled with bioenergy, CCS is a versatile technology that 
Figure 6�21 | Global mitigation costs of idealized implementation scenarios. Panels show the development of (a) carbon prices, (c) consumption losses, (e) GDP losses and 
(f) abatement costs over time, and (b) the average carbon price (2015 – 2100), and (d) the NPV mitigation costs (2015 – 2100) discounted at a 5 % discount rate. Costs are expressed 
as a fraction of economic output — or in the case of consumption losses — consumption in the baseline. The number of scenarios included in the boxplots is indicated at the bot-
tom of the panels, 2030 numbers also apply for 2020 and 2050. The number of scenarios outside the figure range is noted at the top. One model shows NPV consumption losses 
of 13 % / 9.5 %, and GDP losses of 15 % / 11 % for 430 – 480 / 530 – 580 ppm CO2eq (see text). Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10).The scenario selection includes 
all idealized implementation scenarios that reported costs or carbon prices to 2050 or 2100 (only the latter are included in aggregate cost and price plots) after removal of similar 





Figure 6�22 | Carbon price (left panel) and global mitigation cost changes (right panel) for idealized implementation scenarios relative to a reference concentration category 
(530 – 650 ppm CO2eq in 2100). Results for NPV costs are shown by consumption losses, GDP losses, and abatement costs. Results are based on pairs of idealized implementation 
scenarios, one in the 530 – 650 ppm CO2eq range and one in a neighbouring concentration range, from a single model and study. Cost changes were calculated on the basis of NPV 
economic costs (discounted at 5 % per year) and carbon price changes on the basis of average discounted values for the period 2015 – 2100. See Figure 6.21 caption for further 
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Figure 6�23 | Average carbon prices (left panel) and global mitigation costs (right panel) as a function of residual cumulative CO2 emissions expressed as fraction of cumulative 
baseline emissions over the period 2011 – 2100. Emissions reductions relative to baseline can be deduced by subtracting the fraction of residual cumulative emissions from unity. 
Mitigation costs are reported in NPV consumption losses in percent baseline consumption for general equilibrium (GE) models and abatement costs in percent baseline GDP for 
partial equilibrium (PE) models. A discount rate of 5 % per year was used for calculating average carbon prices and net present value mitigation costs. See description of Figure 6.21 
for the selection of scenarios. Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10).
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can be combined with electricity, synthetic fuel, and hydrogen produc-
tion from several feedstocks and in energy-intensive industries such 
as cement and steel. The CCS can also act as bridge technology that is 
compatible with existing fossil-fuel dominated supply structures (see 
Sections 7.5.5, 7.9, and 6.9 for a discussion of challenges and risks of 
CCS and CDR). Bioenergy shares some of these characteristics with 
CCS. It is also an essential ingredient for BECCS, and it can be applied 
in various sectors of the energy system, including for the provision of 
liquid low-carbon fuels for transportation (see Chapter 11, Bioenergy 
Annex for a discussion of related challenges and risks). In contrast, 
those options that are largely confined to the electricity sector (e. g., 
wind, solar, and nuclear energy) and heat generation tend to show a 
lower value, both because they cannot be used to generate negative 
emissions and because there are a number of low-carbon electricity 
supply options available that can generally substitute each other (Krey 
et al., 2014).
Scenarios also suggest that energy end-use technologies and mea-
sures have an important influence on mitigation costs. For example, 
in the EMF27 and AMPERE multi-model studies, reductions in the 
final energy demand of 20 – 30 % by 2050 and 35 – 45 % by 2100 led 
to reductions in the cumulative discounted aggregate mitigation costs 
on the order of 50 % (Krey et  al., 2014; Kriegler et  al., 2014a; Riahi 
et al., 2014). An important caveat to these results is that the costs of 
achieving these reductions were not considered nor were the policy 
or technology drivers that led to them. Energy end-use measures are 
important not just for reducing energy consumption, but also for facili-
tating the use of low-carbon fuels. For example, a number of studies 
(Kyle and Kim, 2011; Riahi et al., 2012; Pietzcker et al., 2014; McCol-
lum et al., 2014b) show that allowing electricity or hydrogen in trans-
portation lowers mitigation costs by opening up additional supply 
routes to the transportation sector (see Section 6.8 for more on this 
topic). An increasing ability to electrify the end-use sectors and trans-
port in particular, in turn, tends to reduce the importance of CCS and 
bioenergy technologies for achieving lower-concentration goals such 
as 450 ppm CO2eq. 
6�3�6�4 Economic implications of non-idealized 
international mitigation policy implementation
Research has consistently demonstrated that delaying near-term global 
mitigation as well as reducing the extent of international participation 
in mitigation can significantly affect aggregate economic costs of miti-
Figure 6�24 | Relative increase of NPV mitigation costs (period 2015 – 2100, 5 % discount rate) from technology portfolio variations compared to a scenario with default technol-
ogy availability. Scenario names on the horizontal axis indicate the technology variation relative to the default assumptions: Low Energy Intensity = higher energy intensity improve-
ments leading to energy demand reductions of 20 – 30 % by 2050 and 35 – 45 % by 2100 relative to the default baseline; No CCS = unavailability of CCS; Nuclear Phase Out = No 
addition of nuclear power plants beyond those under construction; existing plants operated until the end of their lifetime; Limited Solar / Wind = a maximum of 20 % global electric-
ity generation from solar and wind power in any year of these scenarios; Limited Bioenergy = maximum of 100 EJ / yr of modern bioenergy supply globally; Conventional Energy 
Future = combining pessimistic assumptions for renewable energy (Limited Solar / Wind + Limited Bioenergy); Energy efficiency and Renewables = combining low energy intensity 
with non-availability of CCS and nuclear phase-out; Limited Technology Future = all supply-side options constrained and energy intensity developing in line with historical records 
in the baseline. Source: EMF27 study, adapted from (Kriegler et al., 2014a). Only those scenarios from the EMF27 study are included that reached the 430 – 480 and 530 – 580 ppm 
CO2eq concentration ranges or were close to it (see footnotes in the figure).
* Number of models successfully vs. number of models attempting running the respective technology variation scenario
‡ Scenarios from two models reach concentration levels in 2100 that are slightly above the 430-480 ppm CO2eq category.
† Scenarios from one model reach concentration levels in 2100 that are slightly below the 530-580 ppm CO2eq category
0/9*5/8*5/10*11/11*7/10*12/12*8/10*12/12*8/9*10/10*8/9*10/10*4/10*11/11*8/9*12/12*
































































































gation. One way in which aggregate mitigation costs are increased is 
by delaying near-term global mitigation relative to what would be 
warranted in the hypothetical idealized case that a long-term goal was 
adopted and a least-cost approach to reach the global mitigation goal 
was implemented immediately. This represents one manifestation of 
not undertaking mitigation ‘when’ it is least expensive (Keppo and 
Rao, 2007; Bosetti et  al., 2009b; Krey and Riahi, 2009; Jakob et  al., 
2012; Kriegler et al., 2013b; Luderer et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2013b; 
Riahi et al., 2014). In scenarios in which near-term global mitigation is 
limited, the increase in mitigation costs is significantly and positively 
related to the gap in short-term mitigation with respect to the ideal-
ized scenarios (Figure 6.25). Costs are lower in the near-term, but 
increase more rapidly in the transition period following the delayed 
mitigation, and are also higher in the longer term. Future mitigation 
costs are higher because delays in near-term mitgation not only require 
deeper reductions in the long run to compensate for higher emissions 
in the short term, but also produce a larger lock-in in carbon infrastruc-
ture, increasing the challenge of these accelerated emissions reduction 
rates. The effects of delay on mitigation costs increase with the strin-
gency of the mitigation goal. Studies suggest that important transi-
tional economic metrics other than aggregate costs — for example, 
reduced growth rates in economic output and consumption, escalating 
energy prices, and increasing carbon rents — may be more affected by 
delayed mitigation than aggregate costs (Kriegler et al., 2013b; Lud-
erer et al., 2014a).
Studies have consistently found that delays through 2030 have sub-
stantially more profound aggregate economic implications than delays 
through 2020, both in terms of higher transitional impacts due to more 
rapidly increasing mitigation costs at the time of adopting the long-
term strategy and higher long-term costs (Kriegler et al., 2013b; Rogelj 
et al., 2013a; Luderer et al., 2014a). This is directly related to prolonged 
delays in mitigation leading to both larger carbon lock-ins and higher 
short term emissions that need to be compensated by deeper emis-
sions cuts in the long run (Sections 6.3.2 and 6.4). Moreover, delayed 
mitigation further increases the dependence on the full availability 
of mitigation options, especially on CDR technologies such as BECCS 
(Luderer et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2013b; Riahi et al., 2014). (See Sec-
tion 6.3.6.3, Section 6.4). 
Fragmented action or delayed participation by particular coun-
tries — that is, not undertaking mitigation ‘where’ it is least expen-
Figure 6�25 | Mitigation costs increase as a function of reduced near-term mitigation effort, expressed as relative change to immediate mitigation (idealized implementation) sce-
narios (referred to as the ‘mitigation gap’). Cost increase is shown both in the medium term (2030 – 2050, left panel) and in the long term (2050 – 2100, right panel), calculated on 
undiscounted costs. The mitigation gap is calculated from cumulative CO2 mitigation to 2030. Blue and yellow dots show scenarios reaching concentration goals of 430 – 530 ppm 
and 530 – 650 ppm CO2eq, respectively. The shaded area indicates the range for the whole scenario set (two standard deviations). The bars in the lower panel indicate the mitigation 
gap range where 75 % of scenarios with 2030 emissions, respectively, above and below 55 GtCO2 are found. Not all model simulations of delayed additional mitigation until 2030 
could reach the lower concentration goal of 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq (for 2030 emissions above 55 GtCO2eq, 29 of 48 attempted simulations could reach the goal; for 2030 emissions 
below 55 GtCO2eq, 34 of 51 attempted simulations could reach the goal). Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10), differences between delayed mitigation to 2020 and 
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sive — has also been broadly shown to increase global mitigation costs 
(Edmonds et  al., 2008; Calvin et  al., 2009b; Clarke et  al., 2009; Tol, 
2009; Richels et al., 2009; Bosetti et al., 2009d; van Vliet et al., 2009; 
Kriegler et  al., 2014c). Fragmented action will influence aggregate 
global economic costs not only because of misallocation of mitigation 
across countries, but also through emissions leakage and trade-related 
spillover effects (Arroyo-Curras et al., 2014; Babiker, 2005; Bauer et al., 
2014a; Blanford et  al., 2014; Böhringer et  al., 2012; Bosetti and De 
Cian, 2013; Kriegler et  al., 2014c). The range and strength of these 
adverse effects and risks depends on the type of policy intervention 
and the stringency of the mitigation effort. Border carbon adjustments 
have been found to reduce economic impacts of exposed industries, 
but not to yield significant global cost savings (Böhringer et al., 2012). 
Some studies have indicated that the increased costs from fragmented 
action could be counterbalanced by increased incentives to carry out 
innovation, though only to a limited extent (Di Maria and Werf, 2007; 
Golombek and Hoel, 2008; Gerlagh et al., 2009; De Cian and Tavoni, 
2012; De Cian et al., 2014).
Multi model studies have indeed found that the smaller the propor-
tion of total global emissions included in a climate regime due to 
fragmented action, the higher the costs and the more challenging 
it becomes to meet any long-term goal. For example, only 2 (5) of 
10 participating models could produce 450 ppm CO2eq overshoot 
(550 ppm CO2eq not to exceed) scenarios under the regional frag-
mentation assumptions in the EMF22 scenarios (Clarke et al., 2009). 
In these scenarios, the Annex I countries began mitigation immedi-
ately, followed by major emerging economies in 2030, and the rest 
of the world in 2050 (see Table 6.1, (Clarke et al., 2009) (see Section 
6.2 for a discussion of model infeasibility). Discounted global aggre-
gate mitigation costs over the century increased by 50 % to more 
than double for those models that could produce these scenarios 
(FIgure 6.26).
In general, when some countries act earlier than others, the increased 
costs of fragmented action fall on early actors. However, aggregate 
economic costs can also increase for late entrants, even taking into 
account their lower near-term mitigation (Clarke et  al., 2009; Jakob 
et al., 2012). Late entrants benefit in early periods from lower mitiga-
tion; however, to meet long-term goals, they must then reduce emis-
sions more quickly once they begin mitigation, in just the same way 
that global emissions must undergo a more rapid transition if they 
are delayed in total. The increased costs of this rapid and deep miti-
gation can be larger than the reduced costs from delaying near-term 
mitigation (Figure 6.26). The degree to which the late entrants’ miti-
gation costs increase with fragmented action depends on the extent 
of carbon-intensive technologies and infrastructure put in place dur-
ing the period during which they delay reductions and the speed at 
which emissions must be reduced after they begin emissions reduc-
tions. Indeed, in the face of a future mitigation commitment it is opti-
mal to anticipate emissions reductions, reducing the adjustment costs 
of confronting mitigation policy with a more carbon-intensive capital 
stock (Bosetti et al., 2009a; Richels et al., 2009). In addition, countries 
may incur costs from international mitigation policy even if they do not 
participate, for example, from a loss of fossil fuel revenues (Blanford 
et al., 2014).
6�3�6�5 The interactions between policy tools and their 
implementation, pre-existing taxes, market 
failures, and other distortions
The aggregate economic costs reported in Section 6.3.6.2 have 
assumed an idealized policy implementation and in many cases an 
idealized implementation environment with perfectly functioning eco-
nomic markets devoid of market failures, institutional constraints, and 
pre-existing tax distortions. Many models represent some of these dis-
tortions, but most models represent only a small portion of possible 
distortions and market failures. The reality that assumptions of ideal-
ized implementation and idealized implementation environment will 
not be met in practice means that real-world aggregate mitigation 
costs could be very different from those reported here.
Under the assumption of a perfect implementation environment, 
economic analysis has long demonstrated that the way to minimize 
the aggregate economic costs of mitigation is to undertake mitiga-
tion where and when it is least expensive (Montgomery, 1972). This 
implies that policies be flexible and comprehensive with a ubiquitous 
price on GHG emissions, as might be achieved by a cap-and-trade 
policy or carbon tax (Goulder and Parry, 2008). The literature pre-
sented thus far in this section has assumed such an approach. Even 
Figure 6�26 | Impact of fragmented action on the relative mitigation costs of three 
representative regions: Annex I without Russia; Brasil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC); 
and Rest of the World (ROW) from the EMF22 Study. In this study, Annex I (without 
Russia) joins immediately, BRIC in 2030, and ROW in 2050 (see Table 6.1). The vertical 
axis shows the increase in mitigation costs between full participation and fragmented 
action scenarios. Thus, values above 0 indicate that fragmented action increases costs. 
Mitigation costs are calculated relative to baseline over 2015 – 2100 both in NPV at 5 % 





















































scenarios with fragmented or limited near-term emissions reductions 
have typically assumed efficient, full-economy carbon prices for all 
countries undertaking mitigation. However, real-world approaches 
may very well deviate from this approach. For example, some policies 
may only address particular sectors, such as power generation; other 
policies may regulate the behaviour of particular sectors through 
command and control measures, for example, through renewable 
portfolio standards for power generation or fuel economy standards 
for transport.
In an idealized implementation environment, the literature shows that 
approaches that exclude sectors or regulate reductions by sector will 
lead to higher aggregate mitigation costs, particularly for goals requir-
ing large emissions reductions where coverage and flexibility are most 
important (Paltsev et al., 2008). A wide range of recent studies have 
corroborated this general result, including the large scale multi-model 
comparison studies such as EMF22 (Böhringer et  al., 2009), EMF24 
(Fawcett et  al., 2014), and EMF28 (Knopf et  al., 2013) along with a 
wide range of individual papers. As an example, a survey of results 
(OECD, 2009) indicates that exempting energy-intensive industries 
increases mitigation costs for achieving concentrations of 550 ppm by 
50 % in 2050, and that excluding non-CO2 GHG emissions increases 
the mitigation costs by 75 % in 2050. The EMF22 study (Böhringer 
et al., 2009) find that differential prices for the European Union (EU) 
Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) and non-ETS emissions in the EU and 
the inclusion of a renewable portfolio standard could double the miti-
gation costs for the EU goals for 2020. Wise et al. (2009) found that the 
failure to include changes in land use emissions in mitigation policy 
could double global carbon prices in a 450 ppm CO2 scenario. At the 
same time, it is important to recognize that mitigation may not be the 
only objective of these sectoral approaches and regulatory policies. 
They may also be designed to address other policy priorities such as 
energy security and local environmental concerns.
Climate policies will interact with pre-existing policy structures as 
well as with other market failures beyond the market failure posed 
by climate change — that is, a non-idealized implementation environ-
ment — and these interactions can either increase or decrease policy 
costs. A number of authors have argued that costs could be much 
lower or even negative compared to those produced by studies assum-
ing idealized policy and implementation environments (Bosquet, 2000; 
Bye et  al., 2002; Waisman et  al., 2012). The results of these studies 
rest on one or several assumptions — that mitigation policy be used 
not only to address the climate externality, but also to achieve other 
policy priorities such as sustainable development; the use of mitigation 
policy instruments for the correction of the implementation environ-
ment including removal of market failures and pre-existing distortions; 
and / or on optimistic views of climate-related innovation and technol-
ogy development, adoption, and penetration.
Because technology is so critical to the economic costs of mitigation, 
the economic costs and efficacy of climate policies more generally will 
necessarily be influenced by market failures in markets for technology 
adoption and those for development and R&D (Jaffe, 2012). There are 
numerous market failures, such as research and adoption spillovers, 
limited foresight, limited information, and imperfect capital markets, 
which can cause underinvestment in mitigation technologies, dis-
cussed in more detail in Section 15.6 (Thollander et al., 2010; Allcott, 
2011, 2013; Kalkuhl et al., 2012, among many others). Studies indi-
cate aggregate mitigation costs could be lower if these market fail-
ures could be removed through complementary policies (Jaffe et al., 
2005; Thollander et al., 2010). Additionally, literature that focuses in 
particular on failures in markets for investments in technology and 
R&D has found large reductions in aggregate mitigation costs as a 
result of correcting these failures, for example, through the recycling 
of revenue from climate policies or otherwise using public funds (Bos-
quet, 2000; Edenhofer et al., 2010; Waisman et al., 2012). The litera-
ture has also shown the value of related complementary policies to 
enhance labor flexibility (Guivarch et al., 2011) or impact the mobility 
of demand, such as transportation infrastructures or urban and fiscal 
policies lowering real estate prices and urban sprawl (Waisman et al., 
2012).
Interactions with pre-existing policies and associated distortions will 
also influence economic costs. The EU ETS offers an example where 
an efficient policy tool (cap-and-trade system) that is applied on par-
tial sectors (partial coverage) and interacts with pre-existing distor-
tions (high energy taxes) and other energy policies (renewable energy 
requirements) is affected by over-allocation of permits and slower than 
expected economic growth (Ellerman and Buchner, 2008; Ellerman, 
2010; Batlle et al., 2012). Paltsev et al (2007) show that pre-existing 
distortions (e. g., energy taxes) can greatly increase the cost of a policy 
that targets emission reduction. In contrast, literature has also looked 
into the use of carbon revenues to reduce pre-existing taxes (generally 
known as the ‘double dividends’ literature). This literature indicates 
that total mitigation costs can be reduced through such recycling of 
revenues (Goulder, 1995; Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996). Nonetheless, 
a number of authors have also cautioned against the straight gener-
alization of such results indicating that the interplay between carbon 
policies and pre-existing taxes can differ markedly across countries 
showing empirical cases where a ‘double dividend’ does not exist 
as discussed in Section 3.6.3.3 (Fullerton and Metcalf, 1997; Babiker 
et al., 2003; Metcalf et al., 2004).
6�3�6�6 Regional mitigation costs and effort-sharing 
regimes 
The costs of climate change mitigation will not be identical across 
countries (Clarke et al., 2009; Hof et al., 2009; Edenhofer et al., 2010; 
Lüken et al., 2011; Luderer et al., 2012b; Tavoni et al., 2013; Aboumah-
boub et al., 2014; Blanford et al., 2014). The regional variation in costs 
will be influenced by the nature of international participation in miti-
gation, regional mitigation potentials, and transfer payments across 
regions. In the idealized setting of a universal carbon price leading to 





of transfer payments, the total aggregate economic costs of mitiga-
tion would vary substantially across countries and regions. In results 
collected from modelling studies under these circumstances, relative 
aggregate costs in the OECD-1990, measured as a percentage change 
from, or relative to, baseline conditions, are typically lower than the 
global average, those in Latin America are typically around the global 
average, and those in other regions are higher than the global average 
(Figure 6.27) (Clarke et al., 2009; Tavoni et al., 2013).
The variation in these relative regional costs can be attributed to sev-
eral factors (Stern et al., 2012; Tavoni et al., 2013). First, costs are driven 
by relative abatement with respect to emissions in a baseline, or no-
policy, scenario, which are expected to be higher in developing coun-
tries (see Section 6.3.2 for more discussion). Second, developing coun-
tries are generally characterized by higher energy and carbon 
intensities due to the structure of economies in economic transition. 
This induces a higher economic feedback for the same level of mitiga-
tion (Luderer et  al., 2012b). Third, domestic abatement is only one 
determinant of policy costs, since international markets would interact 
with climate policies (Leimbach et al., 2010). For some regions, notably 
the fossil energy exporting countries, higher costs would originate from 
unfavourable terms of trade effects of the mitigation policy (OECD, 
2008; Luderer et al., 2012a; Massetti and Tavoni, 2011; Aboumahboub 
et al., 2014; Blanford et al., 2014), while some regions could experience 
increased bio-energy exports (Persson et al., 2006; Wise et al., 2009; 
Leimbach et al., 2010). A final consideration is that the total costs (as 
opposed to costs measured as a percentage change from baseline con-
ditions) and associated mitigation investments are also heavily influ-
enced by baseline emissions, which are projected to be larger in the 
developing regions than the developed regions (see Section 6.3.1).
A crucial consideration in the analysis of the aggregate economic 
costs of mitigation is that the mitigation costs borne in a region can 
be separated from who pays those costs. Under the assumption of 
efficient markets, effort-sharing schemes have the potential to yield 
a more equitable cost distribution between countries (Ekholm et al., 
2010b; Tavoni et al., 2013). Effort-sharing approaches will not mean-
ingfully change the globally efficient level of regional abatement, but 
can substantially influence the degree to which mitigation costs or 
investments might be borne within a given country or financed by 
other countries (e. g. Edenhofer et al., 2010). A useful benchmark for 
consideration of effort-sharing principles is the analysis of a frame-
work based on the creation of endowments of emission allowances 
and the ability to freely exchange them in an international carbon 
market. Within this framework, many studies have analyzed differ-
ent effort-sharing allocations according to equity principles and other 
indicators (see Section 3.3, Section 4.6.2) (den Elzen and Höhne, 2008, 
2010; Höhne et al., 2014).
Comparing emission allocation schemes from these proposals is com-
plex because studies explore different regional definitions, timescales, 
starting points for calculations, and measurements to assess emission 
allowances such as CO2 only or as CO2eq (see Höhne et al., 2014). The 
range of results for a selected year and concentration goal is relatively 
large due to the fact that the range includes fundamentally different 
effort-sharing approaches and other variations among the assump-
tions of the studies. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to provide a general comparison and charac-
terization of these studies. To allow comparison of substantially different 
proposals, Höhne et al. (2014) developed a categorization into seven cat-
Figure 6�27 | Regional mitigation costs relative to global average for scenarios reaching 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq in 2100 (left panel) and 530 – 650 ppm CO2eq in 2100 (right panel). 
Values above (below) 1 indicate that the region has relative mitigation costs higher (lower) than global average. Relative costs are computed as the cumulative costs of mitigation 
over the period 2020 – 2100, discounted at a 5 % discount rate, divided by cumulative discounted economic output over that period. Scenarios assume no carbon trading across 
regions. The numbers below the regions names indicate the number of scenarios in each box plot. Source: WGIII AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10), idealized implementation 
and default (see Section 6.3.1) technology scenarios.
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egories based on three equity principles (see Chapter 4): responsibility, 
capability, and equality (Table 6.5). The first three categories represent 
these equity principles alone. The following three categories represent 
combinations of these principles. ‘Equal cumulative per capita emissions’ 
combines equality (per capita) with responsibility (cumulative account-
ing for historical emissions); ‘responsibility, capability, and need’ includes 
approaches that put high emphasis on historical responsibility and at the 
same time on capability plus the need for sustainable development; 
‘staged approaches’ includes those that already constitute a compro-
mise over several principles. Finally, the last category, ‘equal marginal 
abatement costs’ (implemented in the models as uniform carbon tax 
with no compensatory transfers), represents the initial allocation to that 
which would emerge from a global price on carbon. This is used as a 
reference against which to compare the implications of other regimes.



















The concept to use historical emissions to derive emission goals 
was first directly proposed by Brazil in the run-up of the Kyoto 
negotiations (UNFCCC, 1997), without allocations. Allowances 
based only on this principle were quantified by only a few studies.
Berk and den Elzen (2001)*, Den Elzen et al. 
(2005); Den Elzen and Lucas (2005)
Capability X
Frequently used for allocation relating reduction goals or reduction 
costs to GDP or human development index (HDI). This includes 
also approaches that are focused exclusively on basic needs.
Den Elzen and Lucas (2005); Knopf et al. (2011); Jacoby 
et al. (2009); Miketa and Schrattenholzer (2006); 
Kriegler et al. (2013b) and Tavoni et al. (2013) **
Equality X
A multitude of studies provide allocations based on immediate or 
converging per capita emissions (e. g. Agarwal and Narain, 1991; 
Meyer, 2000). Later studies refine the approach using also per capita 
distributions within countries (e. g. Chakravarty et al., 2009).
Berk and den Elzen (2001)*, Kriegler et al. (2013b) and Tavoni 
et al. (2013)**, Böhringer and Welsch (2006); Bows and Anderson 
(2008); Chakravarty et al. (2009); Criqui et al.(2003); Den Elzen 
and Lucas (2005); Den Elzen and Meinshausen (2006); Den 
Elzen et al.(2005, 2008); Edenhofer et al. (2010); Hof et al. 
(2010b); Höhne and Moltmann (2008, 2009); Knopf et al.(2009, 
2011); Kuntsi-Reunanen and Luukkanen (2006); Nabel et al.
(2011); Miketa and Schrattenholzer (2006); Peterson and Klepper 




Recent studies used responsibility and capability explicitly 
as a basis, e. g., Greenhouse Development Rights 
(Baer et al., 2008); or ‘Responsibility, Capability, and 
Sustainable Development’(Winkler et al., 2011)
Baer et al. (2008); Baer (2013); Höhne and Moltmann 
(2008, 2009); Winkler et al. (2011)
Equal cumulative per 
capita emissions
X X
Several studies allocate equal cumulative per capita emission rights 
based on a global carbon budget (Pan, 2005, 2008). Studies diverge on 
how they assign the resulting budget for a country to individual years.
Bode (2004); Nabel et al. (2011); Jayaraman 
et al. (2011); Schellnhuber et al. (2009); 
Staged approaches X X X
A suite of studies propose or analyze approaches, where 
countries take differentiated commitments in various stages. 
Also approaches based on allocation for sectors such as the 
Triptych approach (Phylipsen et al., 1998) or sectoral approaches 
are included here. Categorization to a stage and the respective 
commitments are determined by indicators using all four equity 
principles. Finally, studies using equal percentage reduction goals, 
also called grandfathering, are also placed in this category.
Bosetti and Frankel (2012); Criqui et al. (2003); Den Elzen 
and Lucas (2005); Den Elzen and Meinshausen (2006); Den 
Elzen et al. (2007, 2008, 2012); Hof et al.(2010a); Höhne and 
Moltmann (2008, 2009); Höhne et al.(2005, 2006); Knopf et al. 
(2011); Vaillancourt and Waaub (2004); Peterson and Klepper 
(2007); Böhringer and Welsch (2006); Knopf et al.(2011)
Berk and den Elzen (2001)
Equal Marginal Abatement 
Costs (for reference)
Modelling studies often use the allocations that would emerge from a 
global carbon price as a reference case for comparing other allocations. 
Peterson and Klepper (2007), Van Vuuren et al. (2009a), 
Kriegler et al. (2013b) and Tavoni et al. (2013) **
* Not included in the quantitative results, because either too old or pending clarifications of the data. 
** This is a model comparison study of seven integrated models as part of the LIMITS research project: PBL, IIASA, FEEM, ECN*, PIK, PNNL, NIES*. Each of these models repre-





The range of allowances can be substantial even within specific cate-
gories of effort sharing, depending on the way the principle is imple-
mented (Figure 6.28). For some effort-sharing categories, the ranges 
are smaller because only a few studies were found. Despite the ranges 
within a category, distributional impacts differ significantly with under-
lying criteria for effort sharing. 
The concentration goal is significant for the resulting emissions allow-
ances (Figure 6.29). Indeed, for many regions, the concentration goal is 
of equal or larger importance for emission allowances than the effort-
sharing approach. For concentration levels between 430 and 480 in 
2100, the allowances in 2030 under all effort-sharing approaches in 
OECD-1990 are approximately half of 2010 emissions with a large 
range, roughly two-thirds in the EITs, roughly at the 2010 emissions 
level or slightly below in ASIA, slightly above the 2010 level in the 
Middle East and Africa, and well below the 2010 level in Latin Amer-
ica. For these same concentration levels, allowances in OECD-1990 
and EITs are a fraction of today’s emissions in 2050, and allowances 
for Asia and Latin America are approximately half of 2010 emission 
levels in 2050. For higher concentration levels, most studies show a 
significant decline in allowances below current levels for OECD-1990 
and EITs by 2050. Most studies show a decline in allowances below 
current levels for the Latin America region, mostly increasing above 
current levels for the Africa and Middle East region, and an inconsis-
tent picture for ASIA.
The creation of endowments of emissions allowances would gener-
ate payment transfers across regions in a global carbon market. These 
transfer payments would depend on the regional abatement opportu-
nities, the distribution of allowances, and the concentration goal. To 
the extent that regional mitigation levels represent the cost-effective 
mitigation strategy across regions, the size of these allocations relative 
to domestic emissions provide an indication of the degree to which 
allowances would be transferred to or from any region. If allocations 
are higher than the ‘equal marginal abatement cost’ allocation in a 
particular country, then the country could possibly improve its financial 
position by reducing emissions and selling the remaining allowances. 
If allocations are lower than the ‘equal marginal abatement cost’ allo-
cation, the country could possibly purchase allowances and therefore 
provide transfers. 
Box 6�2 | Least-developed countries in integrated models 
There are significant data and information deficits pertaining to 
least-developed countries(LDCs) and limits to the modelling of the 
specific features and characteristics of LDCs. For this reason, the 
integrated modelling literature provides relatively little informa-
tion on the specific implications of transformation pathways for 
LDCs. Based on the limited available literature, LDCs contribute 
little to future GHG emissions until 2050 even though they are 
projected to grow faster than global emissions. Post-2050 emis-
sions trends for LDCs depend on highly uncertain projections of 
their long-term economic growth prospects. One study in the 
available integrated modelling literature suggests that LDC’s 
contribution to global emissions increases by about 50 % between 
2000 and 2100 (Calvin et al., 2009b).The mitigation challenges 
for LDCs are particularly significant given their ambitions for 
economic growth, poverty alleviation, and sustainable develop-
ment on the one hand, and their limited means for mitigation 
in terms of technology and finance on the other hand. Tradeoffs 
can include, among other things, a prolonged use of traditional 
bioenergy and a reduction in final energy use. Potential synergies 
include accelerated electrification (Calvin et al., 2014a). 
The literature on the transformation pathways has also indicated 
the need for large deployment of low-carbon technologies. 
These projections pose critical challenges and uncertainties for 
LDCs when taking into account issues related to deployment, 
institutions and program design, and non-climate socioeconomic 
implications. In particular, many scenarios rely on technologies 
with potentially large land footprints, such as bioenergy and 
afforestation or reforestation, to achieve mitigation goals. The 
scenarios surveyed in the chapter universally project the major-
ity of bioenergy primary energy will occur in developing econo-
mies (50 – 90 % in non-OECD in 2050, see Section 6.3.5). These 
abatement patterns imply significant challenges for developing 
countries in general, and LDCs in particular, where large land-use 
abatement potentials lie. 
The literature related to effort-sharing and distributional impli-
cations of mitigation in LDCs is relatively scarce. The literature 
suggests that there are tradeoffs between food security and 
mitigation (e. g. Reilly et al., 2012) with negative impacts for poor, 
developing countries due to the high share of their incomes spent 
on food. Mitigation might increase the rural-urban gap and dete-
riorate the living standards of large sections of the population in 
developing countries (e. g. Liang and Wei, 2012). In contrast, policy 
and measures aligned to development and climate objectives 
can deliver substantial co-benefits and help avoid climate risks in 
developing countries (Shukla et al., 2009). Modelling studies that 
use the ‘low carbon society’ framework arrive at a similar conclu-
sion about co-benefits in developing countries and LDCs (Kainuma 
et al., 2012; Shrestha and Shakya, 2012). Spillover effects from 
trade-related mitigation policies may pose certain risks for LDCs 
such as induced factor mobility, unemployment, and international 
transport-related impacts on food and tourism sectors (Nurse, 
2009; ICTSD, 2010; Pentelow and Scott, 2011). Downscaling of 






Figure 6�28 | Emission allowances in 2030 relative to 2010 emissions by effort-sharing category for mitigation scenarios reaching 430 – 480 ppm CO2eq in 2100. GHG emissions 
(all gases and sectors) in GtCO2eq in 1990 and 2010 were 13.4 and 14.2 for OECD-1990, 8.4 and 5.6 for EIT, 10.7 and 19.9 for ASIA, 3.0 and 6.2 for MAF, 3.3 and 3.8 for LAM. 
Emissions allowances are shown compared to 2010 levels, but this does not imply a preference for a specific base-year. For the OECD-1990 in the category ‘responsibility, capabil-
ity, need’ the emission allowances in 2030 is – 106 % to – 128 % (20th to 80th percentile) below 2010 level (therefore not shown here). The studies with the ‘Equal cumulative 
per capita emissions’ approaches do not have the regional representation MAF. For comparison in orange: ‘Equal marginal abatement cost’ (allocation based on the imposition of 
a global carbon price) and baseline scenarios. Source: Adapted from Höhne et al.(2014). Studies were placed in this CO2eq concentration range based on the level that the studies 
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Figure 6�29 | Emission allowances in 2050 relative to 2010 emissions for different 2100 CO2eq concentration ranges by all effort-sharing categories except ‘equal marginal abate-
ment costs’. For comparison in orange: baseline scenarios. Source: Adapted from Höhne et al. (2014). Studies were placed in the CO2eq concentration ranges based on the level that 
the studies themselves indicate. The pathways of the studies were compared with the characteristics of the ranges, but concentration levels were not recalculated.
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Multi-model studies indicate that the size of the carbon market 
transfers would be significant in relation to the total global aggre-
gate economic costs of mitigation, of the order of hundreds of bil-
lions of United States dollars per year before mid-century (Clarke 
et  al., 2009; Luderer et  al., 2012b; Tavoni et  al., 2013). Transfers 
through emissions allowances are also particularly high if the carbon 
price is high, because the transfers are based on the quantity of the 
allowances traded and the price of those allowances. Higher prices 
are associated with more ambitious mitigation. For some regions, 
financial flows could be on the same order of magnitude as the 
investment requirements for emissions reductions (McCollum et al., 
2013b). Transfers are particularly high for some regions for the cat-
egories ‘equal per capita cumulative emissions’ and ‘responsibility, 
capability, and need’ in general and for ‘staged approaches’ in some 
of studies. 
The transfers associated with different effort-sharing schemes have 
a direct impact on the regional distribution of mitigation policy costs 
(Luderer et al., 2012b). These costs are sensitive both to local abate-
ment costs and to size and direction of transfers, both of which are 
related to the effort-sharing scheme as well as the carbon price and 
the associated climate goal (Russ and Criqui, 2007; den Elzen et  al., 
2008; Edenhofer et  al., 2010; Ekholm et  al., 2010b; Luderer et  al., 
2012b). Given the large uncertainty about future transfers and car-
bon prices, the regional distribution of costs under different sharing 
schemes varies widely (Luderer et al., 2012b; Tavoni et al., 2013). For 
example, emerging economies like China could incur relatively high 
expenditures (den Elzen et al., 2012; Johansson et al., 2014), but this 
would change when cumulative past emissions are also accounted for 
(Jiahua, 2008; Ding et al., 2009; He et al., 2009). Moreover, the uneven 
regional distribution of relative mitigation costs observed in Figure 
6.27 in the case without transfers is not significantly alleviated when 
emissions rights are equalized per capita by 2050 and the concentra-
tion goal is stringent, as shown in Figure 6.30. 
Optimal transfers can also be devised as a way to provide economic 
incentives to regions to participate in international climate agree-
ments. When accounting for the strategic behaviour of the various 
regions and countries, the literature suggests that climate coalitions, 
which are self-enforcing and stable, can indeed be effective only in the 
presence of significant compensatory payments across regions (Finus 
et  al., 2003; Nagashima et  al., 2009; Bréchet et  al., 2011). Transfers 
would also occur in the case that different regional social costs of 
carbon were equalized to maximize efficiency (Landis and Bernauer, 
2012).
The impacts of mitigation policies on global fossil fuel trade depend 
on the type of fuel, time horizon, and stringency of mitigation efforts. 
Recent model intercomparison studies focusing on low-concentration 
goals (430 – 530 CO2eq in 2100) have found an unambiguous decrease 
in coal trade over the first half of the century (Cherp et al., 2014; Jewell 
et al., 2013). In contrast, studies indicate that natural gas trade could 
potentially increase over the coming decades as gas serves as a transi-
tion fuel and substitutes for coal (Cherp et al., 2014). Studies present 
a less clear picture regarding the future of oil trade for concentration 
goals in this range. In general, however, studies find oil trade to be less 
sensitive to mitigation policy than coal and gas trade through 2030, 
and perhaps even to 2050 (Bauer et al., 2014a, 2014b; Cherp et al., 
2014; Jewell et al., 2013; McCollum et al., 2014a). 
These changes in trade patterns will have important implications 
for the future trade revenues of fossil-exporting countries. There is 
high agreement among integrated models that revenues from coal 
trade are likely to fall for major exporters (Lüken et al., 2011; Bauer 
et al., 2014a, 2014b). For oil and gas, on the other hand, the effect of 
stringent climate policies on export revenues is less clear, with results 
varying across models. Notwithstanding these differences, the gen-
eral conclusion of recent intercomparison exercises is that there is 
likely to be a decrease in oil and gas revenues for exporting coun-
tries over the first half of the century (IEA, 2009; Haurie and Vielle, 
2010; Bauer et al., 2014a, 2014b; Tavoni et al., 2013; McCollum et al., 
2014a). There are several studies that diverge from the bulk of the lit-
erature and argue that conventional oil exporters could in the short-
term benefit from climate policies under certain conditions related to 
the cost of oil alternatives (biofuels and unconventional oil), the price 
elasticity of oil and the cost of backstop technologies (Persson et al., 
2007; Johansson et  al., 2009; Nemet and Brandt, 2012). Because 
exporters of these resources can benefit from the cheaper extraction 
costs and less carbon-intensive nature of conventional oil (relative to 
unconventional oil deposits and coal- or gas-derived liquids), mitiga-
Figure 6�30 | Regional mitigation costs relative to global average for a 450 ppm CO2eq 
concentration goal for a per capita effort-sharing scheme from the LIMITS multi-model 
study. Values above (below) 1 indicate that the region has relative mitigation costs 
higher (lower) than global average ones. Values below 0 are possible for regions who 
are large net sellers of carbon allowances. Mitigation costs are computed relative to 
the baseline, over 2020 – 2100 in NPV at a 5 % discount rate. Emission allocations are 
based on linear convergence from 2020 levels to equal per capita by 2050, with per 
capita equalization thereafter. Regions are allowed to trade emission rights after 2020 


























































































tion efforts could potentially have a positive impact on export rev-
enues for conventional oil. These dynamics depend critically on future 
commodity prices. No global studies have, as yet, systematically 
explored the impact of stringent climate policies on unconventional 
gas trade and export revenues, particularly those where methane 
leakage from extraction activities could be an issue. The deployment 
of fossil fuels is generally higher in scenarios with CCS. The availabil-
ity of CCS would thus reduce the adverse effect of mitigation on the 
value of fossil fuel assets.
6.4 Integrating long- and 
short-term perspectives
6�4�1 Near-term actions in a long-term 
 perspective
Stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of GHGs and radiative forc-
ing is a long-term endeavour. Whether a particular long-term mitiga-
tion goal will be met, and what the costs and other implications will 
be of meeting it, will depend on decisions to be made and uncertain-
ties to be resolved over many decades in the future. For this rea-
son, transformation pathways to long-term climate goals are best 
understood as a process of sequential decision making and learn-
ing. The most relevant decisions are those that must be made in the 
near term with the understanding that new information and oppor-
tunities for strategic adjustments will arrive often in the future, but 
largely beyond the reach of those making decisions today. An impor-
tant question for decision makers today is therefore how near-term 
decisions will influence choices available to future decision makers. 
Some decisions may maintain a range of future options, while oth-
ers may constrain the future set of options for meeting long-term 
climate goals.
6�4�2 Near-term emissions and long-term 
transformation pathways
A key outcome of current decision making will be the level of near-
term global emissions. Scenarios can provide important insights into 
the implications of the near-term (i. e., 2020 – 2030) emissions level 
for long-term climate outcomes. As discussed in Section 6.1.2, a num-
ber of multi-model studies have been designed specifically for this 
purpose, exploring delays in global mitigation, in which near-term 
emissions are held fixed to particular levels, and fragmented action, 
in which only a subset of regions initially respond to a long-term 
goal (see Table 6.1). These scenarios are typically designed as coun-
terpoint to idealized implementation scenarios in which mitigation 
begins immediately, timing of reductions is unconstrained, and full 
participation is assumed from the outset. This distinction is essential 
for characterizing the relationship between the path emissions fol-
low through 2030 and the possible climate outcomes through the 
end of the century. Among idealized implementation scenarios with 
2100 concentrations in the range of 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq, emissions 
in 2020 fall almost exclusively below the range of global GHG emis-
sions implied by the Cancún Pledges (see Section 13.13.1.3 for more 
details), as in Rogelj et al. (2013a) (Figure 6.31, top panel). However, 
several scenarios with delayed mitigation imposed either through 
global delays or delayed participation have 2020 emissions in the 
possible range of the Cancún Agreements and in some cases 2030 
emissions even higher than this range while still remaining consistent 
with the long-term goal (the cost implications of delay are discussed 
in Section 6.3.6.4).
A second distinction that can play a critical role is the extent to which 
CDR options are available and deployed. In scenarios designed with a 
forcing goal applied only at the end of the century, particularly concen-
trations in the range of 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq, idealized implementation 
scenarios often choose to temporarily overshoot the 2100 concentra-
tion (Section 6.3.2). As noted in Section 6.3.2, CDR options, typically 
represented in integrated models by BECCS but also afforestation in 
some cases, facilitate more rapid declines in emissions, amplifying 
this overshoot pattern (Krey et al., 2014). A large number of scenarios 
reaching CO2eq concentrations below 530 ppm CO2eq by 2100 deploy 
CDR technologies at large enough scales that net global emissions 
become negative in the second half of the century. The availability of 
CDR options, as well as the representation of intertemporal flexibility, 
varies significantly across models and studies. The spread in reliance 
on CDR options across scenarios reveals a strong impact on the timing 
of emissions pathways. In scenarios reaching the the 2100 concentra-
tion range of 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq in which global net CO2 emissions 
remain positive through the century, near-term emissions are gener-
ally lower than if the scenario deploys CDR technologies to a large 
enough scale to lead to net negative total global CO2 emissions later 
in the century (Figure 6.31, top panel). More generally, the scenarios 
indicate that a reliance on large-scale CDR, whether or not emissions 
become net negative, leads to higher near-term emissions (van Vuuren 
and Riahi, 2011).
The interaction between delayed mitigation and CDR options is also 
important. Very few scenarios are available to demonstrate emissions 
pathways consistent with 2100 concentrations of 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq 
in which mitigation effort is delayed in some form and global carbon 
emissions do not become net negative. Whether these circumstances 
are not represented because they have been under-examined or 
because they have been examined and the scenarios failed is a crucial 
distinction, yet one that it is currently not possible to fully report (see 
discussion of model infeasibility in Section 6.3.2). However, there are 
instances where the combination of delay and limited options for CDR 
has been explored and has resulted in model infeasibilities (Luderer 
et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2013b; Riahi et al., 2014), which supports the 
notion that this combination presents important challenges. For exam-






Figure 6�31 | Near-term global GHG emissions from mitigation scenarios reaching 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq (top panel) and 530 – 650 ppm CO2eq (bottom panel) in 2100. Includes 
only scenarios for which temperature exceedance probabilities were calculated (see Section 6.3.2). Individual model results are indicated with a data point when 2 °C exceedance 
probability, based on the MAGICC results, is below 50 % for top panel or when 2.5 °C exceedance probability is below 50 % for bottom panel. For these below-50 % scenarios the 
interquartile range is shown by a black rectangular frame. Colours refer to scenario classification in terms of whether net CO2 emissions become negative before 2100 (Negative vs. 
No Negative) and the timing of international participation in climate mitigation (Immediate vs. Delay 2020 / 2030). Number of reported individual results is shown in legend. The 
range of global GHG emissions in 2020 implied by the Cancún Pledges is based on an analysis of alternative interpretations of national pledges (see Section 13.13.1.3 for details). 
Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10). Historic data: JRC / PBL (2013), IEA (2012a), see Annex II.9. Note: Only four reported scenarios were produced based on delayed 
mitigation without net negative emissions while still lying below 530 ppm CO2eq by 2100. They do not appear in the top panel because the model had insufficient coverage of 
non-gas species to enable a temperature calculation (see Section 6.3.2). Delay in these scenarios extended only to 2020, and their emissions fell in the same range as the ‘No Nega-
tive / Immediate’ category. Note: Delayed scenarios include both delayed global action and fragmented action scenarios.
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a scenario with global delay through 2030 and a restriction on CCS 
technology that reached 450 CO2eq by 2100 (one of the remaining 
two had net negative global emissions through other channels and the 
other did not run past 2050). Several individual modelling team stud-
ies have also explored this space, and have found situations in which 
they could not reach solutions for more ambitious goals and delayed 
mitigation or constrained technology, including O’Neill et  al. (2010), 
Edmonds et al. (2008), and Edmonds et al. (2013). Studies have found 
that delayed reductions through 2020 do not have as substantial an 
effect on the cost and challenge more broadly of meeting 2100 con-
centration levels such as 450 ppm CO2eq as delayed reductions 
through 2030 (Kriegler et al., 2013b; Luderer et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 
2013b) 
The implications of delayed mitigation, CDR options, and overshoot 
for possible temperature outcomes are also significant. Numerous 
studies have attempted to place the possible outcome of the Cancún 
Agreements in the context of longer-term climate goals (Höhne et al., 
2012; UNEP, 2012). Due to the factors discussed above, but also varia-
tion in assumptions about baseline growth, mitigation costs, trad-
eoffs between sectors such as energy and land use, and the evolution 
of non-gas forcing agents, models have found that a wide range of 
near-term emissions could be consistent with a given long-term out-
come. Among scenarios with 2100 concentrations between 430 and 
530 ppm CO2eq, focusing on those scenarios in the AR5 database for 
which temperature implications were calculated (see Section 6.3.2), 
near-term global emissions range from 22 to 56  GtCO2eq in 2020 
and from 18 to 66 GtCO2eq in 2030 (Figure 6.31, top panel). How-
ever, based on the MAGICC results, not all pathways in this range 
are consistent with at least a 50 % chance of remaining below 2 °C, 
in particular those that rely on net negative global emissions. Path-
ways reaching the same 2100 concentration with higher emissions 
in 2030 tend to have more overshoot; when forcing stays higher for 
longer, the likelihood of reaching a temperature threshold increases. 
Based on the MAGICC results, very few scenarios in the 430 – 530 ppm 
CO2eq range have a 50 % chance of remaining below 1.5 °C, and 
none with delay or limited deployment of CDR technologies; most 
have a probability between 0 and 25 %. A few studies have explored 
scenarios that lead to concentrations below 430 ppm CO2eq in 2100 
(e. g., Luderer et  al., 2013, Rogelj et  al., 2013a, b), some of which 
have been found to have more than a 66 % chance of returning to 
1.5 °C by the end of the century after peaking at higher levels; these 
scenarios are characterized by immediate emissions reductions fol-
lowed by very low mid-century emissions and extensive deployment 
of CDR technologies. Based on the MAGICC results, nearly all sce-
narios reaching 2100 concentrations in the range of 530 – 650 ppm 
CO2eq, have a greater than 50 % chance of exceeding 2 °C by 2100, 
but many have a probability of less than 50 % of exceeding 2.5 °C 
(Figure 6.31, bottom panel). Because of the higher long-term forcing 
range, some growth in emissions can occur, and the preferred least-
cost range is similar to the delayed range and largely consistent with 
the global GHG emissions reductions through 2020 implied by the 
Cancún Pledges (see Section 13.13.1.3).
Whether due to delayed mitigation or widespread use of CDR options 
or some combination of the two, higher levels of emissions in the near-
term imply an emissions pathway shifted in time, resulting in steeper 
reductions later to remain consistent with a given long-term forcing 
goal. As discussed in Section 6.3.2, emissions in 2030 have been used 
as a rough indicator for understanding the relationship between near-
term and long-term mitigation. Higher emissions in 2030 require more 
rapid decreases in emissions from 2030 through 2050, both to make 
up for the larger cumulative emissions up through 2030 and because 
emissions must be reduced from a higher 2030 level (Figure 6.32). 
Emissions decline rates for any scenario that meets 2100 concentra-
tion goals such as 450 or 550 ppm CO2eq must at some point push 
beyond historical experience, because emissions have in general fol-
lowed growth, with past instances of decline associated only with 
large-scale disruptions such as the collapse of the Soviet Union or spe-
cial cases of policy intervention such as France and Sweden (see Chap-
ter 5). Less mitigation over the coming decades will only exacerbate 
the required departure from the past to meet long-term goals — path-
ways with emissions above 55 GtCO2eq in 2030 indicate decline rates 
between 2030 and 2050 of around 6 % for scenarios in the range of 
430 – 530 ppm CO2eq in 2100 (Figure 6.32).
6�4�3 The importance of near-term 
 technological investments and 
 development of institutional capacity
While it is clear that some mitigation effort in the near term is crucial 
to preserve the option of achieving low-concentration goals, whether 
these goals are met in the long run depends to a greater extent on 
the potential for deep GHG-emissions reductions several decades from 
now. Thus efforts to begin the transformation to lower concentra-
tions must also be directed toward developing the technologies and 
institutions that will enable deep future emissions cuts rather than 
exclusively on meeting particular near-term goals. The way in which 
countries begin low-carbon technology deployment and the imple-
mentation of climate change mitigation policies may well turn out to 
be quite different from the approach that proves best in the long run. 
The benefit of beginning to create and improve technologies as well 
as to develop appropriate institutional capacity today is that these 
present-day activities create opportunities to make early and mid-
course corrections.
The likelihood of a unified global policy for a deep GHG-emissions 
reduction is low for the near future. Rather, the expectation is that a 
‘mosaic’ of national and regional policies will emerge over the years 
to come. Individual countries will bring different views and values to 
bear on their decisions, which will likely lead to a wide variety of policy 
approaches, some more economically efficient than others. Flexible 
market-based policies with maximal sectoral and geographic coverage 
are generally understood to deliver emissions reductions at the lowest 
economic cost (see Section 6.3.6.5 for a discussion of issues that influ-
ence the efficiency of implementation approaches). Although the added 
Figure 6�32 | The implications of different 2030 GHG emissions levels for the pace of CO2 emissions reductions to 2050 in mitigation scenarios reaching 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq 
by 2100. Left-hand panel shows the development of GHG emissions to 2030. Right-hand panel denotes the corresponding annual CO2 emissions reduction rates for the period 
2030 – 2050. The scenarios are grouped according to different emissions levels by 2030 (colored in dark, medium and light green). The range of global GHG emissions in 2020 
implied by the Cancún Pledges is based on an analysis of alternative interpretations of national pledges (see Section 13.13.1.3 for details). The right-hand panel compares the 
median and interquartile range across scenarios from recent intermodelling comparisons with explicit 2030 interim goals with the range of scenarios in the WG III AR5 Scenario 
Database (Annex II.10). Extreme scenarios with very high net negative emissions (>20 GtCO2 / yr) in 2100 are reported separetly as diamonds. Annual rates of historical emissions 
change between 1900-2010 (sustained over a period of 20 years) and average annual emissions change between 2000-2010 are shown in grey. Sources: Intermodelling compari-
sons with explicit interim goals (AMPERE: Riahi et al., 2013; LIMITS: Kriegler et al., 2013b; ROSE: Luderer et al., 2013) and the WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10). Historic 
data: JRC/PBL (2013), IEA (2012a), see Annex II.9. Note: Only scenarios with default technology assumptions are shown. Scenarios with non-optimal timing of mitigation due to 
exogenous carbon price trajectories are excluded.
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a scenario with global delay through 2030 and a restriction on CCS 
technology that reached 450 CO2eq by 2100 (one of the remaining 
two had net negative global emissions through other channels and the 
other did not run past 2050). Several individual modelling team stud-
ies have also explored this space, and have found situations in which 
they could not reach solutions for more ambitious goals and delayed 
mitigation or constrained technology, including O’Neill et  al. (2010), 
Edmonds et al. (2008), and Edmonds et al. (2013). Studies have found 
that delayed reductions through 2020 do not have as substantial an 
effect on the cost and challenge more broadly of meeting 2100 con-
centration levels such as 450 ppm CO2eq as delayed reductions 
through 2030 (Kriegler et al., 2013b; Luderer et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 
2013b) 
The implications of delayed mitigation, CDR options, and overshoot 
for possible temperature outcomes are also significant. Numerous 
studies have attempted to place the possible outcome of the Cancún 
Agreements in the context of longer-term climate goals (Höhne et al., 
2012; UNEP, 2012). Due to the factors discussed above, but also varia-
tion in assumptions about baseline growth, mitigation costs, trad-
eoffs between sectors such as energy and land use, and the evolution 
of non-gas forcing agents, models have found that a wide range of 
near-term emissions could be consistent with a given long-term out-
come. Among scenarios with 2100 concentrations between 430 and 
530 ppm CO2eq, focusing on those scenarios in the AR5 database for 
which temperature implications were calculated (see Section 6.3.2), 
near-term global emissions range from 22 to 56  GtCO2eq in 2020 
and from 18 to 66 GtCO2eq in 2030 (Figure 6.31, top panel). How-
ever, based on the MAGICC results, not all pathways in this range 
are consistent with at least a 50 % chance of remaining below 2 °C, 
in particular those that rely on net negative global emissions. Path-
ways reaching the same 2100 concentration with higher emissions 
in 2030 tend to have more overshoot; when forcing stays higher for 
longer, the likelihood of reaching a temperature threshold increases. 
Based on the MAGICC results, very few scenarios in the 430 – 530 ppm 
CO2eq range have a 50 % chance of remaining below 1.5 °C, and 
none with delay or limited deployment of CDR technologies; most 
have a probability between 0 and 25 %. A few studies have explored 
scenarios that lead to concentrations below 430 ppm CO2eq in 2100 
(e. g., Luderer et  al., 2013, Rogelj et  al., 2013a, b), some of which 
have been found to have more than a 66 % chance of returning to 
1.5 °C by the end of the century after peaking at higher levels; these 
scenarios are characterized by immediate emissions reductions fol-
lowed by very low mid-century emissions and extensive deployment 
of CDR technologies. Based on the MAGICC results, nearly all sce-
narios reaching 2100 concentrations in the range of 530 – 650 ppm 
CO2eq, have a greater than 50 % chance of exceeding 2 °C by 2100, 
but many have a probability of less than 50 % of exceeding 2.5 °C 
(Figure 6.31, bottom panel). Because of the higher long-term forcing 
range, some growth in emissions can occur, and the preferred least-
cost range is similar to the delayed range and largely consistent with 
the global GHG emissions reductions through 2020 implied by the 
Cancún Pledges (see Section 13.13.1.3).
Figure 6�32 | The implications of different 2030 GHG emissions levels for the pace of CO2 emissions reductions to 2050 in mitigation scenarios reaching 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq 
by 2100. Left-hand panel shows the development of GHG emissions to 2030. Right-hand panel denotes the corresponding annual CO2 emissions reduction rates for the period 
2030 – 2050. The scenarios are grouped according to different emissions levels by 2030 (colored in dark, medium and light green). The range of global GHG emissions in 2020 
implied by the Cancún Pledges is based on an analysis of alternative interpretations of national pledges (see Section 13.13.1.3 for details). The right-hand panel compares the 
median and interquartile range across scenarios from recent intermodelling comparisons with explicit 2030 interim goals with the range of scenarios in the WG III AR5 Scenario 
Database (Annex II.10). Extreme scenarios with very high net negative emissions (>20 GtCO2 / yr) in 2100 are reported separetly as diamonds. Annual rates of historical emissions 
change between 1900-2010 (sustained over a period of 20 years) and average annual emissions change between 2000-2010 are shown in grey. Sources: Intermodelling compari-
sons with explicit interim goals (AMPERE: Riahi et al., 2013; LIMITS: Kriegler et al., 2013b; ROSE: Luderer et al., 2013) and the WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10). Historic 
data: JRC/PBL (2013), IEA (2012a), see Annex II.9. Note: Only scenarios with default technology assumptions are shown. Scenarios with non-optimal timing of mitigation due to 
exogenous carbon price trajectories are excluded.
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cost of inefficient policies in the near term may be smaller than in the 
long-term when mitigation requirements will be much larger, their 
implementation now may lead to ‘institutional lock-in’ if policy reform 
proves difficult. Thus a near-term focus on developing institutions to 
facilitate flexible mitigation strategies, as well as political structures to 
manage the large capital flows associated with carbon pricing (see e. g. 
Kober et al., 2014), could provide substantial benefits over the coming 
decades when mitigation efforts reach their full proportions.
R&D investments to bring down the costs of low-emitting technology 
options, combined with early deployment of mitigation technologies to 
improve long-term performance through learning-by-doing, are among 
the most important steps that can be taken in the near term (see e. g. 
Sagar and van der Zwaan, 2006). R&D investments are important for 
bringing down the costs of known low-carbon energy alternatives to 
the current use of predominantly fossil fuels, to develop techniques that 
today only exist on the drawing board, or for generating new concepts 
that have not yet been invented. Early deployment of climate change 
mitigation technologies can lead to both incremental and fundamental 
improvements in their long-term performance through the accumula-
tion of experience or learning by doing. Mitigation policy is essential 
for spurring R&D and learning by doing, because it creates commit-
ments to future GHG-emissions reductions that create incentives today 
for investments in these drivers of technological innovation, and avoids 
further lock-in of long-lived carbon-intensive capital stock.
Even if policies requiring GHG-emissions reductions are not imple-
mented immediately, market participants may act in anticipation of 
future mitigation. Commitments to emissions reductions in the future 
will create incentives for investments in climate change mitigation 
technologies today, which can serve both to reduce current emissions 
and avoid further lock-in of long-lived carbon-intensive capital stock 






6.5 Integrating  technological 
and societal change
Technological change occurs as innovations create new possibilities 
for processes and products, and market demand shifts over time in 
response to changes in preferences, purchasing power, and other soci-
etal factors. Societal changes can be viewed as both a requirement for 
and a result of global climate change mitigation. Because the use of 
improved and new technologies is an inherent element of society’s 
transformation required for climate change mitigation, technological 
and societal changes necessarily interact. Their analysis therefore needs 
to be integrated.
6�5�1 Technological change
The development and deployment of technology is central to long-
term mitigation, since established fossil fuel-based energy supply will 
need to be replaced by new low-carbon energy techniques. The impor-
tance of technological change raises key questions about whether cur-
rent technology is sufficient for deep GHG-emissions reductions, the 
best ways to improve the technologies needed for deep emissions 
reductions, and the degree to which current efforts in this regard are 
adequate to the upcoming challenge. Essential questions also surround 
the appropriate timing of investments in technological change relative 
to other efforts to reduce GHG emissions.
A primary question regarding technological change is whether cur-
rent technology is sufficient for the deep emissions reductions ulti-
mately needed to stabilize GHG concentrations. Arguments have 
been made on both sides of this debate (see Hoffert et  al. (2002), 
and Pacala and Socolow (2004), for complementary perspectives on 
this question). The integrated modelling literature provides limited 
information regarding the sufficiency of current technology, because 
virtually all baseline and mitigation scenarios assume that technol-
ogy will improve significantly over time, especially for technologies 
with a large potential for advancement (see Riahi et  al., 2013, and 
van der Zwaan et al., 2013, for two recent cross-model comparison 
examples). There is generally more agreement about the rate of incre-
mental cost and performance improvements for mature technologies 
than for emerging technologies upon which transformation pathways 
may depend (see McCollum et al., 2013b, for a cross-model study on 
the investment dimension of this matter). Nonetheless, the literature 
makes clear that improvements in technology and the availability of 
advanced technologies can dramatically alter the costs of climate 
change mitigation (see also Section 6.3.6.3). The current scientific 
literature also emphasizes that the development and deployment 
of CDR technologies (see Section 6.9), are a further requirement for 
particular transformation pathways, for example those leading to 
450 ppm CO2eq by 2100 yet assuming substantial near-term delays 
in mitigation.
Various steps can be observed in the life of a technology, from inven-
tion through innovation, demonstration, commercialization, diffusion, 
and maturation (see e. g. Grübler et  al., 1999). Both investments in 
R&D and the accumulation of experience through learning by doing 
play important roles in the mechanisms behind technological change. 
These forces are complemented by economies of scale. All these driv-
ers of technological change are complementary yet and interlinked 
(Clarke and Weyant, 2002; Goulder and Mathai, 2000; Sagar and van 
der Zwaan, 2006; Stoneman, 2013). 
Although technological change has received extensive attention and 
analysis in the context of transformation pathways (for recent exam-
ples, see IPCC, 2011; GEA, 2012), a clear systematic understanding of 
the subject matter is still not available. For this reason, most of the 
scenarios developed since the 1970s for energy and climate change 
analysis make exogenous assumptions about the rate of technological 
change. Only since the late 1990s has the effect of induced innova-
tion been considered in a subset of integrated models used for the 
development of these scenarios (such as in Messner, 1997; Goulder 
and Schneider, 1999; van der Zwaan et al., 2002; Carraro et al., 2003). 
This restricted treatment is due to limitations in the ability to repre-
sent the complexity of technological change, and also results from the 
incomplete empirical evidence on the magnitude of the effects of tech-
nological change (Popp, 2006b). More recently, empirical data on tech-
nological change have been incorporated in some integrated models 
(see e. g., Fisher-Vanden, 2008), which advances the endogenous rep-
resentation of technological progress. Unsettled issues remain, how-
ever, including the proper accounting for opportunity costs of climate-
related knowledge generation, the treatment of knowledge spillovers 
and appropriability, and the empirical basis for parameterizing techno-
logical relationships (Gillingham et al., 2008).
The relation between mitigation and innovation, and the presence of 
market failures associated with both, raises the question of the proper 
combination of innovation and mitigation policy for reducing GHG 
emissions over the long term. The modelling literature broadly indicates 
that relying solely on innovation policies would not be sufficient to sta-
bilize GHG concentrations (see e. g. Bosetti et al., 2011; Kalkuhl et al., 
2013), as evidenced by the fact that although most reference scenarios 
assume substantial technological change, none of them lead to emis-
sions reductions on the level of those needed to bring CO2eq concen-
trations to levels such as 650 ppm CO2eq or below by 2100 (see Section 
6.3.2). Climate policies such as carbon pricing could induce significant 
technological change, provided the policy commitment is credible, long 
term, and sufficiently strong (Popp, 2006a; Bosetti et al., 2011), while 
at the same time contributing to emission reductions. The positive 
effect of climate policies on technological change, however, does not 
necessarily obviate the need for specific policies aimed at incentivizing 
R&D investments. Market failures associated with innovation provide 
the strongest rationale for subsidizing R&D (see Section 15.6).
The joint use of R&D subsidies and climate policies has been shown 





cating benefits of the order of 10 – 30 % overall climate control cost 
reductions (D. Popp, 2006; V. Bosetti et  al., 2011). Climate-specific 
R&D instruments can step up early innovation and ultimately reduce 
mitigation costs (Gerlagh et al., 2009), although R&D subsidies could 
raise the shadow value of CO2 in the short term because of rebound 
effects from stimulating innovation (Otto and Reilly, 2008) (See Sec-
tion 6.3.6.5 for further discussion of combining policy instruments to 
reduce aggregate mitigation costs). In the absence of explicit efforts 
to address innovation market failures, carbon taxes might be increased 
or differentiated across regions to indirectly address the under provi-
sion of R&D (Golombek and Hoel, 2008; Hart, 2008; Greaker and Pade, 
2009; Heal and Tarui, 2010; De Cian and Tavoni, 2012). 
Although there is no definitive conclusion on the subject matter, sev-
eral studies suggest that the benefits of increased technological 
change for climate change mitigation may be sufficiently high to jus-
tify upfront investments and policy support in innovation and diffu-
sion of energy efficiency and low-carbon mitigation technologies (see 
e. g. Dowlatabadi, 1998; Newell et al., 1999; Nordhaus, 2002; Buon-
anno et al., 2003; Gerlagh and van der Zwaan, 2003). For example, it 
has been suggested that the current rates of investments are rela-
tively low and that an average increase several times from current 
clean energy R&D expenditures may be closer towards optimality to 
stabilize GHG concentrations (Popp, 2006a; Nemet and Kammen, 
2007; Bosetti et  al., 2009a; IEA, 2010a; Marangoni and M. Tavoni, 
2014) (Table 6.6). Bridging a possible ‘R&D gap’ is particularly impor-
tant and challenging, given that public energy R&D investments in 
OECD countries have generally been decreasing as a share of total 
research budgets over the past 30 years (from 11 % down to 4 %, 
according to recent International Energy Agency (IEA) R&D statistics). 
On the other hand, in the private sector the rate of innovation (if 
measured by clean energy patents) seems to have accelerated over 
the past 10 years. 
An unequivocal call for energy innovation policy can be questioned, 
however, when all inventive activities are accounted for. It might also 
not be straightforward to determine the overall effect of mitigation 
policy on technological innovation, since low-carbon energy R&D may 
crowd out other inventive activity and result in lower overall welfare 
(Goulder and Schneider, 1999). The degree of substitutability between 
different inputs of production has been shown to drive the outcome of 
scenarios from integrated models (Otto et al., 2008; Acemoglu et al., 
2009; Carraro et al., 2010). Innovation is found to play an important 
role in attempts to hedge against future uncertainties such as related 
to climate change impacts, technological performance and policy 
implementation (Loschel, 2002; Bohringer and Löschel, 2006; Baker 
and Shittu, 2008; Bosetti and Tavoni, 2009). 
6�5�2 Integrating societal change
Individual behaviour, social preferences, historical legacies, and insti-
tutional structures can influence the use of technologies and mitiga-
tion more generally. Technological transitions necessarily encompass 
more than simply improving and deploying technology. Because they 
co-evolve with technologies, social determinants of individual and col-
lective behaviours can be either causes or consequences of transfor-
mation pathways. Moreover, governance and policies can influence 
these factors and thereby affect transformation pathways. This more 
complex framing of transformation pathways implies the need for a 
broader perspective on mitigation that explicitly considers the obsta-
cles to deployment and mitigation more generally.
Research on these societal change elements is analytically diverse 
and often country-specific, which complicates comparative modelling 
exercises of the type reviewed in this chapter. The difficulty in repre-
senting these processes in models has meant that societal change 
research has often been divorced from the literature on transformation 
pathways. However, significant bodies of literature show how societal 
changes can affect the costs and acceptability of mitigation, and the 
interactions of climate policies and other dimensions of public policies 
beyond the energy sector.
Non-optimal or real world institutional conditions can influence how 
technological pathways evolve even under an economy-wide price on 
carbon. Because of the heterogeneity of the carbon impact of differ-
ent sectors, the impact of a carbon price differs widely across sec-
tors (Smale et  al., 2006; Houser et  al., 2009; Fischer and Fox, 2011; 
Monjon and Quirion, 2011) Demailly et al., 2008). Even in less energy-
intensive sectors, pre-existing characteristics in the national econ-
Table 6�6 | Preliminary findings on energy efficiency and clean energy R&D investments, as suggested in the literature to date, and as needed to attain concentration goals. For 
reference, current public R&D expenditures are approximately 10 Billion USD / yr.
Study
Foreseen total clean 
energy R&D investments
Notes
Nemet and Kammen (2007) based on Davis and Owens (2003) 17 – 27 Billion USD / yr For the period 2005 – 2015
IEA (2010a) 50 – 100 Billion USD / yr To achieve the ‘Blue Map’ scenario in 2050. Roughly half of the 
investments are reserved for advanced vehicle R&D.
Bosetti et al. (2009a) 70 – 90 Billion USD / yr Average to 2050 for a range of climate concentration goals. 





omy — such as inflexible labour markets — can complicate the deploy-
ment of technologies (Guivarch et al., 2011). A further obstacle is the 
uneven impacts of a carbon price on household purchasing power, 
particularly for lower-income brackets (Combet et al., 2010; Grainger 
and Kolstad, 2010).
Policy uncertainty can have implications for low-carbon technol-
ogy investment. High levels of uncertainty force risk-averse firms 
not to adopt technologies by merit order in terms of net present 
value (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Pindyck, 1982; Majd and Pin-
dyck, 1987). Hallegatte et al. (2008) show the importance of the dif-
ference in investment rules in a managerial economy (Roe, 1994) 
and a shareholder economy (Jensen, 1986). Hadjilambrinos (2000) 
and Finon and Romano (2009) show how differences in regulatory 
regimes may explain differences in technological choices in the elec-
tricity industries. Bosetti et  al. (2011) show that investment uncer-
tainty increases the costs and reduces the pace of transformation 
pathways. Perceived policy risks can not only dampen investment but 
can also encourage perverse outcomes such as non-additionality in 
the CDM (Hultman et al., 2012b). This raises the potential for linking 
mitigation policies, energy sector regulatory reforms, and financial 
policies to increase the risk-averse returns of mitigation investments 
(Hourcade and Shukla, 2013).
Changes in institutional structures will be required to facilitate the 
technological change envisaged in the scenarios reviewed in this 
chapter. Historically, political and institutional pre-conditions, chang-
ing decision routines, and organizational skills help explain why coun-
tries with similar dependence on oil imports adopted very different 
energy responses to oil shocks (Hourcade and Kostopoulou, 1994; 
Hultman et al., 2012a). Similar issues arise in a low-carbon transition. 
New policies and institutional structures might be developed to man-
age infrastructures such as those associated with large quantities of 
intermittent resources on the electric grid, CO2 transport and storage, 
dispersed generation or storage of electricity, or nuclear waste and 
materials. 
Although modelling exercises have been able to assess the possible 
changes in the energy supply portfolio and the pressures to deploy 
energy efficiency technologies, such changes are difficult in practice 
to separate from the evolution of preference and lifestyles. The litera-
ture on energy-efficiency investments highlights the frequent incon-
gruity between perceived economic benefits for energy efficiency 
and actual consumer behaviour that seems often to ignore profitable 
investments. Such behaviour has been shown to stem from perceived 
unreliability, unfounded expectations for maintenance, information 
failures, property rights, split incentives, and differentiation across 
income.
Finally, social factors influence the changes in the way energy systems 
couple with other large-scale systems of production such as the built 
environment, transportation, and agriculture. The way that energy is 
used and consumed in urban areas (such as in transportation, heat-
ing, and air-conditioning) is often driven by the structure and form of 
the urban infrastructure (Leck, 2006). Recent modelling exercises dem-
onstrated the tradeoff between commuting costs and housing costs 
and their impact on the urban sprawl and the mobility needs (Gusdorf 
and Hallegatte, 2007; Gusdorf et al., 2008). In many cases, the price of 
real estate is as powerful a driver of mobility demand as the price of 
transportation fuel, and therefore affects the price of carbon needed 
for meeting a given climate objective (Waisman et al., 2012; Lampin 
et al., 2013). The transport contribution to carbon can be affected by, 
for example, just-in-time processes and geographical splits of the pro-
ductive chains (Crassous and Hourcade, 2006).
6.6 Sustainable development 
and transformation path-
ways, taking into account 
differences across regions
Averting the adverse social and environmental effects of climate 
change is fundamental to sustainable development (WCED, 1987, and 
Chapter 4). Yet, climate change is but one of many challenges fac-
ing society in the 21st century. Others include, for instance, providing 
access to clean, reliable, and affordable energy services to the world’s 
poorest; maintaining stable and plentiful employment opportuni-
ties; limiting air pollution, health damages, and water impacts from 
energy and agriculture; alleviating energy security concerns; minimiz-
ing energy-driven land use requirements and biodiversity loss; and 
maintaining the security of food supplies. A complex web of interac-
tions and feedback effects links these various policy objectives, all of 
which are important for sustainable development (see Section 4.8 and 
Table 4.1). 
Implementation of mitigation policies and measures therefore may 
be adequately described within a multi-objective framework and may 
be aligned with other objectives to maximize synergies and minimize 
tradeoffs. Because the relative importance of individual objectives dif-
fers among diverse stakeholders and may change over time, transpar-
ency on the multiple effects that accrue to different actors at different 
points of time is important for decision making (see Sections 2.4, 3.6.3, 
3.7.1, and 4.8).
Although the scientific literature makes very clear that a variety of 
policies and measures exist for mitigating climate change, the impacts 
of each of these options along other, non-climate dimensions have 
received less attention. To the extent these mitigation side-effects are 
positive, they can be deemed ‘co-benefits’; if adverse, they imply ‘risks’ 
with respect to the other non-climate objectives (see Annex I for defini-
tions). Despite their importance for mitigation strategies, side-effects 
are often not monetized or even quantified in analyses of climate 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6�6�1 Co-benefits and adverse side-effects 
of mitigation measures: Synthesis of 
 sectoral information and linkages to 
transformation pathways 
One source of information on side-effects emerges from literature 
exploring the nature of individual technological or sectoral mitigation 
measures. These studies are covered in Chapters 7 – 12. Based on those 
assessments, Table 6.7 provides an aggregated but qualitative over-
view of the potential co-benefits and adverse side-effects that could be 
realized if certain types of mitigation measures are enacted in different 
sectors: energy supply-side transformations; technological and behav-
ioural changes in the transport, buildings, and industry end-use sec-
tors; and modified agriculture, forestry, and land use practices. These 
co-benefits and adverse side-effects can be classified by the nature of 
their sustainable development implications: economic, social, or envi-
ronmental (see Sections 4.2 and 4.8 for a discussion of the three pillars 
of sustainable development). Other types of impacts are also possible 
and are highlighted in the table where relevant. 
Whether or not any of these side-effects actually materialize, and to 
what extent, will be highly case- and site-specific, as they will depend 
importantly on local circumstances and the scale, scope, and pace 
of implementation, among other factors. Measures undertaken in 
an urbanized area of the industrialized world, for instance, may not 
yield the same impacts as when enacted in a rural part of a devel-
oping country (Barker et  al., 2007). Such detailed considerations are 
not reflected in Table 6.7, which is meant to give an aggregated sense 
of the potential co-benefits and adverse side-effects throughout the 
world when mitigation policies are in place. Details are discussed in 
each of the respective sectoral chapters (see Chapters 7 – 12). Note 
that in addition to the qualitative information on potential side-effects 
summarized below, Table 6.7 also provides quantitative information 
for each sector regarding the mid-century contribution of the respec-
tive (group of) mitigation measures to reach stringent mitigation goals 
(see Sections 6.8, 7.11, and 11.9 for the underlying data). 
The compilation of sectoral findings in Table 6.7 suggests that the 
potential for co-benefits clearly outweighs that of adverse side-effects 
in the case of energy end-use mitigation measures (transport, buildings, 
and industry), whereas the evidence suggests this may not be the case 
for all supply-side and AFOLU measures. Although no single category 
of mitigation measures is completely devoid of risk, Table 6.7 high-
lights that certain co-benefits are valid across all sectors. For instance, 
by contributing to a phaseout of conventional fossil fuels, nearly all 
mitigation measures have major health and environmental benefits for 
society, owing to significant reductions in both outdoor and indoor air 
pollution, and lead to improved energy security at the national level for 
most countries. In addition to the many sector-specific co-benefits and 
adverse side-effects, sectoral employment and productivity gains, tech-
nological spillovers, and more equitable energy / mobility access offer 
examples of co-benefits that are possible across all demand sectors. 
While energy demand reductions additionally mitigate risks associated 
with energy supply technologies (see also Rogelj et  al., 2013b), the 
upstream effects of fuel switching are more complex and depend to a 
large extent on local circumstances (see Section 7.11).
Moreover, while nearly all mitigation measures for reducing (fuel) 
carbon and energy intensity have higher up-front investment require-
ments than conventional technologies, their often lower operating 
costs, and sometimes even lifecycle costs, can contribute to reduced 
energy service prices for consumers, depending on local and national 
institutional settings (see Section 7.9.1). If, on the other hand, energy 
prices rise as a consequence, so do the political challenges of imple-
mentation, such as those associated with the provision of universal 
energy access and associated economic, social, environmental, and 
health risks for the poorest members of society (Markandya et  al., 
2009; Sathaye et al., 2011; Rao, 2013). Well-designed policies are thus 
important to avoid perverse incentives of climate policies, including 
increasing traditional biomass use for heating and cooking (see Bollen 
et al., 2009a, b, and Section 9.7.1). 
In addition to furthering the achievement of various global goals 
for sustainability, namely those of the major environmental conven-
tions (e. g., the United Nations’ Convention to Combat Desertification 
(UNCCD, 2004), Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD, 1992), ‘Sus-
tainable Energy for All’ initiative, and the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG)), mitigation can potentially yield positive side-effects in 
the impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability (IAV) dimensions (see Sec-
tion 6.6.2.5 and 11.7, Haines et  al., 2009; Rogelj et  al., 2013c). For 
instance, decentralized renewable energy systems can help to build 
adaptive capacity in rural communities (Venema and Rehman, 2007), 
and sustainable agricultural practices (e. g., conservation tillage and 
water management) can improve drought resistance and soil conser-
vation and fertility (Uprety et al., 2012).
6�6�2 Transformation pathways studies with 
links to other policy objectives
As indicated above, the overall nature and extent of the co-benefits 
and risks arising from global transformation pathways depends impor-
tantly on which mitigation options are implemented and how. The full 
systems-level welfare impacts for multi-objective decision making are 
therefore best viewed from an integrated perspective that permits 
the full accounting of the impacts of each of the objectives on social 
welfare (see Section 3.5.3) (Bell et al., 2008; Sathaye et al., 2011; Rao 
et al., 2013). Taking such a perspective poses a significant challenge, 
since the costs of mitigation need to be weighed against the multiple 
benefits and adverse side-effects for the other objectives. To compli-
cate matters further, these other objectives are traditionally measured 
in different units (e. g., health benefits of reduced air pollution in terms 
of deaths avoided). In addition, combining the different objectives into 
a single overall welfare formulation implies subjective choices about 
the ranking or relative importance of policy priorities. Such a ranking 





Since AR4, a number of scenario studies have been conducted to 
shed light on the global implications of transformation pathways for 
other objectives. Earlier scenario literature primarily focused on the 
health and ecosystem benefits of mitigation via reduced air pollu-
tion; some evidence of co-benefits for employment and energy secu-
rity was also presented in AR4. More recent studies have broadened 
their focus to include energy security, energy access, biodiversity 
conservation, water, and land-use requirements (see Section 11.13.7 
for a review of scenario studies focusing on water and land use and 
implications for food security). Many of these newer analyses use 
globally consistent methods, meaning they employ long-term, multi-
region frameworks that couple models of both bio-geophysical and 
human processes, thereby permitting the consideration of targeted 
policies for the additional objectives in their own right. While the 
majority of these studies focus on two-way interactions (e. g., the 
effect of mitigation on air pollution in a given country or across 
groups of countries — or vice versa), a few recent analyses have 
looked at three or more objectives simultaneously (Section 6.6.2.7). 
Important to note in this context is that many of the non-technical 
measures listed in Table 6.7 (e. g., behavioral changes) are not fully 
taken into account by models, though the state-of-the-art continues 
to improve.
6�6�2�1 Air pollution and health
Greenhouse gas and air pollutant emissions typically derive from the 
same sources, such as power plants, factories, and cars. Hence, miti-
gation strategies that reduce the use of fossil fuels typically result 
in major cuts in emissions of black carbon (BC), sulfur dioxide (SO2), 
nitrogen oxides (NOx), and mercury (Hg), among other harmful species. 
Together with tropospheric ozone and its precursors (mainly deriving 
from AFOLU and fossil fuel production / transport processes), these pol-
lutants separately or jointly cause a variety of detrimental health and 
ecosystem effects at various scales (see Section 7.9.2). The magnitude 
of these effects varies across pollutants and atmospheric concentra-
tions (as well as the concentrations of pollutants created via further 
chemical reactions) and is due to different degrees of population 
exposure, whether indoor or outdoor or in urban or rural settings (see 
Barker et al., 2007; Bollen et al., 2009b; Markandya et al., 2009; Smith 
et al., 2009; Sathaye et al., 2011; GEA, 2012). The term ‘fine particulate 
matter (PM2.5)’ is frequently used to refer to a variety of air pollutants 
that are extremely small in diameter and therefore cause some of the 
most serious health effects. 
The literature assessed in AR4 focused on air pollution reductions 
in individual countries and regions, pointing to large methodologi-
cal differences in, for example, the type of pollutants analyzed, sec-
toral focus, and the treatment of existing air pollution policy regimes. 
As confirmed by recent literature (Friel et al., 2009; Wilkinson et al., 
2009; Woodcock et al., 2009; Markandya et al., 2009; Haines et al., 
2009; Smith et al., 2009; Nemet et al., 2010), AR4 showed that the 
monetized air quality co-benefits from mitigation are of a similar 
order of magnitude as the mitigation costs themselves (see Sec-
tions 3.6.3 and 5.7.1). For instance, taking into account new findings 
on the relationship between chronic mortality and exposure to PM 
and ozone as well as the effect of slowing climate change on air 
quality, West et  al. (2013) calculate global average monetized co-
benefits of avoided mortality of 55 – 420 USD2010 / tCO2. They find that 
the values for East Asia far exceed the marginal mitigation costs in 
2030. (See Section 5.7 for a broader review of this issue, as well as a 
discussion of the importance of baseline conditions for these results.) 
Furthermore, it has been noted that reductions in certain air pollut-
ants can potentially increase radiative forcing (see Sections 1.2.5, 
5.2, and WG  I Chapter 7). This is an important adverse side-effect, 
and one that is not discussed here due to the lack of scenario stud-
ies addressing the associated tradeoff between health and climate 
benefits.
The available evidence indicates that transformation pathways lead-
ing to 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq in 2100 will have major co-benefits in 
terms of reduced air pollution (Figure 6.33, top right panel). Recent 
integrated modelling studies agree strongly with earlier findings by 
van Vuuren et al. (2006) and Bollen et al. (2009a) in this regard. For 
example, Rose et al. (2014b) find that national air pollution policies 
may no longer be binding constraints on pollutant emissions depend-
ing on the stringency of climate policies. In China, for instance, miti-
gation efforts consistent with a global goal of 3.7 W / m2 (2.8 W / m2) 
in 2100 result in SO2 emissions 15 to 55 % (25 – 75 %) below refer-
ence levels by 2030 and 40 to 80 % (55 – 80 %) by 2050. Chaturvedi 
and Shukla (2014) find similar results for India. Globally, Rafaj et al. 
(2013b) calculate that stringent mitigation efforts would simulta-
neously lead to near-term (by 2030) reductions of SO2, NOx, and 
PM2.5 on the order of 40 %, 30 %, and 5 %, respectively, relative to 
a baseline scenario. Riahi et  al. (2012) find that by further exploit-
ing the full range of opportunities for energy efficiency and ensuring 
access to modern forms of energy for the world’s poorest (hence less 
indoor / household air pollution), the near-term air pollution co-bene-
fits of mitigation could be even greater: 50 % for SO2, 35 % for NOx, 
and 30 % for PM2.5 by 2030. Additionally, Amann et al. (2011) and Rao 
et al. (2013) find significant reductions in air quality control costs due 
to mitigation policies (see Section 6.6.2.7). Riahi et al. (2012) further 
estimate that stringent mitigation efforts can help to reduce globally 
aggregated disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) by more than 10 mil-
lion by 2030, a decrease of one-third compared to a baseline scenario. 
The vast majority of these co-benefits would accrue in urban house-
holds of the developing world. Similarly, West et al. (2013) find that 
global mitigation (RCP 4.5) can avoid 0.5 ± 0.2, 1.3 ± 0.5, and 2.2 
± 0.8 million premature deaths in 2030, 2050, and 2100, relative to 
a baseline scenario that foresees decreasing PM and ozone (O3) con-
centrations. Regarding mercury, Rafaj et al. (2013a) show that under 
a global mitigation regime, atmospheric releases from anthropogenic 
sources can be reduced by 45 % in 2050, relative to a a baseline sce-
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Several studies published since AR4 have analyzed the potential cli-
mate impacts of methane mitigation and local air pollutant emissions 
control (West et al., 2006, 2007; Shine et al., 2007; Reilly et al., 2007; 
Ramanathan and Carmichael, 2008; Jerrett et  al., 2009; Anenberg 
et al., 2012). For instance, Shindell et al. (2012) identify 14 different 
methane and BC mitigation measures that, in addition to slowing the 
growth in global temperatures in the medium term (~0.5 °C lower 
by 2050, central estimate), lead to important near-term (2030) co-
benefits for health (avoiding 0.7 to 4.7 million premature deaths from 
outdoor air pollution globally) and food security (increasing annual 
crop yields globally by 30 to 135 million metric tons due to ozone 
reductions; see Section 11.13.7 for a further discussion of the rela-
tionship between mitigation and food security). Smith and Mizrahi 
(2013) also acknowledge the important co-benefits of reducing cer-
tain short-lived climate forcers (SLCF) but at the same time conclude 
that (1) the near-to-medium term climate impacts of these measures 
are likely to be relatively modest (0.16 °C lower by 2050, central esti-
mate; 0.04 – 0.35 °C considering the various uncertainties), and (2) the 
additional climate benefit of targeted SLCF measures after 2050 is 
comparatively low. 
6�6�2�2 Energy security
A number of analyses have studied the relationship between mitiga-
tion and energy security. The assessment here focuses on energy secu-
rity concerns that relate to (1) the sufficiency of resources to meet 
national energy demand at competitive and stable prices, and (2) the 
resilience of energy supply (see Section 7.9.1 for a broader discus-
sion). A number of indicators have been developed to quantitatively 
express these concerns (Kruyt et al., 2009; Jewell, 2011; Jewell et al., 
2014). The most common indicators of sufficiency of energy supply are 
energy imports (see SRREN (IPCC, 2011) Figure 9.6) and the adequacy 
of the domestic resource base (Gupta, 2008; Kruyt et al., 2009; Le Coq 
and Paltseva, 2009; IEA, 2011; Jewell, 2011; Jewell et al., 2013). Resil-
ience of energy systems is commonly measured by the diversity of 
energy sources and carriers (Stirling, 1994, 2010; Grubb et al., 2006; 
Bazilian and Roques, 2009; Skea, 2010) and the energy intensity of 
GDP (Gupta, 2008; Kruyt et al., 2009; Jewell, 2011; Cherp et al., 2012).
Recent studies show that mitigation policies would likely increase 
national energy sufficiency and resilience (Figure 6.33, top left panel). 
Mitigation policies lead to major reductions in the import dependency of 
many countries, thus making national and regional energy systems less 
vulnerable to price volatility and supply disruptions (Criqui and Mima, 
2012; Shukla and Dhar, 2011; Jewell et al., 2013). One multi-model study 
finds that in stringent mitigation scenarios, global energy trade would 
be 10 – 70 % lower by 2050 and 40 – 74 % by 2100 than in the baseline 
scenario (Jewell et al., 2013). Most of the decrease in regional import 
dependence would appear after 2030 since mitigation decreases the 
use of domestic coal in the short term, which counteracts the increase 
in domestic renewables (Akimoto et al., 2012; Jewell et al., 2013). At 
the same time mitigation leads to much lower extraction rates for fos-
sil resources (Kruyt et  al., 2009; Jewell et  al., 2013; McCollum et  al., 
2014a). The IEA, for example, finds that rapid deployment of energy 
efficiency technologies could reduce oil consumption by as much as 13 
million barrels a day (IEA, 2012). Mitigation actions could thus alleviate 
future energy price volatility, given that perceptions of resource scarcity 
are a key driver of rapid price swings. This would mean that domestic 
fossil resources could act as a ‘buffer of indigenous resources’ (Turton 
and Barreto, 2006). Improved energy security of importers, however, 
could adversely impact the ‘demand security’ of exporters (Luft, 2013); 
indeed, most of the modeling literature indicates that climate mitigation 
would decrease oil export revenues of oil exporters (IEA, 2009; Haurie 
and Vielle, 2010; Bauer et al., 2014a, 2014b; Tavoni et al., 2013; McCol-
lum et al., 2013a). However, three recent studies argue that if the cost of 
alternatives to conventional oil is high enough, conventional oil export-
ers could benefit from climate policies, particularly in the near term 
(Persson et al. 2007; Johansson et al. 2009; Nemet and Brandt, 2012). 
Although there is broad agreement in the literature about the overall 
negative effect on oil export revenues, the distribution of this effect will 
differ between exporters of conventional vs unconventional oil export-
ers. (See Section 6.3.6.6 regarding the impacts that these trade shifts 
would have on major energy exporters.) 
Studies also indicate that mitigation would likely increase the resil-
ience of energy systems (Figure 6.33, top left panel). The diversity 
of energy sources used in the transport and electricity sectors would 
rise relative to today and to a baseline scenario in which fossils 
remain dominant (Grubb et al., 2006; Riahi et al., 2012; Cherp et al., 
2014; Jewell et al., 2013). Additionally, energy trade would be much 
less affected by fluctuations in GDP growth and by uncertainties 
in fossil resource endowments and energy demand growth (Cherp 
et al., 2014; Jewell et al., 2013). These developments (mitigation and 
energy-efficiency improvements) would make energy systems more 
resilient to various types of shocks and stresses and would help 
insulate economies from price volatility and supply disruptions (see 
Chapters 8 – 10).
Figure 6�33 | Co-benefits of mitigation for energy security and air quality in scenarios with stringent climate policies (reaching 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq concentrations in 2100). 
Upper panels show co-benefits for different energy security indicators and air pollutant emissions. Lower panel shows related global policy costs of achieving the energy security, 
air quality, and mitigation objectives, either alone (w, x, y) or simultaneously (z). Integrated approaches that achieve these objectives simultaneously show the highest cost-
effectiveness due to synergies (w+x+y>z). Policy costs are given as the increase in total energy system costs relative to a no-policy baseline; hence, they only capture the mitigation 
component and do not include the monetized co-benefits of, for example, reduced health impacts or climate damages. In this sense, costs are indicative and do not represent full 
uncertainty ranges. Sources: LIMITS model intercomparison (Jewell et al., 2013; Tavoni et al., 2013), WGIII AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10, includes only scenarios based on 






According to the literature, providing universal energy access (see Sec-
tion 7.9.1 for a broader discussion) would likely result in negligible 
impacts on GHG emissions globally (PBL, 2012; Riahi et al., 2012). Rog-
elj et al (2013c) find that the United Nation’s (UN) energy access goals 
for 2030 are fully consistent with stringent mitigation measures while 
other scenario analyses indicate that deployment of renewable energy 
in LDCs can help to promote access to clean, reliable, and afford-
able energy services (Kaundinya et  al., 2009; Reddy et  al., 2009). In 
addition, a number of recent integrated modelling studies ensure, by 
design, that developing country household final energy consumption 
levels are compatible with minimal poverty thresholds (Ekholm et al., 
2010a; van Ruijven et  al., 2011; Daioglou et  al., 2012; Narula et  al., 
2012; Krey et al., 2012). An important message from these studies is 
that the provision of energy access in developing countries should not 
be confused with broader economic growth. The latter could have a 
pronounced GHG affect, particularly in today’s emerging economies 
(see Section 6.3.1.3).
The primary risk from mitigation is that an increase in energy prices 
for the world’s poor could potentially impair the transition to univer-
sal energy access by making energy less affordable (see Sections 6.6.1 
and 7.9.1). A related concern is that increased energy prices could also 
delay structural changes and the build-up of physical infrastructure 
(Goldemberg et al., 1985; Steckel et al., 2013; Jakob and Steckel, 2014). 
Isolating these effects has proven to be difficult in the integrated mod-
elling context because these models typically aggregate consumption 
losses from climate policies (see Section 6.3.6).
6�6�2�4 Employment
The potential consequences of climate policies on employment are 
addressed in the scientific literature in different ways. One strand 
of literature analyzes the employment impacts associated with the 
deployment of specific low-carbon technologies, such as renewables 
or building retrofits (see Sections 7.9.1 and 9.7.2.1). This literature 
often finds a significant potential for gross job creation, either directly 
or indirectly; however, a number of issues are left unresolved regard-
ing the methodologies used in computing those impacts on one hand 
and the gap between this potential and net employment impacts in 
a particular sector on the other hand (see Wei et  al., 2010). The net 
effect is typically addressed in general equilibrium literature. Although 
many integrated models used to develop long-term scenarios are gen-
eral equilibrium models, they usually assume full employment and are 
therefore not well-suited to addressing gross versus net employment-
related questions.
According to the literature, employment benefits from mitigation 
depend on the direction and strength of income / output and substitu-
tion impacts of mitigation. These impacts are governed by two inter-
related sets of factors related to mitigation technologies and general 
equilibrium effects. One set involves the characteristics of mitigation 
technologies, including (1) their costs per job created, which deter-
mines the crowding out of jobs in other sectors when capital is con-
strained (Frondel et al., 2010); (2) the portion of the low-carbon tech-
nologies that is imported, which determines domestic job creation and 
the net positive impact on the trade balance; and (3) the availability of 
skills in the labor force, as well as its capacity to adapt (Babiker and 
Eckaus, 2007; Fankhauser et  al., 2008; Guivarch et  al., 2011), which 
determines the pace of job creation and the real cost of low-carbon 
technology deployment in terms of increased wages due to skilled 
labor scarcities.
A second set of factors encompasses all the general equilibrium effects, 
some of which are triggered by the above parameters and others by 
the net income effects of higher carbon prices (see Section  3.6.3). 
Recycling the revenues from carbon pricing and subsequently lower-
ing labor taxes changes the relative prices of labor and energy (and 
to a lesser extent the costs of production inputs), which in turn leads 
to a redirection of technology choices and innovation towards more 
labor-intensive techniques. In addition, by contributing to higher 
energy costs, climate policies change the relative prices of energy- and 
non-energy intensive goods and services, thereby causing households 
to consume more of the latter. These mechanisms operate differently 
in developed, emerging, and developing economies, particularly with 
respect to the various forms of informal labor. Some of the mechanisms 
operate over the medium (more labor-intensive techniques) and long 
term (structural change) (Fankhauser et  al., 2008). Others, however, 
operate over the short term and might therefore be influenced by near-
term mitigation policies.
6�6�2�5 Biodiversity conservation
The concept of biodiversity can be interpreted in different ways. Mea-
suring it therefore presents a challenge. One indicator that has been 
used in the integrated modelling literature for assessing the biodiversity 
implications of global transformation pathways is that of mean species 
abundance (MSA), which uses the species composition and abundance 
of the original ecosystem as a reference situation. According to PBL 
(2012), globally averaged MSA declined continuously from approxi-
mately 76 % in 1970 to 68 % in 2010 (relative to the undisturbed states 
of ecosystems). This was mostly due to habitat loss resulting from con-
version of natural systems to agriculture uses and urban areas. 
The primary biodiversity-related side-effects from mitigation involve 
the potentially large role of reforestation and afforestation efforts 
and of bioenergy production. These elements of mitigation strategy 
could either impose risks or lead to co-benefits, depending on where 
and how they are implemented (see Table 6.7). The integrated model-
ling literature does not at this time provide an explicit enough treat-
ment of these issues to effectively capture the range of transforma-
tion pathways. One study (PBL, 2012) suggests that it is possible to 





65 %) by 2050 even if land-use mitigation measures are deployed. 
Such an achievement represents more than a halving of all biodiver-
sity loss projected to occur by mid-century in the baseline scenario 
and is interpreted to be in accordance with the Aichi Biodiversity Tar-
gets (CBD, 2010). Of critical importance in this regard are favourable 
institutional and policy mechanisms for reforestation / afforestation 
and bioenergy that complement mitigation actions (as described in 
Section 11.13).
6�6�2�6 Water use
The last decades have seen the world’s freshwater resources come 
under increasing pressure. Almost three billion people live in water-
scarce regions (Molden, 2007), some two billion in areas of severe 
water stress in which demand accounts for more than 40 % of total 
availability (PBL, 2012). Water withdrawals for energy and industrial 
processes (currently 20 % globally) and municipal applications (10 %) 
are projected to grow considerably over the next decades, jointly sur-
passing irrigation (70 %) as the primary water user by 2050 (Alcamo 
and Henrichs, 2002; Shiklomanov and Rodda, 2003; Molden, 2007; 
Fischer et  al., 2007; Shen et  al., 2008; Bruinsma, 2011). This growth 
is projected to be greatest in areas already under high stress, such as 
South Asia. 
Renewable energy technologies such as solar PV and wind power will 
reduce freshwater withdrawals for thermal cooling relative to fossil 
alternatives. On the other hand, CCS and some forms of renewable 
energy, especially bioenergy, could demand a significant amount of 
water (see Table 6.7 and Section 7.9.2). For bioenergy in particular, the 
overall effect will depend importantly on which feedstocks are grown, 
where, and if they require irrigation (see Section 11.13.7). Similarly, 
reforestation and afforestation efforts, as well as attempts to avoid 
deforestation, will impact both water use and water quality. The net 
effects could be either positive (Townsend et  al., 2012) or negative 
(Jackson et  al., 2005), depending on the local situation (see Section 
11.7). 
When accounting for the system dynamics and relative econom-
ics between alternative mitigation options (both in space and time), 
recent integrated modelling scenarios generally indicate that stringent 
mitigation actions, combined with heightened water-use efficiency 
measures, could lead to significant reductions in global water demand 
over the next several decades. PBL (2012), for instance, calculates a 
25 % reduction in total demand by 2050, translating to an 8 % decline 
in the number of people living in severely water-stressed regions 
worldwide. Other studies by Hanasaki et al. (2013) and Hejazi et al.
(2013) find the co-benefits from mitigation to be of roughly the same 
magnitude: reductions of 1.0 – 3.9 % and 1.2 – 5.5 %, respectively, in 
2050. Hejazi et al. (2013) note, however, that water scarcity could be 
exacerbated if mitigation leads to more intensive production of bio-
energy crops. In contrast, Akimoto et  al. (2012) find that stringent 
mitigation increases water-stressed populations globally (+3 % in 
2050) as a result of decreases in annual water availability in places 
like South Asia. 
6�6�2�7 Integrated studies of multiple objectives
Integrated scenario research is just beginning to assess multiple sustain-
able development objectives in parallel. This emerging literature gener-
ally finds that mitigation goals can be achieved more cost-effectively if 
the objectives are integrated and pursued simultaneously rather than in 
isolation. Recent examples of such studies include Bollen et al. (2010) 
and the Global Energy Assessment (GEA) (McCollum et al., 2011, 2013a; 
Riahi et al., 2012). These two analyses are unique from other integrated 
studies (see e. g., Shukla et  al., 2008; Skea and Nishioka, 2008; Stra-
chan et al., 2008; IEA, 2011; Shukla and Dhar, 2011; PBL, 2012; Akimoto 
et al., 2012; Howells et al., 2013) because they attempt to quantify key 
interactions in economic terms on a global scale, employing varying 
methodologies to assess the interactions between climate change, air 
pollution, and energy security policies. Bollen et  al. (2010) employ a 
cost-benefit social welfare optimization approach while the GEA study 
employs a cost-effectiveness approach (see Section 3.7.2.1). Despite 
these differences, the two studies provide similar insights. Both suggest 
that near-term synergies can be realized through decarbonization and 
energy efficiency and that mitigation policy may be seen as a strategic 
entry point for reaping energy security and air quality co-benefits. The 
GEA study in particular finds major cost savings from mitigation policy 
in terms of reduced expenditures for imported fossil fuels and end-of-
pipe air pollution control equipment (see bottom panel of Figure 6.33). 
The magnitude of these co-benefits depends importantly on the future 
stringency of energy security and air pollution policies in the absence of 
mitigation policy. If these are more aggressive than currently planned, 
then the co-benefits would be smaller. 
Another class of sustainable development scenarios are the Low-Carbon 
Society (LCS) assessments (Kainuma et  al., 2012), which collectively 
indicate that explicit inclusion of mitigation co-benefits in the cost cal-
culation results in a lower-carbon price in the LCS scenarios than in a 
scenario that only considers mitigation costs (Shukla et al., 2008). A key 
message from these studies is that co-benefits are neither automatic nor 
assured, but result from conscious and carefully coordinated policies and 
implementation strategies, such as lifestyle changes, green manufactur-
ing processes, and investments into energy efficient devices, recycling 
measures, and other targeted actions (Shukla and Chaturvedi, 2012). 
Finally, studies suggest that co-benefits could influence the incen-
tives for global climate agreements discussed in Section 13.3 (Pittel 
and Rübbelke, 2008; Bollen et al., 2009b; Wagner, 2012). At the pres-
ent time, however, international policy regimes for mitigation and its 
important co-benefits remain separate (Holloway et  al., 2003; Swart 
et al., 2004; Nemet et al., 2010; Rao et al., 2013). Dubash et al. (2013) 
propose a methodology for operationalizing co-benefits in mitigation 
policy formulation, thus helping to bring the varied policy objectives 





6.7 Risks of  transformation 
pathways
Mitigation will be undertaken within the context of a broad set of pol-
icy objectives, existing societal structures, institutional frameworks, and 
physical infrastructures. The relationship between these broader char-
acteristics of human societies and the particular implications of mitiga-
tion activities will be both complex and uncertain. Mitigation will also 
take place under uncertainty about the underlying physical processes 
that govern the climate. All of these indicate that there is a range of 
different risks associated with different transformation pathways.
The various risks associated with transformation pathways can be 
grouped into several categories, and many of these are discussed else-
where in this chapter. One set of risks is associated with the linkage 
of mitigation with other policy objectives, such as clean air, energy 
security, or energy access. These linkages may be positive (co-benefits) 
or negative (risks). These relationships are discussed in Section  6.6. 
Another set of risks is associated with the possibility that particular 
mitigation measures might be taken off the table because of perceived 
negative side-effects and that stabilization will prove more challenging 
that what might have been expected (Strachan and Usher, 2012). These 
issues are discussed in Section 6.3 as well as elsewhere in the chapter, 
including Section 6.9 for CDR options. Another risk is that the economic 
costs may be higher or lower than anticipated, because the implications 
of mitigation cannot be understood with any degree of certainty today, 
for a wide range of reasons. This issue is discussed in Section 6.3.6. It is 
important to emphasize that both the economic costs and the economic 
benefits of mitigation are uncertain. One of the most fundamental risks 
associated with mitigation is that any transformation pathway may 
not maintain temperatures below a particular threshold, such as 2 °C 
or 1.5 °C above preindustrial levels due to limits in our understanding 
of the relationship between emissions and concentrations and, more 
importantly, the relationship between GHG concentrations and atmo-
spheric temperatures. This topic is discussed in Section 6.3.2.
A broad risk that underpins all the mitigation scenarios in this chapter 
is that every long-term pathway depends crucially not just on actions by 
today’s decision makers, but also by future decision-makers and future 
generations. Indeed, mitigation must be framed within a sequential-
decision making not just because it is good practice, but more funda-
mentally because decision makers today cannot make decisions for 
those in the future. A consistent risk is that future decision makers may 
not undertake the mitigation that is required to meet particular long-
term goals. In this context, actions today can be seen as creating or 
limiting options to manage risk rather than leading to particular goals. 
This topic is discussed in Sections 6.3 and 6.4 through the exploration 
of the consequences of different levels of near-term mitigation. This 
issue is particularly important in the context of scenarios that lead to 
concentration goals such as 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100. The vast majority 
of these scenarios temporarily overshoot the long-term goal and then 
descend to it by the end of the century through increasing emissions 
reductions. When near-term mitigation is not sufficiently strong, future 
mitigation must rely heavily on CDR technologies such as BECCS, put-
ting greater pressure on future decision makers and highlighting any 
uncertainties and risks surrounding these technologies. While these sce-
narios are possible in a physical sense, they come with a very large risk 
that future decision makers will not take on the ambitious action that 
would ultimately be required. Indeed, studies have shown that delayed 
and fragmented mitigation can lead to a relaxation of long-term goals 
if countries that delay their participation in a global mitigation strategy 
are not willing or unable to pick up the higher costs of compensating 
higher short-term emissions (Blanford et al., 2014; Kriegler et al., 2014c).
6.8 Integrating sector 
 analyses and 
 transformation scenarios
6�8�1 The sectoral composition of GHG 
 emissions along transformation 
pathways
Options for reducing GHG emissions exist across a wide spectrum of 
human activities. The majority of these options fall into three broad 
areas: energy supply, energy end-use, and AFOLU. The primary focus 
of energy supply options is to provide energy from low- or zero-car-
bon energy sources; that is, to decarbonize energy supply. Options 
in energy end-use sectors focus either on reducing the use of energy 
and / or on using energy carriers produced from low-carbon sources, 
including electricity generated from low-carbon sources. Direct 
options in AFOLU involve storing carbon in terrestrial systems (for 
example, through afforestation). This sector is also the source of bio-
energy. Options to reduce non-CO2 emissions exist across all these 
sectors, but most notably in agriculture, energy supply, and industry.
These sectors and the associated options are heavily interlinked. For 
example, energy demand reductions may be evident not only as direct 
emissions reductions in the end-use sectors but also as emissions 
reductions from the production of energy carriers such as electricity 
(‘indirect emissions’, see Annex A.II.5). Replacing fossil fuels in energy 
supply or end-use sectors by bioenergy reduces emissions in these sec-
tors, but may increase land-use emissions in turn (see Chapter 11, Bio-
energy Appendix). In addition, at the most general level, sectoral miti-
gation actions are linked by the fact that reducing emissions through a 
mitigation activity in one sector reduces the required reductions from 
mitigation activities in other sectors to meet a long-term CO2-equiva-
lent concentration goal.
The precise set of mitigation actions taken in any sector will depend on 





tures, and linkages to other objectives (see Section 6.6) and interac-
tions among measures across sectors. Both integrated models, such as 
those assessed in this chapter, and sectorally focused research, such as 
that assessed in Chapters 7 – 11, offer insights into the options for miti-
gation across sectors. The remainder of this section first assesses the 
potential for mitigation within the sectors based on integrated studies 
and then in each of the emitting sectors based on the combined assess-
ments from sectoral and integrated studies. Important questions are 
how consistent the results from integrated modelling studies are with 
sectorally-focused literature and how they complement each other.
6�8�2 Mitigation from a cross-sectoral 
 perspective: Insights from integrated 
models
Integrated models are a key source of research on the tradeoffs and 
synergies in mitigation across sectors. In scenarios from these models, 
energy sector emissions are the dominant source of GHG emissions in 
baseline scenarios, and these emissions continue to grow over time 
relative to net AFOLU CO2 emissions and non-CO2 GHG emissions (Sec-
tion 6.3.1 and Figure 6.34). Within the energy sector, direct emissions 
from energy supply, and electricity generation in particular, are larger 
than the emissions from any single end-use sector (Figure 6.34). Direct 
emissions, however, do not provide a full representation of the impor-
tance of different activities causing the emissions, because the con-
sumption of energy carriers such as electricity by the end-use sectors, 
leads to indirect emissions from the production of those energy car-
riers (consumption-based approach). An alternative perspective is to 
allocate these indirect energy supply emissions to the end-use sectors 
that use these supplies (see, for example, in Figure 6.34). At present, 
indirect emissions from electricity use are larger than direct emissions 
in buildings and constitute an important share of industrial emissions 
while they are small in transport compared to direct CO2 emissions.
In mitigation scenarios from integrated models, decarbonization of the 
electricity sector takes place at a pace more rapid than reduction of 
direct emissions in the energy end-use sectors (see Sections 7.11.3 and 
Figure 6.35). For example, in 450 ppm CO2eq scenarios, the electricity 
sector is largely decarbonized by 2050, whereas deep reductions in direct 
emissions in the end-use sectors largely arise beyond mid-century. More 
so than any other energy supply technology, the availability of BECCS 
and its role as a primary CDR technology (Sections 6.3.2 and 6.9) has a 
substantial effect on this dynamic, allowing for energy supply sectors to 
serve as a net negative emissions source by mid-century and allowing for 
more gradual emissions reductions in other sectors. In contrast, sectoral 
studies show available pathways to deep reductions in emissions (both 
direct and indirect) already by mid-century (see, e. g., Chapter 9).
Figure 6�34 | Direct (left panel) and direct and indirect emissions (right panel) of CO2 and non-CO2 GHGs across sectors in baseline scenarios. Note that in the case of indirect emis-
sions, only electricity emissions are allocated from energy supply to end-use sectors. In the left panel electricity sector emissions are shown (“Electricity*”) in addition to energy sup-
ply sector emissions which they are part of, to illustrate their large role on the energy supply side. The numbers at the bottom refer to the number of scenarios included in the ranges 
that differ across sectors and time due to different sectoral resolution and time horizon of models. Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10). Includes only baseline scenar-



























































































Within the end-use sectors, deep emissions reductions in transport 
are generally the last to emerge in integrated modelling studies 
because of the assumption that options to switch to low-carbon 
energy carriers in transport are more limited than in buildings and 
industry, and also because of the expected high growth for mobility 
and freight transport (Section 8.9.1). In the majority of baseline sce-
narios from integrated models, net AFOLU CO2 emissions largely dis-
appear by mid-century, with some models projecting a net sink after 
2050 (Section 6.3.1.4). There is a wide uncertainty in the role of affor-
estation and reforestation in mitigation, however. In some mitigation 
scenarios the AFOLU sectors can become a significant carbon sink 
(Section 6.3.2.4).
6�8�3 Decarbonizing energy supply
Virtually all integrated modelling studies indicate that decarbonization 
of electricity is critical for mitigation, but there is no general consensus 
regarding the precise low-carbon technologies that might support this 
decarbonization (Fischedick et al., 2011; Clarke et al., 2012) (Section 
7.11.3). These studies have presented a wide range of combinations 
of renewable energy sources (Krey and Clarke, 2011; Luderer et  al., 
2014b), nuclear power (Bauer et  al., 2012; Rogner and Riahi, 2013), 
and CCS-based technologies (McFarland et  al., 2009; Bauer et  al., 
2014a; McCollum et al., 2014a; van der Zwaan et al., 2014) as both 
viable and cost-effective (see Section 7.11). The breadth of different, 
potentially cost-effective strategies raises the possibility not only that 
future costs and performances of competing electricity technologies 
are uncertain today, but also that regional circumstances, including 
both energy resources and links to other regional objectives (e. g., 
national security, local air pollution, energy security, see Section 6.6), 
might be as important decision making factors as economic costs (Krey 
et al., 2014). The one exception to this flexibility in energy supply sur-
rounds the use of BECCS. CDR technologies such as BECCS are fun-
damental to many scenarios that achieve low-CO2eq concentrations, 
particularly those based on substantial overshoot as might occur if 
near-term mitigation is delayed (Sections 6.3.2 and 6.4). In contrast to 
the electricity sector, decarbonization of the non-electric energy-supply 
sector (e. g., liquid fuels supply) is progressing typically at much lower 
pace (Section 7.11.3, Figures 7.14 and 7.15) and could therefore con-
stitute a bottleneck in the transformation process.
6�8�4 Energy demand reductions and fuel 
switching in end-use sectors
The two major groups of options in energy end-use sectors are those 
that focus on reducing the use of energy and / or those that focus on 
using energy carriers produced from low-carbon sources. Three impor-
tant issues are therefore the potential for fuel switching, the potential 
Figure 6�35 | Direct emissions of CO2 and non-CO2 GHGs across sectors in mitigation scenarios that reach around 450 (430 – 480) ppm CO2eq concentrations in 2100 with using 
CCS (left panel) and without using CCS (right panel). The numbers at the bottom of the graphs refer to the number of scenarios included in the ranges that differ across sectors and 
time due to different sectoral resolution and time horizon of models. White dots in the right panel refer to emissions of individual scenarios to give a sense of the spread within the 
ranges shown due to the small number of scenarios. Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10). Includes only scenarios based on idealized policy implementation that 
provide emissions at the sectoral level. Note that scenarios from the AMPERE study were excluded due to large overlap with the EMF27 study. Historical data: JRC / PBL (2013), IEA 
(2012), see Annex II.9.
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for reductions of energy use per unit of output / service, and the rela-
tionship and timing between the two. In general, as discussed in Sec-
tion 6.3.4, integrated studies indicate that energy intensity (per unit of 
GDP) reductions outweigh decarbonization of energy supply in the 
near term when the energy-supply system is still heavily reliant on 
largely carbon-intensive fossil fuels (Figure 6.17). Over time, the miti-
gation dynamic switches to one focused on carbon-intensity reduc-
tions (see AR4, Fisher et al., 2007, Section 3.3.5.2). From the perspec-
tive of end-use sectors, decarbonization of energy involves both the 
decarbonization of existing sources, for example, by producing electric-
ity from low-carbon sources or using liquid fuels made from bioenergy, 
and an increase in the use of lower-carbon fuels, for example, through 
an increase in the use of electricity (Edmonds et al., 2006; Kyle et al., 
2009; Sugiyama, 2012; Williams et al., 2012; Krey et al., 2014; Yama-
moto et al., 2014). It should be noted that there is generally an autono-
mous increase in electrification in baseline scenarios that do not 
assume any climate policies, which reflects a trend toward more con-
venient grid-based fuels due to higher affluence (Nakicenovic et  al., 
1998; Schäfer, 2005), as well as electricity typically showing a slower 
cost increase over time compared to other energy carriers (Edmonds 
et al., 2006; Krey et al., 2014).
The comparison between integrated and sectoral studies is difficult 
with regard to the timing and tradeoffs between fuel switching and 
energy reduction, because few sectoral studies have attempted to 
look concurrently at both fuel switching and energy-reduction strat-
egies. Instead, the majority of sectoral studies have focused most 
heavily on energy reduction, asking how much energy use for a par-
ticular activity can be reduced with state-of-the-art technology. One 
reason for this focus on energy reduction is that sectoral research 
is more commonly focused on near-term actions based on available 
mitigation technologies and, in the near-term, major fuel sources 
such as liquid fuels and electricity may have high-carbon intensities. 
This means that energy reductions will have substantial near-term 
mitigation effects. In the longer term, however, these fuel sources 
will be largely decarbonized along low-concentration transformation 
pathways, meaning that energy reductions will not so clearly lead to 
reductions in indirect emissions (note that this does not mean they 
do not continue to be important, because they decrease the need for 
utilizing energy sources and the associated co-benefits and risks, see 
Section 6.6).
This evolution can be clearly seen through a comparison of direct and 
indirect emissions in end-use sectors in integrated modelling scenarios 
(Figure 6.36). In 2010, the largest part of emissions from the buildings 
sector are the indirect emissions from electricity. This trend continues in 
baseline scenarios (Figure 6.36). However, in deep emission-reduction 
scenarios, indirect emissions from electricity are largely eliminated by 
2050, and in many scenarios, the electricity sector even becomes a sink 
for CO2 through the use of BECCS (Figure 6.35, left panel). There are 
only minimal indirect emissions from electricity in the transport sector 
today and by 2050 in mitigation scenarios. Those scenarios that decar-
bonize the transportation sector through electrification do so by taking 
advantage of a largely decarbonized electricity sector. The industrial 
sector lies between the buildings and transport sectors. Of importance, 
the observed trends can be very regional in character. For example, 
the value of electrification will be higher in countries or regions that 
already have low-carbon electricity portfolios.
The primary distinction between sectoral studies and integrated model-
ling studies with regard to end-use options for fuel switching and end-
use reductions is that integrated models typically represent end-use 
options at a more aggregated scale than sectoral studies. In addition, 
however, there is an important difference in the way that the two types 
of studies attempt to ascertain opportunities (see Section 8.9). Long-
term mitigation scenarios from integrated models achieve reductions 
from baseline emissions based almost exclusively on the imposition of a 
carbon price and generally assume functioning markets and may not 
Figure 6�36 | Direct CO2 emissions vs. indirect CO2 emissions from electricity in the transport, buildings, and industry sectors in 2050 for baseline and mitigation scenarios reach-
ing 430 – 480 ppm and 530 – 580 ppm CO2eq in 2100. Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10). Includes only scenarios based on idealized policy implementation that 
provide emissions at the sectoral level. Historical data from JRC / PBL (2013), IEA (2012a), see Annex II.9.
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fully represent existing barriers, in particular in end-use sectors. In con-
trast, sectoral studies explore options for energy-demand reduction 
based on engineering and / or local details and do so based on cost-
effectiveness calculations regarding a typically much richer portfolio of 
tailored options. They also recognize that there are many boundaries to 
consumer rationality and thus not all options that are cost-effective hap-
pen automatically in a baseline, but are mobilized by mitigation policies. 
It is also challenging to compare the potential for energy reductions 
across sectoral and integrated studies, because of difficulties to discern 
the degree of mitigation that has occurred in the baseline itself in these 
studies. Therefore any comparisons must be considered approximate at 
best. It is important to note that the emphasis on economic instruments 
like carbon pricing in integrated studies leads to a negative correlation 
between energy-demand reduction and the option of switching to low-
carbon energy carriers at modest cost. Therefore, integrated studies that 
foresee a significant potential for switching to electricity, for example, in 
an end-use sector at modest costs, usually show a lower need for reduc-
ing energy demand in this sector and the other way around. It should 
also be noted that there is not always a clear cut distinction between 
sectoral and integrated studies. Some sectoral studies, in particular 
those that provide estimates for both energy savings and fuel switching, 
are in fact integrated studies with considerable sectoral detail such as 
the IEA World Energy Outlook (IEA, 2010b, 2012b) or the Energy Tech-
nology Perspectives report (IEA, 2008, 2010c) (see Annex II.10). 
In general, in the transport sector, the opportunities for energy-use 
reductions and fuel switching are broadly consistent between inte-
grated and sectoral studies (Figures 6.37 and 6.38, Section 8.9). 
However, the underlying mechanisms utilized in these studies may 
be different. Comprehensive transport sector studies tend to include 
technical efficiency measures, switching to low-carbon fuels, behav-
ioural changes that affect both the modal split and the amount of 
transport services demanded, and a broader set of infrastructural 
characteristics such as compact cities. In integrated studies, these 
factors are not always addressed explicitly, and the focus is usually 
on technical efficiency measures, fuel switching and service demand 
reduction. Regarding fuel choice, the majority of integrated stud-
ies indicate a continued reliance on liquid and gaseous fuels, sup-
ported by an increase in the use of bioenergy up to 2050. Many inte-
grated studies also include substantial shares of electricity through, 
for example, the use of electric vehicles for light-duty transporta-
tion, usually during the second-half of the century. Hydrogen has 
also been identified by numerous studies as a potential long-term 
solution should storage, production, and distribution challenges be 
overcome (Section 8.9.1). While electricity and hydrogen achieve 
substantial shares in some scenarios, many integrated modelling sce-
narios show no dominant transport fuel source in 2100. This prevails 
in scenarios leading to 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq concentration levels in 
2100 with the median values for the share of electricity and hydro-
Figure 6�37 | Sectoral final energy demand reduction relative to baseline in the energy end-use sectors, transport, buildings, and industry by 2030 and 2050 in mitigation scenarios 
reaching 430 – 530 ppm and 530 – 650 ppm CO2eq in 2100 (see Section 6.3.2) compared to sectoral studies assessed in Chapters 8 – 10. Filled circles correspond to sectoral studies 
with full sectoral coverage while empty circles correspond to studies with only partial sectoral coverage (e. g., heating and cooling only for buildings). Source: WG III AR5 Scenario 
Database (Annex II.10). Includes only scenarios based on idealized policy implementation. Sectoral studies as provided by Chapters 8, 9, and 10, see Annex II.10.























































































































gen in 2100 being 22 % and 25 % of final energy, respectively (Sec-
tion 8.9.1, Figure 8.9.4).
Detailed building sector studies indicate energy savings potential 
by 2050 on the upper end of what integrated studies show (Section 
9.8.2, Figure 9.19), and both sectoral and integrated studies show 
modest opportunities for fuel switching due to the already high 
level of electricity consumption in the buildings sector, particularly 
in developed countries (Figures 6.37 and 6.38). Building sector stud-
ies have focused largely on identifying options for saving energy 
whereas fuel switching as a means for reducing emissions is not con-
sidered in detail by most studies. In general, both sectoral and inte-
grated studies indicate that electricity will supply a dominant share 
of building energy demand over the long term, especially if heating 
demand decreases due to a combination of efficiency gains, better 
architecture and climate change. Best case new buildings can reach 
90 % lower space heating and cooling energy use compared to the 
existing stock (Section 9.3.3), while for existing buildings, deep ret-
rofits can achieve heating and cooling energy savings in the range of 
50 – 90 % (Section 9.3.4).
Detailed industry sector studies tend to be more conservative regard-
ing savings in industrial final energy compared to baseline, but on the 
other hand foresee a greater potential for switching to low-carbon 
fuels, including electricity, heat, hydrogen and bioenergy than inte-
grated studies (Figures 6.37 and 6.38). Sectoral studies, which are 
often based on micro unit-level analyses, indicate that the broad appli-
cation of best available technologies for energy reduction could lead to 
about 25 % of energy savings in the sector with immediate deployment 
and similar contributions could be achieved with new innovations 
and deployment across a large number of production processes (Sec-
tion 10.4). Integrated models in general (with exceptions, see Section 
10.10.1) treat the industry sector in a more aggregated fashion and 
mostly do not provide detailed sub-sectoral material flows, options for 
reducing material demand, and price-induced inter-input substitution 
possibilities explicitly (Section  10.10.1). Similar to the transportation 
sector, there is no single perceived near- or long-term configuration 
for industrial energy (see Sections 10.4 and 10.7). Multiple pathways 
may be pursued or chosen depending on process selection and tech-
nology development. For the industry sector to achieve near-zero 
emission with carbonaceous energy, carriers will need CCS facilities 
though market penetration of this technology is still highly uncertain 
and only limited examples are in place so far. Some integrated studies 
indicate a move toward electricity whereas others indicate a continued 
reliance on liquid or solid fuels, largely supported through bioenergy 
(Section 10.10.1, Figure 10.14). Due to the heterogeneous character of 
the industry sector a coherent comparison between sectoral and inte-
grated studies remains difficult.
Figure 6�38 | Development of final energy low-carbon fuel shares in the energy end-use sectors transport, buildings, and industry by 2030 and 2050 in baseline and mitigation 
scenarios reaching 430 – 530 ppm and 530 – 650 ppm CO2eq in 2100 (see Section 6.3.2) compared to sectoral studies assessed in Chapters 8 – 10. Low-carbon fuels include electric-
ity, hydrogen, and liquid biofuels in transport, electricity in buildings and electricity, heat, hydrogen, and bioenergy in industry. Filled symbols correspond to sectoral studies with 
additional climate policies whereas empty symbols correspond to studies with baseline assumptions. Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10). Includes only scenarios 
based on idealized policy implementation. Sectoral studies as provided by Chapters 8, 9, and 10, see Annex II.10. Historical data from IEA (2012c; d).





































































































6�8�5 Options for bioenergy production, 
reducing land-use change emissions, and 
creating land-use GHG sinks
As noted in Section 6.3.5, land use has three primary roles in miti-
gation: bioenergy production, storage of carbon in terrestrial systems, 
mitigation of non-CO2 GHGs. It also influences mitigation through 
biogeophysical factors such as albedo. Integrated modelling studies 
are the primary means by which the tradeoffs and synergies between 
these different roles, in particular the first two, might unfold over the 
rest of the century. The integrated modelling studies sketch out a wide 
range of ways in which these forces might affect the land surface, from 
widespread afforestation under comprehensive climate policies to 
widespread deforestation if carbon storage on land is not included in 
the mitigation policy (Sections 6.3.5 and 11.9).
Sectoral studies complement integrated modelling studies by explor-
ing the ability of policy and social structures to support broad 
changes in land-use practices over time (Section 11.6). In general, 
sectoral studies point to the challenges associated with making 
large-scale changes to the land surface in the name of mitigation, 
such as challenges associated with institutions, livelihoods, social 
and economic concerns, and technology and infrastructure. These 
challenges raise questions about transformation pathways (Section 
11.6). For example, although increasing the land area covered by nat-
ural forests could enhance biodiversity and a range of other ecosys-
tem services, afforestation occurring through large-scale plantations 
could negatively impact biodiversity, water, and other ecosystem 
services (Sections 11.7 and 11.13.6). Similarly, the use of large land 
areas for afforestation or dedicated feedstocks for bioenergy could 
increase food prices and compromise food security if land normally 
used for food production is converted to bioenergy or forests (Sec-
tion 11.4). The degree of these effects is uncertain and depends on 
a variety of sector-specific details regarding intensification of land 
use, changes in dietary habits, global market interactions, and bio-
physical characteristics and dynamics. The implications of transfor-
mation pathways that rely heavily on reductions of non-CO2 GHGs 
from agriculture depend on whether mitigation is achieved through 
reduced absolute emissions, or through reduced emissions per unit of 
agricultural product (Section 11.6), and the role of large-scale inten-
sive agriculture, which has often not been implemented sustainably 
(e. g., large areas of monoculture food or energy crops or intensive 
livestock production, potentially damaging ecosystem services). Fur-
thermore, sector studies are beginning to elucidate implementation 
issues, such as the implications of staggered and / or partial regional 
adoption of land mitigation policies, as well as institutional design. 
For example, realizing large-scale bioenergy without compromising 
the terrestrial carbon stock might require strong institutional condi-
tions, such as an implemented and enforced global price on land car-
bon. Finally, sector studies will continue to provide revised and new 
characterizations of mitigation technologies that can be evaluated in 
a portfolio context (Section 11.9). 
6.9 Carbon and  radiation 
management and 
other geo- engineering 
options including 
 environmental risks
Some scientists have argued that it might be useful to consider, in 
addition to mitigation and adaptation measures, various intentional 
interventions into the climate system as part of a broader climate 
policy strategy (Keith, 2000; Crutzen, 2006). Such technologies have 
often been grouped under the blanket term ‘geoengineering’ or, alter-
natively, ‘climate engineering’ (Keith, 2000; Vaughan and Lenton, 
2011). Calls for research into these technologies have increased in 
recent years (Caldeira and Keith, 2010; Science and Technology Com-
mittee, 2010), and several assessments have been conducted (Royal 
Society, 2009; Edenhofer et al., 2011; Ginzky et al., 2011; Rickels et al., 
2011). Two categories of geoengineering are generally distinguished. 
Removal of GHGs, in particular carbon dioxide termed ‘carbon diox-
ide removal’ or CDR, would reduce atmospheric GHG concentrations. 
The boundary between some mitigation and some CDR methods is 
not always clear (Boucher et al., 2011, 2013). ‘Solar radiation manage-
ment’ or SRM technologies aim to increase the reflection of sunlight to 
cool the planet and do not fall within the usual definitions of mitiga-
tion and adaptation. Within each of these categories, there is a wide 
range of techniques that are addressed in more detail in Sections 6.5 
and 7.7 of the WG I report. 
Many geoengineering technologies are presently only hypothetical. 
Whether or not they could actually contribute to the avoidance of future 
climate change impacts is not clear (Blackstock et al., 2009; Royal Soci-
ety, 2009). Beyond open questions regarding environmental effects and 
technological feasibility, questions have been raised about the socio-
political dimensions of geoengineering and its potential implications 
for climate politics (Barrett, 2008; Royal Society, 2009; Rickels et  al., 
2011). In the general discussion, geoengineering has been framed in a 
number of ways (Nerlich and Jaspal, 2012; Macnaghten and Szerszyn-
ski, 2013; Luokkanen et al., 2013; Scholte et al., 2013), for instance, as 
a last resort in case of a climate emergency (Blackstock et  al., 2009; 
McCusker et al., 2012), or as a way to buy time for implementing con-
ventional mitigation (Wigley, 2006; Institution of Mechanical Engineers, 
2009; MacCracken, 2009). Most assessments agree that geoengineer-
ing technologies should not be treated as a replacement for conven-
tional mitigation and adaptation due to the high costs involved for 
some techniques, particularly most CDR methods, and the potential 
risks, or pervasive uncertainties involved with nearly all techniques 
(Royal Society, 2009; Rickels et al., 2011). The potential role of geoengi-
neering as a viable component of climate policy is yet to be determined, 
and it has been argued that geoengineering could become a distraction 





6�9�1 Carbon dioxide removal
6�9�1�1 Proposed carbon dioxide removal methods and 
characteristics
Proposed CDR methods involve removing CO2 from the atmosphere 
and storing the carbon in land, ocean, or geological reservoirs. These 
methods vary greatly in their estimated costs, risks to humans and 
the environment, potential scalability, and notably in the depth of 
research about their potential and risks. Some techniques that fall 
within the definition of CDR are also regarded as mitigation mea-
sures such as afforestation and BECCS (see Glossary). The term 
‘negative emissions technologies’ can be used as an alternative to 
CDR (McGlashan et al., 2012; McLaren, 2012; Tavoni and Socolow, 
2013).
The WG I report (Section 6.5.1) provides an extensive but not exhaus-
tive list of CDR techniques (WG I Table 6.14). Here only techniques that 
feature more prominently in the literature are covered. This includes 
(1) increased land carbon sequestration by reforestation and affores-
tation, soil carbon management, or biochar (see WG  III Chapter 11); 
(2) increased ocean carbon sequestration by ocean fertilization; (3) 
increased weathering through the application of ground silicates to 
soils or the ocean; and (4) chemical or biological capture with geologi-
cal storage by BECCS or direct air capture (DAC). CDR techniques can 
be categorized in alternative ways. For example, they can be catego-
rized (1) as industrial technologies versus ecosystem manipulation; (2) 
by the pathway for carbon dioxide capture (e. g. McLaren, 2012; Cal-
deira et al., 2013); (3) by the fate of the stored carbon (Stephens and 
Keith, 2008); and (4) by the scale of implementation (Boucher et al., 
2013). Removal of other GHGs, e. g., CH4 and N2O, have also been pro-
posed (Boucher and Folberth, 2010; de Richter and Caillol, 2011; Sto-
laroff et al., 2012). 
All CDR techniques have a similar slow impact on rates of warming as 
mitigation measures (van Vuuren and Stehfest, 2013) (see WG I Section 
6.5.1). An atmospheric ‘rebound effect’ (see WG  I Glossary) dictates 
that CDR requires roughly twice as much CO2 removed from the atmo-
sphere for any desired net reduction in atmospheric CO2 concentration, 
as some CO2 will be returned from the natural carbon sinks (Lenton 
and Vaughan, 2009; Matthews, 2010). Permanence of the storage res-
ervoir is a key consideration for CDR efficacy. Permanent (larger than 
tens of thousands of years) could be geological reservoirs while non-
permanent reservoirs include oceans and land (the latter could, among 
others, be affected by the magnitude of future climate change) (see 
WG I Section 6.5.1). Storage capacity estimates suggest geological res-
ervoirs could store several thousand GtC; the oceans a few thousand 
GtC in the long term, and the land may have the potential to store 
the equivalent to historical land-use loss of 180 ± 80 GtC (also see 
Table 6.15 of WG  I)(IPCC, 2005; House et  al., 2006; Orr, 2009; Mat-
thews, 2010). 
Ocean fertilization field experiments show no consensus on the effi-
cacy of iron fertilization (Boyd et  al., 2007; Smetacek et  al., 2012). 
Modelling studies estimate between 15 ppm and less than 100 ppm 
drawdown of CO2 from the atmosphere over 100 years (Zeebe and 
Archer, 2005; Cao and Caldeira, 2010) while simulations of mechanical 
upwelling suggest 0.9 Gt / yr (Oschlies et al., 2010). The latter technique 
has not been field tested. There are a number of possible risks including 
downstream decrease in productivity, expanded regions of low-oxygen 
concentration, and increased N2O emissions (See WG I Section 6.5.3.2) 
(low confidence). Given the uncertainties surrounding effectiveness 
and impacts, this CDR technique is at a research phase with no active 
commercial ventures. Furthermore, current international governance 
states that marine geoengineering including ocean fertilization is to 
be regulated under amendments to the London Convention / London 
Protocol on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes 
and Other Matter, only allowing legitimate scientific research (Güssow 
et al., 2010; International Maritime Organization, 2013).
Enhanced weathering on land using silicate minerals mined, crushed, 
transported, and spread on soils has been estimated to have a poten-
tial capacity, in an idealized study, of 1 GtC / yr (Köhler et al., 2010). 
Ocean-based weathering CDR methods include use of carbonate or 
silicate minerals processed or added directly to the ocean (see WG I 
Section 6.5.2.3). All of these measures involve a notable energy 
demand through mining, crushing, and transporting bulk materials. 
Preliminary hypothetical cost estimates are in the order of 23 – 66 
USD / tCO2 (Rau and Caldeira, 1999; Rau et  al., 2007) for land and 
51 – 64 USD / tCO2 for ocean methods (McLaren, 2012). The confidence 
level on the carbon cycle impacts of enhanced weathering is low 
(WG I Section 6.5.3.3). 
The use of CCS technologies (IPCC, 2005) with biomass energy also 
creates a carbon sink (Azar et  al., 2006; Gough and Upham, 2011). 
BECCS is included in the RCP 2.6 (van Vuuren et al., 2007, 2011b) and 
a wide range of scenarios reaching similar and higher concentration 
goals. From a technical perspective, BECCS is very similar to a com-
bination of other techniques that are part of the mitigation portfolio: 
the production of bio-energy and CCS for fossil fuels. Estimates of the 
global technical potential for BECCS vary greatly ranging from 3 to 
more than 10 GtCO2 / yr (Koornneef et  al., 2012; McLaren, 2012; van 
Vuuren et al., 2013), while initial cost estimates also vary greatly from 
around 60 to 250 USD / tCO2 (McGlashan et al., 2012; McLaren, 2012). 
Important limiting factors for BECCS include land availability, a sus-
tainable supply of biomass and storage capacity (Gough and Upham, 
2011; McLaren, 2012). There is also a potential issue of competition for 
biomass under bioenergy-dependent mitigation pathways.
Direct air capture uses a sorbent to capture CO2 from the atmosphere 
and the long-term storage of the captured CO2 in geological reservoirs 
(GAO, 2011; McGlashan et al., 2012; McLaren, 2012). There are a number 
of proposed capture methods including adsorption of CO2 using amines 





or sodium cycling. Current research efforts focus on capture methodolo-
gies (Keith et al., 2006; Baciocchi et al., 2006; Lackner, 2009; Eisenberger 
et al., 2009; Socolow et al., 2011) with storage technologies assumed 
to be the same as CCS (IPCC, 2005). A U. S. Government Accountabil-
ity Office (GAO) (2011) technology assessment concluded that all DAC 
methods were currently immature. A review of initial hypothetical cost 
estimates, summarizes 40 – 300 USD / tCO2 for supported amines and 
165 – 600 USD / tCO2 for sodium or calcium scrubbers (McLaren, 2012) 
reflecting an ongoing debate across very limited literature. Carbon diox-
ide captured through CCS, BECCS, and DAC are all intended to use the 
same storage reservoirs (in particular deep geologic reservoirs), poten-
tially limiting their combined use under a transition pathway. 
6�9�1�2 Role of carbon dioxide removal in the context of 
transformation pathways
Two of the CDR techniques listed above, BECCS and afforestation, are 
already evaluated in the current integrated models. For concentration 
goals on the order of 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq by 2100, BECCS forms an 
essential component of the response strategy for climate change in 
the majority of scenarios in the literature, particularly in the context of 
concentration overshoot. As discussed in Section 6.2.2, BECCS offers 
additional mitigation potential, but also an option to delay some of the 
drastic mitigation action that would need to happen to reach lower 
GHG-concentration goals by the second half of the century. In sce-
narios aiming at such low-concentration levels, BECCS is usually com-
petitive with conventional mitigation technologies, but only after these 
have been deployed at very large scale (see Azar et al., 2010; Tavoni 
and Socolow, 2013). At same time, BECCS applications do not feature 
in less ambitious mitigation pathways (van Vuuren et al., 2011a). Key 
implications of the use of BECCS in transition pathways is that emis-
sion reduction decisions are directly related to expected availability and 
deployment of BECCS in the second half of the century and that scenar-
ios might temporarily overshoot temperature or concentration goals. 
The vast majority of scenarios in the literature show CO2 emissions of 
LUC become negative in the second half of the century — even in the 
absence of mitigation policy (see Section 6.3.2). This is a consequence 
of demographic trends and assumptions on land-use policy. Addition-
ally afforestation as part of mitigation policy is included in a smaller 
set of models. In these models, afforestation measures increase for 
lower-concentration categories, potentially leading to net uptake of 
carbon of around 10 GtCO2 / yr.
There are broader discussions in the literature regarding the techno-
logical challenges and potential risks of large-scale BECCS deploy-
ment. The potential role of BECCS will be influenced by the sustain-
able supply of large-scale biomass feedstock and feasibility of capture, 
transport, and long-term underground storage of CO2 as well as the 
perceptions of these issues. The use of BECCS faces large challenges in 
financing, and currently no such plants have been built and tested at 
scale. Integrated modeling studies have therefore explored the sensi-
tivities regarding the availability of BECCS in the technology portfolio 
by limiting bioenergy supply or CCS storage (Section 6.3.6.3).
Only a few papers have assessed the role of DAC in mitigation scenar-
ios (e. g. Keith et al., 2006; Keller et al., 2008a; Pielke Jr, 2009; Nemet 
and Brandt, 2012; Chen and Tavoni, 2013). These studies generally 
show that the contribution of DAC hinges critically on the stringency 
of the concentration goal, the costs relative to other mitigation tech-
nologies, time discounting and assumptions about scalability. In these 
models, the influence of DAC on the mitigation pathways is similar to 
that of BECCS (assuming similar costs). That is, it leads to a delay in 
short-term emission reduction in favour of further reductions in the 
second half of the century. Other techniques are even less mature and 
currently not evaluated in integrated models.
There are some constraints to the use of CDR techniques as empha-
sized in the scenario analysis. First of all, the potential for BECCS, 
afforestation, and DAC are constrained on the basis of available land 
and / or safe geologic storage potential for CO2. Both the potential for 
sustainable bio-energy use (including competition with other demands, 
e. g., food, fibre, and fuel production) and the potential to store > 100 
GtC of CO2 per decade for many decades are very uncertain (see previ-
ous section) and raise important societal concerns. Finally, the large-
scale availability of CDR, by shifting the mitigation burden in time, 
could also exacerbate inter-generational impacts.
6�9�2 Solar radiation management
6�9�2�1 Proposed solar radiation management methods 
and characteristics
SRM geoengineering technologies aim to lower the Earth’s tempera-
ture by reducing the amount of sunlight that is absorbed by the Earth’s 
surface, and thus countering some of the GHG induced global warm-
ing. Most techniques work by increasing the planetary albedo, thus 
reflecting a greater fraction of the incoming sunlight back to space. A 
number of SRM methods have been proposed:
•	 Mirrors (or sunshades) placed in a stable orbit between the Earth 
and Sun would directly reduce the insolation the Earth receives 
(Early, 1989; Angel, 2006). Studies suggest that such a technology 
is unlikely to be feasible within the next century (Angel, 2006). 
•	 Stratospheric aerosol injection would attempt to imitate the global 
cooling that large volcanic eruptions produce (Budyko and Miller, 
1974; Crutzen, 2006; Rasch et al., 2008). This might be achieved by 
lofting sulphate aerosols (or other aerosol species) or their precur-
sors to the stratosphere to create a high-altitude reflective layer 
that would need to be continually replenished. Section 7.7.2.1 of 
WG I assessed that there is medium confidence that up to 4 W/m2 





•	 Cloud brightening might be achieved by increasing the albedo of 
certain marine clouds through the injection of cloud condensation 
nuclei, most likely sea salt, producing an effect like that seen when 
ship-tracks of brighter clouds form behind polluting ships (Latham, 
1990; Latham et al., 2008, 2012). Section 7.7.2.2 of WG I assessed 
that too little was known about marine cloud brightening to pro-
vide a definitive statement on its potential efficacy, but noted that 
it might be sufficient to counter the radiative forcing that would 
result from a doubling of CO2 levels. 
•	 Various methods have been proposed that could increase the 
albedo of the planetary surface, for example in urban, crop, and 
desert regions (President’s Science Advisory Committee. Environ-
mental Pollution Panel, 1965; Gaskill, 2004; Hamwey, 2007; Ridg-
well et al., 2009). These methods would likely only be possible on a 
much smaller scale than those listed above. Section 7.7.2.3 of WG I 
discusses these approaches.
This list is non-exhaustive and new proposals for SRM methods may be 
put forward in the future. Another method that is discussed alongside 
SRM methods aims to increase outgoing thermal radiation through the 
modification of cirrus clouds (Mitchell and Finnegan, 2009) (see WG I 
Section 7.7.2.4). 
As SRM geoengineering techniques only target the solar radiation 
budget of the Earth, the effects of CO2 and other GHGs on the Earth 
System would remain, for example, greater absorption and re-emis-
sion of thermal radiation by the atmosphere (WG I Section 7.7), an 
enhanced CO2 physiological effect on plants (WG I Section 6.5.4), and 
increased ocean acidification (Matthews et al., 2009). Although SRM 
geoengineering could potentially reduce the global mean surface air 
temperature, no SRM technique could fully return the climate to a 
pre-industrial or low-CO2-like state. One reason for this is that global 
mean temperature and global mean hydrological cycle intensity can-
not be simultaneously returned to a pre-industrial state (Govindasamy 
and Caldeira, 2000; Robock et al., 2008; Schmidt et al., 2012; Kravitz 
et al., 2013; MacMartin et al., 2013; Tilmes et al., 2013). Section 7.7.3 
of WG I details the current state of knowledge on the potential climate 
consequences of SRM geoengineering. In brief, simulation studies sug-
gest that some SRM geoengineering techniques applied to a high-CO2 
climate could create climate conditions more like those of a low-CO2 
climate (Moreno-Cruz et  al., 2011; MacMartin et  al., 2013), but the 
annual mean, seasonality, and interannual variability of climate would 
be modified compared to the pre-industrial climate (Govindasamy and 
Caldeira, 2000; Lunt et al., 2008; Robock et al., 2008; Ban-Weiss and 
Caldeira, 2010; Moreno-Cruz et al., 2011; Schmidt et al., 2012; Kravitz 
et al., 2013; MacMartin et al., 2013). SRM geoengineering that could 
reduce global mean temperatures would reduce thermosteric sea-level 
rise and would likely also reduce glacier and ice-sheet contributions to 
sea-level rise (Irvine et al., 2009, 2012; Moore et al., 2010).
Model simulations suggest that SRM would result in substantially 
altered global hydrological conditions, with uncertain consequences 
for specific regional responses such as precipitation and evaporation in 
monsoon regions (Bala et al., 2008; Schmidt et al., 2012; Kravitz et al., 
2013; Tilmes et al., 2013). In addition to the imperfect cancellation of 
GHG-induced changes in the climate by SRM, CO2 directly affects the 
opening of plant stomata, and thus the rate of transpiration of plants 
and in turn the recycling of water over continents, soil moisture, and 
surface hydrology (Bala et al., 2007; Betts et al., 2007; Boucher et al., 
2009; Spracklen et al., 2012). 
Due to these broadly altered conditions that would result from an 
implementation of geoengineering, and based on experience from 
studies of the detection and attribution of climate change, it may take 
many decades of observations to be certain whether SRM is respon-
sible for a particular regional trend in climate (Stone et al., 2009; Mac-
Mynowski et al., 2011). These detection and attribution problems also 
imply that field testing to identify some of the climate consequences of 
SRM geoengineering would require deployment at a sizeable fraction 
of full deployment for a period of many years or even decades (Robock 
et al., 2010; MacMynowski et al., 2011).
It is important to note that in addition to affecting the planet’s climate, 
many SRM methods could have serious non-climatic side-effects. Any 
stratospheric aerosol injection would affect stratospheric chemistry 
and has the potential to affect stratospheric ozone levels. Tilmes et al. 
(2009) found that sulphate aerosol geoengineering could delay the 
recovery of the ozone hole by decades (WG I Section 7.7.2.1). Strato-
spheric aerosol geoengineering would scatter light, modifying the 
optical properties of the atmosphere. This would increase the diffuse-
to-direct light ratio, which would make the sky appear hazier (Kravitz 
et  al., 2012), reduce the efficacy of concentrated solar power facili-
ties (Murphy, 2009), and potentially increase the productivity of some 
plant species, and preferentially those below the canopy layer, with 
unknown long-term ecosystem consequences (Mercado et al., 2009). 
The installations and infrastructure of SRM geoengineering techniques 
may also have some negative effects that may be particularly acute for 
techniques that are spatially extensive, such as desert albedo geoengi-
neering. SRM would have very little effect on ocean acidification and 
the other direct effects of elevated CO2 concentrations that are likely to 
pose significant risks (see WG I Section 6.5.4). 
6�9�2�2 The relation of solar radiation management to 
climate policy and transformation pathways
A key determinant of the potential role, if any, of SRM in climate policy 
is that some methods might act relatively quickly. For example, strato-
spheric aerosol injection could be deployable within months to years, 
if and when the technology is available, and the climate response to 
the resulting changes in radiative forcing could occur on a timescale 
of a decade or less (e. g. Keith, 2000; Matthews and Caldeira, 2007; 
Royal Society, 2009; Swart and Marinova, 2010; Goes et  al., 2011). 
Mitigating GHG emissions would affect global mean temperatures 





in the carbon cycle (van Vuuren and Stehfest, 2013). Hence, it has been 
argued that SRM technologies could potentially complement mitiga-
tion activities, for example, by countering global GHG radiative forcing 
while mitigation activities are being implemented, or by providing a 
back-up strategy for a hypothetical future situation where short-term 
reductions in radiative forcing may be desirable (Royal Society, 2009; 
Rickels et  al., 2011). However, the relatively fast and strong climate 
response expected from some SRM techniques would also impose 
risks. The termination of SRM geoengineering forcing either by policy 
choice or through some form of failure would result in a rapid rise 
of global mean temperature and associated changes in climate, the 
magnitude of which would depend on the degree of SRM forcing that 
was being exerted and the rate at which the SRM forcing was with-
drawn (Wigley, 2006; Matthews and Caldeira, 2007; Goes et al., 2011; 
Irvine et al., 2012; Jones et al., 2013). It has been suggested that this 
risk could be minimized if SRM geoengineering was used moderately 
and combined with strong CDR geoengineering and mitigation efforts 
(Ross and Matthews, 2009; Smith and Rasch, 2012). The potential of 
SRM to significantly impact the climate on short time-scales, at poten-
tially low cost, and the uncertainties and risks involved in this raise 
important socio-political questions in addition to natural scientific and 
technological considerations in the section above. 
The economic analysis of the potential role of SRM as a climate change 
policy is an area of active research and has, thus far, produced mixed 
and preliminary results (see Klepper and Rickels, 2012). Estimates of 
the direct costs of deploying various proposed SRM methods differ sig-
nificantly. A few studies have indicated that direct costs for some SRM 
methods might be considerably lower than the costs of conventional 
mitigation, but all estimates are subject to large uncertainties because 
of questions regarding efficacy and technical feasibility (Coppock, 
1992; Barrett, 2008; Blackstock et al., 2009; Robock et al., 2009; Pierce 
et al., 2010; Klepper and Rickels, 2012; McClellan et al., 2012). 
However, SRM techniques would carry uncertain risks, do not directly 
address some impacts of anthropogenic GHG emissions, and raise a 
range of ethical questions (see WG III Section 3.3.8) (Royal Society, 2009; 
Goes et  al., 2011; Moreno-Cruz and Keith, 2012; Tuana et  al., 2012). 
While costs for the implementation of a particular SRM method might 
potentially be low, a comprehensive assessment would need to consider 
all intended and unintended effects on ecosystems and societies and 
the corresponding uncertainties (Rickels et al., 2011; Goes et al., 2011; 
Klepper and Rickels, 2012). Because most proposed SRM methods would 
require constant replenishment and an increase in their implementation 
intensity if emissions of GHGs continue, the result of any assessment 
of climate policy costs is strongly dependent on assumptions about the 
applicable discount rate, the dynamics of deployment, the implementa-
tion of mitigation, and the likelihood of risks and side-effects of SRM 
(see Bickel and Agrawal, 2011; Goes et al., 2011). While it has been sug-
gested that SRM technologies may ‘buy time’ for emission reductions 
(Rickels et al., 2011), they cannot substitute for emission reductions in 
the long term because they do not address concentrations of GHGs and 
would only partially and imperfectly compensate for their impacts.
The acceptability of SRM as a climate policy in national and interna-
tional socio-political domains is uncertain. While international com-
mitment is required for effective mitigation, a concern about SRM is 
that direct costs might be low enough to allow countries to unilater-
ally alter the global climate (Bodansky, 1996; Schelling, 1996; Barrett, 
2008). Barrett (2008) and Urpelainen (2012) therefore argue that SRM 
technologies introduce structurally obverse problems to the ‘free-rider’ 
issue in climate change mitigation. Some studies suggest that deploy-
ment of SRM hinges on interstate cooperation, due to the complexity 
of the climate system and the unpredictability of outcomes if states do 
not coordinate their actions (Horton, 2011). In this case, the political 
feasibility of an SRM intervention would depend on the ability of state-
level actors to come to some form of agreement. 
The potential for interstate cooperation and conflict will likely depend 
on the institutional context in which SRM is being discussed, as well 
as on the relative importance given to climate change issues at the 
national and international levels. Whether a broad international agree-
ment is possible is a highly contested subject (see Section  13.4.4) 
(SRMGI, 2012). Several researchers suggest that a UN-based institu-
tional arrangement for decision making on SRM would be most effec-
tive (Barrett, 2008; Virgoe, 2009; Zürn and Schäfer, 2013). So far there 
are no legally binding international norms that explicitly address SRM, 
although certain general rules and principles of international law are 
applicable (see WG II, Chapter 13, p.37). States parties to the UN Con-
vention on Biological Diversity have adopted a non-binding decision on 
geoengineering that establishes criteria that could provide guidance for 
further development of international regulation and governance (CBD 
Decision IX / 16 C (ocean fertilization) and Decision X / 33(8)(w); see also 
LC / LP Resolutions LC-LP.1(2008) and LC-LP.2(2010), preamble). 
Commentators have identified the governance of SRM technologies 
as a significant political and ethical challenge, especially in ensuring 
legitimate decision making, monitoring, and control (Victor, 2008; 
Virgoe, 2009; Bodansky, 2012). Even if SRM would largely reduce the 
global temperature rise due to anthropogenic climate change, as cur-
rent modelling studies indicate, it would also imply a spatial and tem-
poral redistribution of risks. SRM thus introduces important questions 
of intra- and intergenerational justice, both distributive and procedural 
(see Wigley, 2006; Matthews and Caldeira, 2007; Goes et  al., 2011; 
Irvine et  al., 2012; Tuana et  al., 2012; Bellamy et  al., 2012; Preston, 
2013). Furthermore, since the technologies would not remove the need 
for emission reductions, in order to to effectively ameliorate climate 
change over a longer-term SRM regulation would need to be based 
on a viable relation between mitigation and SRM activities, and con-
sider the respective and combined risks of increased GHG concentra-
tions and SRM interventions. The concern that the prospect of a viable 
SRM technology may reduce efforts to mitigate and adapt has featured 
prominently in discussions to date (Royal Society, 2009; Gardiner, 
2011; Preston, 2013).
Whether SRM field research or even deployment would be socially and 





text in which the topic is being discussed. Bellamy et al. (2013) show 
that the success of mitigation policies is likely to have an influence on 
stakeholder acceptability of SRM. While current evidence is limited to 
few studies in a very narrow range of cultural contexts, in a first review 
of early studies on perceptions of geoengineering, Corner et al. (2012) 
find that participants of different studies tend to prefer CDR over SRM 
and mitigation over geoengineering. Considerations that influence 
opinions are, amongst others, the perceived ‘naturalness’ of a technol-
ogy, its reversibility, and the capacity for responsible and transparent 
governance (Corner et al., 2012). Furthermore, the way that the topic is 
framed in the media and by experts plays an important role in influenc-
ing opinions on SRM research or deployment (Luokkanen et al., 2013; 
Scholte et al., 2013). The direction that future discussions may take is 
impossible to predict, since deepened and highly differentiated informa-
tion is rapidly becoming available (Corner et al., 2012; Macnaghten and 
Szerszynski, 2013).
6�9�3 Summary
Despite the assumption of some form of negative CO2 emissions 
in many scenarios, including those leading to 2100 concentrations 
approaching 450 ppm CO2eq, whether proposed CDR or SRM geoen-
gineering techniques can actually play a useful role in transformation 
pathways is uncertain as the efficacy and risks of many techniques are 
poorly understood at present. CDR techniques aim to reduce CO2 (or 
potentially other GHG) concentrations. A broad definition of CDR would 
cover afforestation and BECCS, which are sometimes classified as miti-
gation techniques, but also proposals that are very distinct from mitiga-
tion in terms of technical maturity, scientific understanding, and risks 
such as ocean iron fertilization. The former are often included in current 
integrated models and scenarios and are, in terms of their impact on 
the climate, directly comparable with techniques that are considered 
to be conventional mitigation, notably fossil CCS and bio-energy use. 
Both BECCS and afforestation may play a key role in reaching low-GHG 
concentrations, but at a large scale have substantial land-use demands 
that may conflict with other mitigation strategies and societal needs 
such as food production. Whether other CDR techniques would be able 
to supplement mitigation at any significant scale in the future depends 
upon efficacy, cost, and risks of these techniques, which at present are 
highly uncertain. The properties of potential carbon storage reservoirs 
are also critically important, as limits to reservoir capacity and longevity 
will constrain the quantity and permanence of CO2 storage. Further-
more, some CDR techniques such as ocean iron fertilization may pose 
transboundary risks. The impacts of CDR would be relatively slow: cli-
mate effects would unfold over the course of decades.
In contrast to CDR, SRM would aim to cool the climate by shielding 
sunlight. These techniques would not reduce elevated GHG concentra-
tions, and thus not affect other consequences of high-GHG concentra-
tions, such as ocean acidification. Some SRM proposals could potentially 
cause a large cooling within years, much quicker than mitigation or CDR, 
and a few studies suggest that costs might be considerably lower than 
CDR for some SRM techniques. It has thus been suggested that SRM 
could be used to quickly reduce global temperatures or to limit tempera-
ture rise while mitigation activities are being implemented. However, 
to avoid warming, SRM would need to be maintained as long as GHG 
concentrations remain elevated. Modelling studies show that SRM may 
be able to reduce global average temperatures but would not perfectly 
reverse all climatic changes that occur due to elevated GHG concentra-
tions, especially at local to regional scales. For example, SRM is expected 
to weaken the global hydrological cycle with consequences for regional 
precipitation patterns and surface hydrology, and is expected to change 
the seasonality and variability of climate. Because the potential climate 
impacts of any SRM intervention are uncertain and evidence is very lim-
ited, it is too early to conclude how effective SRM would be in reducing 
climate risks. SRM approaches may also carry significant non-climatic 
side-effects. For example, sulphate aerosol injection would modify 
stratospheric chemistry, potentially reducing ozone levels, and would 
change the appearance of the sky. The risks of SRM interventions and 
large-scale experiments, alongside any potential benefits, raise a num-
ber of ethical and political questions that would require public engage-
ment and international cooperation to address adequately. 
6.10 Gaps in  knowledge 
and data
The questions that motivate this chapter all address the broad char-
acteristics of possible long-term transformation pathways toward sta-
bilization of GHG concentrations. The discussion has not focused on 
today’s global or country-specific technology strategies, policy strate-
gies, or other elements of a near-term strategy. It is therefore within 
this long-term strategic context that gaps in knowledge and data 
should be viewed. 
Throughout this chapter, a number of areas of further development 
have been highlighted. Several areas would be most valuable to fur-
ther the development of information and insights regarding long-term 
transformation pathways. These include the following: development of 
a broader set of socioeconomic and technological storylines to support 
the development of future scenarios; scenarios pursuing a wider set 
of climate goals including those related to temperature change; more 
mitigation scenarios that include impacts from, and adaptations to, a 
changing climate, including energy and land-use systems critical for 
mitigation; expanded treatment of the benefits and risks of CDR and 
SRM options; expanded treatment of co-benefits and risks of mitiga-
tion pathways; improvements in the treatment and understanding of 
mitigation options and responses in end-use sectors in transforma-
tion pathways; and more sophisticated treatments of land use and 
land use-based mitigation options in mitigation scenarios. In addition, 
a major weakness of the current integrated modelling suite is that 





tant area of advancement would be to develop some clearly defined 
regional definitions that can be met by most or all models.
6.11 Frequently Asked 
Questions
FAQ 6�1 Is it possible to bring climate change 
under control given where we are 
and what options are available to us? 
What are the implications of delay-
ing  mitigation or limits on technology 
options? 
Many commonly discussed concentration goals, including the goal 
of reaching 450 ppm CO2eq by the end of the 21st century, are both 
physically and technologically possible. However, meeting long-term 
climate goals will require large-scale transformations in human societ-
ies, from the way that we produce and consume energy to how we 
use the land surface, that are inconsistent with both long-term and 
short-term trends. For example, to achieve a 450 ppm CO2eq concen-
tration by 2100, supplies of low-carbon energy — energy from nuclear 
power, solar power, wind power, hydroelectric power, bioenergy, and 
fossil resources with carbon dioxide capture and storage — might 
need to increase five-fold or more over the next 40 years. The pos-
sibility of meeting any concentration goal therefore depends not just 
on the available technologies and current emissions and concentra-
tions, but also on the capacity of human societies to bear the asso-
ciated economic implications, accept the associated rapid and large-
scale deployment of technologies, develop the necessary institutions 
to manage the transformation, and reconcile the transformation with 
other policy priorities such as sustainable development. Improvements 
in the costs and performance of mitigation technologies will ease the 
burden of this transformation. If the world’s countries cannot take on 
sufficiently ambitious mitigation over the next 20 years, or obstacles 
impede the deployment of important mitigation technologies at large 
scale, goals such as 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100 may no longer be pos-
sible. 
FAQ 6�2 What are the most important 
 technologies for mitigation? Is there a 
silver bullet technology?
Limiting CO2eq concentrations will require a portfolio of options, 
because no single option is sufficient to reduce CO2eq concentrations 
and eventually eliminate net CO2 emissions. A portfolio approach can 
be tailored to local circumstances to take into account other priorities 
such as those associated with sustainable development. Technology 
options include a range of energy supply technologies such as nuclear 
power, solar energy, wind power, and hydroelectric power, as well as 
bioenergy and fossil resources with carbon dioxide capture and storage. 
In addition, a range of end-use technologies will be needed to reduce 
energy consumption, and therefore the need for low-carbon energy, 
and to allow the use of low-carbon fuels in transportation, buildings, 
and industry. Halting deforestation and encouraging an increase in for-
ested land will help to halt or reverse LUC CO2 emissions. Furthermore, 
there are opportunities to reduce non-CO2 emissions from land use and 
industrial sources. Many of these options must be deployed to some 
degree to stabilize CO2eq concentrations. At the same time, although a 
portfolio approach is necessary, if emissions reductions are too modest 
over the coming two decades, it may no longer be possible to reach a 
goal of 450 ppm CO2eq by the end of the century without large-scale 
deployment of carbon dioxide removal technologies. Thus, while no 
individual technology is sufficient, carbon dioxide removal technologies 
could become necessary in such a scenario.
FAQ 6�3 How much would it cost to bring climate 
change under control?
Aggregate economic mitigation cost metrics are an important criterion 
for evaluating transformation pathways and can indicate the level of 
difficulty associated with particular pathways. However, the broader 
socio-economic implications of mitigation go beyond measures of 
aggregate economic costs, as transformation pathways involve a range 
of tradeoffs that link to other policy priorities. Global mitigation cost 
estimates vary widely due to methodological differences along with 
differences in assumptions about future emissions drivers, technolo-
gies, and policy conditions. Most scenario studies collected for this 
assessment that are based on the idealized assumptions that all coun-
tries of the world begin mitigation immediately, there is a single global 
carbon price applied to well-functioning markets, and key technologies 
are available, find that meeting a 430 – 480 ppm CO2eq goal by cen-
tury’s end would entail a reduction in the amount global consumers 
spend of 1 – 4 % in 2030, 2 – 6 % in 2050, and 3 – 11 % in 2100 rela-
tive to what would happen without mitigation. To put these losses in 
context, studies assume that consumption spending might grow from 
four- to over ten-fold over the century without mitigation. Less ambi-
tious goals are associated with lower costs this century. Substantially 
higher and lower estimates have been obtained by studies that con-
sider interactions with pre-existing distortions, non-climate market 
failures, and complementary policies. Studies explicitly exploring the 
implications of less-idealized policy approaches and limited technol-
ogy performance or availability have consistently produced higher cost 
estimates. Delaying mitigation would reduce near-term costs; however 
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The energy systems chapter addresses issues related to the 
mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) from the energy 
supply sector� The energy supply sector, as defined in this report, 
comprises all energy extraction, conversion, storage, transmission, and 
distribution processes that deliver final energy to the end-use sectors 
(industry, transport, and building, as well as agriculture and forestry). 
Demand side measures in the energy end-use sectors are discussed in 
chapters 8 – 11.
The energy supply sector is the largest contributor to global 
greenhouse gas emissions (robust evidence, high agreement). In 
2010, the energy supply sector was responsible for approximately 35 % 
of total anthropogenic GHG emissions. Despite the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto 
Protocol, GHG emissions grew more rapidly between 2000 and 2010 
than in the previous decade. Annual GHG-emissions growth in the global 
energy supply sector accelerated from 1.7 % per year from 1990 – 2000 
to 3.1 % per year from 2000 – 2010. The main contributors to this trend 
were a higher energy demand associated with rapid economic growth 
and an increase of the share of coal in the global fuel mix. [7.2, 7.3] 
In the baseline scenarios assessed in AR5, direct CO2 emissions 
of the energy supply sector increase from 14�4 GtCO2 / yr in 
2010 to 24 – 33 GtCO2 / yr in 2050 (25 – 75th percentile; full range 
15 – 42 GtCO2 / yr), with most of the baseline scenarios assessed 
in AR5 showing a significant increase (medium evidence, medium 
agreement). The lower end of the full range is dominated by scenarios 
with a focus on energy intensity improvements that go well beyond 
the observed improvements over the past 40 years. The availability of 
fossil fuels alone will not be sufficient to limit CO2-equivalent (CO2eq) 
concentrations to levels such as 450 ppm, 550 ppm, or 650 ppm. [6.3.4, 
Figures 6.15, 7.4, 7.11.1, Figure TS 15] 
Multiple options exist to reduce energy supply sector GHG 
emissions (robust evidence, high agreement). These include energy 
efficiency improvements and fugitive emission reductions in fuel 
extraction as well as in energy conversion, transmission, and distribu-
tion systems; fossil fuel switching; and low-GHG energy supply tech-
nologies such as renewable energy (RE), nuclear power, and carbon 
dioxide capture and storage (CCS). [7.5, 7.8.1, 7.11]
The stabilization of GHG concentrations at low levels requires 
a fundamental transformation of the energy supply system, 
including the long-term substitution of unabated1 fossil fuel 
conversion technologies by low-GHG alternatives (robust evi-
dence, high agreement). Concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere 
can only be stabilized if global (net) CO2 emissions peak and decline 
1 These are fossil fuel conversion technologies not using carbon dioxide capture and 
storage technologies. 
toward zero in the long term. Improving the energy efficiencies of fos-
sil power plants and / or the shift from coal to gas will not by itself be 
sufficient to achieve this. Low-GHG energy supply technologies are 
found to be necessary if this goal is to be achieved. [ 7.5.1, 7.8.1, 
7.11]
Decarbonizing (i� e� reducing the carbon intensity of) electric-
ity generation is a key component of cost-effective mitigation 
strategies in achieving low-stabilization levels (430 – 530 ppm 
CO2eq); in most integrated modelling scenarios, decarboniza-
tion happens more rapidly in electricity generation than in the 
industry, buildings and transport sectors (medium evidence, high 
agreement). In the majority of low-stabilization scenarios, the share 
of low-carbon electricity supply (comprising RE, nuclear and CCS) 
increases from the current share of approximately 30 % to more than 
80 % by 2050, and fossil fuel power generation without CCS is phased 
out almost entirely by 2100. [7.11]
Since the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), many RE technologies have 
demonstrated substantial performance improvements and cost 
reductions, and a growing number of RE technologies have 
achieved a level of maturity to enable deployment at signifi-
cant scale (robust evidence, high agreement). Some technologies are 
already economically competitive in various settings. While the level-
ized cost of photovoltaic (PV) systems fell most substantially between 
2009 and 2012, a less marked trend has been observed for many other 
RE technologies. Regarding electricity generation alone, RE accounted 
for just over half of the new electricity-generating capacity added glob-
ally in 2012, led by growth in wind, hydro, and solar power. Decentral-
ized RE supply to meet rural energy needs has also increased, including 
various modern and advanced traditional biomass options as well as 
small hydropower, PV, and wind. 
RE technology policies have been successful in driving the recent 
growth of RE. Nevertheless many RE technologies still need direct 
support (e. g., feed-in tariffs, RE quota obligations, and tendering / bid-
ding) and / or indirect support (e. g., sufficiently high carbon prices and 
the internalization of other externalities) if their market shares are to 
be significantly increased. Additional enabling policies are needed to 
address issues associated with the integration of RE into future energy 
systems (medium evidence, medium agreement). [7.5.3, 7.6.1, 7.8.2, 
7.12, 11.13]
There are often co-benefits from the use of RE, such as a reduc-
tion of air pollution, local employment opportunities, few 
severe accidents compared to some other forms of energy sup-
ply, as well as improved energy access and security (medium 
evidence, medium agreement). At the same time, however, some RE 
technologies can have technology- and location-specific adverse side-
effects, though those can be reduced to a degree through appropriate 






Infrastructure and integration challenges vary by RE technology 
and the characteristics of the existing background energy sys-
tem (medium evidence, medium agreement). Operating experience and 
studies of medium to high penetrations of RE indicate that these issues 
can be managed with various technical and institutional tools. As RE 
penetrations increase, such issues are more challenging, must be care-
fully considered in energy supply planning and operations to ensure 
reliable energy supply, and may result in higher costs. [7.6, 7.8.2] 
Nuclear energy is a mature low-GHG emission source of base-
load power, but its share of global electricity generation has 
been declining (since 1993)� Nuclear energy could make an 
increasing contribution to low-carbon energy supply, but a vari-
ety of barriers and risks exist (robust evidence, high agreement). 
Its specific emissions are below 100  gCO2eq per kWh on a lifecycle 
basis and with more than 400 operational nuclear reactors worldwide, 
nuclear electricity represented 11 % of the world’s electricity genera-
tion in 2012, down from a high of 17 % in 1993. Pricing the externali-
ties of GHG emissions (carbon pricing) could improve the competitive-
ness of nuclear power plants. [7.2, 7.5.4, 7.8.1, 7.12]
Barriers to and risks associated with an increasing use of nuclear 
energy include operational risks and the associated safety con-
cerns, uranium mining risks, financial and regulatory risks, unre-
solved waste management issues, nuclear weapon proliferation 
concerns, and adverse public opinion (robust evidence, high agree-
ment). New fuel cycles and reactor technologies addressing some of 
these issues are under development and progress has been made con-
cerning safety and waste disposal (medium evidence, medium agree-
ment). [7.5.4, 7.8.2, 7.9, 7.11]
Carbon dioxide capture and storage technologies could reduce 
the lifecycle GHG emissions of fossil fuel power plants (medium 
evidence, medium agreement). While all components of integrated CCS 
systems exist and are in use today by the fossil fuel extraction and 
refining industry, CCS has not yet been applied at scale to a large, com-
mercial fossil fuel power plant. A variety of pilot and demonstrations 
projects have led to critical advances in the knowledge of CCS sys-
tems and related engineering, technical, economic and policy issues. 
CCS power plants could be seen in the market if they are required for 
fossil fuel facilities by regulation or if they become competitive with 
their unabated counterparts, for instance, if the additional investment 
and operational costs, caused in part by efficiency reductions, are com-
pensated by sufficiently high carbon prices (or direct financial sup-
port). Beyond economic incentives, well-defined regulations concern-
ing short- and long-term responsibilities for storage are essential for a 
large-scale future deployment of CCS. [7.5.5, 7.8.1] 
Barriers to large-scale deployment of CCS technologies include 
concerns about the operational safety and long-term integrity 
of CO2 storage as well as transport risks (limited evidence, medium 
agreement). There is, however, a growing body of literature on how 
to ensure the integrity of CO2 wells, on the potential consequences of 
a pressure buildup within a geologic formation caused by CO2 stor-
age (such as induced seismicity), and on the potential human health 
and environmental impacts from CO2 that migrates out of the primary 
injection zone (limited evidence, medium agreement). [7.5.5, 7.9]
Combining bioenergy with CCS (BECCS) offers the prospect of 
energy supply with large-scale net negative emissions, which 
plays an important role in many low-stabilization scenarios, 
while it entails challenges and risks (limited evidence, medium 
agreement). These challenges and risks include those associated with 
the upstream provision of the biomass that is used in the CCS facility 
as well as those associated with the CCS technology itself. BECCS faces 
large challenges in financing and currently no such plants have been 
built and tested at scale. [7.5.5, 7.8.2, 7.9, 7.12, 11.13]
GHG emissions from energy supply can be reduced significantly 
by replacing current world average coal-fired power plants with 
modern, highly efficient natural gas combined-cycle (NGCC) 
power plants or combined heat and power (CHP) plants, pro-
vided that natural gas is available and the fugitive emissions 
associated with its extraction and supply are low or mitigated 
(robust evidence, high agreement). Lifecycle assessments indicate a 
reduction of specific GHG emissions of approximately 50 % for a shift 
from a current world-average coal power plant to a modern NGCC 
plant depending on natural gas upstream emissions. Substitution of 
natural gas for renewable energy forms increases emissions. Mitiga-
tion scenarios with low-GHG concentration targets (430 – 530 ppm 
CO2eq) require a fundamental transformation of the energy system in 
the long term. In mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 ppm CO2eq 
by 2100, natural gas power generation without CCS typically acts as 
a bridge technology, with deployment increasing before peaking and 
falling to below current levels by 2050 and declining further in the sec-
ond half of the century (robust evidence, high agreement). [7.5.1, 7.8, 
7.9, 7.11] 
Direct GHG emissions from the fossil fuel chain can be reduced 
through various measures (medium evidence, high agreement). 
These include the capture or oxidation of coal bed methane, the reduc-
tion of venting and flaring in oil and gas systems, as well as energy 
efficiency improvements and the use of low-GHG energy sources in the 
fuel chain. [7.5.1]
Greenhouse gas emission trading and GHG taxes have been 
enacted to address the market externalities associated with 
GHG emissions (high evidence, high agreement). In the longer term, 
GHG pricing can support the adoption of low-GHG energy technolo-
gies due to the resulting fuel- and technology-dependent mark up in 
marginal costs. Technology policies (e. g., feed-in tariffs, quotas, and 
tendering / bidding) have proven successful in increasing the share of 
RE technologies (medium evidence, medium agreement). [7.12]
The success of energy policies depends on capacity building, the 





framework, and sufficient regulatory stability (robust evidence, 
high agreement). Property rights, contract enforcement, and emissions 
accounting are essential for the successful implementation of climate 
policies in the energy supply sector. [7.10, 7.12]
The energy infrastructure in developing countries, especially 
in Least Developed Countries (LDCs), is still undeveloped and 
not diversified (robust evidence, high agreement). There are often 
co-benefits associated with the implementation of mitigation energy 
technologies at centralized and distributed scales, which include local 
employment creation, income generation for poverty alleviation, as 
well as building much-needed technical capability and knowledge 
transfer. There are also risks in that the distributive impacts of higher 
prices for low-carbon energy might become a burden on low-income 
households, thereby undermining energy-access programmes, which 
can, however, be addressed by policies to support the poor. [7.9, 7.10]
Although significant progress has been made since AR4 in the 
development of mitigation options in the energy supply sector, 
important knowledge gaps still exist that can be reduced with 
further research and development (R&D)� These especially com-
prise the technological challenges, risks, and co-benefits associated 
with the upscaling and integration of low-carbon technologies into 
future energy systems, and the resulting costs. In addition, research on 
the economic efficiency of climate-related energy policies, and espe-
cially concerning their interaction with other policies applied in the 
energy sector, is limited. [7.13]
7.1 Introduction
The energy supply sector is the largest contributor to global greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions. In 2010, approximately 35 % of total anthropo-
genic GHG emissions were attributed to this sector. Despite the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 
Kyoto Protocol, annual GHG-emissions growth from the global energy 
supply sector accelerated from 1.7 % per year in 1990 – 2000 to 3.1 % 
in 2000 – 2010 (Section 7.3). Rapid economic growth (with the associ-
ated higher demand for power, heat, and transport services) and an 
increase of the share of coal in the global fuel mix were the main con-
tributors to this trend. 
The energy supply sector, as defined in this chapter (Figure 7.1), com-
prises all energy extraction, conversion, storage, transmission, and dis-
tribution processes with the exception of those that use final energy 
to provide energy services in the end-use sectors (industry, transport, 
and building, as well as agriculture and forestry). Concerning energy 
statistics data as reported in Sections 7.2 and 7.3, power, heat, or fuels 
that are generated on site for own use exclusively are not accounted 
for in the assessment of the energy supply sector. Note that many sce-
narios in the literature do not provide a sectoral split of energy-related 
emissions; hence, the discussion of transformation pathways in Section 
7.11 focuses on aggregated energy-related emissions comprising the 
supply and the end-use sectors.
The allocation of cross-cutting issues among other chapters allows for 
a better understanding of the Chapter 7 boundaries (see Figure 7.1). 
The importance of energy for social and economic development is 
reviewed in Chapters 4 and 5 and to a lesser degree in Section 7.9 of 
this chapter. Chapter 6 presents long-term transformation pathways 
and futures for energy systems.
Transport fuel supply, use in vehicles, modal choice, and the local 
infrastructure are discussed in Chapter 8. Building integrated power 
and heat generation as well as biomass use for cooking are addressed 
in Chapter 9. Responsive load issues are dealt with by chapters 8 – 10. 
Chapter 7 considers mitigation options in energy-extraction indus-
tries (oil, gas, coal, uranium, etc.), while other extractive industries 
are addressed in Chapter 10. Together with aspects related to bioen-
ergy usage, provision of biomass is discussed in Chapter 11, which 
covers land uses including agriculture and forestry. Only energy sup-
ply sector-related policies are covered in Chapter 7 while the broader 
and more-detailed climate policy picture is presented in Chapters 
13 – 15. 
The derivation of least-cost mitigation strategies must take into 
account the interdependencies between energy demand and supply. 
Due to the selected division of labor described above, Chapter 7 does 
not discuss demand-side measures from a technological point of view. 
Tradeoffs between demand- and supply-side options, however, are 
considered by the integrated models (IAM) that delivered the trans-
formation pathways collected in the WGIII AR5 Scenario Database (see 
Annex II.10 and, concerning energy supply aspects, Section 7.11).
Chapter 7 assesses the literature evolution of energy systems from 
earlier Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports, 
comprising the Special Report on Carbon Dioxide Capture and Stor-
age (IPCC, 2005), the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) (IPCC, 2007), 
and the Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate 
Change Mitigation (SRREN) (IPCC, 2011a). Section 7.2 describes the 
current status of global and regional energy markets. Energy-related 
GHG-emissions trends together with associated drivers are presented 
in Section 7.3. The next section provides data on energy resources. 
Section 7.5 discusses advances in the field of mitigation technologies. 
Issues related to the integration of low-carbon technologies are cov-
ered in Section 7.6, while Section 7.7 describes how climate change 
may impact energy demand and supply. Section 7.8 discusses emis-
sion-reduction potentials and related costs. Section 7.9 covers issues 
of co-benefits and adverse side effects of mitigation options. Mitiga-
tion barriers are dealt with in Section 7.10. The implications of various 
transformation pathways for the energy sector are covered in Section 
7.11. Section 7.12 presents energy supply sector-specific policies. Sec-
tion 7.13 addresses knowledge gaps and Section 7.14 summarizes fre-
quently asked questions (FAQ). 
Figure 7�1 | Illustrative energy supply paths shown in order to illustrate the boundaries of the energy supply sector as defined in this report. The self-generation of heat and power 

























































Chapter 7 on Energy Systems





7.2 Energy production, 
 conversion,  transmission 
and distribution
The energy supply sector converts over 75 % of total primary energy 
supply (TPES) into other forms, namely, electricity, heat, refined oil 
products, coke, enriched coal, and natural gas. Industry (including 
non-energy use) consumes 84 % of final use of coal and peat, 26 % of 
petroleum products, 47 % of natural gas, 40 % of electricity, and 43 % 
of heat. Transportation consumes 62 % of liquid fuels final use. The 
building sector is responsible for 46 % of final natural gas consump-
tion, 76 % of combustible renewables and waste, 52 % of electricity 
use, and 51 % of heat (Table 7.1). Forces driving final energy-consump-
tion evolution in all these sectors (Chapters 8 – 11) have a significant 
impact on the evolution of energy supply systems, both in scale and 
structure.
The energy supply sector is itself the largest energy user. Energy losses 
assessed as the difference between the energy inputs to (78 % of 
the TPES) and outputs from this sector (48.7 % of TPES) account for 
29.3 % of TPES (Table 7.1). The TPES is not only a function of end users’ 
demand for higher-quality energy carriers, but also the relatively low 
average global efficiency of energy conversion, transmission, and 
distribution processes (only 37 % efficiency for fossil fuel power and 
just 83 % for fossil fuel district heat generation). However, low effi-
ciencies and large own energy use of the energy sector result in high 
emissions; hence, the discussion of transformation pathways in Section 
7.11 focuses on aggregated energy-related emissions comprising the 
supply and the end-use sectors.
The allocation of cross-cutting issues among other chapters allows for 
a better understanding of the Chapter 7 boundaries (see Figure 7.1). 
The importance of energy for social and economic development is 
reviewed in Chapters 4 and 5 and to a lesser degree in Section 7.9 of 
this chapter. Chapter 6 presents long-term transformation pathways 
and futures for energy systems.
Transport fuel supply, use in vehicles, modal choice, and the local 
infrastructure are discussed in Chapter 8. Building integrated power 
and heat generation as well as biomass use for cooking are addressed 
in Chapter 9. Responsive load issues are dealt with by chapters 8 – 10. 
Chapter 7 considers mitigation options in energy-extraction indus-
tries (oil, gas, coal, uranium, etc.), while other extractive industries 
are addressed in Chapter 10. Together with aspects related to bioen-
ergy usage, provision of biomass is discussed in Chapter 11, which 
covers land uses including agriculture and forestry. Only energy sup-
ply sector-related policies are covered in Chapter 7 while the broader 
and more-detailed climate policy picture is presented in Chapters 
13 – 15. 
The derivation of least-cost mitigation strategies must take into 
account the interdependencies between energy demand and supply. 
Due to the selected division of labor described above, Chapter 7 does 
not discuss demand-side measures from a technological point of view. 
Tradeoffs between demand- and supply-side options, however, are 
considered by the integrated models (IAM) that delivered the trans-
formation pathways collected in the WGIII AR5 Scenario Database (see 
Annex II.10 and, concerning energy supply aspects, Section 7.11).
Chapter 7 assesses the literature evolution of energy systems from 
earlier Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports, 
comprising the Special Report on Carbon Dioxide Capture and Stor-
age (IPCC, 2005), the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) (IPCC, 2007), 
and the Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate 
Change Mitigation (SRREN) (IPCC, 2011a). Section 7.2 describes the 
current status of global and regional energy markets. Energy-related 
GHG-emissions trends together with associated drivers are presented 
in Section 7.3. The next section provides data on energy resources. 
Section 7.5 discusses advances in the field of mitigation technologies. 
Issues related to the integration of low-carbon technologies are cov-
ered in Section 7.6, while Section 7.7 describes how climate change 
may impact energy demand and supply. Section 7.8 discusses emis-
sion-reduction potentials and related costs. Section 7.9 covers issues 
of co-benefits and adverse side effects of mitigation options. Mitiga-
tion barriers are dealt with in Section 7.10. The implications of various 
transformation pathways for the energy sector are covered in Section 
7.11. Section 7.12 presents energy supply sector-specific policies. Sec-
tion 7.13 addresses knowledge gaps and Section 7.14 summarizes fre-
quently asked questions (FAQ). 
Figure 7�1 | Illustrative energy supply paths shown in order to illustrate the boundaries of the energy supply sector as defined in this report. The self-generation of heat and power 
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indirect multiplication effects of energy savings from end users. One 
argument (Bashmakov, 2009) is that in estimating indirect energy 
efficiency effects, transformation should be done not only for electric-
ity, for which it is regularly performed, but also for district heating as 
well as for any activity in the energy supply sector, and even for fuels 
transportation. Based on this argument, global energy savings multi-
plication factors are much higher if assessed comprehensively and are 
equal to 1.07 for coal and petroleum products, 4.7 for electricity, and 
2.7 for heat.
Between 2000 – 2010, TPES grew by 27 % globally (2.4 % per annum), 
while for the regions it was 79 % in Asia, 47 % in Middle East and 
Africa (MAF), 32 % in Latin America (LAM), 13 % in Economies 
in Transition (EIT), and it was nearly stable for the countries of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 1990 
(OECD90)2 (IEA, 2012a). After 2010, global TPES grew slower (close 
to 2 % per annum over 2010 – 2012) with Asia, MAF, and LAM show-
2 For regional aggregation, see Annex II.2
ing nearly half their 2000 – 2010 average annual growth rates and 
declining energy use in EIT and OECD90 (BP, 2013; Enerdata, 2013). 
Thus all additional energy demand after 2000 was generated out-
side of the OECD90 (Figure 7.2). The dynamics of the energy mar-
kets evolution in Asia differs considerably from the other markets. 
This region accounted for close to 70 % of the global TPES increment 
in 2000 – 2010 (over 90 % in 2010 – 2012), for all additional coal 
demand, about 70 % of additional oil demand, over 70 % of addi-
tional hydro, and 25 % of additional wind generation (IEA, 2012a; BP, 
2013; Enerdata, 2013). Between 2000 – 2010, China alone more than 
doubled its TPES and contributed to over half of the global TPES incre-
ment, making it now the leading energy-consuming nation.
Led by Asia, global coal consumption grew in 2000 – 2010 by over 4 % 
per annum and a slightly slower rate in 2010 – 2012. Coal contributed 
44 % of the growth in energy use and this growth alone matched the 
total increase in global TPES for 1990 – 2000 (Figure 7.2). Power gener-
ation remains the main global coal renaissance driver (US DOE, 2012). 
China is the leading coal producer (47 % of world 2012 production), 
followed by the United States, Australia, Indonesia, and India (BP, 
Figure 7�2 | Contribution of energy sources to global and regional primary energy use increments. Notes: Modern biomass contributes 40 % of the total biomass share. Underlying 
data from IEA (2012a) for this figure have been converted using the direct equivalent method of accounting for primary energy (see Annex.II.4). Legend: OECD-1990 (OECD-1990), 
Asia (ASIA), Economies in Transition (EIT), Middle East and Africa (MAF), and Latin America (LAM),total primary energy supply (TPES).
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2013). Competitive power markets flexible to gas and coal price 
spreads are creating stronger links between gas and coal markets driv-
ing recent coal use down in the USA, but up in EU (IEA, 2012b). 
Although use of liquid fuels has grown in non-OECD countries (mostly 
in Asia and the MAF), falling demand in the OECD90 has seen oil’s 
share of global energy supply continue to fall in 2000 – 2012. Meet-
ing demand has required mobilization of both conventional and 
unconventional liquid supplies. Relatively low transportation costs 
have given rise to a truly global oil market with 55 % of crude con-
sumption and 28 % of petroleum products being derived from cross-
border trade (Table 7.1). The Organization of the Petroleum Export-
ing Countries (OPEC) in 2012 provided 43 % of the world’s total oil 
supply keeping its share above its 1980 level; 33 % came from the 
Middle East (BP, 2013). The most significant non-OPEC contributors 
to production growth since 2000 were Russia, Canada, United States, 
Kazakhstan, Brazil, and China (GEA, 2012; IEA, 2012b; US DOE, 2012; 
BP, 2013). Growing reliance on oil imports raises concerns of Asia and 
other non-OECD regions about oil prices and supply security (IEA, 
2012b).
In the global gas balance, the share of unconventional gas produc-
tion (shale gas, tight gas, coal-bed methane, and biogas) grew to 16 % 
in 2011 (IEA, 2012c). The shale gas revolution put the United States 
(where the share of unconventional gas more than doubled since 
2000, and reached 67 % in 2011) on top of the list of major contrib-
utors to additional (since 2000) gas supply, followed by Qatar, Iran, 
China, Norway, and Russia (BP, 2013; US DOE, 2013a). Although the 
2000 – 2010 natural gas consumption increments are more widely dis-
tributed among the regions than for oil and coal, gas increments in 
Asia and the MAF dominate. The low energy density of gas means that 
transmission and storage make up a large fraction of the total supply 
chain costs, thus limiting market development. Escalation of Liquefied 
Natural Gas (LNG) markets to 32 % of international gas trade in 2012 
(BP, 2013) has, however, created greater flexibility and opened the way 
to global trade in gas (MIT, 2011). Growth in United States natural gas 
production and associated domestic gas prices decline have resulted in 
the switching of LNG supplies to markets with higher prices in South 
America, Europe, and Asia (IEA, 2012b). Nevertheless, natural gas sup-
ply by pipelines still delivers the largest gas volumes in North America 
and in Europe (US DOE, 2012; BP, 2013). 
Renewables contributed 13.5 % of global TPES in 2010 (Table 7.1). The 
share of renewables in global electricity generation approached 21 % 
in 2012 (BP, 2013; Enerdata, 2013), making them the third-largest con-
tributor to global electricity production, just behind coal and gas, with 
large chances to become the second-largest contributor well before 
2020. Greatest growth during 2005 – 2012 occurred in wind and solar 
with generation from wind increasing 5-fold, and from solar photovol-
taic, which grew 25-fold. By 2012, wind power accounted for over 2 % 
of world electricity production (gaining 0.3 % share each year since 
2008). Additional energy use from solar and wind energy was driven 
mostly by two regions, OECD90 and Asia, with a small contribution 
from the rest of the world (IEA, 2012d). In 2012, hydroelectricity sup-
plied 16.3 % of world electricity (BP, 2013).
New post-2000 trends were registered for nuclear’s role in global 
energy systems. In recent years, the share of nuclear energy in world 
power generation has declined. Nuclear electricity represented 11 % of 
the world’s electricity generation in 2012, down from a high of 17 % 
in 1993; its contribution to global TPES is declining since 2002 (IEA, 
2012b; BP, 2013). Those trends were formed well before the incident at 
the Fukushima nuclear plants in March 2011 and following revision of 
policies towards nuclear power by several governments (IEA, 2012e). 
Growing nuclear contribution to TPES after 2000 was observed only in 
EIT and Asia (mostly in Russia and China). 
Additional information on regional total and per-capita energy con-
sumption and emissions, historic emissions trends and drivers, and 
embedded (consumption-based) emissions is reported in Chapter 5.
7.3 New  developments 
in emission trends 
and drivers
In 2010, the energy supply sector accounts for 49 % of all energy-
related GHG emissions3 (JRC / PBL, 2013) and 35 % of anthropogenic 
GHG emissions, up 13 % from 22 % in 1970, making it the largest sec-
toral contributor to global emissions. According to the Historic Emis-
sion Database, Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research 
(EDGAR) / International Energy Agency (IEA) dataset, 2000 – 2010 global 
energy supply sector GHG emissions increased by 35.7 % and grew on 
average nearly 1 % per year faster than global anthropogenic GHG 
emissions. Despite the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, GHG emissions 
grew more rapidly between 2000 and 2010 than in the previous 
decade. Growth in the energy supply sector GHG emissions accelerated 
from 1.7 % per year from 1990 – 2000 to 3.1 % per year from 
2000 – 2010 (Figure 7.3). In 2012, the sector emitted 6 % more than in 
2010 (BP, 2013), or over 18 GtCO2eq. In 2010, 43 % of CO2 emissions 
from fuel combustion were produced from coal, 36 % from oil, and 
20 % from gas (IEA, 2012f). 
Emissions from electricity and heat generation contributed 75 % of the 
last decade increment followed by 16 % for fuel production and trans-
mission and 8 % for petroleum refining. Although sector emissions 
were predominantly CO2, also emitted were methane (of which 31 % 
is attributed to mainly coal and gas production and transmission), and 
3 The remaining energy-related emissions occur in the consumer sectors (see 
Figure 7.1). The IEA reports energy sector share at 46 % (IEA, 2012f).
Figure 7�3 | Energy supply sector GHG emissions by subsectors. Table shows average annual growth rates of emissions over decades and the shares (related to absolute emissions) 
of different emission sources. Right-hand graph displays contribution of different drivers (POP = population, GDP = gross domestic product, FEC = final energy consumption, TPES 
= total primary energy supply) to energy supply sector GHG (GHGs) decadal emissions increments. It is based on (IEA, 2012a). The large graph and table are based on the Historic 
Emission Database EDGAR / IEA dataset (IEA, 2012g; JRC / PBL, 2013).
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indirect nitrous oxide (of which 9 % comes from coal and fuel-wood 
combustion) (IEA, 2012f).4 
Decomposition analysis (Figure 7.3), shows that population growth 
contributed 39.7 % of additional sector emissions in 2000 – 2010, 
with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita 72.4 %. Over the same 
period, energy intensity decline (final energy consumption (FEC) per 
unit of GDP) reduced the emissions increment by 45.4 %. Since elec-
tricity production grew by 1 % per year faster than TPES, the ratio of 
TPES / FEC increased contributing 13.1 % of the additional emissions. 
Sector carbon intensity relative to TPES was responsible for 20.2 % of 
additional energy supply sector GHG emissions. 
4 As in the case with energy, there is some disagreement on the historical level 
of global energy- related GHG emissions (See Andres et al., 2012). Moreover, 
emission data provided by IEA or EDGAR often do not match data from national 
communications to UNFCCC. For example, Bashmakov and Myshak (2012) argue 
that EDGAR does not provide adequate data for Russian GHG emissions: accord-
ing to national communication, energy-related CO2 emissions in 1990 – 2010 are 
37 % down while EDGAR reports only a 28 % decline. 
In addition to the stronger TPES growth, the last decade was marked 
by a lack of progress in the decarbonization of the global fuel mix. 
With 3.1 % annual growth in energy supply sector emissions, the 
decade with the strongest-ever mitigation policies was the one with 
the strongest emissions growth in the last 30 years. 
Carbon intensity decline was fastest in OECD90 followed closely by 
EIT in 1990 – 2000, and by LAM in 2000 – 2010 (IEA, 2012a; US DOE, 
2012); most developing countries show little or no decarbonization. 
Energy decarbonization progress in OECD90 (– 0.4 % per annum in 
2000 – 2010) was smaller than the three previous decades, but enough 
to compensate their small TPES increment keeping 2010 emissions 
below 2000 levels. In non-OECD90 countries, energy-related emissions 
increased on average from 1.7 % per year in 1990 – 2000 to 5.0 % in 
2000 – 2010 due to TPES growth accompanied by a 0.6 % per annum 
growth in energy carbon intensity, driven largely by coal demand in 
Asia (IEA, 2012b). As a result, in 2010 non-OECD90 countries’ energy 
supply sector GHG emissions were 2.3fold that for OECD90 countries. 
In 1990, OECD90 was the world’s highest emitter of energy supply sec-
tor GHGs (42 % of the global total), followed by the EIT region (30 %). 
from the rest of the world (IEA, 2012d). In 2012, hydroelectricity sup-
plied 16.3 % of world electricity (BP, 2013).
New post-2000 trends were registered for nuclear’s role in global 
energy systems. In recent years, the share of nuclear energy in world 
power generation has declined. Nuclear electricity represented 11 % of 
the world’s electricity generation in 2012, down from a high of 17 % 
in 1993; its contribution to global TPES is declining since 2002 (IEA, 
2012b; BP, 2013). Those trends were formed well before the incident at 
the Fukushima nuclear plants in March 2011 and following revision of 
policies towards nuclear power by several governments (IEA, 2012e). 
Growing nuclear contribution to TPES after 2000 was observed only in 
EIT and Asia (mostly in Russia and China). 
Additional information on regional total and per-capita energy con-
sumption and emissions, historic emissions trends and drivers, and 
embedded (consumption-based) emissions is reported in Chapter 5.
7.3 New  developments 
in emission trends 
and drivers
In 2010, the energy supply sector accounts for 49 % of all energy-
related GHG emissions3 (JRC / PBL, 2013) and 35 % of anthropogenic 
GHG emissions, up 13 % from 22 % in 1970, making it the largest sec-
toral contributor to global emissions. According to the Historic Emis-
sion Database, Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research 
(EDGAR) / International Energy Agency (IEA) dataset, 2000 – 2010 global 
energy supply sector GHG emissions increased by 35.7 % and grew on 
average nearly 1 % per year faster than global anthropogenic GHG 
emissions. Despite the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, GHG emissions 
grew more rapidly between 2000 and 2010 than in the previous 
decade. Growth in the energy supply sector GHG emissions accelerated 
from 1.7 % per year from 1990 – 2000 to 3.1 % per year from 
2000 – 2010 (Figure 7.3). In 2012, the sector emitted 6 % more than in 
2010 (BP, 2013), or over 18 GtCO2eq. In 2010, 43 % of CO2 emissions 
from fuel combustion were produced from coal, 36 % from oil, and 
20 % from gas (IEA, 2012f). 
Emissions from electricity and heat generation contributed 75 % of the 
last decade increment followed by 16 % for fuel production and trans-
mission and 8 % for petroleum refining. Although sector emissions 
were predominantly CO2, also emitted were methane (of which 31 % 
is attributed to mainly coal and gas production and transmission), and 
3 The remaining energy-related emissions occur in the consumer sectors (see 
Figure 7.1). The IEA reports energy sector share at 46 % (IEA, 2012f).
Figure 7�3 | Energy supply sector GHG emissions by subsectors. Table shows average annual growth rates of emissions over decades and the shares (related to absolute emissions) 
of different emission sources. Right-hand graph displays contribution of different drivers (POP = population, GDP = gross domestic product, FEC = final energy consumption, TPES 
= total primary energy supply) to energy supply sector GHG (GHGs) decadal emissions increments. It is based on (IEA, 2012a). The large graph and table are based on the Historic 
Emission Database EDGAR / IEA dataset (IEA, 2012g; JRC / PBL, 2013).
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By 2010, Asia had become the major emitter with 41 % share. China’s 
emissions surpassed those of the United States, and India’s surpassed 
Russia’s (IEA, 2012f). Asia accounted for 79 % of additional energy 
supply sector emissions in 1990 – 2000 and 83 % in 2000 – 2010, fol-
lowed well behind by the MAF and LAM regions (Figure 7.4). The rapid 
increase in energy supply sector GHG emissions in developing Asia was 
due to the region’s economic growth and increased use of fossil fuels. 
The per-capita energy supply sector GHGs emissions in developing 
countries are below the global average, but the gap is shrinking, espe-
cially for Asia (Figure 7.4). The per-capita energy supply sector CO2 
emissions of Asia (excluding China) in 2010 was only 0.75 tCO2, 
against the world average of 2.06 tCO2, while the 2010 Chinese energy 
supply sector CO2 emissions per capita of 2.86  tCO2 exceeded the 
2.83 tCO2 of OECD-Europe (IEA, 2012f).
Another region with large income-driven energy supply sector GHG 
emissions in 2000 – 2010 was EIT, although neutralized by improve-
ments in energy intensity there. This region was the only one that man-
aged to decouple economic growth from energy supply sector emis-
sions; its GDP in 2010 being 10 % above the 1990 level, while energy 
supply sector GHG emissions declined by 29 % over the same period. 
Additional information on regional total and per-capita emissions, his-
toric emissions trends and drivers and embedded (consumption based) 
emissions is reported in Chapter 5.
7.4 Resources and resource 
availability
7�4�1 Fossil fuels
Table 7.2 provides a summary of fossil fuel resource estimates in terms 
of energy and carbon contents. Fossil fuel resources are not fixed; they 
are a dynamically evolving quantity. The estimates shown span quite a 
range reflecting the general uncertainty associated with limited knowl-
Figure 7�4 | Energy supply sector GHG emissions by subsectors and regions: OECD90, ASIA countries, Economies in Transition (EIT), Africa and the Middle East (MAF), and Latin 
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edge and boundaries. Changing economic conditions, technological 
progress, and environmental policies may expand or contract the eco-
nomically recoverable quantities altering the balance between future 
reserves and resources. 
Coal reserve and resource estimates are subject to uncertainty and 
ambiguity, especially when reported in mass units (tonnes) and with-
out a clear distinction of their specific energy contents, which can vary 
considerably. For both reserves and resources, the quantity of hard 
(black) coal significantly outnumbers the quantity of lignite (brown 
coal), and despite resources being far greater than reserves, the pos-
sibility for resources to cross over to reserves is expected to be limited 
since coal reserves are likely to last around 100 years at current rates 
of production (Rogner et al., 2012).
Cumulative past production of conventional oil falls between the esti-
mates of the remaining reserves, suggesting that the peak in conven-
tional oil production is imminent or has already been passed (Höök 
et al., 2009; Owen et al., 2010; Sorrell et al., 2012). Including resources 
extends conventional oil availability considerably. However, depending 
on such factors as demand, the depletion and recovery rates achiev-
able from the oil fields (IEA, 2008a; Sorrell et  al., 2012), even the 
higher range in reserves and resources will only postpone the peak by 
about two decades, after which global conventional oil production is 
expected to begin to decline, leading to greater reliance on unconven-
tional sources. 
Unconventional oil resources are larger than those for conventional 
oils. Large quantities of these in the form of shale oil, heavy oil, bitu-
men, oil (tar) sands, and extra-heavy oil are trapped in sedimentary 
rocks in several thousand basins around the world. Oil prices in excess 
of USD2010 80 / barrel are probably needed to stimulate investment in 
unconventional oil development (Engemann and Owyang, 2010; Rog-
ner et al., 2012; Maugeri, 2012).
Unlike oil, natural gas reserve additions have consistently outpaced 
production volumes and resource estimations have increased steadily 
since the 1970s (IEA, 2011a). The global natural gas resource base is 
vast and more widely dispersed geographically than oil. Unconven-
tional natural gas reserves, i. e., coal bed methane, shale gas, deep for-
mation and tight gas are now estimated to be larger than conventional 
reserves and resources combined. In some parts of the world, supply 
of unconventional gas now represents a significant proportion of gas 
withdrawals, see Section 7.2.
For climate change, it is the CO2 emitted to the atmosphere from the 
burning of fossil fuels that matters. When compared to the estimated 
CO2 budgets of the emission scenarios presented in Chapter 6 (Table 
6.2), the estimate of the total fossil fuel reserves and resources con-
tains sufficient carbon, if released, to yield radiative forcing above that 
required to limit global mean temperature change to less than 2 °C. 
The scenario analysis carried out in Section 6.3.4 illustrates in detail 
that the availability of fossil fuels alone will not be sufficient to limit 
CO2eq concentration to levels such as 450 ppm, 550 ppm, or 650 ppm 
[Figure 6.15]. Mitigation scenarios are further discussed in Section 7.11 
and Chapter 6. 
7�4�2 Renewable energy
For the purpose of AR5, renewable energy (RE) is defined as in the 
SRREN (IPCC, 2011a) to include bioenergy, direct solar energy, geo-
thermal energy, hydropower, ocean energy, and wind energy.5 The 
technical potential for RE is defined in Verbruggen et al. (2011) as “the 
amount of renewable energy output obtainable by full implementation 
of demonstrated technologies or practices.” A variety of practical, land 
use, environmental, and / or economic constraints are sometimes used 
in estimating the technical potential of RE, but with little uniformity 
across studies in the treatment of these factors, including costs. Defini-
tions of technical potential therefore vary by study (e. g., Verbruggen 
et al., 2010), as do the data, assumptions, and methods used to esti-
mate it (e. g., Angelis-Dimakis et al., 2011). There have also been ques-
5 Note that, in practice, the RE sources as defined here are sometimes extracted 
at a rate that exceeds the natural rate of replenishment (e. g., some forms of 
biomass and geothermal energy). Most, but not all, RE sources impose smaller 
GHG burdens than do fossil fuels when providing similar energy services (see Sec-
tion 7.8.1).
Table 7�2 | Estimates of fossil reserves and resource, and their carbon content. Source: (Rogner et al. 2012)*.
Reserves Resources
[EJ] [Gt C] [EJ] [Gt C]
Conventional oil 4,900 – 7,610 98 – 152 4,170 – 6,150 83 – 123
Unconventional oil 3,750 – 5,600 75 – 112 11,280 – 14,800 226 – 297
Conventional gas 5,000 – 7,100 76 – 108 7,200 – 8,900 110 – 136
Unconventional gas 20,100 – 67,100 307 – 1,026 40,200 – 121,900 614 – 1,863
Coal 17,300 – 21,000 446 – 542 291,000 – 435,000 7,510 – 11,230
Total 51,050 – 108,410 1 002 – 1,940 353,850 – 586,750 8,543 – 13,649






tions raised about the validity of some of the ‘bottom up’ estimates 
of technical potential for RE that are often reported in the literature, 
and whether those estimates are consistent with real physical limits 
(e. g., de Castro et  al., 2011; Jacobson and Archer, 2012; Adams and 
Keith, 2013). Finally, it should be emphasized that technical potential 
estimates do not seek to address all practical or economic limits to 
deployment; many of those additional limits are noted at the end of 
this section, and are discussed elsewhere in Chapter 7.
Though comprehensive and consistent estimates for each individual 
RE source are not available, and reported RE technical potentials are 
not always comparable to those for fossil fuels and nuclear energy due 
to differing study methodologies, the SRREN (IPCC, 2011a) concludes 
that the aggregated global technical potential for RE as a whole is sig-
nificantly higher than global energy demands. Figure 7.12 (shown in 
Section 7.11) summarizes the ranges of global technical potentials as 
estimated in the literature for the different RE sources, as reported in 
IPCC (2011a). The technical potential for solar is shown to be the larg-
est by a large magnitude, but sizable potential exists for many forms of 
RE. Also important is the regional distribution of the technical poten-
tial. Though the regional distribution of each source varies (see, e. g., 
IPCC, 2011a), Fischedick et al. (2011) reports that the technical poten-
tial of RE as a whole is at least 2.6 times as large as the 2007 total 
primary energy demand in all regions of the world.
Considering all RE sources together, the estimates reported by this 
literature suggest that global and regional technical potentials are 
unlikely to pose a physical constraint on the combined contribution of 
RE to the mitigation of climate change (also see GEA, 2012). Addition-
ally, as noted in IPCC (2011b), “Even in regions with relatively low lev-
els of technical potential for any individual renewable energy source, 
there are typically significant opportunities for increased deployment 
compared to current levels”. Moreover, as with other energy sources, 
all else being equal, continued technological advancements can be 
expected to increase estimates of the technical potential for RE in the 
future, as they have in the past (Verbruggen et al., 2011). 
Nonetheless, the long-term percentage contribution of some indi-
vidual RE sources to climate change mitigation may be limited by the 
available technical potential if deep reductions in GHG emissions are 
sought (e. g., hydropower, bioenergy, and ocean energy), while even RE 
sources with seemingly higher technical potentials (e. g., solar, wind) 
will be constrained in certain regions (see Fischedick et  al., 2011). 
Additionally, as RE deployment increases, progressively lower-quality 
resources are likely to remain for incremental use and energy conver-
sion losses may increase, e. g., if conversion to alternative carriers such 
as hydrogen is required (Moriarty and Honnery, 2012). Competition 
for land and other resources among different RE sources may impact 
aggregate technical potentials, as might concerns about the carbon 
footprint and sustainability of the resource (e. g., biomass) as well as 
materials demands (cf. Annex Bioenergy in Chapter 11; de Vries et al., 
2007; Kleijn and van der Voet, 2010; Graedel, 2011). In other cases, 
economic factors, environmental concerns, public acceptance, and / or 
the infrastructure required to manage system integration (e. g., invest-
ments needed to accommodate variable output or transmit renewable 
electricity to load centres) are likely to limit the deployment of individ-
ual RE technologies before absolute technical resource potential limits 
are reached (IPCC, 2011a).
7�4�3 Nuclear energy
The average uranium (U) concentration in the continental Earth’s 
crust is about 2.8 ppm, while the average concentration in ocean 
water is 3 to 4 ppb (Bunn et  al., 2003). The theoretically available 
uranium in the Earth’s crust is estimated at 100 teratonnes (Tt) U, 
of which 25 Tt U occur within 1.6 km of the surface (Lewis, 1972). 
The amount of uranium dissolved in seawater is estimated at 4.5 
Gt (Bunn et  al., 2003). Without substantial research and develop-
ment (R&D) efforts to develop vastly improved and less expensive 
extraction technologies, these occurrences do not represent practi-
cally extractable uranium. Current market and technology conditions 
limit extraction of conventional uranium resources to concentrations 
above 100 ppm U. 
Altogether, there are 4200 EJ (or 7.1 MtU) of identified conven-
tional uranium resources available at extraction costs of less than 
USD 260 / kgU (current consumption amounts to about 53,760 tU per 
year). Additional conventional uranium resources (yet to be discov-
ered) estimated at some 4400 EJ can be mobilized at costs larger than 
USD 260 / kgU (NEA and IAEA, 2012). Present uranium resources are 
sufficient to fuel existing demand for more than 130 years, and if all 
conventional uranium occurrences are considered, for more than 250 
years. Reprocessing of spent fuel and recycling of uranium and plu-
tonium in used fuel would double the reach of each category (IAEA, 
2009). Fast breeder reactor technology can theoretically increase ura-
nium utilization 50-fold or even more with corresponding reductions in 
high-level waste (HLW) generation and disposal requirements (IAEA, 
2004). However, reprocessing of spent fuel and recycling is not eco-
nomically competitive below uranium prices of USD2010 425 / kgU (Bunn 
et al., 2003). Thorium is a widely distributed slightly radioactive metal. 
Although the present knowledge of the world’s thorium resource base 
is poor and incomplete, it is three to four times more abundant than 
uranium in the Earth’s outer crust (NEA, 2006). Identified thorium 
resource availability is estimated at more than 2.5 Mt at production 
costs of less than USD2010 82 / kgTh (NEA, 2008).
Further information concerning reactor technologies, costs, risks, co-
benefits, deployment barriers and policy aspects can be found in Sec-





7.5 Mitigation technology 
options, practices and 
behavioral aspects
Climate change can only be mitigated and global temperature be sta-
bilized when the total amount of CO2 emitted is limited and emissions 
eventually approach zero (Allen et al., 2009; Meinshausen et al., 2009). 
Options to reduce GHG emissions in the energy supply sector reduce 
the lifecycle GHG-emissions intensity of a unit of final energy (electric-
ity, heat, fuels) supplied to end users. Section 7.5 therefore addresses 
options to replace unabated fossil fuel usage with technologies with-
out direct GHG emissions, such as renewable and nuclear energy 
sources, and options to mitigate GHG emissions from the extraction, 
transport, and conversion of fossil fuels through increased efficiency, 
fuel switching, and GHG capture. In assessing the performance of 
these options, lifecycle emissions have to be considered. Appropri-
ate policies need to be in place to ensure that the adoption of such 
options leads to a reduction and ultimate phaseout of freely emitting 
(i. e., unabated) fossil technologies and not only to reduced additional 
energy consumption, as indicated in Section 7.12.
Options discussed in this section put some emphasis on electricity pro-
duction, but many of the same options could be used to produce heat or 
transport fuels or deliver heating and transportation services through 
electrification of those demands. The dedicated provision of transport 
fuels is treated in Chapter 8, of heat for buildings is covered in Chapter 
9, and of heat for industrial processes in Chapter 10. Options to reduce 
final energy demand are addressed in Chapters 8 – 12. Options covered 
in this section mainly address technology solutions. Behavioural issues 
in the energy supply sector often concern the selection of and invest-
ment in technology, and these issues are addressed in Sections 7.10, 
7.11, and 7.12. Costs and emission-reduction potentials associated 
with the options are discussed in Section 7.8, whereas co-benefits and 
risks are addressed in Section 7.9.
7�5�1 Fossil fuel extraction, conversion, and 
fuel switching 
Several important trends shape the opportunity to mitigate emissions 
associated with the extraction, transport, and conversion of fossil 
fuels: (1) new technologies that make accessible substantial reservoirs 
of shale gas and unconventional oil; (2) a renewed focus on fugitive 
methane emissions, especially those associated with gas production; 
(3) increased effort required to find and extract oil; and (4) improved 
technologies for energy efficiency and the capture or prevention of 
methane emissions in the fuel supply chain. Carbon dioxide capture 
technologies are discussed in Section 7.5.5.
A key development since AR4 is the rapid deployment of hydraulic-
fracturing and horizontal-drilling technologies, which has increased 
and diversified the gas supply and allowed for a more extensive 
switching of power and heat production from coal to gas (IEA, 2012b); 
this is an important reason for a reduction of GHG emissions in the 
United States. At the same time, the increasing utilization of gas has 
raised the issue of fugitive emissions of methane from both conven-
tional and shale gas production. While some studies estimate that 
around 5 % of the produced gas escapes in the supply chain, other 
analyses estimate emissions as low as 1 % (Stephenson et al., 2011; 
Howarth et al., 2011; Cathles et al., 2012). Central emission estimates 
of recent analyses are 2 % — 3 % (+ / – 1 %) of the gas produced, where 
the emissions from conventional and unconventional gas are compa-
rable (Jaramillo et al., 2007; O’Sullivan and Paltsev, 2012; Weber and 
Clavin, 2012). Fugitive emissions depend to a significant degree on 
whether low-emission practices, such as the separation and capture 
of hydrocarbons during well completion and the detection and repair 
of leaks throughout gas extraction and transport, are mandated and 
how they are implemented in the field (Barlas, 2011; Wang et al., 2011; 
O’Sullivan and Paltsev, 2012). Empirical research is required to reduce 
uncertainties and to better understand the variability of fugitive gas 
emissions (Jackson et al., 2013) as well as to provide a more-global 
perspective. Recent empirical research has not yet resolved these 
uncertainties (Levi, 2012; Petron et al., 2012). The main focus of the 
discussion has been drilling, well completion, and gas product, but gas 
grids (Ryerson et al., 2013) and liquefaction (Jaramillo et al., 2007) are 
also important. 
There has also been some attention to fugitive emissions of methane 
from coal mines (Su et  al., 2011; Saghafi, 2012) in connection with 
opportunities to capture and use or treat coal-seam gas (Karacan et al., 
2011). Emission rates vary widely based on geological factors such as 
the age of the coal and previous leakage from the coal seam (Moore, 
2012). 
Taking into account revised estimates for fugitive methane emis-
sions, recent lifecycle assessments indicate that specific GHG emis-
sions are reduced by one half (on a per-kWh basis) when shifting 
from the current world-average coal-fired power plant to a modern 
natural gas combined-cycle (NGCC) power plant, evaluated using the 
100-year global warming potentials (GWP) (Burnham et al., 2012), as 
indicated in Figure 7.6 (Section 7.8). This reduction is the result of 
the lower carbon content of natural gas (15.3 gC / MJ compared to, 
e. g., 26.2 gC / MJ for sub-bituminous coal) and the higher efficiency 
of combined-cycle power plants (IEA, 2011a). A better appreciation 
of the importance of fugitive emissions in fuel chains since AR4 has 
resulted in a downward adjustment of the estimated benefit from fuel 
switching. More modest emissions reductions result when shifting 
from current average coal plants to the best available coal technology 
or less-advanced gas power plants. Climate mitigation consistent with 
the Cancun Agreement requires a reduction of emissions rates below 
that of NGCC plants by the middle of this century (Figure 7.7, Section 
7.8.2 and Figure 7.9, Section 7.11), but natural gas may play a role 






Combined heat and power (CHP) plants are capable of recovering a 
share of the waste heat that is otherwise released by power plants 
that generate only electricity. The global average efficiency of fossil-
fuelled power plants is 37 %, whereas the global average efficiency 
of CHP units is 58 % if both power and the recovered heat are taken 
into account (see Table 7.1 in 7.2). State of the art CHP plants are able 
to approach efficiencies over 85 % (IEA, 2012b). The usefulness of 
decentralized cogeneration units is discussed in (Pehnt, 2008). Further 
emissions reductions from fossil fuel systems are possible through CO2 
capture and storage (Section 7.5.5). 
Producing oil from unconventional sources and from mature con-
ventional oil fields requires more energy than producing it from vir-
gin conventional fields (Brandt and Farrell, 2007; Gagnon, Luc et al., 
2009; Lechtenböhmer and Dienst, 2010). Literature indicates that the 
net energy return on investment has fallen steadily for conventional 
oil to less than 10 GJ / GJ (Guilford et al.; Brandt et al., 2013). For oil 
sands, the net energy return ratio of the product delivered to the 
customer is about 3  GJ / GJ invested (Brandt et  al., 2013), with simi-
lar values expected for oil shale (Dale et al., 2013). As a result, emis-
sions associated with synthetic crude production from oil sands are 
higher than those from most conventional oil resources (Charpentier 
et al., 2009; Brandt, 2011). These emissions are related to extra energy 
requirements, fugitive emissions from venting and flaring (Johnson and 
Coderre, 2011), and land use (Rooney et al., 2012). Emissions associ-
ated with extraction of oil sands and refining to gasoline are estimated 
to be 35 – 55 gCO2eq / MJ fuel, compared to emissions of 20 gCO2eq / MJ 
for the production and refining of regular petroleum and 70 gCO2eq / MJ 
associated with combusting this fuel (Burnham et al., 2012). Overall, 
fossil fuel extraction and distribution are currently estimated to con-
tribute 5 % – 10 % of total fossil-fuel-related GHG emissions (Alsalam 
and Ragnauth, 2011; IEA, 2011a; Burnham et  al., 2012). Emissions 
associated with fuel production and transmission can be reduced 
through higher energy efficiency and the use of lower-carbon energy 
sources in mines, fields, and transportation networks (IPIECA and API, 
2007; Hasan et al., 2011), the capture and utilization (UNECE, 2010b), 
or treatment (US EPA, 2006; IEA, 2009a; Karacan et al., 2011; Karakurt 
et al., 2011; Su et al., 2011) of methane from coal mining, the reduc-
tion of venting and flaring from oil and gas production (IPIECA and 
API, 2009; Johnson and Coderre, 2011), and leak detection and repair 
for natural gas systems (Goedbloed, 2011; Wilwerding, 2011).
7�5�2 Energy efficiency in transmission and 
distribution
Electrical losses associated with the high-voltage transmission system 
are generally less than losses within the lower-voltage distribution sys-
tem mainly because the total length of transmission lines is far less 
than that for distribution in most power systems, and that currents and 
thus losses are lower at high voltages. These losses are due to a combi-
nation of cable or line losses and transformer losses and vary with the 
nature of the power system, particularly its geographical layout. Losses 
as a fraction of power generated vary considerably between countries, 
with developed countries tending to have lower losses, and a number 
of developing countries having losses of over 20 % in 2010 according 
to IEA online data (IEA, 2010a). Combined transmission and distribu-
tion losses for the OECD countries taken together were 6.5 % of total 
electricity output in 2000 (IEA, 2003a), which is close to the EU aver-
age (European Copper Institute, 1999). 
Approximately 25 % of all losses in Europe, and 40 % of distribution 
losses, are due to distribution transformers (and these losses will be simi-
lar in OECD countries); therefore, use of improved transformer designs 
can make a significant impact (see European Copper Institute, 1999 and 
in particular Appendix A therein). Roughly a further 25 % of losses are 
due to the distribution system conductors and cables. An increase in dis-
tributed generation can reduce these losses since generation typically 
takes place closer to loads than with central generation and thus the 
electricity does not need to travel so far (Méndez Quezada et al., 2006; 
Thomson and Infield, 2007). However, if a large amount of distributed 
power generation is exported back into the main power system to meet 
more distant loads, then losses can increase again. The use of greater 
interconnection to ease the integration of time varying renewables into 
power systems would be expected to increase the bulk transfer of power 
over considerable distances and thus the losses (see Section 7.6.1). High-
voltage direct current transmission (HVDC) has the potential to reduce 
transmission losses and is cost-effective for very long above-ground 
lines. However, sub-sea HVDC has lower losses over 55 to 70 kms (Bar-
beris Negra et al., 2006) and will most likely be used for the connection 
of large offshore wind farms due to the adverse reactive power charac-
teristics of long sub-sea alternating current (AC) transmission cables. 
Crude oil transportation from upstream production facilities to refin-
eries and subsequent moving of petroleum products to service sta-
tions or end user is an energy-consuming process if it is not effectively 
performed (PetroMin Pipeliner, 2010). Pipelines are the most efficient 
means to transport fluids. Additives can ease the flow of oil and reduce 
the energy used (Bratland, 2010). New pumps technology, pipeline 
pigging facilities, chemicals such as pour point depressants (for waxy 
crude oil), and drag-reducing agents are good examples of these tech-
nologies that increase the pipeline throughput. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the decarbonization of heat through 
heat pumps and transport through an increased use of electric vehicles 
(EVs), could require major additions to generation capacity and aligned 
with this, an improved transmission and distribution infrastructure. 
Exactly how much will depend on whether these new loads are con-
trolled and rescheduled through the day by demand-side management 
(see Section 8.3.4.2 for more detail). 
7�5�3 Renewable energy technologies
Only a small fraction of the renewable energy (RE) technical potential 





not all — forms of RE supply have low lifecycle GHG emissions in 
comparison to fossil fuels (see Section 7.8.1). Though RE sources are 
often discussed together as a group, the specific conversion technolo-
gies used are numerous and diverse. A comprehensive survey of the 
literature is available in IPCC (2011a). Renewable energy sources are 
capable of supplying electricity, but some sources are also able to sup-
ply thermal and mechanical energy, as well as produce fuels that can 
satisfy multiple energy service needs (Moomaw et al., 2011b). 
Many RE sources are primarily deployed within larger, central-
ized energy networks, but some technologies can be — and often 
are — deployed at the point of use in a decentralized fashion (Sath-
aye et al., 2011; Sims et al., 2011; REN21, 2013). The use of RE in the 
transport, buildings, and industrial sectors — as well as in agriculture, 
forestry, and human settlements — is addressed more fully in Chapters 
8 – 12. 
Fischedick et al. (2011) find that, while there is no obvious single domi-
nant RE technology likely to be deployed at a global level, bioenergy, 
wind, and solar may experience the largest incremental growth. The 
mix of RE technologies suited to a specific location, however, will 
depend on local conditions, with hydropower and geothermal playing 
a significant role in certain countries. 
Because some forms of RE are primarily used to produce electricity 
(e. g., Armaroli and Balzani, 2011), the ultimate contribution of RE to 
overall energy supply may be dictated in part by the future electrifica-
tion of transportation and heating / cooling or by using RE to produce 
other energy carriers, e. g., hydrogen (Sims et al., 2011; Jacobson and 
Delucchi, 2011; see also other chapters of AR5). 
The performance and cost of many RE technologies have advanced 
substantially in recent decades and since AR4 (e. g., IPCC, 2011a; 
Arent et  al., 2011). For example, improvements in photovoltaic (PV) 
technologies and manufacturing processes, along with changed mar-
ket conditions (i. e., manufacturing capacity exceeding demand) and 
reduced non-hardware costs, have substantially reduced PV costs and 
prices. Continued increases in the size and therefore energy capture 
of individual wind turbines have reduced the levelized cost of land-
based wind energy and improved the prospects for future reductions 
in the cost of offshore wind energy. Concentrated solar thermal power 
(CSP) technologies, some together with thermal storage or as gas / CSP 
hybrids, have been installed in a number of countries. Research, devel-
opment, and demonstration of enhanced geothermal systems has con-
tinued, enhancing the prospects for future commercial deployments. 
Performance improvements have also been made in cropping systems, 
logistics, and multiple conversion technologies for bioenergy (see 
11.13). IPCC (2011a) provides further examples from a broader array 
of RE technologies.
As discussed in IPCC (2011a), a growing number of RE technologies 
have achieved a level of technical and economic maturity to enable 
deployment at significant scale (with some already being deployed 
at significant scale in many regions of the world), while others are 
less mature and not yet widely deployed. Most hydropower technolo-
gies, for example, are technically and economically mature. Bioenergy 
technologies, meanwhile, are diverse and span a wide range; exam-
ples of mature technologies include conventional biomass-fuelled 
power plants and heating systems as well as ethanol production from 
sugar and starch, while many lignocellulose-based transport fuels are 
at a pre-commercial stage (see Section 11.13). The maturity of solar 
energy ranges from the R&D stage (e. g., fuels produced from solar 
energy), to relatively more technically mature (e. g., CSP), to techni-
cally mature (e. g., solar heating and wafer-based silicon PV); how-
ever, even the technologies that are more technically mature have 
not all reached a state of economic competitiveness. Geothermal 
power and heat technologies that rely on hydrothermal resources 
use mature technologies (though reservoir risks remain substantial), 
whereas enhanced geothermal systems continue to undergo R&D 
with some limited demonstration plants now deployed. Except for 
certain types of tidal barrages, ocean energy technologies are also 
at the demonstration phase and require additional R&D. Traditional 
land-based wind technologies are mature, while the use of wind 
energy in offshore locations is increasing but is typically more costly 
than land-based wind. 
With regard to traditional biomass, the conversion of wood to charcoal 
in traditional kilns results in low-conversion efficiencies. A wide range 
of interventions have tried to overcome this challenge by promoting 
more efficient kilns, but the adoption rate has been limited in many 
countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (Chidumayo and Gumbo, 
2013). Although not yielding large GHG savings in global terms, 
increasing the efficiency of charcoal production offers local benefits 
such as improved charcoal delivery and lower health and environmen-
tal impacts (FAO, 2010).
Because the cost of energy from many (but not all) RE technologies 
has historically been higher than market energy prices (e. g. Fischedick 
et al., 2011; Section 7.8), public R&D programmes have been impor-
tant, and government policies have played a major role in defining the 
amount and location of RE deployment (IEA, 2011b; Mitchell et  al., 
2011; REN21, 2013). Additionally, because RE relies on natural energy 
flows, some (but not all) RE technologies must be located at or near 
the energy resource, collect energy from diffuse energy flows, and pro-
duce energy output that is variable and — though power-output fore-
casting has improved — to some degree unpredictable (IPCC, 2011b). 
The implications of these characteristics for infrastructure development 
and network integration are addressed in Section 7.6.1.
Renewable energy currently constitutes a relatively small fraction of 
global energy supply, especially if one excludes traditional biomass. 
However, RE provided almost 21 % of global electricity supply in 2012, 
and RE deployment has increased significantly since the AR4 (see Sec-
tion 7.2). In 2012, RE power capacity grew rapidly: REN21 (2013) 





erating capacity added globally in 2012.6 As shown in Figure 7.5, the 
fastest-growing sources of RE power capacity included wind power (45 
GW added in 2012), hydropower (30 GW), and PV (29 GW).7 
In aggregate, the growth in cumulative renewable electricity capac-
ity equalled 8 % from 2010 to 2011 and from 2011 to 2012 (REN21, 
2013). Biofuels accounted for 3.4 % of global road transport fuel 
demand in 2012 (REN21, 2013); though growth was limited from 2010 
to 2012, growth since the IPCC’s AR4 has been substantial. By the 
end of 2012, the use of RE in hot water / heating markets included 293 
GWth of modern biomass, 255 GWth of solar, and 66 GWth of geother-
mal heating (REN21, 2013). 
Collectively, developing countries host a substantial fraction of the 
global renewable electricity generation capacity, with China add-
ing more capacity than any other country in 2012 (REN21, 2013). 
Cost reductions for PV have been particularly sizable in recent years, 
resulting in and reflecting strong percentage growth rates (albeit from 
a small base), with the majority of new installations through 2012 
coming from Europe (and to a lesser degree Asia and North America) 
but with manufacturing shifting to Asia (REN21, 2013; see also Sec-
tion 7.8). The United States and Brazil accounted for 61 % and 26 %, 
respectively, of global bioethanol production in 2012, while China led 
in the use of solar hot water (REN21, 2013). 
6 A better metric would be based on energy supply, not installed capacity, especially 
because of the relatively low capacity factors of some RE sources. Energy supply 
statistics for power plants constructed in 2012, however, are not available. 
7 REN21 (2013) estimates that biomass power capacity increased by 9 GW in 2012, 
CSP by 1 GW, and geothermal power by 0.3 GW.
Decentralized RE to meet rural energy needs, particularly in the less-
developed countries, has also increased, including various modern and 
advanced traditional biomass options as well as small hydropower, 
PV, and wind, thereby expanding and improving energy access (IPCC, 
2011a; REN21, 2013). 
7�5�4 Nuclear energy 
Nuclear energy is utilized for electricity generation in 30 countries 
around the world (IAEA, 2013a). There are 434 operational nuclear 
reactors with a total installed capacity of 371 GWe as of Septem-
ber 2013 (IAEA, 2013a). Nuclear electricity represented 11 % of the 
world’s electricity generation in 2012, with a total generation of 2346 
TWh (IAEA, 2013b). The 2012 share of global nuclear electricity gen-
eration is down from a high of 17 % in 1993 (IEA, 2012b; BP, 2013). 
The United States, France, Japan, Russia, and Korea (Rep. of) — with 
99, 63, 44, 24, and 21 GWe of nuclear power, respectively — are the top 
five countries in installed nuclear capacity and together represent 68 % 
of total global nuclear capacity as of September 2013 (IAEA, 2013a). 
The majority of the world’s reactors are based on light-water technol-
ogy of similar concept, design, and fuel cycle. Of the reactors world-
wide, 354 are light-water reactors (LWR), of which 270 are pressurized 
water reactors (PWR) and 84 are boiling water reactors (BWR) (IAEA, 
2013a). The remaining reactor types consist of 48 heavy-water reactors 
(PHWR), 15 gas-cooled reactors (GCR), 15 graphite-moderated reac-
tors (RBMK / LWGR), and 2 fast breeder reactors (FBR) (IAEA, 2013a). 
The choice of reactor technologies has implications for safety, cost, 
and nuclear fuel cycle issues.
Growing demand for electricity, energy diversification, and climate 
change mitigation motivate the construction of new nuclear reactors. 
Figure 7�5 | Selected indicators of recent global growth in RE deployment (REN21, 2013).  Note: A better metric of the relative contribution of RE would be based on energy supply, 
not installed capacity, especially because of the relatively low capacity factors of some RE sources. Energy supply statistics for power plants constructed in the most recent years, 







































































The electricity from nuclear power does not contribute to direct GHG 
emissions. There are 69 reactors, representing 67 GWe of capacity, cur-
rently under construction in 14 countries (IAEA, 2013a). The bulk of the 
new builds are in China, Russia, India, Korea (Rep. of), and the United 
States — with 28, 10, 7, 5, and 3 reactors under construction, respectively 
(IAEA, 2013a). New reactors consist of 57 PWR, 5 PHWR, 4 BWR, 2 FBR, 
and one high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) (IAEA, 2013a).
Commercial reactors currently under construction — such as the 
Advanced Passive-1000 (AP-1000, USA-Japan), Advanced Boiling 
Water Reactor (ABWR, USA-Japan), European Pressurized Reactor (EPR, 
France), Water-Water Energetic Reactor-1200 (VVER-1200, Russia), and 
Advanced Power Reactor-1400 (APR-1400, Rep. of Korea) — are Gen III 
and Gen III+ reactors that have evolutionary designs with improved 
active and passive safety features over the previous generation of 
reactors (Cummins et al., 2003; IAEA, 2006; Kim, 2009; Goldberg and 
Rosner, 2011). 
Other more revolutionary small modular reactors (SMR) with additional 
passive safety features are under development (Rosner and Goldberg, 
2011; IAEA, 2012a; Vujic et al., 2012; World Nuclear Association, 2013). 
The size of these reactors is typically less than 300 MWe, much smaller 
than the 1000 MWe or larger size of current LWRs. The idea of a smaller 
reactor is not new, but recent SMR designs with low power density, 
large heat capacity, and heat removal through natural means have the 
potential for enhanced safety (IAEA, 2005a, 2012a). Additional motiva-
tions for the interest in SMRs are economies of manufacturing from 
modular construction techniques, shorter construction periods, incre-
mental power capacity additions, and potential for improved financing 
(Rosner and Goldberg, 2011; Vujic et al., 2012; World Nuclear Associa-
tion, 2013). Several SMR designs are under consideration. Light-water 
SMRs are intended to rely on the substantial experience with current 
LWRs and utilize existing fuel-cycle infrastructure. Gas-cooled SMRs 
that operate at higher temperatures have the potential for increased 
electricity generation efficiencies relative to LWRs and industrial appli-
cations as a source of high-temperature process heat (EPRI, 2003; 
Zhang et al., 2009). A 210 MWe demonstration high-temperature peb-
ble-bed reactor (HTR-PM) is under construction in China (Zhang et al., 
2009). While several countries have interest in the development of 
SMRs, their widespread adoption remains uncertain. 
The choice of the nuclear fuel cycle has a direct impact on uranium 
resource utilization, nuclear proliferation, and waste management. The 
use of enriched uranium fuels for LWRs in a once-through fuel cycle 
dominates the current nuclear energy system. In this fuel cycle, only a 
small portion of the uranium in the fuel is utilized for energy produc-
tion, while most of the uranium remains unused. The composition of 
spent or used LWR fuel is approximately 94 % uranium, 1 % plutonium, 
and 5 % waste products (ORNL, 2012). The uranium and converted plu-
tonium in the spent fuel can be used as new fuel through reprocessing. 
While the ultimate availability of natural uranium resources is uncer-
tain (see Section 7.4.3), dependence on LWRs and the once-through 
fuel cycle implies greater demand for natural uranium. Transition to 
ore grades of lower uranium concentration for increasing uranium sup-
ply could result in higher extraction costs (Schneider and Sailor, 2008). 
Uranium ore costs are a small component of nuclear electricity costs, 
however, so higher uranium extraction cost may not have a significant 
impact on the competitiveness of nuclear power (IAEA, 2012b).
The necessity for uranium enrichment for LWRs and the presence of 
plutonium in the spent fuel are the primary proliferation concerns. 
There are differing national policies for the use or storage of fissile 
plutonium in the spent fuel, with some nations electing to recycle plu-
tonium for use in new fuels and others electing to leave it intact within 
the spent fuel (IAEA, 2008a). The presence of plutonium and minor 
actinides in the spent fuel leads to greater waste-disposal challenges 
as well. Heavy isotopes such as plutonium and minor actinides have 
very long half-lives, as high as tens to hundreds of thousands of years 
(NRC, 1996), which require final waste-disposal strategies to address 
safety of waste disposal on such great timescales. Alternative strate-
gies to isolate and dispose of fission products and their components 
apart from actinides could have significant beneficial impact on waste-
disposal requirements (Wigeland et al., 2006). Others have argued that 
separation and transmutation of actinides would have little or no prac-
tical benefit for waste disposal (NRC, 1996; Bunn et al., 2003).
Alternative nuclear fuel cycles, beyond the once-through uranium 
cycle, and related reactor technologies are under investigation. Par-
tial recycling of used fuels, such as the use of mixed-oxide (MOX) 
fuels where U-235 in enriched uranium fuel is replaced with recycled 
or excess plutonium, is utilized in some nations to improve uranium 
resource utilization and waste-minimization efforts (OECD and NEA, 
2007; World Nuclear Association, 2013). The thorium fuel cycle is an 
alternative to the uranium fuel cycle, and the abundance of thorium 
resources motivates its potential use (see Section 7.4.3). Unlike natural 
uranium, however, thorium does not contain any fissile isotopes. An 
external source of fissile material is necessary to initiate the thorium 
fuel cycle, and breeding of fissile U-233 from fertile Th-232 is necessary 
to sustain the fuel cycle (IAEA, 2005b). 
Ultimately, full recycling options based on either uranium or thorium 
fuel cycles that are combined with advanced reactor designs — includ-
ing fast and thermal neutron spectrum reactors — where only fission 
products are relegated as waste can significantly extend nuclear 
resources and reduce high-level wastes (GIF, 2002, 2009; IAEA, 2005b). 
Current drawbacks include higher economic costs, as well as increased 
complexities and the associated risks of advanced fuel cycles and reac-
tor technologies. Potential access to fissile materials from widespread 
application of reprocessing technologies further raises proliferation 
concerns. The advantages and disadvantages of alternative reprocess-
ing technologies are under investigation.
There is not a commonly accepted, single worldwide approach to dealing 
with the long-term storage and permanent disposal of high-level waste. 
Regional differences in the availability of uranium ore and land resources, 





acceptance of waste disposal have resulted in alternative approaches to 
waste storage and disposal. Regardless of these differences and the fuel 
cycle ultimately chosen, some form of long-term storage and permanent 
disposal, whether surface or geologic (subsurface), is required. 
There is no final geologic disposal of high-level waste from commercial 
nuclear power plants currently in operation, but Finland and Sweden 
are the furthest along in the development of geologic disposal facilities 
for the direct disposal of spent fuel (Posiva Oy, 2011, 2012; SKB, 2011). 
In Finland, construction of the geologic disposal facility is in prog-
ress and final disposal of spent fuel is to begin in early 2020 (Posiva 
Oy, 2012). Other countries, such as France and Japan, have chosen 
to reprocess spent fuel to use the recovered uranium and plutonium 
for fresh fuel and to dispose of fission products and other actinides 
in a geologic repository (OECD and NEA, 2007; Butler, 2010). Yet oth-
ers, such as Korea (Rep. of), are pursuing a synergistic application of 
light and heavy water reactors to reduce the total waste by extract-
ing more energy from used fuels (Myung et al., 2006). In the United 
States, waste-disposal options are currently under review with the ter-
mination of the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository in Nevada 
(CRS, 2012). Indefinite dry cask storage of high-level waste at reactor 
sites and interim storage facilities are to be pursued until decisions on 
waste disposal are resolved.
The implementation of climate change mitigation policies increases the 
competiveness of nuclear energy technologies relative to other tech-
nology options that emit GHG emissions (See 7.11, Nicholson et  al., 
2011). The choice of nuclear reactor technologies and fuel cycles will 
affect the potential risks associated with an expanded global response 
of nuclear energy in addressing climate change. 
Nuclear power has been in use for several decades. With low levels of 
lifecycle GHG emissions (see Section 7.8.1), nuclear power contributes 
to emissions reduction today and potentially in the future. Continued 
use and expansion of nuclear energy worldwide as a response to cli-
mate change mitigation require greater efforts to address the safety, 
economics, uranium utilization, waste management, and proliferation 
concerns of nuclear energy use (IPCC, 2007, Chapter 4; GEA, 2012). 
Research and development of the next-generation nuclear energy 
system, beyond the evolutionary LWRs, is being undertaken through 
national and international efforts (GIF, 2009). New fuel cycles and 
reactor technologies are under investigation in an effort to address 
the concerns of nuclear energy use. Further information concerning 
resources, costs, risks and co-benefits, deployment barriers, and policy 
aspects can be found in Sections 7.4.3, 7.8.2, 7.9, 7.10, and 7.12.
7�5�5 Carbon dioxide capture and storage 
(CCS)
As of mid-2013, CCS has not yet been applied at scale to a large, com-
mercial fossil-fired power generation facility. However, all of the com-
ponents of integrated CCS systems exist and are in use today by the 
hydrocarbon exploration, production, and transport, as well as the pet-
rochemical refining sectors. 
 A ‘complete end-to-end CCS system’ captures CO2 from large (e. g., 
typically larger than 0.1  MtCO2 / year) stationary point sources (e. g., 
hydrocarbon-fuelled power plants, refineries, cement plants, and steel 
mills), transports and injects the compressed CO2 into a suitable deep 
(typically more than 800 m below the surface) geologic structure, and 
then applies a suite of measurement, monitoring, and verification 
(MMV) technologies to ensure the safety, efficacy, and permanence of 
the captured CO2’s isolation from the atmosphere (IPCC, 2005; Herzog, 
2011). As of mid  2013, five large end-to-end commercial CCS facili-
ties were in operation around the world. Collectively, they have stored 
more than 30 MtCO2 over their lifetimes (Eiken et al., 2011; Whittaker 
et al., 2011; MIT, 2013). All of them capture a high-purity CO2 stream 
from industrial (i. e., non-electricity-generating) facilities such as natu-
ral gas processing plants. The near-term deployment of CCS is likely to 
arise in just these kinds of industrial facilities that produce high-purity 
(which connotes relatively inexpensive to capture) CO2 waste streams 
that would otherwise be vented to the atmosphere and / or in situations 
where the captured CO2 can be used in a value-added manner as is the 
case with CO2-driven tertiary hydrocarbon recovery (IPCC, 2005; Bak-
ker et al., 2010; Vergragt et al., 2011). 
In the long term, the largest market for CCS systems is most likely 
found in the electric power sector, where the cost of deploying CCS 
(measured on a USD / tCO2 basis) will be much higher and, as a result, 
will be done solely for the purpose of isolating anthropogenic CO2 from 
the atmosphere. However, this is unlikely to occur without sufficiently 
stringent limits on GHG emissions to make it economic to incur these 
additional costs, regulatory mandates that would require the use of 
CCS (for example, on new facilities), or sufficient direct or indirect 
financial support (IPCC, 2005; Herzog, 2011). 
Research aimed at improving the performance and cost of CO2 capture 
systems for the electric power sector is significant across three broad 
classes of CO2 capture technologies: pre-combustion (Rubin et  al., 
2007; Figueroa et  al., 2008), post-combustion (Lin and Chen, 2011; 
Padurean et al., 2011; Versteeg and Rubin, 2011), and oxyfuel capture 
(Scheffknecht et al., 2011; Wall et al., 2011). 
The risks associated with a large-scale deployment of CCS technologies 
include concerns about the lifecycle toxicity of some capture solvents 
(IEAGHG, 2010; Korre et al., 2010; Corsten et al., 2013), the operational 
safety and long-term integrity of CO2 storage sites (Birkholzer et  al., 
2009; Oruganti and Bryant, 2009; Juanes et  al., 2010, 2012; Morris 
et al., 2011; Mazzoldi et al., 2012), as well as risks associated with CO2 
transport via dedicated pipelines (Aines et al., 2009; Mazzoldi et al., 
2012). 
There is, however, a growing body of literature on how to minimize 





2007, 2010; Jordan and Benson, 2009; Crow et al., 2010; Zhang and 
Bachu, 2011; Matteo and Scherer, 2012), as well as on using detailed 
measurement, monitoring, and verification data to lower the threshold 
for detecting any leakage out of the intended injection zone (Hovo-
rka et al., 2006; Gilfillan et al., 2009; Jordan and Benson, 2009; Eiken 
et al., 2011). The literature is also quantifying potential consequences 
of a pressure buildup within a formation caused by CO2 storage such 
as induced seismicity (Juanes et al., 2012; Mazzoldi et al., 2012; NAS, 
2013a), the potential human health impacts (Roberts et al., 2011; de 
Lary et al., 2012; Atchley et al., 2013), and environmental consequences 
from CO2 that might migrate out of the primary injection zone (Gaus, 
2010; Romanak et al., 2012; Zheng et al., 2012) as well as mechanisms 
for actively managing the storage formation such as withdrawing for-
mation waters to reduce pressure buildup (Esposito and Benson, 2012; 
Réveillère et al., 2012; Sullivan et al., 2013). 
The deployment of CCS at a scale of 100s of GtCO2 over the course 
of this century (which is consistent with the stabilization scenarios 
described in Chapter 6 and in Section 7.11) would imply that large, 
regional, deep-geologic basins would have to accommodate multiple 
large-scale CO2 injection projects (Bachu, 2008; Nicot, 2008; Birkholzer 
and Zhou, 2009; Juanes et al., 2010) while taking into account other 
industrial activities in the region that could impact the integrity of CO2 
storage reservoirs (Elliot and Celia, 2012). The peer-reviewed literature 
that has looked at these large CCS deployment scenarios stress the 
need for good CO2 storage site selection that would explicitly address 
the cumulative far-field pressure effects from multiple injection proj-
ects in a given basin. 
A considerable body of practical engineering and scientific knowl-
edge has been generated from the first five large-scale, complete 
CCS deployments as well as from numerous smaller-scale CCS field 
experiments and technology demonstrations (Cavanagh et  al., 2010; 
IEAGHG, 2011; NETL, 2012). In particular, a key advance has been the 
field testing of MMV technologies to monitor injected CO2 in a vari-
ety of settings. These real-world MMV deployments are the beginnings 
of a broader portfolio of MMV technologies that can be matched to 
site-specific geology and project- and jurisdiction-specific MMV needs 
(Mathieson et al., 2010; Vasco et al., 2010; Sato et al., 2011). The value 
of high-quality MMV data is becoming clearer as these data allow for 
the active management of a geologic CO2 storage formation and can 
provide operators and regulators with the ability to detect possible 
leakage out of the target formation at low levels, which, in turn, can 
reduce the probability and magnitude of adverse events (Dooley et al., 
2010; Torvanger et al., 2012; Buscheck et al., 2012; Schloemer et al., 
2013). 
As noted by Bachu (2008), Krevor et al., (2012), and IPCC (2005), there 
are a number of key physical and chemical processes that work in con-
cert to help ensure the efficacy of deep-geologic CO2 storage over time. 
The accumulated knowledge from the five commercial CCS facilities 
mentioned above, from many smaller field experiments and technol-
ogy demonstrations, and from laboratory-based research suggests a 
declining long-term risk profile for CO2 stored in deep-geologic reser-
voirs once active CO2 injection into the reservoir has ceased (Hovorka 
et al., 2006; Gilfillan et al., 2009; Jordan and Benson, 2009). Torvanger 
et al. (2012) builds upon this accumulated knowledge and concludes, 
“only in the most unfortunate conditions could such CO2 escape [from 
deep-geologic CO2 storage reservoirs and] compromise [humanity’s 
ability to not exceed a] maximum 2.5 °C warming.” 
Further information concerning transport risks, costs, deployment bar-
riers, and policy aspects can be found in Sections 7.6.4, 7.8.2, 7.10, and 
7.12, respectively. The use of CCS in the industrial sector is described 
in Section 10.4. 
The direct CO2 emissions from biogenic feedstock combustion broadly 
correspond to the amount of atmospheric CO2 sequestered through the 
growth cycle of bioenergy production.8 A net removal of atmospheric 
CO2 therefore would result, once the direct emissions are captured and 
stored using CCS technologies (see Section 11.13, Figure 11.22). As a 
consequence, a combination of bio-energy and CCS (BECCS) generally 
will result in net negative emissions (see IEA, 2011c, 2012c; IEAGHG, 
2011). Currently, two small-scale examples of commercial precursors 
to BECCS are capturing CO2 emissions from ethanol production facili-
ties for enhanced oil recovery in close-proximity facilities (DiPietro and 
Balash, 2012). 
BECCS is one of the few technologies that is capable of removing 
past CO2 emissions remaining in the atmosphere. As this enhances 
the ‘when’ (i. e., temporal) flexibility during the design of mitigation 
scenarios considerably, BECCS plays a prominent role in many of the 
low-stabilization pathways discussed in Chapter 6 and Section 7.11. 
Potential risks associated with BECCS technologies are related to those 
associated with the upstream provision of the used biomass9 (see Sec-
tion  11.13) as well as those originating from the capture, transport, 
and long-term underground storage of CO2 that would be emitted oth-
erwise (see above). 
8 Non-vanishing life-cycle emissions originate from fossil fuels used during the 
planting, regrowth, and harvesting cycle and potential emissions from land-use 
and management change, among others. The lifecycle emissions depend on the 
type of feedstock, specific location, scale and practices of biomass production, and 
on the dynamics and management of land use. In some cases, if biomass growth 
accumulates carbon in the soil until reaching equilibrium, additional carbon 
sequestration can occur, but these may be short-term effects. Indirect emissions 
relate more directly to the use of food crops for energy than to the use of lignocel-
lulosic biomass (see Section 11.13). Short rotation species (herbaceous plants) 
wastes have near-zero net emissions cycles.
9 BECCS costs can be reduced by using large-scale biomass conversion facilities, 
which, in turn, require the development of cost-effective and low-emitting large-





7.6 Infrastructure and 
 systemic perspectives
7�6�1 Electrical power systems 
Reducing GHG emissions from the electric power sector will require 
infrastructure investments and changes in the operations of power 
systems — these will both depend on the mitigation technologies 
employed. The fundamental reliability constraints that underpin this 
process are the requirements that power supply and electricity demand 
remain in balance at all times (system balancing), that adequate gen-
eration capacity is installed to meet (peak) residual demand (capacity 
adequacy)10, and that transmission and distribution network infrastruc-
ture is sufficient to deliver generation to end users (transmission and 
distribution). Studies of high variable RE penetration (Mason et  al., 
2010; Delucchi and Jacobson, 2011; Denholm and Hand, 2011; Huva 
et al., 2012; Elliston et al., 2012; Haller et al., 2012; Rasmussen et al., 
2012; Budischak et al., 2013) and the broader literature (summarized 
in Sims et  al., 2011) suggest that integrating significant RE genera-
tion technology is technically feasible, though economic and institu-
tional barriers may hinder uptake. Integrating high penetrations of RE 
resources, particularly those that are intrinsically time variable, along-
side operationally inflexible generation is expected to result in higher 
system-balancing costs. Compared to other mitigation options variable 
renewable generation will contribute less to capacity adequacy, and, if 
remote from loads, will also increase transmission costs. The determi-
nation of least-cost portfolios of those options that facilitate the inte-
gration of fluctuating power sources is a field of active and ongoing 
research (Haller et al., 2012; Steinke et al., 2013).
7�6�1�1 System balancing — flexible generation and 
loads
Variable RE resources may increase the need for system balancing 
beyond that required to meet variations in demand. Existing generating 
resources can contribute to this additional flexibility. An IEA assessment 
shows the amount of variable RE electricity that can be accommodated 
using ‘existing’ balancing resources exceeds 20 % of total annual elec-
tricity supply in seven regions and is above 40 % in two regions and 
one country (IEA, 2011d). Higher RE penetrations will require additional 
flexible resources (De Vos et al., 2013). Surplus renewable supply can be 
curtailed by switching off unwanted plants or through regulation of the 
power output, but with corresponding economic consequences (Brand-
stätt et al., 2011; Jacobsen and Schröder, 2012). 
Some low-carbon power technologies (such as nuclear) have relatively 
high up-front and low operating costs, making them attractive for 
10 Sometimes called resource adequacy. 
baseload operation rather than providing flexible generation to assist 
in system balancing. Depending on the pattern of electricity demand, 
a relatively high share of energy can be provided by these baseload 
technologies but at some point, further increases in their penetration 
will require part-loaded operation,11 load following, time shifting of 
demand (via load management or demand response), and / or deploy-
ment of storage where it is cost-effective (Knapp, 1969; Johnson and 
Keith, 2004; Chalmers et al., 2009; Pouret et al., 2009). 
Part-load operation of nuclear plants is possible as in France, though 
in other regions it may be restricted by institutional barriers (Perez-
Arriaga and Batlle, 2012). Load following by nuclear power plants is 
more challenging and must be considered at the design stage (NEA, 
2011a, 2012; Greenblatt et al., 2012). Flexible operation of a CCS-fitted 
generation plant is also an active area of research (Chalmers and Gib-
bins, 2007; Nord et al., 2009; Cohen et al., 2011). Operational flexibility 
of combined heat and power (CHP) plants may be constrained by heat 
loads, though thermal storages and complementary heat sources can 
mitigate this effect (e. g., Lund and Andersen, 2005; Christidis et  al., 
2012; Blarke, 2012; Nuytten et al., 2013), however, the capital intensity 
of CHP will favor high load factors. Reservoir hydropower can be useful 
in balancing due to its flexibility. 
Certain combinations may present further challenges (Ludig et  al., 
2011): high shares of variable RE power, for example, may not be 
ideally complemented by nuclear, CCS, and CHP plants (without heat 
storage). If those plants cannot be operated in a flexible manner, 
additional flexibility is required and can be obtained from a number 
of sources including investment in new flexible generation, improve-
ments in the flexibility of existing power plants, demand response, and 
storage as summarized in the SRREN (Sims et  al., 2011). Obtaining 
flexibility from fossil generation has a cost (see Section 7.8.2) and can 
affect the overall GHG reduction potential of variable RE (Pehnt et al., 
2008; Fripp, 2011; Wiser et al., 2011; Perez-Arriaga and Batlle, 2012). 
Demand response12 is of increasing interest due to its potentially low 
cost (see chapter 9 and 10; IEA, 2003b; Depuru et al., 2011; Cook et al., 
2012; Joung and Kim, 2013; Procter, 2013), albeit some emphasize its 
limitation compared to flexible conventional supply technologies (Cut-
ter et  al., 2012). Smart meters and remote controls are key compo-
nents of the so-called smart grid where information technology is used 
to improve the operation of power systems, especially with resources 
located at the distribution level (IEA, 2011e). 
Energy storage might play an increasing role in the field of system bal-
ancing (Zafirakis et al., 2013). Today pumped hydro storage is the only 
widely deployed storage technology (Kanakasabapathy, 2013). Other 
storage technologies including compressed air energy storage (CAES) 
and batteries may be deployed at greater scale within centralized 
power systems in the future (Pickard et al., 2009a; b; Roberts and Sand-
11 In the field of RE this is called “curtailment“. 
12 Demand response is load management triggered by power price signals derived 





berg, 2011), and the latter can be decentralized. These short-term stor-
age resources can be used to compensate the day-night cycle of solar 
and short-term fluctuation of wind power (Denholm and Sioshansi, 
2009; Chen et al., 2009; Loisel et al., 2010; Beaudin et al., 2010). With 
the exception of pumped hydro storage, full (levelized) storage costs 
are still high, but storage costs are expected to decline with technol-
ogy development (IEA, 2009b; Deane et al., 2010; Dunn et al., 2011; 
EIA, 2012). ‘Power to heat’ and ‘power to gas’ (H2 or methane) tech-
nologies might allow for translating surplus renewable electricity into 
other useful final energy forms (see Sections 7.6.2 and 7.6.3). 
7�6�1�2 Capacity adequacy
One measure of reliability in a power system is the probability that 
demand will exceed available generation. The contribution of different 
generation technologies to ensuring the availability of sufficient gener-
ation is called the capacity credit or capacity value (Keane et al., 2011). 
The capacity credit of nuclear, thermal plants with CCS, geothermal, 
and large hydro is expected to be higher than 90 % (i. e., within 10 % of 
the plant nameplate capacity) as long as fuel supply and cooling water 
is sufficient and maintenance is scheduled outside critical periods. Vari-
able RE will generally have a lower capacity credit that depends on 
the correlation between generation availability and periods of high 
demand. The capacity credit of wind power, for instance, ranges from 
5 % to 40 % of the nameplate capacity (Mason et al., 2010; Holttinen 
et al., 2011); ranges of capacity credits for other RE resources are sum-
marized in Sims et al. (2011). 
The addition of significant plants with low capacity credit can lead to 
the need for a higher planning-reserve margin (defined as the ratio of 
the sum of the nameplate capacity of all generation to peak demand) 
to ensure the same degree of system reliability. If specifically tied to 
RE generation, energy storage can increase the capacity credit of that 
source; for example, the capacity credit of CSP with thermal storage is 
greater than without thermal storage (Madaeni et al., 2011).
7�6�1�3 Transmission and distribution
Due to the geographical diversity of RE resources, connecting RE 
sources to the existing transmission system may require the installa-
tion of additional transmission capacity and strengthening the exist-
ing system if significantly greater power flows are required across the 
system (Sims et al., 2011). Increased interconnection and strengthened 
transmission systems provide power system operators the capability 
to move surplus generation in one region to meet otherwise unmet 
demand in another, exploiting the geographical diversity of both loads 
and generation (Rasmussen et  al., 2012). Although there will be a 
need for additional transmission capacity, its installation often faces 
institutional challenges, and it can be visually intrusive and unpopular 
in the affected areas. Infrastructure challenges are particularly acute 
for RE deployment in developing countries, which is why stand-alone 
decentralized generation, such as with solar home systems, is often 
favored.
Transmission considerations applied to CCS plants have to reflect the 
tradeoff between the cost of electrical transmission and the cost of 
pipeline transport of CO2 to final depositories (Svensson et al., 2004; 
Benson et al., 2005; Herzog et al., 2005; Spiecker et al., 2011). Trans-
mission investments may also be needed for future nuclear plants if 
these are located at some distance from load centers due to public per-
ceptions of health and safety, access to cooling water, or other factors.
Distributed generation (DG), where small generating units (often 
renewable technologies, cogeneration units, or fuel cells) are con-
nected directly to the electricity distribution system and near loads, 
may not have the same need for expansion of the transmission system. 
The net impact of DG on distribution networks depends on the local 
penetration level, the location of DG relative to loads, and temporal 
coincidence of DG generation and loads (Cossent et al., 2011). As DG 
grows, system operators would like to have increased visibility and 
controllability of DG to ensure overall system reliability. Smart grids 
might include components to facilitate the integration of various DG 
technologies, allow for more active control of the distribution network, 
and improve the market value of DG through aggregation into virtual 
power plants (Pudjianto et al., 2007; Clastres, 2011; IEA, 2011e; Wiss-
ner, 2011; Ardito et al., 2013; Hashmi et al., 2013).
7�6�2 Heating and cooling networks
Globally, 15.8 EJ were used in 2010 (2.6 % of global TPES) to produce 
nearly 14.3 EJ13 of district heat for sale at CHP (44 %) and heat-only 
boilers (56 %) (Table 7.1). After a long decline in the 1990s, district 
heat returned to a growing trajectory in the last decade, rising by about 
21 % above the year-2000 level (IEA, 2012a). This market is dominated 
by the Russian Federation with a 42 % share in the global heat gen-
eration, followed by Ukraine, United States, Germany, Kazakhstan, and 
Poland. Natural gas dominates in the fuel balance of heat generation 
(46 %), followed by coal (40 %), oil (5 %), biofuels and waste (5 %), 
geothermal and other renewables (2.4 %), and a small contribution 
from nuclear. Development of intelligent district heating and cooling 
networks in combination with (seasonal) heat storage allows for more 
flexibility and diversity (combination of wind and CHP production in 
Denmark) and facilitates additional opportunities for low-carbon tech-
nologies (CHP, waste heat use, heat pumps, and solar heating and 
cooling) (IEA, 2012a). In addition, excess renewable electricity can be 
converted into heat to replace what otherwise would have been pro-
duced by fossil fuels (Meibom et al., 2007). 
Statistically reported average global efficiency of heat generation by 
heat-only boilers is 83 %, while it is possible to improve it to 90 – 95 % 
13 UNES reports lower number. For 2008 this sources assess the total production of 





depending on fuel used. About 6.9 % of globally generated heat for sale 
is lost in heating networks (Table 7.1). In some Russian and Ukrainian 
municipal heating systems, such losses amount to 20 – 25 % as a result 
of excessive centralization of many district heating systems and of 
worn and poorly maintained heat supply systems (Bashmakov, 2009). 
The promotion of district heating and cooling system should also 
account for future technology developments that impact the district 
heating sector (building heat demand reduction, high-efficiency single-
housing boilers, heat-pump technology, cogeneration reciprocating 
engines, or fuel cells, etc.), which may allow switching to more-effi-
cient decentralized systems (GEA, 2012). District heating and cooling 
systems could be more energy and economically efficient when heat 
or coldness load density is high through the development of tri-gener-
ation, the utilization of waste heat by communities or industrial sites, if 
heat (cooling) and power loads show similar patterns, and if heat-loss 
control systems are well-designed and managed (see 9.4.1.1). 
7�6�3 Fuel supply systems
As noted in Section 7.5.1, fossil fuel extraction and distribution contrib-
utes around 5 – 10 % of total fossil fuel related GHG emissions. It has 
also been noted that specific emissions from this sector will increase 
due to increased energy requirements of extraction and processing of 
oil and gas from mature fields and unconventional sources, and the 
mining of coal from deeper mines. The fuel supply system supporting 
this sector does, however, provide opportunities to reduce GHG emis-
sions by enabling the delivery of low-carbon fuels (such as biofuels, 
biogas, renewable H2,or renewable methane). 
Opportunities for delivery of liquid fuels are likely limited to fuels such 
as biodiesel and ethanol at points in the system that enable either 
storage or blending before transport to distribution nodes, which is 
discussed in Section 8.3.3; for gaseous fuels, supply of low-carbon 
fuels could occur across much of the gas delivery network. 
More than 50 countries transport high-pressure natural gas through 
pipe networks greater than 1,000  km in length (Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2011). Although individual layout varies, connected to these 
are the lower-pressure networks that distribute gas for power genera-
tion, industry, and domestic use. Because of their ability to carry natu-
ral gas substitutes, these networks provide an opportunity to expand 
production of these gases; depending on the availability of resources, 
estimates suggest substitutes could replace 17.4 EJ of natural gas used 
in Europe by 2020 (IPCC, 2011a). Low CO2-emitting natural gas sub-
stitutes can be produced from surplus fluctuating renewable electric-
ity generation, e. g., ‘power to methane’ (Sterner, 2009; Arvizu et al., 
2011), from other renewable sources such as biomass and waste, or 
via coal when combined with CCS; CCS can be added to gas produc-
tion from biomass to further enhance the CO2-mitigation potential 
(Carbo et al., 2011). Provided the substitute natural gas meets the rel-
evant gas quality standard (IEA Bioenergy, 2006, 2009; IPCC, 2011a), 
and gas cleanup may be required to achieve this, there are no tech-
nical barriers to the injection of gas substitutes into the existing gas 
networks (Hagen et  al., 2001). Biomethane produced from a variety 
of sources is already being injected into a number of natural gas net-
works (IEA Bioenergy, 2011; IPCC, 2011a).
The existing natural gas network also has the potential to transport 
and distribute hydrogen provided the injected fraction remains below 
20 % by volume, although estimates vary (Naturalhy 2004). Limiting 
factors are gas quality standard and equipment compliance, pipeline 
integrity (failure, fire, and explosion) and end-user safety (Naturalhy, 
2004; Tabkhi et al., 2008). Where the pipelines are suitable and more-
frequent inspections can be undertaken, a higher fraction of hydrogen 
can be carried, although the lower volumetric energy density of hydro-
gen will reduce energy flow, unless gas pressure can be increased. If 
required, hydrogen separation is possible via a range of existing tech-
nologies. 
For dedicated hydrogen delivery, transport distance is an important 
consideration; pipelines are favoured over shorter delivery distances 
and at high flow rates, while batch delivery of liquid hydrogen is 
favoured by long distances (Yang and Ogden, 2007). Hydrogen can be 
produced from renewable sources such as wind and solar (IEA, 2006; 
Moriarty and Honnery, 2007; Gahleitner, 2013) as well as biomass. Its 
production from intermittent renewable sources can provide greater 
system flexibility; drawbacks are the additional cost and reduced over-
all efficiency in energy delivery (Mason and Zweibel, 2007; Honnery 
and Moriarty, 2009; IPCC, 2011a). 
7�6�4 CO2 transport
There are more than 6,300 km of existing CO2 pipeline in the U.S and 
much has been learned from the decades of operational experience 
obtained from these existing CO2 pipeline systems (Dooley et al., 2011). 
There is a growing body of research that describes the magnitude and 
region-specific nature of future CO2 transport systems. Specifically, there 
are a growing number of bottom-up studies that examine spatial rela-
tionships between where CO2 capture units might be located and the 
very heterogeneous distribution, capacity, and quality of candidate geo-
logic storage reservoirs. For example, the work of Dahowski et al., (2005, 
2012) suggests that more than 90 % of the large stationary CO2 point 
sources in the United States are within 160 km of at least one candidate 
geologic storage reservoir and 80 % of China’s large stationary point 
sources are within 80 km of at least one candidate storage reservoir. 
For regions like these, the proximity of most large stationary CO2 point 
sources to large and geographically distributed geologic CO2 storage 
reservoirs suggests that — at least early on in the commercial deploy-
ment of CCS technologies — facilities might rely on dedicated pipelines 
linking the CO2 source to an appropriate sink. The work of Johnson and 
Ogden (2011) suggests that once there is a critical density of CO2 cap-
ture and storage projects in a region, a more-integrated national pipe-





Europe, Japan, and Korea, where onshore storage options are not widely 
distributed, more care is needed in planning pipeline networks given 
the geographical (and political) challenges of linking distributed CO2 
sources to the available / usable predominantly offshore geologic stor-
age options. This requires longer-term planning as well as political / legal 
agreements between countries in those regions as more coordination 
and cross-boundary transport will be necessary / desired (Huh et  al., 
2011; Ogawa et al., 2011; Strachan et al., 2011; ZEP, 2011a). While pipe-
lines are likely to be the transport mode of choice for onshore and most 
offshore storage projects (IPCC, 2005), in certain circumstances, trans-
porting CO2 by large ocean going vessels could be a technically feasible 
and cost-effective option (Aspelund et  al., 2006; Decarre et  al., 2010; 
Ozaki and Ohsumi, 2011; Yoo et al., 2011). 
The United States oil and gas industry has more than 40 years of expe-
rience associated with transporting large volumes of CO2 via dedicated 
commercial pipelines (IPCC, 2005; Meyer, 2007). Available data sug-
gests that these CO2 pipelines have safety records that are as good or 
better than large interstate natural gas pipelines, their closest indus-
trial analogue (Gale and Davison, 2004; IPCC, 2005; Cole et al., 2011). 
There is also a growing body of work combining pipeline fluid flow, 
pipeline engineering models, and atmospheric dispersion models sug-
gesting that the hazard associated with potential ruptures in CO2 pipe-
lines is likely to be small for most plausible releases to the atmosphere 
(Aines et  al., 2009; Koornneef et  al., 2010; Mazzoldi et  al., 2011). 
Although much can be learned from existing CO2 pipeline systems, 
knowledge gaps exist for systems that integrate multiple CO2 source 
points. Because of their impact on pipeline integrity, gas stream prop-
erties and flow management, impurity control is emerging as a major 
design feature of these systems (Oosterkamp and Ramsen, 2008; Cole 
et al., 2011) with particular importance given to limiting the amount of 
water in the gas stream at its source to avoid corrosion. 
Estimates for the cost of transporting, injecting into a suitable forma-
tion, site closure, and long-term post-injection monitoring are summa-
rized at the end of Section 7.8.2. Options for CO2 geologic storage are 
presented in Section 7.5.5 and a discussion of the cost of CO2 capture 
is presented in Section 7.8.2.
7.7 Climate change 
 feedback and  interaction 
with adaptation
Climate change will affect heating and cooling energy demands (see 
also Chapter 9.5; Arent et al., 2014), thereby also influencing energy 
supply needs. The effect on overall energy demand will vary geographi-
cally (Mideksa and Kallbekken, 2010; Pilli-Sihvola et  al., 2010; Wan 
et  al., 2011). Many studies indicate that demand for electricity will 
increase because of greater need for space cooling, while demand for 
natural gas and oil will decline because of less need for space heating 
(Isaac and van Vuuren, 2009; Akpinar-Ferrand and Singh, 2010; Arent 
et  al., 2014). Peak electricity demand could also increase, especially 
as a result of extreme events, requiring a disproportionate increase 
in energy infrastructure (US EPA, 2008). Although impacts on energy 
demands outside of heating and cooling are less clear, possible effects 
include increased energy use for climate-sensitive processes, such as 
pumping water for irrigated agriculture and municipal uses (US EPA, 
2008; Aromar and Sattherhwaite, 2014). As another example, reduc-
tions or changes to surface water flows could increase energy demand 
for desalination (Boyé, 2008; Scholes and Settele, 2014). 
In addition to impacting energy supply through changes in energy 
demand, climate change will have various impacts on the potential 
future role of mitigation technologies in the energy supply sector. 
Though these impacts are summarized here, further details on poten-
tial impacts, as well as a summary of how conventional higher-car-
bon energy supplies might be affected, are available in the WGII AR5 
report, especially but not limited to Chapter 10 (Arent et al., 2014). 
Though the impact of climate change on the primary resource base 
for fossil fuels is likely to be small (World Bank, 2011a), RE sources 
can be particularly sensitive to climate change impacts. In general, any 
impacts are expected to increase with the level of climate change, but 
the nature and magnitude of these effects are technology-dependent 
and somewhat uncertain, and they may vary substantially on regional 
and local levels (IPCC, 2011a; Schaeffer et al., 2012; Arent et al., 2014). 
The SRREN SPM (IPCC, 2011a, p. 12), summarizes the available litera-
ture as follows: 
“The future technical potential for bioenergy could be 
influenced by climate change through impacts on biomass 
production such as altered soil conditions, precipitation, crop 
productivity, and other factors. The overall impact of a global 
mean temperature change of less than 2 °C on the technical 
potential of bioenergy is expected to be relatively small on a 
global basis. However, considerable regional differences could 
be expected and uncertainties are larger and more difficult to 
assess compared to other RE options due to the large number 
of feedback mechanisms involved. For solar energy, though cli-
mate change is expected to influence the distribution and vari-
ability of cloud cover, the impact of these changes on overall 
technical potential is expected to be small. For hydropower the 
overall impacts on the global technical potential is expected 
to be slightly positive. However, results also indicate the pos-
sibility of substantial variations across regions and even within 
countries. Research to date suggests that climate change is not 
expected to greatly impact the global technical potential for 
wind energy development but changes in the regional distribu-
tion of the wind energy resource may be expected. Climate 
change is not anticipated to have significant impacts on the 






A decline in renewable resource potential in one area could lead to 
a shift in the location of electricity-generation technologies over time 
to areas where the resource has not degraded. Long-lived transmis-
sion and other infrastructure built to accommodate these technolo-
gies, however, may be stranded. The longer lifetimes of hydropower 
dams may mean that these facilities are also less adaptable to climate 
changes such as changes in local precipitation; nonetheless, dams also 
offer the opportunity for energy and water storage that may provide 
climate-adaptation benefits (Kumar et al., 2011; Schaeffer et al., 2012).
Climate change may also impact the design and operation of energy 
sourcing and delivery facilities (e. g., US DOE, 2013b). Offshore infra-
structure, including gas and oil wells but also certain RE facilities such 
as offshore wind power plants, are vulnerable to extreme weather 
events (Karl et al., 2009; Wiser et al., 2011; World Bank, 2011a; Rose 
et al., 2012; Arent et al., 2014). Production losses from thermal power 
plants (whether low- or high-carbon facilities) and efficiency losses 
from energy-delivery infrastructures increase when temperatures 
exceed standard design criteria (Schaeffer et al., 2012; Sathaye et al., 
2013). Some power-generation facilities will also be impacted by 
changes in access to and the temperature of cooling water, while both 
power-generation facilities and energy-delivery infrastructures can be 
impacted by sea-level rise and extreme weather events (Kopytko and 
Perkins, 2011; Schaeffer et  al., 2012; Arent et  al., 2014). Adaptation 
strategies include infrastructure relocation and reinforcement, cooling-
facility retrofit, and proactive water-resource management (Rübbelke 
and Vögele, 2011; Arent et al., 2014). 
Finally, interdependencies between the energy supply sector and other 
sectors of the economy are important to consider (de Lucena et  al., 
2009). For example, if climate change detrimentally impacts crop 
yields, bioenergy potential may decline and costs may rise because 
more land is demanded for food crop production (Porter and Xie 2014; 
11.13). Climate change may also exacerbate water and energy ten-
sions across sectors and regions, potentially impacting hydropower 
(either positively or negatively, depending on whether the potential 
climate-adaptation benefits of hydropower facilities are realized) and 
other technologies that require water (Kumar et al., 2011; Arent et al., 
2014; Cisneros and Oki, 2014). 
7.8 Costs and potentials
7�8�1 Potential emission reduction from miti-
gation measures
When assessing the potential of different mitigation opportunities, it is 
important to evaluate the options from a lifecycle perspective to take 
into account the emissions in the fuel chain and the manufacturing of 
the energy conversion technology (Annex II.6.3). This section contains 
a review of life-cycle GHG emissions associated with different energy 
supply technologies per unit of final energy delivered, with a focus on 
electricity generation (Figure 7.6).
The largest lifecycle GHG emissions are associated with the com-
bustion of coal. Lifecycle assessments reviewed in SRREN (IPCC, 
2011a), showed a range of 675 – 1689 gCO2eq / kWh electricity. Cor-
responding ranges for oil and gas were 510 – 1170 gCO2eq / kWh and 
290 – 930  gCO2eq / kWh14. For the AR5, the performance of prospec-
tive new fossil fuel power plants was assessed, taking into account 
a revised assessment of fugitive methane emission from coal min-
ing and natural gas supply (Section 7.5.1). According to this assess-
ment, modern-to-advanced hard coal power plants show a range of 
710 – 950 gCO2eq / kWh, while natural gas combined-cycle plants have 
emissions in the range of 410 – 650 gCO2eq / kWh, with high uncertainty 
and variability associated with methane emissions from gas produc-
tion (Section 7.5.1; Annex II.6). Compared to a separate provision of 
heat, cooling, and power from stand-alone fossil fuel-based facilities, 
combined heat and power plants reduce emissions by one quarter 
(Pehnt, 2008). The transformation pathways that achieve a stabiliza-
tion of the global temperature consistent with the Cancun Agreement 
(Chapter 6, Section 7.11, Figure 7.9), however, are based on emissions 
intensities approaching zero in the second half of the 21st century, so 
that the employment of technologies with even lower emissions (than 
the one mentioned for gas-fired power and combined heat and power 
plants) is called for if these goals are to be achieved.
A number of power supply technologies offer very low lifecycle GHG 
emissions (Figure 7.6). The use of CCS is expected to reduce GHG 
emissions to 70 – 290 gCO2eq / kWh for coal (98 – 396  gCO2eq / kWh in 
SRREN). For gas power, the literature specifies 120 – 170 gCO2eq / kWh 
assuming a leakage of 1 % of natural gas (Koornneef et  al., 2008; 
Singh et  al., 2011; Corsten et  al., 2013), while SRREN specified 
65 – 245 gCO2eq / kWh. According to the literature, natural gas leakage 
is between 0.8 % – 5.5 % (Burnham et al., 2012) (see Section 7.5.1 for 
a discussion and more references), resulting in emissions between 90 
and 370 gCO2eq / kWh (Figure 7.6). Most of these assessments assume 
that 90 % of the CO2 in the flue gas is captured, while the remaining 
emissions are mainly connected to the fuel chain. The upper range of 
emissions for CCS-based power plants is flexible since plants can be 
designed to capture less, something that results in lower cost and less 
equipment required. (Figure 7.6).
Renewable heat and power generation and nuclear energy can 
bring more significant reductions in GHG emissions. The informa-
tion provided here has been updated from the data provided in 
SRREN, taking into account new findings and reviews, where avail-
able. The ranges of harmonized lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions 
reported in the literature are 18 – 180 gCO2eq / kWh for PV (Kim et al., 
2012; Hsu et al., 2012), 9 – 63 gCO2eq / kWh for CSP (Burkhardt et al., 






Figure 7�6 | Comparative lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions from electricity supplied by commercially available technologies (fossil fuels, renewable, and nuclear power) and 
projected emissions of future commercial plants of currently pre-commercial technologies (advanced fossil systems with CCS and ocean energy). The figure shows distributions of 
lifecycle emissions (harmonization of literature values for WGIII AR5 and the full range of published values for SRREN for comparison) and typical contributions to lifecycle emis-
sions by source (cf. the notes below). Note that percentiles were displayed for RE and traditional coal and gas in the SRREN, but not for coal CCS and gas CCS. In the latter cases, 
the entire range is therefore shown. For fossil technologies, fugitive emissions of methane from the fuel chain are the largest indirect contribution and hence shown separately. For 
hydropower, the variation in biogenic methane emissions from project to project are the main cause of the large range. See also Annex II and Annex III.
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2012), and 4 – 110 gCO2eq / kWh for nuclear power (Warner and 
Heath, 2012). The harmonization has narrowed the ranges down 
from 5 – 217  gCO2eq / kWh for PV, 7 – 89  gCO2eq / kWh for CSP, and 
1 – 220  gCO2eq / kWh for nuclear energy. A new literature review for 
wind power published since 2002 reports 7 – 56 gCO2eq / kWh, where 
the upper part of the range is associated with smaller turbines (< 100 
kW) (Arvesen and Hertwich, 2012), compared to 2 – 81  gCO2eq / kWh 
reported in SRREN. For all of these technologies, at least five studies are 
reviewed. The empirical basis for estimating the emissions associated 
with geothermal and ocean energy is much weaker. SRREN reported 
6 – 79 gCO2eq / kWh for geothermal power and 2 – 23 gCO2eq / kWh 
for ocean energy (IPCC, 2011a). For ocean power, Figure 7.6 shows 
only the results of newer assessments, which range between 
10 – 30 gCO2eq / kWh for tidal barrages, marine current turbines, and 
wave power (Walker and Howell, 2011; Kelly et al., 2012). For RE, emis-
sions are mainly associated with the manufacturing and installation of 
the power plants, but for nuclear power, uranium enrichment can be 
significant (Warner and Heath, 2012). Generally, the ranges are quite 
wide reflecting differences in local resource conditions, technology, 
and methodological choices of the assessment. The lower end of esti-
mates often reflects incomplete systems while the higher end reflects 
poor local conditions or outdated technology. 
Lifecycle direct global climate impacts of bioenergy in Figure 7.6 come 
from the peer-reviewed literature from 2010 to 2012 (reviewed in Sec-
tion 11.13.4) and are based on a range of electric conversion efficien-
cies of 30 % – 50 %. The category ‘Biomass-dedicated and crop residues’ 
includes perennial grasses like switchgrass and miscanthus, short-rota-
tion species like willow and eucalyptus, and agricultural byproducts 
like wheat straw and corn stover. ‘Biomass-forest wood’ refers to sus-
tainably harvested forest biomass from long-rotation species in various 
climate regions. The range in ‘Biomass-forest wood’ is representative of 
various forests and climates, e. g., aspen forest in Wisconsin (US), mixed 
forest in Pacific Northwest (US), pine forest in Saskatchewan (Canada), 
and spruce forest in Southeast Norway. Impacts from biogenic CO2 
and albedo are included in the same manner as the other GHGs, i. e., 
converted to gCO2eq after characterization of emissions from combus-
tion with case-specific GWPs (Cherubini et al., 2012). In areas affected 
by seasonal snow cover, the cooling contribution from the temporary 
change in surface albedo can be larger than the warming associated 
with biogenic CO2 fluxes and the bioenergy system can have a net neg-
ative impact (i. e., cooling). Change in soil organic carbon can have a 
substantial influence on the overall GHG balance of bioenergy systems, 
especially for the case ‘Biomass – dedicated and crop residues’, but are 
not covered here due to their high dependence on local soil conditions 
and previous land use (Don et al., 2012; Gelfand et al., 2013). 
The climate effect of hydropower is very project-specific. Lifecycle 
emissions from fossil fuel combustion and cement production related 
to the construction and operation of hydropower stations reported in 
the literature fall in the range of up to 40 gCO2eq / kWh for the stud-
ies reviewed in the SRREN (Kumar et al, 2011) and 3 – 7 gCO2eq / kWh 
for studies reviewed in (Dones et al., 2007). Emissions of biogenic CH4 
result from the degradation of organic carbon primarily in hydropower 
reservoirs (Tremblay et al., 2005; Barros et al., 2011; Demarty and Bas-
tien, 2011), although some reservoirs act as sinks (Chanudet et. al 
2011). Few studies appraise net emissions from freshwater reservoirs, 
i. e., adjusting for pre-existing natural sources and sinks and unrelated 
anthropogenic sources (Kumar et al, 2011, Section 5.6.3.2). A recent 
meta-analysis of 80 reservoirs indicates that CH4 emission factors are 
log-normally distributed, with the majority of measurements being 
below 20 gCO2eq / kWh (Hertwich, 2013), but emissions of approxi-
mately 2 kgCO2eq / kWh coming from a few reservoirs with a large 
area in relation to electricity production and thus low power inten-
sity (W / m2) (Abril et al., 2005; Kemenes et al., 2007, 2011). The global 
average emission rate was estimated to be 70 gCO2eq / kWh (Maeck 
et al., 2013; Hertwich, 2013). Due to the high variability among power 
stations, the average emissions rate is not suitable for the estimation 
of emissions of individual countries or projects. Ideas for mitigating 
existing methane emissions have been presented (Ramos et al., 2009; 
Stolaroff et al., 2012). 
The literature reviewed in this section shows that a range of technol-
ogies can provide electricity with less than 5 % of the lifecycle GHG 
emissions of coal power: wind, solar, nuclear, and hydropower in suit-
able locations. In the future, further reductions of lifecycle emissions on 
these technologies could be attained through performance improve-
ments (Caduff et  al., 2012; Dale and Benson, 2013) and as a result 
of a cleaner energy supply in the manufacturing of the technologies 
(Arvesen and Hertwich, 2011).
Abbreviations: AR5 — IPCC WG III Fifth Assessment Report, CCS — CO2 capture and storage, IGCC — integrated coal gasification combined cycle, PC — pulverized hard coal, 
PV — photovoltaic, SRREN — IPCC Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation. Sources: SRREN (IPCC, 2011a), Wind (Arvesen and Hertwich, 
2012), PV (Kim et al., 2012; Hsu et al., 2012), CSP (Burkhardt et al., 2012), ocean and wave (Walker and Howell, 2011; Kelly et al., 2012), geothermal power (Sathaye et al., 2011), 
hydropower (Sathaye et al., 2011; Hertwich, 2013), nuclear power (Warner and Heath, 2012), bioenergy (Cherubini et al., 2012). 
Notes: Harmonized values have been used where available and the mean values of the typical contributions are shown for the set of those cases where the data base allowed the 
separation. For world average coal and gas, the uncertainty range represents the uncertainty in the mean; the range of the uncerlying distribution is much larger. For the fossil fuel 
technologies, all fugitive methane emissions were calculated based on the range provided by (Burnham et al., 2012), infrastructure and supplies are based on (Singh et al., 2011), 
and direct emissions are based on (Singh et al., 2011; Corsten et al., 2013). For bioenergy, ranges include global climate impacts of CO2 emissions from combustion of regenerative 
biomass (i. e., biogenic CO2) and the associated changes in surface albedo following ecosystem disturbances, quantified according to the IPCC framework for emission metrics (see 
the 4th IPCC Assessment Report, (Forster et al., 2007)) and using global warming potentials (GWP) with TH = 100 years as characterization factors (Cherubini et al., 2012; Section 
11.13.4). These impacts are site-specific and generally more significant for long rotation species. The category ‘Biogas’ includes cases where manure, dedicated crops (e. g., maize), 
or a mixture of both are used as feedstocks. In addition to the variability in the substrates, the large range in the results reflects different degrees of CH4 emissions from leakage and 
digestate storage, with the latter that can be reduced in closed storage systems (Boulamanti et al., 2013). No contribution analysis was available for this category. For methodologi-
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1 Assuming biomass feedstocks are dedicated energy plants and crop residues and 80-95% coal input.
2 Assuming feedstocks are dedicated energy plants and crop residues.
* Carbon price levied on direct emissions. Effects shown where significant.
3 Direct emissions of biomass power plants are not shown explicitly, but included in the lifecycle 
  emissions. Lifecycle emissions include albedo effect.
4 LCOE of nuclear include front and back-end fuel costs as well as decommissioning costs.
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7�8�2 Cost assessment of mitigation measures
Though there are limits to its use as a tool for comparing the com-
petitiveness of energy supply technologies, the concept of ‘levelized 
costs of energy’ (LCOE, also called levelized unit costs or levelized gen-
eration costs)15 is frequently applied (IEA, 2005, 2010b, 2011a; GEA, 
2012). 
Figure 7.7 shows a current assessment of the private cost16 of various 
low-carbon power supply technologies in comparison to their conven-
tional counterparts. 
The LCOE ranges are broad as values vary across the globe depend-
ing on the site-specific (renewable) energy resource base, on local fuel 
and feedstock prices as well as on country and site-specific projected 
costs of investment, and operation and maintenance. Investment 
decisions therefore should not be based on the LCOE data provided 
here; instead, site-, project-, and investor-specific conditions are to be 
considered. Integration costs, time-dependent revenue opportunities 
(especially in the case of intermittent renewables), and relative envi-
ronmental impacts (e. g., external costs) play an important role as well 
(Heptonstall, 2007; Fischedick et al., 2011; Joskow, 2011; Borenstein, 
2012; Edenhofer et al., 2013; Hirth, 2013).
The LCOE of many low-carbon technologies changed considerably 
since the release of the AR4. Even compared to the numbers published 
in the SRREN (IPCC, 2011a), the decline of LCOE of some RE technolo-
gies have been significant.17 The LCOE of (crystalline silicon) photovol-
taic systems, for instance, fell by 57 % since 2009. Compared to PV, a 
similar, albeit less-extreme trend towards lower LCOE (from the second 
quarter of 2009 to the first quarter of 2013) has been observed for 
onshore wind (– 15 %), land-fill gas (– 16 %), municipal solid waste 
(– 15 %), and biomass gasification (– 26 %) (BNEF and Frankfurt 
School-UNEP Centre, 2013). 
15 A basic description of this concept, including its merits and shortcomings, can be 
found in Annex II of this report. 
16 Beyond variations in carbon prices, additional external costs are not considered in 
the following. Although the term ‘private’ will be omitted in the remainder of this 
section, the reader should be aware that all costs discussed here are private costs. 
An extended discussion of external costs is given in Fischedick et al., (2011). 
17 The subsequent percent values in LCOE data refer to changes between the second 
quarter (Q2) of 2009 and the first quarter (Q1) of 2013 (BNEF and Frankfurt 
School-UNEP Centre, 2013). Although the SRREN was published in 2011, the cost 
data base used there refers to 2009. 
Due to their rapid cost decline, some RE sources have become an eco-
nomical solution for energy supply in an increasing number of coun-
tries (IRENA, 2013). Under favourable conditions (see Figure  7.7), 
large-scale hydropower (IEA, 2008b), larger geothermal projects 
(> 30 MWe) (IEA, 2007), and wind onshore power plants (IEA, 2010c) 
are already competitive. The same is true for selected off-grid PV appli-
cations (IEA, 2010d, 2011b). As emphasized by the SRREN (2011a) and 
IEA (IEA, 2008b, 2011b, 2012h) support policies, however, are still nec-
essary in order to promote the deployment of many RE in most regions 
of the world. 
Continuous cost reductions are not always a given (see BNEF and 
Frankfurt School-UNEP Centre, 2013), as illustrated by the recent 
increase in costs of offshore wind (+44 %) and technologies in an 
early stage of their development (marine wave and tidal, binary 
plant geothermal systems). This however, does not necessarily imply 
that technological learning has stopped. As observed for PV and 
wind onshore (see SRREN, IPCC, 2011a), phases characterized by an 
increase of the price might be followed by a subsequent decline, if, 
for instance, a shortage of input material is eliminated or a ‘shake 
out’ due to increasing supplier competition is happening (Junginger 
et  al., 2005, 2010). In contrast, a production overcapacity as cur-
rently observed in the PV market might result in system prices that 
are temporarily below production costs (IEA, 2013a). A critical dis-
cussion of the solar photovoltaic grid-parity issue can be found in 
IEA (2013b). 
While nuclear power plants, which are capable of delivering base-
load electrical energy with low lifecycle emissions, have low oper-
ating costs (NEA, 2011b), investments in nuclear power are char-
acterized by very large up-front investment costs, and significant 
technical, market, and regulatory risks (IEA, 2011a). Potential project 
and financial risks are illustrated by the significant time and cost 
over-runs of the two novel European Pressurized Reactors (EPR) in 
Finland and France (Kessides, 2012). Without support from govern-
ments, investments in new nuclear power plants are currently gen-
erally not economically attractive within liberalized markets, which 
have access to relatively cheap coal and / or gas (IEA, 2012b). Carbon 
pricing could improve the competitiveness of nuclear power plants 
(NEA, 2011b). The post Fukushima assessment of the economics 
and future fate of nuclear power is mixed. According to the IEA, the 
economic performance and future prospects of nuclear power might 
be significantly affected (IEA, 2011a, 2012b). Joskow and Parsons 
(2012) assesses that the effect will be quite modest at the global 
level, albeit based on a pre-Fukushima baseline evolution, which is a 
moderate one itself. 
Figure 7�7 | Specific direct and lifecycle emissions (gCO2eq / kWh) and levelized cost of electricity (LCOE in USD2010 / MWh) for various power-generating technologies (cf. Figure 7.6 
for lifecycle; Annex III, Section A.III.2 for data and assumptions and Annex II, Section A.II.3.1 and Section A.II.9.3 for methodological issues). The upper left graph shows global aver-
ages of specific direct CO2 emissions (gCO2 / kWh) of power generation in 2030 and 2050 for the set of 430 – 530 ppm scenarios that are contained in the AR5 database (cf. Annex II, 
Section A.II.10). The global average of specific direct CO2 emissions (gCO2 / kWh) of power generation in 2010 is shown as a vertical line (IEA, 2013a).





As there is still no commercial large-scale CCS power plant in opera-
tion today, the estimation of their projected costs has to be carried on 
the basis of design studies and few existing pilot projects. The associ-
ated problems are described in (Yeh and Rubin, 2010; Global CCS Insti-
tute, 2011; Rubin, 2012). The CCS technologies applied in the power 
sector will only become competitive with unabated technologies if the 
additional equipment attached to the power plant and their decreased 
efficiency as well as the additional cost for CO2 transport and stor-
age is compensated by sufficiently high carbon prices or direct finan-
cial support (Lohwasser and Madlener, 2011; IEA, 2013c). BECCS faces 
large challenges in financing and currently no such plants have been 
built and tested at scale (see Section 7.5.5).
The deployment of CCS requires infrastructure for long-term storage of 
waste products, which includes direct CO2 transport and storage costs, 
along with costs associated with long-term measurement, monitoring, 
and verification. The related cost of transport and storage (excluding 
capture costs) are unlikely to exceed USD 15 / tCO2 for the majority of 
CCS deployment scenarios (Herzog et  al., 2005; Herzog, 2011; ZEP, 
2011b) and some estimates are below USD 5 / tCO2 (McCoy and Rubin, 
2008; Dahowski et al., 2011). Figure 7.7 relies on an assumed cost of 
USD 10 / tCO2.
System integration costs (cf. Section 7.6.1, and not included in Figure 
7.7) typically increase with the level of deployment and are depen-
dent on the mitigation technology and the state of the background 
energy system. From the available evidence, these costs appear to 
be greater for variable renewable technologies than they are for dis-
patchable power plants (Hirth, 2013). The costs comprise (1) balancing 
costs (originating from the required flexibility to maintain a balance 
between supply and demand), (2) capacity adequacy costs (due to the 
need to ensure operation even at peak times of the residual load), and 
(3) transmission and distribution costs. 
(1) Based on assessments carried out for OECD countries, the provision 
of additional balancing reserves increases the system costs of wind 
energy by approximately USD 1 to 7 / MWh for wind energy market 
shares of up to approximately 30 % of annual electricity demand (IEA, 
2010e, 2011d; Wiser et  al., 2011; Holttinen et  al., 2011). Balancing 
costs for PV are in a similar range (Hoke and Komor, 2012). 
(2) As described in Section 7.6.1, the contribution of variable renew-
ables like wind, solar, and tidal energy to meeting peak demand is less 
than the resources’ nameplate capacity. Still, determining the cost of 
additional conventional capacity needed to ensure that peak demands 
are met is contentious (Sims et  al., 2011). Estimates of this cost for 
wind power range from USD 0 to 10 / MWh (IEA, 2010e, 2011d; Wiser 
et al., 2011). Because of the coincidence of solar generation with air-
conditioning loads, solar at low-penetration levels can in some regions 
displace a larger amount of capacity, per unit of energy generated, 
than other supply options, yielding estimates of infrastructure savings 
as high as USD 23 / MWh greater than the savings from baseload sup-
ply options (Mills et al., 2011). 
(3) Estimates of the additional cost of transmission infrastructure 
for wind energy in OECD countries are often in the range of USD 0 
to 15 / MWh, depending on the amount of wind energy supply, region, 
and study assumptions (IEA, 2010e, 2011d; Wiser et  al., 2011; Holt-
tinen et al., 2011). Infrastructure costs are generally higher for time-
variable and location-dependent RE, at least when developed as large 
centralized plants, than for other sources of energy supply (e. g., Sims 
et  al., 2007; Hoogwijk et  al., 2007; Delucchi and Jacobson, 2011). If 
mitigation technologies can be deployed near demand centres within 
the distribution network, or used to serve isolated autonomous sys-
tems (e. g., in less developed countries), such deployments may defer 
or avoid the need for additional transmission and distribution, poten-
tially reducing infrastructure costs relative to a BAU scenario.18 
7�8�3 Economic potentials of mitigation 
 measures
Quantifying the economic potential of major GHG-mitigation options 
is problematic due to the definition of welfare metrics, broader impacts 
throughout the energy-economic system, and the background energy 
system carbon intensity, and energy prices (see Sections 3.4.3 and 
3.7.1 for a general discussion). Three major approaches to reveal the 
economic potentials of mitigation measures are discussed in the lit-
erature: 
One approach is to use energy supply cost curves, which summarize 
energy resource estimates (GEA, 2012) into a production cost curve on 
an annual or cumulative basis. Uncertainties associated with energy 
cost curves include the relationship between confirmed reserves and 
speculative resources, the impact of unconventional sources of fuels, 
future technological change and energy market structures, discount-
ing, physical conditions (e. g., wind speeds), scenarios (e. g., land-use 
tradeoffs in energy vs. food production) and the uneven data avail-
ability on global energy resources. Illustrative renewable resource cost 
curves are discussed in Section 10.4 and Figure 10.29 of Fischedick 
et al., (2011). 
A second and broader approach are marginal abatement cost (MAC) 
curves. The MAC curves (discussed in Section 3.9.3) discretely rank 
mitigation measures according to their GHG emission abatement cost 
(in USD / tCO2) for a given amount of emission reduction (in million 
tCO2). The MAC curves have become a standard policy communica-
tion tool in assessing cost-effective emissions reductions (Kesicki and 
Ekins, 2011). There is wide heterogeneity (discussed in detail in Sec-
tion 3.9.3) in the method of construction, the use of experts vs. mod-
els, and the year / region to which the MAC is applied. Recent global 
18 The ability for distributed resources to defer distribution investments depends 
on the correlation of the generation profile and load, as well as on location-
specific factors (Mendez et al., 2006; Thomson and Infield, 2007; Hernández et 
al., 2008; Wang et al., 2010; Agah and Abyaneh, 2011). At higher penetrations of 
distributed generation, additional distribution infrastructure may be required (e. g., 





MAC curve studies (van Vuuren et al., 2004; IEA, 2008c; Clapp et al., 
2009; Nauclér and Enkvist, 2009) give overall mitigation potentials 
ranging from 20 – 100 % of the baseline for costs up to USD 100 / tCO2. 
These MACs can be a useful summary mechanism but improved treat-
ment of interactions between mitigation measures and the path-
dependency of potential cost reductions due to technological learning 
(e. g., Luderer et al., 2012), as well as more sophisticated modelling of 
interactions throughout the energy systems and wider economy are 
required. 
A third approach — utilized in the AR5 — overcomes these shortcom-
ings through integrated modelling exercises in order to calculate the 
economic potential of specific supply-side mitigation options. These 
models are able to determine the economic potential of single options 
within the context of (other) competing supply-side and demand-side 
mitigation options by taking their interaction and potential endog-
enous learning effects into account. The results obtained in this way 
are discussed in Chapter 6; the different deployment paths of various 
supply-side mitigation options as part of least-cost climate protection 
strategies are shown in Section 7.11.
7.9 Co-benefits, risks 
and spillovers
Besides economic cost aspects, the final deployment of mitigation 
measures will depend on a variety of additional factors, including syn-
ergies and tradeoffs across mitigation and other policy objectives. The 
implementation of mitigation policies and measures can have positive 
or negative effects on these other objectives – and vice versa. To the 
extent these side-effects are positive, they can be deemed ‘co-bene-
fits’; if adverse and uncertain, they imply risks.19 
Co-benefits, adverse side effects, technical risks and uncertainties 
associated with alternative mitigation measures and their reliability 
(Sections 7.9.1 – 7.9.3) as well as public perception thereof (Section 
7.9.4) can affect investment decisions, individual behaviour as well 
as priority setting of policymakers. Table 7.3 provides an overview of 
the potential co-benefits and adverse side effects of the main mitiga-
tion measures that are assessed in this chapter. In accordance with the 
three sustainable development pillars described in Chapter 4, the table 
19 Co-benefits and adverse side-effects describe effects in non-monetary units 
without yet evaluating the net effect on overall social welfare. Please refer to the 
respective Sections in the framing chapters as well as to the glossary in Annex I 
for concepts and definitions – particularly Sections 2.4, 3.6.3, and 4.8. The extent 
to which co-benefits and adverse side-effects will materialize in practice as well as 
their net effect on social welfare will differ greatly across regions, and depend on 
local circumstances, implementation practices, as well as the scale and pace of the 
deployment of the different measures. 
presents effects on objectives that may be economic, social, environ-
mental, and health-related. 
7�9�1 Socio-economic effects
There is an increasing body of work showing that the implementation 
of energy mitigation options can lead to a range of socio-economic 
co-benefits for, e. g., employment, energy security, and better access 
to energy services in rural areas (Shrestha and Pradhan, 2010; IPCC, 
2011a; UNEP, 2011). 
Employment� Analysis by Cai et al. (2011) shows that as a result of the 
increased share of renewable energy in China, the power sector regis-
tered 472,000 net job gains in 2010. For the same amount of power 
generated, solar PV requires as many as 18 and 7 times more jobs than 
nuclear and wind, respectively. Using conservative assumptions on 
local content of manufacturing activities, van der Zwaan et al. (2013) 
show that renewable sources of power generation could account for 
about 155,000 direct and 115,000 indirect jobs in the Middle East by 
2050. Examples of Germany and Spain are also noteworthy where 500 
to 600 thousand people could be employed in the renewable energy 
supply sector in each country by 2030 (Lehr et al., 2012; Ruiz-Romero 
et  al., 2012) while the net effect is less clear. Wei et  al. (2010) also 
found that over 4 million full-time jobs could be created by 2030 from 
the combined effect of implementing aggressive energy-efficiency 
measures coupled with meeting a 30 % renewable energy target. An 
additional 500,000 jobs could be generated by increasing the share 
of nuclear power to 25 % and CCS to 10 % of overall total generation 
capacity. In line with these trends, Kenley et al. (2009) show that add-
ing 50,000 megawatts by 2020 of new nuclear generating capacity in 
the United States would lead to 117,000 new jobs, 250,000 indirect 
jobs, and an additional 242,000 non-nuclear induced jobs. Relating 
to CCS, although development in this sector could deliver additional 
employment (Yuan and Lyon, 2012; Bezdek and Wendling, 2013), safe-
guarding jobs in the fossil-based industry is expected to be the main 
employment co-benefit (Frankhauser et al., 2008). Whilst recognizing 
the growing contribution of mitigation options for employment, some 
sobering studies have highlighted that this potentially carries a high 
cost. In the PV sector in Germany, for example, the cost per job created 
can be as high as USD2010 236,000 (€175,000 in 2008) (Frondel et al., 
2010), underlining that continued employment and welfare gains will 
remain dependent on the level and availability of support and financ-
ing mechanisms (Alvarez et al., 2010; Furchtgott-Roth, 2012; Böhringer 
et al., 2013). Furthermore, given the higher cost of electricity genera-
tion from RE and CCS-based fossil fuels, at least in the short-term, 
jobs in energy-intensive economic sectors are expected to be affected 
(Delina and Diesendorf, 2013). The structure of the economy and wage 
levels will nonetheless influence the extent of industry restructuring 
and its impact of labour redeployment. 
Energy security� As discussed in Section 6.6.2.2, energy security can 





Table 7�3 | Overview of potential co-benefits (green arrows) and adverse side-effects (orange arrows) of the main mitigation measures in the energy supply sector. Arrows pointing 
up / down denote positive / negative effect on the respective objective / concern; a question mark (?) denotes an uncertain net effect. Please refer to Sections 11.7 and 11.13.6 for 
possible upstream effects of biomass supply on additional objectives. Co-benefits and adverse side-effects depend on local circumstances as well as on the implementation practice, 
pace, and scale (see Section 6.6). For an assessment of macroeconomic, cross-sectoral effects associated with mitigation policies (e. g., on energy prices, consumption, growth, and 
trade), see Sections 3.9, 6.3.6, 13.2.2.3, and 14.4.2. Numbers correspond to references listed below the table.
Mitigation 
measures
Effect on additional objectives / concerns







Energy security (reduced exposure to fuel 
price volatility)1 
Local employment impact (but uncertain 
net effect)2





Health impact via 
Air pollution4 and coal-mining accidents5
Nuclear accidents6 and waste treatment, 
uranium mining and milling7
Safety and waste concerns8
↓
↑
Ecosystem impact via 
Air pollution9 and coal mining10
Nuclear accidents11 
Proliferation risk12










Energy security (resource sufficiency, 
diversity in the near / medium term)13
Local employment impact (but uncertain 
net effect)14
Irrigation, flood control, navigation, water 
availability (for multipurpose use of 
reservoirs and regulated rivers)15
Extra measures to match demand (for PV, 






Health impact via 
Air pollution (except bioenergy)17
Coal-mining accidents18
Contribution to (off-grid) energy access19 
Project-specific public acceptance concerns 
(e. g., visibility of wind)20 







Ecosystem impact via 
Air pollution (except bioenergy)22
Coal mining23
Habitat impacts (for some hydro)24
Landscape and wildlife impact (for 
wind)25
Water use (for wind and PV)26
Water use (for bioenergy, CSP, geo-
thermal, and reservoir hydro)27
Higher use of 
critical metals 
for PV and 




↑↑ Preservation vs. lock-in of human and 





Risk of CO2 leakage30
Upstream supply-chain activities31 






















Occupational safety at coal mines37
Health impact via reduced air pollution38
↓ Ecosystem impact via reduced air 
pollution39
References: 1Adamantiades and Kessides (2009); Rogner (2010, 2012a; b). For the low share of fuel expenditures in LCOE, see IAEA (2008b) and Annex III. For the energy security 
effects of a general increase in nuclear power, see NEA (2010) and Jewell (2011a). 2Cai et al. (2011); Wei et al. (2010); Kenley et al. (2009); McMillen et al. (2011). 3Marra and Palmer 
(2011); Greenberg, (2013a); Schwenk-Ferrero (2013a); Skipperud et al. (2013); Tyler et al. (2013a). 4Smith and Haigler (2008); Smith et al. (2012b); Smith et al. (2013); Gohlke et al. 
(2011); Rückerl et al. (2011), and WGII Section 11.9 on health impacts from air pollution attributable to coal; Solli et al. (2006); Dones et al. (2007); Dones et al. (2005); Simons and 
Bauer (2012) on air pollution attributable to nuclear; see Section 7.9.2 for comparison.5See Section 7.9.3 and references cited therein: Epstein et al. (2010); Burgherr et al. (2012); 
Chen et al. (2012); Chan and Griffiths (2010); Asfaw et al. (2013). 6See Section 7.9.3, in particular Cardis et al. (2006); Balonov et al. (2011); Moomaw et al. (2011a); WHO (2013). 
7Abdelouas (2006); Al-Zoughool and Kewski (2009) cited in Sathaye et al. (2011a); Smith et al. (2013); Schnelzer et al. (2010); Tirmarche (2012); Brugge and Buchner (2011). 8Visschers 
and Siegrist (2012); Greenberg (2013a); Kim et al. (2013); Visschers and Siegrist (2012); see Section 7.9.4 and references cited therein: Bickerstaff et al. (2008); Sjoberg and Drottz-Sjo-
berg (2009); Corner et al. (2011); Ahearne (2011). 9Simons and Bauer (2012) for comparison of nuclear and coal. See Section 7.9.2 and references cited therein for ecological impacts 
of coal: Galloway et al. (2008); Doney (2010); Hertwich et al. (2010); Rockstrom et al. (2009); van Grinsven et al. (2013) for eutrophication and acidification; Emberson et al. (2012); 
van Geothem et al. (2013) for photooxidants; IEA (2011a); Pacyna et al. (2007) for increased metal emissions; and Nagajyoti et al. (2010); Sevcikova et al. (2011); Mahboob (2013) 
for the ecosystem effects of those emissions. 10Adibee et al. (2013); Cormier et al. (2013); Smith et al. (2013), and reference cited therein: Palmer et al. (2010). 11Møller et al. (2012); 
Hiyama et al. (2013); Mousseau and Møller (2013); Møller and Mousseau (2011); Møller et al. (2011). 12von Hippel et al. (2011, 2012); Sagan (2011); Yim and Li (2013); Adamantiades 
and Kessides (2009); Rogner (2010). 13Sathaye et al. (2011); McCollum et al. (2013b); Jewell et al. (2014); Cherp et al. (2013). 14van der Zwaan et al. (2013); Cai et al. (2011); Lehr 
et al. (2012); Ruiz-Romero et al. (2012); Böhringer et al. (2013); Sathaye et al. (2011), and references cited therein, e. g., Frondel et al. (2010) and Barbier (2009). 15Kumar et al. (2011); 
Schaeffer et al. (2012); Smith et al. (2013); WCD (2000) and Moore et al. (2010), cited in Sathaye et al. (2011a). 16IEA (2011d); Williams et al. (2012); Sims et al. (2011); Holttinen et al. 
(2011); Rasmussen et al. (2012). 17Sathaye et al. (2011); Smith, GEA (2012); Smith et al. (2013); Figure 7.8, Annex II and references cited therein. 18Section 7.9.3, especially Moomaw 
et al. (2011a); Chen et al. (2012); Burgherr et al. (2012). 19Pachauri et al. (2012); Sathaye et al. (2011); Kanagawa and Nakata (2008); Bazilian et al. (2012); Sokona et al. (2012); Byrne 
et al. (2007); D’Agostino et al. (2011); Pachauri et al. (2012); Díaz et al. (2013); van der Vleuten et al. (2013); Nguyen, (2007); Narula et al. (2012); Sudhakara-Reddy et al. (2009). 
20Lovich and Ennen (2013); Sathaye et al. (2011); Wiser et al. (2011). 21Bao (2010); Scudder (2005); Kumar et al. (2011); Sathaye et al. (2011a) and references cited therein: Richter 
et al. (2010); Smith et al. (2013) and references cited therein: Hwang et al. (2011); McDonald-Wilmsen and Webber (2010); Finley-Brook and Thomas (2010). 22See Section 7.9.2 and 






(Cherp et al., 2012). Energy security concerns can be grouped as (1) 
the sufficiency of resources to meet national energy demand at com-
petitive and stable prices, and (2) the resilience of the energy supply.20 
Since vital energy systems and their vulnerabilities differ from one 
country to another, the concept of energy security also differs between 
countries (Chester, 2009; Cherp and Jewell, 2011; Winzer, 2012). Coun-
tries with a high share of energy imports in total imports (or export 
earnings) are relatively more vulnerable to price fluctuations and his-
torically have focused on curtailing energy imports (GNESD, 2010; Jain, 
2010; Sathaye et al., 2011), but more recently, also building the resil-
ience of energy supply (IEA, 2011a; Jewell, 2011b). For energy import-
ers, climate policies can increase the sufficiency of national energy 
demand by decreasing imports and energy intensity while at the 
same time increasing the domestic resource buffer and the diversity of 
energy supply (Turton and Barreto, 2006; Costantini et al., 2007; Kruyt 
et al., 2009; McCollum et al., 2013a; Jewell et al., 2014). Energy-export-
ing countries are similarly interested in stable and competitive global 
prices, but they have the opposite interest of maintaining or increasing 
energy export revenues (Sathaye et al., 2011; Cherp and Jewell, 2011). 
There is uncertainty over how climate policies would impact energy 
export revenues and volumes as discussed in Section 6.3.6.6. One of 
the biggest energy security issues facing developing countries is the 
necessity to dramatically expand energy systems to support economic 
growth and development (Kuik et al., 2011; Cherp et al., 2012), which 
makes energy security in low- and middle-income countries closely 
related to the energy-access challenge, discussed in the next para-
graphs and in Section 6.6.2.3.
Rural development� In various developing countries such as India, 
Nepal, Brazil, and parts of Africa, especially in remote and rural areas, 
some renewables are already cost-competitive options for increas-
ing energy access (Nguyen, 2007; Goldemberg et al., 2008; Cherian, 
2009; Sudhakara Reddy et al., 2009; Walter et al., 2011; Narula et al., 
2012). Educational benefits as a function of rural electrification 
(Kanagawa and Nakata, 2008), and enhanced support for the produc-
20 These dimensions are roughly in line with the treatment of energy security in the 
SRREN albeit with terminology based on recent literature – along the lines of the 
sovereignty and robustness perspectives on the one hand and resilience on the 
other described by Cherp and Jewell (2011). It is also very similar to the IEA’s dis-
tinction between energy system risks and resilience capacities (IEA, 2011a; Jewell, 
2011b).
tive sector and income generation opportunities (Bazilian et al., 2012; 
Sokona, Y. et al., 2012; Pachauri et al., 2013) are some of the impor-
tant co-benefits of some mitigation options. However, the co-benefits 
may not be evenly distributed within countries and local jurisdictions. 
While there is a regressive impact of higher energy prices in devel-
oped countries (Grainger and Kolstad, 2010), the empirical evidence 
is more mixed for developing countries (Jakob and Steckel, 2013). The 
impact depends on the type of fuel used by different income groups, 
the redistribution of the revenues through, e. g., a carbon tax, and 
in what way pro-poor measures are able to mitigate adverse effects 
(Casillas and Kammen, 2010) (see Section 15.5.2.3 for a discussion of 
the distributional incidence of fuel taxes). Hence, regulators need to 
pay attention that the distributive impacts of higher prices for low-
carbon electricity (fuel) do not become a burden on low-income rural 
households (Rao, 2013). The success of energy access programmes 
will be measured against affordability and reliability criteria for the 
poor. 
Other positive spillover effects from implementation of renewable 
energy options include technology trade and knowledge transfer (see 
Chapter 13), reduction in the exposure of a regional economy to the 
volatility of the price of fossil fuels (Magnani and Vaona, 2013; see 
Chapter 14), and enhanced livelihoods conditions at the household 
level (Cooke et al., 2008; Oparoacha and Dutta, 2011).
7�9�2 Environmental and health effects
Energy supply options differ with regard to their overall environ-
mental and health impacts, not only their GHG emissions (Table 7.3). 
Renewable energies are often seen as environmentally benign by 
nature; however, no technology — particularly in large scale applica-
tion — comes without environmental impacts. To evaluate the relative 
burden of energy systems within the environment, full energy supply 
chains need to be considered on a lifecycle basis, including all system 
components, and across all impact categories.
To avoid creating new environmental and health problems, assess-
ments of mitigation technologies need to address a wide range of 
issues, such as land and water use, as well as air, water, and soil pol-
lution, which are often location-specific. Whilst information is scarce 
Box 7�1 | Energy systems of LDCs: Opportunities & challenges for low-carbon development
One of the critical indicators of progress towards achieving devel-
opment goals in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) is the level 
of access to modern energy services. It is estimated that 79 % of 
the LDC population lacked access to electricity in 2009, compared 
to a 28 % average in the developing countries (WHO and UNDP, 
2009). About 71 % of people in LDCs relied exclusively on biomass 
burning for cooking in 2009. The dominance of subsistence 
agriculture in LDCs as the mainstay of livelihoods, combined with 
a high degree of population dispersal, and widespread income 
poverty have shaped the nature of energy systems in this category 
of countries (Banuri, 2009; Sokona, Y. et al., 2012). The LDCs from 
sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia, with limited access to fossil-
based electricity (and heat), would need to explore a variety of 
appropriate sustainable technologies to fuel their development 
goals (Guruswamy, 2011). In addition to deploying fossil-based 
and renewable technologies, improved biomass cooking from 
biogas and sustainably produced wood for charcoal will remain 
essential in LDCs (Guruswamy, 2011). 
Bioenergy production from unsustainable biomass harvesting, for 
direct combustion and charcoal production is commonly practiced 
in most LDCs. The net GHG emissions from these practices is 
significant (FAO, 2011), and rapid urbanization trends is likely to 
intensify harvesting for wood, contributing further to rises in GHG 
emissions, along with other localized environmental impacts. How-
ever, important initiatives from multilateral organizations and from 
the private sector with innovative business models are improving 
agricultural productivity for food and creating bioenergy develop-
ment opportunities. One example produces liquid biofuels for 
stove cooking while creating, near cities, agroforestry zones with 
rows of fast-growing leguminous trees / shrubs and alleys planted 
with annual crop rotations, surrounded by a forestry shelterbelt 
zone that contains indigenous trees and oilseed trees and provides 
business opportunities across the value chain including for women 
(WWF-UK, 2011). The mixture of crops and trees produces food 
with higher nutritive values, enables clean biofuels production for 
stove cooking, develops businesses, and simultaneously avoids 
GHG emissions from deforestation to produce charcoal for cooking 
(Zvinavashe et al., 2011). A dearth of documented information 
and a lack of integration of outcomes of the many successful 
specific projects that show improved management practices of 
so-called traditional forest biomass resource into sustainably 
managed forest propagate the impression that all traditional 
biomass is unsustainable. As more data emerge, the record will be 
clarified. Holistic biomass programmes that address the full value 
chain, from sustainable production of wood-based fuels to their 
processing, conversion, distribution, and marketing, and use with 
the potential to reduce future GHG emissions are currently being 
promoted (see Box 11.6). Other co-benefits associated with these 
programmes include reduced burden of fuel collection, employ-
ment, and improved health conditions of the end users (Reddy 
et al., 2000; Lambrou and Piana, 2006; Hutton et al., 2007; Anen-
berg et al., 2013; Owen et al., 2013). The LDC contribution to cli-
mate stabilization requires minimizing future GHG emissions while 
meeting unmet (or suppressed) energy demand, which is likely to 
rise. For example, though emissions levels remain low, the rate of 
growth in emissions in Africa is currently above the world average, 
and the continent’s share of global emissions is likely to increase 
in the coming decades (Canadell et al., 2009). Whilst growth in 
GHG emissions is expected as countries build their industrial base 
and consumption moves beyond meeting basic needs, minimizing 
this trend will involve exploring new opportunities for scaling up 
modern energy access where possible by embracing cleaner and 
more-efficient energy options that are consistent with regional 
and global sustainability goals. One such opportunity is the avoid-
ance of associated natural gas flaring in oil- and gas-producing 
developing countries where venting and flaring amounts to 69 % 
of world total of 150 billion cubic metres – representing 1.2 % of 
global CO2 emissions (Farina, 2011; GGFR and World Bank, 2011). 
For a country such as Nigeria, which flares about 15 billion m3 of 
gas – sufficient to meet its energy needs along with the current 
needs of many neighbouring countries (Dung et al., 2008), this 
represents an opportunity towards a low-carbon pathway (Hassan 
and Kouhy, 2013). Collier and Venables (2012) argue that while 
abundant natural endowments in renewable and fossil resources 
in Africa and other LDCs should create opportunities for green 
energy development, energy sourcing, conversion, distribution, and 
usage are economic activities that require the fulfilment of factors 
such as capital, governance capacity, and skills (see Box 1.1).
and acidification; Emberson et al. (2012) and van Geothem et al. (2013) for photooxidants. See Arversen and Hertwich (2011, 2012) for wind, Fthenakis et al. (2008) and Laleman 
et al. (2011) for PV, Becerralopez and Golding (2007) and Moomaw et al. (2011a) for CSP, and Moomaw et al. (2011b) for a general comparison. 23See footnote 10 on ecosystem 
impact from coal mining. 24Kumar et al. (2011); Alho (2011); Kunz et al. (2011); Smith et al. (2013); Ziv et al. (2012). 25Wiser et al. (2011); Lovich and Ennen (2013); Garvin et al. (2011); 
Grodsky et al. (2011); Dahl et al. (2012); de Lucas et al. (2012); Dahl et al. (Dahl et al., 2012); Jain et al. (2011). 26Pachauri et al. (2012); Fthenakis and Kim (2010); Sathaye et al. (2011); 
Moomaw et al. (2011a); Meldrum et al. (2013). 27Pachauri et al. (2012); Fthenakis and Kim (2010); Sathaye et al. (2011); Moomaw et al. (2011a); Meldrum et al. (2013); Berndes 
(2008); Pfister et al. (2011); Fingerman et al. (2011); Mekonnen and Hoekstra (2012); Bayer et al. (2013a). 28Section 7.9.2, Kleijn and van der Voet (2010); Graedel (2011); Zuser and 
Rechberger (2011); Fthenakis and Anctil (2013); Ravikumar and Malghan (2013); Pihl et al. (2012); Hoenderdaal et al. (2013). 29Vergragt et al. (2011); Markusson et al. (2012); IPCC 
(2005); Benson et al. (2005); Fankhauser et al. (2008); Shackley and Thompson (2012). 30Atchley et al. (2013) – simarly applicable to animal health; Apps et al. (2010); Siirila et al. 
(2012); Wang and Jaffe (2004). 31Koorneef et al. (2011); Singh et al. (2011); Hertwich et al. (2008); Veltman et al. (2010); Corsten et al.(2013). 32Ashworth et al. (2012); Einsiedel et al. 
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and often difficult to generalize, tradeoffs among the different types 
of impacts, affecting different species, and at different times, become 
important in carrying out the assessments (Sathaye et al., 2011). Also, 
the analysis has to go beyond marginal changes (see Section 3.6.3) in 
the existing system to address alternative futures. Environmental and 
health implications of different low-carbon technologies as they are 
understood today are briefly discussed below. 
Combustion-related emissions cause substantial human health and eco-
logical impacts. Exposure to outdoor particulate matter emitted directly 
or formed from products of incomplete combustion, i. e., sulphur, nitro-
gen oxides, and ammonia, lead to cardiovascular disease, chronic and 
acute respiratory illness, lung cancer, and other health damages, caus-
ing in the order of 3.2 million premature deaths per year (Pope et al., 
2009; Lim et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2012a). Despite air pollution policies, 
tive sector and income generation opportunities (Bazilian et al., 2012; 
Sokona, Y. et al., 2012; Pachauri et al., 2013) are some of the impor-
tant co-benefits of some mitigation options. However, the co-benefits 
may not be evenly distributed within countries and local jurisdictions. 
While there is a regressive impact of higher energy prices in devel-
oped countries (Grainger and Kolstad, 2010), the empirical evidence 
is more mixed for developing countries (Jakob and Steckel, 2013). The 
impact depends on the type of fuel used by different income groups, 
the redistribution of the revenues through, e. g., a carbon tax, and 
in what way pro-poor measures are able to mitigate adverse effects 
(Casillas and Kammen, 2010) (see Section 15.5.2.3 for a discussion of 
the distributional incidence of fuel taxes). Hence, regulators need to 
pay attention that the distributive impacts of higher prices for low-
carbon electricity (fuel) do not become a burden on low-income rural 
households (Rao, 2013). The success of energy access programmes 
will be measured against affordability and reliability criteria for the 
poor. 
Other positive spillover effects from implementation of renewable 
energy options include technology trade and knowledge transfer (see 
Chapter 13), reduction in the exposure of a regional economy to the 
volatility of the price of fossil fuels (Magnani and Vaona, 2013; see 
Chapter 14), and enhanced livelihoods conditions at the household 
level (Cooke et al., 2008; Oparoacha and Dutta, 2011).
7�9�2 Environmental and health effects
Energy supply options differ with regard to their overall environ-
mental and health impacts, not only their GHG emissions (Table 7.3). 
Renewable energies are often seen as environmentally benign by 
nature; however, no technology — particularly in large scale applica-
tion — comes without environmental impacts. To evaluate the relative 
burden of energy systems within the environment, full energy supply 
chains need to be considered on a lifecycle basis, including all system 
components, and across all impact categories.
To avoid creating new environmental and health problems, assess-
ments of mitigation technologies need to address a wide range of 
issues, such as land and water use, as well as air, water, and soil pol-
lution, which are often location-specific. Whilst information is scarce 
Box 7�1 | Energy systems of LDCs: Opportunities & challenges for low-carbon development
One of the critical indicators of progress towards achieving devel-
opment goals in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) is the level 
of access to modern energy services. It is estimated that 79 % of 
the LDC population lacked access to electricity in 2009, compared 
to a 28 % average in the developing countries (WHO and UNDP, 
2009). About 71 % of people in LDCs relied exclusively on biomass 
burning for cooking in 2009. The dominance of subsistence 
agriculture in LDCs as the mainstay of livelihoods, combined with 
a high degree of population dispersal, and widespread income 
poverty have shaped the nature of energy systems in this category 
of countries (Banuri, 2009; Sokona, Y. et al., 2012). The LDCs from 
sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia, with limited access to fossil-
based electricity (and heat), would need to explore a variety of 
appropriate sustainable technologies to fuel their development 
goals (Guruswamy, 2011). In addition to deploying fossil-based 
and renewable technologies, improved biomass cooking from 
biogas and sustainably produced wood for charcoal will remain 
essential in LDCs (Guruswamy, 2011). 
Bioenergy production from unsustainable biomass harvesting, for 
direct combustion and charcoal production is commonly practiced 
in most LDCs. The net GHG emissions from these practices is 
significant (FAO, 2011), and rapid urbanization trends is likely to 
intensify harvesting for wood, contributing further to rises in GHG 
emissions, along with other localized environmental impacts. How-
ever, important initiatives from multilateral organizations and from 
the private sector with innovative business models are improving 
agricultural productivity for food and creating bioenergy develop-
ment opportunities. One example produces liquid biofuels for 
stove cooking while creating, near cities, agroforestry zones with 
rows of fast-growing leguminous trees / shrubs and alleys planted 
with annual crop rotations, surrounded by a forestry shelterbelt 
zone that contains indigenous trees and oilseed trees and provides 
business opportunities across the value chain including for women 
(WWF-UK, 2011). The mixture of crops and trees produces food 
with higher nutritive values, enables clean biofuels production for 
stove cooking, develops businesses, and simultaneously avoids 
GHG emissions from deforestation to produce charcoal for cooking 
(Zvinavashe et al., 2011). A dearth of documented information 
and a lack of integration of outcomes of the many successful 
specific projects that show improved management practices of 
so-called traditional forest biomass resource into sustainably 
managed forest propagate the impression that all traditional 
biomass is unsustainable. As more data emerge, the record will be 
clarified. Holistic biomass programmes that address the full value 
chain, from sustainable production of wood-based fuels to their 
processing, conversion, distribution, and marketing, and use with 
the potential to reduce future GHG emissions are currently being 
promoted (see Box 11.6). Other co-benefits associated with these 
programmes include reduced burden of fuel collection, employ-
ment, and improved health conditions of the end users (Reddy 
et al., 2000; Lambrou and Piana, 2006; Hutton et al., 2007; Anen-
berg et al., 2013; Owen et al., 2013). The LDC contribution to cli-
mate stabilization requires minimizing future GHG emissions while 
meeting unmet (or suppressed) energy demand, which is likely to 
rise. For example, though emissions levels remain low, the rate of 
growth in emissions in Africa is currently above the world average, 
and the continent’s share of global emissions is likely to increase 
in the coming decades (Canadell et al., 2009). Whilst growth in 
GHG emissions is expected as countries build their industrial base 
and consumption moves beyond meeting basic needs, minimizing 
this trend will involve exploring new opportunities for scaling up 
modern energy access where possible by embracing cleaner and 
more-efficient energy options that are consistent with regional 
and global sustainability goals. One such opportunity is the avoid-
ance of associated natural gas flaring in oil- and gas-producing 
developing countries where venting and flaring amounts to 69 % 
of world total of 150 billion cubic metres – representing 1.2 % of 
global CO2 emissions (Farina, 2011; GGFR and World Bank, 2011). 
For a country such as Nigeria, which flares about 15 billion m3 of 
gas – sufficient to meet its energy needs along with the current 
needs of many neighbouring countries (Dung et al., 2008), this 
represents an opportunity towards a low-carbon pathway (Hassan 
and Kouhy, 2013). Collier and Venables (2012) argue that while 
abundant natural endowments in renewable and fossil resources 
in Africa and other LDCs should create opportunities for green 
energy development, energy sourcing, conversion, distribution, and 
usage are economic activities that require the fulfilment of factors 





the exposure to ambient air pollution of 80 % of the world’s population 
is estimated to exceed the World Health Organization (WHO) recom-
mendation of 10 μg / m3 for PM2.5 (Brauer et  al., 2012; Rao et  al., 
2013).21 Sulphur and nitrogen oxides are involved in the acidification of 
fresh water and soils; and nitrogen oxides in the eutrophication of water 
bodies (Galloway et al., 2008; Doney, 2010), both threatening biodiver-
sity (Rockstrom et al., 2009; Hertwich et al., 2010; van Grinsven et al., 
2013). Volatile organic compounds and nitrogen oxides cause the for-
mation of photochemical oxidants (summer smog), which impact 
human health (Lim et al., 2012) and ecosystems (Emberson et al., 2012; 
van Goethem et  al., 2013).22 Coal is an important source of mercury 
(IEA, 2011a) and other toxic metals (Pacyna et al., 2007), harming eco-
systems (Nagajyoti et al., 2010; Sevcikova et al., 2011; Mahboob, 2013), 
21 See WGII 11.9 (Smith et al., 2014) and Chapter 4 of the Global Energy Assessment 
“Energy and Health” (Smith et al., 2012) for a recent overview of human health 
effects associated with air pollution.
22 See Chapter 3 of the Global Energy Assessment “Energy and Environment” 
(Emberson et al., 2012) for a recent overview of environmental effects associated 
with air pollution.
and potentially also human health (van der Voet et al., 2012; Tchoun-
wou et al., 2012). Many of these pollutants can be significantly reduced 
through various types of pollution control equipment, but even with this 
equipment in place, some amount of pollution remains. In addition, sur-
face mining of coal and tar sand causes substantial land use and mining 
waste (Yeh et al., 2010; Elliott Campbell et al., 2012; Jordaan, 2012).  
Reducing fossil fuel combustion, especially coal combustion, can 
reduce many forms of pollution and may thus yield co-benefits for 
health and ecosystems. Figure 7.8 indicates that most renewable 
power projects offer a reduction of emissions contributing to particu-
late matter exposure even compared to modern fossil fuel-fired power 
plants with state-of-the-art pollution control equipment. 
Ecological and health impacts of renewable energy have been com-
prehensively assessed in the SRREN, which also provides a review of 
life-cycle assessments of nuclear and fossil-based power generation 
(Sathaye et  al., 2011). Renewable energy sources depend on large 
areas to harvest energy, so these technologies have a range of eco-
Figure 7�8 | Life-cycle inventory results of the production of 1 kWh of electricity for important air pollutants contributing to particulate matter (PM) exposure, the leading cause 
of health impact from air pollution. The technology modelling considers state-of-the-art pollution control equipment for fossil power plants. Data sources: Arvesen and Hertwich 
(2011); Burkhardt et al. (2011); Whitaker (2013), Dones et al. (2005); Singh et al. (2011). Abbreviations: PC = pulverized coal, PV = photovoltaic, CSP = concentrating solar power, 
Poly-Si = polycrystalline silicon, CIGS = copper indium gallium selenide thin film, CdTe = cadmium telluride thin film, IGCC = integrated gasification combined cycle, CCS = CO2 
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logical impacts related to habitat change, which — depending on site 
characteristics and the implementation of the technology — may be 
higher than that of fossil fuel-based systems (Sathaye et  al., 2011). 
For wind power plants, collisions with raptors and bats, as well as site 
disturbance during construction cause ecological concerns (Garvin 
et al., 2011; Grodsky et al., 2011; Dahl et al., 2012). Adjustments in the 
location, design and operation of facilities can mitigate some of these 
damages (Arnett et al., 2011; de Lucas et al., 2012). For hydropower 
plants, dams present an obstacle to migratory species (Alho, 2011; Ziv 
et al., 2012). The large-scale modification of river flow regimes affects 
the amount and timing of water release, reduces seasonal flood-
ing, and sediment and nutrient transport to flood plains (Kunz et al., 
2011). These modifications result in a change of habitat of species 
adapted to seasonal flooding or living on flood plains (Young et  al., 
2011). Geothermal (Bayer et al., 2013b) and concentrating solar power 
(CSP) (Damerau et al., 2011) can cause potential concerns about water 
use / pollution, depending on design and technological choices. 
Wind, ocean, and CSP need more iron and cement than fossil fuel 
fired power plants, while photovoltaic power relies on a range of 
scarce materials (Burkhardt et  al., 2011; Graedel, 2011; Kleijn et  al., 
2011; Arvesen and Hertwich, 2011). Furthermore, mining and material 
processing is associated with environmental impacts (Norgate et  al., 
2007), which make a substantial contribution to the total life-cycle 
impacts of renewable power systems. There has been a significant 
concern about the availability of critical metals and the environmen-
tal impacts associated with their production. Silver, tellurium, indium, 
and gallium have been identified as metals potentially constraining 
the choice of PV technology, but not presenting a fundamental obsta-
cle to PV deployment (Graedel, 2011; Zuser and Rechberger, 2011; 
Fthenakis and Anctil, 2013; Ravikumar and Malghan, 2013). Silver is 
also a concern for CSP (Pihl et  al., 2012). The limited availability of 
rare earth elements used to construct powerful permanent magnets, 
especially dysprosium and neodymium, may limit the application of 
efficient direct-drive wind turbines (Hoenderdaal et  al., 2013). Recy-
cling is necessary to ensure the long-term supply of critical metals and 
may also reduce environmental impacts compared to virgin materials 
(Anctil and Fthenakis, 2013; Binnemans et  al., 2013). With improve-
ments in the performance of renewable energy systems in recent years, 
their specific material demand and environmental impacts have also 
declined (Arvesen and Hertwich, 2011; Caduff et al., 2012). 
While reducing atmospheric GHG emissions from power generation, 
CCS will increase environmental burdens associated with the fuel sup-
ply chains due to the energy, water, chemicals, and additional equip-
ment required to capture and store CO2. This is likely to increase the 
pressure on human health and ecosystems through chemical mecha-
nisms by 0 – 60 % compared to the best available fossil fuel power 
plants (Singh, et  al., 2011). However, these impacts are considered 
to be lower than the ecological and human health impacts avoided 
through reduced climate change (Singh et al., 2012). Uncertainties and 
risks associated with long-term storage also have to be considered 
(Sections 7.5.5 and 7.9.3; Ketzer et al., 2011; Koornneef et al., 2011). 
For an overview of mitigation options and their unresolved challenges, 
see Section 7.5.
The handling of radioactive material23 poses a continuous challenge to 
the operation of the nuclear fuel chain and leads to releases of radio-
nuclides. The most significant routine emissions of radionuclides occurs 
during fuel processing and mining (Simons and Bauer, 2012). The leg-
acy of abandoned mines, sites, and waste storage causes some con-
cerns (Marra and Palmer, 2011; Greenberg, 2013b; Schwenk-Ferrero, 
2013; Skipperud et al., 2013; Tyler et al., 2013). 
Epidemiological studies indicate an increase in childhood leukemia of 
populations living within 5 km of a nuclear power plant in a minority 
of sites studied (Kaatsch et  al., 2008; Raaschou-Nielsen et  al., 2008; 
Laurier et  al., 2008; Heinävaara et  al., 2010; Spycher et  al., 2011; 
Koerblein and Fairlie, 2012; Sermage-Faure et  al., 2012), so that the 
significance of a potential effect is not resolved (Fairlie and Körblein, 
2010; Laurier et al., 2010). 
Thermal power plants with high cooling loads and hydropower reser-
voirs lead to reduced surface water flows through increased evapora-
tion (IPCC, 2008; Dai, 2011), which can adversely affect the biodiver-
sity of rivers (Hanafiah et al., 2011) and wetlands (Amores et al., 2013; 
Verones et al., 2013). 
While any low-carbon energy system should be subject to scrutiny 
to assure environmental integrity, the outcome must be compared 
against the performance of the current energy system as a baseline, 
and well-designed low-carbon electricity supply outperforms fossil-
based systems on most indicators. In this context, it should be noted 
that the environmental performance of fossil-based technologies is 
expected to decline with increasing use of unconventional resources 
with their associated adverse environmental impacts of extraction 
(Jordaan et al., 2009; Yeh et al., 2010).
7�9�3 Technical risks
Within the context of sustainable development, a comprehensive 
assessment of energy supply and mitigation options needs to take 
into account technical risks, especially those related to accidents risks. 
In the event of accidents, fatality and injury may occur among work-
ers and residents. Evacuation and resettlements of residents may also 
take place. This section, therefore, updates the risk assessment pre-
sented in Chapter 9 of the SRREN (IPCC, 2011a): “Accidental events 
can be triggered by natural hazards (e. g., Steinberg et al., 2008; Kaiser 
et al., 2009; Cozzani et al., 2010), technological failures (e. g., Hirsch-
berg et al., 2004; Burgherr et al., 2008), purposefully malicious action 
(e. g., Giroux, 2008), and human errors (e. g., Meshakti, 2007; Ale et al., 
2008)”, (IPCC, 2011a, p. 745). An analysis of the fatalities caused by 





large accidents (≥  5 fatalities or ≥  10 injured or ≥  200  evacuated) 
recorded in the Energy-Related Severe Accident Database (ENSAD) 
(Burgherr et al., 2011), as presented in SRREN, allows for a comparison 
of the potential impacts. The analysis in SRREN included accidents in 
the fuel chain, such as coal mining and oil shipping, 1970 – 2008. 
SRREN indicates high fatality rates (> 20 fatalities per PWh)24 associ-
ated with coal, oil, and hydropower in non-OECD countries and low 
fatalities (<  2 fatalities per PWh) associated with renewable and 
nuclear power in OECD countries (Figure 9.12 in Sathaye et al., 2011). 
Coal and oil power in OECD countries and gas power everywhere were 
associated with impacts on the order of 10 fatalities per PWh. 
Coal mining accidents in China were identified to have contributed to 
25,000 of the historical total of 33,000 fatalities in severe accidents 
from 1970 – 2008 (Epstein et  al., 2010; Burgherr et  al., 2012). New 
analysis indicates that the accident rate in Chinese coal mining has 
been reduced substantially, from 5670 deaths in 2001 to 1400 in 2010, 
or from 5.1 to 0.76 fatalities per Mt coal produced (Chen et al., 2012). 
The majority of these fatalities is apparently associated with smaller 
accidents not covered in the ENSAD database. In China, accident rates 
in smaller coal mines are higher than those in larger mines (Chan and 
Griffiths, 2010), and in the United States, less profitable mines have 
higher rates than more profitable ones (Asfaw et  al., 2013). A wide 
range of research into underlying causes of accidents and measures to 
prevent future accidents is currently under way.
For oil and gas, fatalities related to severe accidents at the transport 
and distribution stage are a major component of the accident related 
external costs. Over 22,000 fatalities in severe accidents for the oil 
chain were reported, 4000 for LPG, and 2800 for the natural gas chain 
(Burgherr et al., 2011, 2012). Shipping and road transport of fuels are 
associated with the highest number of fatalities, and accident rates in 
non-OECD countries are higher than those in OECD countries (Eckle 
and Burgherr, 2013).
For hydropower, a single event, the 1975 Banqiao / Shimantan dam 
failure in China, accounted for 26,000 immediate fatalities. Remain-
ing fatalities from large hydropower accidents amount to nearly 4000, 
but only 14 were recorded in OECD countries (Moomaw et al., 2011a; 
Sathaye et al., 2011). 
Severe nuclear accidents have occurred at Three-Mile Island in 1979, 
Chernobyl in 1986, and Fukushima in 2011. For Three-Mile Island, no 
fatalities or injuries were reported. For Chernobyl, 31 immediate fatali-
ties occurred and 370 persons were injured (Moomaw et al., 2011a). 
Chernobyl resulted in high emissions of iodine-131, which has caused 
measureable increases of thyroid cancer in the surrounding areas (Car-
dis et al., 2006). The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects 
of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) identified 6000 thyroid cases in indi-
24 The global electricity production in 2008 was 17 PWh.
viduals who were below the age of 18 at the time of the accident, 15 
of which had resulted in mortalities (Balonov et al., 2011). A significant 
fraction of these are above the background rate. Epidemiological evi-
dence for other cancer effects does not exist; published risk estimates 
often assume a linear no-threshold dose-response relationship, which 
is controversial (Tubiana et  al., 2009). Between 14,000 and 130,000 
cancer cases may potentially result (Cardis et  al., 2006), and up to 
9,000 potential fatalities in the Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia in the 70 
years after the accident (Hirschberg et al., 1998). The potential radia-
tion-induced increase in cancer incidence in a population of 500 mil-
lion would be too low to be detected by an epidemiological study and 
such estimates are neither endorsed nor disputed by UNSCEAR (Balo-
nov et al., 2011). Adverse effects on other species have been reported 
within the 30-km exclusion zone (Alexakhin et al., 2007; Møller et al., 
2012; Geras’kin et al., 2013; Mousseau and Møller, 2013). 
The Fukushima accident resulted in much lower radiation exposure. 
Some 30 workers received radiation exposure above 100 mSv, and 
population exposure has been low (Boice, 2012). Following the linear, 
no-threshold assumption, 130 (15 – 1100) cancer-related mortalities, 
and 180 (24 – 1800) cancer-related morbidities have been estimated 
(Ten Hoeve and Jacobson, 2012). The WHO does not estimate cancer 
incidence from low-dose population exposure, but identifies the high-
est lifetime attributable risk to be thyroid cancer in girls exposed dur-
ing infancy in the Fukushima prefecture, with an increase of a maxi-
mum of 70 % above relatively low background rates. In the highest 
exposed locations, leukemia in boys may increase by 5 % above back-
ground, and breast cancer in girls by 4 % (WHO, 2013).
Design improvements for nuclear reactors have resulted in so-called 
Generation III+ designs with simplified and standardized instrumen-
tation, strengthened containments, and ‘passive’ safety designs seek-
ing to provide emergency cooling even when power is lost for days. 
Nuclear power reactor designs incorporating a ‘defence-in-depth’ 
approach possess multiple safety systems including both physical bar-
riers with various layers and institutional controls, redundancy, and 
diversification — all targeted at minimizing the probability of accidents 
and avoiding major human consequences from radiation when they 
occur (NEA, 2008).
The fatality rates of non-hydro RE technologies are lower than those 
of fossil chains, and are comparable to hydro and nuclear power in 
developed countries. Their decentralized nature limits their capacity to 
have catastrophic impacts.
As indicated by the SRREN, accidents can result in the contamination 
of large land and water areas with radionuclides or hydrocarbons. The 
accidental releases of crude oil and its refined products into the mari-
time environment have been substantially reduced since the 1970s 
through technical measures, international conventions, national leg-
islations, and increased financial liabilities (see e. g. Kontovas et  al., 
2010; IPCC, 2011a; Sathaye et  al., 2011). Still, oil spills are common 





Rogowska and Namiesnik, 2010). Furthermore, increased drilling in 
deep offshore waters (e. g., Gulf of Mexico, Brazil) and extreme envi-
ronments (e. g., the Arctic) poses a risk of potentially high environmen-
tal and economic impacts (Peterson et al., 2012; Moreno et al., 2013; 
Paul et  al., 2013). Leakage of chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing 
during shale gas and geothermal operations can potentially contami-
nate local water flows and reservoirs (Aksoy et al., 2009; Kargbo et al., 
2010; Jackson et al., 2013). Further research is needed to investigate 
a range of yet poorly understood risks and risk factors related to CCS 
storage (see Sections 7.5.5 and 7.9.4). Risks of CO2 transport are dis-
cussed in Section 7.6.4.
7�9�4 Public perception25
Although public concerns are often directed at higher-GHG-emitting 
energy sources, concerns also exist for lower-emitting sources, and 
opposition can impede their deployment. Although RE sources often 
receive relatively wide public support, public concerns do exist, which, 
because of the diversity of RE sources and applications, vary by tech-
nology (Sathaye et al., 2011). For bioenergy, concerns focus on direct 
and indirect land use and related GHG emissions, deforestation, and 
possible competition with food supplies (e. g., Chum et al., 2011; and 
Bioenergy Annex of chapter 11). For hydropower, concerns include the 
possibility of the displacement of human populations, negative envi-
ronmental impacts, and altered recreational opportunities (e. g., Kumar 
et al., 2011). For wind energy, concerns primarily relate to visibility and 
landscape impacts as well as potential nuisance effects, such as noise 
(e. g., Wiser et al., 2011). For solar energy, land area requirements can 
be a concern for large, utility-scale plants (e. g., Arvizu et  al., 2011). 
For ocean energy, sea area requirements are a concern (e. g., Lewis 
et  al., 2011). Concerns for geothermal energy include the possibility 
of induced local seismicity and impacts on natural — especially recre-
ational — areas (e. g., Goldstein et al., 2011). 
For nuclear energy, anxieties often focus on health and safety (e. g., 
accidents, disposal of wastes, decommissioning) and proliferation (e. g., 
terrorism, civil unrest). Further, perceptions are dependent on how the 
debate around nuclear is framed relative to other sources of energy 
supply (e. g., Bickerstaff et al., 2008; Sjoberg and Drottz-Sjoberg, 2009; 
Corner et al., 2011; Ahearne, 2011; Visschers and Siegrist, 2012; Green-
berg, 2013b; Kim et al., 2013). 
25 Other portions of this chapter and AR5 contain discussions of actual ecological 
and environmental impacts of various energy sources. Although not addressed 
here, energy transmission infrastructure can also be the focus of public concern. 
See also Chapters 2, 6, and 10, which cover issues of public acceptance through 
complementary lenses.
Among CCS technologies, early26 misgivings include the ecological 
impacts associated with different storage media, the potential for 
accidental release and related storage effectiveness of stored CO2, and 
the perception that CCS technologies do not prevent all of the non-
GHG social and environmental impacts of fossil energy sources (e. g., 
IPCC, 2005; Miller et al., 2007; de Best-Waldhober et al., 2009; Shack-
ley et  al., 2009; Wong-Parodi and Ray, 2009; Wallquist et  al., 2009, 
2010; Reiner and Nuttall, 2011; Ashworth et al., 2012; Einsiedel et al., 
2013). For natural gas, the recent increase in the use of unconventional 
extraction methods, such as hydraulic fracturing, has created concerns 
about potential risks to local water quality and public health (e. g., US 
EPA, 2011; IEA, 2012i). 
Though impacts, and related public concerns, cannot be entirely elimi-
nated, assessing, minimizing and mitigating impacts and concerns are 
elements of many jurisdictions’ planning, siting, and permitting pro-
cesses. Technical mitigation options show promise, as do procedural 
techniques, such as ensuring the availability of accurate and unbiased 
information about the technology, its impacts and benefits; aligning 
the expectations and interests of different stakeholders; adjusting 
to the local societal context; adopting benefit-sharing mechanisms; 
obtaining explicit support at local and national levels prior to develop-
ment; building collaborative networks; and developing mechanisms for 
articulating conflict and engaging in negotiation (e. g., Ashworth et al., 
2010; Fleishman, De Bruin, and Morgan, 2010; Mitchell et  al., 2011; 
Terwel et al., 2010). 
7.10 Barriers and opportunities
7�10�1 Technical aspects
From a global perspective, the large number of different technologies 
that are available to mitigate climate change (Section 7.5.) facilitates 
the achievement of prescribed climate protection goals. Given that 
many different combinations of the mitigation technologies are often 
feasible, least-cost portfolios can be determined that select those 
options that interact in the best possible way (Chapter 6, Section 7.11). 
On a local scale and / or concerning specific technologies, however, 
technological barriers might constrain their mitigation potential. These 
limits are discussed in Sections 7.4, 7.5, 7.6, and 7.9. 
26 Knowledge about the social acceptability of CCS is limited due to the early 
state of the technologies’ deployment, though early research has deepened our 
understanding of the issues related to CCS significantly (de Best-Waldhober et al., 






7�10�2 Financial and investment barriers and 
opportunities 
The total global investment in the energy supply sector in 2010 is esti-
mated to be USD 1,076 to 1,350 billion per year, of which 43 – 48 % is 
invested in the power sector and 37 – 50 % is invested in fossil extrac-
tion. In the power sector, 49 – 55 % of the investments is used for 
power generation and 45 – 51 % is used for transmission and distribu-
tion (see Section 16.2.2).
The total investment in renewables excluding hydropower in 2012 was 
USD 244 billion, which was six times the level in 2004. Out of this 
total, USD 140 billion was for solar and USD 80 billion for wind power. 
The total was down 12 % from a record USD 279 billion in 2011 in 
part due to changes in support policies and also due to sharp reduc-
tions in renewable energy technology costs. Total investment in devel-
oped countries fell 29 % in 2012 to USD 132 billion, while investment 
in developing countries rose 19 % to USD 112 billion. The investment 
in renewables is smaller than gross investment on fossil-fuel plants 
(including replacement plant) at USD 262 billion, but much larger 
than net investment in fossil-fuel technologies, at USD 148 billion. The 
amount of installed capacity of renewables excluding hydropower was 
85 GW, up from 2011's 80 GW (BNEF and Frankfurt School-UNEP Cen-
tre, 2013; REN21, 2013).
Additional investments required in the energy supply sector by 2050 
are estimated to be USD 190 billion to USD 900 billion / year to limit the 
temperature increase below 2 °C (about 0.30 % to 1.4 % of world GDP 
in 2010) (GEA, 2012; IEA, 2012h; Kainuma et al., 2013). The additional 
investment costs from both supply and demand sides are estimated to 
about USD 800 billion / year according to McCollum et al. (2014). With a 
greater anticipated increase in energy demands, developing countries 
are expected to require more investments than the developed coun-
tries (see also Chapter 6 and Chapter 16).
Investment needs in the energy supply sector increase under low-GHG 
scenarios. However, this should be set in the context of the total value 
of the world’s financial stock, which (including global stock market 
capitalization) stood at more than USD 210 trillion at the end of 2010 
(Roxburgh et  al., 2011). Moreover, the investment needs described 
above would be offset, to a degree, by the lower operating costs of 
many low-GHG energy supply sources, as well as those due to energy-
efficiency improvements in the end-use sectors (IEA, 2012h).
Though only a fraction of the available private-sector capital stock 
would be needed to cover the costs of low-GHG energy supply even 
in aggressive GHG-reduction scenarios, private capital will not be 
mobilized automatically for such purposes. For this reason, various 
measures — such as climate investment funds, carbon pricing, feed-in 
tariffs, RE quotas and RE-tendering / bidding schemes, carbon offset 
markets, removal of fossil fuel subsidies and private / public initiatives 
aimed at lowering barriers for investors — are currently being imple-
mented (see Section 7.12, chapters 13, 14, and Section 15.2), and still 
more measures may be needed to achieve low-GHG stabilization sce-
narios. Uncertainty in policies is also a barrier to investment in low-
GHG energy supply sources (United Nations, 2010; World Bank, 2011b; 
IEA, 2012h; IRENA, 2012a; BNEF and Frankfurt School-UNEP Centre, 
2013). 
Investment in LDCs may be a particular challenge given their less-
developed capital markets. Multilateral development banks and insti-
tutions for bilateral developmental cooperation will have an impor-
tant role towards increasing levels of confidence for private investors. 
Innovative insurance schemes to address regulatory and policy barriers 
could encourage participation of more diverse types of institutional 
investors (Patel, 2011). Building capacity in local governments in devel-
oping countries for designing and implementing appropriate policies 
and regulations, including those for efficient and transparent procure-
ment for infrastructure investment, is also important (World Economic 
Forum, 2011; IRENA, 2012a; Sudo, 2013).
Rural areas in LDCs are often characterized by very low population 
densities and income levels. Even with the significant decline in the 
price of PV systems, investment cost barriers are often substantial in 
these areas (IPCC, 2011b). Micro-finance mechanisms (grants, conces-
sional loans) adapted to the pattern of rural activities (for instance, 
installments correlated with income from agriculture) may be nec-
essary to lift rural populations out of the energy poverty trap and 
increase the deployment of low-carbon energy technologies in these 
areas (Rao et al., 2009; Bazilian et al., 2012; IRENA, 2012c). 
7�10�3 Cultural, institutional, and legal barriers 
and opportunities
Managing the transition from fossil fuels to energy systems with a 
large penetration of low-carbon technologies and improved energy 
efficiency will pose a series of challenges and opportunities, particu-
larly in the case of poor countries. Depending on the regions and the 
development, barriers and opportunities may differ dramatically.
Taking the example in the United States, Sovacool (Sovacool, 2009) 
points to significant social and cultural barriers facing renewable 
power systems as policymakers continue to frame electricity generation 
as a mere technical challenge. He argues that in the absence of a wider 
public discourse around energy systems and challenging entrenched 
values about perceived entitlements to cheap and abundant forms of 
electricity, RE and energy-efficiency programmes will continue to face 
public acceptability problems. Indeed, attitudes towards RE in addi-
tion to rationality are driven by emotions and psychological issues. To 
be successful, RE deployment, as well as information and awareness 
efforts and strategies need to take this explicitly into account (Sath-
aye et al., 2011). Legal regulations and procedures are also impacting 
on the deployment of nuclear energy, CCS, shale gas, and renewable 
energy. However, the fundamental reasons (environment, health, and 





lying risks are discussed in Sections 7.5 and 7.9, and enabling policies 
to address them are in Section 7.12.
A huge barrier in the case of poor, developing countries is the cultural, 
economic, and social gap between rural and urban areas (Khennas, 
2012). For instance, cooking fuels, particularly firewood, is widely used 
in rural areas because it is a suitable fuel for these communities in 
addition to its access without payment apart from the time devoted 
to its collection. Indeed, values such as time have different percep-
tions and opportunity costs depending on the social and geographi-
cal context. Furthermore, legal barriers are often hindering the pen-
etration of modern energy services and distorting the economics of 
energy systems. For instance, informal settlements in poor peripheral 
urban areas mean legal barriers to get access to electricity. Land ten-
ancy issues and illegal settlements are major constraints to energy 
access, which are often overcome by illegal power connections with 
an impact on the safety of the end users and economic loss for the 
utility due to meter tampering. In addition, in many slums, there is a 
culture of non-payment of the bills (UN Habitat and GENUS, 2009). 
Orthodox electrification approaches appear to be inefficient in the 
context of urban slums, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Adopting 
a holistic approach encompassing cultural, institutional, and legal 
issues in the formulation and implementation of energy policies and 
strategies is increasingly perceived particularly in sub-Saharan Africa 
as essential to addressing access to modern energy services. In South 
Africa, the Electricity Supply Commission (ESKOM), the large utility in 
Africa, implemented a holistic Energy Losses Management Program 
(UN Habitat and GENUS, 2009), with strong community involvement 
to deal with the problem of energy loss management and theft. As 
a result prepayment was successfully implemented as it gives poor 
customers a daily visibility of consumption and a different culture and 
understanding of access to modern energy services. 
7�10�4 Human capital capacity building
Lack of human capital is widely recognized as one of the barriers to 
development, acquisition, deployment, and diffusion of technologies 
required for meeting energy-related CO2 emissions reduction targets 
(IRENA, 2012d). Human capacity is critical in providing a sustainable 
enabling environment for technology transfer in both the host and 
recipient countries (Barker et al., 2007; Halsnæs et al., 2007). Human 
workforce development has thus been identified as an important near-
term priority (IEA, 2010c). 
There is increasing concern in the energy supply sector in many coun-
tries that the current educational system is not producing sufficient 
qualified workers to fill current and future jobs, which increasingly 
require science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) 
skills. This is true not only in the booming oil and gas and traditional 
power industries, but also in the rapidly expanding RE supply sector 
(NAS, 2013b). Skilled workforce in the areas of RE and decentral-
ized energy systems, which form an important part of ‘green jobs’ 
(Strietska-Ilina et  al., 2011), requires different skill sets for different 
technologies and local context, and hence requires specific train-
ing (Moomaw et al., 2011b). Developing the skills to install, operate, 
and maintain the RE equipment is exceedingly important for a suc-
cessful RE project, particularly in developing countries (UNEP, 2011), 
where shortages of teachers and trainers in subjects related to the 
fast-growing RE supply sector have been reported (Strietska-Ilina et al., 
2011) (ILO and EU, 2011). Well-qualified workers will also be required 
on other low-carbon energy technologies, particularly nuclear and 
CCS — should there be large-scale implementation (Creutzig and Kam-
men, 2011; NAS, 2013b). 
Apart from technology-oriented skills, capacity for decision support 
and policymaking in the design and enactment stages is also essential, 
particularly on assessing and choosing technology and policy options, 
and designing holistic policies that effectively integrate renewable 
energy with other low-carbon options, other policy goals, and across 
different but interconnected sectors (Mitchell et al., 2011; Jagger et al., 
2013).
To avoid future skill shortages, countries will need to formulate 
short- and long-term capacity development strategies based on well-
informed policy decisions, and adequate information on labour mar-
ket and skill needs in the context of low-carbon transition and green 
jobs (Strietska-Ilina et al., 2011; Jagger et al., 2013). But producing 
a skilled workforce with the right skills at the right time requires 
additional or alternatives to conventional approaches. These include, 
but are not limited to, increased industry-education-government 
partnership, particularly with industry organizations, in job demand 
forecasting, designing education and training curricula, augmenting 
available skills with specific skills, and adding energy supply sector 
experience in education and training (Strietska-Ilina et  al., 2011; 
NAS, 2013b).
7�10�5 Inertia in energy systems physical 
 capital stock turnover
The long life of capital stock in energy supply systems (discussed in 
detail in Section 5.6.3) gives the possibility of path-dependant car-
bon lock-in (Unruh, 2002). The largest contribution to GHG emissions 
from existing high-carbon energy capital stock is in the global elec-
tricity sector, which is also characterized by long-lived facilities — with 
historical plant lifetimes for coal, natural gas, and oil plant of 38.6, 
35.8, and 33.8 years, respectively (Davis et al., 2010). Of the 1549 GW 
investments (from 2000 – 2010) in the global electricity sector (EIA, 
2011), 516 GW (33.3 %) were coal and 482 GW (31.1 %) were natural 
gas. Only 34 GW (2.2 %) were nuclear investments, with combined 
renewable source power plants at 317 GW (20.5 %). The investment 
share for RE power plants accelerated toward the end of the decade. 
The transport, industrial, commercial, and residential sectors gener-
ally have smaller technology sizes, shorter lifetimes, and limited plant 





tion, contribute over half of the GHG emissions from existing primary 
energy capital stock (Davis et al., 2010).
Long-lived fossil energy system investments represent an effective 
(high-carbon) lock-in. Typical lifetime of central fossil-fuelled power 
plants are between 30 and 40 years; those of electricity and gas 
infrastructures between 25 – 50 years (Philibert and Pershing, 2002). 
Although such capital stock is not an irreversible investment, prema-
ture retirement (or retrofitting with CCS if feasible) is generally expen-
sive. Examples include low natural gas prices in the United States due 
to shale gas production making existing coal plants uneconomic to run, 
or merit order consequences of new renewable plants, which endanger 
the economic viability of dispatchable fossil fuel power plants in some 
European countries under current market conditions (IEA, 2013b). Fur-
thermore, removal of existing fossil plants must overcome inertia from 
existing providers, and consider wider physical, financial, human capi-
tal, and institutional barriers.
Explicit analysis of path dependency from existing energy fossil tech-
nologies (450 ppm scenario, IEA, 2011a) illustrates that if current 
trends continue, by 2015 at least 90 % of the available ‘carbon budget’ 
will be allocated to existing energy and industrial infrastructure, and in 
a small number of subsequent years there will be extremely little room 
for manoeuvre at all (IEA, 2011a, Figure 6.12).
Effective lock-in from long-lived energy technologies is particularly 
relevant for future investments by developing economies, which are 
projected to account for over 90 % of the increase in primary energy 
demand by 2035 (IEA, 2011a). The relative lack of existing energy capi-
tal in many developing countries bolsters the potential opportunities 
to develop a low-carbon energy system, and hence reduce the effective 
carbon lock-in from broader energy infrastructures (e. g., oil refineries, 
industrial heat provision, transport networks) (Guivarch and Halle-
gatte, 2011), or the very long-lived capital stock embodied in buildings 
and urban patterns (Jaccard and Rivers, 2007).
7.11 Sectoral  implication 
of transformation 
 pathways and  sustainable 
development 
This section reviews long-term integrated scenarios and transforma-
tion pathways with regard to their implication for the global energy 
system. Focus is given to energy-related CO2 emissions and the 
required changes to the energy system to achieve emissions reduc-
tions compatible with a range of long-term climate targets. Aggre-
gated energy-related emissions, as primarily discussed in this sec-
tion, comprise the full energy system, including energy sourcing, 
conversion, transmission, as well as the supply of energy carries to 
the end-use sectors and their use in the end-use sectors. Aggregated 
energy-related emissions are further split into emissions from elec-
tricity generation and the rest of the energy system.27,28 This section 
builds upon about 1200 emissions scenarios, which were collated 
by Chapter 6 in the WGIII AR5 Scenario Database (Section 6.2.2 and 
Annex II.10). The scenarios were grouped into baseline and mitiga-
tion scenarios. As described in more detail in Section 6.3.2, the sce-
narios are further categorized into bins based on 2100 concentrations: 
between 430 – 480 ppm CO2eq, 480 – 530 ppm CO2eq, 530 – 580 ppm 
CO2eq, 580 – 650 ppm CO2eq, 650 – 720 ppm CO2eq, 720 – 1000 ppm 
CO2eq, and > 1000 ppm CO2eq by 2100. An assessment of geophysical 
climate uncertainties consistent with the dynamics of Earth System 
Models assessed in WG I found that the most stringent of these sce-
narios — leading to 2100 concentrations between 430 and 480 ppm 
CO2eq — would lead to an end-of-century median temperature change 
between 1.5 to 1.7 °C compared to pre-industrial times, although 
uncertainties in understanding of the climate system mean that the 
possible temperature range is much wider than this. These scenarios 
were found to maintain temperature change below 2 °C over the 
course of the century with a likely chance. Scenarios in the concen-
tration category of 650 – 720 ppm CO2eq correspond to comparatively 
modest mitigation efforts, and were found to lead to median tempera-
ture rise of approximately 2.6 – 2.9 °C in 2100 (see Section 6.3.2 for 
details).
7�11�1 Energy-related greenhouse gas 
 emissions
In the baseline scenarios assessed in AR5, direct CO2 emis-
sions of the energy supply sector increase from 14.4 GtCO2 / yr in 
2010 to 24 – 33 GtCO2 / yr in 2050 (25 – 75th percentile; full range 
15 – 42 GtCO2 / yr), with most of the baseline scenarios assessed in AR5 
showing a significant increase. The lower end of the full range is domi-
nated by scenarios with a focus on energy intensity improvements that 
go well beyond the observed improvements over the past 40 years 
[Figure TS 15].
In absence of climate change mitigation policies,29 energy-related CO2 
emissions (i. e. those taking into account the emissions of the energy 
27 Note that the other Sections in Chapter 7 are focusing on the energy supply 
sector, which comprises only energy extraction, conversion, transmission, and 
distribution. As noted in Section 7.3, CO2 emissions from the energy supply sector 
are the most important source of climate forcing. Climate forcing associated with 
emissions from non-CO2 greenhouse gases (e. g., CH4 and N2O) of the energy sup-
ply sector is smaller than for CO2. For the most part, non-CO2 greenhouse gases 
are emitted by other non-energy sectors, though CH4 is released in primary energy 
sourcing and supply as a bi-product of oil, gas, and coal production as well as in 
the transmission and distribution of methane to markets. While its share in total 
GHG emissions is relatively small, the energy supply sector is, however, a major 
source of sulphur and other aerosol emissions. (See also Section 6.6)
28 The mitigation scenarios in the WGIII AR5 Scenario Database do not provide 
information on energy-related emissions of non-CO2 gases. The assessment in this 
section thus focuses on CO2 emissions only.





supply sector and those in the end-use sectors) are expected to con-
tinue to increase from current levels to about 55 – 70 GtCO2 by 2050 
(25th – 75th percentile of the scenarios in the WGIII AR5 Scenario Data-
base, see Figure 7.9).30 This corresponds to an increase of between 
80 % and 130 % compared to emissions of about 30 GtCO2 in the year 
2010. By the end of the 21st century, emissions could grow further, the 
75th percentile of scenarios reaching about 90 GtCO2.31,32
The stabilization of GHG concentrations requires fundamental 
changes in the global energy system relative to a baseline scenario. 
For example, in mitigation scenarios reaching 450 ppm CO2eq con-
centrations in 2100, CO2 emissions from the energy supply sec-
30 Note that the total energy-related emissions include in some scenarios also fossil 
fuel emissions from industrial processes, such as the use of fossil fuel feedstocks 
for lubricants, asphalt, or cement production. A split between energy and indus-
trial process emissions is not available from the WGIII AR5 Scenario Database.
31 The full uncertainty range of the WGIII AR5 Scenario Database includes high-
emissions scenarios approaching 80 GtCO2 by 2050, and almost 120 GtCO2 by 
2100.
32 If not otherwise mentioned, ranges refer to the 25th — 75th percentile of the 
WGIII AR5 Scenario Database.
tor decline over the next decades, reach 90 % below 2010 levels 
between 2040 and 2070 and in many scenarios decline to below 
zero thereafter. As discussed in Section 7.11.4, unlike traditional 
pollutants, CO2 concentrations can only be stabilized if global emis-
sions peak and in the long term, decline toward zero. The lower 
the concentration at which CO2 is to be stabilized, the sooner and 
lower is the peak. For example, in the majority of the scenarios 
compatible with a long-term concentration goal of below 480 ppm 
CO2eq, energy-related emissions peak between 2020 and 2030, 
and decline to about 10 – 15 GtCO2 by 2050 (Figure 7.9). This cor-
responds to emissions reductions by 2050 of 50 – 70 % compared 
to the year 2010, and 75 – 90 % compared to the business-as-usual 
(25th – 75th percentile). 
7�11�2 Energy supply in low-stabilization 
 scenarios
While stabilizing CO2eq concentrations requires fundamental changes 
to the global energy supply systems, a portfolio of measures is avail-
able that includes the reduction of final energy demand through 
Figure 7�9 | Global development of annual CO2 emissions for the full energy system including energy supply, and end uses (upper panel), and the split between electricity and non-
electric emissions (lower panels). The baseline emissions range (grey) is compared to the range of emissions from mitigation scenarios grouped according to their long-term CO2eq 
concentration level by 2100. Shaded areas correspond to the 25th – 75th percentile and dashed lines to the median across the scenarios. ‘Non-electric’ comprises emissions from 
the full chain of non-electric conversion processes as well as emissions from fossil fuels supplied to the end-use sectors. The upper panel includes in addition also the representa-
tive concentration pathways (RCPs) (black lines, see Chapter 6, Table 6.2). Source: WGIII AR5 Scenario Database (See Section 6.2.2 and Annex II.10). Note: Some scenarios report 
industrial process emissions (e. g., CO2 released from cement manufacture beyond energy-related emissions) as part of the energy system.












































































Figure 7�10 | Development of annual primary energy supply (EJ) in three illustrative baseline scenarios (left-hand panel); and the change in primary energy compared to the base-
line to meet a long-term concentration target between 430 and 530 ppm CO2eq. Source: ReMIND (RoSE: Bauer et al., 2013); GCAM (AME: Calvin et al., 2012); MESSAGE (GEA: 
Riahi et al., 2012).*
























































































































































































































































































































































enhanced efficiency or behavioural changes as well as fuel switch-
ing (e. g., from coal to gas) and the introduction of low-carbon supply 
options such as renewables, nuclear, CCS, in combination with fossil or 
biomass energy conversion processes, and finally, improvements in the 
efficiency of fossil fuel use. These are discussed in Section 7.5 as well 
as in Chapters 8 – 10. 
Figure 7.10 shows three examples of alternative energy system trans-
formation pathways that are consistent with limiting CO2eq concen-
trations to about 480 ppm CO2eq by 2100. The scenarios from the 
three selected models are broadly representative of different strate-
gies for how to transform the energy system. In absence of new poli-
cies to reduce GHG emissions, the energy supply portfolio of the sce-
narios continues to be dominated by fossil fuels. Global energy supply 
in the three baseline scenarios increases from present levels to 
900 – 1200 EJ / yr by 2050 (left-hand panels of Figure 7.10). Limiting 
concentrations to low levels requires the rapid and pervasive replace-
ment of fossil fuel without CCS (see the negative numbers at the 
right-hand panels of Figure 7.10). Between 60 and 300  EJ of fossil 
fuels are replaced across the three scenarios over the next two 
decades (by 2030). By 2050 fossil energy use is 230 – 670 EJ lower 
than in non-climate-policy baseline scenarios.33 
The three scenarios achieve their concentration goals using different 
portfolios. These differences reflect the wide range in assumptions 
about technology availability and the policy environment.34 While the 
pace of the transformation differs across the scenarios (and depends 
also on the carbon-intensity and energy-demand development in the 
baseline), all three illustrative scenarios show the importance of mea-
sures to reduce energy demand over the short term. For instance, by 
33 The numbers refer to the replacement of freely emitting (unabated) fossil fuels 
without CCS. The contribution of fossil fuels with CCS is increasing in the mitiga-
tion scenarios. 
34 For example, the MESSAGE scenario corresponds to the so-called “efficiency” case 
of the Global Energy Assessment, which depicts low energy demand to test the 
possibility of meeting the concentration goal even if nuclear power were phased 
out. GCAM on the other hand imposed no energy supply technology availability 
constraints and assumed advances across a broad suite of technologies.
Figure 7�11 | Influence of energy demand on the deployment of energy supply technologies for stringent mitigation scenarios (430 – 530 ppm CO2eq) in 2050. Blue bars for ‘low 
energy demand’ show the deployment range of scenarios with limited growth of final energy of < 20 % in 2050 compared to 2010. Red bars show the deployment range of tech-
nologies in case of ‘high energy demand’ (> 20 % growth in 2050 compared to 2010). For each technology, the median-, interquartile-, and full-deployment range is displayed. 
(Source: WGIII AR5 Scenario Database; see Annex II.10).
Notes: Scenarios assuming technology restrictions and scenarios with final energy in the base-year outside ± 5 % of 2010 inventories are excluded. Ranges include results from 
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2030, between 40 – 90 % of the emissions reductions are achieved 
through energy-demand savings, thus reducing the need for fossil 
fuels. The long-term contribution of energy-demand savings differs, 
however, significantly across the three scenarios. For instance, in MES-
SAGE about 1200 EJ of fossil fuels are replaced through efficiency and 
demand-side improvements by 2100, compared to about 400 EJ in the 
GCAM scenario.
Achieving concentrations at low levels (430 – 530 ppm CO2eq) requires 
significant up-scaling of low-carbon energy supply options. The up-
scaling of low-carbon options depends greatly on the development 
of energy demand, which determines the overall ‘size’ of the sys-
tem. Hence, scenarios with greater emphasis on efficiency and other 
measures to limit energy demand, generally show less pervasive and 
rapid up-scaling of supply-side options (see right-side panels of Fig-
ure 7.11). Figure 7.11 compares stringent mitigation scenarios with 
low and comparatively high global energy demands by 2050. The 
higher energy-demand scenarios are generally accompanied by higher 
deployment rates for low-carbon options and more rapid phaseout of 
freely emitting fossil fuels without CCS. Moreover, and as also shown 
by Figure 7.11, high energy demand leads to a further ‘lock-in’ into 
fossil-intensive oil-supply infrastructures, which puts additional pres-
sure on the supply system of other sectors that need to decarbonize 
more rapidly to compensate for the increased emissions from oil prod-
ucts. The results confirm the importance of measures to limit energy 
demand (Wilson et al, 2013) to increase the flexibility of energy supply 
systems, thus reducing the risk that stringent mitigation stabilization 
scenarios might get out of reach (Riahi et  al., 2013). Note also that 
even at very low concentration levels, a significant fraction of energy 
supply in 2050 may be provided by freely emitting fossil energy (with-
out CCS).
The projected deployment of renewable energy technologies in the 
mitigation scenarios (Figure 7.12), with the exception of biomass, is 
well within the estimated global technical potentials assessed by the 
IPCC (2011a). As illustrated in Figure 7.12, global technical potentials 
of, for instance, wind, solar, geothermal, and ocean energy are often 
more than an order of magnitude larger than the projected deploy-
ment of these technologies by 2050. Also for hydropower the technical 
potentials are larger than the projected deployment, whereas for bio-
mass, projected global deployment is within the wide range of global 
technical potential estimates. Considering the large up-scaling in the 
mitigation scenarios, global technical potentials of biomass and hydro-
power seem to be more limiting than for other renewables (Figure 
7.12). That said, considering not only global potentials, but also 
regional potentials, other renewable energy sources may also be lim-
ited by technical potentials under mitigation scenarios (Fischedick 
et al., 2011). 
Figure 7�12 | Comparison of global technical potentials of renewable energy sources (Moomaw et al., 2011b) and deployment of renewable energy technologies in integrated 
model scenarios in 2050 (WGIII AR5 Scenario Database, see Annex II.10). Solar energy and biomass are displayed as primary energy as they can serve multiple uses. Note that the 
figure is presented in logarithmic scale due to the wide range of assessed data. Integrated model mitigation scenarios are presented for different ranges of CO2eq concentration 
levels (see Chapter 6). 
Notes: The reported technical potentials refer to the total worldwide annual RE supply. Any potential that is already in use is not deducted. Renewable energy power sources could 
also supply heating applications, whereas solar and biomass resources are represented in terms of primary energy because they could be used for multiple (e. g., power, heat, and 
transport) services. The ranges were derived by using various methodologies and the given values refer to different years in the future. As a result, the displayed ranges cannot be 
strictly compared across different technologies. Additional information concerning data sources and additional notes that should be taken into account in interpreting the figure, 
see Moomaw et al. (2011b). Contribution of ocean energy in the integrated model scenarios is less than 0.1 EJ and thus outside the logarithmic scale of the figure. Note that not 
all scenarios report deployment for all RE sources. The number of assessed scenarios differs thus across RE sources and scenario categories. The abbreviation ‘n. a.’ indicates lack of 
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Additionally, reaching the global deployment levels as projected by 
the mitigation scenarios requires addressing potential environmental 
concerns, public acceptance, the infrastructure requirements to man-
age system integration and deliver renewable energy to load centres, 
and other barriers (see Section 7.4.2, 7.6, 7.8, 7.9, 7.10; IPCC, 2011a). 
Competition for land and other resources among different renewables 
may also impact aggregate technical potentials as well as deployment 
levels, as might concerns about the carbon footprint and sustainability 
of the resource (e. g., biomass) as well as materials demands (cf. Annex 
Bioenergy in Chapter 11; de Vries et al., 2007; Kleijn and van der Voet, 
2010; Graedel, 2011). In many mitigation scenarios with low demand, 
nuclear energy supply is projected to increase in 2050 by about a fac-
tor of two compared to today, and even a factor of 3 or more in case 
of relatively high energy demand (Figure 7.11). Resource endowments 
will not be a major constraint for such an expansion, however, greater 
efforts will be necessary to improve the safety, uranium utilization, 
waste management, and proliferation concerns of nuclear energy use 
(see also Sections 7.5.4, 7.4.3, 7.8, 7.9, and 7.10).
Integrated models (see Section 6.2) tend to agree that at about USD 
100 – 150 / tCO2 the electricity sector is largely decarbonized with a sig-
nificant fraction being from CCS deployment (Krey and Riahi, 2009; 
Luckow et al., 2010; Wise et al., 2010). Many scenarios in the WGIII 
AR5 Scenario Database achieve this decarbonization at a carbon 
tax of approximately USD 100 / tCO2. This price is sufficient, in most 
scenarios, to produce large-scale utilization of bioenergy with CCS 
(BECCS) (Krey and Riahi, 2009; Azar et al., 2010; Luckow et al., 2010; 
Edmonds et al., 2013). BECCS in turn allows net removal of CO2 from 
the atmosphere while simultaneously producing electricity (Sections 
7.5.5 and 11.13). In terms of large-scale deployment of CCS in the 
power sector, Herzog (2011, p. 597), and many others have noted that 
“Significant challenges remain in growing CCS from the megatonne 
level where it is today to the gigatonne level where it needs to be 
to help mitigate global climate change. These challenges, none of 
which are showstoppers, include lowering costs, developing needed 
infrastructure, reducing subsurface uncertainty, and addressing legal 
and regulatory issues”. In addition, the up-scaling of BECCS, which 
plays a prominent role in many of the stringent mitigation scenarios 
in the literature, will require overcoming potential technical barriers 
to increase the size of biomass plants. Potential adverse side effects 
related to the biomass feedstock usage remain the same as for bio-
mass technologies without CCS (Sections 7.5.5, 11.13, particularly 
11.7, 11.13.6, and 11.13.7). 
Over the past decade, a standardized geologic CO2 storage-capacity 
methodology for different types of deep geologic formations (Bachu 
et al., 2007; Bradshaw et al., 2007; Kopp et al., 2009; Orr, 2009; Good-
man et al., 2011; De Silva et al., 2012) has been developed and applied 
in many regions of the world. The resulting literature has been sur-
veyed by Dooley (2013), who reports that, depending on the quality of 
the underlying data used to calculate a region’s geologic CO2 storage 
capacity, and on the type and stringency of various engineering and 
economic constraints, global theoretical CO2 storage could be as much 
as 35,000 GtCO2, global effective storage capacity is 13,500 GtCO2, 
global practical storage capacity is 3,900 GtCO2, and matched geo-
logic CO2 storage capacity for those regions of the globe where this 
has been computed is 300 GtCO2. Dooley (2013) compared these esti-
mates of geologic storage capacity to the potential demand for stor-
age capacity in the 21st century by looking across more than 100 peer-
reviewed scenarios of CCS deployment. He concludes that a lack of 
geologic storage space is unlikely to be the primary impediment to CCS 
deployment as the average demand for geologic CO2 storage for sce-
narios that have end-of-century CO2 concentrations of 400 – 500 ppm 
ranges from 448 GtCO2 to 1,000 GtCO2.
Energy system response to a prescribed climate policy varies across 
models and regions. There are multiple alternative transition path-
ways, for both the global energy system as a whole, and for individual 
regional energy systems. In fact the special circumstances encountered 
by individual regions imply greater regional variety in energy mitiga-
tion portfolios than in the global portfolio (Calvin et al., 2012; Bauer 
et al., 2013). 
7�11�3 Role of the electricity sector in climate 
change mitigation
Electrification of the energy system has been a major driver of the his-
torical energy transformation from an originally biomass-dominated 
energy system in the 19th century to a modern system with high reli-
ance on coal and gas (two of the major sources of electricity genera-
tion today). Many mitigation scenario studies (Edmonds et al., 2006; 
as well as the AR5 database; cf. Sections 6.3.4 and 6.8) have three 
generic components: (1) decarbonize power generation; (2) substitute 
electricity for direct use of fossil fuels in buildings and industry (see 
Sections 9.3 and 10.4), and in part for transportation fuels (Chapter 
8); and (3) reduce aggregate energy demands through technology and 
other substitutions. 
Most scenarios in the WGIII AR5 Scenario Database report a continu-
ation of the global electrification trend in the future (Figure 7.13). In 
the baseline scenarios (assuming no new climate policies) most of the 
demand for electricity continues to be in the residential, commercial, 
and industry sectors (see Chapters 9 and 10), while transport sectors 
rely predominantly on liquid fuels (Section 8.9). Biofuels and electricity 
both have the potential to provide transport services without fossil fuel 
emissions. The relative contribution of each depends at least in part on 
the character of technologies that evolve to provide transport services 
with each fuel.
Electricity production is the largest single sector emitting fossil fuel CO2 
at present and in baseline scenarios of the future. A variety of mitiga-
tion options exist in the electricity sector, including renewables (wind, 
solar energy, biomass, hydro, geothermal), nuclear, and the possibility 
of fossil or biomass with CCS. The electricity sector plays a major role 





tion scenario studies report an acceleration of the electrification trend 
in mitigation scenarios (Figure 7.13).
Mitigation scenario studies indicate that the decarbonization of the 
electricity sector may be achieved at a much higher pace than in the 
rest of the energy system (Figure 7.14). In the majority of stringent 
mitigation scenarios (430 – 480 ppm and 480 – 530 ppm), the share of 
low-carbon energy increases from presently about 30 % to more than 
80 % by 2050. In the long term (2100), fossil-based electricity genera-
tion without CCS is phased out entirely in these scenarios. 
Figure 7.15 shows the evolution over time of transformation pathways 
for primary energy supply, electricity supply, and liquid fuels supply for 
reference scenarios and low-concentration scenarios (430 – 530 ppm 
CO2eq). The development of the full scenario ensemble is further com-
pared to the three illustrative mitigation scenarios by the ReMIND, 
MESSAGE, and GCAM models discussed in Section 7.11.2 (see Figure 
7.10). The effect of climate policy plays out differently in each of the 
three supply domains. In aggregate, mitigation leads to a reduction 
in primary energy demands. However, two distinctly different mitiga-
tion portfolios emerge – one in which hydro-carbon fuels, including 
biomass, BECCS, and fossil CCS play a prominent role; and the other 
where, taken together, non-biomass renewables and nuclear power 
take center stage. In both instances, the share of fossil energy without 
CCS declines to less than 20 % of the total by 2100. Note that in the 
scenarios examined here, the major branch point occurs around the 
2050 period, while the foundations are laid in the 2030 to 2050 period.
Electricity generation is a somewhat different story. While as previously 
noted, electricity generation decarbonizes rapidly and completely (in 
many scenarios emissions actually become negative), taken together, 
non-biomass renewables and nuclear power always play an impor-
tant role. The role of CCS varies greatly, but even when CCS becomes 
extremely important to the overall mitigation strategy, it never exceeds 
half of power generation. By 2050, the contribution of fossil CCS tech-
nologies is in most scenarios larger than BECCS (see Figure 7.11). In 
contrast to the overall scale of primary energy supply, which falls in cli-
mate policy scenarios relative to baseline scenarios, the scale of power 
generation can be higher in the presence of climate policy depending 
on whether the pace of electrification proceeds more or less rapidly 
than the rate of end-use energy demand reductions. With regards to 
the deployment of individual non-biomass renewables or different CCS 
technologies, see also Figure 7.11 and Figure 7.12.
Liquid fuels are presently supplied by refining petroleum. Many sce-
narios report increasing shares for liquids derived from other primary 
Figure 7�14 | Share of low-carbon energy in total primary energy, electricity and liquid supply sectors for the year 2050. Colored bars show the interquartile range and white bars 
indicate the full range across the baseline and mitigation scenarios for different CO2eq ppm concentration levels in 2100 (Section 6.3.2). Dashed horizontal lines show the low-
carbon share for the year 2010. Low-carbon energy includes nuclear, renewables, fossil fuels with CCS and bioenergy with CCS: WGIII AR5 Scenario Database (see Annex II.10). 
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Figure 7�13 | Share of electricity in total final energy for the year 2050 in baseline 
scenarios and five different levels of mitigation stringency (long-term concentration lev-
els in ppm CO2eq by 2100). Colored bars show the interquartile range and white bars 
indicate the full range across the baseline and mitigation scenarios (See Section 6.3.2). 
Dashed horizontal line shows the electricity share for the year 2010. Source: WGIII AR5 
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energy feedstocks such as bioenergy, coal, and natural gas. This transi-
tion is gradual, and becomes more pronounced in the second half of 
the century. Like aggregate primary energy supply, the supply of liquid 
fuels is reduced in climate policy scenarios compared with baseline 
scenarios. In addition, the primary feedstock shifts from petroleum and 
other fossil fuels to bioenergy. 
7�11�4 Relationship between short-term action 
and long-term targets
The relationship between near-term actions and long-term goals is 
complex and has received a great deal of attention in the research 
literature. Unlike short-lived species (e. g., CH4, CO, NOx, and SO2) for 
which stable concentrations are associated with stable emissions, sta-
ble concentrations of CO2 ultimately in the long term require net emis-
sions to decline to zero (Kheshgi et al., 2005).35 Two important implica-
tions follow from this observation. 
First, it is cumulative emissions over the entire century that to a first 
approximation determines the CO2 concentration at the end of the 
century, and therefore no individual year’s emissions are critical (for 
cumulative CO2 emissions consistent with different concentration 
goals see Section 6.3.2, and Meinshausen et al, 2009). For any stable 
concentration of CO2, emissions must peak and then decline toward 
zero, and for low concentrations, some period of negative emissions 
may prove necessary.
35 The precise relationship is subject to uncertainty surrounding processes in both 
the oceans and on land that govern the carbon cycle. Processes to augment ocean 
uptake are constrained by international agreements.
Figure 7�15 | Transition Pathways for the Aggregate Energy Supply Transformation System (a), Electricity Supply (b), and the Supply of Liquid Fuels (c): 2010 to 2100 for baseline 
and stringent mitigation scenarios (430 – 530 ppm CO2eq). The pathways of three illustrative scenarios (cases A, B, and C) are highlighted for comparison. The illustrative pathways 
correspond to the same scenarios as shown in Figure 7.10. Dashed lines in the middle panels show the development to 2030 and 2050, and are indicative only for central trends 
across the majority of the scenarios. Source: WGIII AR5 Scenario Database (see Section 6.2.2 and Annex II.10) and three illustrative scenarios from ReMIND (Rose: Bauer et al., 
2013); GCAM (AME: Calvin et al., 2012); and the MESSAGE model (GEA: Riahi et al., 2012).
Note: Scenarios assuming technology restrictions and scenarios with significant deviations for the base-year (2010) are excluded.
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Second, minimization of global social cost implies an immediate initia-
tion of global emissions mitigation, relative to a reference, no-climate-
policy scenario, with a marginal value of carbon that rises exponentially 
(Hotelling, 1931; Peck and Wan, 1996). The consequence of this latter 
feature is that emissions abatement and the deployment of mitigation 
technologies grows over time. When only a long-term state, e. g., a fixed 
level of radiative forcing in a specific year such as 2.6 Wm– 2 in 2100, is 
prescribed, the interim path can theoretically take on any value before 
the target year. ‘Overshoot scenarios’ are scenarios for which target 
values are exceeded during the period before the target date. They 
are possible because carbon is removed from the atmosphere by the 
oceans over an extended period of time, and can be further extended 
by the ability of society to create negative emissions through seques-
tration in terrestrial systems (Section 7.5, Chapter 11), production of 
bioenergy in conjunction with CCS technology (Section 7.5.5), and / or 
direct air capture (DAC). See for example, Edmonds, et al. (2013). 
Even so, the bounded nature of the cumulative emissions associated 
with any long-term CO2 concentration limit creates a derived limit on 
near-term emissions. Beyond some point, the system cannot adjust suf-
ficiently to achieve the goal. Early work linking near-term actions with 
long-term goals was undertaken by researchers such as Swart, et al. 
(1998), the ‘safe landing’ concept, and Bruckner, et al., (1999), the ‘tol-
erable windows’ concept. O’Neill, et al., (2010) and Rogelj et al., (2013) 
assessed the relationship between emissions levels in 2020 and 2050 
to meet a range of long-term targets (in 2100). They identified ‘emis-
sions windows’ through which global energy systems would need to 
pass to achieve various concentration goals. 
Recent intermodel comparison projects AMPERE, LIMITS and RoSE 
(Bauer et al., 2013; Eom et al., 2013; Kriegler et al., 2013; Luderer et al., 
2013; Riahi et al., 2013; Tavoni et al., 2014) have explored the implica-
tions of different near-term emissions targets for the attainability and 
costs of reaching low-concentrations levels of 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq. 
The studies illustrate that the pace of the energy transformation will 
strongly depend on the attainable level of emissions in the near term 
(Figure 7.16). Scenarios that achieve comparatively lower global emis-
sions levels by 2030 (< 50 GtCO2eq) show a more gradual transforma-
tion to 2050 corresponding to about a doubling of the low-carbon 
energy share every 20 years. Scenarios with higher 2030 emissions lev-
els (> 55 GtCO2eq) lead to a further ‘lock-in’ into GHG-intensive energy 
infrastructures without any significant change in terms of the low-car-
bon energy share by 2030. This poses a significant challenge for the 
time period between 2030 and 2050, where the low-carbon share in 
these scenarios would need to be rapidly scaled by nearly a factor of 
four (from about 15 % to about 60 % in 20 years).
Figure 7�16 | The up-scaling of low-carbon energy in scenarios meeting different 2100 CO2eq concentration levels (left panel). The right panel shows the rate of up-scaling for 
different levels of emissions in 2030 in mitigation scenarios reaching 450 to 500 (430 – 530) ppm CO2eq concentrations by 2100. Colored bars show the interquartile range and 
white bars indicate the full range across the scenarios, excluding those with large net negative global emissions (> 20 GtCO2 / yr) (see Section 6.3.2 for more details). Scenarios 
with large net negative global emissions are shown as individual points. The arrows indicate the magnitude of zero- and low-carbon energy supply up-scaling from 2030 to 2050. 
Zero- and low-carbon energy supply includes renewables, nuclear energy, fossil energy with CCS, and bioenergy with CCS (BECCS). Note: Only scenarios that apply the full, uncon-
strained mitigation technology portfolio of the underlying models (default technology assumption) are shown. Scenarios with exogenous carbon price assumptions are excluded in 
both panels. In the right panel, scenarios with policies affecting the timing of mitigation other than 2030 interim targets are also excluded. Sources: WGIII AR5 Scenario Database 
(see Annex II.10). The right panel builds strongly upon scenarios from multimodel comparisons with explicit 2030 emissions targets: AMPERE: Riahi et al. (2013), Eom et al. (2013); 
LIMITS: Kriegler et al. (2013), ROSE: Luderer et al. (2013).
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Eom et  al. (2013) indicates that such rapid transformations due to 
delays in near-term emissions reductions would pose enormous chal-
lenges with respect to the up-scaling of individual technologies. The 
study shows that depending on the assumptions about the technol-
ogy portfolio, a quadrupling of the low-carbon share over 20 years 
(2030 – 2050) would lead on average to the construction of 29 to 107 
new nuclear plants per year. While the lower-bound estimate corre-
sponds to about the observed rate of nuclear power installations in 
the 1980s (Wilson et al., 2013), the high estimate is historically unprec-
edented. The study further indicates an enormous requirement for the 
future up-scaling of RE technologies. For instance, solar power is pro-
jected in the models to increase by 50 – 360 times of the year-2011 
global solar capacity between 2030 and 2050. With respect to the 
attainability of such high deployment rates, the recent study by Wilson 
et al. (2013) indicates that the diffusion of successful technologies in 
the past has been generally more rapid than the projected technology 
diffusion by integrated models. 
As shown in Figure 7.17, cost-effective pathways (without delay) show 
a remarkable near-term up-scaling (between 2008 and 2030) of CCS 
technologies by about three orders of magnitude from the current CCS 
facilities that store a total of 5 MtCO2 per year (see also, Sathre et al., 
2012). The deployment of CCS in these scenarios is projected to accel-
erate even further reaching CO2 storage rates of about half to double 
current global CO2 emissions from fossil fuel and industry by 2100. The 
majority of the models indicate that in absence of this CCS potential, 
the transformation to low-GHG concentrations (about 480 ppm CO2eq) 
might not be attainable if mitigation is delayed to 2030 (Riahi et al., 
2013). Delays in mitigation thus reduce technology choices, and as a 
result some of the currently optional technologies might become ‘a 
must’ in the future (Riahi et  al., 2012, 2013; Rogelj et  al., 2013). It 
should be noted that even at the level of CCS deployment as depicted 
by the cost-effective scenarios, CO2 storage capacity is unlikely to be a 
major limiting factor for CCS (see 7.11.2.), however, various concerns 
related to potential ecological impacts, accidental release of CO2, and 
related storage effectiveness of CCS technologies might pose barriers 
to deployment. (See Section 7.9) 
7.12 Sectoral policies
The stabilization of GHG concentrations at a level consistent with 
the Cancun agreement requires a fundamental transformation of the 
energy supply system, and the long-term substitution of freely emit-
ting (i. e., unabated)36 fossil fuel conversion technologies by low-carbon 
alternatives (Chapter 6, Section 7.11). Studies that have analyzed cur-
rent policies plus the emission reduction pledges under the Cancun 
agreement have found that global GHG emissions are expected to 
grow (den Elzen et al., 2011; IEA, 2011a; e. g., Carraro and Massetti, 
2012). As a consequence, additional policies must be enacted and / or 
the coverage and stringency of the existing ones must be increased if 
the Cancun agreement is to be fulfilled.
Currently, most countries combine instruments from three domains: 
economic instruments to guide investments of profit-maximizing firms, 
information and regulation approaches to guide choices where eco-
nomic instruments are politically not feasible or not fully reflected in 
satisficing behaviour of private actors, and innovation and infrastruc-
ture policies reflecting public investment in long-term transformation 
needs (Grubb et al., 2013). This section discusses the outcome of exist-
ing climate policies that address the energy supply sector in terms of 
36   These are those not using carbon dioxide capture and storage technologies.
Figure 7�17 | Annual Levels of Geological Carbon Dioxide Storage in cost-effective mitigation scenarios reaching 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq. Source: AMPERE intermodelling compari-
son; Eom et al. (2013), Riahi et al. (2013). Source: Reprinted from Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Eom J. et al., “The impact of near-term climate policy choices on 















































































their GHG-emission reduction, their influence on the operation, and 
(via changed investments) on the structure of the energy system, as 
well as the associated side effects. The policy categories considered 
in the following are those introduced in Section 3.8. The motivation 
behind the policies (e. g., their economic justification) and problems 
arising from enacting multiple policies simultaneously are discussed in 
Sections 3.8.6, 3.8.7, 15.3, and 15.7. A general evaluation of the per-
formance of the policies is carried out in Section 15.5.
7�12�1 Economic instruments
GHG pricing policies, such as GHG-emission trading schemes (ETS) and 
GHG-emission taxes, have been frequently proposed to address the 
market externalities associated with GHG emissions (see Sections 3.8 
and 15.5). In the power sector, GHG pricing has primarily been pursued 
through emission trading mechanisms and, to a lower extent, by car-
bon taxes (Sumner et al., 2009; IEA, 2010f; Lin and Li, 2011). Economic 
instruments associated with the provision of transport fuels and heat 
are discussed in chapters 8 – 10.
The existence of GHG (allowance or tax) prices increases the cost of 
electricity from fossil-fuelled power plants and, as a consequence, 
average electricity prices. The short-term economic impacts of power 
price increases for industrial and private consumers have been widely 
discussed (Parry, 2004; Hourcade et al., 2007). To address the associ-
ated distributional impacts, various compensation schemes have been 
proposed (IEA, 2010f; Burtraw et al., 2012; EU Commission, 2012). The 
impact of an emission trading scheme on the profitability of power 
generation can vary. Allowances that are allocated for free lead to 
windfall gains (Keats and Neuhoff, 2005; IEA, 2010f). With full auction-
ing, the impact on profitability can vary between different power sta-
tions (Keppler and Cruciani, 2010).
From an operational point of view, what counts is the fuel- and tech-
nology-dependent mark up in the marginal costs of fossil fuel power 
plants due to GHG prices. Power plants with low specific GHG emis-
sions (e. g., combined cycle gas turbines) will see a smaller increase 
of their marginal costs compared to those with higher specific emis-
sions (e. g., coal power plants). The resulting influence on the relative 
competiveness of different power plants and the associated effect on 
the generation mix depends, in part, on fuel prices (which help set the 
marginal cost reference levels) and the stringency of the GHG-emission 
cap or tax (defining the GHG price) (IEA, 2010f). 
Although GHG taxes are expected to have a high economic efficiency 
(see Section 15.5.2), explicit GHG taxes that must be obeyed by the 
power sector (e. g., as part of an economy-wide system) have only 
been enacted in a couple of countries (WEC, 2008; Tanaka, 2011). 
In contrast, taxes on fuels are common (Section 15.5.2). Concerning 
operational decisions, GHG taxes, taxes or charges on input fuels and 
emission permit schemes are equal as long as the resulting (explicit 
or implicit) GHG price is the same. Concerning investment decisions 
(especially those made under uncertainty), there are differences that 
are discussed as part of the ‘prices versus quantities’ debate (see 
Weitzman, 1974, 2007; OECD, 2009). Due to some weaknesses of 
existing ETSs and associated uncertainties, there is a renewed interest 
in hybrid systems, which combine the merits of both approaches by 
introducing price caps (serving as ‘safety valves’) and price floors into 
emission trading schemes to increase their flexibility in the context of 
uncertain costs (Pizer, 2002; Philibert, 2008). Concerning the issue of 
potential intertemporal and spatial leakages, as discussed in the Green 
Paradox literature (Section 15.5.2.4), differences between tax and GHG 
ETSs exist as well. Options to address these issues are discussed in Sec-
tion 15.5.3.8 and Kalkuhl and Edenhofer (2013). 
The EU ETS37 is perhaps the world’s most-prominent example of a GHG 
trading scheme, and the GHG prices observed in that market, in com-
bination with other policies that have been enacted simultaneously, 
have been effective in changing operating and investment choices in 
a way that has allowed the short-term fulfilment of the sector-specific 
GHG reduction goals (Ellerman et al., 2010; IEA, 2010f). The significant 
associated emission reductions compared to the baseline are discussed 
in Section 14.4.2.1. Shortcomings of emissions trading in general, and 
the EU ETS in particular (e. g., the high GHG price volatility and the 
resulting lack of stable price signals), are addressed by (Grubb et al., 
2006; Neuhoff et  al., 2006; Åhman et  al., 2007; Kettner et  al., 2008; 
Ellerman et al., 2010; IEA, 2010f; Pahle et al., 2011). According to the 
IEA (2010f), these shortcomings can be mitigated by setting long-term 
emission caps that are consistent with given GHG concentration stabi-
lization goals and by avoiding a free allocation of allowances to power 
producers. A general discussion of the performance of GHG trading 
schemes is given in Section 15.5.3, including programs outside Europe. 
The main factors that have contributed to the low EU ETS carbon prices 
currently observed include caps that are modest in comparison to the 
Cancun agreement, relatively low electricity demand due to the eco-
nomic crisis in the EU, increasing shares of RE, as well as an unex-
pected high inflow of certificates from CDM projects (IEA, 2013c). 
In the longer term and provided that sufficiently stringent emissions 
caps are set, GHG pricing (potentially supplemented by technology 
support, see Section 15.6) can support low-emitting technologies (e. g., 
RE, nuclear power, and CCS) due to the fuel- and technology-depen-
dent mark-up in the marginal costs of fossil fuel power plants: 
(a) The economic performance of nuclear power plants, for instance, 
can be improved by the establishment of GHG pricing schemes (NEA, 
2011b; Linares and Conchado, 2013). 
(b) CCS technologies applied in the power sector will only become 
competitive with their freely emitting (i. e., unabated) counterparts if 
the additional investment and operational costs associated with the 
CCS technology are compensated for by sufficiently high carbon prices 
37 For additional information on the history and general success of this policy see 





or direct financial support (Herzog, 2011; IEA, 2013c). In terms of the 
price volatility seen in the ETS, Oda and Akimoto (2011) analyzed the 
influence of carbon price volatility on CCS investments and concluded 
that carbon prices need to be higher to compensate for the associ-
ated uncertainty. The provision of capital grants, investment tax cred-
its, credit guarantees, and / or insurance are considered to be suitable 
means to support CCS technologies as long as they are in their early 
stages of development (IEA, 2013c).
(c) Many RE technologies still need direct (e. g., price-based or quan-
tity-based deployment policies) or indirect (e. g., sufficiently high car-
bon prices and the internalization of other externalities) support if 
their market shares are to be increased (see Section 7.8.2; IPCC, 2011a; 
IRENA, 2012a). To achieve this goal, specific RE deployment policies 
have been enacted in a large number of countries (Halsnæs et  al., 
2012; Zhang et  al., 2012; REN21, 2013). These policies are designed 
to facilitate the process of bringing RE technologies down the learn-
ing curve (IEA, 2011f; IRENA, 2012a). Taken together, RE policies have 
been successful in driving an escalated growth in the deployment of 
RE (IPCC, 2011a). Price-based mechanisms (such as feed-in tariffs 
(FITs)) and quantity-based systems (such as quotas or renewable port-
folio standards, RPS, and tendering / bidding) are the most common RE 
deployment policies in the power sector (Section 15.6, Halsnæs et al., 
2012; REN21, 2013). With respect to their success and efficiency, the 
SRREN SPM (IPCC, 2011a, p.25) notes “that some feed in tariffs have 
been effective and efficient at promoting RE electricity, mainly due to 
the combination of long-term fixed price or premium payments, net-
work connections, and guaranteed purchase of all RE electricity gener-
ated. Quota policies can be effective and efficient if designed to reduce 
risk; for example, with long-term contracts”. Supported by Klessmann 
et  al. (2013), a new study confirms: “Generally, it can be concluded 
that support schemes, which are technology specific, and those that 
avoid unnecessary risks in project revenues, are more effective and 
efficient than technology-neutral support schemes, or schemes with 
higher revenue risk” (Ragwitz and Steinhilber, 2013). 
Especially in systems with increasing and substantial shares of RE and 
“despite the historic success of FITs, there is a tendency to shift to ten-
der-based systems because guaranteed tariffs without a limit on the 
total subsidy are difficult to handle in government budgets. Conversely 
a system with competitive bidding for a specified amount of electricity 
limits the total amount of subsidy required” (Halsnæs et al., 2012, p.6). 
A renewed tendency to shift to tender-based systems with public com-
petitive bidding to deploy renewables is observed by REN21 (2013) as 
well. Assessing the economic efficiency of RE policies requires a clear 
distinction between whether a complete macroeconomic assessment is 
intended (i. e., one where competing mitigation options are taken into 
account as well) or whether prescribed and time-dependent RE shares 
are to be achieved in a cost-effective manner. In addition, the planning 
horizon must be clearly stated. RE policies might be considered to be 
inefficient in a short-term (myopic) perspective, while they could be 
potentially justified in an intertemporal setting where a dynamic opti-
mization over a couple of decades is carried out (see Section 15.6, IEA, 
2011f; SRREN Sections 11.1.1 and 11.5.7.3 in IPCC, 2011a; Kalkuhl 
et al., 2012, 2013). 
Issues related to synergetic as well as adverse interactions of RE poli-
cies with GHG policies (Halsnæs et al., 2012) are discussed in detail in 
Section 15.7 and SRREN Sections 11.1.1 and 11.5.7.3. A new line of 
reasoning shows that delayed emission-pricing policies can be partially 
compensated by near-term support of RE (Bauer et al., 2012). The mac-
roeconomic burden associated with the promotion of RE is emphasized 
by Frondel et al. (2010). The relationship between RE policy support and 
larger power markets is also an area of focus. Due to the ‘merit order 
effect’, RE can, in the short term, reduce wholesale electricity prices by 
displacing power plants with higher marginal costs (Bode, 2006; Sens-
fuß et al., 2008; Woo et al., 2011; Würzburg et al., 2013), though in the 
long term, the impact may be more on the temporal profile of whole-
sale prices and less on overall average prices. The promotion of low-
carbon technologies can have an impact on the economics of backup 
power plants needed for supply security. The associated challenges and 
options to address them are discussed in Lamont, (2008); Sáenz de 
Miera et al., (2008); Green and Vasilakos, (2011); Hood, (2011); Traber 
and Kemfert, (2011); IEA, (2012b, 2013b; c); and Hirth, (2013). 
According to Michaelowa et  al., (2006); Purohit and Michaelowa, 
(2007); Restuti and Michaelowa, (2007); Bodas Freitas et  al., (2012); 
Hultman et al., (2012); Zhang et al., (2012); and Spalding-Fecher et al., 
(2012), the emissions credits generated by the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) have been a significant incentive for the expansion 
of renewable energy in developing countries. 
Zavodov (2012), however, has questioned this view and argues that 
CDM in its current form is not a reliable policy tool for long-term RE 
development plans. In addition, CCS has been accepted as an eligible 
measure under the CDM by the UN (IEA, 2010g). 
The phaseout of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies as discussed during the 
G-20 summit meetings in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 will have a vis-
ible influence on global energy-related carbon emissions (Bruvoll et al., 
2011; IEA, 2011g, 2013c). Removing these subsidies could lead to a 
13 % decline in CO2 emissions and generate positive spillover effects 
by reducing global energy demand (IMF, 2013). In addition, ineffi-
ciently low pricing of externalities (e. g., environmental and social costs 
of electricity production) in the energy supply sector introduces a bias 
against the development of many forms of low-carbon technologies 
(IRENA, 2012a).
A mitigation of GHG emissions in absolute terms is only possible 
through policies / measures that either reduce the amount of fossil fuel 
carbon oxidized and / or that capture and permanently remove GHGs 
from fossil fuel extraction, processing, and use from the atmosphere 
(Sections 7.5, 7.11). The deployment of renewable or nuclear energy 
or energy efficiency as such does not guarantee that fossil fuels will 
not be burned (in an unabated manner). The interplay between growth 





carbon energy, and fossil fuel is discussed in detail in SRREN Chapter 1 
(Figure 1.14), and Chapter 10 (IPCC, 2011a). 
The question whether or not the deployment of low-carbon technolo-
gies substitutes fossil fuels that otherwise would have emitted GHG 
have to take into account the complexity of economic systems and 
human behaviour (York, 2012). A central aspect in this context is the 
rebound effect, which is extensively discussed in Sections 3.9.5 and 
5.6.2. Spillover effects that are highly related to this issue are dis-
cussed in Section 6.3.6. To constrain the related adverse effects, care-
fully drafted packages combining GHG pricing schemes with tech-
nology policies in a way that avoids negative interactions have been 
proposed (see SRREN Chapter 11 in IPCC, 2011a). 
7�12�2 Regulatory approaches
The formulation of low-carbon technologies targets can help technol-
ogy companies to anticipate the scale of the market and to identify 
opportunities for their products and services (Lester and Neuhoff, 
2009), thus, motivating investments in innovation and production facil-
ities while reducing costs for low-carbon technologies. Currently, for 
instance, about 138 countries have renewable targets in place. More 
than half of them are developing countries (REN21, 2013).
The success of energy policies heavily depends on the development of 
an underlying solid legal framework as well as a sufficient regulatory 
stability (Reiche et  al., 2006; IPCC, 2011a). Property rights, contract 
enforcement, appropriate liability schemes, and emissions account-
ing are essential for a successful implementation of climate policies. 
For example, well-defined responsibilities for the long-term reliability 
of geologic storages are an important pre-requisite for successful CCS 
applications (IEA, 2013c), while non-discriminatory access to the grid 
is of similar importance for RE. 
Concerning the promotion of RE, the specific challenges that are 
faced by developing countries and countries with regulated markets 
are addressed by IRENA (2012a); IRENA, (2012b); Kahrl (2011); and 
Zhang et al. (2012). Renewable portfolio standards (or quota obliga-
tions, see Section 15.5.4.1) are usually combined with the trading of 
green certificates and therefore have been discussed under the topic of 
economic instruments (see Section 7.12.1). Efficiency and environmen-
tal performance standards are usual regulatory instruments applied to 
fossil fuel power plants. 
In the field of nuclear energy, a stable policy environment comprising 
a regulatory and institutional framework that addresses operational 
safety and the appropriate management of nuclear waste as well as 
long-term commitments to the use of nuclear energy are requested to 
minimize investment risks for new nuclear power plants (NEA, 2013). 
To regain public acceptance after the Fukushima accident, comprehen-
sive safety reviews have been carried out in many countries. Some of 
them included ‘stress tests’, which investigated the capability of exist-
ing and projected reactors to cope with extreme natural and man-
made events, especially those lying outside the reactor design assump-
tions. As a result of the accident and the subsequent investigations, a 
“radical revision of the worst-case assumptions for safety planning” is 
expected to occur (Rogner, 2013, p. 291). 
7�12�3 Information programmes 
Though information programs play a minor role in the field of power 
plant-related energy efficiency improvements and fossil fuel switching, 
awareness creation, capacity building, and information dissemination 
to stakeholders outside of the traditional power plant sector plays 
an important role especially in the use of decentralized RE in LDCs 
(IRENA, 2012c). Other low-carbon technologies like CCS and nuclear 
would require specifically trained personnel (see Section 7.10.4). Fur-
thermore, enhanced transparency of information improves public and 
private decisions and can enhance public perception (see Section 
7.9.4).
7�12�4 Government provision of public goods 
or services
Public energy-related R&D expenditures in the IEA countries peaked 
in 2009 as a result of economic stimulus packages, but soon after suf-
fered a substantial decline. Although R&D spending is now again ris-
ing, energy-related expenditures still account for less than 5 % of total 
government R&D – compared to 11 % that was observed in 1980 (IEA, 
2012j). Nuclear has received significant support in many countries and 
the share of research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) for RE 
has increased, but public R&D for CSS is lower, and does not reflect its 
potential importance (see Section 7.11) for the achievement of nega-
tive emissions (von Stechow et al., 2011; Scott et al., 2013) IEA, 2012j).
Although private R&D expenditures are seldom disclosed,38 they are 
estimated to represent a large share of the overall spending for RD&D 
activities (IEA, 2012j). Private R&D investments are not only stimu-
lated by R&D policies. Additional policies (e. g., deployment policies, 
see 7.12.1 and Section 15.6) addressing other parts of the innovation 
chain as well as broad GHG pricing policies might assist in triggering 
private investments in R&D (IPCC, 2011a; Rogge et al., 2011; Battelle, 
2012). 
The integration of variable RE poses additional challenges, as discussed 
earlier in Section 7.6, with a variety of possible technical and institu-
tional responses. Many of these technical and institutional measures 
require an enabling regulatory framework facilitating their application. 
Infrastructure challenges, e. g., grid extension, are particularly acute 





for RE deployment in developing countries, sometimes preventing 
deployment (IRENA, 2012a). Governments can play a prominent role in 
providing the infrastructure (e. g., transmissions grids or the provision 
of district heating and cooling systems) that is needed to allow for a 
transformation of energy systems towards lower GHG emissions (IEA, 
2012b; Grubb et al., 2013). 
7�12�5  Voluntary actions 
Voluntary agreements (see Section  15.5.7.4) have been frequently 
applied in various sectors around the globe, though they often have 
been replaced by mandatory schemes in the long-term (Halsnæs et al., 
2012). According to Chapter 15, their success is mixed. “Voluntary 
agreements had a positive effect on energy efficiency improvements, 
but results in terms of GHG emissions reductions have been mod-
est, with the exception of Japan, where the status of these voluntary 
agreements has also been much more ‘binding’ than in other countries 
in line with Japanese cultural traditions” (Halsnæs et al., 2012, p. 13; 
IPCC, 2007; Yamaguchi, 2012). 
7.13 Gaps in  knowledge 
and data
Gaps in knowledge and data are addressed to identify those that can 
be closed through additional research and others that are inherent to 
the problems discussed and are therefore expected to persist. Chapter 
7 is confronted by various gaps in knowledge, especially those related 
to methodological issues and availability of data:
•	 The diversity of energy statistic and GHG emission accounting 
methodologies as well as several years delay in the availability of 
energy statistics data limit reliable descriptions of current and his-
toric energy use and emission data on a global scale (Section 7.2, 
7.3). 
•	 Although fundamental problems in identifying fossil fuel and 
nuclear resource deposits, the extent of potential carbon storage 
sites, and technical potentials of RE are acknowledged, the devel-
opment of unified and consistent reporting schemes, the collection 
of additional field data, and further geological modelling activities 
could reduce the currently existing uncertainties (Section 7.4). 
•	 There is a gap in our knowledge concerning fugitive CH4 emissions 
as well as adverse environmental side effects associated with the 
increasing exploitation of unconventional fossil fuels. As novel 
technologies are applied in these fields, research could help reduce 
the gap. Operational and supply chain risks of nuclear power 
plants, the safety of CCS storage sites and adverse side effects 
of some RE, especially biomass and hydropower, are often highly 
dependent on the selected technologies and the locational and 
regulatory context in which they are applied. The associated risks 
are therefore hard to quantify, although further research could, in 
part, reduce the associated knowledge gaps (Section 7.5). 
•	 There is limited research on the integration issues associated with 
high levels of low-carbon technology utilization (Section7.6). 
•	 Knowledge gaps pertain to the regional and local impacts of cli-
mate change on the technical potential for renewable energy and 
appropriate adaptation, design, and operational strategies to mini-
mize the impact of climate change on energy infrastructure (Sec-
tion 7.7).
•	 The current literature provides a limited number of comprehen-
sive studies on the economic, environmental, social, and cultural 
implications that are associated with low-carbon emission paths. 
Especially, there is a lack of consistent and comprehensive global 
surveys concerning the current cost of sourcing and using uncon-
ventional fossil fuels, RE, nuclear power, and the expected ones for 
CCS and BECCS. In addition, there is a lack of globally comprehen-
sive assessments of the external cost of energy supply and GHG-
related mitigation options (Sections 7.8, 7.9, 7.10).
•	 Integrated decision making requires further development of energy 
market models as well as integrated assessment modelling frame-
works, accounting for the range of possible cobenefits and trade off 
between different policies in the energy sector that tackle energy 
access, energy security, and / or environmental concerns (Sec-
tion 7.11). 
•	 Research on the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of climate-
related energy policies and especially concerning their interaction 
with other policies in the energy sector is limited (Section 7.12).
7.14 Frequently Asked 
Questions
FAQ 7�1 How much does the energy sup-
ply  sector contribute to the GHG 
 emissions?
The energy supply sector comprises all energy extraction, conversion, 
storage, transmission, and distribution processes with the exception of 
those that use final energy in the demand sectors (industry, transport, 
and building). In 2010, the energy supply sector was responsible for 
46 % of all energy-related GHG emissions (IEA, 2012b) and 35 % of 





In the last 10 years, the growth of GHG emissions from the energy sup-
ply sector has outpaced the growth of all anthropogenic GHG emis-
sions by nearly 1 % per year. Most of the primary energy delivered to 
the sector is transformed into a diverse range of final energy products 
including electricity, heat, refined oil products, coke, enriched coal, and 
natural gas. A significant amount of energy is used for transformation, 
making the sector the largest consumer of energy. Energy use in the 
sector results from end-user demand for higher-quality energy carriers 
such as electricity, but also the relatively low average global efficiency 
of energy conversion and delivery processes (Sections 7.2, 7.3).
Increasing demand for high-quality energy carriers by end users in 
many developing countries has resulted in significant growth in the 
sectors’ GHG emission, particularly as much of this growth has been 
fuelled by the increased use of coal in Asia, mitigated to some extent 
by increased use of gas in other regions and the continued uptake of 
low-carbon technologies. While total output from low-carbon tech-
nologies, such as hydro, wind, solar, biomass, geothermal, and nuclear 
power, has continued to grow, their share of global primary energy 
supply has remained relatively constant; fossil fuels have maintained 
their dominance and carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) has yet 
to be applied to electricity production at scale (Sections 7.2, 7.5). 
Biomass and hydropower dominate renewable energy, particularly 
in developing countries where biomass remains an important source 
of energy for heating and cooking; per capita emissions from many 
developing countries remain lower than the global average. Renew-
able energy accounts for one-fifth of global electricity production, with 
hydroelectricity taking the largest share. Importantly, the last 10 years 
have seen significant growth in both wind and solar, which combine to 
deliver around one-tenth of all renewable electricity. Nuclear energy’s 
share of electricity production declined from maximum peak of 17 % in 
1993 to 11 % in 2012 (Sections 7.2, 7.5).
FAQ 7�2 What are the main mitigation options in 
the energy supply sector?
The main mitigation options in the energy supply sector are energy 
efficiency improvements, the reduction of fugitive non-CO2 GHG emis-
sions, switching from (unabated) fossil fuels with high specific GHG 
emissions (e. g., coal) to those with lower ones (e. g., natural gas), use 
of renewable energy, use of nuclear energy, and carbon dioxide cap-
ture and storage (CCS). (Section 7.5).
No single mitigation option in the energy supply sector will be suffi-
cient to hold the increase in global average temperature change below 
2 °C above pre-industrial levels. A combination of some, but not neces-
sarily all, of the options is needed. Significant emission reductions can 
be achieved by energy-efficiency improvements and fossil fuel switch-
ing, but they are not sufficient by themselves to provide the deep cuts 
needed. Achieving deep cuts will require more intensive use of low-
GHG technologies such as renewable energy, nuclear energy, and CCS. 
Using electricity to substitute for other fuels in end-use sectors plays 
an important role in deep emission cuts, since the cost of decarbon-
izing power generation is expected to be lower than that in other parts 
of the energy supply sector (Chapter 6, Section 7.11).
While the combined global technical potential of low-carbon technolo-
gies is sufficient to enable deep cuts in emissions, there are local and 
regional constraints on individual technologies (Sections 7.4, 7.11). The 
contribution of mitigation technologies depends on site- and context-
specific factors such as resource availability, mitigation and integration 
costs, co-benefits / adverse side effects, and public perception (Sections 
7.8, 7.9, 7.10). Infrastructure and integration challenges vary by miti-
gation technology and region. While these challenges are not in gen-
eral technically insurmountable, they must be carefully considered in 
energy supply planning and operations to ensure reliable and afford-
able energy supply (Section 7.6).
FAQ 7�3 What barriers need to be overcome in 
the energy supply sector to enable a 
transformation to low-GHG emissions? 
The principal barriers to transforming the energy supply sector are 
mobilizing capital investment; lock-in to long-lived high-carbon sys-
tems; cultural, institutional, and legal aspects; human capital; and lack 
of perceived clarity about climate policy (Section 7.10). 
Though only a fraction of available private-sector capital investment 
would be needed to cover the costs of future low-GHG energy supply, 
a range of mechanisms — including climate investment funds, carbon 
pricing, removal of fossil fuel subsidies and private / public initiatives 
aimed at lowering barriers for investors — need to be utilized to direct 
investment towards energy supply (Section 7.10.2).
Long-lived fossil energy system investments represent an effective 
(high-carbon) lock-in. The relative lack of existing energy capital in 
many developing countries therefore provides opportunities to develop 
a low-carbon energy system (Section 7.10.5).
A holistic approach encompassing cultural, institutional, and legal issues 
in the formulation and implementation of energy supply strategies is 
essential, especially in areas of urban and rural poverty where conven-
tional market approaches are insufficient. Human capital capacity build-
ing — encompassing technological, project planning, and institutional 
and public engagement elements — is required to develop a skilled 
workforce and to facilitate wide-spread adoption of renewable, nuclear, 
CCS, and other low-GHG energy supply options (Sections 7.10.3, 7.10.4).
Elements of an effective policy aimed at achieving deep cuts in CO2 
emissions would include a global carbon-pricing scheme supple-
mented by technology support, regulation, and institutional develop-
ment tailored to the needs to individual countries (notably less-devel-
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Dedication to Lee Schipper
This Transport chapter is dedicated to the memory of Leon Jay 
(Lee) Schipper. A leading scientist in the field of energy research 
with emphasis on transport, Lee died on 16 August 2011 at the 
age of 64. He was a friend and colleague of many of the Chapter 
authors who were looking forward to working with him in his 
appointed role as Review Editor. Lee’s passing is a great loss to 
the research field of transport, energy, and the environment and 
his expertise and guidance in the course of writing this chapter 







Reducing global transport greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
will be challenging since the continuing growth in passenger 
and freight activity could outweigh all mitigation measures 
unless transport emissions can be strongly decoupled from GDP 
growth (high confidence).
The transport sector produced 7.0 GtCO2eq of direct GHG emissions 
(including non-CO2 gases) in 2010 and hence was responsible for 
approximately 23 % of total energy-related CO2 emissions (6.7 GtCO2) 
[8.1]. Growth in GHG emissions has continued since the Fourth Assess-
ment Report (AR4) in spite of more efficient vehicles (road, rail, water 
craft, and aircraft) and policies being adopted. (robust evidence, high 
agreement) [Section 8.1, 8.3] 
Without aggressive and sustained mitigation policies being imple-
mented, transport emissions could increase at a faster rate than emis-
sions from the other energy end-use sectors and reach around 12 Gt 
CO2eq / yr by 2050. Transport demand per capita in developing and 
emerging economies is far lower than in Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries but is expected 
to increase at a much faster rate in the next decades due to rising 
incomes and development of infrastructure. Analyses of both sectoral 
and integrated model scenarios suggest a higher emission reduction 
potential in the transport sector than the levels found possible in AR4 
and at lower costs. Since many integrated models do not contain a 
detailed representation of infrastructural and behavioural changes, 
their results for transport can possibly be interpreted as conserva-
tive. If pricing and other stringent policy options are implemented in 
all regions, substantial decoupling of transport GHG emissions from 
gross domestic product (GDP) growth seems possible. A strong slow-
ing of light-duty vehicle (LDV) travel growth per capita has already 
been observed in several OECD cities suggesting possible saturation. 
(medium evidence, medium agreement) [8.6, 8.9, 8.10]
Avoided journeys and modal shifts due to behavioural change, 
uptake of improved vehicle and engine performance technolo-
gies, low-carbon fuels, investments in related infrastructure, 
and changes in the built environment, together offer high miti-
gation potential (high confidence).
Direct (tank-to-wheel) GHG emissions from passenger and freight 
transport can be reduced by: 
•	 avoiding journeys where possible — by, for example, densifying 
urban landscapes, sourcing localized products, internet shopping, 
restructuring freight logistics systems, and utilizing advanced infor-
mation and communication technologies (ICT); 
•	 modal shift to lower-carbon transport systems — encouraged by 
increasing investment in public transport, walking and cycling 
infrastructure, and modifying roads, airports, ports, and railways 
to become more attractive for users and minimize travel time and 
distance;
•	 lowering energy intensity (MJ / passenger km or MJ / tonne km) — by 
enhancing vehicle and engine performance, using lightweight 
materials, increasing freight load factors and passenger occupancy 
rates, deploying new technologies such as electric 3-wheelers; 
•	 reducing carbon intensity of fuels (CO2eq / MJ) — by substituting oil-
based products with natural gas, bio-methane, or biofuels, electric-
ity or hydrogen produced from low GHG sources. 
In addition, indirect GHG emissions arise during the construction of 
infrastructure, manufacture of vehicles, and provision of fuels (well-to-
tank). (robust evidence, high agreement) [8.3, 8.4, 8.6 and Chapters 
10, 11, 12]
Both short- and long-term transport mitigation strategies are 
essential if deep GHG reduction ambitions are to be achieved 
(high confidence).
Short-term mitigation measures could overcome barriers to low-car-
bon transport options and help avoid future lock-in effects resulting, 
for example, from the slow turnover of vehicle stock and infrastructure 
and expanding urban sprawl. Changing behaviour of consumers and 
businesses will likely play an important role but is challenging and the 
possible outcomes, including modal shift, are difficult to quantify. Busi-
ness initiatives to decarbonize freight transport have begun, but need 
support from policies that encourage shifting to low-carbon modes 
such as rail or waterborne options where feasible, and improving logis-
tics. The impact of projected growth in world trade on freight trans-
port emissions may be partly offset in the near term by more efficient 
vehicles, operational changes, ‘slow steaming’ of ships, eco-driving and 
fuel switching. Other short-term mitigation strategies include reducing 
aviation contrails and emissions of particulate matter (including black 
carbon), tropospheric ozone and aerosol precursors (including NOx) 
that can have human health and mitigation co-benefits in the short 
term. (medium evidence, medium agreement) [8.2, 8.3, 8.6, 8.10] 
Methane-based fuels are already increasing their share for road 
vehicles and waterborne craft. Electricity produced from low-car-
bon sources has near-term potential for electric rail and short- to 
medium-term potential as electric buses, light-duty and 2-wheel 
road vehicles are deployed. Hydrogen fuels from low-carbon sources 
constitute longer-term options. Gaseous and liquid-biofuels can pro-
vide co-benefits. Their mitigation potential depends on technology 
advances (particularly advanced ‘drop-in’ fuels for aircraft and other 
vehicles) and sustainable feedstocks. (medium evidence, medium 
agreement) [8.2, 8.3]
The technical potential exists to substantially reduce the current CO2eq 





and beyond. Energy efficiency and vehicle performance improvements 
range from 30 – 50 % relative to 2010 depending on mode and vehicle 
type. Realizing this efficiency potential will depend on large invest-
ments by vehicle manufacturers, which may require strong incentives 
and regulatory policies in order to achieve GHG emissions reduction 
goals. (medium evidence, medium agreement) [8.3, 8.6, 8.10] 
Over the medium-term (up to 2030) to long-term (to 2050 and 
beyond), urban (re)development and investments in new infrastruc-
ture, linked with integrated urban planning, transit-oriented develop-
ment and more compact urban form that supports cycling and walking 
can all lead to modal shifts. Such mitigation measures could evolve 
to possibly reduce GHG intensity by 20 – 50 % below 2010 baseline by 
2050. Although high potential improvements for aircraft efficiency are 
projected, improvement rates are expected to be slow due to long air-
craft life, and fuel switching options being limited, apart from biofu-
els. Widespread construction of high-speed rail systems could partially 
reduce short-to-medium-haul air travel demand. For the transport sec-
tor, a reduction in total CO2eq emissions of 15 – 40 % could be plau-
sible compared to baseline activity growth in 2050. (medium evidence, 
medium agreement) [8.3, 8.4, 8.6, 8.9, 12.3, 12.5]
Barriers to decarbonizing transport for all modes differ across 
regions, but can be overcome in part by reducing the marginal 
mitigation costs (medium evidence, medium agreement). 
Financial, institutional, cultural, and legal barriers constrain low-car-
bon technology uptake and behavioural change. All of these barri-
ers include the high investment costs needed to build low-emissions 
transport systems, the slow turnover of stock and infrastructure, and 
the limited impact of a carbon price on petroleum fuels already heav-
ily taxed. Other barriers can be overcome by communities, cities, and 
national governments which can implement a mix of behavioural mea-
sures, technological advances, and infrastructural changes. Infrastruc-
ture investments (USD / tCO2 avoided) may appear expensive at the 
margin, but sustainable urban planning and related policies can gain 
support when co-benefits, such as improved health and accessibility, 
can be shown to offset some or all of the mitigation costs. (medium 
evidence, medium agreement) [8.4, 8.7, 8.8]
Oil price trends, price instruments on emissions, and other measures 
such as road pricing and airport charges can provide strong economic 
incentives for consumers to adopt mitigation measures. Regional dif-
ferences, however, will likely occur due to cost and policy constraints. 
Some near term mitigation measures are available at low marginal 
costs but several longer-term options may prove more expensive. Full 
societal mitigation costs (USD / tCO2eq) of deep reductions by 2030 
remain uncertain but range from very low or negative (such as effi-
ciency improvements for LDVs, long-haul heavy-duty vehicles (HDVs) 
and ships) to more than 100 USD / tCO2eq for some electric vehicles, 
aircraft, and possibly high-speed rail. Such costs may be significantly 
reduced in the future but the magnitude of mitigation cost reductions 
is uncertain. (limited evidence, low agreement) [8.6, 8.9]
There are regional differences in transport mitigation pathways 
with major opportunities to shape transport systems and infra-
structure around low-carbon options, particularly in developing 
and emerging countries where most future urban growth will 
occur (robust evidence, high agreement).
Transport can be an agent of sustained urban development that priori-
tizes goals for equity and emphasizes accessibility, traffic safety, and 
time-savings for the poor while reducing emissions, with minimal det-
riment to the environment and human health. Transformative trajecto-
ries vary with region and country due to differences in the dynamics 
of motorization, age and type of vehicle fleets, existing infrastructure, 
and urban development processes. Prioritizing access to pedestrians 
and integrating non-motorized and public transit services can result 
in higher levels of economic and social prosperity in all regions. Good 
opportunities exist for both structural and technological change around 
low-carbon transport systems in most countries but particularly in fast 
growing emerging economies where investments in mass transit and 
other low-carbon transport infrastructure can help avoid future lock-
in to carbon intensive modes. Mechanisms to accelerate the transfer 
and adoption of improved vehicle efficiency and low-carbon fuels to all 
economies, and reducing the carbon intensity of freight particularly in 
emerging markets, could offset much of the growth in non-OECD emis-
sions by 2030. It appears possible for LDV travel per capita in OECD 
countries to peak around 2035, whereas in non-OECD countries it will 
likely continue to increase dramatically from a very low average today. 
However, growth will eventually need to be slowed in all countries. 
(limited evidence, medium agreement) [8.7, 8.9]
A range of strong and mutually-supportive policies will be 
needed for the transport sector to decarbonize and for the co-
benefits to be exploited (robust evidence, high agreement). 
Decarbonizing the transport sector is likely to be more challenging 
than for other sectors, given the continuing growth in global demand, 
the rapid increase in demand for faster transport modes in developing 
and emerging economies, and the lack of progress to date in slowing 
growth of global transport emissions in many OECD countries. Trans-
port strategies associated with broader non-climate policies at all gov-
ernment levels can usually target several objectives simultaneously to 
give lower travel costs, improved mobility, better health, greater energy 
security, improved safety, and time savings. Realizing the co-benefits 
depends on the regional context in terms of economic, social, and polit-
ical feasibility as well as having access to appropriate and cost-effective 
advanced technologies. (medium evidence, high agreement) [8.4, 8.7] 
In rapidly growing developing economies, good opportunities exist for 
both structural and technological change around low-carbon trans-
port. Established infrastructure may limit the options for modal shift 
and lead to a greater reliance on advanced vehicle technologies. Policy 
changes can maximize the mitigation potential by overcoming the bar-
riers to achieving deep carbon reductions and optimizing the synergies. 





ate social acceptance, can help reduce travel demand and increase the 
demand for more efficient vehicles (for example, where fuel economy 
standards exist) and induce a shift to low-carbon modes (where good 
modal choice is available). For freight, a range of fiscal, regulatory, and 
advisory policies can be used to incentivize businesses to reduce the 
carbon intensity of their logistical systems. Since rebound effects can 
reduce the CO2 benefits of efficiency improvements and undermine a 
particular policy, a balanced package of policies, including pricing ini-
tiatives, could help to achieve stable price signals, avoid unintended 
outcomes, and improve access, mobility, productivity, safety, and 
health. (medium evidence, medium agreement) [8.7, 8.9, 8.10] 
Knowledge gaps in the transport sector
There is a lack of comprehensive and consistent assessments of the 
worldwide potential for GHG emission reduction and especially costs 
of mitigation from the transport sector. Within this context, the poten-
tial reduction is much less certain for freight than for passenger modes. 
For LDVs, the long-term costs and high energy density potential for 
on-board energy storage is not well understood. Also requiring evalua-
tion is how best to manage the tradeoffs for electric vehicles between 
performance, driving range and recharging time, and how to create 
successful business models. 
Another area that requires additional research is in the behavioural 
economic analysis of the implications of norms, biases, and social 
learning in decision making, and of the relationship between trans-
port and lifestyle. For example, how and when people will choose to 
use new types of low-carbon transport and avoid making unnecessary 
journeys is unknown. Consequently, the outcomes of both positive and 
negative climate change impacts on transport services and scheduled 
timetables have not been determined, nor have the cost-effectiveness 
of carbon-reducing measures in the freight sector and their possible 
rebound effects. Changes in the transport of materials as a result of 
the decarbonization of other sectors and adaptation of the built envi-
ronment are unknown. [8.11]
8.1 Freight and  passenger 
transport (land, air, 
sea and water)
Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the transport sector have more 
than doubled since 1970, and have increased at a faster rate than any 
other energy end-use sector to reach 7.0 Gt CO2eq in 20101 (IEA, 2012a; 
1 CO2eq units are used throughout this chapter for direct emissions wherever 
feasible, although this is not always the case in some literature that reports CO2 
emissions only. For most transport modes, non-CO2 gases are usually less than 
5 % of total vehicle emissions.
JRC / PBL, 2013; see Annex II.8). Around 80 % of this increase has come 
from road vehicles (see Figure 8.1). The final energy consumption for 
transport reached 28 % of total end-use energy in 2010 (IEA, 2012b), of 
which around 40 % was used in urban transport (IEA, 2013). The global 
transport industry (including the manufacturers of vehicles, providers 
of transport services, and constructors of infrastructure) undertakes 
research and development (R&D) activities to become more carbon 
and energy efficient. Reducing transport emissions will be a daunting 
task given the inevitable increases in demand and the slow turnover 
and sunk costs of stock (particularly aircraft, trains, and large ships) 
and infrastructure. In spite of a lack of progress to date, the transition 
required to reduce GHG emissions could arise from new technologies, 
implementation of stringent policies, and behavioural change.
Key developments in the transport sector since the Intergovernmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) 
(IPCC, 2007) include:
•	 continued increase in annual average passenger km per capita, 
but signs that LDV2 ownership and use may have peaked in some 
OECD countries (8.2); 
•	 deployment of technologies to reduce particulate matter and black 
carbon, particularly in OECD countries (8.2); 
•	 renewed interest in natural gas as a fuel, compressed for road 
vehicles and liquefied for ships (8.3); 
•	 increased number of electric vehicles (including 2-wheelers) and 
bus rapid transit systems, but from a low base (8.3); 
•	 increased use of sustainably produced biofuels including for avia-
tion (8.3, 8.10); 
•	 greater access to mobility services in developing countries (8.3, 
8.9); 
•	 reduced carbon intensity of operations by freight logistics compa-
nies, the slow-steaming of ships, and the maritime industry impos-
ing GHG emission mandates (8.3, 8.10); 
•	 improved comprehension that urban planning and developing 
infrastructure for pedestrians, bicycles, buses and light-rail can 
impact on modal choice while also addressing broader sustainabil-
ity concerns such as health, accessibility and safety (8.4, 8.7); 
•	 better analysis of comparative passenger and freight transport 
costs between modes (8.6); 
•	 emerging policies that slow the rapid growth of LDVs especially 
in Asia, including investing in non-motorized transport systems 
(8.10);
•	 more fuel economy standards (MJ / km) and GHG emission vehicle 
performance standards implemented for light and heavy duty vehi-
cles (LDVs and HDVs) (8.10); and
•	 widely implemented local transport management policies to 
reduce air pollution and traffic congestion (8.10).
2 LDVs are motorized vehicles (passenger cars and commercial vans) below 
approximately 2.5 – 3.0 t net weight with HDVs (heavy duty vehicles or “trucks” 





Figure 8�1 | Direct GHG emissions of the transport sector (shown here by transport mode) rose 250 % from 2.8 Gt CO2eq worldwide in 1970 to 7.0 Gt CO2eq in 2010 (IEA, 2012a; 
JRC / PBL, 2013; see Annex II.8). 
Note: Indirect emissions from production of fuels, vehicle manufacturing, infrastructure construction etc. are not included.
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For each mode of transport, direct GHG emissions can be decomposed3 
into:
•	 activity — total passenger-km / yr or freight tonne-km / yr having a 
positive feedback loop to the state of the economy but, in part, 
influenced by behavioural issues such as journey avoidance and 
restructuring freight logistics systems;
•	 system infrastructure and modal choice (NRC, 2009); 
•	 energy intensity — directly related to vehicle and engine design 
efficiency, driver behaviour during operation (Davies, 2012), and 
usage patterns; and
•	 fuel carbon intensity — varies for different transport fuels includ-
ing electricity and hydrogen.
Each of these components has good potential for mitigation through 
technological developments, behavioural change, or interactions 
3 Based on the breakdown into A (total Activity), S (modal Structure), I (modal 
energy Intensity), and F (carbon content of Fuels) using the ‘ASIF approach’. 
Details of how this decomposition works and the science involved can be found in 
Schipper et al. (2000); Kamakaté and Schipper (2009).
between them, such as the deployment of electric vehicles impacting 
on average journey distance and urban infrastructure (see Figure 8.2). 
Deep long-term emission reductions also require pricing signals and 
interactions between the emission factors. Regional differences exist 
such as the limited modal choice available in some developing coun-
tries and the varying densities and scales of cities (Banister, 2011a). 
Indirect GHG emissions that arise during the construction of transport 
infrastructure, manufacture of vehicles, and provision of fuels, are cov-
ered in Chapters 12, 10, and 7 respectively.
8�1�1 The context for transport of passengers 
and freight
Around 10 % of the global population account for 80 % of total 
motorized passenger-kilometres (p-km) with much of the world’s 
population hardly travelling at all. OECD countries dominate GHG 
transport emissions (see Figure 8.3) although most recent growth 
has taken place in Asia, including passenger kilometres travelled by 
low GHG emitting 2- to 3-wheelers that have more than doubled 
since 2000 (see Figure 8.4). The link between GDP and transport has 
Figure 8�2 | Direct transport GHG emission reductions for each mode and fuel type option decomposed into activity (passenger or freight movements); energy intensity (specific 
energy inputs linked with occupancy rate); fuel carbon intensity (including non-CO2 GHG emissions); and system infrastructure and modal choice. These can be summated for each 
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been a major reason for increased GHG emissions (Schafer and Vic-
tor, 2000) though the first signs that decoupling may be happening 
are now apparent (Newman and Kenworthy, 2011a; Schipper, 2011). 
Slower rates of growth, or even reductions in the use of LDVs, have 
been observed in some OECD cities (Metz, 2010, 2013; Meyer et al., 
2012; Goodwin and van Dender, 2013; Headicar, 2013) along with a 
simultaneous increase in the use of mass transit systems (Kenwor-
thy, 2013). The multiple factors causing this decoupling, and how it 
can be facilitated more widely, are not well understood (ITF, 2011; 
Goodwin and Van Dender, 2013). However, ‘peak’ travel trends are 
not expected to occur in most developing countries in the foreseeable 
future, although transport activity levels may eventually plateau at 
lower GDP levels than for OECD countries due to higher urban densi-
ties and greater infrastructure constraints (ADB, 2010; Figueroa and 
Ribeiro, 2013).
As shown in Figure 8.3, the share of transport emissions tended to 
increase due to structural changes as GDP per capita increased, i. e., 
countries became richer. The variance between North America and 
other OECD countries (Western Europe and Pacific OECD) shows that 
the development path of infrastructure and settlements taken by 
developing countries and economies in transition (EITs) will have a sig-
nificant impact on the future share of transport related emissions and, 
consequently, total GHG emissions (see Section 12.4).
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Figure 8�3 | GHG emissions from transport sub-sectors by regions in 1970, 1990 and 2010 with international shipping and aviation shown separately (IEA, 2012a; JRC / PBL, 2013; 
see Annex II.8). Inset shows the relative share of total GHG emissions for transport relative to GDP per capita from 1970 to 2010 for each region and the world. Adapted from 
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8�1�2 Energy demands and direct / indirect 
emissions 
Over 53 % of global primary oil consumption in 2010 was used to 
meet 94 % of the total transport energy demand, with biofuels supply-
ing approximately 2 %, electricity 1 %, and natural gas and other fuels 
3 % (IEA, 2012b). LDVs consumed around half of total transport 
energy (IEA, 2012c). Aviation accounted for 51 % of all international 
passenger arrivals in 2011 (UNWTO, 2012) and 17 % of all tourist 
travel in 2005 (ICAO, 2007a; UNWTO and UNEP, 2008). This gave 43 % 
of all tourism transport CO2eq emissions, a share forecast to increase 
to over 50 % by 2035 (Pratt et  al., 2011). Buses and trains carried 
about 34 % of world tourists, private cars around 48 %, and water-
borne craft only a very small portion (Peeters and Dubois, 2010). 
Freight transport consumed almost 45 % of total transport energy in 
2009 with HDVs using over half of that (Figure 8.5). Ships carried 
around 80 % (8.7 Gt) of internationally traded goods in 2011 (UNC-
TAD, 2013) and produced about 2.7 % of global CO2 emissions 
(Buhaug and et. al, 2009).
Direct vehicle CO2 emissions per kilometre vary widely for each mode 
(see Figure 8.6). The particularly wide range of boat types and sizes 
gives higher variance for waterborne than for other modes of trans-
port (Walsh and Bows, 2012). Typical variations for freight movement 
range from ~2 gCO2 / t-km for bulk shipping to ~1,700 gCO2 / t-km for 
short-haul aircraft, whereas passenger transport typically ranges from 
~20 – 300  gCO2 / p-km. GHG emissions arising from the use of liquid 
and gaseous fuels produced from unconventional reserves, such as 
Figure 8�5 | Final energy consumption of fuels by transport sub-sectors in 2009 for freight and passengers, with heat losses at around two thirds of total fuel energy giving an 






































from oil sands and shale deposits, vary with the feedstock source and 
refining process. Although some uncertainty remains, GHG emissions 
from unconventional reserves are generally higher per vehicle kilome-
tre compared with using conventional petroleum products (Brandt, 
2009, 2011, 2012; Charpentier et al., 2009; ETSAP, 2010; IEA, 2010a; 
Howarth et al., 2011, 2012; Cathles et al., 2012).
‘Sustainable transport’, arising from the concept of sustainable devel-
opment, aims to provide accessibility for all to help meet the basic 
daily mobility needs consistent with human and ecosystem health, but 
to constrain GHG emissions by, for example, decoupling mobility from 
oil dependence and LDV use. Annual transport emissions per capita 
correlate strongly with annual income, both within and between coun-
tries (Chapter 5) but can differ widely even for regions with similar 
income per capita. For example, the United States has around 2.8 times 
the transport emissions per capita than those of Japan (IEA, 2012a). 
In least developed countries (LDCs), increased motorized mobility will 
produce large increases in GHG emissions but give significant social 
benefits such as better access to markets and opportunities to improve 
education and health (Africa Union, 2009; Pendakur, 2011; Sietchiping 
et al., 2012). Systemic goals for mobility, climate, and energy security 
can help develop the more general sustainable transport principles. 
Affordable, safe, equitable, and efficient travel services can be pro-
vided with fairness of mobility access across and within generations 
(CST, 2002; ECMT, 2004; Bongardt et al., 2011; E C Environment, 2011; 
Zegras, 2011; Figueroa and Kahn Ribeiro, 2013).
The following sections of this chapter outline how changes to the 
transport sector could reduce direct GHG emissions over the next 
decades to help offset the significant global increase in demand pro-
jected for movement of both passengers and freight.
Freight transport consumed almost 45 % of total transport energy in 
2009 with HDVs using over half of that (Figure 8.5). Ships carried 
around 80 % (8.7 Gt) of internationally traded goods in 2011 (UNC-
TAD, 2013) and produced about 2.7 % of global CO2 emissions 
(Buhaug and et. al, 2009).
Direct vehicle CO2 emissions per kilometre vary widely for each mode 
(see Figure 8.6). The particularly wide range of boat types and sizes 
gives higher variance for waterborne than for other modes of trans-
port (Walsh and Bows, 2012). Typical variations for freight movement 
range from ~2 gCO2 / t-km for bulk shipping to ~1,700 gCO2 / t-km for 
short-haul aircraft, whereas passenger transport typically ranges from 
~20 – 300  gCO2 / p-km. GHG emissions arising from the use of liquid 
and gaseous fuels produced from unconventional reserves, such as 
Figure 8�5 | Final energy consumption of fuels by transport sub-sectors in 2009 for freight and passengers, with heat losses at around two thirds of total fuel energy giving an 



































Figure 8�4 | Total passenger distance travelled by mode and region in 2000 and 2010 
(IEA, 2012c)
Note: Non-motorized modal shares are not included, but can be relatively high in Asia 



















































8.2 New  developments 
in emission trends 
and drivers
Assessments of transport GHG emissions require a comprehensive 
and differential understanding of trends and drivers that impact on 
the movement of goods and people. Transport’s share of total national 
GHG emissions range from up to 30 % in high income economies to 
less than 3 % in LDCs, mirroring the status of their industry and ser-
vice sectors (Schäfer et al., 2009; Bongardt et al., 2011) (IEA, 2012a; 
JRC / PBL, 2013; see Annex II.8) (see inset Figure 8.3). Travel patterns 
vary with regional locations and the modes available, and guide the 
development of specific emission reduction pathways.
Indicators such as travel activity, vehicle occupancy rates, and fuel 
consumption per capita can be used to assess trends towards reduc-
ing emissions and reaching sustainability goals (WBCSD, 2004; Dalk-
mann and Brannigan, 2007; Joumard and Gudmundsson, 2010; Kane, 
2010; Litman, 2007; Ramani et al., 2011). For example, petroleum prod-
uct consumption to meet all transport demands in 2009 ranged from 
52 GJ / capita in North America to less than 4 GJ / capita in Africa and 
India where mobility for many people is limited to walking and cycling. 
Likewise, residents and businesses of several cities in the United States 
consume over 100 GJ / capita each year on transport whereas those in 
Figure 8�6 | Typical ranges of direct CO2 emissions per passenger kilometre and per tonne-kilometre for freight, for the main transport modes when fuelled by fossil fuels including 
thermal electricity generation for rail. (ADEME, 2007; US DoT, 2010; Der Boer et al., 2011; NTM, 2012; WBCSD, 2012).
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many Indian and Chinese cities use less than 2 GJ / capita (Newman and 
Kenworthy, 2011a). For freight, companies are starting to adopt green 
initiatives as a means of cost savings and sustainability initiatives (Fürst 
and Oberhofer, 2012). Such programmes are also likely to reduce GHG 
emissions, although the long-term impact is difficult to assess. 
8�2�1 Trends
As economies have shifted from agriculture to industry to service, the 
absolute GHG emissions from transport (Figure 8.1) and the share 
of total GHG emissions by the transport sector (Chapter 5.2.1) have 
risen considerably. Total LDV ownership is expected to double in the 
next few decades (IEA, 2009) from the current level of around 1 bil-
lion vehicles (Sousanis, 2011). Two-thirds of this growth is expected 
in non-OECD countries where increased demand for mobility is also 
being met by motorized two-wheelers and expansion of bus and rail 
public transport systems. However, passenger kilometres travelled and 
per capita ownership of LDVs will likely remain much lower than in 
OECD countries (Cuenot et al., 2012; Figueroa et al., 2013).
Air transport demand is projected to continue to increase in most 
OECD countries (see Section 8.9). Investments in high-speed rail sys-
tems could moderate growth rates over short- to medium-haul dis-
tances in Europe, Japan, China, and elsewhere (Park and Ha, 2006; 
Gilbert and Perl, 2010; Åkerman, 2011; Salter et al., 2011). 
There is limited evidence that reductions to date in carbon intensity, 
energy intensity, and activity, as demonstrated in China, Japan, and 
Europe, have adequately constrained transport GHG emissions growth in 
the context of mitigation targets. Recent trends suggest that economic, 
lifestyle, and cultural changes will be insufficient to mitigate global 
increases in transport emissions without stringent policy instruments, 
incentives, or other interventions being needed (see Section 8.10).
8�2�1�1 Non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions, black 
carbon, and aerosols 
The transport sector emits non-CO2 pollutants that are also climate 
forcers. These include methane, volatile organic compounds (VOCs), 
nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulphur dioxide (SO2), carbon monoxide (CO), 
F-gases, black carbon, and non-absorbing aerosols (Ubbels et al., 2002; 
Sections 5.2.2 and 6.6.2.1). Methane emissions are largely associ-
ated with leakage from the production of natural gas and the filling 
of compressed natural gas vehicles; VOCs, NOx and CO are emitted by 
internal combustion engines; and F-gas emissions generally from air 
conditioners (including those in vehicles) and refrigerators. Contrails 
from aircraft and emissions from ships also impact on the troposphere 
and the marine boundary layer, respectively (Fuglestvedt et al., 2009; 
Lee et al., 2010). Aviation emissions can also impact on cloud forma-
tion and therefore have an indirect effect on climate forcing (Burkhardt 
and Kärcher, 2011). 
Black carbon and non-absorbing aerosols, emitted mainly during diesel 
engine operation, have short lifetimes in the atmosphere of only days 
to weeks, but can have significant direct and indirect radiative forc-
ing effects and large regional impacts (Boucher et al., 2013). In North 
and South America and Europe, over half the black carbon emissions 
result from combusting diesel and other heavy distillate fuels (includ-
ing marine oil), in vehicle engines (Bond et  al., 2013). Black carbon 
emissions are also significant in parts of Asia, Africa, and elsewhere 
from biomass and coal combustion, but the relative contribution from 
transport is expected to grow in the future. There is strong evidence 
that reducing black carbon emissions from HDVs, off-road vehicles, and 
ships could provide an important short term strategy to mitigate atmo-
spheric concentrations of positive radiative forcing pollutants (USEPA, 
2012; Shindell et al., 2013; Chapter 6.6; WG I Chapter 7).
Conversely, transport is also a significant emitter of primary aerosols 
that scatter light and gases that undergo chemical reactions to pro-
duce secondary aerosols. Primary and secondary organic aerosols, sec-
ondary sulphate aerosols formed from sulphur dioxide emissions, and 
secondary nitrate aerosols from nitrogen oxide emissions from ships, 
aircraft, and road vehicles, can have strong, local, and regional cooling 
impacts (Boucher et al., 2013). 
The relative contributions of different short-term pollutants to radiative 
forcing in 2020 have been equated by Unger et al. (2010) to having 
continuous constant GHG emissions since 2000. Although this study 
did not provide a projection for future emissions scenarios, it did offer 
a qualitative comparison of short- and long-term impacts of different 
pollutants. Relative to CO2, major short-term impacts stem from black 
carbon, indirect effects of aerosols and ozone from land vehicles, and 
aerosols and methane emissions associated with ships and aircraft. 
Their relative impacts due to the longer atmospheric lifetime of CO2 
will be greatly reduced when integrated from the present time to 2100. 
Although emissions of non-CO2 GHGs and aerosols can be mitigated 
by reducing carbon intensity, improving energy intensity, changing to 
lower-carbon modes, and reducing transport activity, they can also 
be significantly reduced by technologies that prevent their formation 
or lead to their destruction using after-treatments. Emission control 
devices such as diesel particulate filters and selective catalytic reduc-
tion have fuel efficiency penalties that can lead to an increase in trans-
port CO2 emissions. 
Non-CO2 emissions from road transport and aviation and shipping 
activities in ports have historically been constrained by local air qual-
ity regulations that are directed at near-surface pollution and seek to 
protect human health and welfare by reducing ozone, particulate mat-
ter, sulphur dioxide, and toxic components or aerosols, including vana-
dium, nickel, and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (Verma et al. 2011). 
The importance of regional climate change in the context of mitiga-
tion has prompted a growing awareness of the climate impact of these 
emissions. Policies are already in place for reducing emissions of 





et al., 2000). More efforts are being directed at potential programmes 
to accelerate control measures to reduce emissions of black carbon, 
ozone precursors, aerosols, and aerosol precursors (Lin and Lin, 2006). 
Emissions from road vehicles continue to decrease per unit of travel 
in many regions due to efforts made to protect human health from 
air pollution. The implementation of these controls could potentially 
be accelerated as a driver to mitigate climate change (Oxley et  al., 
2012). Short-term mitigation strategies that focus on black carbon and 
contrails from aircraft, together with national and international pro-
grammes to reduce aerosol and sulphate emissions from shipping, are 
being implemented (Buhaug and et. al, 2009; Lack, 2012). However, 
the human health benefits from GHG emissions reductions and the co-
benefits of climate change mitigation through black carbon reductions 
need to be better assessed (Woodcock et al., 2009).
8�2�2 Drivers 
The major drivers that affect transport trends are travel time budgets, 
costs and prices, increased personal income, and social and cultural 
factors (Schäfer, 2011). For a detailed discussion of effects of urban 
form and structure on elasticities of vehicle kilometres travelled see 
Section 12.4.2.
Travel time budget� Transport helps determine the economy of a city 
or region based on the time taken to move people and goods around. 
Travel time budgets are usually fixed and tied to both travel costs and 
time costs (Noland, 2001; Cervero, 2001; Noland and Lem, 2002). 
Because cities vary in the proportion of people using different trans-
port modes, urban planners tend to try to adapt land use planning to 
fit these modes in order to enable speeds of around 5 km / hr for walk-
ing, 20 – 30 km / hr for mass transit, and 40 – 50 km / hr for LDVs, though 
subject to great variability. Infrastructure and urban areas are usually 
planned for walking, mass transit, or LDVs so that destinations can be 
reached in half an hour on average (Newman and Kenworthy, 1999). 
Urban travel time budgets for a typical commute between work and 
home average around 1.1 – 1.3 hours per traveller per day in both 
developed and developing economies (Zahavi and Talvitie, 1980; van 
Wee et al., 2006). Higher residential density can save fuel for LDVs, but 
leads to more congested commutes (Small and Verhoef, 2007; Downs, 
2004). While new road construction can reduce LDV travel time in the 
short run, it also encourages increased LDV demand, which typically 
leads to increases in travel time to a similar level as before (Maat and 
Arentze, 2012). Moreover, land uses quickly adapt to any new road 
transport infrastructure so that a similar travel time eventually resumes 
(Mokhtarian and Chen, 2004). 
Regional freight movements do not have the same fixed time demands, 
but rather are based more on the need to remain competitive by limit-
ing transport costs to a small proportion of the total costs of the goods 
(Schiller et al. 2010). See also Section 12.4.2.4 on accessibility aspects 
of urban form.
Costs and prices� The relative decline of transport costs as a share of 
increasing personal expenditure has been the major driver of increased 
transport demand in OECD countries throughout the last century and 
more recently in non-OECD countries (Mulalic et al., 2013). The price of 
fuel, together with the development of mass transit systems and non-
motorized transport infrastructure, are major factors in determining the 
level of LDV use versus choosing public transport, cycling, or walking 
(Hughes et al., 2006). Transport fuel prices, heavily influenced by taxes, 
also impact on the competition between road and rail freight. The costs 
of operating HDVs, aircraft, and boats increase dramatically when fuel 
costs go up given that fuel costs are a relatively high share of total costs 
(Dinwoodie, 2006). This has promulgated the designs of more fuel effi-
cient engines and vehicle designs (Section 8.3) (IEA, 2009). Although the 
average life of aircraft and marine engines is two to three decades and 
fleet turnover is slower than for road vehicles and small boats, improv-
ing their fuel efficiency still makes good economic sense (IEA, 2009). 
The high cost of developing new infrastructure requires significant cap-
ital investment that, together with urban planning, can be managed 
and used as a tool to reduce transport demand and also encourage 
modal shift (Waddell et al., 2007). Changing urban form through plan-
ning and development can therefore play a significant role in the miti-
gation of transport GHG emissions (see Section 8.4) (Kennedy et al., 
2009). See also Section 12.5.2 on urban policy instruments.
Social and cultural factors. Population growth and changes in 
demographics are major drivers for increased transport demand. Eco-
nomic structural change, particularly in non-OECD countries, can lead 
to increased specialization of jobs and a more gender-diversified work-
force, which can result in more and longer commutes (McQuaid and 
Chen, 2012). At the household level, once a motorized vehicle becomes 
affordable, even in relatively poor households, then it becomes a major 
item of expenditure; however, ownership has still proven to be increas-
ingly popular with each new generation (Giuliano and Dargay, 2006; 
Lescaroux, 2010; Zhu et  al., 2012). Thus, there is a high growth rate 
in ownership of motorized two-wheel vehicles and LDVs evident in 
developing countries, resulting in increasing safety risks for pedestrians 
and non-motorized modes (Nantulya and Reich 2002; Pendakur, 2011). 
The development of large shopping centres and malls usually located 
outside the city centre allows many products to be purchased by a con-
sumer following a single journey but the travel distance to these large 
shopping complexes has tended to increase (Weltevreden, 2007). For 
freight transport, economic globalization has increased the volume and 
distance of movement of goods and materials (Henstra et al., 2007).
Modal choice can be driven by social factors that are above and 
beyond the usual time, cost, and price drivers. For example, some 
urban dwellers avoid using mass transit or walking due to safety and 
security issues. However, there is evidence that over the past decade 
younger people in some OECD cities are choosing walking, cycling, and 
mass transit over LDVs (Parkany et al., 2004; Newman and Kenworthy, 
2011b; Delbosc and Currie, 2013; Kuhnimhof et al., 2013) although this 





Another example is that in some societies, owning and driving a LDV 
can provide a symbolic function of status and a basis for sociability 
and networking through various sign-values such as speed, safety, suc-
cess, career achievement, freedom, masculinity, and emancipation of 
women (Mokhtarian and Salomon, 2001; Steg, 2005; Bamberg et al., 
2011; Carrabine and Longhurst, 2002; Miller, 2001; Sheller, 2004; Urry, 
2007). In such cases, the feeling of power and superiority associated 
with owning and using a LDV may influence driver behaviour, for 
example, speeding without a concern for safety, or without a concern 
about fuel consumption, noise, or emissions (Brozović and Ando, 2009; 
Tiwari and Jain, 2012). The possible effects on travel patterns from 
declining incomes are unclear.
Lifestyle and behavioural factors are important for any assessment 
of potential change to low-carbon transport options and additional 
research is needed to assess the willingness of people to change 
(Ashton-Graham, 2008; Ashton-Graham and Newman, 2013). Disrup-
tive technologies such as driverless cars and consumer-based manu-
facturing (e. g. 3-D printing) could impact on future transport demands 
but these are difficult to predict. Likewise, the impact of new informa-
tion technology (IT) applications and telecommuting could potentially 
change travel patterns, reduce trips, or facilitate interactions with the 
mode of choice (ITF, 2011). Conversely, increased demand for tourism 
is expected to continue to be a driver for all transport modes (Sections 
8.1 and 10.4; Gössling et al., 2009).
8.3 Mitigation technology 
options, practices and 
behavioural aspects
Technological improvements and new technology-related practices 
can make substantial contributions to climate change mitigation in 
the transport sector. This section focuses on energy intensity reduction 
technology options for LDVs, HDVs, ships, trains and aircraft and fuel 
carbon intensity reduction options related to the use of natural gas, 
electricity, hydrogen and biofuels. It also addresses some technology-
related behavioural aspects concerning the uptake and use of new 
technologies, behaviour of firms, and rebound effects. Urban form and 
modal shift options are discussed in Section 8.4.
8�3�1 Energy intensity reduction — incremental 
vehicle technologies
Recent advances in LDVs in response to strong regulatory efforts in 
Japan, Europe, and the United States have demonstrated that there is 
substantial potential for improving internal combustion engines (ICEs) 
with both conventional and hybrid drive-trains. Recent estimates sug-
gest substantial additional, unrealized potentials exist compared to 
similar-sized, typical 2007 – 2010 vehicles, with up to 50 % improve-
ments in vehicle fuel economy (in MJ / km or litres / 100km units, or 
equal to 100 % when measured as km / MJ, km / l, or miles per gal-
lon) (Bandivadekar et al., 2008; Greene and Plotkin, 2011). Similar or 
slightly lower potentials exist for HDVs, waterborne craft, and aircraft.
8�3�1�1 Light duty vehicles
As of 2011, leading-edge LDVs had drive-trains with direct injection 
gasoline or diesel engines (many with turbochargers), coupled with 
automated manual or automatic transmissions with six or more gears 
(SAE International, 2011). Drive-train redesigns of average vehicles to 
bring them up to similar levels could yield reductions in fuel consump-
tion and GHG emissions of 25 % or more (NRC, 2013). In European 
Union 27 (EU27), the average tested emissions of 2011 model LDVs 
was 136 gCO2 / km, with some models achieving below 100 gCO2 / km 
(EEA, 2012). In developing countries, vehicle technology levels are typi-
cally lower, although average fuel economy can be similar since vehicle 
size, weight, and power levels are also typically lower (IEA, 2012d). 
Hybrid drive-trains (ICE plus electric motor with battery storage) can 
provide reductions up to 35 % compared to similar non-hybridized 
vehicles (IEA, 2012e) and have become mainstream in many countries, 
but with only a small share of annual sales over the last decade except 
in Japan, where over two million had been sold by 2012 (IEA, 2012e). 
There is substantial potential for further advances in drive-train design 
and operation, and for incremental technologies (NRC, 2013). There is 
often a time lag between when new technologies first appear in OECD 
countries and when they reach developing countries, which import 
mostly second-hand vehicles (IEA, 2009).
Lower fuel consumption can be achieved by reducing the loads that 
the engine must overcome, such as aerodynamic forces, auxiliary com-
ponents (including lighting and air conditioners), and rolling resis-
tance. Changes that reduce energy loads include improved aerodynam-
ics, more efficient auxiliaries, lower rolling-resistance tyres, and weight 
reduction. With vehicle performance held constant, reducing vehicle 
weight by 10 % gives a fuel economy improvement of about 7 % (EEA, 
2006). Together, these non-drive-train changes offer potential fuel 
consumption reductions of around 25 % (ICCT, 2012a; NRC, 2013). 
Combined with improved engines and drive-train systems, overall LDV 
fuel consumption for new ICE-powered vehicles could be reduced by 
at least half by 2035 compared to 2005 (Bandivadekar et  al., 2008; 
NRC, 2013). This predicted reduction is consistent with the Global Fuel 
Economy Initiative target for new LDVs of a 50 % reduction in average 
fuel use per kilometre in 2030 compared to 2005 (Eads, 2010).
8�3�1�2 Heavy-duty vehicles 
Most modern medium and HDVs already have efficient diesel engines 





streamlined spoilers on their cabs to reduce drag, particularly in OECD 
countries. Aerodynamic drag can also be reduced using other modifica-
tions offering up to 10 % reduction in fuel consumption (TIAX, 2009; 
NRC, 2010; AEA, 2011). In non-OECD countries, many older trucks with 
relatively inefficient (and highly polluting) engines are common. Truck 
modernization, along with better engine, tyre, and vehicle maintenance, 
can significantly improve fuel economy in many cases.
Medium and HDVs in the United States can achieve a reduction in 
energy intensity of 30 – 50 % by 2020 by using a range of technology 
and operational improvements (NRC, 2010a). Few similar estimates 
are available in non-OECD countries, but most technologies eventually 
will be applicable for HDVs around the world. 
Expanding the carrying capacity of HDVs in terms of both volume and 
weight can yield significant net reductions in the energy intensity of 
trucks so long as the additional capacity is well utilized. A comparison 
of the performance of 18 longer and heavier HDVs in nine countries 
(ITF / OECD, 2010) concluded that higher capacity vehicles can signifi-
cantly reduce CO2 emissions per t-km. The use of long combination 
vehicles rather than single trailer vehicles has been shown to cut direct 
GHG emissions by up to 32 % (Woodrooffe and Ash, 2001). 
Trucks and buses that operate largely in urban areas with a lot of 
stop-and-go travel can achieve substantial benefits from using electric 
hybrid or hydraulic hybrid drive-trains. Typically a 20 – 30 % reduction 
in fuel consumption can be achieved via hybridization (Chandler et al., 
2006; AEA, 2011). 
8�3�1�3 Rail, waterborne craft, and aircraft
Rail is generally energy efficient, but improvements can be gained from 
multiple drive-trains and load-reduction measures. For example, the high-
speed ‘Shinkansen’ train in Japan gained a 40 % reduction of energy 
consumption by optimizing the length and shape of the lead nose, reduc-
ing weight, and by using efficient power electronics (UIC, 2011); Amtrack 
in the United States employed regenerative braking systems to reduce 
energy consumption by 8 % (UIC, 2011); and in China, electrification and 
other measures from 1975 to 2007 contributed to a 87 % reduction in 
CO2 emission intensity of the rail system (He et al., 2010).
Shipping is a comparatively efficient mode of freight and passenger 
transport, although size and load factor are important determinants 
for specific motorized craft, large and small. Efficiency of new-built ves-
sels can be improved by 5 – 30 % through changes in engine and trans-
mission technologies, waste heat recovery, auxiliary power systems, 
propeller and rotor systems, aerodynamics and hydrodynamics of the 
hull structure, air lubrication systems, electronically controlled engine 
systems to give fuel efficient speeds, and weight reduction (IMO, 2009; 
Notteboom and Vernimmen, 2009; AEA, 2007; IEA, 2009; IMO, 2009; 
ICCT, 2011). Retrofit and maintenance measures can provide additional 
efficiency gains of 4 – 20 % (Buhaug and et. al, 2009) and operational 
changes, such as anti-fouling coatings to cut water resistance, along 
with operation at optimal speeds, can provide 5 – 30 % improvement 
(Pianoforte, 2008; Corbett et al., 2009; WSC, 2011). 
Several methods for improving waterborne craft efficiency are already 
in use. For example, wind propulsion systems such as kites and para-
foils can provide lift and propulsion to reduce fuel consumption by up 
to 30 %, though average savings may be much less (Kleiner, 2007). 
Photovoltaics and small wind turbines can provide on-board electricity 
and be part of ‘cold ironing’ electric systems in ports. For international 
shipping, combined technical and operational measures have been 
estimated to potentially reduce energy use and CO2 emissions by up 
to 43 % per t-km between 2007 and 2020 and by up to 60 % by 2050 
(Crist, 2009; IMO, 2009). 
Aircraft designs have received substantial, on-going technology effi-
ciency improvements over past decades (ITF, 2009) typically offering 
a 20 – 30 % reduction in energy intensity compared to older aircraft 
models (IEA, 2009). Further fuel efficiency gains of 40 – 50 % in the 
2030 – 2050 timeframe (compared to 2005) could come from weight 
reduction, aerodynamic and engine performance improvements, and 
aircraft systems design (IEA, 2009). However, the rate of introduction 
of major aircraft design concepts could be slow without significant 
policy incentives, regulations at the regional or global level, or fur-
ther increases in fuel prices (Lee, 2010). Retrofit opportunities, such as 
engine replacement and adding ‘winglets’, can also provide significant 
reductions (Gohardani et al., 2011; Marks, 2009). Improving air traffic 
management can reduce CO2 emissions through more direct routings 
and flying at optimum altitudes and speeds (Dell’Olmo and Lulli, 2003; 
Pyrialakou et  al., 2012). Efficiency improvements of ground service 
equipment and electric auxiliary power units can provide some addi-
tional GHG reductions (Pyrialakou et al., 2012).
8�3�2 Energy intensity reduction — advanced 
propulsion systems
At present, most vehicles and equipment across all transport modes are 
powered by ICEs, with gasoline and diesel as the main fuels for LDVs; 
gasoline for 2- and 3-wheelers and small water craft; diesel for HDVs; 
diesel or heavy fuel oil for ships and trains (other than those using grid 
electricity); and kerosene for aircraft turbine engines. New propulsion 
systems include electric motors powered by batteries or fuel cells, tur-
bines (particularly for rail), and various hybridized concepts. All offer 
significant potential reductions in GHG, but will require considerable 
time to penetrate the vehicle fleet due to slow stock turnover rates.
8�3�2�1 Road vehicles — battery and fuel cell  electric-
drives 
Battery electric vehicles (BEVs) emit no tailpipe emissions and have 





bon electricity generation) (Kromer and Heywood, 2007). BEVs oper-
ate at a drive-train efficiency of around 80 % compared with about 
20 – 35 % for conventional ICE LDVs. At present, commercially avail-
able BEVs typically have a limited driving range of about 100 – 160km, 
long recharge times of four hours or more (except with fast-charging 
or battery switching systems), and high battery costs that lead to rel-
atively high vehicle retail prices (Greene and Plotkin, 2011). Lithium 
ion (Li-ion) batteries will likely improve but new battery technologies 
(e. g., Li-air, Li-metal, Li-sulphur) and ultra-capacitors may be required 
to achieve much higher energy and power densities (IEA, 2009; NRC, 
2013). Compressed air as an energy storage medium for LDVs is 
thermo-dynamically inefficient and would require high storage volume 
(Creutzig et al., 2009).
Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) capable of grid recharging 
typically can operate on battery electricity for 20 to 50 km, but emit 
CO2 when their ICE is operating. The electric range of PHEVs is heav-
ily dependent on the size of battery, design architectures, and control 
strategies for the operation of each mode (Plotkin et al., 2001).
For HDVs, the use of BEVs is most applicable to light-medium duty 
urban vehicles such as delivery vans or garbage collection trucks 
whose drive cycles involve frequent stops and starts and do not need a 
long range (TIAX, 2009; AEA, 2011). Transit buses are also good candi-
dates for electrification either with batteries or more commonly using 
overhead wire systems (IEA, 2009). Electric 2-wheelers with lower 
requirements for battery and motor capacities are a mature technology 
with widespread acceptance, especially in developing countries (Wein-
ert, 2008). For example, there were over 120 million electric 2-wheel-
ers in China by the end of 2010 (Wu et al., 2011).
Fuel cell vehicles (FCVs) can be configured with conventional, hybrid, 
or plug-in hybrid drive-trains. The fuel cells generate electricity from 
hydrogen that may be generated on-board (by reforming natural gas, 
methanol, ammonia, or other hydrogen-containing fuel), or produced 
externally and stored on-board after refuelling. FCVs produce no tail-
pipe emissions except water and can offer a driving range similar to 
today’s gasoline / diesel LDVs, but with a high cost increment. Fuel cells 
typically operate with a conversion efficiency of 54 – 61 % (significantly 
better than ICEs can achieve), giving an overall fuel-cycle efficiency of 
about 35 – 49 % for an LDV (JHFC, 2011). 
Although a number of FCV LDVs, HDVs, and buses have been dem-
onstrated and some are expected to become commercially available 
within five years, overall it could take 10 years or longer for FCVs to 
achieve commercial success based on current oil and vehicle purchase 
prices (IEA, 2012e). 
8�3�2�2 Rail, waterborne craft, and aircraft
Diesel-hybrid locomotives demonstrated in the UK and advanced types 
of hybrid drive-trains under development in the United States and 
Japan, could save 10 – 20 % of diesel fuel plus around a 60 % reduc-
tion of NOx and particulate matter compared to conventional locomo-
tives (JR East, 2011). A shift to full electrification may enable many 
rail systems to reach very low CO2 emissions per kilometre where elec-
tricity generation has been deeply decarbonized. Fuel cell systems for 
rail may be attractive in areas lacking existing electricity infrastructure 
(IEA, 2012e).
Most ocean-going ships will probably continue to use marine diesel 
engines for the foreseeable future, given their high reliability and low 
cost. However, new propulsion systems are in development. Full elec-
trification appears unlikely given the energy storage requirements for 
long-range operations, although on-board solar power generation sys-
tems could be used to provide auxiliary power and is already used for 
small craft (Crist, 2009). Fuel cell systems (commonly solid-oxide) with 
electric motors could be used for propulsion, either with hydrogen fuel 
directly loaded and stored on board or with on-board reforming. How-
ever, the cost of such systems appears relatively high, as are nuclear 
power systems as used in some navy vessels. 
For large commercial aircraft, no serious alternative to jet engines for 
propulsion has been identified, though fuel-switching options are pos-
sible, including ‘drop-in’ biofuels (that are fungible with petroleum 
products, can be blended from 0 to 100 %, and are compatible with all 
existing engines) or hydrogen. Hydrogen aircraft are considered only 
a very long run option due to hydrogen’s low energy density and the 
difficulty of storing it on board, which requires completely new aircraft 
designs and likely significant compromises in performance (Cryoplane, 
2003). For small, light aircraft, advanced battery electric / motor sys-
tems could be deployed but would have limited range (Luongo et al., 
2009). 
8�3�3 Fuel carbon intensity reduction
In principle, low-carbon fuels from natural gas, electricity, hydrogen, 
and biofuels (including biomethane) could all enable transport systems 
to be operated with low direct fuel-cycle CO2eq emissions, but this 
would depend heavily on their feedstocks and conversion processes. 
Natural gas (primarily methane) can be compressed (CNG) to replace 
gasoline in Otto-cycle (spark ignition) vehicle engines after minor mod-
ifications to fuel and control systems. CNG can also be used to replace 
diesel in compression ignition engines but significant modifications are 
needed. Denser storage can be achieved by liquefaction of natural gas 
(LNG), which is successfully being used for long-haul HDVs and ships 
(Buhaug and et. al, 2009; Arteconi et al., 2010). The energy efficiency 
of driving on CNG is typically similar to that for gasoline or diesel but 
with a reduction of up to 25 % in tailpipe emissions (CO2 / km) because 
of differences in fuel carbon intensity. Lifecycle GHG analysis suggests 
lower net reductions, in the range of 10 – 15 % for natural gas fuel sys-
tems. They may also provide a bridge to lower carbon biomethane sys-





Electricity can be supplied to BEVs and PHEVS via home or public 
rechargers. The varying GHG emissions intensity of power grids directly 
affects lifecycle CO2eq emissions (IEA, 2012e). Since the GHG inten-
sity of a typical coal-based power plant is about 1000 gCO2eq / kWh 
at the outlet (Wang, 2012a), for a BEV with efficiency of 200 Wh / km, 
this would equate to about 200 gCO2eq / km, which is higher than for 
an efficient ICE or hybrid LDV. Using electricity generated from nuclear 
or renewable energy power plants, or from fossil fuel plants with car-
bon dioxide capture and storage (CCS), near-zero fuel-cycle emissions 
could result for BEVs. The numbers of EVs in any country are unlikely to 
reach levels that significantly affect national electricity demand for at 
least one to two decades, during which time electricity systems could 
be at least partially decarbonized and modified to accommodate many 
EVs (IEA, 2012e). 
Hydrogen used in FCVs, or directly in modified ICEs, can be produced 
by the reforming of biomass, coal or natural gas (steam methane 
reforming is well-established in commercial plants); via commercial 
but relatively expensive electrolysis using electricity from a range of 
sources including renewable; or from biological processes (IEA, 2009). 
The mix of feedstocks largely determines the well-to-wheel GHG emis-
sions of FCVs. Advanced, high-temperature and photo-electrochemical 
technologies at the R&D stage could eventually become viable path-
ways (Arvizu et al., 2011). Deployment of FCVs (8.3.2.1) needs to be 
accompanied by large, geographically focused, investments into hydro-
gen production and distribution and vehicle refuelling infrastructure. 
Costs can be reduced by strategic placement of stations (Ogden and 
Nicholas, 2011) starting with specific locations (‘lighthouse cities’) and 
a high degree of coordination between fuel suppliers, vehicle manu-
facturers and policy makers is needed to overcome ‘chicken-or-egg’ 
vehicle / fuel supply problems (ITS-UC Davis, 2011).
A variety of liquid and gaseous biofuels can be produced from various 
biomass feedstocks using a range of conversion pathways (Chapter 
11.A.3). The ability to produce and integrate large volumes of biofu-
els cost-effectively and sustainably are primary concerns of which 
policy makers should be aware (Sims et al., 2011). In contrast to elec-
tricity and hydrogen, liquid biofuels are relatively energy-dense and 
are, at least in certain forms and blend quantities, compatible with 
the existing petroleum fuel infrastructure and with all types of ICEs 
installed in LDVs, HDVs, waterborne craft, and aircraft. Ethanol and 
biodiesel (fatty-acid-methyl-ester, FAME) can be blended at low levels 
(10 – 15 %) with petroleum fuels for use in unmodified ICEs. New ICEs 
can be cheaply modified during manufacture to accommodate much 
higher blends as exemplified by ‘flex-fuel’ gasoline engines where 
ethanol can reach 85 % of the fuel blend (ANFAVEA, 2012). However, 
ethanol has about a 35 % lower energy density than gasoline, which 
reduces vehicle range — particularly at high blend levels — that can be 
a problem especially for aircraft. Synthetic ‘drop-in’ biofuels have simi-
lar properties to diesel and kerosene fuels. They can be derived from a 
number of possible feedstocks and conversion processes, such as the 
hydro-treatment of vegetable oils or the Fischer-Tropsch conversion of 
biomass (Shah, 2013). Bio-jet fuels suitable for aircraft have been dem-
onstrated to meet the very strict fuel specifications required (Takeshita 
and Yamaji, 2008; Caldecott and Tooze, 2009). Technologies to produce 
ligno-cellulosic, Fisher-Tropsch, algae-based, and other advanced bio-
fuels are in development, but may need another decade or more to 
achieve widespread commercial use (IEA, 2011a). Bio-methane from 
suitably purified biogas or landfill gas can also be used in natural gas 
vehicles (REN21, 2012). 
Biofuels have direct, fuel-cycle GHG emissions that are typically 
30 – 90 % lower per kilometre travelled than those for gasoline or diesel 
fuels. However, since for some biofuels, indirect emissions — including 
from land use change — can lead to greater total emissions than when 
using petroleum products, policy support needs to be considered on a 
case by case basis (see Chapter 11.13 and, for example, Lapola et al., 
2010; Plevin et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2011; Creutzig et al., 2012a).
8�3�4 Comparative analysis
The vehicle and power-train technologies described above for reducing 
fuel consumption and related CO2 emissions span a wide range and 
are not necessarily additive. When combined, and including different 
propulsion and fuel systems, their overall mitigation potential can be 
evaluated as an integrated fuel / vehicle system (see Section 8.6). How-
ever, to produce an overall mitigation evaluation of the optimal design 
of a transport system, non-CO2 emissions, passenger or freight occu-
pancy factors, and indirect GHG emissions from vehicle manufacture 
and infrastructure should also be integrated to gain a full comparison 
of the relative GHG emissions across modes (see Section 8.4; Hawkins 
et al., 2012; Borken-Kleefeld et al., 2013).
Taking LDVs as an example, a comparative assessment of current and 
future fuel consumption reduction potentials per kilometre has been 
made (Figure 8.7), starting from a 2010 baseline gasoline vehicle at 
about 8 lge4  / 100km and 195 g / km CO2. Using a range of technologies, 
average new LDV fuel economy can be doubled (in units of distance 
per energy, i. e., energy intensity cut by 50 %). Further improvements 
can be expected for hybrids, PHEVs, BEVs, and FCVs, but several hur-
dles must be overcome to achieve wide market penetration (see Sec-
tion 8.8). Vehicle cost increases due to new technologies could affect 
customers’ willingness to pay, and thus affect market penetration, 
although cost increases would be at least partly offset by fuel cost sav-
ings (see Section 8.6). 
8�3�5 Behavioural aspects
The successful uptake of more efficient vehicles, advanced technolo-
gies, new fuels, and the use of these fuels and vehicles in ‘real life’ 
conditions, involves behavioural aspects. 
4 “Litre per gasoline equivalent” allows for a comparison between fuels with differ-
ent energy contents.
 
Figure 8�7 | Indicative fuel consumption reduction potential ranges for a number of 
LDV technology drive-train and fuel options in 2010 and 2030, compared with a base-
line gasoline internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicle consuming 8 l / 100km in 2010. 
(Based on Kobayashi et al., 2009; Plotkin et al., 2009; IEA, 2012b; NRC, 2013).
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•	 Purchase behaviour: Few consumers attempt to minimize the 
lifecycle costs of vehicle ownership (Greene, 2010a), which leads 
to a considerable imbalance of individual costs versus society-wide 
benefits. There is often a lack of interest in purchasing more fuel 
efficient vehicles (Wozny and Allcott, 2010) due to imperfect infor-
mation, information overload in decision making, and consumer 
uncertainty about future fuel prices and vehicle life (Anderson 
et al., 2011; Small, 2012). This suggests that in order to promote 
the most efficient vehicles, strong policies such as fuel economy 
standards, sliding-scale vehicle tax systems, or ‘feebate’ systems 
with a variable tax based on fuel economy or CO2 emissions may 
be needed (Section 8.10) (Gallagher and Muehlegger, 2011). Vehi-
cle characteristics are largely determined by the desires of new-car 
buyers in wealthier countries, so there may be a five-year or longer 
lag before new technologies reach second-hand vehicle markets in 
large quantities, particularly through imports to many developing 
countries (though this situation will likely change in the coming 
decades as new car sales rise across non-OECD countries) (IEA, 
2009).
•	 New technologies / fuels: Consumers’ unwillingness to purchase 
new types of vehicles with significantly different attributes (such 
as smaller size, shorter range, longer refuelling or recharging time, 
higher cost) is a potential barrier to introducing innovative pro-
pulsion systems and fuels (Brozović and Ando, 2009). This may 
relate simply to the perceived quality of various attributes or to 
risk aversion from uncertainty (such as driving range anxiety for 
BEVs5) (Wenzel and Ross, 2005). The extent to which policies must 
compensate by providing incentives varies but may be substantial 
(Gallagher and Muehlegger, 2011).
•	 On-road fuel economy: The fuel economy of a vehicle as quoted 
from independent testing can be up to 30 % better than that actu-
ally achieved by an average driver on the road (IEA, 2009; TMO, 
2010; ICCT, 2012). This gap reflects a combination of factors 
including inadequacies in the test procedure, real-world driving 
conditions (e. g., road surface quality, weather conditions), driver 
behaviour, and vehicle age and maintenance. Also congested traf-
fic conditions in OECD cities differ from mixed-mode conditions in 
some developing countries (Tiwari et al., 2008; Gowri et al., 2009). 
Some countries have attempted to adjust for these differences in 
their public vehicle fuel economy information. A significant reduc-
tion in the gap may be achievable by an ‘integrated approach’ that 
includes better traffic management, intelligent transport systems, 
and improved vehicle and road maintenance (IEA, 2012e). 
•	 Eco-Driving: A 5 – 10 % improvement in on-road fuel economy can 
be achieved for LDVs through efforts to promote ‘eco-driving’ (An 
et al., 2011; IEA, 2012d). Fuel efficiency improvements from eco-
driving for HDVs are in the 5 – 20 % range (AEA, 2011).
•	 Driving behaviour with new types of vehicles: Taking electric 
vehicles (EVs) as an example, day / night recharging patterns and 
the location of public recharging systems could affect how much 
these vehicles are driven, when and where they are driven, and 
potentially their GHG emissions impacts (Axsen and Kurani, 2012). 
•	 Driving rebound effects: Reactions to lowering the cost of travel 
(through fuel economy measures or using budget airline opera-
tors) can encourage more travel, commonly known as the (direct) 
rebound effect (Greene et al., 1999; for a general discussion of the 
rebound effect see Section 5.6.1). In North America, fuel cost elas-
ticity is in the range of a – 0.05 to – 0.30 (e. g., a 50 % cut in the 
fuel cost would result in a 2.5 % to 15 % increase in driving). Sev-
eral studies show it is declining (Hughes et al., 2006; Small and van 
Dender, 2007; EPA, 2012). The rebound effect is larger when the 
marginal cost of driving (mostly gasoline) is a high share of house-
hold income. The implication for non-OECD countries is that the 
price elasticity of demand for vehicle travel will be a function of 
household income. The rebound effect may be higher in countries 
with more modal choice options or where price sensitivity is higher, 
but research is poor for most countries and regions outside the 
OECD. Minimizing the rebound can be addressed by fuel taxes or 
road pricing that offset the lower travel costs created by efficiency 
improvements or reduced oil prices (see Section 8.10) (Hochman 
et al., 2010; Rajagopal et al., 2011; Chen and Khanna, 2012). 
5 Should a BEV run out of stored energy, it is less easy to refuel than is an ICE 
vehicle that runs out of gasoline. With typical ranges around 100 – 160 km, BEV 
drivers can become anxious about failing to complete their journey.
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•	 Vehicle choice-related rebounds: Other types of rebound effect 
are apparent, such as shifts to purchasing larger cars concurrent 
with cheaper fuel or shifts from gasoline to diesel vehicles that give 
lower driving costs (Schipper and Fulton, 2012). Shifts to larger 
HDVs and otherwise less expensive systems can divert freight from 
lower carbon modes, mainly rail, and can also induce additional 
freight movements (Umweltbundesamt, 2007; TML, 2008; Leduc, 
2009; Gillingham et al., 2013).
•	 Company behaviour: Behavioural change also has a business 
dimension. Company decision making can exert a strong influence 
on the level of transport emissions, particularly in the freight sec-
tor (Rao and Holt, 2005). Freight business operators have a strong 
incentive to reduce energy intensity, since fuel typically accounts 
for around one third of operating costs in the road freight sector, 
40 % in shipping, and 55 % in aviation (Bretzke, 2011). The resulting 
reductions in transport costs can cause a rebound effect and gener-
ate some additional freight movement (Matos and Silva, 2011). For 
company managers to switch freight transport modes often requires 
a tradeoff of higher logistics costs for lower carbon emissions 
(Winebrake et al., 2008). Many large logistics service providers have 
set targets for reducing the carbon intensity of their operations by 
between 20 % and 45 % over the period from 2005 / 2007 to 2020, 
(McKinnon and Piecyk, 2012) whereas many smaller freight opera-
tors have yet to act (Oberhofer and Fürst, 2012).
8.4 Infrastructure and 
 systemic perspectives
Transport modes, their infrastructures, and their associated urban fab-
ric form a system that has evolved into the cities and regions with 
which we are most familiar. ‘Walking cities’ existed for 8000 years; 
some are being reclaimed around their walkability (Gehl, 2011). ‘Tran-
sit cities’ were built and developed around trams, trolley buses, and 
train systems since the mid 19th century (Cervero, 1998; Newman and 
Kenworthy, 1999). ‘Automobile cities’ evolved from the advent of 
cheap LDVs (Brueckner, 2000) and have become the dominant para-
digm since the 1950s, leading to automobile dependence and auto-
mobility (Urry, 2007). A region can be defined and understood in terms 
of the transport links to ports and airports regardless of the number 
and types of cities located there. In all cases, the inter-linkages 
between transport infrastructure and the built environment establish 
path dependencies, which inform long-term transport-related mitiga-
tion options. For a general discussion of urban form and infrastructure 
see Chapter 12.4.
8�4�1 Path dependencies of infrastructure and 
GHG emission impacts
Systemic change tends to be slow and needs to address path depen-
dencies embedded in sunk costs, high investment levels, and cultural 
patterns. Technological and behavioural change can either adapt to 
existing infrastructures, or develop from newly constructed infrastruc-
tures, which could provide an initial template for low carbon technolo-
gies and behaviour. Developments designed to improve infrastructure 
in rapidly urbanizing developing countries will decisively determine 
the future energy intensity of transport and concomitant emissions 
(Lefèvre, 2009), and will require policies and actions to avoid lock-in.
The construction, operation, maintenance, and eventual disposal of 
transport infrastructure (such as rail tracks, highways, ports, and air-
ports), all result in GHG emissions. These infrastructure-related emis-
sions are usually accounted for in the industry and building sectors. 
However, full accounting of life cycle assessment (LCA) emissions 
from a transport-perspective requires these infrastructure-related 
emissions to be included along with those from vehicles and fuels 
(see Section 8.3.5). GHG emissions per passenger-kilometre (p-km) or 
per tonne-kilometre (t-km) depend, inter alia, on the intensity of use 
of the infrastructure and the share of tunnels, bridges, runways, etc. 
(Åkerman, 2011; Chang and Kendall, 2011; UIC, 2012). In the United 
States, GHG emissions from infrastructure built for LDVs, buses, and 
Table 8�1 | High-speed rail transport infrastructure GHG emissions based on LCA data. 
Mode / component Emissions (gCO2eq / p-km) Reference Comment
Swedish high-speed rail plans for Europabanan 
infrastructure
2.7
Amos et al., 2010; Åkerman, 
2011 
At 25 million passengers per year
Vehicle construction and maintenance emissions; 
Swedish high-speed rail 
1.0 Åkerman, 2011 Over full lifetime of high-speed rail vehicles
Inter-city express (ICE) system study (Germany and 
surrounds) 
9.7 Von Rozycki et al., 2003
About half total emissions arise from infrastructure including non-
high-speed stretches
High-speed rail infrastructure (Europe) 3.1 – 10.9 Tuchschmid, 2009
Low emission value for 90 trains per track per day, high emission 
value for 25. Current EU network is at 6.3 g / p-km
US high-speed rail plans 3.2 g / p-km Chang and Kendall, 2011 This 725 km line will emit 2.4 MtCO2eq / yr





air transport amount to 17 – 45 gCO2eq / p-km, 3 – 17 gCO2eq / p-km, and 
5 – 9 gCO2eq / p-km respectively (Chester and Horvath, 2009) with rail 
typically between 3 – 11 gCO2eq / p-km (see Table 8.1). Other than for 
rail, relevant regional infrastructure-related GHG emissions research on 
this topic is very preliminary. 
Opportunities exist to substantially reduce these infrastructure related 
emissions, for instance by up to 40 % in rail (Milford and Allwood, 
2010), by the increased deployment of low-carbon materials and recy-
cling of rail track materials at their end-of-life (Network Rail, 2009; Du 
and Karoumi, 2012). When rail systems achieve modal shift from road 
vehicles, emissions from the rail infrastructure may be partially offset 
by reduced emissions from road infrastructures (Åkerman, 2011). To be 
policy-relevant, LCA calculations that include infrastructure need to be 
contextualized with systemic effects such as modal shifts (see Sections 
8.4.2.3 and 8.4.2.4). 
Existing vehicle stock, road infrastructure, and fuel-supply infrastruc-
ture prescribe future use and can lock-in emission paths for decades 
while inducing similar investment because of economies of scale (Sha-
lizi and Lecocq, 2009). The life span of these infrastructures ranges 
from 50 to more than 100 years. This range makes the current develop-
ment of infrastructure critical to the mode shift opportunities of the 
future. For example, the successful development of the United States 
interstate highway system resulted in a lack of development of an 
extensive passenger rail system, and this determined a demand-side 
lock-in produced by the complementarity between infrastructure and 
vehicle stock (Chapter 12.3.2). The construction of the highway sys-
tem accelerated the growth of road vehicle kilometres travelled (VKT) 
around 1970, and ex-urban development away from city centres cre-
ated a second peak in road transport infrastructure investment post 
1990 (Shalizi and Lecocq, 2009). Conversely, the current rapid develop-
ment of high-speed rail infrastructure in China (Amos et al., 2010) may 
provide low emission alternatives to both road transport and aviation. 
Substantial additional rail traffic has been generated by constructing 
new lines (Chapter 12.4.2.5), although a net reduction of emissions 
will only occur after achieving a minimum of between 10 and 22 mil-
lion passengers annually (Westin and Kågeson, 2012). 
Aviation and shipping require less fixed infrastructures and hence tend 
to have a relative low infrastructure share of total lifecycle emissions. 
Rising income and partially declining airfares have led to increased 
air travel (Schäfer et al., 2009), and this correlates not only with new 
construction and expansion of airports, but also with shifting norms in 
travel behaviour (Randles and Mander, 2009). 
8�4�2 Path dependencies of urban form and 
mobility
Transport demand and land use are closely inter-linked. In low-density 
developments with extensive road infrastructure, LDVs will likely domi-
nate modal choice for most types of trips. Walking and cycling can be 
made easier and safer where high accessibility to a variety of activi-
ties are located within relative short distances (Ewing and Cervero, 
2010) and when safe cycle infrastructure and pedestrian pathways 
are provided (Tiwari and Jain, 2012; Schepers et al., 2013). Conversely 
the stress and physical efforts of cycling and walking can be greater 
in cities that consistently prioritize suburban housing developments, 
which leads to distances that accommodate the high-speed movement 
and volume of LDVs (Naess, 2006). In developing countries, existing 
high-density urban patterns are conducive to walking and cycling, both 
with substantial shares. However, safe infrastructure for these modes is 
often lacking (Thynell et al., 2010; Gwilliam, 2013). Sustainable urban 
planning offers tremendous opportunities (reduced transport demand, 
improved public health from non-motorized transport (NMT), less air 
pollution, and less land use externalities) (Banister, 2008; Santos et al., 
2010; Bongardt et  al., 2013; Creutzig et  al., 2012a). As an example, 
an additional 1.1 billion people will live in Asian cities in the next 20 
years (ADB, 2012a) and the majority of this growth will take place in 
small-medium sized cities that are at an early stage of infrastructure 
development. This growth provides an opportunity to achieve the long-
term benefits outlined above (Grubler et al., 2012) (see also 8.7 and 
Chapter 12.4.1). 
Urban population density inversely correlates with GHG emissions 
from land transport (Kennedy et al., 2009; Rickwood et al., 2011) and 
enables non-motorized modes to be more viable (Newman and Ken-
worthy, 2006). Disaggregated studies that analyze individual transport 
use confirm the relationship between land use and travel (Echenique 
et  al., 2012). Land use, employment density, street design and con-
nectivity, and high transit accessibility also contribute to reducing car 
dependence and use (Handy et  al., 2002; Ewing, 2008; Cervero and 
Murakami, 2009; Olaru et al., 2011). The built environment has a major 
impact on travel behaviour (Naess, 2006; Ewing and Cervero, 2010), 
but residential choice also plays a substantial role that is not easy 
to quantify (Cao et al., 2009; Ewing and Cervero, 2010). There exists 
a non-linear relationship between urban density and modal choice 
(Chapter 12.4.2.1). For example, suburban residents drive more and 
walk less than residents living in inner city neighbourhoods (Cao et al., 
2009), but that is often true because public transit is more difficult 
to deploy successfully in suburbs with low densities (Frank and Pivo, 
1994). Transport options that can be used in low density areas include 
para-transit6 and car-sharing, both of which can complement individu-
alized motorized transport more efficiently and with greater customer 
satisfaction than can public transit (Baumgartner and Schofer, 2011). 
Demand-responsive, flexible transit, and car sharing services can have 
lower GHG emissions per passenger kilometre with higher quality ser-
vice than regional public transport (Diana et al., 2007; Mulley and Nel-
son, 2009; Velaga et al., 2012; Loose, 2010).
6 Para-transit, also called “community-transit”, is where flexible passenger transport 
minibuses (also termed matatus and marshrutkas), shared taxis, and jitneys 






The number of road intersections along the route of an urban jour-
ney, the number of destinations within walking distance, and land use 
diversity issues have been identified as key variables for determining 
the modal choice of walking (Ewing and Cervero, 2010). Public trans-
port use in the United States is related to the variables of street net-
work design and proximity to transit. Land use diversity is a secondary 
factor.
8�4�2�1 Modal shift opportunities for passengers 
Small but significant modal shifts from LDVs to bus rapid transit (BRT) 
have been observed where BRT systems have been implemented. 
Approximately 150 cities worldwide have implemented BRT systems, 
serving around 25 million passengers daily (Deng and Nelson, 2011; 
BRT Centre of Excellence, EMBARQ, IEA and SIBRT, 2012). BRT systems 
can offer similar benefits and capacities as light rail and metro systems 
at much lower capital costs (Deng and Nelson, 2011), but usually with 
higher GHG emissions (depending on the local electricity grid GHG 
emission factor) (Table 8.2). High occupancy rates are an important 
requirement for the economic and environmental viability of public 
transport.
Public transit, walking, and cycling are closely related. A shift from 
non-motorized transport (NMT) to LDV transport occurred during the 
20th century, initially in OECD countries and then globally. However, 
a reversion to cycling and walking now appears to be happening in 
many cities — mostly in OECD countries — though accurate data is 
scarce (Bassett et  al., 2008; Pucher et  al., 2011). Around 90 % of all 
public transit journeys in the United States are accompanied with a 
walk to reach the final destination and 70 % in Germany (Pucher and 
Buehler, 2010). In Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and elsewhere, 
the cycling modal share of total trips has increased since the 1970s 
and are now between 10 – 25 % (Pucher and Buehler, 2008). Some car-
bon emission reduction has resulted from cycle infrastructure deploy-
ment in some European cities (COP, 2010; Rojas-Rueda et  al., 2011; 
Creutzig et al., 2012a) and in some cities in South and North America 
(USCMAQ, 2008; Schipper et  al., 2009; Massink et  al., 2011; USFHA, 
2012). Walking and cycling trips vary substantially between countries, 
accounting for over 50 % of daily trips in the Netherlands and in many 
Asian and African cities (mostly walking); 25 – 35 % in most European 
countries; and approximately 5 – 10 % in the United States and Aus-
tralia (Pucher and Buehler, 2010; Leather et al., 2011; Pendakur, 2011; 
Mees and Groenhart, 2012). 
The causes for high modal share of NMT differ markedly between 
regions depending on their cultures and characteristics. For example, 
they tend to reflect low-carbon urban policies in OECD countries such 
as the Netherlands, while reflecting a lack of motorization in devel-
oping countries. Land use and transport policies can influence the 
bicycle modal share considerably (Pucher and Buehler, 2006), most 
notably by the provision of separate cycling facilities along heavily 
traveled roads and at intersections, and traffic-calming of residential 
neighbourhoods (Andrade et  al., 2011; NRC, 2011b)� Many Indian 
and Chinese cities with traditionally high levels of walking are now 
reporting dramatic decreases in this activity (Leather et  al., 2011), 
with modal shifts to personal transport including motorbikes and 
LDVs. Such shifts are to some degree inevitable, and are in part desir-
able as they reflect economic growth. However, the maintenance of a 
healthy walking and cycling modal share could be a sign of a liveable 
and attractive city for residents and businesses (Bongardt et al., 2011; 
Gehl, 2011).
Deliberate policies based around urban design principles have 
increased modal shares of walking and cycling in Copenhagen, Mel-
bourne, and Bogota (Gehl, 2011). Public bicycle share systems have 
created a new mode for cities (Shaheen et al., 2010), with many cit-
ies now implementing extensive public cycling infrastructure, which 
results in increased bicycle modal share (DeMaio, 2009). Revising elec-
tric bicycle standards to enable higher performance could increase the 
feasible commuting range and encourage this low emissions personal 
transport mode. Electric bicycles offer many of the benefits of LDVs in 
terms of independence, flexibility of routes, and scheduling freedom, 
but with much lower emissions and improved health benefits.
With rising income and urbanization, there will likely be a strong pull 
toward increasing LDV ownership and use in many developing coun-
tries. However, public transit mode shares have been preserved at fairly 
high levels in cities that have achieved high population densities and 
that have invested heavily in high quality transit systems (Cervero, 
2004). Their efficiency is increased by diverse forms of constraints 
on LDVs, such as reduced number of lanes, parking restrictions, and 
limited access (La Branche, 2011). Investments in mass rapid transit, 
timed with income increases and population size / density increases, 
Table 8�2 | Comparison of capital costs, direct CO2 emissions, and capacities for BRT, light rail, and metro urban mass transit options (IEA, 2012e). 
Bus rapid transit Light rail Metro
Capital cost (million USD2010 / km) 5 – 27 13 – 40 27 – 330
Length of network that can be constructed for 1 USD2010 billion cost (km) 37 – 200 25 – 77 3 – 37
World network length in 2011 (km) 2,139 15,000 10,000
Direct CO2 intensity (gCO2 / p-km) 14 – 22 4 – 22 3 – 21





have been successful in some Asian megacities (Acharya and Morichi, 
2007). As traffic congestion grows and freeway infrastructure reaches 
physical, political, and economic limits, the modal share of public tran-
sit has increased in some OECD countries (Newman and Kenworthy, 
2011b). 
High-speed rail can substitute for short-distance passenger air travel 
(normally up to around 800 km but also for the 1500 km in the case 
of Beijing to Shanghai), as well as for most road travel over those 
distances, and hence can mitigate GHG emissions (McCollum et  al., 
2010; IEA, 2008). With optimized operating speeds and long distances 
between stops, and high passenger load factors, energy use per pas-
senger-km could be as much as 65 to 80 % less than air travel (IEA, 
2008). A notable example is China, which has shown a fast develop-
ment of its high-speed rail system. When combined with strong land-
use and urban planning, a high-speed rail system has the potential 
to restructure urban development patterns, and may help to alleviate 
local air pollution, noise, road, and air congestion (McCollum et  al., 
2010). 
8�4�2�2 Modal shift opportunities for freight
Over the past few decades, air and road have increased their global 
share of the freight market at the expense of rail and waterborne 
transport (European Environment Agency, 2011; Eom et al., 2012). This 
has been due to economic development and the related change in the 
industry and commodity mix, often reinforced by differential rates of 
infrastructure improvement and the deregulation of the freight sector, 
which typically favours road transport. Inducing a substantial reversal 
of recent freight modal split trends will be difficult, inter alia because 
of ‘structural inelasticity’ which confines shorter distance freight move-
ments to the road network because of its much higher network density 
(Rich et al., 2011). If growth in global truck travel between 2010 and 
2050 could be cut by half from the projected 70 % and shifted to 
expanded rail systems, about a 20 % reduction in fuel demand and CO2 
could be achieved, with only about a fifth of this savings being offset 
by increased rail energy use (IEA, 2009). The European Commission 
(EC) set an ambitious target of having all freight movements using rail 
or waterborne modes over distances greater than 300 km by 2030, 
leading to major changes in modal shares (Figure 8.8) (Tavasszy and 
Meijeren, 2011; EC, 2013).
The capacity of the European rail network would have to at least dou-
ble to handle this increase in freight traffic and the forecast growth 
in rail passenger volumes, even if trains get longer and run empty 
less often (den Boer et al., 2011). Longer-term transformations need 
to take account of the differential rates at which low-carbon technol-
ogies could impact on the future carbon intensity of freight modes. 
Applying current average energy intensity values (Section 8.3.1) may 
result in over-estimates of the potential carbon benefits of the modal 
shift option. Although rail freight generates far lower GHG emissions 
per tonne-kilometre than road (Table 8.3), the rate of carbon-related 
technical innovation, including energy efficiency improvements, has 
been faster in HDV than rail freight and HDV replacement rate is typi-
cally much shorter, which ensures a more rapid uptake of innovation. 
The potential for shifting freight to greener modes is difficult in urban 
areas. Improvements in intra-urban rail freight movements are pos-
sible (Maes and Vanelslander, 2011), but city logistical systems are 
almost totally reliant on road vehicles and are likely to remain so. The 
greater the distance of land haul for freight, the more competitive 
the lower carbon modes become. Within cities, the concept of modal 
split between passenger and freight movement can be related to the 
interaction. Currently, large amounts of freight on the so-called ‘last 
mile’ to a home or business are carried by shoppers in LDVs and pub-
lic transport vehicles. With the rapid growth of on-line retailing, much 
private car-borne freight, which seldom appears in freight transport 
statistics, will be transferred to commercial delivery vans. Comparative 
analyses of conventional and on-line retailing suggest that substitut-
ing a van delivery for a personal shopping trip by private car can yield 
a significant carbon saving (Edwards et al., 2010).
At the international level, opportunities for switching freight from air 
to shipping services are limited. The two markets are relatively discrete 
and the products they handle have widely differing monetary values 
and time-sensitivity. The deceleration of deep-sea container vessels 
in recent years in accordance with the ‘slow steaming’ policies of the 
shipping lines has further widened the transit time gap between sea 
and air services. Future increases in the cost of fuel may, however, 
encourage businesses to economize on their use of air-freight, pos-
sibly switching to sea-air services in which products are air-freighted 
for only part of the way. This merger of sea and air transport offers 
substantial cost and CO2 savings for companies whose global supply 
chains are less time-critical (Conway, 2007; Terry, 2007). 
Figure 8�8 | Projected freight modal split in the EU-25 in 2030 comparing 2011 shares 
with future business-as-usual shares without target and with EU White Paper modal 






































8.5 Climate change feed-
back and interaction 
with adaptation
Transport is impacted by climate change both positively and negatively. 
These impacts are dependent on regional variations in the nature and 
degree of climate change and the nature of local transport infrastruc-
ture and systems. Adapting transport systems to the effects of climate 
in some cases complement mitigations efforts while in others they 
have a counteracting effect. Little research has so far been conducted 
on the inter-relationship between adaptation and mitigation strategies 
in the transport sector.
8�5�1 Accessibility and feasibility of transport 
routes
Decreases in the spatial and temporal extent of ice cover in the Arctic 
and Great Lakes region of North America regions are opening new and 
shorter shipping routes over longer periods of the year (Drobot et al., 
2009; Stephenson et al., 2011). The expanded use of these routes could 
reduce GHG emissions due to a reduction in the distance travelled. For 
example, the Northern Sea Route (NSR) between Shanghai and Rot-
terdam is approximately 4,600 km shorter (about 40 %) than the route 
via the Suez Canal. The NSR passage takes 18 – 20 days compared to 
28 – 30 days via the southern route (Verny and Grigentin, 2009). Cli-
mate change will not only affect ice coverage, but may also increase 
the frequency and severity of northern hemisphere blizzards and arctic 
cyclones, deterring use of these shorter routes (Wassmann, 2011; Liu 
et al., 2012). It is, nevertheless, estimated that the transport of oil and 
gas through the NSR could increase from 5.5 Mt in 2010 to 12.8 Mt 
by 2020 (Ho, 2010). The passage may also become a viable option for 
other bulk carriers and container shipping in the near future (Verny 
& Grigentin, 2009; Schøyen & Bråthen, 2011). The economic viability 
of the NSR is still uncertain without assessments of potentially prof-
itable operation (Liu and Kronbak, 2010) and other more pessimistic 
prospects for the trans-Arctic corridors (Econ, 2007). One possible 
negative impact would be that the increase in shipping through these 
sensitive ecosystems could lead to an increase in local environmental 
and climate change impacts unless additional emissions controls are 
introduced along these shipping routes (Wassmann, 2011). Of spe-
cific concern are the precursors of photochemical smog in this polar 
region that could lead to additional local positive regional climate forc-
ing (Corbett et al., 2010) and emissions of black carbon (see Section 
8.2.2.1). Measurement methods of black carbon emissions from ships 
and additional work to evaluate their impact on the Arctic are needed 
before possible control measures can be investigated.
Changes in climate are also likely to affect northern inland waterways 
(Millerd, 2011). In summer, these effects are likely to adversely affect 
waterborne craft when reductions in water levels impair navigabil-
ity and cut capacity (Jonkeren et al., 2007; Görgen et al. 2010; Nilson 
et al., 2012). On the other hand, reduced winter freezing can benefit 
inland waterway services by extending the season. The net annual 
effect of climate change on the potential for shifting freight to this 
low-carbon mode has yet to be assessed. 
8�5�2 Relocation of production and 
 reconfiguration of global supply chains
Climate change will induce changes to patterns of agricultural produc-
tion and distribution (Ericksen et al., 2009; Hanjra and Qureshi, 2010; 
Tirado et al., 2010; Nielsen and Vigh, 2012; Teixeira et al., 2012). The 
effect of these changes on freight transport at different geographi-
cal scales are uncertain (Vermeulen et  al., 2012). In some scenarios, 
food supply chains become longer, generating more freight movement 
(Nielsen and Vigh, 2012; Teixeira et  al., 2012). These and other long 
supply lines created by globalization could become increasingly vulner-
able to climate change. A desire to reduce climate risk may be one of 
several factors promoting a return to more localized sourcing in some 
sectors (World Economic Forum and Accentura, 2009), a trend that 
would support mitigation. Biofuel production may also be adversely 
affected by climate change inhibiting the switch to lower carbon fuels 
(de Lucena et al., 2009).
8�5�3 Fuel combustion and technologies
Increased ambient temperatures and humidity levels are likely to affect 
nitrogen oxide, carbon monoxide, methane, black carbon, and other 
particulate emissions from internal combustion engines and how these 
gases interact with the atmosphere (Stump et al., 1989; Rakopoulos, 
1991; Cooper and Ekstrom, 2005; Motallebi et al., 2008; Lin and Jeng, 
1996; McCormick et al., 1997; Pidolal, 2012). Higher temperatures also 
lead to higher evaporative emissions of volatile organic compound 
emissions (VOCs) (Roustan et al., 2011) and could lead to higher ozone 
levels (Bell et al., 2007). The overall effects are uncertain and could be 
positive or negative depending on regional conditions (Ramanathan & 
Carmichael, 2008). 
As global average temperatures increase, the demand for on-board 
cooling in both private vehicles and on public transport will increase. 
The heating of vehicles could also grow as the frequency and sever-
ity of cold spells increase. Both reduce average vehicle fuel efficien-
cies. For example, in a passenger LDV, air-conditioning can increase 
fuel consumption by around 3 – 10 % (Farrington and Rugh, 2000; IEA, 
2009). Extremes in temperature (both high and low) negatively impact 
on the driving range of electric vehicles due to greater use of on-board 
heating and air conditioning, and thus will require more frequent 
recharging. In the freight sector, energy consumption and emissions 
in the refrigeration of freight flows will also increase as the extent and 
degree of temperature-control increases across the supply chains of 






Climate proofing and adaptation will require substantial infrastruc-
ture investments (see Section 8.4 and the Working Group II (WGII) 
Contribution to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), Chapter 15). 
This will generate additional freight transport if implemented outside 
of the normal infrastructure maintenance and upgrade cycle. Climate 
proofing of transport infrastructure can take many forms (ADB, 2011a; 
Highways Agency, 2011) varying in the amount of additional freight 
movement required. Resurfacing a road with more durable materials 
to withstand greater temperature extremes may require no additional 
freight movement, whereas re-routing a road or rail link, or installing 
flood protection, are likely to generate additional logistics demands, 
which have yet to be quantified. 
Adaptation efforts are likely to increase transport infrastructure costs 
(Hamin & Gurran, 2009), and influence the selection of projects for 
investment. In addition to inflating maintenance costs (Jollands et al., 
2007; Larsen et al., 2008), climate proofing would divert resources that 
could otherwise be invested in extending networks and expanding 
capacity. This is likely to affect all transport modes to varying degrees. 
If, for example, climate proofing were to constrain the development of 
a rail network more than road infrastructure, it might inhibit a modal 
shift to less carbon-intensive rail services. 
The future choice of freight and passenger traffic between modes may 
also become more responsive to their relative sensitivity to extreme 
weather events (Koetse and Rietveld, 2009; Taylor and Philp, 2010). 
The exposure of modes to climate risks include aviation (Eurocontrol, 
2008), shipping (Becker et  al., 2012), and land transport (Hunt and 
Watkiss, 2011). Little attempt has been made to conduct a compara-
tive analysis of their climate risk profiles, to assess the effects on the 
modal choice behaviour of individual travellers and businesses, or to 
take account of regional differences in the relative vulnerability of dif-
ferent transport modes to climate change (Koetse and Rietveld, 2009).
Overall, the transport sector will be highly exposed to climate change 
and will require extensive adaptation of infrastructure, operations, 
and service provision. It will also be indirectly affected by the adapta-
tion and decarbonization of the other sectors that it serves. Within the 
transport sector there will be a complex interaction between adapta-
tion and mitigation efforts. Some forms of adaptation, such as infra-
structural climate proofing, will be likely to generate more freight and 
personal movement, while others, such as the NSR, could substantially 
cut transport distances and related emissions.
8.6 Costs and potentials
For transport, the potential for reducing GHG emissions, as well as the 
associated costs, varies widely across countries and regions. Appropri-
ate policies and measures that can accomplish such reductions also 
vary (see Section 8.10) (Kahn Ribeiro et al., 2007; Li, 2011). Mitigation 
costs and potentials are a function of the stringency of climate goals and 
their respective GHG concentration stabilization levels (Fischedick et al., 
2011; Rogelj et al., 2013). This section presents estimates of mitigation 
potentials and associated costs from the application of new vehicle and 
fuel technologies, performance efficiency gains, operational measures, 
logistical improvements, electrification of modes, and low-carbon fuels 
and activity reduction for different transport modes (aviation, rail, road, 
waterborne and cross-modal). Potential CO2eq emissions reductions 
from passenger-km (p-km) and tonne-km (t-km) vary widely by region, 
technology, and mode according to how rapidly the measures and appli-
cations can be developed, manufactured, and sold to buyers replacing 
existing ones in vehicles an fuels or adding to the total fleet, and on the 
way they are used given travel behaviour choices (Kok et al., 2011). In 
general, there is a larger emission reduction potential in the transport 
sector, and at a lower cost, compared to the findings in AR4 (Kahn Ribeiro 
et al., 2007).
The efforts undertaken to reduce activity, to influence structure and modal 
shift, to lower energy intensity, and to increase the use of low-carbon 
fuels, will influence future costs and potentials. Ranges of mitigation 
potentials have an upper boundary based on what is currently understood 
to be technically achievable, but will most likely require strong policies to 
be achieved in the next few decades (see Section 8.10). Overall reductions 
are sensitive to per-unit transport costs (that could drop with improved 
vehicle efficiency); resulting rebound effects; and shifts in the type, level, 
and modal mix of activity. For instance, the deployment of more efficient, 
narrow-body jet aircraft could increase the number of commercially-
attractive, direct city-to-city connections, which may result in an overall 
increase in fleet fuel use compared to hub-based operations. 
This assessment follows a bottom-up approach to maintain consis-
tency in assumptions. Table 8.3 outlines indicative direct mitigation 
costs using reference conditions as baselines, and illustrative examples 
of existing vehicles and situations for road, aviation, waterborne, and 
rail (as well as for some cross-mode options) available in the literature. 
The data presented on the cost-effectiveness of different carbon reduc-
tion measures is less detailed than data on the potential CO2eq savings 
due to literature gaps. The number of studies assessing potential future 
GHG reductions from energy intensity gains and use of low-carbon 
fuels is larger than those assessing mitigation potentials and cost from 
transport activity, structural change and modal shift, since they are 
highly variable by location and background conditions.
Key assumptions made in this analysis were: 
•	 cost estimates are based on societal costs and benefits of tech-
nologies, fuels, and other measures, and take into account initial 
costs as well as operating costs and fuel savings;
•	 existing transport options are compared to current base vehicles 
and activities, whereas future options are compared to estimates 





•	 fuel price projections are based on the IEA World Energy Outlook 
(IEA, 2012b) and exclude taxes and subsidies where possible;
•	 discount rates of 5 % are used to bring future estimates back to 
present (2013) values, though the literature considered has exam-
ined these issues mostly in the developed-world context; and
•	 indirect responses that occur through complex relationships within 
sectors in the larger socioeconomic system are not included (Stepp 
et al., 2009).
Results in Table 8.3 indicate that, for LDVs, efficiency improvement 
potentials of 50 % in 2030 are technically possible compared to 2010, 
with some estimates in the literature even higher (NRC, 2010). Virtu-
ally all of these improvements appear to be available at very low, or 
even negative, societal costs. Electric vehicles have a CO2eq reduc-
tion cost highly correlated with the carbon intensity of electricity 
generation: using relatively high-carbon intensity electricity systems 
(500 – 600 gCO2eq / kWh), EVs save little CO2eq compared to conven-
tional LDVs and the mitigation cost can be many hundreds of dollars 
per tonne; for very low-carbon electricity (below 200 gCO2eq / kWh) the 
mitigation cost drops below 200 USD2010 / tCO2eq. In the future, with 
lower battery costs and low-carbon electricity, EVs could drop below 
100 USD2010 / tCO2eq and even approach zero net cost. 
For long-haul HDVs, up to a 50 % reduction in energy intensity by 2030 
appears possible at negative societal cost per tCO2eq due to the very 
large volumes of fuel they use. HDVs used in urban areas where their 
duty cycle does not require as much annual travel (and fuel use), have 
a wider range of potentials and costs, reaching above 100 USD2010 / t 
CO2eq. Similarly, inter-city buses use more fuel annually than urban 
buses, and as a result appear to have more low-cost opportunities for 
CO2eq reduction (IEA, 2009; NRC, 2010; TIAX, 2011).
Recent designs of narrow and wide-body commercial aircraft are sig-
nificantly more efficient than the models they replace, and provide 
CO2eq reductions at net negative societal cost when accounting for 
fuel savings over 10 – 15 years of operation at 5 % discount rate. An 
additional 30 – 40 % CO2eq reduction potential is expected from future 
new aircraft in the 2020 – 2030 time frame, but the mitigation costs 
are uncertain and some promising technologies, such as open rotor 
engines, appear expensive (IEA, 2009; TOSCA, 2011).
For virtually all types of ocean-going ships including container vessels, 
bulk carriers, and oil tankers, the potential reduction in CO2eq emis-
sions is estimated to be over 50 % taking into account a wide range of 
technology and operational changes. Due to the large volume of fuel 
used annually by these ships, the net cost of this reduction is likely to 
be negative (Buhaug and et. al, 2009; Crist, 2009).
Key factors in the long term decarbonization of rail transport will be 
the electrification of services and the switch to low-carbon electric-
ity generation, both of which will vary widely by country. Potential 
improvements of 35 % energy efficiency for United States rail freight, 
46 % for European Union rail freight and 56 % for EU passenger rail 
services have been forecast for 2050 (Anderson et al., 2011; Vyas et al., 
2013). The EU improvements will yield a 10 – 12 % reduction in operat-
ing costs, though no information is available on the required capital 
investment in infrastructure and equipment.
Regarding fuel substitution in all modes, some biofuels have the poten-
tial for large CO2eq reduction, although net GHG impact assessments 
are complex (see Sections 8.3 and 11.13). The cost per tonne of CO2eq 
avoided will be highly dependent on the net CO2eq reduction and the 
relative cost of the biofuel compared to the base fuel (e. g., gasoline or 
diesel), and any technology changes required to the vehicles and fuel 
distribution network in order to accommodate new fuels and blends. 
The mitigation cost is so sensitive that, for example, while an energy 
unit of biofuel that cuts CO2eq emissions by 80 % compared to gas-
oline and costs 20 % more has a mitigation cost of about 80 USD / t 
CO2eq, if the biofuel’s cost drops to parity with gasoline, the mitigation 
cost drops to 0 USD / t CO2eq (IEA, 2009).
The mitigation potentials from reductions in transport activity con-
sider, for example, that “walking and cycle track networks can provide 
20 % (5 – 40 % in sensitivity analyses) induced walking and cycle jour-
neys that would not have taken place without the new networks, and 
around 15 % (0 – 35 % in sensitivity analyses) of current journeys less 
than 5 km made by car or public transport can be replaced by walking 
or cycling” (Sælensminde, 2004). Urban journeys by car longer than 
5  km can be replaced by combined use of non-motorized and intermo-




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8.7 Co-benefits, risks 
and spillovers
Mitigation in the transport sector has the potential to generate syner-
gies and co-benefits with other economic, social, and environmental 
objectives. In addition to mitigation costs (see Section 8.6), the deploy-
ment of mitigation measures will depend on a variety of other fac-
tors that relate to the broader objectives that drive policy choices. The 
implementation of policies and measures can have positive or negative 
effects on these other objectives — and vice versa. To the extent these 
effects are positive, they can be deemed as ‘co-benefits’; if adverse 
and uncertain, they imply risks. Potential co-benefits and adverse side 
effects of alternative mitigation measures (Section 8.7.1), associated 
technical risks and uncertainties (Section 8.7.2), and public percep-
tions (Section 8.7.3) can significantly affect investment decisions and 
individual behaviour as well as influence the priority-setting of poli-
cymakers. Table 8.4 provides an overview of the potential co-benefits 
and adverse side-effects of the mitigation measures that are assessed 
in this chapter. In accordance with the three sustainable development 
pillars described in Sections 4.2 and 4.8, the table presents effects on 
objectives that may be economic, social, environmental, and health 
related. The extent to which co-benefits and adverse side effects will 
materialize in practice, and their net effect on social welfare, differ 
greatly across regions. Both are strongly dependent on local circum-
stances and implementation practices as well as on the scale and pace 
of the deployment of the different mitigation measures (see Section 
6.6).
8�7�1 Socio-economic, environmental, and 
health effects
Transport relies almost entirely on oil with about 94 % of transport 
fuels being petroleum products (IEA, 2011b). This makes it a key area of 
energy security concern. Oil is also a major source of harmful emissions 
that affect air quality in urban areas (see Section 8.2) (Sathaye et al., 
2011). In scenario studies of European cities, a combination of pub-
lic transit and cycling infrastructures, pricing, and land-use measures 
is projected to lead to notable co-benefits. These include improved 
energy security, reduced fuel spending, less congestion, fewer acci-
dents, and increased public health from more physical activity, less air 
pollution and less noise-related stress (Costantini et al., 2007; Greene, 
2010b; Rojas-Rueda et  al., 2011; Rojas-Rueda et  al., 2012; Creutzig 
et al., 2012a). However, only a few studies have assessed the associ-
ated welfare effects comprehensively and these are hampered by data 
uncertainties. Even more fundamental is the epistemological uncer-
tainty attributed to different social costs. As a result, the range of plau-
sible social costs and benefits can be large. For example, the social 
costs of the co-dimensions congestion, air pollution, accidents, and 
noise in Beijing were assessed to equate to between 7.5 % to 15 % 
of GDP (Creutzig and He, 2009). Improving energy security, mobility 
access, traffic congestion, public health, and safety are all important 
policy objectives that can possibly be influenced by mitigation actions 
(Jacobsen, 2003; Goodwin, 2004; Hultkrantz et al., 2006; Rojas-Rueda 
et al., 2011).
Energy security. Transport stands out in comparison to other energy 
end-use sectors due to its almost complete dependence on petroleum 
products (Sorrell and Speirs, 2009; Cherp et al., 2012). Thus, the sector 
suffers from both low resilience of energy supply and, in many coun-
tries, low sufficiency of domestic resources. (For a broader discussion 
on these types of concerns see Section 6.6.2.2). The sector is likely to 
continue to be dominated by oil for one or more decades (Costan-
tini et al., 2007). For oil-importing countries, the exposure to volatile 
and unpredictable oil prices affects the terms of trade and their eco-
nomic stability. Measuring oil independence is possible by measuring 
the economic impact of energy imports (Greene, 2010b). Mitigation 
strategies for transport (such as electrifying the sector and switching 
to biofuels) would decrease the sector’s dependence on oil and diver-
sify the energy supply, thus increasing resilience (Leiby, 2007; Shakya 
and Shrestha, 2011; Jewell et al., 2013). However, a shift away from oil 
could have implications for energy exporters (see Chapter 14). Addi-
tionally, mitigation measures targeted at reducing the overall transport 
demand — such as more compact urban form with improved transport 
infrastructure and journey distance reduction and avoidance (see Sec-
tions 8.4 and 12.4.2.1) — may reduce exposure to oil price volatility 
and shocks (Sovacool and Brown, 2010; Leung, 2011; Cherp et  al., 
2012).
Access and mobility. Mitigation strategies that foster multi-modality 
are likely to foster improved access to transport services particularly for 
the poorest and most vulnerable members of society. Improved mobil-
ity usually helps provide access to jobs, markets, and facilities such as 
hospitals and schools (Banister, 2011b; Boschmann, 2011; Sietchip-
ing et al., 2012). More efficient transport and modal choice not only 
increases access and mobility it also positively affects transport costs 
for businesses and individuals (Banister, 2011b). Transport systems that 
are affordable and accessible foster productivity and social inclusion 
(Banister, 2008; Miranda and Rodrigues da Silva, 2012). 
Employment impact. In addition to improved access in developing 
countries, a substantial number of people are employed in the formal 
and informal public transport sector (UN-Habitat, 2013). A shift to pub-
lic transport modes is likely to generate additional employment oppor-
tunities in this sector (Santos et al., 2010). However, the net effect on 
employment of a shift towards low-carbon transport remains unclear 
(UNEP, 2011).
Traffic congestion. Congestion is an important aspect for decision 
makers, in particular at the local level, as it negatively affects journey 
times and creates substantial economic cost (Goodwin, 2004; Duranton 
and Turner, 2011). For example, in the United States in 2000, time lost 
in traffic amounted to around 0.7 % of GDP (Federal Highway Admin-





101 billion USD2010 in 2010, also being 0.7 % of GDP, but with more 
accurate data covering the cost per kilometre travelled of each major 
vehicle type for 500 urban centres (Schrank et al., 2011). Time lost was 
valued at 1.2 % of GDP in the UK (Goodwin, 2004); 3.4 % in Dakar, 
Senegal; 4 % in Manila, Philippines (Carisma and Lowder, 2007); 3.3 % 
to 5.3 % in Beijing, China (Creutzig and He, 2009); 1 % to 6 % in Bang-
kok, Thailand (World Bank, 2002) and up to 10 % in Lima, Peru where 
people on average spend around four hours in daily travel (JICA, 2005; 
Kunieda and Gauthier, 2007).
Modal shifts that reduce traffic congestion can simultaneously reduce 
GHG emissions and short-lived climate forcers. These include road con-
gestion pricing, modal shifts from aviation to rail, and shifts from LDVs 
to public transport, walking, and cycling (Cuenot et al., 2012). How-
ever, some actions that seek to reduce congestion can induce addi-
tional travel demand, for example, expansions of airport infrastructure 
or construction of roads to increase capacity (Goodwin, 2004; ECMT, 
2007; Small and van Dender, 2007). 
Health. Exposure to vehicle exhaust emissions can cause cardiovas-
cular, pulmonary, and respiratory diseases and several other negative 
health impacts (McCubbin, D. R., Delucchi, 1999; Medley et al., 2002; 
Chapters 7.9.2, 8.2, and WG II Chapter 11.9). In Beijing, for example, 
the social costs of air pollution were estimated to be as high as those 
for time delays from congestion (Creutzig and He, 2009). Various strat-
egies to reduce fuel carbon intensity have varying implications for the 
many different air pollutants. For example, many studies indicate lower 
carbon monoxide and hydrocarbon emissions from the displacement of 
fossil-based transport fuels with biofuels, but NOx emissions are often 
higher. Advanced biofuels are expected to improve performance, such 
as the low particulate matter emissions from ligno-cellulosic ethanol 
(see Hill et al., 2009, Sathaye et al., 2011 and Section 11.13.5). Strat-
egies that target local air pollution, for example switching to elec-
tric vehicles, have the potential to also reduce CO2 emissions (Yedla 
et al., 2005) and black carbon emissions (UNEP and WMO, 2011) pro-
vided the electricity is sourced from low-carbon sources. Strategies 
to improve energy efficiency in the LDV fleet though fostering diesel-
powered vehicles may affect air quality negatively (Kirchstetter et al., 
2008; Schipper and Fulton, 2012) if not accompanied by regulatory 
measures to ensure emission standards remain stable. The structure 
and design of these strategies ultimately decides if this potential can 
be realized (see Section 8.2).
Transport also contributes to noise and vibration issues, which affect 
human health negatively (WHO, 2009; Oltean-Dumbrava et al., 2013; 
Velasco et al., 2013). Transport-related human inactivity has also been 
linked to several chronic diseases (WHO, 2008). An increase in walk-
ing and cycling activities could therefore lead to health benefits but 
conversely may also lead to an increase in traffic accidents and a 
larger lung intake of air pollutants (Kahn Ribeiro et al., 2012; Takeshita, 
2012). Overall, the benefits of walking and cycling significantly out-
weigh the risks due to pollution inhalation (Rojas-Rueda et al., 2011; 
Rabl and de Nazelle, 2012). 
Assessing the social cost of public health is a contested area when 
presented as disability-adjusted life years (DALYs). A reduction in 
CO2 emissions through an increase in active travel and less use of 
ICE vehicles gave associated health benefits in London (7,332 DALYs 
per million population per year) and Delhi (12,516 (DALYs / million 
capita) / yr) — significantly more than from the increased use of lower-
emission vehicles (160 (DALYs / million capita) / yr) in London, and 1,696 
in Delhi) (Woodcock et al., 2009). More generally, it has been found 
consistently across studies and methods that public health benefits 
(induced by modal shift from LDVs to non-motorized transport) from 
physical activity outweighs those from improved air quality (Woodcock 
et al., 2009; de Hartog et al., 2010; Rojas-Rueda et al., 2011; Grabow 
et al., 2012; Maizlish et al., 2013). In a similar trend, reduced car use in 
Australian cities has been shown to reduce health costs and improve 
productivity due to an increase in walking (Trubka et al., 2010a). 
Safety� The increase in motorized road traffic in most countries places 
an increasing incidence of accidents with 1.27 million people killed 
globally each year, of which 91 % occur in low and middle-income 
countries (WHO, 2011). A further 20 to 50 million people suffer serious 
injuries (WHO, 2011). By 2030, it is estimated that road traffic injuries 
will constitute the fifth biggest reason for premature deaths (WHO, 
2008). Measures to increase the efficiency of the vehicle fleet can also 
positively affect the crash-worthiness of vehicles if more stringent 
safety standards are adopted along with improved efficiency standards 
(Santos et al., 2010). Lack of access to safe walking, cycling, and pub-
lic transport infrastructure remains an important element affecting the 
success of modal shift strategies, in particular in developing countries 
(Sonkin et al., 2006; Tiwari and Jain, 2012).
Fossil fuel displacement. Economists have criticized the assump-
tion that each unit of energy replaces an energy-equivalent quantity of 
fossil energy, leaving total fuel use unaffected (Drabik and de Gorter, 
2011; Rajagopal et  al., 2011; Thompson et  al., 2011). As with other 
energy sources, increasing energy supply through the production of 
bioenergy affects energy prices and demand for energy services, and 
these changes in consumption also affect net global GHG emissions 
(Hochman et  al., 2010; Rajagopal et  al., 2011; Chen and Khanna, 
2012). The magnitude of the effect of increased biofuel production 
on global fuel consumption is uncertain (Thompson et al., 2011) and 
depends on how the world responds in the long term to reduced 
petroleum demand in regions using increased quantities of biofu-
els. This in turn depends on the Organization of Petroleum Export-
ing Countries’ (OPEC) supply response and with China’s and India’s 
demand response to a given reduction in the demand for petroleum 
in regions promoting biofuels, and the relative prices of biofuels and 
fossil fuels including from hydraulic fracturing (fracking) (Gehlhar 
et  al., 2010; Hochman et al., 2010; Thompson et al., 2011). Notably, 
if the percentage difference in GHG emissions between an alternative 
fuel and the incumbent fossil fuel is less than the percentage rebound 
effect (the fraction not displaced, in terms of GHG emissions), a net 
increase in GHG emissions will result from promoting the alternative 





Table 8�4 | Overview of potential co-benefits (green arrows) and adverse side effects (orange arrows) of the main mitigation measures in the transport sector. Arrows pointing 
up / down denote positive / negative effect on the respective objective / concern; a question mark (?) denotes an uncertain net effect. Co-benefits and adverse side-effects depend on 
local circumstances as well as on the implementation practice, pace, and scale (see Section 6.6). For an assessment of macroeconomic, cross-sectoral effects associated with mitiga-
tion policies (e. g., energy prices, consumption, growth, and trade), see Sections 3.9, 6.3.6, 13.2.2.3 and 14.4.2. For possible upstream effects of low-carbon electricity and biomass 
supply, see Sections 7.9 as well as 11.7 and 11.13.6. Numbers in brackets correspond to references below the table.
Mitigation measures
Effect on additional objectives / concerns
Economic Social (including health) Environmental
Reduction of fuel 
carbon intensity:  
electricity, 
hydrogen, CNG, 





Energy security (diversification, reduced oil 
dependence and exposure to oil price volatility) 
(1 – 3,32 – 34,94)
Technological spillovers (e. g., battery 










Health impact via urban air pollution (59,69) by
CNG, biofuels: net effect unclear 
(13,14,19,20,36,50)
Electricity, hydrogen: reducing most 
pollutants (13,20,21,36,58,63,92)
Shift to diesel: potentially increasing 
pollution (11,23,25)
Health impact via reduced noise (electricity and 
fuel cell LDVs) (10,61,64 – 66,82)  







Ecosystem impact of electricity and hydrogen 
via: 
Urban air pollution (13,20,69,91 – 93)
Material use (unsustainable resource mining) 
(17,18)
Ecosystem impact of biofuels (24,41,42,89)
Reduction of energy 
intensity
↑ Energy security (reduced oil dependence and 
exposure to oil price volatility) (1 – 3,32 – 34)
↓ 
↑
Health impact via reduced urban air pollution 
(22,25,43,59,62,69,84)
Road safety (crash-worthiness depending on the 
design of the standards) (38,39,52,60)
↓ Ecosystem and biodiversity impact via reduced 
urban air pollution (20,22,69,95)
Compact urban 








Energy security (reduced oil dependence and 
exposure to oil price volatility) (77 – 80,86)
Productivity (reduced urban congestion and 
travel times, affordable and accessible transport) 
(6 – 8,26,35,45,46,48,49)
Employment opportunities in the public 











Health impact for non-motorized modes via 
Increased physical activity 
(7,12,27,28,29,51,64,70,73,74)
Potentially higher exposure to air pollution 
(19,27,59,69,70,74)
Noise (modal shift and travel reduction) 
(58,61,64 – 66,81 – 83)
Equitable mobility access to employment 
opportunities, particularly in developing 
countries (4,5,8,9,26,43,47,49)
Road safety (via modal shift and / or 





Ecosystem impact via 







Energy security (reduced oil dependence and 
exposure to oil price volatility) (31,77 – 80,86)
Productivity (reduced urban congestion, travel 
times, walking) (6 – 8,26,45,46,49)
↓ Health impact (for non-motorized transport 





Ecosystem impact via 
Urban air pollution (20,53,54,60,69)
New / shorter shipping routes (15,16,57)
Land-use competition from transport 
infrastructure (7,9,58,71,75)
References: 1: Greene (2010b), 2: Costantini et al. (2007), 3: Bradley and Lefevre (2006), 4: Boschmann (2011), 5: Sietchiping et al. (2012), 6: Cuenot et al. (2012), 7: Creutzig 
et al. (2012a), 8: Banister (2008), 9: Geurs and Van Wee (2004), Banister (2008), 10: Creutzig and He (2009), 11: Leinert et al. (2013), 12: Rojas-Rueda et al. (2011), 13: Sathaye 
et al. (2011), 14: Hill et al. (2009), 15: Garneau et al. (2009), 16: Wassmann (2011), 17: Eliseeva and Bünzli (2011), 18: Massari and Ruberti (2013), 19: Takeshita (2012), 20: 
Kahn Ribeiro et al. (2012), 21: IEA (2011a), 22: Woodcock et al. (2009), 23: Schipper and Fulton (2012), 24: see Section 11.13.6, 25: Kirchstetter et al. (2008), 26: Banister (2008), 
Miranda and Rodrigues da Silva (2012), 27: Rojas-Rueda et al. (2011), Rabl and de Nazelle (2012), 28: Jacobsen (2003), 29: Hultkrantz et al. (2006), 30: Goodwin (2004), 31: Sor-
rell and Speirs (2009), 32: Jewell et al. (2013), 33: Shakya and Shrestha (2011), 34: Leiby (2007), 35: Duranton and Turner (2011), 36: Trubka et al. (2010a), 37: WHO (2011), 38: 
Santos et al. (2010), 39: Tiwari and Jain (2012), 40: Sonkin et al. (2006), 41: Chum et al. (2011), 42: Larsen et al. (2009), 43: Steg and Gifford (2005), 44: Christensen et al. (2012), 
45: Schrank et al. (2011), 46: Carisma and Lowder (2007), 47: World Bank (2002), 48: JICA (2005), 49: Kunieda and Gauthier (2007), 50: see Section 11.13.5, 51: Maizlish et al. 
(2013), 52: WHO (2008), 53: ICCT (2012b), 54: Yedla et al. (2005), 55: Lu et al. (2013), 56: Schoon and Huijskens (2011), 57: see Section 8.5, 58: see Section 12.8, 59: Medey et al. 
(2002), 60: Machado-Filho (2009), 61: Milner et al. (2012), 62: Kim Oanh et al. (2012), 63: Fulton et al. (2013), 64: de Nazelle et al. (2011), 65: Twardella and Ndrepepa (2011), 66: 
Kawada (2011), 67: Grabow et al. (2012), 68: Pucher et al. (2010), 69: Section 7.9.2 and WGII Section 11.9, 70: de Hartog et al. (2010), 71: Heath et al. (2006), 72: Saelens et al. 
(2003), 73: Sallis  et al. (2009), 74: Hankey and Brauer (2012), 75: Cervero and Sullivan (2011), 76: Mikler (2010), 77: Cherp et al. (2012), 78: Leung (2011), 79: Knox-Hayes et al. 
(2013), 80: Sovacool and Brown (2010), 81: WHO (2009), 82: Oltean-Dumbrava et al. (2013), 83: Velasco et al. (2013), 84: Smith et al. (2013), 86: see Section 8.4, 87: Schepers 
et al. (2013), 88: White (2004), 89: UNEP / GEF (2013), 90: Rao and Wang (2011), 91: Notter et al. (2010), 92: Sioshansi and Denholm (2009), 93: Zackrisson et al. (2010), 94: 





If biofuels displace high carbon-intensity oil from tar sands or heavy 
oils, the displacement effect would provide higher GHG emission sav-
ings. Estimates of the magnitude of the petroleum rebound effect 
cover a wide range and depend on modelling assumptions. Two recent 
modelling studies suggest that biofuels replace about 30 – 70 % of the 
energy equivalent quantity of petroleum-based fuel (Drabik and de 
Gorter, 2011; Chen and Khanna, 2012), while others find replacement 
can be as low as 12 – 15 % (Hochman et al., 2010). Under other circum-
stances, the rebound can be negative. The rebound effect is always 
subject to the policy context, and can be specifically avoided by global 
cap and pricing instruments.
8�7�2 Technical risks and uncertainties
Different de-carbonization strategies for transport have a number of 
technological risks and uncertainties associated with them. Unsus-
tainable mining of resources to supply low-carbon transport technol-
ogies such as batteries and fuel cells may create adverse side effects 
for the local environment (Massari and Ruberti, 2013; Eliseeva and 
Bünzli, 2011). Mitigation options from lower energy-intensity tech-
nologies (e. g., electric buses) and reduced fuel carbon intensity (e. g., 
biofuels) are particularly uncertain regarding their technological via-
bility, sources of primary energy, and biomass and lifecycle emission 
reduction potential (see Section 8.3). Biofuels indicators are being 
developed to ensure a degree of sustainability in their production 
and use (UNEP / GEF, 2013; Sections 11.13.6 and 11.13.7). For ship-
ping, there is potential for new and shorter routes such as across 
the Arctic, but these may create risks to vulnerable ecosystems (see 
Section 8.5).
A focus on improving vehicle fuel efficiency may reduce GHG emissions 
and potentially improve air quality, but without an increase in modal 
choice it may not result in improved access and mobility (Steg and Gif-
ford, 2005). The shift toward more efficient vehicles, for example the 
increasing use of diesel for the LDV fleet in Europe, has also created 
tradeoffs such as negatively affecting air quality in cities (Kirchstetter 
et al., 2008). More generally, mitigation options are also likely to be 
subject to rebound effects to varying degrees (see Sections 8.3 and 
8.10).
8�7�3 Technological spillovers
Advancements in technologies developed for the transport sector may 
have technological spillovers to other sectors. For example advance-
ments in battery technology systems for consumer electronics could 
facilitate the development of batteries for electric vehicles and vice-
versa (Rao and Wang, 2011). The production of land-competitive biofu-
els can also have direct and indirect effects on biodiversity, water, and 
food availability (see Sections 11.13.6 and 11.13.7). Other areas where 
technological spillovers may occur include control and navigation sys-
tems and other information technology applications.
8.8 Barriers and opportunities
Barriers and opportunities are processes that hinder or facilitate deploy-
ment of new transport technologies and practices. Reducing transport 
GHG emissions is inherently complex as increasing mobility with LDVs, 
HDVs, and aircraft has been associated with increasing wealth for the 
past century of industrialization (Meyer et al., 1965; Glaeser, 2011). The 
first signs of decoupling fossil fuel-based mobility from wealth genera-
tion are appearing in OECD countries (Kenworthy, 2013). To decouple 
and reduce GHG emissions, a range of technologies and practices have 
been identified that are likely to be developed in the short- and long-
terms (see Section 8.3), but barriers to their deployment exist as do 
opportunities for those nations, cities, and regions willing to make low-
carbon transport a priority. There are many barriers to implementing a 
significantly lower carbon transport system, but these can be turned 
into opportunities if sufficient consideration is given and best-practice 
examples are followed. 
8�8�1 Barriers and opportunities to reduce 
GHGs by technologies and practices
The key transport-related technologies and practices garnered from 
sections above are set out below in terms of their impact on fuel car-
bon intensity, improved energy intensity of technologies, system infra-
structure efficiency, and transport demand reduction. Each has short- 
and long-term potentials to reduce transport GHG emissions that are 
then assessed in terms of their barriers and opportunities (Table 8.5). 
(Details of policies follow in Section 8.10). 
Psychological barriers can impede behavioural choices that might oth-
erwise facilitate mitigation as well as adaptation and environmental 
sustainability. Many individuals are engaged in ameliorative actions to 
improve their local environment, although many could do more. Gif-
ford (2011) outlined barriers that included “limited cognition about 
the problem, ideological worldviews that tend to preclude pro-envi-
ronmental attitudes and behaviour, comparisons with the responses of 
other people, sunk costs and behavioural momentum, a dis-credence 
toward experts and authorities, perceived risks as a result of making 
change and positive but inadequate confidence to make behavioural 
change.” 
The range of barriers to the ready adoption of the above technolo-
gies and practices have been described in previous sections, but are 





challenges involved in removing barriers in each of the 16 elements 
listed depend on the politics of a region. In most places, reducing fuel 
carbon and energy intensities are likely to be relatively easy as they are 
technology-based, though they can meet capital investment barriers 
in developing regions and may be insufficient in the longer-term. On 
the other hand, system infrastructure efficiency and transport demand 
reduction options would require human interventions and social 
change as well as public investment. Although these may not require 
as much capital investment, they would still require public acceptance 
of any transport policy option (see Section 8.10). As implementation 
approaches, public acceptance fluctuates, so political support may be 
required at critical times (Pridmore and Miola, 2011). 
Table 8�5 | Transport technologies and practices with potential for both short- and long-term GHG reduction and the related barriers and opportunities in terms of the policy arenas 
of fuel carbon intensity, energy intensity, infrastructure, and activity.
Transport technology or 
practice
Short-term possibilities Long-term possibilities Barriers Opportunities References
Fuel carbon intensity: fuel switching BEV — Battery electric vehicle; PHEV — Plug-in hybrid electric vehicle; FCV — Fuel cell vehicles; CHP — combined heat and power;
 CNG — Compressed natural gas; LNG — Liquefied natural gas; CBG — Compressed biogas; LBG — Liquefied biogas)
1. BEVs and PHEVs based 
on renewable electricity.
Rapid increase in use likely 
over next decade from a small 
base, so only a small impact 
likely in short-term.
Significant replacement of 
ICE-powered LDVs.
EV and battery costs reducing 
but still high.
Lack of infrastructure, and 
recharging standards not 
uniform. 
Vehicle range anxiety.
Lack of capital and electricity 
in some least developed 
countries.
Universal standards 
adopted for EV rechargers. 
Demonstration in green 
city areas with plug-in 
infrastructure. 
Decarbonized electricity.
Smart grids based on 
renewables. 
EV subsidies.
New business models, such as 
community car sharing.
EPRI 2008; Beck ,2009; IEA, 
2011; Salter et al., 2011; 
Kley et al., 2011; Leurent & 
Windisch, 2011; Graham-
Rowe et al., 2012
2. CNG, LNG, CBG and LBG 
displacing gasoline in 
LDVs and diesel in HDVs.
Infrastructure available in 
some cities so can allow 
a quick ramp – up of gas 
vehicles in these cities.
Significant replacement of 
HDV diesel use depends on 
ease of engine conversion, 




subsidies and local gas 
infrastructure and markets. 
Leakage of gas. 
Demonstration gas conversion 
programmes that show cost 
and health co-benefits. Fixing 
gas leakage in general.
IEA, 2007; Salter et al., 2011; 
Alvarez et al., 2012 
3. Biofuels displacing 
gasoline, diesel and 
aviation fuel.
Niche markets continue for 
first generation biofuels (3 % 
of liquid fuel market, small 
biogas niche markets).
Advanced and drop-in 
biofuels likely to be adopted 
around 2020 – 2030, mainly 
for aviation.
Some biofuels can be 
relatively expensive, 
environmentally poor and 
cause inequalities by inducing 
increases in food prices. 
Drop-in fuels attractive for all 
vehicles. 
Biofuels and bio-electricity 
can be produced together, 
e. g., sugarcane ethanol and 
CHP from bagasse.
New biofuel options need to 
be further tested, particularly 
for aviation applications.
Ogden et al., 2004; Fargione 
et al., 2010; IEA, 2010;  Plevin 
et al., 2010; Creutzig et al., 
2011; Salter et al., 2011; 
Pacca and Moreira, 2011; 
Flannery et al., 2012 
Energy intensity: efficiency of technologies FEV — fuel efficient vehicles   ICE — internal combustion engine




technologies (ICT) in fuel-
efficient vehicles.
Continuing fuel efficiency 
improvements across new 
vehicles of all types can show 
large, low-cost, near-term 
reductions in fuel demand.
Likely to be a significant 
source of reduction.
Behavioural issues (e. g., 
rebound effect). Consumer 
choices can reduce vehicle 
efficiency gains.
Insufficient regulatory 
support for vehicle emissions 
standards.
On-road performance 
deteriorates compared with 
laboratory tests.
Creative regulations that 
enable quick changes to 
occur without excessive costs 
on emissions standards. China 
and most OECD countries 
have implemented standards.
Reduced registration tax 
can be implemented for low 
CO2eq-based vehicles. 
Schipper et al., 2000; Ogden 
et al., 2004; Small and van 
Dender, 2007; Sperling and 
Gordon, 2009; Timilsina and  
Dulal, 2009; Fuglestvedt et al., 
2009; Mikler, 2010; Salter 
et al., 2011
Structure:  system infrastructure efficiency 
5. Modal shift by public 
transport displacing 
private motor vehicle use.
Rapid short-term growth 
already happening.
Significant displacement 
only where quality system 
infrastructure and services are 
provided.
Availability of rail, bus, ferry, 
and other quality transit 
options. 
Density of people to allow 
more access to services.
Levels of services.
Time barriers on roads 
without right of way
Public perceptions.
Investment in quality transit 
infrastructure, density of 
adjacent land use, and 
high level of services using 
innovative financing that 
builds in these features.
Multiple co-benefits especially 
where walkability health 
benefits are a focus. 
Kenworthy, 2008; Millard-Ball 
& Schipper, 2011; Newman 
and Kenworthy, 2011; Salter 
et al., 2011; Buehler and 







Transport technology or 
practice
Short-term possibilities Long-term possibilities Barriers Opportunities References
6. Modal shift by cycling 
displacing private motor 
vehicle use.
Rapid short-term growth 
already happening in many 
cities.
Significant displacement 
only where quality system 
infrastructure is provided.
Cultural barriers and lack of 
safe cycling infrastructure and 
regulations. Harsh climate.
Demonstrations of quality 
cycling infrastructure 
including cultural programmes 
and bike-sharing schemes.
Bassett et al., 2008; Garrard 
et al., 2008; Salter et al., 
2011; Anon, 2012; Sugiyama 
et al., 2012
7. Modal shift by walking 
displacing private motor 
vehicle use.
Some growth but depends on 
urban planning and design 
policies being implemented.
Significant displacement 
where large-scale adoption of 
polycentric city policies and 
walkable urban designs are 
implemented.
Planning and design policies 
can work against walkability 
of a city by too easily allowing 
cars into walking city areas.
Lack of density and 
integration with transit. 
Culture of walkability.
Large-scale adoption of 
polycentric city policies and 
walkable urban designs 
creating walking city in 
historic centres and new ones. 
Cultural programmes. 
Gehl, 2011; Höjer et al., 2011; 
Leather et al., 2011; Salter 
et al., 2011 
8. Urban planning by 
reducing the distances to 
travel within urban areas.
Immediate impacts where 
dense transit-oriented 
development (TOD) centres 
are built.
Significant reductions where 
widespread polycentric city 
policies are implemented.
Urban development does 
not always favour dense TOD 
centres being built. TODs need 
quality transit at their base. 
Integration of professional 
areas required. 
Widespread polycentric city 
policies implemented with 
green TODs, backed by quality 
transit. Multiple co-benefits 
in sprawl costs avoided and 
health gains.
Anon, 2004; Anon, 2009; 
Naess, 2006; Ewing et al., 
2008; Cervero and Murakami, 
2009; Cervero and Murakami, 
2010; Cervero and Sullivan, 
2011; Salter et al., 2011; 
Lefèvre; 2009
9. Urban planning by 
reducing private motor 
vehicle use through 
parking and traffic 
restraint.
Immediate impacts on traffic 
density observed.
Significant reductions only 
where quality transport 
alternatives are available.
Political barriers due to 
perceived public opposition 
to increased costs, traffic and 
parking restrictions. Parking 
codes too prescriptive for 
areas suited to walking and 
transit. 
Demonstrations of better 
transport outcomes from 
combinations of traffic 
restraint, parking and new 
transit / walking infrastructure 
investment.
Gwilliam, 2003; ADB, 2011; 
Creutzig et al., 2011; Shoup, 
2011; Newman  and Matan, 
2013
10. Modal shift by displacing 
aircraft and LDV trips 
through high-speed rail 
alternatives. 
Immediate impacts after 
building rail infrastructure.
Continued growth but only 
short-medium distance trips 
suitable.
High-speed rail infrastructure 
expensive. 
Demonstrations of how to 
build quality fast-rail using 
innovative finance.
Park and Ha, 2006; Gilbert 
and Perl, 2010; Åkerman, 
2011; Salter et al., 2011
11. Modal shift of freight by 
displacing HDV demand 
with rail.
Suitable immediately for 
medium- and long-distance 
freight and port traffic.
Substantial displacement 
only if large rail infrastructure 
improvements made, 
the external costs of 
freight transport are fully 
internalized, and the quality 
of rail services are enhanced. 
EU target to have 30 % of 
freight tonne-km moving 
more than 300 km to go by 
rail (or water) by 2030.
Inadequacies in rail 
infrastructure and service 
quality.  Much freight 
moved over distances that 
are too short for rail to be 
competitive.
Upgrading of inter-modal 
facilities. Electrification of rail 
freight services.  Worsening 
traffic congestion on road 
networks and higher fuel cost 
will favour rail.
IEA, 2009; Schiller et al., 
2010; Salter et al., 2011
12. Modal shift by displacing 
truck and car use through 
waterborne transport.
Niche options already 
available.  EU “Motorways 
of the Sea” programme 
demonstrates potential to 
expand short-sea shipping 
share of freight market.
Potential to develop beyond 
current niches, though will 
require significant investment 
in new vessels and port 
facilities.
Lack of vision for water 
transport options and land-
locked population centres. 
Long transit times.  Tightening 
controls on dirty bunker fuel 
and SOx and NOx emissions 
raising cost and reducing 
modal competitiveness.
Demonstrations of quality 
waterborne transport that 
can be faster and with 
lower-carbon emissions than 
alternatives.
Fuglestvedt et al., 2009; 
Salter et al. 2011
13. System optimization by 
improved road systems, 
freight logistics and 




Insufficient in long term to 
significantly reduce carbon 
emissions without changing 
mode, reducing mobility, or 
reducing fuel carbon intensity.
Insufficient regulatory 
support and key performance 
indicators (KPIs) covering 
logistics and efficiency.
Creative regulations and KPIs 
that enable change to occur 
rapidly without excessive 
costs.
Pels and Verhoef, 2004; 
A. Zhang and Y. Zhang, 
2006; Fuglestvedt et al., 
2009; Kaluza et al., 2010; 
McKinnon, 2010; Simaiakis 
and Balakrishnan, 2010; 
Salter et al., 2011
Activity:  demand reduction 
14. Mobility service 
substitution by reducing 
the need to travel 
through enhanced 
communications. 
Niche markets growing and 
ICT improving in quality and 
reliability.
Significant reductions possible 
after faster broadband and 
quality images available, 
though ICT may increase the 
need for some trips. 
Technological barriers due 
to insufficient broadband in 
some regions.
Demonstrations of improved 
video-conferencing system 
quality.
Golob and Regan, 2001; 
Choo et al., 2005; Wang and 
Law, 2007; Yi and Thomas, 
2007; Zhen et al., 2009; Salter 







Transport technology or 
practice
Short-term possibilities Long-term possibilities Barriers Opportunities References
15. Behavioural change from 
reducing private motor 
vehicle use through 
pricing policies, e.g, 
network charges and 
parking fees.
Immediate impacts on traffic 
density observed.
Significant reductions only 
where quality transport 
alternatives are available.
Political barriers due to 
perceived public opposition to 
increased pricing costs. Lack 
of administrative integration 
between transport, land-use 
and environment departments 
in city municipalities.
Demonstrations of better 
transport outcomes from 
combinations of pricing, 
traffic restraint, parking 
and new infrastructure 
investment from the revenue. 
Removing subsidies to fossil 
fuels important for many 
co-benefits.
Litman, 2005, 2006; Salter 
et al., 2011; Creutzig et al., 
2012a
16. Behavioural change 
resulting from education 
to encourage gaining 
benefits of less motor 
vehicle use.
Immediate impacts of 
10 – 15 % reduction of LDV 
use are possible.
Significant reductions only 
where quality transport 
alternatives are available.
Lack of belief by politicians 
and professionals in the value 
of educational behaviour 
change programmes.
Demonstrations of ‘travel 
smart’ programmes linked to 
improvements in sustainable 
transport infrastructure. 
Cost effective and multiple 
co-benefits.
Pandey, 2006; Goodwin and 
Lyons, 2010; Taylor and Philp, 
2010; Ashton-Graham et al., 
2011; Höjer et al., 2011; 
Salter et al., 2011
8�8�2 Financing low-carbon transport
Transport is a foundation for any economy as it enables people to 
be linked, goods to be exchanged, and cities to be structured (Glae-
ser, 2011). Transport is critical for poverty reduction and growth in 
the plans of most regions, nations, and cities. It therefore is a key 
area to receive development funding. In past decades the amount of 
funding going to transport through various low-carbon mechanisms 
had been relatively low, but has had a recent increase. The projects 
registered in the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) 
pipeline database for the clean development mechanism (CDM) 
shows only 42 projects out of 6707 were transport-related (Kopp, 
2012). The Global Environment Facility (GEF) has approved only 28 
projects in 20 years, and the World Bank’s Clean Technology Fund 
has funded transport projects for less than 17 % of the total. If this 
international funding does not improve, then transport could move 
from emitting 22 % of energy-related GHGs in 2009 to reach 80 % 
by 2050 (ADB, 2012a). Conversely, national appropriate mitigation 
measures (NAMAs) could attract low-carbon financing in the trans-
port area for the developing world. To support sustainable transport 
system development, eight multi-lateral development banks have 
pledged to invest around 170 billion USD2010 over the next ten years 
(Marton-Lefèvre, 2012).
A major part of funding sustainable transport could arise from the redi-
rection of funding from unsustainable transport (Sakamoto et al., 2010; 
UNEP, 2011; ADB, 2012b). In addition, land-based taxes or fees can 
capitalize on the value gains brought by sustainable transport infra-
structures (Chapter 12.5.2). For example, in locations close to a new rail 
system, revenue can be generated from land-based taxes and council 
rates levied on buildings that are seen to rise by 20 – 50 % compared to 
areas not adjacent to such an accessible facility (Cervero 1994; Haider 
and Miller, 2000; Rybeck, 2004). Local municipal financing by land 
value capture and land taxes could be a primary source of financing 
for public transit and non-motorized transport infrastructure, especially 
in rapidly urbanizing Asia (Chapter 12.5.2; Bongardt et al., 2013). For 
example, a number of value capture projects are underway as part of 
the rapid growth in urban rail systems, including Indian cities (Newman 
et al., 2013). The ability to fully outline the costs and benefits of low-
carbon transport projects will be critical to accessing these new fund-
ing opportunities. R&D barriers and opportunities exist for all of these 
agendas in transport.
8�8�3 Institutional, cultural, and legal barriers 
and opportunities
Institutional barriers to low-carbon transport include international 
standards required for new EV infrastructure to enable recharging; 
low pricing of parking; lack of educational programmes for modal 
shift; and polycentric planning policies that require the necessary insti-
tutional structures (OECD, 2012; Salter et al., 2011). Cultural barriers 
underlie every aspect of transport, for example, automobile depen-
dence being built into a culture and legal barriers that can exist to pre-
vent the building of dense, mixed-use community centres that reduce 
car dependence. Overall, there are political barriers that combine most 
of the above (Pridmore and Miola, 2011).
Opportunities also exist. Low-carbon transport elements in green 
growth programmes (OECD, 2011; Hargroves and Smith, 2008) are 
likely to be the basis of changing economies because they shape cit-
ies and create wealth (Glaeser, 2011; Newman et  al., 2009). Those 
nations, cities, businesses, and communities that grasp the opportuni-
ties to demonstrate these changes are likely to be the ones that benefit 
most in the future (OECD, 2012). The process of decoupling economic 
growth from fossil fuel dependence could become a major feature of 
the future economy (ADB, 2012a) with sustainable transport being one 
of four key approaches. Overcoming the barriers to each technology 
and practice (Table 8.5) could enable each to contribute to a more 
sustainable transport system and realize the opportunities from tech-
nological and social changes when moving towards a decarbonized 





8.9 Sectoral implications 
of transformation 
 pathways and  sustainable 
development
Scenarios that focus on possible reductions of energy use and CO2 
emissions from transport are sourced from either integrated models 
that incorporate a cross-sector approach to modelling global emissions 
reductions and other mitigation options, or sectoral models that focus 
solely on transport and its specific potential for emissions reductions. 
A comparison of scenarios from both integrated and sectoral models 
with a focus on long-term concentration goals up until 2100 is con-
ducted in this section. This comparison is complemented by the results 
of the transport-specific evaluation of cost and potentials in Section 
8.6 and supported by a broader integrated assessment in Chapter 67. 
The integrated and sectoral model transport literature presents a wide 
range of future CO2 emissions reduction scenarios and offers two 
distinct forms of assessment. Both contemplate how changes in pas-
senger and freight activity, structure, energy intensity, and fuel carbon 
intensity could each contribute to emissions reductions and assist the 
achievement of concentration goals. 
The integrated model literature focuses upon systemic assess-
ments of the impacts of macro-economic policies (such as limits on 
global / regional emissions or the implementation of a carbon tax) and 
reviews the relative contributions of a range of sectors to overall global 
mitigation efforts (Section 6.2.1). Within the WG III AR5 Scenario Data-
base (Annex II.10), transport specific variables are not available for 
all scenarios. Therefore, the present analysis is based on a sub-sample 
of almost 600 scenarios8. Due to the macro-economic scale of their 
analysis, integrated models have a limited ability to assess behaviour 
changes that may result from structural developments impacting on 
7 Section 6.2.2 and Annex II.10 provide details on the WG III AR5 Scenario Data-
base, which is the source of more than 1,200 integrated scenarios.
8 This section builds upon the scenarios which were collated by Chapter 6 in the 
WG III AR5 Scenario Database and compares them to global scale transport 
studies. The scenarios were grouped into baseline and mitigation scenarios. 
As described in more detail in Chapter 6.3.2, the scenarios are further catego-
rized into bins based on 2100 concentrations: between 430 – 480 ppm CO2eq, 
480 – 530 ppm CO2eq, 530 – 580 ppm CO2eq, 580 – 650 ppm CO2eq, 650 – 720 ppm 
CO2eq, and > 720 ppm CO2eq. An assessment of geo-physical climate uncer-
tainties, consistent with the dynamics of Earth System Models assessed in WGI, 
found that the most stringent of these scenarios, leading to 2100 concentrations 
between 430 and 480 ppm CO2eq, would lead to an end-of-century median 
temperature change between 1.6 to 1.8 °C compared to pre-industrial times, 
although uncertainties in understanding of the climate system mean that the 
possible temperature range is much wider than this. They were found to maintain 
temperature change below 2 °C over the course of the century with a likely 
chance. Scenarios in the concentration category of 650 – 720 ppm CO2eq cor-
respond to comparatively modest mitigation efforts, and were found to lead to 
median temperature rise of approximately 2.6 – 2.9 °C in 2100 (Chapter 6.3.2). 
The x-axis of Figures 8.9 to 8.12 show specific sample numbers for each category 
of scenario reviewed.
modal shift or journey avoidance, behavioural factors such as travel 
time and budget might contribute up to 50 % reduction of activity 
globally in 2100 compared to the 2005 baseline (Girod et al., 2013). 
Sectoral scenarios, however, are able to integrate results concerning 
emission reduction potentials from sector specific interventions (such 
as vehicle taxation, parking fees, fuel economy standards, promotion 
of modal shift, etc.). They can be instrumental in evaluating how poli-
cies that target structural factors9 can impact on passenger and freight 
travel demand reductions (see Sections 8.4 and 8.10). Unlike inte-
grated models, sectoral studies do not attempt to measure transport 
emissions reductions with respect to the amounts that other sectors 
could contribute in order to reach long-term concentration goals. 
8�9�1 Long term stabilization goals — integra-
ted and sectoral perspectives
A diversity of transformation pathways highlights the possible range of 
decarbonization options for transport (Section 6.8). Results from both 
integrated and sectoral models up until 2050 closely match each other. 
Projected GHG emissions vary greatly in the long term integrated sce-
narios, reflecting a wide range in assumptions explored such as future 
population, economic growth, policies, technology development, and 
acceptance (Section 6.2.3). Without policy interventions, a continua-
tion of current travel demand trends could lead to a more than dou-
bling of transport-related CO2 emissions by 2050 and more than a 
tripling by 2100 in the highest scenario projections (Figure 8.9). The 
convergence of results between integrated and sectoral model studies 
suggests that through substantial, sustained, and directed policy inter-
ventions, transport emissions can be consistent with limiting long-term 
concentrations to 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq. 
The growth of global transport demand could pose a significant chal-
lenge to the achievement of potential emission reduction goals. The 
average transport demand growth from integrated scenarios with 
respect to 2010 levels suggests that total passenger and freight travel 
will continue to grow in the coming decades up to 2050, with most 
of this growth taking place within developing country regions where 
large shares of future population and income growth are expected 
(Figure 8.10) (UN Secretariat, 2007).
A positive income elasticity and the relative price-inelastic nature 
of passenger travel partially explain the strength of the relationship 
between travel and income (Dargay, 2007; Barla et  al., 2009). Both 
integrated and sectoral model projections for total travel demand 
show that while demand in non-OECD countries grows rapidly, a lower 
starting point results in a much lower per capita level of passenger 
travel in 2050 than in OECD countries (Figure 8.10) (IEA, 2009; Fulton 
9 These include land use planning that favours high density or polycentric urban 







Figure 8�9 | Direct global transport CO2 emissions. All results for passenger and freight transport are indexed relative to 2010 values for each scenario from integrated models 
grouped by CO2eq concentration levels by 2100, and sectoral studies grouped by baseline and policy categories. Sources: Integrated models — WG III AR5 Scenario Database 
(Annex II.10). Sectoral models: IEA (2008, 2011b, 2012b), WEC (2011a), EIA (2011), IEEJ (2011). 
Note: All figures in Section 8.9 show the full range of results for both integrated and sectoral studies. Where the data is sourced from the WG III AR5 Scenario Database a line 
denotes the median scenario and a box and bolder colours highlight the inter-quartile range. The specific observations from sectoral studies are shown as black dots with light bars 
(policy) or dark bars (baseline) to give the full ranges. “n” equals number of scenarios assessed in each category.












































Figure 8�10 | Global passenger (p-km / capita / yr) and freight (t-km / capita / yr) regional demand projections out to 2050 based on integrated models for various CO2eq concentra-
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et  al., 2013). Consistent with a recent decline in growth of LDV use 
in some OECD countries (Goodwin and Van Dender, 2013), integrated 
and sectoral model studies have suggested that decoupling of passen-
ger transport from GDP could take place after 2035 (IEA, 2012; Girod 
et al., 2012). However, with both transport demand and GDP tied to 
population growth, decoupling may not be fully completed. At higher 
incomes, substitution to faster travel modes, such as fast-rail and air 
travel, explains why total passenger and freight travel continues to rise 
faster than per capita LDV travel (Schäfer et al., 2009).
Freight transport increases in all scenarios at a slower pace than pas-
senger transport, but still rises as much as threefold by 2050 in com-
parison to 2010 levels. Freight demand has historically been closely 
coupled to GDP, but there is potential for future decoupling. Over the 
long term, changes in activity growth rates (with respect to 2010) for 
430 – 530 ppm CO2eq scenarios from integrated models suggest that 
decoupling freight transport demand from GDP can take place earlier 
than for passenger travel. Modest decreases in freight activity per dol-
lar of GDP suggest that a degree of relative decoupling between freight 
and income has been occurring across developed countries includ-
ing Finland (Tapio, 2005), the UK (McKinnon, 2007a) and Denmark 
(Kveiborg and Fosgerau, 2007). Two notable exceptions are Spain and 
South Korea, which are at relatively later stages of economic develop-
ment (Eom et  al., 2012). Where decoupling has occurred, it is partly 
associated with the migration of economic activity to other countries 
(Corbertt and Winebrake, 2008; Corbertt and Winebrake, 2011). See 
Sections 3.9.5 and 5.4.1 for a broader discussion of leakage. Opportu-
nities for decoupling could result from a range of changes, including a 
return to more localized sourcing (McKinnon, 2007b); a major shift in 
the pattern of consumption to services and products of higher value; 
the digitization of media and entertainment; and an extensive appli-
cation of new transport-reducing manufacturing technologies such as 
3-D printing (Birtchnell et al., 2013). 
Due to the increases in total transport demand, fuel consumption also 
increases over time, but with GHG emissions at a lower level if policies 
toward decarbonization of fuels and reduced energy intensity of vehi-
cles are successfully implemented. The integrated scenarios suggest 
that energy intensity reductions for both passenger and freight trans-
port could continue to occur if the present level of fuel economy stan-
dards are sustained over time, or could decrease further with more 
stringent concentration goals (Figure 8.11). 
Projected reductions in energy intensity for freight transport scenarios 
(EJ / bn t-km) in the scenarios show a wider spread (large ranges in 
Figure 8.11 between the 25th and 75th percentiles) than for passen-
gers, but still tend to materialize over time. Aviation and road transport 
have higher energy intensities than rail and waterborne transport (Fig-
ure 8.6). Therefore, they account for a larger share of emissions than 
their share of meeting service demands (Girod et al., 2013). However, 
limited data availability makes the assessment of changes in modal 
structure challenging as not all integrated models provide information 
at a sufficiently disaggregated level or fully represent structural and 
behavioural choices. Sectoral studies suggest that achieving signifi-
cant reductions in aviation emissions will require reductions in the rate 
of growth of travel activity through demand management alongside 
technological advances (Bows et al., 2009). 
In addition to energy intensity reductions, fuel carbon intensity can be 
reduced further in stringent mitigation scenarios and play an important 
role in the medium term with the potential for continued improvement 
throughout the century (Figure 8.11). Scenarios suggest that fuel switch-
Figure 8�11 | Normalized energy intensity scenarios (indexed relative to 2010 values) out to 2100 for passenger (left panel) and freight transport (centre panel), and for fuel car-
bon intensity based on scenarios from integrated models grouped by CO2eq concentration levels by 2100 (right panel). Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10). Note 
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ing does not occur to a great extent until after 2020 – 2030 (Fig 8.12) 
after which it occurs sooner in more stringent concentration scenarios. 
The mix of fuels and technologies is difficult to foresee in the long term, 
especially for road transport, but liquid petroleum fuels tend to domi-
nate at least up until 2050 even in the most stringent mitigation sce-
nario. Within some sectoral studies, assumed breakthroughs in biofuels, 
fuel cell vehicles, and electrification of road vehicles help achieve deep 
reductions in emissions by 2050 (Kahn Ribeiro et  al., 2012; Williams 
et al., 2012). Other studies are less confident about fuel carbon intensity 
reductions, arguing that advanced biofuels, low-carbon electricity, and 
hydrogen will all require time to make substantial contributions to miti-
gation efforts. They therefore attribute greater potential for emission 
reductions to structural and behavioural changes (Salter et al., 2011). 
Model assumptions for future technology cost, performance, regula-
tory environment, consumer choice, and fuel prices result in differ-
ent shares of fuels that could replace fossil fuels (Table 8.3; Krey and 
Clarke, 2011). Availability of carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) 
is also likely to have major impact on fuel choices (Luckow et al., 2010; 
Sathaye et al., 2011). Uncertainty is evident by the wide ranges in all 
the pathways considered, and are larger after 2050 (Bastani et  al., 
2012; Wang et al., 2012; Pietzcker et al., 2013). In terms of direct emis-
sions reductions, biofuels tend to have a more important role in the 
period leading up to 2050. In general, integrated models have been 
criticized as being optimistic on fuel substitution possibilities, spe-
cifically with respect to lifecycle emission assumptions and hence the 
utilization of biofuels (Sections 8.3 and 11.A.4; Creutzig et al., 2012a; 
Pietzcker et  al., 2013). However, scenarios from integrated models 
are consistent with sectoral scenarios with respect to fuel shares in 
2050 (Figure  8.12). Within the integrated model scenarios, deeper 
emissions reductions associated with lower CO2eq concentrations in 
2100 are consistent with increasing market penetration of low-carbon 
electricity and hydrogen in the latter part of the century. Uncertainties 
as to which fuel becomes dominant, as well as on the role of energy 
efficiency improvements and fuel savings, are relevant to the strin-
gent mitigation scenarios (van der Zwaan et al., 2013). Indeed, many 
scenarios show no dominant transport fuel source in 2100, with the 
median values for electricity and hydrogen sitting between a 22 – 25 % 
share of final energy, even for scenarios consistent with limiting con-
centrations to 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq in 2100 (Figure 8.12). 
Both the integrated and sectoral model literature present energy effi-
ciency measures as having the greatest promise and playing the larg-
est role for emission reductions in the short term (Skinner et al., 2010; 
Harvey, 2012; IEA, 2009; McKinnon and Piecyk, 2009; Sorrell et  al., 
2012). Since models typically assume limited cost reduction impacts, they 
include slow transitions for new transport technologies to reach large 
cumulative market shares. For example, a range of both sectoral and inte-
grated studies note that it will take over 15 – 20 years for either BEVs or 
FCVs to become competitive with ICE vehicles (Baptista et al., 2010; Epp-
stein et al., 2011; IEA, 2011c; Girod et al., 2012; Girod et al., 2013; Bosetti 
and Longden, 2013; van der Zwaan et al., 2013). Since integrated models 
do not contain a detailed representation of infrastructural changes, their 
results can be interpreted as a conservative estimate of possible changes 
to vehicles, fuels, and modal choices (Pietzcker et al., 2013). 
The sectoral literature presents a more positive view of transforma-
tional opportunities than do the integrated models (IEA, 2008, 2012b; 
DOE / EIA, 2010; Kahn Ribeiro et al., 2012). Sectoral studies suggest 
that up to 20 % of travel demand could be reduced by avoided jour-
neys or shifts to low-carbon modes (McCollum and Yang, 2009; Har-
vey, 2012; IEA, 2012d; Kahn Ribeiro et al., 2012; Anable et al., 2012; 
<Beginpic>
Figure 8�12 | Global shares of final fuel energy in the transport sector in 2020, 2050, and 2100 based on integrated models grouped by CO2eq concentration levels by 2100 and 
compared with sectoral models (grouped by baseline and policies) in 2050. Box plots show minimum / maximum, 25th / 75th percentile and median. Source: Integrated models — WG 
III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10). Sectoral models — IEA, 2012; IEA, 2011b; IEA, 2008; WEC, 2011a; EIA, 2011 and IEEJ, 2011. 
Note: Interpretation is similar to that for Figs. 8.9 and 8.10, except that the boxes between the 75th and 25th percentiles for integrated model results have different colours to 
highlight the fuel type instead of GHG concentration categories. The specific observations from sectoral studies are shown as black dots
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Huo and Wang, 2012). They also estimate that urban form and infra-
structure changes can play decisive roles in mitigation, particularly in 
urban areas where 70 % of the world’s population is projected to live 
in 2050 (Chapter 8.4 and 12.4), although the estimated magnitude 
varies between 5 % and 30 % (Ewing, 2007; Creutzig and He, 2009; 
Echenique et  al., 2012). Altogether, for urban transport, 20 – 50 % 
reduction in GHG emissions is possible between 2010 and 2050 com-
pared to baseline urban development (Ewing, 2007; Eliasson, 2008; 
Creutzig and He, 2009; Lefèvre, 2009; Woodcock et  al., 2009; Ewing 
and Cervero, 2010; Marshall, 2011; Echenique et al., 2012; Viguié and 
Hallegatte, 2012; Salon et al., 2012; Creutzig et al., 2012a). Since the 
lead time for infrastructure development is considerable (Short and 
Kopp, 2005), such changes can only be made on decadal time scales. 
Conversely, some developing countries with fast growing economies 
have shown that rapid transformative processes in spatial develop-
ment and public transport infrastructure are possible. Further advances 
may be gaining momentum with a number of significant initiatives for 
reallocating public funding to sustainable and climate-friendly trans-
port (Bongardt et al., 2011; Wittneben et al., 2009; ADB, 2012; New-
man and Matan, 2013).
8�9�2 Sustainable development
Within all scenarios, the future contribution of emission reductions from 
developing countries carries especially large uncertainties. The accel-
Box 8�1 | Transport and sustainable development in developing countries
Passenger and freight mobility are projected to double in devel-
oping countries by 2050 (IEA, 2012e). This increase will improve 
access to markets, jobs, education, healthcare and other services 
by providing opportunities to reduce poverty and increase equity 
(Africa Union, 2009; Vasconcellos, 2011; United Nations Human 
Settlements Programme, 2012). Well-designed and well-managed 
transport infrastructure can also be vital for supporting trade and 
competitiveness (United Nations Human Settlements Programme, 
2012). Driven by urbanization, a rapid transition from slow non-
motorized transport modes to faster modes using 2- or 3- wheel-
ers, LDVs, buses, and light rail is expected to continue (Schäfer 
et al., 2009; Kumar, 2011). In rural areas of Africa and South Asia, 
the development of all-season, high-quality roads is becoming 
a high priority (Africa Union, 2009; Arndt et al., 2012). In many 
megacities, slum area development in peri-urban fringes confines 
the urban poor to a choice between low paying jobs near home 
or long commuting times for marginally higher wages (Burdett 
and Sudjic, 2010). The poor have limited options to change living 
locations and can afford few motorized trips, so they predomi-
nantly walk, which disproportionally burdens women and children 
(Anand and Tiwari, 2006; Pendakur, 2011). The urban poor in OECD 
cities have similar issues (Glaeser, 2011). Reducing vulnerability to 
climate change requires integrating the mobility needs of the poor 
into planning that can help realize economic and social develop-
ment objectives (Amekudzi et al., 2011; Bowen et al., 2012). 
Total transport emissions from non-OECD countries will likely 
surpass OECD emissions by 2050 due to motorization, increasing 
population and higher travel demand (Figure 8.10). However, esti-
mated average personal travel per capita in non-OECD countries 
at will remain below the average in OECD countries. With coun-
tries facing limits to transport infrastructure investment (Arndt 
et al., 2012), the rapid mobility trends represents a major chal-
lenge in terms of traffic congestion, energy demand, and related 
GHG emissions (IEA, 2012a). Failure to manage the growth of 
motorized mobility in the near term will inevitably lead to higher 
environmental cost and greater difficulty to control emissions in 
the long term (Schäfer et al., 2009; Pietzcker et al., 2013). 
A high modal share of public transport use characterizes develop-
ing cities (Estache and GóMez-Lobo, 2005) and this prevalence 
is expected to continue (Deng and Nelson, 2011; Cuenot et al., 
2012). However, deficient infrastructure and inadequate services 
leads to the overloading of para-transit vans, minibuses, jeeps and 
shared taxis and the use of informal transport services (Cervero 
and Golub, 2011). By combining technologies, providing new 
social arrangements, and incorporating a long-term sustainability 
and climate perspective to investment decisions, these services 
can be recast and maintained as mobility resources since they 
service the poor living in inaccessible areas at affordable prices 
(Figueroa et al., 2013). A central strategy that can have multiple 
health, climate, environmental, and social benefits is to invest in 
the integration of infrastructure systems that connect safe routes 
for walking and cycling with local public transport, thus giving it 
priority over infrastructure for LDVs that serve only a small share 
of the population (Woodcock et al., 2009; Tiwari and Jain, 2012). 
Opportunities for strategic sustainable urban transport devel-
opment planning exist that can be critical to develop medium 
sized cities where population increases are expected to be large 
(Wittneben et al., 2009; ADB, 2012b; Grubler et al., 2012). Vision, 
leadership, and a coherent programme for action, adaptation, and 
consolidation of key institutions that can harness the energy and 
engagement of all stakeholders in a city will be needed to achieve 
these goals (Dotson, 2011). Today, more than 150 cities worldwide 
have implemented bus rapid transit (BRT) systems. Innovative 
features such as electric transit buses (Gong et al., 2012) and the 
ambitious high-speed rail expansion in China provide evidence of 





erated pace with which both urbanization and motorization are pro-
ceeding in many non-OECD countries emphasizes serious constraints 
and potentially damaging developments. These include road and public 
transport systems that are in dire condition; limited technical and finan-
cial resources; the absence of infrastructure governance; poor legal 
frameworks; and rights to innovate that are needed to act effectively 
and improve capacity competences (Kamal-Chaoui and Plouin, 2012; 
Lefèvre, 2012). The outcome is a widening gap between the growth of 
detrimental impacts of motorization and effective action (Kane, 2010; 
Li, 2011; Vasconcellos, 2011). A highly complex and changing context 
with limited data and information further compromise transport sus-
tainability and mitigation in non-OECD countries (Dimitriou, 2006; 
Kane, 2010; Figueroa et al., 2013). The relative marginal socio-economic 
costs and benefits of various alternatives can be context sensitive with 
respect to sustainable development (Amekudzi, 2011). Developing the 
analytical and data capacity for multi-objective evaluation and priority 
setting is an important part of the process of cultivating sustainability 
and mitigation thinking and culture in the long-term. 
Potentials for controlling emissions while improving accessibility and 
achieving functional mobility levels in the urban areas of rapidly grow-
ing developing countries can be improved with attention to the man-
ner in which the mobility of the masses progresses in their transition 
from slower (walking / cycling) to faster motorized modes (Kahn Ribeiro 
et al., 2012). A major shift towards the use of mass public transport 
guided by sustainable transport principles, including the maintenance 
of adequate services and safe infrastructure for non-motorized trans-
port, presents the greatest mitigation potential (Bongardt et al., 2011; 
La Branche, 2011). Supporting non-motorized travel can often provide 
access and also support development more effectively, more equitably, 
and with fewer adverse side-effects, than if providing for motorized 
travel (Woodcock et al., 2007). Transport can be an agent of sustained 
urban development that prioritizes goals for equity and emphasizes 
accessibility, traffic safety, and time savings for the poor with minimal 
detriment to the environment and human health, all while reducing 
emissions (Amekudzi et  al., 2011; Li, 2011; Kane, 2010). The choice 
among alternative mitigation measures in the transport sector can 
be supported by growing evidence on a large number of co-benefits, 
while some adverse side effects exist that need to be addressed or 
minimized (see Section 8.7) (Figueroa and Kahn Ribeiro, 2013; Creutzig 
and He, 2009; Creutzig et al., 2012a, b; Zusman et al., 2012). 
8.10 Sectoral policies
Aggressive policy intervention is needed to significantly reduce fuel 
carbon intensity and energy intensity of modes, encourage travel by 
the most efficient modes, and cut activity growth where possible and 
reasonable (see Sections 8.3 and 8.9). In this section, for each major 
transport mode, policies and strategies are briefly discussed by policy 
type as regulatory or market-based, or to a lesser extent as informa-
tional, voluntary, or government-provided. A full evaluation of poli-
cies across all sectors is presented in Chapters 14 and 15. Policies to 
support sustainable transport can simultaneously provide co-benefits 
(Table 8.4) such as improving local transport services and enhanc-
ing the quality of environment and urban living, while boosting both 
climate change mitigation and energy security (ECMT, 2004; WBCSD, 
2004, 2007; World Bank, 2006; Banister, 2008; IEA, 2009; Bongardt 
et al., 2011; Ramani et al., 2011; Kahn Ribeiro et al., 2012). The type 
of policies, their timing, and chance of successful implementation are 
context dependent (Santos et al., 2010). Diverse attempts have been 
made by transport agencies in OECD countries to define and measure 
policy performance (OECD, 2000; CST, 2002; Banister, 2008; Ramani 
et al., 2011). The mobility needs in non-OECD countries highlight the 
importance of placing their climate-related transport policies in the 
context of goals for broader sustainable urban development goals (see 
Section 8.9; Kahn Ribeiro et al., 2007; Bongardt et al., 2011). 
Generally speaking, market-based instruments, such as carbon cap and 
trade, are effective at incentivizing all mitigation options simultane-
ously (Flachsland et al., 2011). However, vehicle and fuel suppliers as 
well as end-users, tend to react weakly to fuel price signals, such as 
fuel carbon taxes, especially for passenger travel (Creutizig et al., 2011; 
Yeh and McCollum, 2011). Market policies are economically more effi-
cient at reducing emissions than fuel carbon intensity standards (Hol-
land et  al., 2009; Sperling and Yeh, 2010; Chen and Khanna, 2012; 
Holland, 2012). However, financial instruments, such as carbon taxes, 
must be relatively large to achieve reductions equivalent to those pos-
sible with regulatory instruments. As a result, to gain large emissions 
reductions a suite of policy instruments will be needed (NRC, 2011c; 
Sperling and Nichols, 2012), including voluntary schemes, which have 
been successful in some circumstances, such as for the Japanese airline 
industry (Yamaguchi, 2010). 
8�10�1 Road transport
A wide array of policies and strategies has been employed in differ-
ent circumstances to restrain private LDV use, promote mass transit 
modes, manage traffic congestion and promote new fuels in order to 
reduce fossil fuel use, air pollution, and GHG emissions. These policies 
and strategies overlap considerably, often synergistically. 
The magnitude of urban growth and population redistribution from 
rural to urban areas in emerging and developing countries is expected 
to continue (see Sections 8.2 and 12.2). This implies a large increase 
in demand for motorized transport especially in medium-size cities 
(Grubler et al., 2012). In regions and countries presently with low lev-
els of LDV ownership, opportunities exist for local and national gov-
ernments to manage future rising road vehicle demand in ways that 
support economic growth, provide broad social benefits (Wright and 





in bounds. Local history and social culture can help shape the specific 
problem, together with equity implications and policy aspirations that 
ultimately determine what will become acceptable solutions (Vascon-
cellos, 2001; Dimitriou, 2006; Kane, 2010; Li, 2011; Verma et al., 2011).
Even if non-OECD countries pursue strategies and policies that encour-
age LDV use for a variety of economic, social, and environmental moti-
vations, per capita LDV travel in 2050 could remain far below OECD 
countries. However, in many OECD countries, passenger LDV travel 
demand per capita appears to have begun to flatten, partly driven 
by increasing levels of saturation and polices to manage increased 
road transport demand (Section 8.2.1; Millard-Ball and Schipper, 
2011; Schipper, 2011; Goodwin, 2012; IEA, 2012c; Meyer et al., 2012). 
Even if this OECD trend of slowing growth in LDV travel continues or 
even eventually heads downwards, it is unlikely to offset projected 
growth in non-OECD LDV travel or emissions because those popula-
tions and economies are likely to continue to grow rapidly along with 
LDV ownership. Only with very aggressive policies in both OECD and 
non-OECD countries would total global LDV use stabilize in 2050. 
This is illustrated in a 2 °C LDV transport scenario generated by Fulton 
et  al. (2013), using mainly IEA (2012c) data. In that policy scenario, 
LDV travel in OECD countries reaches a peak of around 7500 vehicle 
km / capita in 2035 then drops by about 20 % by 2050. By comparison, 
per capita LDV travel in non-OECD countries roughly quadruples from 
an average of around 500 vehicle km / capita in 2012 to about 2000 
vehicle km / capita in 2050, remaining well below the OECD average. 
Many countries have significant motor fuel taxes that, typically, have 
changed little in recent years. This indicates that such a market instru-
ment is not a policy tool being used predominantly to reduce GHG 
emissions. The typical approach increasingly being used is a suite of 
regulatory and other complementary policies with separate instru-
ments for vehicles and for fuels. The challenge is to make them consis-
tent and coherent. For instance, the fuel efficiency and GHG emission 
standards for vehicles in Europe and the United States give multiple 
credits to plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) and fuel cell vehicles (FCVs). 
Zero upstream emissions are assigned, although this is technically 
incorrect but designed to be an implicit subsidy (Lutsey and Sperling, 
2012).
Fuel choice and carbon intensity10. Flexible fuel standards that 
combine regulatory and market features include the Californian low-
carbon fuel standard (LCFS) (Sperling and Nichols, 2012) and the Euro-
pean Union fuel quality directive (FQD). Fuel carbon intensity reduction 
targets for 2020 (10 % for California and 6 % for EU) are expected to 
be met by increasing use of low-carbon biofuels, hydrogen, and elec-
tricity. They are the first major policies in the world premised on the 
measurement of lifecycle GHG intensities (Yeh and Sperling, 2010; 
Creutzig et  al., 2011), although implementation of lifecycle analyses 
can be challenging and sometimes misleading since it is difficult to 
10 The following four sub-sections group policies along the lines of the decomposi-
tion as outlined in 8.1 and Figure 8.2
design implementable rules that fully include upstream emissions 
(Lutsey and Sperling, 2012); emissions resulting from induced market 
effects; and emissions associated with infrastructure, the manufactur-
ing of vehicles, and the processing and distribution of fuels (for LCA 
see Annex II.6.3 Kendall and Price, 2012).
Biofuel policies have become increasingly controversial as more scru-
tiny is applied to the environmental and social equity impacts (Section 
11.13). In 2007, the European Union and the United States adopted 
aggressive biofuel policies (Yeh and Sperling, 2013). The effectiveness 
of these policies remains uncertain, but follow-up policies such as 
California’s LCFS and EU’s FQD provide broader, more durable policy 
frameworks that harness market forces (allowing trading of credits), 
and provide flexibility to industry in determining how best to reduce 
fuel carbon intensity. Other related biofuel policies include subsidies 
(IEA, 2011d) and mandatory targets (REN21, 2012). 
Vehicle energy intensity. The element of transport that shows the 
greatest promise of being on a trajectory to achieve large reductions in 
GHG emissions by 2050 is reducing the energy and fuel carbon intensi-
ties of LDVs. Policies are being put in place to achieve dramatic 
improvements in vehicle efficiency, stimulating automotive companies 
to make major investments. Many countries have now adopted aggres-
sive targets and standards (Figure 8.13), with some standards criticized 
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Figure 8�13 | Historic emissions and future (projected and mandated) carbon dioxide 
emissions targets for LDVs in selected countries and European Union, normalized by 
using the same New European Driving Cycle (NDEC) that claims to represent real-world 
driving conditions. Source: ICCT (2007, 2013) 
Notes: (1) China’s target reflects gasoline LDVs only and may become higher if new 
energy vehicles are considered. (2) Gasoline in Brazil contains 22 % ethanol but data 






































for not representing real-world conditions (Mock et  al., 2012). Most 
are developed countries, but some emerging economies, including 
China and India, are also adopting increasingly aggressive standards 
(Wang et al., 2010).
Regulatory standards focused on fuel consumption and GHG emissions 
vary in their design and stringency. Some strongly stimulate reductions 
in vehicle size (as in Europe) and others provide strong incentives to 
reduce vehicle weight (as in the United States) (CCC, 2011). All have 
different reduction targets. As of April 2010, 17 European countries 
had implemented taxes on LDVs wholly or partially related to CO2 
emissions. Regulatory standards require strong market instruments 
and align market signals with regulations as they become tighter 
over time. Examples are fuel and vehicle purchase taxes and circula-
tion taxes that can limit rebound effects. Several European countries 
have established revenue-neutral feebate schemes (a combination of 
rebates awarded to purchasers of low carbon emission vehicles and 
fees charged to purchasers of less efficient vehicles) (Greene and Plot-
kin, 2011). Annual registration fees can have similar effects if linked 
directly with carbon emissions or with related vehicle attributes such 
as engine displacement, engine power, or vehicle weight (CARB, 2012). 
One concern with market-based policies is their differential impact 
across population groups such as farmers needing robust vehicles to 
traverse rugged terrain and poor quality roads. Equity adjustments can 
be made so that farmers and large families are not penalized for hav-
ing to buy a large car or van (Greene and Plotkin, 2011).
Standards are likely to spur major changes in vehicle technology, but 
in isolation are unlikely to motivate significant shifts away from petro-
leum-fuelled ICE vehicles. In the United States, a strong tightening of 
standards through to 2025 is estimated to trigger only a 1 % market 
share for PEVs if only economics is considered (EPA, 2011).
A more explicit regulatory instrument to promote EVs and other new, 
potentially very-low carbon propulsion technologies is a zero emis-
sion vehicle mandate, as originally adopted by California in 1990 to 
improve local air quality, and which now covers almost 30 % of the 
United States market. This policy, now premised on reducing GHGs, 
requires about 15 % of new vehicles in 2025 to be a mix of PEVs and 
FCVs (CARB, 2012). 
There are large potential efficiency improvements possible for medium 
and heavy-duty vehicles (HDVs) (see Section 8.3.1.2), but policies to 
pursue these opportunities have lagged those for LDVs. Truck types, 
loads, applications, and driving cycles are much more varied than for 
LDVs and engines are matched with very different designs and loads, 
thereby complicating policy-making. However, China implemented 
fuel consumption limits for HDVs in July 2012 (MIIT, 2011); in 2005 
Japan set modest fuel efficiency standards to be met by 2015 (Ata-
bani et al., 2011); California, in 2011, required compulsory retrofits to 
reduce aerodynamic drag and rolling resistance (Atabani et al., 2011); 
the United States adopted standards for new HDVs and buses manu-
factured from 2014 to 2018 (Greene and Plotkin, 2011); and the EU 
intends to pursue similar actions including performance standards and 
fuel efficiency labelling by 2014 (Kojima and Ryan, 2010). Aggressive 
air pollution standards since the 1990s for NOx and particulate matter 
emissions from HDVs in many OECD countries have resulted in a fuel 
consumption penalty in the past of 7 % to 10 % (IEA, 2009; Tourlonias 
and Koltsakis, 2011). However, emission technology improvements and 
reductions in black carbon emissions, which strongly impact climate 
change (see Section 8.2.2.1), will offset some of the negative effect of 
this increased fuel consumption. 
Activity reduction. A vast and diverse mix of policies is used to restrain 
and reduce the use of LDVs, primarily by focusing on land use patterns, 
public transport options, and pricing. Other policy strategies to reduce 
activity include improving traffic management (Barth and Boriboonsom-
sin, 2008), better truck routing systems (Suzuki, 2011), and smart real-
time information to reduce time searching for a parking space. Greater 
support for innovative services using information and communication 
technologies, such as dynamic ride sharing and demand-responsive 
para-transit services (see Section 8.4), creates still further opportunities 
to shift toward more energy efficient modes of travel.
Policies can be effective at reducing dependence on LDVs as shown 
by comparing Shanghai with Beijing, which has three times as many 
LDVs even though the two cities have similar levels of affluence, the 
same culture, and are of a similar population (Hao et al., 2011). Shang-
hai limited the ownership of LDVs by establishing an expensive license 
auction, built fewer new roads, and invested more in public transport, 
whereas Beijing built an extensive network of high capacity express-
ways and did little to restrain car ownership or use until recently. The 
Beijing city administration has curtailed vehicle use by forbidding cars 
to be used one day per week since 2008, and sharply limited the num-
ber of new license plates issued each year since 2011 (Santos et al., 
2010) Hao et al., 2011). The main aims to reduce air pollution, traffic 
congestion, and costs of road infrastructure exemplify how policies to 
reduce vehicle use are generally, but not always, premised on non-GHG 
co-benefits. European cities have long pursued demand reduction strat-
egies, with extensive public transport supply, strict growth controls, 
and more recent innovations such as bicycle sharing. California seeks 
to create more liveable communities by adopting incentives, policies, 
and rules to reduce vehicle use, land use sprawl, and GHG emissions 
from passenger travel. The California law calls for 6 – 8 % reduction in 
GHG emissions from passenger travel per capita (excluding changes 
in fuel carbon intensity and vehicle energy intensity) in major cities by 
2020, and 13 – 16 % per capita by 2035 (Sperling and Nichols, 2012). 
The overall effectiveness of initiatives to reduce or restrain road vehicle 
use varies dramatically depending on local commitment and local cir-
cumstances, and the ability to adopt synergistic policies and practices by 
combining pricing, land use management, and public transport measures. 
A broad mix of policies successfully used to reduce vehicle use in OECD 
countries, and to restrain growth in emerging economies, includes pric-
ing to internalize energy, environmental, and health costs; strengthening 





Policies to reduce LDV activity can be national, but mostly they are local, 
with the details varying from one local administration to another. 
Some policies are intrinsically more effective than others. For instance, 
fuel taxes will reduce travel demand but drivers are known to be rela-
tively inelastic in their response (Hughes et al., 2006; Small and van 
Dender, 2007). However, drivers are more elastic when price increases 
are planned and certain (Sterner, 2007). Pricing instruments such as 
congestion charges, vehicle registration fees, road tolls and parking 
management can reduce LDV travel by inducing trip chaining, modal 
shifts, and reduced use of cars (Litman, 2006). Policies and practices 
of cities in developing countries can be influenced by lending prac-
tices of development banks, such as the Rio+20 commitment to spend 
approximately 170 billion USD2010 on more sustainable transport proj-
ects, with a focus on Asia (ADB, 2012c).  
System efficiency. Improvements have been far greater in freight 
transport and aviation than for surface passenger transport (rail and 
road). Freight transport has seen considerable innovation in container-
ization and intermodal connections, as has aviation, though the effects 
on GHG emissions are uncertain (and could be negative because of 
just-in-time inventory management practices). For surface passenger 
travel, efforts to improve system efficiency and inter-modality are hin-
dered by conflicting and overlapping jurisdictions of many public and 
private sector entities and tensions between fiscal, safety, and equity 
goals. Greater investment in roads than in public transport occurred in 
most cities of developed countries through the second half of the 20th 
century (Owens, 1995; Goodwin, 1999). The 21st century, though, has 
seen increasing government investment in bus rapid transit and rail 
transit in OECD countries (Yan and Crookes, 2010; Tennøy, 2010) along 
with increasing support for bicycle use. 
Since the 1960s, many cities have instigated supportive policies and 
infrastructure that have resulted in a stable growth in cycling (Servaas, 
2000; Hook, 2003; TFL, 2007; NYC, 2012). Several European cities have 
had high cycle transport shares for many years, but now even in Lon-
don, UK, with efficient public transport systems, the 2 % cycle share 
of travel modes is targeted to increase to 5 % of journeys in 2026 as 
a result of a range of new policies (TFL, 2010). However, in less devel-
oped cities such as Surabaya, Indonesia, 10 % of total trips between 
1 – 3 km are already by cycling (including rickshaws) in spite of unsup-
portive infrastructure and without policies since there are few afford-
able alternatives (Hook, 2003). Where cycle lanes have been improved, 
as in Delhi, greater uptake of cycling is evident (Tiwari and Jain, 2012).
8�10�2 Rail transport
Rail transport serves 28 billion passengers globally, carrying them 
around 2500 billion p-km / yr11. Rail also carries 11.4 billion tonne of 
11 By way of comparison, aviation moves 2.1 billion passengers globally (some 3900 
billion p-km / yr).
freight (8845 billion t-km / yr) (Johansson et al., 2012). Policies to fur-
ther improve system efficiency may improve competitiveness and 
opportunities for modal shift to rail (Johansson et al., 2012). Specific 
energy and carbon intensities of rail transport are relatively small com-
pared to some other modes (see Section 8.3). System efficiency can 
also be assisted through train driver education and training policies 
(Camagni et al., 2002).
Fuel intensity. Roughly one third of all rail transport is driven by die-
sel and two-thirds by electricity (Johansson et  al., 2012). Policies to 
reduce fuel carbon intensity are therefore linked to a large extent to 
those for decarbonizing electricity production (Chapter 7; DLR, 2012). 
For example, Sweden and Switzerland are running their rail systems 
using very low carbon electricity (Gössling, 2011).
Energy intensity. Driven largely by corporate strategies, the energy 
intensity of rail transport has been reduced by more than 60 % 
between 1980 and 2001 in the United States (Sagevik, 2006). Overall 
reduction opportunities of 45 – 50 % are possible for passenger trans-
port in the EU and 40 – 50 % for freight (Andersson et al., 2011). Recent 
national policies in the United Kingdom and Germany appear to have 
resulted in 73 % rail freight growth over the period 1995 – 2007, partly 
shifted from road freight.
System efficiency. China, Europe, Japan, Russia, United States and 
several Middle-eastern and Northern African countries continue (or are 
planning) to invest in high-speed rail (HSR) (CRC, 2008). It is envis-
aged that the worldwide track length of about 15,000 km in 2012 will 
nearly triple by 2025 due to government supporting policies, allowing 
HSR to better compete with medium haul aviation (UIC, 2012). 
8�10�3 Waterborne transport 
Although waterborne transport is comparatively efficient in terms of 
gCO2 / t-km compared to other freight transport modes (see Section 
8.6), the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has adopted man-
datory measures to reduce GHG emissions from international shipping 
(IMO, 2011). This is the first mandatory GHG reduction regime for an 
international industry sector and for the standard to be adopted by all 
countries is a model for future international climate change co-opera-
tion for other sectors (Yamaguchi, 2012). Public policies on emissions 
from inland waterways are nationally or regionally based and currently 
focus more on the reduction of NOx and particulate matter than on 
CO2. However, policy measures are being considered to reduce the 
carbon intensity of this mode including incentives to promote ‘smart 
steaming’, upgrade to new, larger vessels, and switch to alternative 
fuels, mainly LNG (Panteia, 2013). Few if any, policies support the use 
of biofuels, natural gas or hydrogen for small waterborne craft around 
coasts or inland waterways and little effort has been made to assess 
the financial implications of market (and other) policies on developing 
countries who tend to import and export low value-to-weight prod-





Energy intensity� IMO’s Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) is to 
be phased in between 2013 and 2025. It aims to improve the energy 
efficiency of certain categories of new ships and sets technical stan-
dards (IMO, 2011). However, the EEDI may not meet the target if ship-
ping demand increases faster than fuel carbon and energy intensi-
ties improve. The voluntary Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan 
(SEEMP) was implemented in 2013 (IMO, 2011). For different ship 
types and sizes it provides a minimum energy efficiency level. As much 
as 70 % reduction of emissions from new ships is anticipated with the 
aim to achieve approximately 25 – 30 % reductions overall by 2030 
compared with business-as-usual (IISD, 2011). It is estimated that, in 
combination, EEDI requirements and SEEMP will cut CO2 emissions 
from shipping by 13 % by 2020 and 23 % by 2030 compared to a ‘no 
policy’ baseline (Lloyds Register and DNV, 2011).   
8�10�4 Aviation
After the Kyoto Protocol directed parties in Annex I to pursue inter-
national aviation GHG emission limitation / reduction working through 
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) (Petersen, 2008), 
member states are working together with the industry towards vol-
untarily improving technologies, increasing the efficient use of air-
port infrastructure and aircraft, and adopting appropriate economic 
measures (ICAO, 2007b; ICAO, 2010a). In 2010, ICAO adopted global 
aspirational goals for the international aviation sector to improve fuel 
efficiency by an average of 2 % per annum until 2050 and to keep 
its global net carbon emissions from 2020 at the same level (ICAO, 
2010b). These goals exceed the assumptions made in many scenarios 
(Mayor and Tol, 2010).
Policy options in place or under consideration include regulatory 
instruments (fuel efficiency and emission standards at aircraft or sys-
tem levels); market-based approaches (emission trading under caps, 
fuel taxes, emission taxes, subsidies for fuel efficient technologies); 
and voluntary measures including emission offsets (Daley and Preston, 
2009). Environmental capacity constraints on airports also exist and 
may change both overall volumes of air transport and modal choice 
(Upham et  al., 2004; Evans, 2010). National policies affect mainly 
domestic aviation, which covers about 30 – 35 % of total air transport 
(IATA, 2009; Lee et  al., 2009; Wood et  al., 2010). A nationwide cap-
and-trade policy could have the unintended consequence of slow-
ing aircraft fleet turnover and, through diverted revenue, of delaying 
technological upgrades, which would slow GHG reductions, though 
to what degree is uncertain (Winchester et  al., 2013). In the UK, an 
industry group including airport companies, aircraft manufacturers and 
airlines has developed a strategy for reducing GHG emissions across 
the industry (Sustainable Aviation, 2012).
The EU is currently responsible for 35 % of global aviation emissions. 
The inclusion of air transport in the EU emission trading scheme (ETS) 
is the only binding policy to attempt to mitigate emissions in this sec-
tor (Anger, 2010; Petersen, 2008; Preston et  al., 2012). The applica-
bility of ETS policy to non-European routes (for flights to and from 
destinations outside the EU) (Malina et al., 2012) has been delayed 
for one year, but the directive continues to apply to flights between 
destinations in the EU following a proposal by the European Com-
mission in November 2012 in anticipation of new ICAO initiatives 
towards a global market-based mechanism for all aviation emissions 
(ICAO, 2012). 
Taxing fuels, tickets, or emissions may reduce air transport volume 
with elasticities varying between – 0.3 to – 1.1 at national and inter-
national levels, but with strong regional differences (Europe has 40 % 
stronger elasticities than most other world regions, possibly because 
of more railway options). Airport congestion adds considerable emis-
sions (Simaiakis and Balakrishnan, 2010) and also tends to moderate 
air transport demand growth to give a net reduction of emissions at 
network level (Evans and Schäfer, 2011). 
Fuel carbon intensity. Policies do not yet exist to introduce low-car-
bon biofuels. However, the projected GHG emission reductions from 
the possible future use of biofuels, as assumed by the aviation indus-
try, vary between 19 % of its adopted total emission reduction goal 
(Sustainable Aviation, 2008) to over 50 % (IATA, 2009),depending on 
the assumptions made for the other reduction options that include 
energy efficiency, improved operation and trading emission permits. 
Sustainable production issues also apply (see Section 8.3.3). 
Energy intensity. The energy efficiency of aircraft has improved his-
torically without any policies in force, but with the rate of fuel con-
sumption reducing over time from an initial 3 – 6 % in the 1950s to 
between 1 % and 2 % per year at the beginning of the 21st century 
(Pulles et al., 2002; Fulton and Eads, 2004; Bows et al., 2005; Peeters 
and Middel, 2007; Peeters et al., 2009). This slower rate of fuel reduc-
tion is possibly due to increasing lead-times required to develop, cer-
tify, and introduce new technology (Kivits et al., 2010). 
System efficiency. The interconnectedness of aviation services can 
be a complicating factor in adopting policies, but also lends itself to 
global agreements. For example, regional and national air traffic con-
trollers have the ability to influence operational efficiencies. The use 
of market policies to reduce GHG emissions is compelling because 
it introduces a price signal that influences mitigation actions across 
the entire system. But like other aspects of the passenger transport 
system, a large price signal is needed with aviation fuels to gain sig-
nificant reductions in energy use and emissions (Tol, 2007; Peeters 
and Dubois, 2010; OECD and UNEP, 2011). Complementary policies to 
induce system efficiencies include measures to divert tourists to more 
efficient modes such as high-speed rail. However, since short- and 
medium-haul aircraft now have similar energy efficiencies per passen-
ger km compared to LDVs (Figure 8.6), encouraging people to take 
shorter journeys (hence by road instead of by air), thereby reducing 
tourism total travel, has become more important (Peeters and Dubois, 
2010). No country has adopted a low-carbon tourism strategy (OECD 





8�10�5 Infrastructure and urban planning 
Urban form has a direct effect on transport activity (see Section 12.4). 
As a consequence, infrastructure policies and urban planning can pro-
vide major contributions to mitigation (see Section 12.5). A modal shift 
from LDVs to other surface transport modes could be partly incentiv-
ized by policy measures that impose physical restrictions as well as 
pricing regimes. For example, LDV parking management is a simple 
form of cost effective, pricing instrument (Barter et al., 2003; Litman, 
2006). Dedicated bus lanes, possibly in combination with a vehicle 
access charge for LDVs, can be strong instruments to achieving rapid 
shifts to public transport (Creutzig and He, 2009).
Policies that support the integration of moderate to high density 
urban property development with transit-oriented development strat-
egies that mix residential, employment, and shopping facilities can 
encourage pedestrians and cyclists, thereby giving the dual benefits of 
reducing car dependence and preventing urban sprawl (Newman and 
Kenworthy, 1996; Cervero, 2004; Olaru et  al., 2011). GHG emissions 
savings (Trubka et al., 2010a; Trubka et al., 2010b) could result in co-
benefits of health, productivity, and social opportunity (Trubka et al., 
2010c; Ewing and Cervero, 2010; Höjer et al., 2011) if LDV trips could 
be reduced using polycentric city design and comprehensive smart-
growth policies (Dierkers et al., 2008). Policies to support the building 
of more roads, airports, and other infrastructure can help relieve con-
gestion in the short term, but can also induce travel demand (Duranton 
and Turner, 2011) and create GHG emissions from construction (Ches-
ter and Horvath, 2009). 
8.11 Gaps in  knowledge 
and data 
The following gaps made assessing the mitigation potential of the 
transport sector challenging. 
Gaps in the basic statistics are still evident on the costs and energy 
consumption of freight transport, especially in developing countries. 
•	 Data and understanding relating to freight logistical systems and 
their economic implications are poor, as are the future effects 
on world trade of decarbonization and climate change impacts. 
Hence, it is difficult to design new low-carbon freight policies. 
•	 Future technological developments and costs of batteries, fuel 
cells, and vehicle designs are uncertain. 
•	 The infrastructure requirement for new low-carbon transport fuels 
is poorly understood. 
•	 Cost of components for novel vehicle powertrains cannot be deter-
mined robustly since rates of learning, cost decreases, and associ-
ated impacts are unknown.
•	 Assessments of mitigating transport GHG emissions, the global 
potential, and costs involved are inconsistent. 
•	 Prices of crude oil products fluctuate widely as do those for alter-
native transport fuels, leading to large variations in scenario mod-
elling assumptions. 
•	 A better knowledge of consumer travel behaviour is needed, par-
ticularly for aviation. 
•	 Limited understanding exists of how and when people will choose 
to buy and use new types of low-carbon vehicles or mobility ser-
vices (such as demand responsive transit or car-share). 
•	 There are few insights of behavioural economics to predict mobility 
systematically and whether producers will incorporate low-carbon 
technologies that may not maximize profit. 
•	 How travellers will respond to combinations of low-carbon strat-
egies (mixes of land use, transit, vehicle options) is especially 
important for fast-growing, developing countries where alternative 
modes to the car-centric development path could be deployed, is 
unknown. 
•	 Understanding how low-carbon transport and energy technologies 
will evolve (via experience curves and innovation processes) is not 
well developed. Most vehicles rely on stored energy, so there is 
a need to better understand the cost and energy density of non-
hydrocarbon energy storage mediums, such as batteries, super-
capacitors and pressure vessels.
•	 Decoupling of transport GHG from economic growth needs further 
elaboration, especially the policy frameworks that can enable this 
decoupling to accelerate in both OECD and non-OECD nations. 
•	 The rate of social acceptance of innovative concepts such as LDV 
road convoys, induction charging of electric vehicles, and driver-
less cars (all currently being demonstrated) is difficult to predict, as 
is the required level of related infrastructure investments. Recent 
rapid developments in metro systems in several cities illustrate 
how quickly new transport systems can be implemented when the 
demand, policies, and investments all come together and public 
support is strong.
8.12 Frequently Asked 
Questions
FAQ 8�1 How much does the transport sector 
contribute to GHG emissions and how is 
this changing?
The transport sector is a key enabler of economic activity and social 
connectivity. It supports national and international trade and a large 
global industry has evolved around it. Its greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions are driven by the ever-increasing demand for mobility and move-
ment of goods. Together, the road, aviation, waterborne, and rail trans-





energy-related CO2 emissions [Section 8.1]. Emissions have more than 
doubled since 1970 to reach 7.0 Gt CO2eq by 2010 with about 80 % of 
this increase coming from road vehicles. Black carbon and other aero-
sols, also emitted during combustion of diesel and marine oil fuels, are 
relatively short-lived radiative forcers compared with carbon dioxide 
and their reduction is emerging as a key strategy for mitigation [8.2].
Demands for transport of people and goods are expected to continue 
to increase over the next few decades [8.9]. This will be exacerbated 
by strong growth of passenger air travel worldwide due to improved 
affordability; by the projected demand for mobility access in non-OECD 
countries that are starting from a very low base; and by projected 
increases in freight movements. A steady increase of income per capita 
in developing and emerging economies has already led to a recent 
rapid growth in ownership and use of 2-wheelers, 3-wheelers and light 
duty vehicles (LDVs), together with the development of new transport 
infrastructure including roads, rail, airports, and ports.  
Reducing transport emissions will be a daunting task given the inevi-
table increases in demand.  Based on continuing current rates of growth 
for passengers and freight, and if no mitigation options are implemented 
to overcome the barriers [8.8], the current transport sector’s GHG emis-
sions could increase by up to 50 % by 2035 at continued current rates 
of growth and almost double by 2050 [8.9]. An increase of transport’s 
share of global energy-related CO2 emissions would likely result. How-
ever, in spite of lack of progress in many countries to date, new vehicle 
and fuel technologies, appropriate infrastructure developments including 
for non-motorized transport in cities, transport policies, and behavioural 
changes could begin the transition required [8.3, 8.4, 8.9].
FAQ 8�2 What are the main mitigation options 
and potentials for reducing GHG 
 emissions?
Decoupling transport from GDP growth is possible but will require 
the development and deployment of appropriate measures, advanced 
technologies, and improved infrastructure. The cost-effectiveness of 
these opportunities may vary by region and over time [8.6]. Delivering 
mitigation actions in the short-term will avoid future lock-in effects 
resulting from the slow turnover of stock (particularly aircraft, trains, 
and ships) and the long-life and sunk costs of infrastructure already in 
place [8.2, 8.4].  
When developing low-carbon transport systems, behavioural change and 
infrastructure investments are often as important as developing more 
efficient vehicle technologies and using lower-carbon fuels [8.1, 8.3]. 
•	 Avoidance: Reducing transport activity can be achieved by avoid-
ing unnecessary journeys, (for example by tele-commuting and 
internet shopping), and by shortening travel distances such as 
through the densification and mixed-zoning of cities. 
•	 Modal choice: Shifting transport options to more efficient modes 
is possible, (such as from private cars to public transport, walking, 
and cycling), and can be encouraged by urban planning and the 
development of a safe and efficient infrastructure. 
•	 Energy intensity: Improving the performance efficiency of air-
craft, trains, boats, road vehicles, and engines by manufacturers 
continues while optimizing operations and logistics (especially for 
freight movements) can also result in lower fuel demand.
•	 Fuel carbon intensity: Switching to lower carbon fuels and 
energy carriers is technically feasible, such as by using sustain-
ably produced biofuels or electricity and hydrogen when produced 
using renewable energy or other low-carbon technologies. 
These four categories of transport mitigation options tend to be inter-
active, and emission reductions are not always cumulative. For exam-
ple, an eco-driven, hybrid LDV, with four occupants, and fuelled by a 
low-carbon biofuel would have relatively low emissions per passenger 
kilometre compared with one driver travelling in a conventional gaso-
line LDV. But if the LDV became redundant through modal shift to pub-
lic and non-motorized transport, the overall emission reductions could 
only be counted once. 
Most mitigation options apply to both freight and passenger trans-
port, and many are available for wide deployment in the short term 
for land, air, and waterborne transport modes, though not equally and 
at variable costs [8.6]. Bus rapid transit, rail, and waterborne modes 
tend to be relatively carbon efficient per passenger or tonne kilometre 
compared with LDV, HDV, or aviation, but, as for all modes, this varies 
with the vehicle occupancy rates and load factors involved. Modal 
shift of freight from short- and medium-haul aircraft and road trucks 
to high-speed rail and coastal shipping often offers large mitigation 
potential [Table 8.3]. In addition, opportunities exist to reduce the 
indirect GHG emissions arising during the construction of infrastruc-
ture; manufacture of vehicles; and extraction, processing, and delivery 
of fuels.
The potentials for various mitigation options vary from region to 
region, being influenced by the stage of economic development, sta-
tus and age of existing vehicle fleet and infrastructure, and the fuels 
available in the region. In OECD countries, transport demand reduc-
tion may involve changes in lifestyle and the use of new informa-
tion and communication technologies. In developing and emerging 
economies, slowing the rate of growth of using conventional trans-
port modes with relatively high-carbon emissions for passenger and 
freight transport by providing affordable, low-carbon options could 
play an important role in achieving global mitigation targets. Poten-
tial GHG emissions reductions from efficiency improvements on new 
vehicle designs in 2030 compared with today range from 40 – 70 % for 
LDVs, 30 – 50 % for HDVs, up to 50 % for aircraft, and for new ships 
when combining technology and operational measures, up to 60 % 





Policy options to encourage the uptake of such mitigation options 
include implementing fiscal incentives such as fuel and vehicle taxes, 
developing standards on vehicle efficiency and emissions, integrating 
urban and transport planning, and supporting measures for infrastruc-
ture investments to encourage modal shift to public transport, walk-
ing, and cycling [8.10]. Pricing strategies can reduce travel demands 
by individuals and businesses, although successful transition of the 
sector may also require strong education policies that help to create 
behavioural change and social acceptance. Fuel and vehicle advances 
in the short to medium term will largely be driven through research 
investment by the present energy and manufacturing industries that 
are endeavouring to meet existing policies as well as to increase their 
market shares. However, in order to improve upon this business-as-
usual scenario and significantly reduce GHG emissions across the sec-
tor in spite of the rapidly growing demand, more stringent policies will 
be needed. To achieve an overall transition of the sector will require 
rapid deployment of new and advanced technology developments, 
construction of new infrastructure, and the stimulation of acceptable 
behavioural changes. 
FAQ 8�3 Are there any co-benefits associated 
with mitigation actions?
Climate change mitigation strategies in the transport sector can result 
in many co-benefits [8.7]. However, realizing these benefits through 
implementing those strategies depends on the regional context in 
terms of their economic, social, and political feasibility as well as hav-
ing access to appropriate and cost-effective advanced technologies. 
In developing countries where most future urban growth will occur, 
increasing the uptake, comfort, and safety of mass transit and non-
motorized transport modes can help improve mobility. In least devel-
oping countries, this may also improve access to markets and therefore 
assist in fostering economic and social development. The opportunities 
to shape urban infrastructure and transport systems to gain greater 
sustainability in the short- to medium-terms are also likely to be higher 
in developing and emerging economies than in OECD countries where 
transport systems are largely locked-in [8.4]. 
A reduction in LDV travel and ownership has been observed in sev-
eral cities in OECD countries, but demand for motorized road transport, 
including 2- and 3-wheelers, continues to grow in non-OECD nations 
where increasing local air pollution often results. Well-designed pol-
icy packages can help lever the opportunities for exploiting welfare, 
safety, and health co-benefits [8.10]. Transport strategies associated 
with broader policies and programmes can usually target several pol-
icy objectives simultaneously. The resulting benefits can include lower 
travel costs, improved mobility, better community health through 
reduced local air pollution and physical activities resulting from non-
motorized transport, greater energy security, improved safety, and 
time savings through reduction in traffic congestion. 
A number of studies suggest that the direct and indirect benefits of 
sustainable transport measures often exceed the costs of their imple-
mentation [8.6, 8.9]. However, the quantification of co-benefits and 
the associated welfare effects still need accurate measurement. In 
all regions, many barriers to mitigation options exist [8.8], but a wide 
range of opportunities are available to overcome them and give deep 
carbon reductions at low marginal costs in the medium- to long-term 
[8.3, 8.4, 8.6, 8.9]. Decarbonizing the transport sector will be challeng-
ing for many countries, but by developing well-designed policies that 
incorporate a mix of infrastructural design and modification, techno-
logical advances, and behavioural measures, co-benefits can result and 
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Transport. Techno-Economic Analysis of Energy and Greenhouse Gas Reduc-
tions. Royal Institute of Technology (KTH), Stockholm, 43 pp.
Andrade V�, O� B� Jensen, H� Harder, and J� C� O� Madsen (2011)� Bike Infrastruc-
tures and Design Qualities: Enhancing Cycling. Danish Journal of Geoinformat-
ics and Land Management 46, 65 – 80. Available at: http: / / ojs.statsbiblioteket.
dk / index.php / tka / article / view / 5734.
Anger, A� (2010)� Including aviation in the European emissions trading scheme: 
Impacts on the industry, CO2 emissions and macroeconomic activity in the EU. 
Journal of Air Transport Management 16(2), 100 – 105.
ANFAVEA (2012)� Carta da Anfavea June / 2012.
Arndt C�, P� Chinowsky, K� Strzepek, and J� Thurlow (2012)� Climate 
Change, Growth and Infrastructure Investment: The Case of Mozambique. 
Review of Development Economics 16, 463 – 475. doi: 10.1111 / j.1467-
9361.2012.00674.x, ISSN: 1467-9361.
Arteconi A�, C� Brandoni, D� Evangelista, and F� Polonara (2010)� Life-cycle 
greenhouse gas analysis of LNG as a heavy vehicle fuel in Europe. Applied 
Energy 87, 2005 – 2013. doi: 10.1016 / j.apenergy.2009.11.012, ISSN: 0306-
2619.
Arvizu, D�, P� Balaya, L� Cabeza, T� Hollands, A� Jager-Waldau, M� Kondo, C� 
Konseibo, V� Meleshko, W� Stein, Y� Tamaura, H� Xu, R� Zilles (2012)� Direct 
Solar Energy (Chapter 3). In: Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change 
Mitigation. Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
[O. Edenhofer, R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, K. Seyboth, P. Matschoss, S. Kadner, 
T. Zwickel, P. Eickemeier, G. Hansen, S. Schlömer, C. von Stechow (eds.)]. Cam-
bridge University Press, New York, USA, pp. 333 – 400. 
Ashton-Graham C� (2008)� Behavioural responses to peak oil and carbon pricing: 
Save 70 cents a litre by driving less. Planning and Transport Research Centre.
Ashton-Graham C�, M� Burgess, O� V� D� Vandersteen, and R� Salter (2011)� 
Influencing Travel Choices. TNA Guidebook Series. In: Technologies for Climate 
Change Mitigation — Transport. UNEP Riso Centre for Energy, Climate and Sus-
tainable Development, Roskilde, Denmark, pp. 58 – 68. ISBN: 978-87-550-3901-
8.
Ashton-Graham C�, and P� Newman (2013)� Living Smart in Australian House-
holds: Sustainability Coaching as an Effective Large-Scale Behaviour Change 
Strategy. In: The Global Challenge Of Encouraging Sustainable Living: Oppor-
tunities, Barriers, Policy and Practice. Edward Elgar, London, UK, pp. 181 – 207. 
Atabani A� E�, I� A� Badruddin, S� Mekhilef, and A� S� Silitonga (2011)� A review 
on global fuel economy standards, labels and technologies in the transporta-
tion sector. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 15, 4586 – 4610. doi: 
10.1016 / j.rser.2011.07.092, ISSN: 1364-0321.
Axsen J�, and K� S� Kurani (2012)� Characterizing Residential Recharge Poten-
tial for Plug-in Electric Vehicles. Transportation Research Board. Available at: 
http: / / trid.trb.org / view.aspx?id=1129899.
Bamberg S�, S� Fujii, M� Friman, and T� Gärling (2011)� Behaviour theory and 






Bandivadekar A�, K� Bodek, L� Cheah, C� Evans, T� Groode, J� Heywood, E� 
Kasseris, M� Kromer, and M� Weiss (2008)� On the Road in 2035: Reducing 
Transportation’s Petroleum Consumption and GHG Emissions. MIT Laboratory 
for Energy and the Environment, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 196 pp.
Banister D� (2008)� The sustainable mobility paradigm. Transport Policy 15, 73 – 80.
Banister D� (2011a)� The trilogy of distance, speed and time. Journal of Transport 
Geography 19, 950 – 959. doi: 10.1016 / j.jtrangeo.2010.12.004, ISSN: 0966-
6923.
Banister D� (2011b)� Cities, mobility and climate change. Special Section on Alter-
native Travel Futures 19, 1538 – 1546. doi: 10.1016 / j.jtrangeo.2011.03.009, 
ISSN: 0966-6923.
Baptista P�, M� Tomás, and C� Silva (2010)� Plug-in hybrid fuel cell vehicles 
market penetration scenarios. International Journal of Hydrogen Energy 35, 
10024 – 10030. doi: 10.1016 / j.ijhydene.2010.01.086.
Barla P�, B� Lamonde, L� F� Miranda-Moreno, and N� Boucher (2009)� Traveled 
distance, stock and fuel efficiency of private vehicles in Canada: price elas-
ticities and rebound effect. Transportation 36, 389 – 402. doi: 10.1007 / s11116-
009-9211-2, ISSN: 0049-4488, 1572 – 9435.
Barter P�, J� Kenworthy, and F� Laube (2003)� Lessons from Asia on Sustainable 
Urban Transport. In: Making Urban Transport Sustainable. Palgrave- Macmillan, 
Basingstoke UK, pp. 252 – 270. 
Barth M�, and K� Boriboonsomsin (2008)� Real-World Carbon Dioxide Impacts of 
Traffic Congestion. Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transporta-
tion Research Board 2058, 163 – 171. doi: 10.3141 / 2058-20, ISSN: 0361-1981.
Bassett D�, J� Pucher, R� Buehler, D� L� Thompson, and S� E� Crouter (2008)� 
Walking, Cycling, and Obesity Rates in Europe, North America, and Australia. 
Journal of Physical Activity and Health 5, 795 – 814. Available at: http: / / policy.
rutgers.edu / faculty / pucher / JPAH08.pdf.
Bastani P�, J� B� Heywood, and C� Hope (2012)� The effect of uncertainty on US 
transport-related GHG emissions and fuel consumption out to 2050. Trans-
portation Research Part A: Policy and Practice 46, 517 – 548. doi: 10.1016 / j.
tra.2011.11.011, ISSN: 0965-8564.
Baumgartner D� S�, and J� L� Schofer (2011)� Forecasting Call-N-Ride Productivity 
In Low-Density Areas. Transportation Research Board, Transportation Research 
Board 90th Annual Meeting, Washington DC, USA, 14 pp.
Beck L� (2009)� V2G — 10: A Text About Vehicle-to-Grid, the Technology Which 
Enables a Future of Clean and Efficient Electric-Powered Transportation. Self-
Published, Delaware, 331 pp.
Becker A�, S� Inoue, M� Fischer, and B� Schwegler (2012)� Climate change 
impacts on international seaports: knowledge, perceptions, and planning efforts 
among port administrators. Climatic Change 110, 5 – 29. ISSN: 0165-0009.
Bell M� L�, R� Goldberg, C� Hogrefe, P� L� Kinney, K� Knowlton, B� Lynn, J� Rosen-
thal, C� Rosenzweig, and J� A� Patz (2007)� Climate change, ambient ozone, 
and health in 50 US cities. Climatic Change 82, 61 – 76. doi: 10.1007 / s10584-
006-9166-7.
Birtchnell T�, J� Urry, C� Cook, and A� Curry (2013)� Freight Miles: The Impacts of 
3D Printing on Transport and Society. University of Lancaster, UK, 40 pp. Avail-
able at: http: / / www. academia. edu / 3628536 / Freight_Miles_The_Impacts_
of_3D_Printing_on_Transport_and_Society.
den Boer E�, H� Van Essen, F� Brouwer, E� Pastori, and A� Moizo (2011)� Poten-
tial of Modal Shift to Rail Transport. CE Delft, Delft, Netherlands, 119 pp. Avail-
able at: http: / / www. cedelft. eu / publicatie / potential_of_modal_shift_to_rail_
transport / 1163?PHPSESSID=85969a496d79705462017a60f30353cc.
den Boer E�, M� Otten, and H� Van Essen (2011)� STREAM International Freight 
2011: Comparison of various transport modes on an EU scale with the STREAM 
database. STREAM International Freight 2011. Available at: http: / / www. 
shortsea. be / html_nl / publicaties / documents / CEDelft-STREAMInternational 
Freight2011.pdf.
Bongardt D�, M� Breithaupt, and F� Creutzig (2010)� Beyond the Fossil City: 
Towards low Carbon Transport and Green Growth. GTZ working paper, Bang-
kok, Thailand.
Bongardt D�, F� Creutzig, H� Hüging, K� Sakamoto, S� Bakker, S� Gota, and S� 
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Gössling S�, J� P� Ceron, G� Dubois, and C� M� Hall (2009)� Hypermobile travellers. 
In: Climate Change and Aviation. S. Gössling, P. Upham, (eds.), Earthscan, pp. 
131 – 149. 
Gowri A�, K� Venkatesan, and R� Sivanandan (2009)� Object-oriented methodol-
ogy for intersection simulation model under heterogeneous traffic conditions. 
Advances in Engineering Software 40, 1000 – 1010. doi: 10.1016 / j.adveng-
soft.2009.03.015, ISSN: 0965-9978.
Grabow M� L�, S� N� Spak, T� Holloway, B� Stone, A� C� Mednick, and J� A� Patz 
(2012)� Air Quality and Exercise-Related Health Benefits from Reduced Car 
Travel in the Midwestern United States. Environmental Health Perspectives 
120, 68 – 76. doi: 10.1289 / ehp.1103440, ISSN: 0091-6765.
Graham-Rowe E�, B� Gardner, C� Abraham, S� Skippon, H� Dittmar, R� Hutchins, 
and J� Stannard (2012)� Mainstream consumers driving plug-in battery-
electric and plug-in hybrid electric cars: A qualitative analysis of responses and 
evaluations. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice 46, 140 – 153. 
doi: 10.1016 / j.tra.2011.09.008, ISSN: 0965-8564.
Greene D� L� (2010a)� How Consumers Value Fuel Economy: A Literature Review. 
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington DC, USA, 79 pp. Available 
at: http: / / www. epa. gov / otaq / climate / regulations / 420r10008.pdf.
Greene D� L� (2010b)� Measuring energy security: Can the United States 
achieve oil independence? Energy Policy 38, 1614 – 1621. doi: 10.1016 / j.
enpol.2009.01.041, ISSN: 0301-4215.
Greene D� L�, J� R� Kahn, and R� C� Gibson (1999)� Fuel Economy Rebound 
Effect for U. S. Household Vehicles. The Energy Journal 20, 1 – 31. Available at: 
http: / / ideas.repec.org / a / aen / journl / 1999v20-03-a01.html.
Greene D� L�, and S� E� Plotkin (2011)� Reducing greenhouse gas emissions from 
U. S. transportation. Pew Center on Global Climate Change.
Grubler A�, X� Bai, T� Buettner, S� Dhakal, D� Fisk, T� Ichinose, J� Keristead, G� 
Sammer, D� Satterthwaite, N� Schulz, N� Shah, J� Steinberger, and H� Weiz 
(2012)� Urban Energy Systems. In: Global Energy Assessment — Toward a Sus-
tainable Future. International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 
pp. 1307 – 1400. 
Gwilliam K� (2003)� Urban transport in developing countries. Transport Reviews 
23, 197 – 216. doi: 10.1080 / 01441640309893, ISSN: 0144-1647.
Gwilliam K� (2013)� Cities on the move — Ten years after. Urban Transport in 
Developing Countries: CODATU Special Issue 40, 3 – 18. doi: 10.1016 / j.ret-
rec.2012.06.032, ISSN: 0739-8859.
Haider M�, and E� J� Miller (2000)� Effects of Transportation Infrastructure and 
Location on Residential Real Estate Values Application of Spatial Autoregressive 
Techniques. Transportation Research Board, Washington DC, USA, 1 – 7 pp.
Hallmark S� L�, B� Wang, Y� Qiu, and R� Sperry (2013)� Evaluation of In-Use 
Fuel Economy for Hybrid and Regular Transit Buses. Journal of Transporta-
tion Technologies 03, 52 – 57. doi: 10.4236 / jtts.2013.31006, ISSN: 2160-0473, 
2160 – 0481.
Halzedine T�, A� Primdore, D� Belissen, and J� Hulskotte (2009)� EU 
Transport GHG: Routes to 2050? Technical Options to Reduce GHG for 
Non-Road Transport Modes. European Commission Directorate-Gen-
eral Environment, Brussels, Belgium, 58 pp. Available at: http: / / www. 
eutransportghg2050. eu / cms / assets / UPDATED-EU-Transport-GHG-2050-Paper-
3-Technical-options-for-non-road-modes-30-10-09.pdf.
Hamin E� M�, and N� Gurran (2009)� Urban form and climate change: Balancing 
adaptation and mitigation in the U. S. and Australia. Habitat International 33, 
238 – 245. doi: 10.1016 / j.habitatint.2008.10.005, ISSN: 0197-3975.
Handy S�, M� G� Boarnet, R� Ewing, and R� E� Killingsworth (2002)� How the 
built environment affects physical activity: Views from urban planning. 
American Journal of Preventive Medicine 23, 64 – 73. doi: 10.1016 / S0749-
3797(02)00475-0, ISSN: 0749-3797.
Hanjra M� A�, and M� E� Qureshi (2010)� Global water crisis and future food secu-
rity in an era of climate change. Food Policy 35, 365 – 377. doi: 10.1016 / j.food-
pol.2010.05.006, ISSN: 0306-9192.
Hankey, J� M� J�, and Brauer, M� (2012)� Health impacts of the built environment: 
within-urban variability in physical inactivity, air pollution, and ischemic heart 
disease mortality. Environmental Health Perspectives 120(2), 247 – 252.
Hao H�, H� Wang, and M� Ouyang (2011)� Comparison of policies on vehicle own-
ership and use between Beijing and Shanghai and their impacts on fuel con-






Hargroves C�, and M� Smith (2008)� The Natural Advantage of Nations. Earthscan, 
London, UK, 576 pp.
de Hartog J� J�, H� Boogaard, H� Nijland, and G� Hoek (2010)� Do the Health Ben-
efits of Cycling Outweigh the Risks? Environmental Health Perspectives 118, 
1109 – 1116. doi: 10.1289 / ehp.0901747, ISSN: 0091-6765.
Harvey L� D� D� (2012)� Global climate-oriented transportation scenarios. Energy 
Policy. doi: 10.1016 / j.enpol.2012.10.053, ISSN: 0301-4215.
Hawkins T� R�, O� M� Gausen, and A� H� Strømman (2012)� Environmental impacts 
of hybrid and electric vehicles — a review. The International Journal of Life 
Cycle Assessment 17, 997 – 1014. doi: 10.1007 / s11367-012-0440-9, ISSN: 
0948-3349, 1614 – 7502.
He J�, W� Wu, and Y� Xu (2010)� Energy Consumption of Locomotives in China Rail-
ways during 1975 – 2007. Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and 
Information Technology 10, 22 – 27. doi: 10.1016 / S1570-6672(09)60061-1, 
ISSN: 1570-6672.
Headicar P� (2013)� The Changing Spatial Distribution of the Population in England: 
Its Nature and Significance for “Peak Car.” Transport Reviews 33, 310 – 324. 
doi: 10.1080 / 01441647.2013.802751, ISSN: 0144-1647, 1464 – 5327.
Heath G� W�, R� C� Brownson, J� Kruger, R� Miles, K� E� Powell, and L� T� Ramsey 
(2006)� The effectiveness of urban design and land use and transport policies 
and practices to increase physical activity: a systematic review. Journal of Physi-
cal Activity & Health 3.
Henstra D�, C� Ruijgrok, and L� Tavasszy (2007)� Globalized trade, logistics and 
intermodality: European perspectives. Globalized Freight Transport, 135 – 163.
Highways Agency (2011)� Climate Change Risk Assessment. High Ways Agency 
Media Services.
Hill N�, C� Brannigan, R� Smokers, A� Schroten, H� van Essen, and I� Skin-
ner (2012)� Developing a Better Understanding of the Secondary Impacts 
and Key Sensitivities for the Decarbonisation of the EU’s Transport Sec-
tor by 2050. European Commission Directorate — General Climate Action 
and AEA Technology, Brussels, Belgium, 112 pp. Available at: http: / / www. 
eutransportghg2050. eu / cms / assets / Uploads / Reports / EU-Transport-GHG-
2050-II-Final-Report-29Jul12.pdf.
Hill J�, S� Polasky, E� Nelson, D� Tilman, H� Huo, L� Ludwig, J� Neumann, H� 
Zheng, and D� Bonta (2009)� Climate change and health costs of air emis-
sions from biofuels and gasoline. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sci-
ences 106, 2077 – 2082. doi: 10.1073 / pnas.0812835106.
Ho J� (2010)� The implications of Arctic sea ice decline on shipping. Marine Policy 
34, 713 – 715. doi: 10.1016 / j.marpol.2009.10.009, ISSN: 0308-597X.
Hochman G�, D� Rajagopal, and D� Zilberman (2010)� The effect of biofuels 
on crude oil markets. AgBioForum 13, 112 – 118. Available at: http: / / www. 
agbioforum. org / v13n2 / v13n2a03-hochman.htm.
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In 2010 buildings accounted for 32 % of total global final 
energy use, 19 % of energy-related GHG emissions (including 
electricity-related), approximately one-third of black carbon 
emissions, and an eighth to a third of F-gases (medium evidence, 
medium agreement). This energy use and related emissions may dou-
ble or potentially even triple by mid-century due to several key trends. 
A very important trend is the increased access for billions of people 
in developing countries to adequate housing, electricity, and improved 
cooking facilities. The ways in which these energy-related needs will be 
provided will significantly determine trends in building energy use and 
related emissions. In addition, population growth, migration to cities, 
household size changes, and increasing levels of wealth and lifestyle 
changes globally will all contribute to significant increases in building 
energy use. The substantial new construction that is taking place in 
developing countries represents both a significant risk and opportunity 
from a mitigation perspective. [Sections 9.1, 9.2]
In contrast to a doubling or tripling, final energy use may stay 
constant or even decline by mid-century, as compared to today’s 
levels, if today’s cost-effective best practices and technologies 
are broadly diffused (robust evidence, high agreement). The technol-
ogy solutions to realize this potential exist and are well demonstrated. 
Recent advances in technology, design practices and know-how, cou-
pled with behavioural changes, can achieve a two to ten-fold reduction 
in energy requirements of individual new buildings and a two to four-
fold reduction for individual existing buildings largely cost-effectively or 
sometimes even at net negative costs. New improved energy efficiency 
technologies have been developed as existing energy efficiency oppor-
tunities have been taken up, so that the potential for cost-effective 
energy efficiency improvement has not been diminishing. Recent devel-
opments in technology and know-how enable construction and retrofit 
of very low- and zero-energy buildings, often at little marginal invest-
ment cost, typically paying back well within the building lifetime (robust 
evidence, high agreement). In existing buildings 50 – 90 % energy sav-
ings have been achieved throughout the world through deep retrofits 
(medium evidence, high agreement). Energy efficient appliances, light-
ing, information communication (ICT), and media technologies can 
reduce the substantial increases in electricity use that are expected due 
to the proliferation of equipment types used and their increased owner-
ship and use (robust evidence, high agreement). [9.2, 9.3]
Strong barriers hinder the market uptake of these cost-effec-
tive opportunities, and large potentials will remain untapped 
without adequate policies (robust evidence, high agreement). These 
barriers include imperfect information, split incentives, lack of aware-
ness, transaction costs, inadequate access to financing, and industry 
fragmentation. In developing countries, corruption, inadequate service 
levels, subsidized energy prices, and high discount rates are additional 
barriers. Market forces alone are not likely to achieve the necessary 
transformation without external stimuli. Policy intervention addressing 
all stages of the building and appliance lifecycle and use, plus new 
business and financial models are essential. [9.8, 9.10]
There is a broad portfolio of effective policy instruments avail-
able to remove these barriers, some of them being implemented 
also in developing countries, thus saving emissions at large 
negative costs (robust evidence, high agreement). Overall, the his-
tory of energy efficiency programmes in buildings shows that 25 – 30 % 
efficiency improvements have been available at costs substantially 
lower than marginal supply. Dynamic developments in building-related 
policies in some developed countries have demonstrated the effec-
tiveness of such instruments, as total building energy use has started 
to decrease while accommodating continued economic, and in some 
cases, population growth. Building codes and appliance standards with 
strong energy efficiency requirements that are well enforced, tightened 
over time, and made appropriate to local climate and other conditions 
have been among the most environmentally and cost-effective. Net 
zero energy buildings are technically demonstrated, but may not always 
be the most cost- and environmentally effective solutions. Experience 
shows that pricing is less effective than programmes and regulation 
(medium evidence, medium agreement). Financing instruments, poli-
cies, and other opportunities are available to improve energy efficiency 
in buildings, but the results obtained to date are still insufficient to 
deliver the full potential (medium evidence, medium agreement). Com-
bined and enhanced, these approaches could provide significant further 
improvements in terms of both enhanced energy access and energy 
efficiency. Delivering low-carbon options raises major challenges for 
data, research, education, capacity building, and training. [9.10]
Due to the very long lifespans of buildings and retrofits there is 
a very significant lock-in risk pointing to the urgency of ambi-
tious and immediate measures (robust evidence, medium agree-
ment). Even if the most ambitious of currently planned policies are 
implemented, approximately 80 % of 2005 energy use in buildings 
globally will be ‘locked in’ by 2050 for decades, compared to a sce-
nario where today’s best practice buildings become the standard in 
new building construction and existing building retrofit. As a result, 
the urgent adoption of state-of-the-art performance standards, in both 
new and retrofit buildings, avoids locking-in carbon intensive options 
for several decades. [9.4]
In addition to technologies and architecture, behaviour, life-
style, and culture have a major effect on buildings’ energy use; 
three- to five-fold difference in energy use has been shown for 
provision of similar building-related energy service levels (limited 
evidence, high agreement). In developed countries, evidence indicates 
that behaviours informed by awareness of energy and climate issues can 
reduce demand by up to 20 % in the short term and 50 % of present 
levels by 2050. Alternative development pathways exist that can moder-
ate the growth of energy use in developing countries through the pro-
vision of high levels of building services at much lower energy inputs, 
incorporating certain elements of traditional lifestyles and architecture, 





ficiency’ has also been emerging, going beyond pure ‘efficiency’. Reduc-
ing energy demand includes rationally meeting floor space needs. [9.3]
Beyond energy cost savings, most mitigation options in this 
sector have other significant and diverse co-benefits (robust evi-
dence, high agreement). Taken together, the monetizable co-benefits of 
many energy efficiency measures alone often substantially exceed the 
energy cost savings and possibly the climate benefits (medium evidence, 
medium agreement), with the non-monetizable benefits often also 
being significant (robust evidence, high agreement). These benefits offer 
attractive entry points for action into policy-making, even in countries or 
jurisdictions where financial resources for mitigation are limited (robust 
evidence, high agreement). These entry points include, but are not lim-
ited to, energy security; lower need for energy subsidies; health (due to 
Table 9�1 | Summary of chapter’s main findings organized by major mitigation strategies (identities)





Building integrated RES 
(BiRES, BiPV). Fuel switching 
to low-carbon fuels such as 
electricity (9.4.1.2). Use of 
natural refrigerants to reduce 
halocarbon emissions (9.3.6). 
Advanced biomass stoves (9.3.8).
High-performance building envelope (HPE). 
Efficient appliances (EA). Efficient lighting (EL). 
Efficient Heating, Ventilation, and Air-Conditioning 
systems (eHVAC). Building automation and control 
systems (BACS). Daylighting, heat pumps, indirect 
evaporative cooling to replace chillers in dry 
climates, advances in digital building automation 
and control systems, smart meters and grids (9.3.2). 
Solar-powered desiccant dehumidification.
Passive House standard (PH). Nearly / net zero and 
energy plus energy buildings (NZEB) (9.3.3.3). 
Integrated Design Process (IDP). Urban planning 
(UP), (9.4.1). District heating / cooling (DH / C). 
Commissioning (C). Advanced building control 
systems (9.3.3.2). High efficiency distributed 
energy systems, co-generation, trigeneration, 
load levelling, diurnal thermal storage, 
advanced management (9.4.1.1). ‘Smart-grids’ 
(9.4.1.2). Utilization of waste heat (9.4.1.1)
Behavioural change 
(BC). Lifestyle 





use / emissions 
(versus 
baseline BAU)
Solar electricity generation 
through buildings’ roof-top 
photo voltaic (PV) installations: 
energy savings – 15 to – 58 % 
relative to BAU (Table 9.4)
– 9.5 % to – 68 % energy savings relative to 
BAU (Table 9.4). Energy savings from advanced 
appliances: Ovens: – 45 %; Microwave ovens: 
– 75 %; Dishwashers: up to – 45 %; Clothes washers: 
– 28 % (by 2030, globally); Clothes dryers: factor 
of 2 reduction; Air-conditioners: – 50 to – 75 %; 
Ceiling fans: – 50 to – 57 %; Office computers/
monitors: – 40 %; Circulation pumps for hydronic 
heating / cooling: – 40 % (by 2020, EU); Residential 
water heaters: factor of 4 improvement (Table 
9.3); Fuel savings: – 30 to – 60 %; Indoor air 
pollution levels from advanced biomass stoves (as 
compared to open fires): – 80 to – 90 % (9.3.8).
– 30 to – 70 % CO2 of BAU. PH & NZEB (new 
versus conventional building): – 83 % (residential 
heating energy) and – 50 % (commercial heating & 
cooling energy); Deep retrofits (DR): – 40 to – 80 % 
(residential, Europe); IDP: up to – 70 % (final energy 
by 2050; Table 9.4); Potential global building final 
energy demand reduction: – 5 % to – 27 % (IAMs ), 
– 14 % to – 75 % (bottom up models) (Fig. 9.21).
Energy savings by building type: (i) Detached 
single-family homes: – 50 – 75 % (total energy use); 
(ii) Multi-family housing: – 80 to – 90 % (space 
heating requirements); (iii) Multi-family housing 
in developing countries: – 30 % (cooling energy 
use), – 60 % (heating energy); (iv) Commercial 
buildings: – 25 % to – 50 % (total HVAC), – 30 
to – 60 % (lighting retrofits) (9.3.4.1).
– 20 to – 40 % of 
BAU. LSC about 




– Retrofit of separate measures: CCE: 0.01 – 0.10 
USD2010 / kWh (Fig. 9.13). Efficient Appliances: 
CCE: – 0.09 USD2010 / kWh / yr (9.3.4.2)
PH & NZEB (new, EU&USA): CCE: 0.2 – 0.7 
USD2010 / kWh (Figure 9.11, 9.12); DR 
(with energy savings of 60 – 75 %): CCE: 





CB: Energy security; lower need for energy subsidies; health and environmental benefits
CB: Employment impact; 
enhanced asset value of buildings; 
energy / fuel poverty alleviation. 
AE: Energy access / fuel poverty
CB: Employment; energy / fuel poverty alleviation; 
improved productivity / competitiveness; 
asset value of buildings; improved quality 
of life. AE: rebound and lock-in effects
CB: Employment impact; improved productivity 
and competitiveness; enhanced asset values of 
buildings; improved quality of life. AE: Rebound 
effect, lower lifecycle energy use of low-energy 
buildings in comparison to the conventional (9.3.9)
Key barriers Suboptimal measures, subsidies 
to conventional fuels
Transaction costs, access to financing, principal 
agent problems, fragmented market and 
institutional structures, poor feedback
Energy and infrastructure lock-in (9.4.2), 
path-dependency (9.4.2) fragmented 
market and institutional structures, 
poor enforcement of regulations
Imperfect information, 
risk aversion, cognitive 
and behavioural 
patterns, lack of 
awareness, poor 
personnel qualification
Key policies Carbon tax, feed-in tariffs 
extended for small capacity; soft 
loans for renewable technologies
Public procurement, appliance standards, 
tax exemptions, soft loans
Building codes, preferential loans, subsidised 
financing schemes, ESCOs, EPCs, suppliers‘ 
obligations, white certificates, IDP into Urban 
Planning, Importance of policy packages 
rather than single instruments (9.10.1.2)
Awareness raising, 
education, energy 
audits, energy labelling, 
building certificates 
& ratings, energy or 






reduced indoor and outdoor air pollution as well as fuel poverty alle-
viation) and environmental benefits; productivity and net employment 
gains; alleviated energy and fuel poverties as well as reduced energy 
expenditures; increased value for building infrastructure; improved 
comfort and services (medium evidence, high agreement). However, 
these are rarely internalized by policies, while a number of tools and 
approaches are available to quantify and monetize co-benefits that can 
help this integration (medium evidence, medium agreement). [9.7]
In summary, buildings represent a critical piece of a low-carbon 
future and a global challenge for integration with sustainable 
development (robust evidence, high agreement). Buildings embody 
the biggest unmet need for basic energy services, especially in develop-
ing countries, while much existing energy use in buildings in developed 
countries is very wasteful and inefficient. Existing and future buildings 
will determine a large proportion of global energy demand. Current 
trends indicate the potential for massive increases in energy demand 
and associated emissions. However, this chapter shows that build-
ings offer immediately available, highly cost-effective opportunities 
to reduce (growth in) energy demand, while contributing to meeting 
other key sustainable development goals including poverty alleviation, 
energy security, and improved employment. This potential is more fully 
represented in sectoral models than in many integrated models, as 
the latter do not represent any or all of the options to cost-effectively 
reduce building energy use. Realizing these opportunities requires 
aggressive and sustained policies and action to address every aspect 
of the design, construction, and operation of buildings and their equip-
ment around the world. The significant advances in building codes and 
appliance standards in some jurisdictions over the last decade already 
demonstrated that they were able to reverse total building energy use 
trends in developed countries to its stagnation or reduction. However, 
in order to reach ambitious climate goals, these standards need to be 
substantially strengthened and adopted for further jurisdictions, build-
ing types, and vintages. [9.6, 9.9, 9.10] Table 9.1 summarizes some 
main findings of the chapter by key mitigation strategy.
9.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to update the knowledge on the building sector 
since the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth 
Assessment Report (AR4) from a mitigation perspective. Buildings and 
activities in buildings are responsible for a significant share of GHG 
emissions, but they are also the key to mitigation strategies. In 2010, 
the building sector accounted for approximately 117 Exajoules (EJ) or 
32 % of global final energy consumption and 19 % of energy-related 
CO2 emissions; and 51 % of global electricity consumption. Buildings 
contribute to a significant amount of F-gas emissions , with large differ-
ences in reported figures due to differing accounting conventions, rang-
ing from around an eighth to a third of all such emissions (9.3.6). The 
chapter argues that beyond a large emission role, mitigation opportuni-
ties in this sector are also significant, often very cost-effective, and are 
in many times associated with significant co-benefits that can exceed 
the direct benefits by orders of magnitude. The sector has significant 
mitigation potentials at low or even negative costs. Nevertheless, with-
out strong actions emissions are likely to grow considerably — and they 
may even double by mid-century — due to several drivers. The chapter 
points out that certain policies have proven to be very effective and 
several new ones are emerging. As a result, building energy use trends 
have been reversed to stagnation or even reduction in some jurisdic-
tions in recent years, despite the increases in affluence and population. 
The chapter uses a novel conceptual framework, in line with the gen-
eral analytical framework of the contribution of Working Group III 
(WGIII) to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), which focuses on 
identities as an organizing principle. This section describes the iden-
tity decomposition Chapter 9 chooses to apply for assessing the litera-
ture, resting on the general identity framework described in Chapter 6. 
Building-related emissions and mitigation strategies have been decom-
posed by different identity logics. Commonly used decompositions use 
factors such as CO2 intensity, energy intensity, structural changes, and 
economic activity (Isaac and Van Vuuren, 2009; Zhang et al., 2009), as 
well as the IPAT (Income-Population-Affluence-Technology) approach 
(MacKellar et al., 1995; O’ Mahony et al., 2012). In this assessment, the 
review focuses on the main decomposition logic described in Chapter 
6, adopted and further decomposed into four identities key to driving 
building sector emissions: 
C O 2 = CI · TEI · SEI · A
where  CO 2  is the emissions from the building sector; (Identity 1) CI is the 
carbon intensity; (Identity 2) TEI is the technological energy intensity; 
(Identity 3) SEI is the structural\systemic energy intensity and (Identity 
4) A is the activity. For a more precise interpretation of the factors, the 
following conceptual equation demonstrates the different components: 
C O 2 =  



















in which FE is the final energy; UsefulE is the useful energy for a par-
ticular energy service (ES), as occurring in the energy conversion chain, 
and pop is population. Instead of population in the residential sector 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is often used as the main decompo-
sition factor for commercial building emissions. Because ES is often dif-
ficult to rigorously define and measure, and UsefulE and ES are either 
difficult to measure or little data are available, this chapter does not 
attempt a systematic quantitative decomposition, but rather focuses 
on the main strategic categories for mitigation based on the relation-
ship established in the previous equation:
C O 2 mitigation ≈  C Eff  ·  T Eff  · S I Eff  · DR
whereby (1)  C Eff , or carbon efficiency, entails fuel switch to low-carbon 
fuels, building-integrated renewable energy sources, and other supply-





the efficiency improvement of individual energy-using devices; (3) 
SI Eff , or systemic / infrastructural efficiency, encompass all efficiency 
improvements whereby several energy-using devices are involved, i. e., 
systemic efficiency gains are made, or energy use reductions due to 
architectural, infrastructural, and systemic measures; and finally (4) DR, 
or demand reduction, composes all measures that are beyond tech-
nological efficiency and decarbonization measures, such as impacts 
on floor space, service levels, behaviour, lifestyle, use, and penetration 
of different appliances. The four main emission drivers and mitigation 
strategies can be further decomposed into more distinct sub-strategies, 
but due to the limited space in this report and in order to maintain 
a structure that supports convenient comparison between different 
sectoral chapters, we focus on these four main identities during the 
assessment of literature in this chapter and use this decomposition as 
the main organizing / conceptual framework.
9.2 New  developments 
in emission trends 
and drivers
9�2�1 Energy and GHG emissions from 
 buildings
Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the building sector have more 
than doubled since 1970 to reach 9.18 GtCO2eq in 2010 (Figure 9.1), 
representing 25 % of total emissions without the Agriculture, Forestry, 
and Land Use (AFOLU) sector; and 19 % of all global 2010 GHG emis-
sions (IEA, 2012a; JRC / PBL, 2013; see Annex II.8). Furthermore, they 
account for approximately one-third of black carbon emissions (GEA, 
2012), and one-eighth to one-third of F-gas emissions, depending par-
tially on the accounting convention used (UNEP, 2011a; EEA, 2013; US 
EPA, 2013; JRC / PBL, 2013; IEA, 2012a; see Annex II.8).
Most of GHG emissions (6.02 Gt) are indirect CO2 emissions from elec-
tricity use in buildings, and these have shown dynamic growth in the 
studied period in contrast to direct emissions, which have roughly stag-
nated during these four decades (Figure 9.1). For instance, residential 
indirect emissions quintupled and commercial emissions quadrupled. 
Figure 9.2 shows the regional trends in building-related GHG emissions. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development (OECD) coun-
tries have the highest emissions, but the growth in this region between 
1970 and 2010 was moderate. For least developed countries, the emis-
sions are low with little growth. The largest growth has taken place in 
Asia where emissions in 1970 were similar to those in other developing 
regions, but by today they are closing in on those of OECD countries.
Due to the high share of indirect emissions in the sector, actual emission 
values very strongly depend on emission factors — mainly that of electric-
ity production — that are beyond the scope of this chapter. Therefore, the 
rest of this chapter focuses on final energy use (rather than emissions) 
that is determined largely by activities and measures within the sector.
In 2010 buildings accounted for 32 % (24 % for residential and 8 % for 
commercial) of total global final energy use (IEA, 2013), or 32.4 PWh, 
being one of the largest end-use sectors worldwide. Space heating rep-
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Box 9�1 | Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the context of the developing world
878 million people with an average 2 USD2010 per day of gross 
national income (The World Bank, 2013) live in the LDCs group. 
Rapid economic development, accompanied by urbanization, is 
propelling large building activity in developing countries (WBCSD, 
2007, 2009; ABC, 2008; Li and Colombier, 2009). The fast grow-
ing rates of new construction, which is occurring in emerging 
economies, is not being witnessed in LDCs. This group of countries 
is still at the fringe of modern development processes and has 
special needs in terms of access to housing, modern energy carri-
ers, and efficient and clean-burning cooking devices (Zhang and 
Smith, 2007; Duflo et al., 2008; WHO, 2009, 2011; Wilkinson et al., 
2009; Hailu, 2012; Pachauri, 2012). Around one-third of the urban 
population in developing countries in 2010 did not have access to 
adequate housing (UNHSP, 2010) and the number of slum dwell-
ers is likely to rise in the near future (UN-Habitat, 2011). In order 
to avoid locking in carbon-intensive options for several decades, 
a shift to electricity and modern fuels needs to be accompanied 
by energy-saving solutions (technological, architectural), as well 
as renewable sources, adequate management, and sustainable 
lifestyles (WBCSD, 2006; Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2009; Wilkinson 
et al., 2009; US EERE, 2011; GEA, 2012; Wallbaum et al., 2012). 
Modern knowledge and techniques can be used to improve ver-
nacular designs (Foruzanmehr and Vellinga, 2011). Principles of 
low-energy design often provide comfortable conditions much of 
the time, thereby reducing the pressure to install energy-intensive 
cooling equipment such as air conditioners. These principles are 
embedded in vernacular designs throughout the world, and have 
evolved over centuries in the absence of active energy systems. 
Beyond the direct energy cost savings, many mitigation options 
in this sector have significant and diverse co-benefits that offer 
attractive entry points for mitigation policy-making, even in 
countries / jurisdictions where financial resources for mitigation are 
limited. These co-benefits include, but are not limited to, energy 
security, air quality, and health benefits; reduced pressures to 
expand energy generation capacities in developing regions; pro-
ductivity, competitiveness, and net employment gains; increased 
social welfare; reduced fuel poverty; decreased need for energy 
subsidies and exposure to energy price volatility risks; improved 
comfort and services; and improved adaptability to adverse cli-
mate events (Tirado Herrero et al., 2012; Clinch and Healy, 2001; 
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resented 32 – 34 % of the global final energy consumption in both the 
residential and the commercial building sub-sectors in 2010 (Figure 
9.4). Moreover, in the commercial sub-sector, lighting was very impor-
tant, while cooking and water heating were significant end-uses in 
residential buildings. In contrast to the dynamically growing total emis-
sions, per capita final energy use did not grow substantially over the 
two decades between 1990 and 2010 in most world regions (see Figure 
9.3). This value stagnated in most regions during the period, except for a 
slight increase in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and a dynamic growth 
in North Africa and Middle East (MEA). Commercial energy use has also 
grown only moderately in most regions on a per capita basis, with more 
dynamic growth shown in Centrally Planned Asia (CPA), South Asia 
(SAS) and MEA. This indicates that most trends to drive building energy 
use up have been compensated by efficiency gains. In many developing 
regions this can largely be due to switching from traditional biomass to 
modern energy carriers that can be utilized much more efficiently.
As shown in Section 9.9 global building energy use may double to 
triple by mid-century due to several key trends. An estimated 0.8 bil-
lion people lack access to adequate housing (UN-Habitat, 2010) while 
an estimated 1.3 billion people lacked access to electricity in 2010 
and about 3 billion people worldwide relied on highly-polluting and 
unhealthy traditional solid fuels for household cooking and heating 
(IEA, 2012a; Pachauri et  al., 2012; see Section 14.3.2.1).The ways 
these energy services will be provided will significantly influence the 





cities, decreasing household size, increasing levels of wealth and life-
style changes, including an increase in personal living space, the types 
and number of appliances and equipment and their use — all contrib-
ute to significant increases in building energy use. Rapid economic 
development accompanied by urbanization and shifts from informal 
to formal housing is propelling significant building activity in develop-
ing countries (WBCSD, 2007). As a result, this substantial new con-
struction, which is taking place in these dynamically growing regions 
represents both a significant risk and opportunity from a mitigation 
perspective. 
9�2�2 Trends and drivers of thermal energy 
uses in buildings
Figure 9.5 shows projections of thermal energy uses in commercial and 
residential buildings in the regions of the world from 2010 to 2050. 
While energy consumption for thermal uses in buildings in the devel-
oped countries (see North America and Western Europe) accounts for 
most of the energy consumption in the world, its tendency is to grow 
little in the period shown, while developing countries show an impor-
tant increase. Commercial buildings represent between 10 to 30 % of 
total building sector thermal energy consumption in most regions of 
the world, except for China, where heating and cooling energy con-
sumption in commercial buildings is expected to overtake that of resi-
dential buildings. Drivers to these trends and their developments are 
discussed separately for heating / cooling and other building energy 
services because of conceptually different drivers. Heating and cooling 
energy use in residential buildings can be decomposed by the follow-
ing key identities: 













where energyresidential stands for the total residential thermal energy 
demand, [h] and [p / h] are the activity drivers, with [h] being the num-
ber of households and the p / h number of persons (p) living in each 
household, respectively. [area / p] is the use intensity driver, with the 
floor area (usually m2) per person; and [energy / area] is the energy 
intensity driver, i. e., the annual thermal energy consumption (usually 
kWh) per unit of floor area, also referred to as specific energy con-
sumption. For commercial buildings, the heating and cooling use is 
decomposed as 









where energycommercial stands for the total commercial thermal energy 
demand, [GDP], i. e., nominal Gross Domestic Product is the activity 
driver; [area / GDP] is the use intensity driver and [energy / area] is the 
energy intensity driver, the annual thermal energy consumption (in 
kWh) per unit of floor area (in m2), also referred to as specific energy 
consumption. Figures 9.6 and 9.7 illustrate the main trends in heating 
and cooling energy use as well as its drivers globally and by region.


























Figure 9�5 | Total annual final thermal energy consumption (PWh / yr) trends in eleven world regions (GEA RC11, see Annex II.2.4) for residential and commercial buildings (GEA 
region abbreviation added in brackets where different from abbreviation used in this report). Historical data (1980 – 2000) are from IEA statistics; projections (2010 – 2050) are 
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PAS Other Pacific Asia
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Heating and cooling energy use in residential and commercial build-
ings is expected to grow by 79 % and 84 %, respectively, over the 
period 2010 – 2050 (Figure 9.6) in a business-as-usual scenario. In resi-
dential buildings, both the growing number of households and the 
area per household tend to increase energy consumption, while the 
decrease in the number of persons per household and in specific 
energy consumption tend to decrease energy consumption. In com-
mercial buildings, the projected decrease of area / GDP is 61 %, while 
energy / area is expected to stay constant over the period 2010 – 2050. 
Different tendencies of the drivers are shown for both residential and 
commercial buildings in the world as whole (Figure 9.6) and in differ-
ent world regions (Figure 9.7). These figures indicate that in some 
regions (e. g., NAM and WEU), strong energy building policies are 
already resulting in declining or stagnating total energy use trends 
despite the increase in population and service levels.
9�2�3 Trends and drivers in energy consump-
tion of appliances in buildings
In this chapter, we use the word ‘appliances’ in a broad sense, cover-
ing all electricity-using non-thermal equipment in buildings, including 
lighting and ICT. Traditional large appliances, such as refrigerators and 
washing machines, are still responsible for most household electricity 
consumption (IEA, 2012c) albeit with a falling share related to the equip-
ment for information technology and communications (including home 
entertainment) accounting in most countries for 20 % or more of resi-
dential electricity consumption (Harvey, 2008). This rapid growth offers 
opportunities to roll out more efficient technologies, but this effect to 
date has been outcompeted by the increased uptake of devices and new 
devices coming to the market. Energy use of appliances can be decom-
posed as shown in the following equation from (Cabeza et al., 2013b):













Where ∑a is the sum overall appliances; [h] is the activity driver, the 
number of households; [n / h] is the use intensity driver, i. e., the num-
ber of appliances of appliance type ‘a’ per household; and [energy] is 
the energy intensity driver (kWh / yr used per appliance). The number 
of appliances used increased around the world. Figure 9.8 shows that 
the energy consumption of major appliances in non-OECD countries is 
already nearly equal to consumption in the OECD, due to their large 
populations and widespread adoption of the main white appliances 
and lighting. In addition, while fans are a minor end-use in most OECD 
countries, they continue to be extremely important in the warm devel-
oping countries.
Figure 9�6 | Trends in the different drivers for global heating and cooling thermal energy consumption in residential and commercial buildings. Source: Ürge-Vorsatz et al. (2013) 
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Figure 9�7 | Trends in the drivers of heating and cooling thermal energy consumption of residential (first page) and commercial (this page) buildings in world regions (GEA RC11, see 





9.3 Mitigation technology 
options and practices, 
behavioural aspects
This section provides a broad overview at the strategic and planning 
level of the technological options, design practices, and behavioural 
changes that can achieve large reductions in building energy use 
(50 % – 90 % in new buildings, 50 % – 75 % in existing buildings). Table 
9.2 summarizes the energy savings and CO2 emission reduction poten-
tial according to the factors introduced in Section 9.1 based on mate-
rial presented in this section or in references given. A synthesis of doc-
umented examples of large reductions in energy use achieved in real, 
new, and retrofitted buildings in a variety of different climates, and of 
costs at the building level, is presented in this section, while Section 
9.4 reviews the additional savings that are possible at the community 
level and their associated costs, and Section 9.6 presents a synthesis of 
studies of the costs, their trends, and with integrated potential calcula-
tions at the national, regional, and global levels.
9�3�1 Key points from AR4
The AR4 Chapter 6 on Buildings (Levine et  al., 2007) contains an 
extensive discussion of the wide range of techniques and designs to 
reduce energy use in new buildings. Savings at the system level are 
generally larger than for individual devices (pumps, motors, fans, heat-
ers, chillers, etc.), as are related net investment-cost savings — usually 
several times higher (Levine et  al., 2007; Harvey, 2008). Integrated 
Design Process (IDP) allows for the systemic approach, which opti-
mizes building performance iteratively, and involves all design team 
members from the start (Montanya et  al., 2009; Pope and Tardiff, 
2011). However, the conventional process of designing and construct-
ing a building and its systems is largely linear, in which design ele-
ments and system components are specified, built, and installed with-
out consideration of optimization opportunities in the following 
design and building phases, thus losing key opportunities for the opti-
mization of whole buildings as systems (Lewis, 2004). As discussed in 
AR4, essential steps in the design of low-energy buildings are: (1) 
building orientation, thermal mass, and shape; (2) high-performance 
envelope specification; (3) maximization of passive features (day-
lighting, heating, cooling, and ventilation); (4) efficient systems meet-
ing remaining loads; (5) highest possible efficiencies and adequate 
sizing of individual energy-using devices; and (6) proper commission-
ing of systems and devices. Cost savings can substantially offset addi-
tional high-performance envelope and higher-efficiency equipment 
costs, of around 35 – 50 % compared to standard practices of new 
commercial buildings (or 50 – 80 % with more advanced approaches). 
Retrofits can routinely achieve 25 – 70 % savings in total energy use 
(Levine et al., 2007; Harvey, 2009).
9�3�2 Technological developments 
since AR4
Since AR4, there have been important performance improvements 
and cost reductions in many relevant technologies, and further sig-
nificant improvements are expected. Examples include (1) daylighting 
and electric lighting (Dubois and Blomsterberg, 2011); (2) household 
appliances (Bansal et  al., 2011); (3) insulation materials (Baetens 
et al., 2011; Korjenic et al., 2011; Jelle, 2011); (4) heat pumps (Chua 
et al., 2010); (5) indirect evaporative cooling to replace chillers in dry 
climates (Jiang and Xie, 2010); (6) fuel cells (Ito and Otsuka, 2011); 
(7) advances in digital building automation and control systems 
(NBI, 2011); and (8) smart meters and grids as a means of reducing 
peak demand and accommodating intermittent renewable electric-
ity sources (Catania, 2012). Many of these measures can individually 
reduce the relevant specific energy use by half or more. In addition 
to the new technologies, practitioners have also increasingly applied 
more established technology and knowledge both in new building 
construction and in the existing building retrofits. These practices 
have been driven in part by targeted demonstration programmes in 
a number of countries. They have been accompanied by a progres-
sive strengthening of the energy provisions of building codes in 
many countries, as well as by plans for significant further tightening 
in the near future (see also Section 9.10). In the following sections 
we review the literature published largely since AR4 concerning the 
energy intensity of low-energy new buildings and of deep retrofits of 
existing buildings.
Table 9�2 | Savings or off-site energy use reductions achievable in buildings for various end uses due to on-site active solar energy systems, efficiency improvements, or behavioural 
changes.
End Use On-site C-Free Energy Supply(1) Device Efficiency System Efficiency Behavioural Change
Heating 20 % – 95 % (2) 30 %(3) – 80 %(4) 90 %(5) 10 % – 30 %(6)
Hot water 50 % – 100 % (7) 60 %(8) – 75 %(9) 40 %(10) 50 %(11)
Cooling 50 % – 80 % (12) 50 %(13) – 75 %(14) 67 %(15) 50 % – 67 %(16)
Cooking 0 – 30 % (17) 25 – 75 %(18) – 80 %(19) 50 %(20)
Lighting 10 – 30 % 75 %(21); 83 % – 90 %(22); 99.83 %(23) 80 % – 93 %(24) 70 %(25)
Refrigerators 40 % (25a) 30 %(26); 50 %(27)
Dishwashers 17+%(27a) 75 %(28)
Clothes washers 30 %(28a) 60 % – 85 %(29)
Clothes dryers 50+%(29a) 10 % – 15 %(30) – 100 %(31)
Office computers & monitors 40 %(31a)
General electrical loads 10 % – 120 %(32)
Notes: (1) Only active solar energy systems. Higher percentage contributions achievable if loads are first reduced through application of device, system, and behavioural efficiencies. 
Passive solar heating, cooling, ventilation, and daylighting are considered under Systemic Efficiency. (2) Space heating. Lower value representative of combi-systems in Europe; upper 
value is best solar district heating systems with seasonal underground thermal energy storage, after a 5-year spin-up (SAIC, 2013). (3) Replacement of 75 % efficient furnace / boiler 
with 95 % efficient unit (e. g., condensing natural gas boilers). (4) Replacement of 80 % efficient furnace or boiler with ground-source heat pump with a seasonal COP for space 
heating of 4 (from ground-source heat pumps in well-insulated new buildings in Germany (DEE, 2011). (5) Reduction from a representative cold-climate heating energy intensity of 
150 kWh / m2 / yr to 15 kWh / m2 / yr (Passive House standard, Section 9.3.2). (6) Typical value; 2 °C cooler thermostat setting at heating season. Absolute savings is smaller but relative 
savings is larger the better the thermal envelope of the building (see also Section 9.3.9). (7) Water heaters. 50 – 80 % of residential hot water needs supplied in Sydney, Australia 
and Germany (Harvey, 2007), while upper limit of 100 % is conceivable in hot desert regions. (8) Replacement of a 60 % efficient with a 95 % efficient water heater (typical of 
condensing and modulating wall-hung natural gas heaters). (9) Table 9.4. (10) Elimination of standby and distribution heat losses in residential buildings (typically accounting for 
30 % water-heating energy use in North America (Harvey, 2007) through use of point-of-use on- demand water heaters. (11) Shorter showers, switch from bathing to showering, and 
other hot-water-conserving behaviour. (12) Air conditioning and dehumidification. Range for systems from central to Southern Europe with a relatively large solar collector area in 
relation to the cooling load (Harvey, 2007). (13) Replacement of air conditioners having a COP of 3 (typical in North America) with others with a COP of 6 (Japanese units); Table 9.4. 
(14) Replacement of North American units with units incorporating all potential efficiency improvements; Table 9.4. (15) Reduction (even elimination) of cooling loads through better 
building orientation & envelopes, provision for passive cooling, and reduction of internal heat gains (Harvey, 2007). (16) Section 9.3.9. Fans during tolerable brief periods eliminating 
cooling equipment in moderately hot climates. (17) Cooking range, various ovens. (18) Range pertains to various kinds of ovens; Table 9.4. (19) Replacement of 10 % – 15 % with 60 % 
efficient (traditional biomass) cookstoves (Rawat et al., 2010). (20) Same recipe with different cooking practices; Table 9.4 / Section 9.3.9. (21) Replacement of 10 – 17 lm / W incandes-
cent lamps with 50 – 70 lm / W compact fluorescent (Harvey, 2010). (22) Replacement of 15 lm / W incandescent lamps with (year 2030) LEDs, 100 – 160 lm / W (McNeil et al., 2005; 
US DOE, 2006). (23) Replacement of 0.25 lm / W kerosene lamps (Fouquet and Pearson, 2006) with future 150 lm / W LEDs. (24) Reduction from average US office lighting energy 
intensity of the existing stock of 73 kWh / m2 / yr (Harvey, 2013) to 5 – 15 kWh / m2 / yr state-of-art systems (Harvey, 2013). (25) Turning off not needed lights (6000 hours / yr out of 8760 
hours / yr). (25a) Table 9.4 (26) 12.5 ft3vs 18.5 ft3 (350 litres, 350 kWh / yr vs 520 litres, 500 kWh / yr) refrigerator-freezers or 18.5 vs 30.5 ft3 (860 litres, 700 kWh / yr) (Harvey, 2010). (27) 
Elimination of a second (‘beer’) fridge. (27a) Table 9.4  (28) Fully loaded operation versus typical part-load operation (Table 9.4). (28a) by 2030 (Table 9.4).  (29) Cold compared to hot 
water washing, based on relative contribution of water heating to total clothes washer energy use for the best US&EU models (Harvey, 2010). (29a) Table 9.4. (30) Operation at full 
load rather than at one-third to half load (Smith, 1997). (31) Air drying inside when there is no space heating requirement, or outside. (31a) Table 9.4. (32) Fraction of on-site electricity 
demand typically generated by on-site PV with low demand kept low through electricity-efficiency measures.
Figure 9�8 | Residential electricity consumption by end-use in a policy scenario from 























































9�3�3 Exemplary New Buildings
This section presents an overview of the energy performance and 
incremental cost of exemplary buildings from around the world, based 
on the detailed compilation of high-performance buildings presented 
in Harvey (2013). The metrics of interest are the on-site energy inten-
sity — annual energy use per square meter of building floor area 
(kWh / m2 / yr) — for those energy uses (heating, cooling, ventilation, 
and lighting) that naturally increase with the building floor area, and 
energy use per person for those energy uses — such as service hot 
water, consumer electronics, appliances, and office equipment — that 
naturally increase with population or the size of the workforce. 
9�3�3�1 Energy intensity of new high-performance 
buildings
The energy performance of new buildings have improved considerably 
since AR4, as demonstrated in Table 9.3, which summarizes the specific 
energy consumption for floor-area driven final energy uses by climate 
type or region. 
A number of voluntary standards for heating energy use have been 
developed in various countries for residential buildings (see Table 1 in 
Harvey, 2013). The most stringent of standards with regard to heat-
ing requirements is the Passive House standard, which prescribes a 
ers, chillers, etc.), as are related net investment-cost savings — usually 
several times higher (Levine et  al., 2007; Harvey, 2008). Integrated 
Design Process (IDP) allows for the systemic approach, which opti-
mizes building performance iteratively, and involves all design team 
members from the start (Montanya et  al., 2009; Pope and Tardiff, 
2011). However, the conventional process of designing and construct-
ing a building and its systems is largely linear, in which design ele-
ments and system components are specified, built, and installed with-
out consideration of optimization opportunities in the following 
design and building phases, thus losing key opportunities for the opti-
mization of whole buildings as systems (Lewis, 2004). As discussed in 
AR4, essential steps in the design of low-energy buildings are: (1) 
building orientation, thermal mass, and shape; (2) high-performance 
envelope specification; (3) maximization of passive features (day-
lighting, heating, cooling, and ventilation); (4) efficient systems meet-
ing remaining loads; (5) highest possible efficiencies and adequate 
sizing of individual energy-using devices; and (6) proper commission-
ing of systems and devices. Cost savings can substantially offset addi-
tional high-performance envelope and higher-efficiency equipment 
costs, of around 35 – 50 % compared to standard practices of new 
commercial buildings (or 50 – 80 % with more advanced approaches). 
Retrofits can routinely achieve 25 – 70 % savings in total energy use 
(Levine et al., 2007; Harvey, 2009).
9�3�2 Technological developments 
since AR4
Since AR4, there have been important performance improvements 
and cost reductions in many relevant technologies, and further sig-
nificant improvements are expected. Examples include (1) daylighting 
and electric lighting (Dubois and Blomsterberg, 2011); (2) household 
appliances (Bansal et  al., 2011); (3) insulation materials (Baetens 
et al., 2011; Korjenic et al., 2011; Jelle, 2011); (4) heat pumps (Chua 
et al., 2010); (5) indirect evaporative cooling to replace chillers in dry 
climates (Jiang and Xie, 2010); (6) fuel cells (Ito and Otsuka, 2011); 
(7) advances in digital building automation and control systems 
(NBI, 2011); and (8) smart meters and grids as a means of reducing 
peak demand and accommodating intermittent renewable electric-
ity sources (Catania, 2012). Many of these measures can individually 
reduce the relevant specific energy use by half or more. In addition 
to the new technologies, practitioners have also increasingly applied 
more established technology and knowledge both in new building 
construction and in the existing building retrofits. These practices 
have been driven in part by targeted demonstration programmes in 
a number of countries. They have been accompanied by a progres-
sive strengthening of the energy provisions of building codes in 
many countries, as well as by plans for significant further tightening 
in the near future (see also Section 9.10). In the following sections 
we review the literature published largely since AR4 concerning the 
energy intensity of low-energy new buildings and of deep retrofits of 
existing buildings.
Table 9�2 | Savings or off-site energy use reductions achievable in buildings for various end uses due to on-site active solar energy systems, efficiency improvements, or behavioural 
changes.
End Use On-site C-Free Energy Supply(1) Device Efficiency System Efficiency Behavioural Change
Heating 20 % – 95 % (2) 30 %(3) – 80 %(4) 90 %(5) 10 % – 30 %(6)
Hot water 50 % – 100 % (7) 60 %(8) – 75 %(9) 40 %(10) 50 %(11)
Cooling 50 % – 80 % (12) 50 %(13) – 75 %(14) 67 %(15) 50 % – 67 %(16)
Cooking 0 – 30 % (17) 25 – 75 %(18) – 80 %(19) 50 %(20)
Lighting 10 – 30 % 75 %(21); 83 % – 90 %(22); 99.83 %(23) 80 % – 93 %(24) 70 %(25)
Refrigerators 40 % (25a) 30 %(26); 50 %(27)
Dishwashers 17+%(27a) 75 %(28)
Clothes washers 30 %(28a) 60 % – 85 %(29)
Clothes dryers 50+%(29a) 10 % – 15 %(30) – 100 %(31)
Office computers & monitors 40 %(31a)
General electrical loads 10 % – 120 %(32)
Notes: (1) Only active solar energy systems. Higher percentage contributions achievable if loads are first reduced through application of device, system, and behavioural efficiencies. 
Passive solar heating, cooling, ventilation, and daylighting are considered under Systemic Efficiency. (2) Space heating. Lower value representative of combi-systems in Europe; upper 
value is best solar district heating systems with seasonal underground thermal energy storage, after a 5-year spin-up (SAIC, 2013). (3) Replacement of 75 % efficient furnace / boiler 
with 95 % efficient unit (e. g., condensing natural gas boilers). (4) Replacement of 80 % efficient furnace or boiler with ground-source heat pump with a seasonal COP for space 
heating of 4 (from ground-source heat pumps in well-insulated new buildings in Germany (DEE, 2011). (5) Reduction from a representative cold-climate heating energy intensity of 
150 kWh / m2 / yr to 15 kWh / m2 / yr (Passive House standard, Section 9.3.2). (6) Typical value; 2 °C cooler thermostat setting at heating season. Absolute savings is smaller but relative 
savings is larger the better the thermal envelope of the building (see also Section 9.3.9). (7) Water heaters. 50 – 80 % of residential hot water needs supplied in Sydney, Australia 
and Germany (Harvey, 2007), while upper limit of 100 % is conceivable in hot desert regions. (8) Replacement of a 60 % efficient with a 95 % efficient water heater (typical of 
condensing and modulating wall-hung natural gas heaters). (9) Table 9.4. (10) Elimination of standby and distribution heat losses in residential buildings (typically accounting for 
30 % water-heating energy use in North America (Harvey, 2007) through use of point-of-use on- demand water heaters. (11) Shorter showers, switch from bathing to showering, and 
other hot-water-conserving behaviour. (12) Air conditioning and dehumidification. Range for systems from central to Southern Europe with a relatively large solar collector area in 
relation to the cooling load (Harvey, 2007). (13) Replacement of air conditioners having a COP of 3 (typical in North America) with others with a COP of 6 (Japanese units); Table 9.4. 
(14) Replacement of North American units with units incorporating all potential efficiency improvements; Table 9.4. (15) Reduction (even elimination) of cooling loads through better 
building orientation & envelopes, provision for passive cooling, and reduction of internal heat gains (Harvey, 2007). (16) Section 9.3.9. Fans during tolerable brief periods eliminating 
cooling equipment in moderately hot climates. (17) Cooking range, various ovens. (18) Range pertains to various kinds of ovens; Table 9.4. (19) Replacement of 10 % – 15 % with 60 % 
efficient (traditional biomass) cookstoves (Rawat et al., 2010). (20) Same recipe with different cooking practices; Table 9.4 / Section 9.3.9. (21) Replacement of 10 – 17 lm / W incandes-
cent lamps with 50 – 70 lm / W compact fluorescent (Harvey, 2010). (22) Replacement of 15 lm / W incandescent lamps with (year 2030) LEDs, 100 – 160 lm / W (McNeil et al., 2005; 
US DOE, 2006). (23) Replacement of 0.25 lm / W kerosene lamps (Fouquet and Pearson, 2006) with future 150 lm / W LEDs. (24) Reduction from average US office lighting energy 
intensity of the existing stock of 73 kWh / m2 / yr (Harvey, 2013) to 5 – 15 kWh / m2 / yr state-of-art systems (Harvey, 2013). (25) Turning off not needed lights (6000 hours / yr out of 8760 
hours / yr). (25a) Table 9.4 (26) 12.5 ft3vs 18.5 ft3 (350 litres, 350 kWh / yr vs 520 litres, 500 kWh / yr) refrigerator-freezers or 18.5 vs 30.5 ft3 (860 litres, 700 kWh / yr) (Harvey, 2010). (27) 
Elimination of a second (‘beer’) fridge. (27a) Table 9.4  (28) Fully loaded operation versus typical part-load operation (Table 9.4). (28a) by 2030 (Table 9.4).  (29) Cold compared to hot 
water washing, based on relative contribution of water heating to total clothes washer energy use for the best US&EU models (Harvey, 2010). (29a) Table 9.4. (30) Operation at full 
load rather than at one-third to half load (Smith, 1997). (31) Air drying inside when there is no space heating requirement, or outside. (31a) Table 9.4. (32) Fraction of on-site electricity 





heating load (assuming a uniform indoor temperature of 20°C) of no 
more than 15 kWh / m2 / yr irrespective of the climate. It typically entails a 
high-performance thermal envelope combined with mechanical ventila-
tion with heat recovery to ensure high indoor air quality. Approximately 
57,000 buildings complied with this standard in 31 European countries 
in 2012, covering 25.15 million square metres (Feist, 2012) with exam-
ples as far north as Helsinki, with significant additional floor area that 
meets or exceeds the standard but have not been certified due to the 
higher cost of certification. As seen from Table 9.3, this standard repre-
sents a factor of 6 – 12 reduction in heating load in mild climates (such 
as Southern Europe) and up to a factor of 30 reduction in cold climate 
regions where existing buildings have little to no insulation. Where 
buildings are not currently heated to comfortable temperatures, adop-
tion of a high-performance envelope can aid in achieving comfortable 
conditions while still reducing heating energy use in absolute terms. 
Cooling energy use is growing rapidly in many regions where, with 
proper attention to useful components of vernacular design combined 
with modern passive design principles, mechanical air conditioning 
would not be needed. This use includes regions that have a strong 
diurnal temperature variation (where a combination of external insula-
tion, exposed interior thermal mass, and night ventilation can maintain 
comfortable conditions), or a strong seasonal temperature variation 
(so that the ground can be used to cool incoming ventilation air) or 
which are dry, thereby permitting evaporative cooling or hybrid evapo-
rative / mechanical cooling strategies to be implemented. 
Combining insulation levels that meet the Passive House standard for 
heat demand in Southern Europe with the above strategies, heating 
loads can be reduced by a factor of 6 – 12 (from 100 – 200 kWh / m2 / yr 
to 10 – 15 kWh / m2 / yr) and cooling loads by a factor of 10 (from < 30 
kWh / m2 / yr to < 3 kWh / m2 / yr) (Schneiders et  al., 2009). With good 
design, comfortable conditions can be maintained ≥80 % of the time 
(and closer to 100 % of the time if fans are used) without mechanical 
cooling in relatively hot and humid regions such as Southern China 
(Ji et al., 2009; Zhang and Yoshino, 2010; Lin and Chuah, 2011), Viet-
nam (Nguyen et al., 2011), Brazil (Grigoletti et al., 2008; Andreasi et al., 
2010; Cândido et al., 2011), and the tropics (Lenoir et al., 2011). 
In commercial buildings, specific energy consumption of modern office 
and retail buildings are typically 200 – 500 kWh / m2 / yr including all 
end-uses, whereas advanced buildings have frequently achieved less 
than 100 kWh / m2 / yr in climates ranging from cold to hot and humid. 
The Passive House standard for heating has been achieved in a wide 
range of different types of commercial buildings in Europe. Sensible 
cooling loads (energy that must be removed from, e. g., the air inside 
a building) can typically be reduced by at least a factor of four com-
pared to recent new buildings — through measures to reduce cooling 
loads (often by a factor of 2 – 4) and through more efficient systems 
in meeting reduced loads (often a factor of two). Dehumidification 
energy use is less amenable to reduction but can be met through solar-
powered desiccant dehumidification with minimal non-solar energy 
requirements. Advanced lighting systems that include daylighting with 
appropriate controls and sensors, and efficient electric lighting systems 
(layout, ballasts, luminaires) typically achieve a factor of two reduc-
tion in energy intensity compared to typical new systems (Dubois and 
Blomsterberg, 2011).
9�3�3�2 Monitoring and commissioning of new and 
existing buildings
Commissioning is the process of systematically checking that all com-
ponents of building HVAC (Heating, Ventilation and Air Condition-
ing) and lighting systems have been installed properly and operate 
correctly. It often identifies problems that, unless corrected, increase 
energy use by 20 % or more, but is often not done (Piette et al., 2001). 
Advanced building control systems are a key to obtaining very low 
energy intensities in commercial buildings. It routinely takes over one 
year or more to adjust the control systems so that they deliver the 
expected savings (Jacobson et al., 2011) through detailed monitoring 
of energy use once the building is occupied. Wagner et al. (2007) give 
Table 9�3 | Typical and current best case specific energy consumption (kWh / m2 / yr) for building loads directly related to floor area (Harvey, 2013).
End Use Climate Region
Residential Commercial
Advanced Typical Advanced Typical
Heating Cold 15 – 30 60 – 200 15 – 30 75 – 250
Heating Moderate 10 – 20 40 – 100 10 – 30 40 – 100
Cooling Moderate 0 – 5 0 – 10 0 – 15 20 – 40
Cooling Hot-dry 0 – 10 10 – 20 0 – 10 20 – 50
Cooling Hot-humid 3 – 15 10 – 30 15 – 30 50 – 150
Ventilation All 4 – 8 0 – 8 0 – 20 10 – 50
Lighting All 2 – 4 3 – 10 5 – 20 30 – 80
Notes: Lighting energy intensity for residential buildings is based on typical modern intensities times a factor of 0.3 – 0.4 to account for an eventual transition to LED lighting. 
Definitions here for climate regions for heating: Cold > 3000 HDD; Moderate 1000 – 3000 HDD. Similarly for cooling: moderate < 750 CDD; hot-dry > 750 CDD; hot-humid > 750 





an example where monitoring of a naturally ventilated and passively 
cooled bank building in Frankfurt, Germany lead to a reduction in pri-
mary energy intensity from about 200 kWh / m2 / yr during the first year 
of operation to 150 kWh / m2 / yr during the third year (with a predicted 
improvement to 110 kWh / m2 / yr during the fourth year). Post-construc-
tion evaluation also provides opportunities for improving the design 
and construction of subsequent buildings (Wingfield et al., 2011).
9�3�3�3 Zero energy / carbon and energy plus 
buildings
Net zero energy buildings (NZEBs) refer to buildings with on-site 
renewable energy systems (such as PV, wind turbines, or solar thermal) 
that, over the year, generate as much energy as is consumed by the 
building. NZEBs have varying definitions around the world, but these 
typically refer to a net balance of on-site energy, or in terms of a net 
balance of primary energy associated with fuels used by the building 
and avoided through the net export of electricity to the power grid 
(Marszal et al., 2011). Space heating and service hot water has been 
supplied in NZEBs either through heat pumps (supplemented with 
electric resistance heating on rare occasions), biomass boilers, or fossil 
fuel-powered boilers, furnaces, or cogeneration. Musall et  al. (2010) 
identify almost 300 net zero or almost net zero energy buildings con-
structed worldwide (both commercial and residential). There have also 
been some NZE retrofits of existing buildings. Several jurisdictions 
have adopted legislation requiring some portion of, or all, new build-
ings to be NZEBs by specific times in the future (Kapsalaki and Leal, 
2011). 
An extension of the NZEB concept is the Positive-Energy Building Con-
cept (having net energy production) (Stylianou, 2011; Kolokotsa et al., 
2011). Issues related to NZEBs include (1) the feasibility of NZEBs; (2) 
minimizing the cost of attaining an NZEB, where feasible; (3) the cost 
of a least-cost NZEB in comparison with the cost of supplying a build-
ing’s residual energy needs (after implementing energy efficiency mea-
sures) from off-site renewable energy sources; (4) the sustainability of 
NZEBs; (5) lifecycle energy use; and (6) impact on energy use of alter-
native uses or treatments of roofs. 
To create a NZEB at minimal cost requires implementing energy saving 
measures in the building in order of increasing cost up to the point 
where the next energy savings measure would cost more than the cost 
of on-site renewable energy systems. In approximately one-third of 
NZEBs worldwide, the reduction in energy use compared to local con-
ventional buildings is about 60 % (Musall et al., 2010). Attaining net 
zero energy use is easiest in buildings with a large roof area (to host 
PV arrays) in relation to the building’s energy demand, so a require-
ment that buildings be NZEB will place a limit on the achievable height 
and therefore on urban density. In Abu Dhabi, for example, NZEB is 
possible in office buildings of up to five stories if internal heat gains 
and lighting and HVAC loads are aggressively reduced (Phillips et al., 
2009). 
9�3�3�4 Incremental cost of low-energy buildings
A large number of published studies on the incremental costs of spe-
cific low-energy buildings are reviewed in Harvey (2013). Summary 
conclusions from this review, along with key studies underlying the 
conclusions, are given here, with Table 9.4 presenting a small selection 
to illustrate some of the main findings. 
In the residential sector, several studies indicate an incremental cost 
of achieving the Passive House standard in the range of 6 – 16 % of the 
construction cost (about 66 – 265 USD2010 / m2) as compared to standard 
construction. A variety of locations in the United States, show addi-
tional costs of houses that achieve 34 – 76 % reduction in energy use 
of about 30 – 163 USD2010 / m2 – this excludes solar PV for both savings 
and costs (Parker, 2009). The extra cost of meeting the ‘Advanced’ ther-
mal envelope standard in the UK, which reduces heating energy use 
by 44 % relative to the 2006 regulations, has been estimated at 7 – 9 % 
(about 66 – 265 USD2010 / m2) relative to a design that meets the 2006 
mandatory regulations — which have since been strengthened (Davis 
Langdon and Element Energy, 2011). 
Several cold-climate studies indicate that if no simplification of the 
heating system is possible as a result of reducing heating require-
ments, then the optimal (least lifecycle cost, excluding environmen-
tal externalities) level of heating energy savings compared to recent 
code-compliant buildings is about 20 – 50 % (Anderson et  al., 2006; 
Hasan et al., 2008; Kerr and Kosar, 2011; Kurnitski et al., 2011). How-
ever, there are several ways in which costs can be reduced: (1) if the 
reference building has separate mechanical ventilation and hydronic 
heating, then the hydronic heating system can be eliminated or at least 
greatly simplified in houses meeting the Passive House standard (Feist 
and Schnieders, 2009); (2) perimeter heating units or heating vents can 
be eliminated with the use of sufficiently insulated windows, thereby 
reducing plumbing or ductwork costs (Harvey and Siddal, 2008); (3) the 
building shape can be simplified (reducing the surface area-to-volume 
ratio), which both reduces construction costs and makes it easier to 
reach any given low-energy standard (Treberspurg et al., 2010); and (4) 
in Passive Houses (where heating cost is negligibly small), individual 
metering units in multi-unit residential buildings could be eliminated 
(Behr, 2009). As well, it can be expected that costs will decrease with 
increasing experience and large-scale implementation on the part of 
the design and construction industries. For residential buildings in 
regions where cooling rather than heating is the dominant energy use, 
the key to low cost and emissions is to achieve designs that can main-
tain comfortable indoor temperatures while permitting elimination of 
mechanical cooling systems. 
Available studies (such as in Table 9.4) indicate that the incremental 
cost of low-energy buildings in the commercial sector is less than in the 
residential sector, due to the greater opportunities for simplification of 
the HVAC system, and that it is possible for low-energy commercial 
buildings to cost less than conventional buildings. In particular, there 





that have been built to the Passive House standard at no additional 
cost compared to similar conventional or less-stringently low-energy 
local buildings (Anwyl, 2011; Pearson, 2011). The Research Support 
Facilities Building (RSF) at the National Renewable Energy Labora-
tory (NREL) in Golden, Colorado achieved a 67 % reduction in energy 
use (excluding the solar PV offset) at zero extra cost for the efficiency 
measures, as the design team was contractually obliged to deliver a 
low-energy building at no extra cost (Torcellini et al., 2010). Torcellini 
and Pless (2012) present many opportunities for cost savings such that 
low-energy buildings can often be delivered at no extra cost. Other 
examples of low-energy buildings (50 – 60 % savings relative to stan-
dards at the time) that cost less than conventional buildings are given 
in McDonell (2003) and IFE (2005). New Buildings Institute (2012) 
reports examples of net-zero-energy buildings that cost no more than 
conventional buildings. Even when low-energy buildings cost more, the 
incremental costs are often small enough that they can be paid back 
in energy cost savings within a few years or less (Harvey, 2013). The 
keys to delivering low-energy buildings at zero or little additional cost 
are through implementation of the Integrated Design Process (IDP; 
described in Section 9.3.1) and the design-bid-build process. Vaidya 
et  al. (2009) discuss how the traditional, linear design process leads 
to missed opportunities for energy savings and cost reduction, often 
leading to the rejection of highly attractive energy savings measures.
9�3�4 Retrofits of existing buildings
As buildings are very long-lived and a large proportion of the total 
building stock existing today will still exist in 2050 in developed coun-
tries, retrofitting the existing stock is key to a low-emission building 
sector. 
9�3�4�1 Energy savings
Numerous case studies of individual retrofit projects (in which mea-
sures, savings, and costs are documented) are reviewed in Harvey 
(2013), but a few broad generalizations are: (1) For detached single-
family homes, the most comprehensive retrofit packages have achieved 
reductions in total energy use by 50 – 75 %; (2) in multi-family hous-
ing (such as apartment blocks), a number of projects have achieved 
reductions in space heating requirements by 80 – 90 %, approaching, 
in many cases, the Passive House standard for new buildings; (3) rela-
tively modest envelope upgrades to multi-family housing in developing 
countries such as China have achieved reductions in cooling energy 
use by about one-third to one-half, and reductions in heating energy 
use by two-thirds; (4) in commercial buildings, savings in total HVAC 
energy use achieved through upgrades to equipment and control sys-
tems, but without changing the building envelope, are typically on the 
order of 25 – 50 %; (5) eventual re-cladding of building façades — espe-
cially when the existing façade is largely glass with a high solar heat 
gain coefficient, no external shading, and no provision for passive ven-
tilation, and cooling — offers an opportunity for yet further significant 
savings in HVAC energy use; and (6) lighting retrofits of commercial 
buildings in the early 2000s typically achieved a 30 – 60 % energy sav-
ings (Bertoldi and Ciugudeanu, 2005).
9�3�4�2 Incremental cost
Various isolated studies of individual buildings and systematic pilot 
projects involving many buildings, reviewed in Harvey (2013), indi-
cate potentials (with comprehensive insulation and window upgrades, 
air sealing, and implementation of mechanical ventilation with heat 
recovery) reductions in heating energy requirements of 50 – 75 % in 
single-family housing and 50 – 90 % in multi-family housing at costs 
of about 100 – 400 USD2010 / m2 above that which would be required 
for a routine renovation. For a small selection of these studies, see 
Table 9.4. In the commercial sector, significant savings can often be 
achieved at very low cost simply through retro-commissioning of 
equipment. Mills (2011) evaluated the benefits of commissioning and 
retro-commissioning for a sample of 643 buildings across the United 
States and reports a 16 % median whole-building energy savings in 
California, with a mean payback time of 1.1 years. Rødsjø et al. (2010) 
showed that among the 60 demonstration projects reviewed, the aver-
age primary energy demand savings was 76 %, and 13 of the projects 
reached or almost reached the Passive House standard. Although ret-
rofits generally entail a large upfront cost, they also generate large 
annual cost savings, and so are often attractive from a purely eco-
nomic point of view. Korytarova and Ürge-Vorsatz (2012) note that 
shallow retrofits can result in greater lifecycle costs than deep retro-
fits. Mata et  al. (2010) studied 23 retrofit measures for buildings in 
Sweden and report a simple technical potential for energy savings in 
the residential sector of 68 % of annual energy use. They estimated a 
cost per kWh saved between – 0.09 USD2010 / kWh (appliance upgrades) 
and +0.45 USD2010 / kWh (façade retrofit). Polly et al. (2011) present a 
method for determining optimal residential energy efficiency retrofit 
packages in the United States, and identify near-cost-neutral packages 
of measures providing between 29 % and 48 % energy savings across 
eight US locations. Lewis (2004) has compiled information from sev-
eral studies in old buildings in Europe and indicates that the total and 
marginal cost of conserved energy both tend to be relatively uniform 
for savings of up to 70 – 80 %, but increase markedly for savings of 
greater than 80 % or for final heating energy intensities of less than 
about 40 kWh / m2 / yr.
9�3�5 Appliances, consumer electronics, office 
equipment, and lighting
Residential appliances have dramatically improved in efficiency over 
time, particularly in OECD countries (Barthel and Götz, 2013; Labanca 
and Paolo, 2013) due to polices such as efficiency standards, labels, and 
subsides and technological progress. Improvements are also appear-
ing in developing countries such as China (Barthel and Götz, 2013) 





Table 9�4 | Summary of estimates for extra investment cost required for selected very low- / zero-energy buildings.




Passive House Projects Central Europe New Passive House standard 5 – 8 % (143 – 225 USD2010 / m2) – (Bretzke, 2005; Schnieders 
and Hermelink, 2006) 
5 Passive Houses Belgium New 62 kWh / m2 / yr total 16 % (252 USD2010 / m2) – (Audenaert et al., 2008)
Passive House apartment block Vienna New Passive House standard 5 % (69 USD2010 / m2) – (Mahdavi and 
Doppelbauer, 2010)
12 very low or net zero-
energy houses
United States New   0.07 – 0.12 USD2010 / kWh (CCE) – (Parker, 2009)
10 buildings in the 
SolarBauprogramme
Germany New < 100 kWh / m2 / yr 
primary energy vs. 
300 – 600 — conventional 
Comparable to the difference 
in costs between alternative 
standards for interior finishes
– (Wagner et al., 2004)
High performance 
commercial buildings
Vancouver New 100 kWh / m2 / yr total 
vs. 180 — conventional
10 % lower cost – (McDonell, 2003)
Offices and laboratory, 
Concordia University
Montreal New   2.30 % – (Lemire and Charneux, 2005)
Welsh Information and 
Technology Adult Learning 
Centre (CaolfanHyddgen)
Wales New Passive House standard No extra cost compared to 
BREEAM ‘Excellent’ standard
– (Pearson, 2011)
Hypothetical 6,000 m2 
office building
Las Vegas New 42 % of energy savings USD2010 2,719 – (Vaidya et al., 2009)
10-story, 7,000 m2 
residential building
Denmark New 14 kWh / m2 / yr 
(heating) vs. 45 
3.4 % (115 USD2010 /  m2) – (Marszal and Heiselberg, 2009)
Leslie Shao-Ming Sun Field 
Station, Stanford University
California New NZEB 4 – 10 % more based on 
hard construction costs
– (NBI, 2011)
Hudson Valley Clean 
Energy Headquarters
New York New NZEB 665 USD2010 / month in mortgage 
payments but saves 823 
USD2010 / month in energy costs
– (NBI, 2011)
IAMU Office Ankeny, IA New NZEB None – (NBI, 2011)
EcoFlats Building Portland, OR New NZEB None – (NBI, 2011)
10-story, 7,000 m2 
residential building
Denmark New NZEB 24 % (558 USD2010 / m2) – (Marszal and Heiselberg, 2009)
Toronto towers Toronto Retrofit 194 / 95 % 259 USD2010 / m2 0.052 (Kesik and Saleff, 2009)
Multi-family housing EU Retrofit 62 – 150 / 52 % – 86 % 53 – 124 USD2010 / m2 0.014 – 0.023 (Petersdorff et al., 2005)
Terrace housing EU Retrofit 97 – 266 / 59 % – 84 % 90 – 207 USD2010 / m2 0.13 – 0.023 (Petersdorff et al., 2005)
High-rise housing EU Retrofit 70 % – 81 % 2.5 – 5.8 USD2010 / m2 / yr 0.018 – 0.028 (Waide et al., 2006)
1950s MFH Germany Retrofit 82 – 247 / 30 % – 90 % 48 – 416 USD2010 / m2 0.023 – 0.065 (Galvin, 2010)
1925 SFH Denmark Retrofit 120 217 USD2010 / m2 0.071 (Kragh and Rose, 2011)
1929 MFH Germany Retrofit 140 – 200 / 58 % – 82 % 167 – 340 USD2010 / m2 0.060 – 0.088 (Hermelink, 2009)
19th century flat UK Retrofit 192 – 234 / 48 % – 59 % 305 – 762 USD2010 / m2 0.068 – 0.140 (United House, 2009)
appliances consume 650 TWh worldwide, which is almost 14 % of total 
residential electricity consumption (Barthel and Götz, 2013).
Table 9.5 summarizes potential reductions in unit energy by house-
hold appliances and equipment through improved technologies. The 
saving potentials identified for individual equipment are typically 
40 – 50 %. Indeed, energy use by the most efficient appliances avail-
able today is often 30 – 50 % less than required by standards; the 
European A+++ model refrigerator, for example, consumes 50 % 
less electricity than the current regulated level in the EU (Letschert 
et al., 2013a), while the most efficient televisions awarded under the 
Super-efficient Equipment and Appliance Deployment (SEAD) initia-
tive use 33 – 44 % less electricity than similar televisions (Ravi et al., 
2013). Aggregate energy consumption by these items is expected 
to continue to grow rapidly as the types and number of equipment 
proliferate, and ownership rates increase with wealth. This will occur 
unless standards are used to induce close to the maximum techni-
cally achievable reduction in unit energy requirements. Despite pro-
jected large increase in the stock of domestic appliances, especially 
in developing countries, total appliance energy consumption could be 
reduced if the best available technology were installed (Barthel and 





2600 TWh / yr by 2030 between the EU, United States, China and India 
(Letschert et al., 2013a). Ultra-low-power micro-computers in a wide 
variety of appliances and electronic equipment also have the potential 
to greatly reduce energy use through better control (Koomey et  al., 
2013). Conversely, new types of electronic equipment for ICT (e. g., 
satellite receivers, broadband home gateways, etc.), broadband and 
network equipment, and dedicated data centre buildings are predicted 
to increase their energy consumption (Fettweis and Zimmermann, 
2008; Bolla et al., 2011; Bertoldi, 2012). Solid State Lighting (SSL) is 
revolutionizing the field of lighting. In the long term, inorganic light 
emitting diodes (LEDs) are expected to become the most widely used 
light sources. White LEDs have shown a steady growth in efficacy for 
more than fifteen years, with average values of 65 – 70 lm / W (Schäppi 
and Bogner, 2013) and the best products achieving 100 lm / W (Moura 
et al., 2013). LED lighting will soon reach efficacy levels above all the 
other commercially available light source (Aman et al., 2013), includ-
ing high efficiency fluorescent lamps.
9�3�6 Halocarbons
The emissions of F-gases (see Chapter 1 Table 1.1 and Chapter 5.3.1) 
related to the building sector primarily originate from cooling / refriger-
ation and insulation with foams. The sector’s share of total F-gas emis-
Table 9�5 | Potential savings in energy consumption by household appliances and equipment.
Item Savings potential Reference
Televisions Average energy use of units sold in the United States (largely LCDs) was426 kWh / yr in 
2008 and 102 kWh / yr in 2012. Further reductions (30 – 50 % below LCD TVs) are expected 
with use of organic LED backlighting (likely commercially available by 2015).
(Howard et al., 2012;  
Letschert et al., 2012)
Televisions Energy savings of best available TVs compared to market norms are 32 – 45 % in 
Europe, 44 – 58 % in North America, and 55 – 60 % in Australia
(Park, 2013)
Computer monitors 70 % reduction in on-mode power draw expected from 2011 to 2015 (Park et al., 2013)
Computing At least a factor of 10 million potential reduction in the energy required per 
computation (going well beyond the so-called Feynman limit).
(Koomey et al., 2013)
Refrigerator-freezer units 40 % minimum potential savings compared to the best standards, 27 % savings 
at ≤0.11 USD2010 / kWh CCE (Costs of Conserved Energy)
(Bansal et al., 2011;  
McNeil and Bojda, 2012)
Cooking 50 % savings potential (in Europe), largely through more efficient cooking practices alone (Fechter and Porter, 1979; 
Oberascher et al., 2011)
Ovens 25 % and 45 % potential savings through advanced technology in natural gas and 
conventional electric ovens, respectively, and 75 % for microwave ovens
(Mugdal, 2011; Bansal et al., 2011)
Dishwashers Typically only 40 – 45 % loaded, increasing energy use per place setting by 77 – 97 % for 3 dishwashers studied (Richter, 2011)
Dishwashers Current initiative targets 17 % less electricity, 35 % less water than best US standard (Bansal et al., 2011)
Clothes washers Global 28 % potential savings by 2030 relative to business-as-usual (Letschert et al., 2012)
Clothes Dryers Factor of two difference between best and average units on the market in Europe (0.27 
kWh / kg vs 0.59 kWh / kg). More than a factor of 2 reduction in going from United States 
average to European heat pump dryer (820 kWh / yr vs 380 kWh / yr)
(Werle et al., 2011)
Standby loads Potential of < 0.005 W for adapters and chargers, < 0.05 for large appliances (‘zero’ 
in both cases) (typical mid 2000s standby power draw: 5 – 15 W)
(Harvey, 2010; Matthews, 2011), 
(Harvey, 2010) for mid 2000s data
Air conditioners COP (a measure of efficiency) of 2.5 – 3.5 in Europe and United States, 
5.0 – 6.5 in Japan (implies up to 50 % energy savings)
(Waide et al., 2011)
Air conditioners COP of 4.2 – 6.8 for air conditioners such that the cost of saving electricity does not exceed the local 
cost of electricity, and a potential COP of 7.3 – 10.2 if all available energy-saving measures were to 
be implemented (implies a 50 – 75 % savings for a given cooling load and operating pattern).
(Shah et al., 2013)
Ceiling fans 50 – 57 % energy savings potential (Letschert et al., 2012;  
Sathaye et al., 2013)
Package of household 
appliances in Portugal
60 % less energy consumption by best available equipment compared to typically-used equipment (da Graca et al., 2012)
Office computers and monitors 40 % savings from existing low-to-zero cost measures only (Mercier and Morrefield, 2009)
Circulation pumps for hydronic 
heating and cooling
40 % savings from projected energy use in 2020 in Europe (relative to a baseline with 
efficiencies as of 2004) due to legislated standards already in place
(Bidstrup, 2011)
Residential lighting Efficacies (lm / W) (higher is better): standard incandescent, 15; CFL, 60; best currently 
available white-light LEDs, 100; current laboratory LEDs, 250 
(Letschert et al., 2012)
Residential water-using fixtures 50 – 80 % reduction in water use by water-saving fixtures compared to older standard fixtures (Harvey, 2010)
Residential water heaters Typical efficiency factor (EF) for gas and electric water heaters in the USA is 0.67 and 0.8 in EU, while the most 






sions is subject to high variation due to uncertainties, lack of detailed 
reporting and differences in accounting conventions. The following 
section discusses the role of the buildings sector in F-gas emissions 
under these constraints.
F-gases are used in buildings through several types of products and 
appliances, including refrigeration, air conditioning, in foams (such 
as for insulation) as blowing agents, fire extinguishers, and aero-
sols. The resulting share of the building sector in the total F-gas 
emissions, similarly to indirect CO2 emissions from electricity gen-
eration, depends on their attribution. Inventories, such as EDGAR 
(JRC / PBL, 2013), are related to the production and sales of these 
gases and differing accounting conventions attribute emissions 
based on the point of their use, emissions, or production (UNEP, 
2011a; EEA, 2013; US EPA, 2013). IPCC emission categories pro-
vide numbers to different sources of emission but do not system-
atically attribute these to sectors. Attribution can be done using a 
production or consumption perspective, rendering different sectoral 
shares (see Chapter 5.2.3.3). Compounding this variation, there are 
uncertainties resulting from the lack of attribution of the use of cer-
tain emission categories to different sectors they are used in and 
uncertainties in reported figures for the same emissions by different 
sources. 
As a guidance on the share of F-gases in the building sector, for 
example, EDGAR (JRC / PBL, 2013; Annex II.9) attributed 12 % of direct 
F-gas emissions to the building sector in 2010 (JRC / PBL, 2013; Annex 
II.9). Of a further share of 22.3 % of F-gas emissions (21 % from HFC 
and SF6 production and 1.3 % from foam blowing) a substantial part 
can be allocated to the buildings sector. The greatest uncertainty of 
attribution of IPCC categories to the buildings sector is the share of 
Refrigeration and Air Conditioning Equipment (2F1a). This totals to up 
to one-third for the share of (direct plus indirect) buildings in F-gas 
emissions. 
As another proxy, EDGAR estimates that HFCs represent the largest 
share (GWP adjusted) in the total F-gas emissions, at about 76 % of 
total 2010 F-gas emissions (JRC / PBL, 2013). Global HFC emissions 
are reported to be 760 MtCO2eq by EDGAR (JRC / PBL, 2013); and 
1100 MtCO2eq by the US EPA (2010). These gases are used mostly 
(55 % of total in 2010) in refrigeration and air-conditioning equip-
ment in homes, other buildings and industrial operations (UNEP, 
2011a). 
While F-gases represent a small fraction of the current total GHG emis-
sions — around 2 % (see Chapter 1.2 and Chapter 5.2), their emissions 
are projected to grow in the coming decades, mostly due to increased 
demand for cooling and because they are the primary substitutes for 
ozone-depleting substances (US EPA, 2013). 
Measures to reduce these emissions include the phase-out of HFCs 
and minimization of the need for mechanical cooling through high-
performance buildings, as discussed in the following sections. The 
use of F-gases as an expanding agent in polyurethane foam has 
been banned in the EU since 2008, and by 2005, 85 % of produc-
tion had already been shifted to hydrocarbons (having a much 
lower GWP). In Germany, almost all new refrigerators use natural 
refrigerants (isobutane, HC-600a, and propane, HC-29), which have 
great potential to reduce emissions during the operation and servic-
ing of HFC-containing equipment (McCulloch, 2009; Rhiemeier and 
Harnisch, 2009). Their use in insulation materials saves heating and 
cooling related CO2 emissions and thus their use in these materi-
als still typically has a net benefit to GHG emissions, but a lifecycle 
assessment is required to determine the net effect on a case-by-case 
basis. 
9�3�7 Avoiding mechanical heating, cooling, 
and ventilation systems
In many parts of the world, high-performance mechanical cooling sys-
tems are not affordable, especially those used for residential hous-
ing. The goal, then is to use principles of low-energy design to pro-
vide comfortable conditions as much of the time as possible, thereby 
reducing the pressure to later install energy-intensive cooling equip-
ment such as air conditioners. These principles are embedded in ver-
nacular designs throughout the world, which evolved over centuries in 
the absence of mechanical heating and cooling systems. For example, 
vernacular housing in Vietnam (Nguyen et al., 2011) experienced con-
ditions warmer than 31 °C only 6 % of the time. The natural and pas-
sive control system of traditional housing in Kerala, India has been 
shown to maintain bedroom temperatures of 23 – 29 °C even as out-
door temperatures vary from 17 – 36 °C on a diurnal time scale (Dili 
et al., 2010). While these examples show that vernacular architecture 
can be an energy efficient option, in order to promote the technology, 
it is necessary to consider the cultural and convenience factors and 
perceptions concerning ‘modern’ approaches, as well as the environ-
mental performance, that influence the decision to adopt or abandon 
vernacular approaches (Foruzanmehr and Vellinga, 2011). In some 
cases, modern knowledge and techniques can be used to improve ver-
nacular designs.
9�3�8 Uses of biomass
Biomass is the single largest source of energy for buildings at the 
global scale, and it plays an important role for space heating, pro-
duction of hot water, and for cooking in many developing countries 
(IEA, 2012d). Compared to open fires, advanced biomass stoves pro-
vide fuel savings of 30 – 60 % and reduce indoor air pollution levels 
by 80 – 90 % for models with chimneys (Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2012b). 
For example, in the state of Arunachal Pradesh, advanced cookstoves 
with an efficiency of 60 %, has been used in place of traditional cook-
stoves with an efficiency of 6 – 8 % (Rawat et al., 2010). Gasifier and 






9�3�9 Embodied energy and building materials 
lifecycle
Research published since AR4 confirms that the total lifecycle energy 
use of low-energy buildings is less than that of conventional buildings, 
in spite of generally greater embodied energy in the materials and 
energy efficiency features (Citherlet and Defaux, 2007; GEA, 2012). 
However, the embodied energy and carbon in construction materials 
is especially important in regions with high construction rates, and 
the availability of affordable low-carbon, low-energy materials that 
can be part of high-performance buildings determines construction-
related emissions substantially in rapidly developing countries (Sar-
tori and Hestnes, 2007; Karlsson and Moshfegh, 2007; Ramesh et al., 
2010). A review of lifecycle assessment, lifecycle energy analysis, and 
material flow analysis in buildings (conventional and traditional) can 
be found in Cabeza et  al. (2013a). Recent research indicates that 
wood-based wall systems entail 10 – 20 % less embodied energy than 
traditional concrete systems (Upton et al., 2008; Sathre and Gustavs-
son, 2009) and that concrete-framed buildings entail less embodied 
energy than steel-framed buildings (Xing et  al., 2008). Insulation 
materials entail a wide range of embodied energy per unit volume, 
and the time required to pay back the energy cost of successive incre-
ments insulation through heating energy savings increases as more 
insulation is added. However, this marginal payback time is less than 
the expected lifespan of insulation (50 years) even as the insulation 
level is increased to that required to meet the Passive House standard 
(Harvey, 2007). The embodied energy of biomass-based insulation 
products is not lower than that of many non-biomass insulation prod-
ucts when the energy value of the biomass feedstock is accounted for, 
but is less if an energy credit can be given for incineration with cogen-
eration of electricity and heat, assuming the insulation is extracted 
during demolition of the building at the end of its life (Ardente et al., 
2008).
9�3�10 Behavioural and lifestyle 
impacts
Chapter 2 discusses behavioural issues in a broad sense. There are 
substantial differences in building energy use in the world driven 
largely by behaviour and culture. Factors of 3 to 10 differences can 
be found worldwide in residential energy use for similar dwellings 
with same occupancy and comfort levels (Zhang et al., 2010), and 
up to 10 times difference in office buildings with same climate 
and same building functions with similar comfort and health levels 
(Batty et al., 1991; Zhaojian and Qingpeng, 2007; Zhang et al., 2010; 
Grinshpon, 2011; Xiao, 2011). The major characteristics of the lower 
energy use buildings are windows that can be opened for natural 
ventilation, part time & part space control of indoor environment 
(thermal and lighting), and variably controllable indoor thermal 
parameters (temperature, humidity, illumination and fresh air). These 
are traditional approaches to obtain a suitable indoor climate and 
thermal comfort. However, since the spread of globalized supply of 
commercial thermal conditioning, heating / cooling solutions tend 
towards fully controlled indoor climates through mechanical systems 
and these typically result in a significantly increased energy demand 
(TUBESRC, 2009). An alternative development pathway to the ubiq-
uitous use of fully conditioned spaces by automatically operated 
mechanical systems is to integrate key elements of the traditional 
lifestyles in buildings, in particular through the use of 'part-time' 
and 'part-space' indoor climate conditioning, using mechanical sys-
tems only for the remaining needs when passive approaches can-
not meet comfort demands. Such pathways can reach the energy use 
levels below 30 kWhe / m2 / yr as a world average (TUBESRC, 2009; 
Murakami et al., 2009), as opposed to the 30 – 50 kWhe / m2 / yr achiev-
able through building development pathways utilizing fully automa-
tized full thermal conditioning (Murakami et al., 2009; Yoshino et al., 
2011).
Behaviour and local cultural factors can drive basic energy use prac-
tices, such as how people and organizations adjust their thermostats 
during different times of the year. During the cooling season, increas-
ing the thermostat setting from 24 °C to 28 °C will reduce annual cool-
ing energy use by more than a factor of three for a typical office build-
ing in Zurich and by more than a factor of two in Rome (Jaboyedoff 
et al., 2004), and by a factor of two to three if the thermostat setting is 
increased from 23 °C to 27 °C for night-time air conditioning of bed-
rooms in apartments in Hong Kong (Lin and Deng, 2004). Thermostat 
settings are also influenced by dress codes and cultural expectations 
towards attires, and thus major energy savings can be achieved 
through changes in attire standards, for example Japan’s ‘Cool Biz’ ini-
tiative to relax certain business dress codes to allow higher thermostat 
settings (GEA, 2011). 
Behaviour and lifestyle are crucial drivers of building energy use in 
more complex ways, too. Figure 9.9 shows the electricity use for sum-
mer cooling in apartments of the same building (occupied by house-
holds of similar affluence and size) in Beijing (Zhaojian and Qingpeng, 
2007), ranging from 0.5 to 14.2 kWh / m2 / yr. The use difference is 
Figure 9�9 | Annual measured electricity per unit of floor space for cooling in an apart-
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Figure 9�10 | Annual total electricity use per unit of floor space of buildings on a university campus in Beijing, China, 2006 (Zhang et al., 2010).
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mainly caused by different operating hours of the split air-conditioner 
units. Opening windows during summer and relying on natural venti-
lation can reduce the cooling load while maintaining indoor air qual-
ity in most warm climate countries (Batty et al., 1991), compared to 
solely relying on mechanical ventilation (Yoshino et al., 2011). Build-
ings with high-performance centralized air-conditioning can use much 
more energy than decentralized split units that operate part time and 
for partial space cooling, with a factor of 9 found by (Zhaojian and 
Qingpeng, 2007; Murakami et  al., 2009), as also illustrated in Fig-
ure 9.10. There are similar findings for other energy end-uses, such 
as clothes dryers (the dominant practice in laundering in the United 
States) consuming about 600 – 1000 kWh / yr, while drying naturally is 
dominant in developing and even in many developed countries (Grin-
shpon, 2011).
Quantitative modelling of the impact of future lifestyle change on 
energy demand shows that, in developed countries where energy ser-
vice levels are already high, lifestyle change can produce substantial 
energy use reductions. In the United States, for example, the short term 
behavioural change potential is estimated to be at least 20 % (Dietz 
et  al., 2009) and over long periods of time, much more substantial 
reductions (typically 50 %) are possible, even in developed countries 
with relatively low consumption (Fujino et al., 2008; Eyre et al., 2010). 
Similar absolute reductions are not possible in developing countries 
where energy services demands need to grow to satisfy development 
needs. However, the rate of growth can be reduced by lower consump-
tion lifestyles (Wei et al., 2007; Sukla et al., 2008). For more on con-
sumption, see also Section 4.4.
Energy use of buildings of similar functions and occupancies can vary 
by a factor of 2 – 10, depending on culture and behaviour. For instance, 
Figure 9.10 and Figure 9.11 show the electricity usage of the HVAC 
system at two university campuses (in Philadelphia and Beijing) with 
similar climates and functions. The differences arise from: operating 
hours of lighting and ventilation (24h / day vs. 12h / day); full mechani-
cal ventilation in all seasons versus natural ventilation for most of the 
year; and district cooling with selective re-heating versus seasonal 
decentralized air-conditioning. When the diversity of users’ activities 
is taken into account, different technologies may be needed to satisfy 
the energy service demand. Therefore, buildings and their energy infra-
structure need to be designed, built, and used taking into account cul-
ture, norms, and occupant behaviour. One universal standard of ‘high 
efficiency’ based on certain cultural activities may increase the energy 
usage in buildings with other cultural backgrounds, raising costs and 
emissions without improving the living standards. This is demonstrated 
in a recent case study of 10 ‘low-energy demonstration buildings’ in 
China built in international collaborations. Most of these demonstra-
tion buildings use more energy in operation than ordinary buildings 
with the same functions and service levels (Xiao, 2011). Although sev-
eral energy saving technologies have been applied, occupant behav-
iours were also restricted by, for instance, using techniques only suit-
able for full-time and full-space cooling. 
commercial thermal conditioning, heating / cooling solutions tend 
towards fully controlled indoor climates through mechanical systems 
and these typically result in a significantly increased energy demand 
(TUBESRC, 2009). An alternative development pathway to the ubiq-
uitous use of fully conditioned spaces by automatically operated 
mechanical systems is to integrate key elements of the traditional 
lifestyles in buildings, in particular through the use of 'part-time' 
and 'part-space' indoor climate conditioning, using mechanical sys-
tems only for the remaining needs when passive approaches can-
not meet comfort demands. Such pathways can reach the energy use 
levels below 30 kWhe / m2 / yr as a world average (TUBESRC, 2009; 
Murakami et al., 2009), as opposed to the 30 – 50 kWhe / m2 / yr achiev-
able through building development pathways utilizing fully automa-
tized full thermal conditioning (Murakami et al., 2009; Yoshino et al., 
2011).
Behaviour and local cultural factors can drive basic energy use prac-
tices, such as how people and organizations adjust their thermostats 
during different times of the year. During the cooling season, increas-
ing the thermostat setting from 24 °C to 28 °C will reduce annual cool-
ing energy use by more than a factor of three for a typical office build-
ing in Zurich and by more than a factor of two in Rome (Jaboyedoff 
et al., 2004), and by a factor of two to three if the thermostat setting is 
increased from 23 °C to 27 °C for night-time air conditioning of bed-
rooms in apartments in Hong Kong (Lin and Deng, 2004). Thermostat 
settings are also influenced by dress codes and cultural expectations 
towards attires, and thus major energy savings can be achieved 
through changes in attire standards, for example Japan’s ‘Cool Biz’ ini-
tiative to relax certain business dress codes to allow higher thermostat 
settings (GEA, 2011). 
Behaviour and lifestyle are crucial drivers of building energy use in 
more complex ways, too. Figure 9.9 shows the electricity use for sum-
mer cooling in apartments of the same building (occupied by house-
holds of similar affluence and size) in Beijing (Zhaojian and Qingpeng, 
2007), ranging from 0.5 to 14.2 kWh / m2 / yr. The use difference is 
Figure 9�9 | Annual measured electricity per unit of floor space for cooling in an apart-
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Figure 9�10 | Annual total electricity use per unit of floor space of buildings on a university campus in Beijing, China, 2006 (Zhang et al., 2010).
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9.4 Infrastructure and 
 systemic perspectives
9�4�1 Urban form and energy supply 
 infrastructure
Land use planning influences greenhouse gas emissions in several 
ways, including through the energy consumption of buildings. More 
compact urban form tends to reduce consumption due to lower per 
capita floor areas, reduced building surface to volume ratio, increased 
shading, and more opportunities for district heating and cooling sys-
tems (Ürge-Vorsatz et  al., 2012a). Greater compactness often has 
tradeoffs in regions with significant cooling demand, as it tends to 
increase the urban heat island effect. However, the overall impact of 
increased compactness is to reduce GHG emissions. Broader issues of 
the implications of urban form and land use planning for emissions 
are discussed in Chapter 12.5. Energy-using activities in buildings and 
their energy supply networks co-evolve. While the structure of the 
building itself is key to the amount of energy consumed, the energy 
supply networks largely determine the energy vector used, and there-
fore the carbon intensity of supply. Changing fuels and energy supply 
infrastructure to buildings will be needed to deliver large emissions 
reductions even with the major demand reductions outlined in Section 
9.3. This section therefore focuses on the interaction of buildings with 
the energy infrastructure, and its implications for use of lower carbon 
fuels. 
9�4�1�1 District heating and cooling networks
Heating and cooling networks facilitate mitigation where they allow 
the use of higher efficiency systems or the use of waste heat or lower 
carbon fuels (e. g., solar heat and biomass) than can be used cost effec-
tively at the scale of the individual building. High efficiency distributed 
energy systems, such as gas engines and solid oxide fuel cell cogen-
eration, generate heat and electricity more efficiently than the com-
bination of centralized power plants and heating boilers, where heat 
can be used effectively. District energy systems differ between climate 
zones. Large-scale district heating systems of cold-climate cities pre-
dominantly provide space heating and domestic hot water. There are 
also some examples that utilize non-fossil heat sources, for example 
biomass and waste incineration (Holmgren, 2006). Despite their energy 
saving benefits, fossil fuel district heating systems cannot alone deliver 
very low carbon buildings. In very low energy buildings, hot water is 
the predominant heating load, and the high capital and maintenance 
costs of district heating infrastructure may be uneconomic (Thyholt and 
Hestnes, 2008; Persson and Werner, 2011). The literature is therefore 
presently divided on the usefulness of district heating to serve very 
low energy buildings. In regions with cold winters and hot summers, 
district energy systems can deliver both heating and cooling, usually at 
the city block scale, and primarily to commercial buildings. Energy sav-
ings of 30 % can be achieved using trigeneration, load levelling, diur-
nal thermal storage, highly-efficient refrigeration, and advanced man-
agement (Nagota et al., 2008). Larger benefits are possible by using 
waste heat from incineration plants (Shimoda et al., 1998) and heat or 
cold from water source heat pumps (Song et al., 2007).










































9�4�1�2 Electricity infrastructure interactions
Universal access to electricity remains a key development goal in 
developing countries. The capacity, and therefore cost, of electricity 
infrastructure needed to supply any given level of electricity services 
depends on the efficiency of electricity use. Electricity is the dominant 
energy source for cooling and appliances, but energy use for heating is 
dominated by direct use of fossil fuels in most countries. Electrification 
of heating can therefore be a mitigation measure, depending on the lev-
els of electricity decarbonization and its end use efficiency. Heat pumps 
may facilitate this benefit as they allow electrification to be a mitigation 
technology at much lower levels of electricity decarbonization (Lowe, 
2007). Ground-source heat pumps already have a high market share in 
some countries with low-cost electricity and relatively efficient build-
ings (IEA HPG, 2010). There is a growing market for low-cost air source 
heat pumps in mid-latitude countries (Cai et al., 2009; Howden-Chap-
man et al., 2009; Singh et al., 2010a). In many cases the attractions are 
that there are not pre-existing whole-house heating systems and that 
air-source heat pumps can provide both heating and cooling. A review 
of scenario studies indicates heating electrification may have a key role 
in decarbonization (Sugiyama, 2012), with heat pumps usually assumed 
to be the preferred heating technology (IEA, 2010a). This would imply a 
major technology shift from direct combustion of fossil fuels for build-
ing heating. Electricity use, even at high efficiency, will increase winter 
peak demand (Cockroft and Kelly, 2006) with implications for genera-
tion and distribution capacity that have not been fully assessed; there 
are challenges in retrofitting to buildings not designed for heating with 
low temperature systems (Fawcett, 2011), and the economics of a high 
capital cost heating system, such as a heat pump, in a low-energy build-
ing are problematic. The literature is inconclusive on the role and scale 
of electrification of heating as a mitigation option, although it is likely to 
be location-dependent. However, significant energy demand reduction 
is likely to be critical to facilitate universal electrification (Eyre, 2011), 
and therefore transition pathways with limited efficiency improvement 
and high electrification are implausible. Electricity infrastructure in 
buildings will increasingly  need to use information technology in ‘smart 
grids’ to provide consumer information and enable demand response to 
assist load balancing (see Chapter 7.12.3). 
9�4�1�3 Thermal energy storage
Thermal energy storage can use diurnal temperature variations to 
improve load factors, and therefore reduce heating and cooling system 
size, which will be particularly important if heating is electrified. Thermal 
storage technologies could also be important in regions with electricity 
systems using high levels of intermittent renewable energy. The use of 
storage in a building can smooth temperature fluctuations and can be 
implemented by sensible heat (e. g., changing the building envelope 
temperature), or by storing latent heat using ice or phase change mate-
rials, in either passive or active systems (Cabeza et al., 2011). Both ther-
mochemical energy storage (Freire González, 2010) and underground 
thermal energy storage (UTES) with ground source heat pumps (GSHP) 
(Sanner et al., 2003) are being studied for seasonal energy storage in 
buildings or district heating and cooling networks, although UTES and 
GSHP are already used for short term storage (Paksoy et al., 2009).
9�4�2 Path dependencies and lock-in
Buildings and their energy supply infrastructure are some of the lon-
gest-lived components of the economy. Buildings constructed and ret-
rofitted in the next few years to decades will determine emissions for 
many decades, without major opportunities for further change. There-
fore the sector is particularly prone to lock-in, due to favouring incre-
mental change (Bergman et al., 2008), traditionally low levels of inno-
vation (Rohracher, 2001), and high inertia (Brown and Vergragt, 2008).
When a major retrofit or new construction takes place, state-of-the-
art performance levels discussed in Section 9.3 are required to avoid 
locking in sub-optimal outcomes. Sunk costs of district heating, in par-
ticular, can be a disincentive to investments in very low energy build-
ings. Without the highest achievable performance levels, global build-
ing energy use will rise (Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2012a). This implies that 
a major reduction in building energy use will not take place without 
strong policy efforts, and particularly the use of building codes that 
require adoption of the ambitious performance levels set out in Section 
9.3 as soon as possible. Recent research (Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2012a) 
finds that by 2050 the size of the lock-in risk is equal to almost 80 % of 
2005 global building heating and cooling final energy use (see Figure 
9.12). This is the gap between a scenario in which today’s best cost-
effective practices in new construction and retrofits become standard 
after a transitional period, and a scenario in which levels of building 
energy performance are changed only to today’s best policy ambi-
tions. This alerts us that while there are good developments in building 
energy efficiency policies, significantly more advances can and need to 
be made if ambitious climate goals are to be reached, otherwise signif-
icant emissions can be ‘locked in’ that will not be possible to mitigate 
for decades. The size of the lock-in risk varies significantly by region: 
e. g., in South-East Asia (including India) the lock-in risk is over 200 % 
of 2005 final heating and cooling energy use.
9.5 Climate change feed-
back and interaction 
with adaptation
Buildings are sensitive to climate change, which influences energy 
demand and its profile. As climate warms, cooling demand increases and 
heating demand decreases (Day et al., 2009; Isaac and Van Vuuren, 2009; 
Hunt and Watkiss, 2011), while passive cooling approaches become less 
effective (Artmann et al., 2008; Chow and Levermore, 2010). Under a 





demand due to climate change may reach 34 % in 2100, while cooling 
demand may increase by ≥ 70 %; net energy demand could reach – 6 % 
by 2050 and + 5 % by 2100; with significant regional differences, e. g., ≥ 
20 % absolute reductions in heating demand in temperate Canada and 
Russia; cooling increasing by ≥ 50 % in warmer regions and even higher 
increases in cold regions (Isaac and Van Vuuren, 2009). Other regional 
and national studies (Mansur et al., 2008; van Ruijven et al., 2011; Wan 
et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2012a) reveal the same general tendencies, with 
energy consumption in buildings shifting from fossil fuels to electricity 
and affecting peak loads (Isaac and Van Vuuren, 2009; Hunt and Wat-
kiss, 2011), especially in warmer regions (Aebischer et al., 2007). Emis-
sions implications of this shift are related to the fuels and technologies 
locally used for heat and power generation: a global reference scenario 
from Isaac and Van Vuuren (2009) shows a net increase in residential 
emissions of ≥ 0.3 Gt C (≥ 1.1 Gt CO2eq) by 2100. 
There is a wide-range of sensitivities but also many opportunities to 
respond to changing climatic conditions in buildings: modified design 
goals and engineering specifications increase resilience (Gerdes et al. 
2011; Pyke et al., 2012). There is no consensus on definitions of climate 
Figure 9�12 | Final building heating and cooling energy use in 2005 and in scenarios from the Global Energy Assessment (GEA) for 2050, organized by eleven regions (Ürge-
Vorsatz et al., 2012a). Notes: Green bars, indicated by arrows with numbers (relative to 2005 values), represent the opportunities through the GEA state-of-the-art scenario, while 
the yellow bars with black numbers show the size of the lock-in risk (difference between the sub-optimal and state-of-the-art scenario). Percent figures are relative to 2005 values. 
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adaptive buildings, but several aims include minimizing energy con-
sumption for operation, mitigating GHG emissions, providing adaptive 
capacity and resilience to the building stock, reducing costs for main-
taining comfort, minimizing the vulnerability of occupants to extreme 
weather conditions, and reducing risks of disruption to energy supply 
and addressing fuel poverty (Roaf et al., 2009; Atkinson et al., 2009). 
Adaptation and mitigation effects may be different by development 
and urbanization level, climate conditions and building infrastructure. 
Contemporary strategies for adapting buildings to climate change still 
often emphasize increasing the physical resilience of building structure 
and fabric to extreme weather and climatic events, but this can lead 
to decreased functional adaptability and increased embodied energy 
and associated GHG emissions. Increased extremes in local weather-
patterns can lead to sub-optimal performance of buildings that were 
designed to provide thermal comfort ‘passively’ using principles of 
bioclimatic design. In such circumstances, increased uncertainty over 
future weather patterns may encourage demand for mechanical space 
heating and / or cooling regardless of the climate-zone.
There are also several opportunities for heat island reduction, air 
quality improvement, and radiation management (geo-engineering) 
through building roofs and pavements, which constitute over 60 % of 
most urban surfaces and with co-benefits such as improved air qual-
ity (Ihara et al., 2008; Taha, 2008). Simulations estimate reductions in 
urban temperatures by up to 0.7 K (Campra et al., 2008; Akbari et al., 
2009; Oleson et al., 2010; Millstein and Menon, 2011). Akbari et al., 
(2009, 2012) estimated that changing the solar reflectance of a dark 
roof (0.15) to an aged white roof (0.55) results in a one-time offset 
of 1 to 2.5 tCO2 per 10 m2 of roof area through enhanced reflection. 
Global CO2 one-time offset potentials from cool roofs and pavements 
amount to 78 GtCO2 (Menon et al., 2010). Increasing the albedo of a 1 
m2 area by 0.01 results in a global temperature reduction of 3 × 10 – 15 
K and offsets emission of 7 kg CO2 (Akbari et al., 2012).
9.6 Costs and potentials
9�6�1 Summary of literature on aggregated 
mitigation potentials by key identity
The chapter’s earlier sections have demonstrated that there is a broad 
portfolio of different technologies and practices available to cut build-
ing-related emissions significantly. However, whereas these potentials 
are large at an individual product / building level, an important question 
is to determine what portion of the stock they apply to, and what the 
overall potential is if we consider the applicability, feasibility, and 
replacement dynamics, together with other constraints (Wada et  al., 
Figure 9�13 | Regional studies on aggregated mitigation potentials grouped by key identity (i. e., main mitigation strategy). Note: Values correspond to the percentage reduction 
as compared to baseline (circle), if available, otherwise to base year (diamond), studies are numbered, for details see Table 9.6, note that for some studies there are multiple entries 





























































POECD (2, 9)MNA (16, 24)
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2012). Figure 9.13 and the corresponding Table 9.6 synthesize the liter-
ature on a selection of regional studies on potentials through different 
types of measures, aggregated to stocks of the corresponding prod-
ucts / buildings at the regional level. The studies are organized by the 
four key identities discussed at the beginning of the chapter, translating 
into the four key mitigation strategies that apply to this sector — i. e., 
carbon efficiency, technological efficiency, systemic efficiency, and 
energy service demand reduction. However, as pointed out earlier, it is 
often not possible to precisely distinguish one category from the other, 
especially given the different categorizations in the studies, therefore 
the binning should be treated as indicative only. The potentials illus-
trated in the table and figure are usually given for final energy use (if 
not specified otherwise) and are mostly presented as a percentage of 
the respective baseline energy, specified in the original source. The fig-
ure demonstrates that the high potentials at the individual prod-
uct / building level translate into relatively high potentials also at stock-
aggregated levels: mitigation or energy saving potentials often go 
beyond 30 % to even 60 % of the baseline energy use / emission of the 
stock the measures apply to. The figure also attests that each of the four 
key mitigation strategies relevant to buildings can bring very large 
reductions, although systemic efficiency seems to bring higher results 
than other strategies, and energy service demand reduction has been so 
far estimated to bring the most modest results from among these strat-
egies, although studies less often assess these options systematically. 
The efficiency and cost studies presented here represent a single snap-
shot in time, implying that as this potential is being captured by poli-
cies or measures, the remaining potential dwindles. This has not been 
reinforced by experience and research. Analyses have shown that tech-
nological improvement keeps replenishing the potential for efficiency 
improvement, so that the potential for cost-effective energy efficiency 
improvement has not been diminishing in spite of continuously improv-
ing standards (NAS, 2010). The National Academy of Science (NAS) 
study (NAS, 2010) of the energy savings potentials of energy efficiency 
technologies and programmes across all sectors in the United States 
note that “[s]tudies of technical and economic energy-savings poten-
tial generally capture energy efficiency potential at a single point in 
time based on technologies that are available at the time a study is 
conducted. But new efficiency measures continue to be developed 
and to add to the long-term efficiency potential.” These new efficiency 
opportunities continue to offer substantial cost-effective additional 
energy savings potentials after previous potentials have been captured 
so that the overall technical potential has been found to remain at the 
same order of magnitude for decades (NAS, 2010).
9�6�2 Overview of option-specific costs and 
potentials
Since the building sector comprises a very large number of end-uses, in 
each of these many different types of equipment being used, and for 
each of which several mitigation alternatives exist, giving a comprehen-
sive account of costs and potentials of each, or even many, is out of the 
scope of this report. The next two sections focus on selected key mitiga-
tion options and discuss their costs and potentials in more depth. Sec-
tion 9.6.2 focuses on whole-building approaches for new and retrofitted 
buildings, while the Section 9.6.3 analyzes a selection of important tech-
nologies systematically. Finally, Section 9.6.5 discusses the sensitivity of 
the findings from the earlier section to various assumptions and inputs.
9�6�2�1 Costs of very high performance new 
construction
There is increasing evidence that very high performance new construc-
tion can be achieved at little, or occasionally even at negative, addi-
tional costs (Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2012a; Harvey, 2013 and Section 9.3).
There are various methodologies applied to understand and demon-
strate the cost-effectiveness of whole building new construction and 
retrofit, including project-based incremental cost accounting, popu-
lation studies, and comparative modelling (Kats, 2009). For commer-
cial buildings, there are instances where these methods have found 
no additional cost in meeting standards as high as the Passive House 
standard (see Section 9.3; Lang Consulting, 2013), or where the cost 
Figure 9�14 | Cost of conserved energy as a function of energy performance improve-
ment (kWh / m2 / yr difference to baseline) to reach ‘Passive House’ or more stringent 
performance levels, for new construction by different building types and climate zones 
in Europe. A discount rate of 3 % and the lifetime of 30 years for retrofit and 40 years 
for new buildings have been assumed. Sources: Hermelink (2006), Galvin (2010), ETK 
(2011), Gardiner and Theobald (2011), Nieminen (2011), Energy Institute Vorarlberg 
(2013), PHI (2013), Harvey (2013).
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of low-energy buildings has been less than that of buildings meeting 
local energy codes. Surveys of delivered full building construction costs 
in the United States and Australia comparing conventional and green 
buildings in a variety of circumstances have been consistently unable 
to detect a significant difference in delivered price between these two 
categories. Rather, they find a wide range of variation costs irrespective 
of performance features (Davis Langdon, 2007; Urban Green Coun-
cil and Davis Langdon, 2009). Collectively, these studies, along with 
evidence in 9.3 and the tables in this section indicate that significant 
improvements in design and operational performance can be achieved 
today under the right circumstances at relatively low or potentially no 
increases, or even decreases, in total cost. 
The cost and feasibility of achieving various ZNEB definitions have 
shown that such goals are rarely cost-effective by conventional stan-
dards; however, specific circumstances, operational goals, and incen-
tives can make them feasible (Boehland, 2008; Meacham, 2009). Table 
9.4 in Section 9.3.5 highlights selected published estimates of the 
incremental cost of net zero-energy buildings; even for these buildings, 
there are cases where there appears to have been little additional cost 
(e. g., NREL Laboratory).The costs of new ZNEBs are heavily dependent 
on supporting policies, such as net metering and feed-in-tariffs, and 
anticipated holding times, beyond the factors described below for all 
buildings. Unlike residential buildings, high-performance commercial 
buildings can cost less to build than standard buildings, even with-
out simplifying the design, because the cost savings from the down-
sizing in mechanical and electricity equipment that is possible with a 
high-performance envelope can offset the extra cost of the envelope. 
In other cases, the net incremental design and construction cost can 
be reduced to the point that the time required to payback the initial 
investment through operating cost savings is quite attractive.
Figure 9.14 shows the resulting cost-effectiveness from a set of doc-
umented best practices from different regions measured in cost of 
conserved energy (CCE). The figure demonstrates well that, despite 
the very broad typical variation in construction costs due to different 
designs and non-energy related extra investments, high-performance 
new construction can be highly cost-effective. Several examples con-
firming the point established in Section 9.3 that even negative CCEs 
can be achieved for commercial buildings — i. e., that the project is 
profitable already at the investment stage, or that the high-perfor-
mance building costs less than the conventional one. Cost-effective-
ness requires that the investments are optimized with regard to the 
Figure 9�16 | Cost of conserved energy as a function of energy saving in percent for 
European retrofitted buildings by building type and climate zones. A discount rate of 
3 % and the lifetime of 30 years for retrofit and 40 years for new buildings have been 
assumed. Sources: Hermelink (2006), Galvin (2010), ETK (2011), Gardiner and Theobald 
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Figure 9�15 | Cost of conserved carbon as a function of specific energy consumption 
for selected best practices shown in Figure 9.14. A discount rate of 3 % and the lifetime 
of 30 years for retrofit and 40 years for new buildings have been assumed. Sources: 
Hermelink (2006), Galvin (2010), ETK (2011), Gardiner and Theobald (2011), Nieminen 
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additional vs. reduced (e. g., simplified or no heating system, ductwork, 
etc.) investment requirements and no non-energy related ‘luxury’ con-
struction investments are included (see Section 9.3 for further discus-
sion of ensuring cost-effectiveness at the individual building level). It 
is also important to note that very high-performance construction is 
still at the demonstration / early deployment level in many jurisdictions, 
and further cost reductions are likely to occur (see, e. g., GEA, 2012). 
Figure  9.14 also shows that higher savings compared to the baseline 
come at a typically lower cost per unit energy saving — i. e., deeper 
reductions from the baseline tend to increase the cost-efficiency. 
Although converting energy saving costs to mitigation costs introduces 
many problems, especially due to the challenges of emission factors, 
Figure 9.15 displays the associated mitigation cost estimates of 
selected points from Figure 9.14 to illustrate potential trends in cost of 
conserved carbon (CCC). The result is a huge range of CCC, which 
extends from three-digit negative costs to triple digit positive costs per 
ton of CO2 emissions avoided. 
9�6�2�2 Costs of deep retrofits
Studies have repeatedly indicated the important distinction between 
conventional ‘shallow’ retrofits, often reducing energy use by only 
10 – 30 %, and aggressive ‘deep’ retrofits (i. e., 50 % or more relative 
to baseline conditions, especially when considering the lock-in effect. 
Korytarova and Ürge-Vorsatz (2012) evaluated a range of existing 
building types to characterize different levels of potential energy sav-
ings under different circumstances. They describe the potential risk for 
shallow retrofits to result in lower levels of energy efficiency and higher 
medium-term mitigation costs when compared to performance-based 
policies promoting deep retrofits. Figure 9.16 presents the costs of con-
served energy related to a selection of documented retrofit best prac-
tices, especially at the higher end of the savings axis. The figure shows 
that there is sufficient evidence that deep retrofits can be cost-effective 
in many climates, building types, and cultures. The figure further shows 
that, while the cost range expands with very large savings, there are 
many examples that indicate that deep retrofits do not necessarily need 
to cost more in specific cost terms than the shallow retrofits — i. e., their 
cost-effectiveness can remain at equally attractive levels for best prac-
tices. Retrofits getting closer to 100 % savings start to get more expen-
sive, mainly due to the introduction of presently more expensive PV and 
other building-integrated renewable energy generation technologies.
9�6�3 Assessment of key factors influencing 
robustness and sensitivity of costs and 
potentials
Costs and potentials of the measures described in previous sections 
depend heavily on various factors and significantly influence the cost-
effectiveness of the investments. While these investments vary with 
the types of measures, a few common factors can be identified. 
 
Figure 9�17 | Sensitivity analysis of the key parameters: Top: CCC for new buildings 
in response to the variation in fuel price; middle: CCE for retrofit buildings in response 
to the variation in discount rate for selected data points shown in Figure 9.14, Figure 
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For the cost-effectiveness of energy-saving investments, the state of 
efficiency of the baseline is perhaps the most important determin-
ing factor. For instance, a Passive House represents a factor of 10 – 20 
improvement when compared to average building stocks, but only a 
fraction of this when compared to, for instance, upcoming German 
new building codes. Figure 9.16 and Figure 9.17 both vary the baseline 
for the respective measure.
CCE figures and thus ‘profitability’, fundamentally depend on the dis-
count rate and assumed lifetime of the measure, and CCC depends fur-
ther on the background emission factor and energy price. Figure 9.17 
illustrates, for instance, the major role discount rate, emission factor, 
and energy price play when determining costs and cost-effectiveness. 
Beyond the well quantifiable influences, further parameters that con-
tribute to the variability of the cost metrics are climate type, geo-
graphic region, building type, etc.
9.7 Co-benefits, risks 
and spillovers
9�7�1 Overview
Mitigation measures depend on and interact with a variety of fac-
tors that relate to broader economic, social, and / or environmental 
objectives that drive policy choices. Positive side-effects are deemed 
‘co-benefits’; if adverse and uncertain, they imply risks.1 Potential co-
benefits and adverse side-effects of alternative mitigation measures 
(Sections 9.7.1 – 9.7.3), associated technical risks, and uncertainties, as 
well as their public perception (see the relevant discussion in Sections 
9.3.10 and 9.8), can significantly affect investment decisions, individ-
ual behaviour, and policymaking priority settings. Table 9.7 provides an 
overview of the potential co-benefits and adverse side-effects of the 
mitigation measures assessed in accordance with sustainable develop-
ment pillars (Chapter 4). The extent to which co-benefits and adverse 
side-effects will materialize in practice, as well as their net effect on 
social welfare, differ greatly across regions. It is strongly dependent 
on local circumstances, implementation practices, scale, and pace of 
measures deployment (see Section 6.6). Ürge-Vorsatz et al. (2009) and 
GEA (2012), synthesizing previous research efforts (Mills and Rosen-
feld, 1996), recognize the following five major categories of co-bene-
fits attributed to mitigation actions in buildings: (1) health effects (e. g., 
reduced mortality and morbidity from improved indoor and outdoor 
air quality), (2) ecological effects (e. g., reduced impacts on ecosys-
tems due to the improved outdoor environment), (3) economic effects 
1 Co-benefits and adverse side-effects describe effects in non-monetary units 
without yet evaluating the net effect on overall social welfare. Please refer to the 
respective sections in the framing chapters (particularly 2.4, 3.6.3, and 4.8) as 
well as to the glossary in Annex I for concepts and definitions.
(e. g., decreased energy bill payments, employment creation, improved 
energy security, improved productivity), (4) service provision benefits 
(e. g., reduction of energy losses during energy transmission and distri-
bution), and (5) social effects (e. g., fuel poverty alleviation, increased 
comfort due to better control of indoor conditions and the reduction of 
outdoor noise, increased safety). Taken together, the GEA (2012) found 
that only the monetizable co-benefits associated with energy efficiency 
in buildings are at least twice the resulting operating cost savings.
On the other hand, some risks are also associated with the implemen-
tation of mitigation actions in buildings emanating mostly from limited 
energy access and fuel poverty issues due to higher investment and 
(sometimes) operating costs, health risks in sub-optimally designed 
airtight buildings, and the use of sub-standard energy efficiency tech-
nologies including risks of premature failure. The AR4 (Levine et  al., 
2007) and other major recent studies (UNEP, 2011b; GEA, 2012) pro-
vide a detailed presentation and a comprehensive analysis of such 
effects. Here, a review of recent advances focuses on selected co-ben-
efits / risks, with a view to providing methods, quantitative information, 
and examples that can be utilized in the decision-making process.
9�7�2 Socio-economic effects
9�7�2�1 Impacts on employment
Studies (Scott et  al., 2008; Pollin et  al., 2009; Kuckshinrichs et  al., 
2010; Köppl et al., 2011; ILO, 2012) have found that greater use of 
renewables and energy efficiency in the building sector results in 
positive economic effects through job creation, economic growth, 
increase of income, and reduced needs for capital stock in the energy 
sector. These conclusions, however, have been criticized on grounds 
that include, among others, the accounting methods used, the effi-
cacy of using public funds for energy projects instead of for other 
investments, and the possible inefficiencies of investing in labour-
intensive activities (Alvarez et al., 2010; Carley et al., 2011; Gülen, 
2011). A review of the literature on quantification of employment 
effects of energy efficiency and mitigation measures in the building 
sector is summarized in Figure 9.18. The bulk of the studies reviewed, 
which mainly concern developed economies, point out that the 
implementation of mitigation interventions in buildings generates 
on average 13 (range of 0.7 to 35.5) job-years per million USD2010 
spent. This range does not change if only studies estimating net 
employment effects are considered. Two studies (Scott et al., 2008; 
Gold et al., 2011) focus on cost savings from unspent energy bud-
gets that can be redirected in the economy, estimating that the 
resulting employment effects range between 6.0 and 10.2 job-years 
per million USD2010 spent. Several studies (Pollin et al., 2009; Ürge-
Vorsatz et al., 2010; Wei et al., 2010; Carley et al., 2011) agree that 
building retrofits and investments in clean energy technologies are 
more labour-intensive than conventional approaches (i. e., energy 





Table 9�7 | Overview of potential co-benefits (green arrows) and adverse side-effects (orange arrows) associated with mitigation actions in buildings. Please refer to Sections 7.9, 
11.7, and 11.13 for possible upstream effects of low-carbon electricity and biomass supply on additional objectives. Co-benefits and adverse side-effects depend on local circum-
stances as well as on the implementation practice, pace, and scale (see Section 6.6). For an assessment of macroeconomic, cross-sectoral effects associated with mitigation policies 
(e. g., on energy prices, consumption, growth, and trade), see Sections 3.9, 6.3.6, 13.2.2.3 and 14.4.2.


























































































































↑ Employment impact X X X X X X X X Scott et al. (2008); Pollin et al. (2009); Ürge-Vorsatz et al. (2010); Gold et al. (2011)
↑ Energy security X X X X X X X X X IEA (2007); Dixon et al. (2010); Borg and Kelly (2011); Steinfeld et al. (2011)
↑ Productivity X X X X X X Fisk (2002); Kats et al. (2003); Loftness et al. (2003); Singh et al. (2010b)
↑ Enhanced asset values of buildings X X X X X X X Miller et al. (2008); Brounen and Kok (2011); Deng et al. (2012b)
↑ Lower need for energy subsidies X X X X X X X X X Ürge-Vorsatz et al. (2009); GEA (2012)
↑ Disaster resilience X X X X X X Berdahl (1995); Mills (2003); Coaffee (2008)
Social
↑ Fuel poverty alleviation (reduced 
demand for energy)
X X X X X X
Tirado Herrero et al. (2012b); Healy (2004); Liddell and Morris 
(2010); Hills (2011); Ürge-Vorsatz and Tirado Herrero (2012)
↓ Fuel poverty alleviation (in cases of 
increases in the cost of energy)
X X X X
GEA (2012); Rao (2013)
↓ Energy access (in cases of increases in the cost 
of energy, high investment costs needed, etc.)
X X X X X X
GEA (2012); for a more in-depth discussion please see Section 7.9.1
↑ Noise impact, thermal comfort X X X X X X Jakob (2006); Stoecklein and Skumatz (2007)
↑ Increased productive time for women and 
children (for replaced traditional cookstoves)
X X X X
Reddy et al. (2000); Lambrou and Piana (2006); Hutton et al. 
(2007); Anenberg et al. (2013); Wodon and Blackden (2006)
↓ Rebound effect
X X X X X X X X
Greening et al. (2000); Sorrell (2007); Hens et al. (2009); Sorrell et al. 
(2009); Druckman et al. (2011); Ürge-Vorsatz et al. (2012a)
Health / Environmental
Health impact due to:
↑ reduced outdoor pollution
X X X X X X X X X
Levy et al. (2003); Aunan et al. (2004); Mirasgedis et al. (2004); Chen et al. 
(2007); Crawford-Brown et al. (2012); Milner et al. (2012); see Section 7.9.2
↑ reduced indoor pollution
X X X X
Bruce et al. (2006); Zhang and Smith (2007); Duflo et al. (2008); 
WHO (2009); Wilkinson et al. (2009); Howden-Chapman and 
Chapman (2012); Milner et al. (2012); WGII Section 11.9.
↑ improved indoor environmental conditions
X X X X X X X
Fisk (2002); Singh et al. (2010b); Howden-Chapman 
and Chapman (2012); Milner et al. (2012)
↑ fuel poverty alleviation
X X X X X X
Tirado Herrero et al. (2012b); Healy (2004); Liddell and Morris 
(2010); Hills (2011); Ürge-Vorsatz and Tirado Herrero (2012)
↓ insufficient ventilation (sick building 
syndrome), sub-standard energy 
efficiency technologies, etc.
X X X X X X
Fisk (2002); GEA (2012); Milner et al. (2012)
↑ Ecosystem impact X X X X X X X X X Aunan et al. (2004); Mirasgedis et al. (2004); Ürge-Vorsatz et al. (2009); Cam (2012)
↑ Reduced water consumption 
and sewage production
X X X X X X X
Kats et al. (2005); Bansal et al. (2011)





to what extent investing in clean energy creates more employment 
compared to conventional activities depends also on the structure of 
the economy in question, level of wages, and if the production of 
equipment and services to develop these investments occurs or not 
inside the economy under consideration. To this end, the estimation 
of net employment benefits instead of gross effects is of particular 
importance for an integrated analysis of energy efficiency implica-
tions on the economy. Investing in clean technologies may create 
new job activities (e. g., in solar industry, in the sector of new build-
ing materials etc.), but the vast majority of jobs can be in traditional 
areas (Pollin et  al., 2009) albeit with different skills required (ILO, 
2012).
9�7�2�2 Energy security
Implementation of mitigation measures in the buildings sector can play 
an important role in increasing the sufficiency of resources to meet 
national energy demand at competitive and stable prices and improv-
ing the resilience of the energy supply system. Specifically, mitigation 
actions result in: (1) strengthening power grid reliability through the 
enhancement of properly managed on-site generation and the reduc-
tion of the overall demand, which result in reduced power transmis-
sion and distribution losses and constraints (Kahn, 2008; Passey et al., 
2011); (2) reducing cooling-related peak power demand and shifting 
demand to off-peak periods (Borg and Kelly, 2011; Steinfeld et  al., 
2011); and (3) increasing the diversification of energy sources as well 
as the share of domestic energy sources used in a specific energy sys-
tem (see for example Dixon et al., 2010). A more general discussion on 
energy security is provided in Section 6.6.
9�7�2�3 Benefits related to workplace 
productivity
Investment in low-carbon technologies related to air conditioning and 
wall thermal properties during construction or renovation improves 
workplace productivity, as evidenced by a meta-analysis of several 
studies (Fisk, 2002; Kats et al., 2003; Loftness et al., 2003; Ries et al., 
2006; Sustainability Victoria and Kador Group, 2007; Miller et al., 2009; 
Singh et al., 2010b). On average, energy efficient buildings may result 
in increased productivity by 1 – 9 % or even higher for specific activities 
or case studies. The productivity gains can be attributed to: (1) reduced 
working days lost due to asthma and respiratory allergies; (2) fewer 
work hours affected by flu, respiratory illnesses, depression, and stress; 
and (3) improved worker performance from changes in thermal com-
fort and lighting. Productivity gains can rank among the highest value 
co-benefits when these are monetized, especially in countries with 
high labour costs (GEA, 2012). 
9�7�2�4 Rebound effects
Improvements in energy efficiency can be offset by increases in demand 
for energy services due to the rebound effect. The general issues relat-
ing to the effect are set out in Sections 3.9.5 and 5.6. The rebound 
effect is of particular importance in buildings because of the high 
proportion of energy efficiency potential in this sector. Studies related 
to buildings form a major part of the two major reviews of rebound 
(Greening et  al., 2000; Sorrell, 2007). Direct rebound effects tend to 
be in the range 0 – 30 % for major energy services in buildings such as 
heating and cooling (Sorrell et  al., 2009; Ürge-Vorsatz et  al., 2012b) 
Figure 9�18 | Employment effects attributed to GHG mitigation initiatives from different provinces, countries and regions in the building sector.
Sources used: USA (Scott et al., 2008; Bezdek, 2009; Hendricks et al., 2009; Pollin et al., 2009; Garrett-Peltier, 2011; Gold et al., 2011), Hungary (Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2010), Ontario, 
Canada (Pollin and Garrett-Peltier, 2009), Germany (Kuckshinrichs et al., 2010), Denmark (Ege et al., 2009), EU (ETUC, 2008), Greece (Markaki et al., 2013), France (ADEME, 2008). 
All studies from the USA, Hungary, Ontario Canada and Greece include the direct, indirect and induced employment effects. In ADEME (2008) and ETUC (2008) only the direct 
effects are taken into account. Ege et al. (2009) includes the direct and indirect effects while this information is not provided in Kuckshinrichs et al. (2010).
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in developed countries. For energy services where energy is a smaller 
fraction of total costs, e. g., electrical appliances, there is less evidence, 
but values are lower and less than 20 % (Sorrell, 2007). Somewhat 
higher rebound levels have been found for lower income groups (Hens 
et al., 2009; Roy, 2000), implying that rebound contributes positively to 
energy service affordability and development. However, there is limited 
evidence outside OECD countries (Roy, 2000; Ouyang et al., 2010) and 
further research is required here. Studies of indirect rebound effects for 
buildings tend to show low values, e. g., 7 % for thermostat changes 
(Druckman et  al., 2011). Some claims have been made that indirect 
rebound effects may be very large (Brookes, 2000; Saunders, 2000), 
even exceeding 100 %, so that energy efficiency improvement would 
increase energy use. These claims may have had some validity for criti-
cal ‘general purpose technologies’ such as steam engines during inten-
sive periods of industrialization (Sorrell, 2007), but there is no evidence 
to support large rebound effects for energy efficiency in buildings. 
Declining energy use in developed countries with strong policies for 
energy efficiency in buildings indicates rebound effects are low (see 
Section 9.2). Rebound effects should be taken into account in build-
ing energy efficiency policies, but do not alter conclusions about their 
importance and cost effectiveness in climate mitigation (Sorrell, 2007).
9�7�2�5 Fuel poverty alleviation
Fuel poverty is a condition in which a household is unable to guarantee 
a certain level of consumption of domestic energy services (especially 
heating) or suffers disproportionate expenditure burdens to meet these 
needs (Boardman, 1991; BERR, 2001; Healy and Clinch, 2002; Buzar, 
2007; Ürge-Vorsatz and Tirado Herrero, 2012). As such, it has a range 
of negative effects on the health and welfare of fuel poor households. 
For instance, indoor temperatures that are too low affect vulnerable 
population groups like children, adolescent, or the elderly (Liddell and 
Morris, 2010; Marmot Review Team, 2011) and increase excess winter 
mortality rates (The Eurowinter Group, 1997; Wilkinson et  al., 2001; 
Healy, 2004). A more analytical discussion on the potential health 
impacts associated with fuel poverty is presented in Section 9.7.3. 
Despite the fact that some mitigation measures (e. g., renewables) may 
result in higher consumer energy prices aggravating energy poverty, 
substantially improving the thermal performance of buildings (such as 
Passive House) and educating residents on appropriate energy man-
agement can largely alleviate fuel poverty. Several studies have shown 
that fuel poverty-related monetized co-benefits make up over 30 % of 
the total benefits of energy efficiency investments and are more impor-
tant than those arising from avoided emissions of greenhouses gases 
and other harmful pollutants like SO2, NOx, and PM10 (Clinch and Healy, 
2001; Ürge-Vorsatz and Tirado Herrero, 2012). 
9�7�3 Environmental and health effects
9�7�3�1 Health co-benefits due to improved indoor 
conditions
The implementation of energy efficiency interventions in buildings 
improves indoor conditions resulting in significant co-benefits for pub-
lic health, through: (1) reduction of indoor air pollution, (2) improve-
ment of indoor environmental conditions, and (3) alleviation of fuel 
poverty particularly in cold regions. In developing countries, inefficient 
combustion of traditional solid fuels in households produces signifi-
cant gaseous and particulate emissions known as products of incom-
plete combustion (PICs), and results in significant health impacts, par-
ticularly for women and children, who spend longer periods at home 
(Zhang and Smith, 2007; Duflo et  al., 2008; Wilkinson et  al., 2009). 
Indoor air pollution from the use of biomass and coal was responsible 
for 2 million premature deaths and 41 million disability-adjusted life-
years (DALYs) worldwide in 2004 (WHO, 2009), with recent estimates 
(Lim et al., 2012) reaching as high as 3.5 million premature deaths in 
2010. Another half a million premature deaths are attributed to 
household cook fuel’s contribution to outdoor air pollution, making a 
total of about 4 million (see WGII Chapter 11.9.1.3). Several climate 
mitigation options such as improved cookstoves, switching to cleaner 
fuels, changing behaviours, and switching to more efficient and less 
dangerous lighting technologies address not only climate change but 
also these health issues (Anenberg et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2013; Rao 
et al., 2013). Wilkinson et al. (2009) showed that the implementation 
of a national programme promoting modern low-emissions stove 
technologies in India could result in significant health benefits 
amounting to 12,500 fewer DALYs per million population in one year. 
Bruce et al. (2006) investigated the health benefits and the costs asso-
ciated with the implementation of selected interventions aiming at 
reducing indoor air pollution from the use of solid fuels for cook-
ing / space heating in various world regions (Table 9.8).
In both developed and developing countries, better insulation, ven-
tilation, and heating systems in buildings improve the indoor condi-
tions and result in fewer respiratory diseases, allergies and asthma as 












East Asia and 
the Pacific
Access to cleaner fuels: LPG 1.30 — 1.79 0.66 — 1.19 ~1.2 0.70 — 0.76 1.70 — 2.97 0.55 — 9.30
Access to cleaner fuels: Kerosene 11.1 — 15.4 1.46 — 8.77 ~9.7 5.07 — 5.56 14.8 — 25.8 4.11 — 79.5





well as reduced sick building syndrome (SBS) symptoms (Fisk, 2002; 
Singh et al., 2010b). On the other hand, insufficient ventilation in air-
tight buildings has been found to affect negatively their occupants’ 
health, as has the installation of sub-standard energy efficiency tech-
nologies due to in-situ toxic chemicals (Fisk, 2002; GEA, 2012; Milner 
et  al., 2012). Of particular importance is the alleviation of fuel pov-
erty in buildings, which is associated with excess mortality and mor-
bidity effects, depression, and anxiety (Green and Gilbertson, 2008). 
It is estimated that over 10 % to as much as 40 % of excess winter 
deaths in temperate countries is related to inadequate indoor tem-
peratures (Clinch and Healy, 2001; Marmot Review Team, 2011). In 
countries such as Poland, Germany, or Spain, this amounts to several 
thousand — up to 10,000 — excess annual winter deaths. These fig-
ures suggest that in developed countries, fuel poverty may be caus-
ing premature deaths per year similar to or higher than that of road 
traffic accidents (Bonnefoy and Sadeckas, 2006; Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 
2012; Tirado Herrero et al., 2012b). Improved residential insulation is 
expected to reduce illnesses associated with room temperature thus 
provide non-energy benefits, such as reduced medical expenses and 
reduced loss of income due to unpaid sick leave from work and school. 
A study in the UK found that for each USD2010 1 invested for warm-
ing homes reduces the healthcare costs by USD2010 0.49 (Liddell, 2008). 
Such findings suggest that addressing fuel poverty issues and the 
resulting health impacts in developing nations are even more impor-
tant, as a greater share of the population is affected (WHO, 2011).
9�7�3�2 Health and environmental co-benefits due to 
reduced outdoor air pollution
The implementation of mitigation measures in the building sector 
reduces the consumption of fossil fuels and electricity, thus improv-
ing the outdoor air quality and resulting in: (1) reduced mortality and 
morbidity, particularly in developing countries and big cities (Smith 
et  al., 2010; Harlan and Ruddell, 2011; see Section 12.8); and (2) 
less stresses on natural and anthropogenic ecosystems (see Section 
7.9.1). Quantification and valuation of these benefits is possible, and 
allows them to be integrated into cost-benefit analysis. Many studies 
(Levy et al., 2003; Aunan et al., 2004; Mirasgedis et al., 2004; Chen 
et al., 2007; Crawford-Brown et al., 2012) have monetized the health 
and environmental benefits attributed to reduced outdoor air pollu-
tion that result from the implementation of energy efficiency mea-
sures in buildings. The magnitude of these benefits is of the order 
of 8 – 22 % of the value of energy savings in developed countries 
(Levy et  al., 2003; Næss-Schmidt et  al., 2012), and even higher in 
developing nations (see Chapter 6.6). Markandya et al. (2009) esti-
mated that the health benefits expressed in USD2010 per ton of CO2 
not emitted from power plants (through for example the implemen-
tation of electricity conservation interventions) are in the range of 
2 USD2010 / tCO2 in EU, 7 USD2010 / tCO2 in China and 46 USD2010 / tCO2 
in India, accounting for only the mortality impacts associated with 
PM2.5 emissions. Please refer to Section 5.7 for other estimates in the 
assessed literature.
9�7�3�3 Other environmental benefits
Energy efficiency measures that are implemented in buildings result 
in several other environmental benefits. Specifically, using energy effi-
cient appliances such as washing machines and dishwashers in homes 
results in considerable water savings (Bansal et al., 2011). More gener-
ally, a number of studies show that green design in buildings is associ-
ated with lower demand for water, resulting in reduced costs and emis-
sions from the utilities sector. For example, Kats et al. (2005) evaluated 
30 green schools in Massachusetts and found an average water use 
reduction of 32 % compared to conventional schools, achieved through 
the reuse of the rain water and other non-potable water as well as the 
installation of water efficient appliances (e. g., in toilets) and advanced 
controls. Also, the implementation of green roofs, roof gardens, bal-
cony gardens, and sky terraces as well as green façades / walls in build-
ings, results in: (1) reducing heat gains for buildings in hot climates; (2) 
reducing the heat island effect; (3) improving air quality; (4) enhancing 
urban biodiversity, especially with the selection of indigenous vegeta-
tion species; (5) absorbing CO2 emissions, etc. (see Cam, 2012; Xu et 
al., 2012b; Gill et al., 2007; and Section 12.5.2.2).
9.8 Barriers and opportunities
Strong barriers — many particular to the buildings sector — hinder the 
market uptake of largely cost-effective opportunities to achieve energy 
efficiency improvements shown in earlier sections. Large potentials 
will remain untapped without adequate policies that induce the 
needed changes in private decisions and professional practices. Bar-
riers and related opportunities vary considerably by location, building 
type, culture, and stakeholder groups, as vary the options to overcome 
them, such as policies, measures, and innovative financing schemes. A 
vast literature on barriers and opportunities in buildings enumerates 
and describes these factors (Brown et al., 2008b; Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 
2012a; Power, 2008; Lomas, 2009; Mlecnik, 2010; Short, 2007; Hegner, 
2010; Stevenson, 2009; Pellegrini-Masini and Leishman, 2011; Greden, 
2006; Collins, 2007; Houghton, 2011; Kwok, 2010; Amundsen, 2010; 
Monni, 2008).
Barriers include imperfect information, transaction costs, limited capital, 
externalities, subsidies, risk aversion, principal agent problems, frag-
mented market and institutional structures, poor feedback, poor enforce-
ment of regulations, cultural aspects, cognitive and behavioural patterns, 
as well as difficulties concerning patent protection and technology 
transfer. In less developed areas, lack of awareness, financing, qualified 
personnel, economic informality, and generally insufficient service levels 
lead to suboptimal policies and measures thus causing lock-in effects in 
terms of emissions. The pace of policy uptake is especially important in 
developing countries because ongoing development efforts that do not 
consider co-benefits may lock in suboptimal technologies and infrastruc-





9.9 Sectoral implication 
of transformation 
pathways and sustainable 
development
9�9�1 Introduction
The purpose of this section is to review both the integrated as well as 
sectoral bottom-up modelling literature from the perspective of what 
main trends are projected for the future building emissions and energy 
use developments, and the role of major mitigation strategies outlined 
in Section 9.1. The section complements the analysis in Section 6.8 
with more details on findings from the building sector. The two key 
pillars of the section are (1) a statistical analysis of a large population 
of scenarios from integrated models (665 scenarios in total) grouped 
by their long-term CO2-equivalent (CO2eq) concentration level by 2100, 
complemented by the analysis of sectoral models (grouped by baseline 
and advanced scenario, since often these do not relate to concentra-
tion goals); and (2) a more detailed analysis of a small selection of 
integrated and end-use / sectoral models. The source of the integrated 
models is the WGIII AR5 Scenario Database (see Section 6.2.2 for 
details), and those of the sectoral models are Cornelissen et al. (2012), 
Deng et al. (2012a), Dowling et al. (2012), GPI (2010), Harvey (2010), 
IEA (2012c0a), Laustsen (2010), McNeil et  al. (2013), Ürge-Vorsatz 
et al. (2012a3), WBCSD (2009),  WEO (2011).
9�9�2 Overview of building sector energy 
projections
Figure 9.19, together with Figure 9.20 and Figure 9. 21 indicate that 
without action, global building final energy use could double or pos-
sibly triple by mid-century. While the median of integrated model sce-
narios forecast an approximate 75 % increase as compared to 2010 (Fig-
ure 9.19), several key scenarios that model this sector in greater detail 
foresee a larger growth, such as: AIM, Message, and the Global Change 
Assessment Model (GCAM), all of which project an over 150 % baseline 
growth (Figure 9.20). The sectoral / bottom-up literature, however, indi-
cates that this growing trend can be reversed and the sector’s energy use 
can stagnate, or even decline, by mid-century, under advanced scenarios.
The projected development in building final energy use is rather dif-
ferent in the sectoral (bottom-up) and integrated modelling literature, 
as illustrated in Figure 9.19, Figure 9.20, and Figure 9. 21. For instance, 
the integrated model literature foresees an increase in building energy 
consumption in most scenarios with almost none foreseeing stabili-
zation, whereas the vast majority of ambitious scenarios from the 
bottom-up / sectoral literature stabilize or even decline despite the 
increases in wealth, floorspace, service levels, and amenities (see Sec-
tion 9.2). Several stringent mitigation scenarios from integrated mod-
Figure 9�19 | Development of normalized annual global building final energy 
demand (2010=100) until 2050 in the integrated modelling literature, grouped by 
the three levels of long-term CO2eq concentration level by 2100 (245 scenarios with 
430 – 530 ppm CO2eq, 156 scenarios with 530 – 650 ppm CO2eq, and 177 scenarios 
exceeding 720 ppm CO2eq — for category descriptions see Chapter 6.3.3; see box plots) 
and sectoral / bottom-up literature (9 baseline scenarios and 9 advanced scenarios; see 
square, triangle and circle symbols). Sectoral scenarios covering appliances (A) only are 
denoted as squares (), scenarios covering heating / cooling / water heating (HCW) as 
triangles (), scenarios covering heating / cooling / water heating / lighting / appliances 
(HCWLA) as circles (). Filled symbols are for baseline scenario, whereas empty sym-
bols are for advanced scenarios. Box plots show minimum, 25th percentile, median, 75th 
percentile and maximum. Sources: Cornelissen et al. (2012), Deng et al. (2012a), Dowl-
ing et al. (2012), GPI (2010), Harvey (2010), IEA (2012c0a), Laustsen (2010), McNeil 
et al. (2013), Ürge-Vorsatz et al. (2012a3), WBCSD (2009), WEO (2011) and WG III AR5 
Scenario Database (Annex II.10).
Note on this section: This section builds upon emissions scenarios, which were 
collated by Chapter 6 in the WGIII AR5 scenario database (Section 6.2.2), and com-
pares them to detailed building sector studies. The scenarios were grouped into 
baseline and mitigation scenarios. As described in more detail in Section 6.3.2, the 
scenarios are further categorized into bins based on 2100 concentrations: between 
430 – 480 ppm CO2eq, 480 – 530 ppm CO2eq, 530 – 580 ppm CO2eq, 580 – 650 ppm 
CO2eq, 650 – 720 ppm CO2eq, and > 720 ppm CO2eq by 2100. An assessment of 
geo-physical climate uncertainties consistent with the dynamics of Earth System 
Models assessed in WGI found that the most stringent of these scenarios — lead-
ing to 2100 concentrations between 430 and 480 ppm CO2eq — would lead to an 
end-of-century median temperature change between 1.6 to 1.8 °C compared to pre-
industrial times, although uncertainties in understanding of the climate system mean 
that the possible temperature range is much wider than this range. They were found 
to maintain temperature change below 2 °C over the course of the century with 
a likely chance. Scenarios in the concentration category of 650 – 720 ppm CO2eq 
correspond to comparatively modest mitigation efforts, and were found to lead to 




3CSEP HEB, Frozen Efficiency
3CSEP HEB, Deep Efficiency
LAUSTSEN, Baseline
LAUSTSEN, Factor 4
HARVEY, High GDP High Pop.
Slow Efficiency w/o Heat Pump
HARVEY, High GDP High Pop.






POLES-IPTS, CO2 Price USD 50
Greenpeace [R]evolution 2010, Baseline








































430-530 ppm CO2eq (N=245)
530-650 ppm CO2eq (N=156)





els are above baseline scenarios from the sectoral literature (Figure 
9.20). In general, the sectoral literature sees deeper opportunities for 
energy use reductions in the building sector than integrated models.
As the focus on selected scenarios in Figure 9.21 suggests, thermal 
energy use can be reduced more strongly than energy in other building 
end-uses: reductions in the total are typically as much as, or less than, 
decreases in heating and cooling (sometimes with hot water) energy 
use scenarios. Figure 9.21 shows that deep reductions are foreseen only 
in the thermal energy uses by bottom-up / sectoral scenarios, but appli-
ances can be reduced only moderately, even in sectoral studies. This 
indicates that mitigation is more challenging for non-thermal end-uses 
and is becoming increasingly important for ambitious mitigation over 
time, especially in advanced heating and cooling scenarios where this 
energy use can be successfully pushed down to a fraction of its 2005 
levels. These findings confirm the more theoretical discussions in this 
chapter, i. e., that in thermal end-uses deeper reductions can be expected 
while appliance energy use will be more difficult to reduce or even limit 
its growth. For instance Ürge-Vorsatz et al. (2012d) show a 46 % reduc-
tion in heating and cooling energy demand as compared to 2005 — even 
under baseline assumptions on wealth and amenities increases. In con-
trast, the selected integrated models that focus on detailed building sec-
tor modelling project very little reduction in heating and cooling.
Another general finding is that studies show significantly larger reduc-
tion potentials by 2050 than by 2030, pointing to the need for a longer-
term, strategic policy planning, due to long lead times of building infra-
structure modernization (see Section 9.4). In fact, most of these studies 
and scenarios show energy growth through 2020, with the decline start-
ing later, suggesting that ‘patience’ and thus policy permanence is vital 
for this sector in order to be able to exploit its large mitigation potentials.
The trends noted above are very different in the different world regions. 
As Figure 9.22 demonstrates, both per capita and total final building 
energy use is expected to decline or close to stabilize even in baseline 
scenarios in OECD countries. In contrast, the Latin-American and Asian 
regions will experience major growth both for per capita and total lev-
els, even in the most stringent mitigation scenarios. MAF will experience 
major growth for total levels, but growth is not projected for per capita 
levels even in baseline scenarios. This is likely due mainly to the fact that 
Figure 9�20 | Annual global final energy demand development in the building sector by 2050 (except WEO'10 and BUENAS) in selected sectoral models for baseline (left) and advanced 
(right) scenarios, for total energy (All, heating / cooling / hot water / lighting / appliances), thermal energy (HCW, includes heating / cooling / hot water), and appliances (A); compared to selected 
integrated models. Dashed lines show integrated models, solid lines show sectoral / bottom-up models. Sources: Cornelissen et al. (2012), Deng et al. (2012a), Dowling et al. (2012), GPI 
(2010), Harvey (2010), IEA (2012c0a), Laustsen (2010), McNeil et al. (2013), Ürge-Vorsatz et al. (2012a3), WBCSD (2009), WEO (2011) and WG III AR5 Scenario Database (Annex II.10).
Note: For the analysis to follow, we have chosen seven illustrative integrated models with two scenarios each, covering the full range of year-2050 final energy use in all no-policy 
scenarios in the WGIII AR5 scenario database and their 450 ppm scenario counterparts. These no-policy scenarios are MESSAGE V.4_EMF27-Base-EERE, IMAGE 2.4_AMPERE2-
Base-LowEI-OPT, AIM-Enduse[Backcast] 1.0_LIMITS-StrPol, BET 1.5_EMF27-Base-FullTech, TIAM-WORLD 2012.2_EMF27-Base-FullTech, GCAM 3.0_AMPERE3-Base, and POLES 
AMPERE_AMPERE3-Base. The mitigation scenario counterparts are MESSAGE V.4_EMF27 – 450-EERE, IMAGE 2.4_AMPERE2 – 450-LowEI-OPT, AIM-Enduse[Backcast] 1.0_LIM-
ITS-StrPol-450, BET 1.5_EMF27 – 450-FullTech, TIAM-WORLD 2012.2_EMF27 – 450-FullTech, GCAM 3.0_AMPERE3-CF450, and POLES AMPERE_AMPERE3-CF450. In addition, 
sectoral / bottom-up models and scenarios were also included. The no policy / baseline scenarios are BUENAS Baseline, 3CSEP HEB Frozen efficiency, LAUSTSEN Baseline, WEO’10 
Current Policies, ETP’10 Baseline, Ecofys Baseline, and Greenpeace Energy Revolution 2010 Baseline. The advanced scenarios are BUENAS EES&L, 3CSEP HEB Deep efficiency, 
LAUSTSEN Factor 4, WEO’10 450 Scenario, ETP’10 BLUE Map, Ecofys TER, and Greenpeace Energy Revolution 2010 Revolution.


















































































fuel switching from traditional biomass to modern energy carriers results 
in significant conversion efficiency gains, thus allowing substantial 
increases in energy service levels without increasing final energy use.
9�9�3 Key mitigation strategies as highlighted 
by the pathway analysis
The diversity of the development in final energy demand even among 
the most stringent mitigation scenarios suggests that different mod-
els take different foci for their building mitigation strategies. While 
most mitigation and advanced bottom-up / sectoral scenarios show flat 
or reducing global final building energy use, a few integrated mod-
els achieve stringent mitigation from rather high final energy demand 
levels, thereby focusing on energy supply-side measures for reducing 
emissions. These scenarios have about twice as high per capita final 
energy demand levels in 2050 as the lowest mitigation scenarios. This 
suggests a focus on energy supply side measures for decarbonization. 
In general, Figure 9.19, Figure 9.20, and Figure 9. 21 all demonstrate 
that integrated models generally place a larger focus on supply-side 
solutions than on final energy reduction opportunities in the building 
sector (see Section 6.8) — except for a small selection of studies. 
Fuel switching to electricity that is increasingly being decarbonized is 
a robust mitigation strategy as shown in Sections 6.3.4 and 6.8. How-
ever, as Figure 9.23a indicates, this is not fully the case in the buildings 
sector. The total share of electricity in this sector is influenced little by 
mitigation stringency except for the least ambitious scenarios: it exhib-
its an autonomous increase from about 28 % of final energy in 2010 
to 50 % and more in 2050 in almost all scenarios, i. e., the use of more 
electricity as a share of building energy supply is an important baseline 
trend in the sector. Compared to this robust baseline trend, the addi-
tional electrification in mitigation scenarios is rather modest (see also 
Section 6.8.4). 
Figure 9.23b indicates that the higher rates of energy growth (x-axis) in 
the models involve generally higher rates of electricity growth (y-axis). 
The two increases are nearly proportional, so that the rates of electricity 
demand share growth, of which level is indicated by 45o lines, remain 
mostly below 2 % per year even in the presence of climate policy. 
The seven selected integrated models see a very different development 
in the fuel mix (Figure 9. 24). In the baseline scenarios, interestingly, 
most scenarios show a fairly similar amount of power use; and the 
difference in total building final energy use largely stems from the dif-
Figure 9�21 | Building final energy use in EJ / yr in 2050 (2030 for BUENAS and WEO'10) for advanced scenarios, modelling four groups of building end-uses as compared to refer-
ence ones. Blue bars show scenarios from integrated models meeting 480 – 580 ppm CO2eq concentration in 2100, orange / red bars are from sectoral models. Sources: Cornelissen 
et al. (2012), Deng et al. (2012a), Dowling et al. (2012), GPI (2010), Harvey (2010), IEA (2012c0a), Laustsen (2010), McNeil et al. (2013), Ürge-Vorsatz et al. (2012a3), WBCSD 
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Figure 9�22 | Normalized total (for first two pairs of box plots) and per capita (for next two pairs of box plots) buildings final energy demand in 2010 and 2050 for each of the 
RC5 regions (Annex II.2.2) in scenarios from integrated models (2010=100). The absolute values of the medians are also shown with the unit of EJ for total buildings final energy 
demand and the unit of GJ for per capita buildings final energy demand (229 scenarios with 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq and 154 scenarios exceeding 720 ppm CO2eq — for category 
descriptions see Section 6.3.2). Note that the 2010 absolute values are not equal for the two CO2eq concentration categories because for most integrated models 2010 is a model-
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ferences in the use of other fuels. Particularly large differences are fore-
seen in the use of natural gas and oil, and, to a lesser extent, biomass. 
Mitigation scenarios are somewhat more uniform: mostly a bit over 
half of their fuel mix is comprised of electricity, with the remaining part 
more evenly distributed among the other fuels except coal that disap-
pears from the portfolio, although some scenarios exclude further indi-
vidual fuels (such as no biomass in MESSAGE, no oil in BET, no natural 
gas in Image) by scenarios outcomes. 
9�9�4 Summary and general observations of 
global building final energy use
The material summarized in this section concludes that without action, 
global building final energy use may double or potentially even triple 
by mid-century, but with ambitious action it can possibly stabilize or 
decline as compared to its present levels. However, the integrated and 
sectoral models do not fully agree with regard to the extent of mitiga-
tion potential and the key mitigation strategy, although there is a very 
wide variation among integrated models with some more agreement 
across sectoral models’ conclusions.
The broad mitigation strategy for buildings implied by sectoral analysis 
is first to significantly reduce demand for both primary fuels and elec-
tricity by using available technologies for energy efficiency improve-
ment, many of which are cost effective without a carbon price. To the 
extent this is insufficient, further mitigation can be achieved through 
additional use of low and zero carbon electricity, from a combination 
of building integrated renewable energy and substitution of fossil fuels 
with low carbon electricity.
The broad mitigation strategies for buildings implied by integrated 
models, however, include a greater emphasis on switching to low-
carbon energy carriers (predominantly electricity). These strategies 
place less emphasis on reducing energy demand, possibly because 
many integrated models do not represent all technical options to 
reduce building energy consumption cost-effectively which are covered 
in sectoral studies and because of the implicit assumption of general 
equilibrium models that all cost-effective opportunities had been taken 
up already in the baseline which is at odds with empirical data from 
the buildings sector. Integrated model outputs tend to show energy 
demand reduction over the coming decades, followed by a more sig-
nificant role for decarbonization of energy supply (with, in some cases, 
heavy reliance on bioenergy with carbon dioxide capture and storage 
(CCS) to offset remaining direct emissions from buildings and the other 
end-use sectors).
To summarize, sectoral studies show there is a larger potential for 
energy efficiency measures to reduce building sector final energy use 
than is most typically shown by integrated models. This indicates that 
some options for demand reductions in the buildings sector are not 
included, or at least not fully deployed, by integrated models because 
of different model assumptions and / or level of richness in technol-
ogy / option representation (see Section 6.8).
Figure 9�23 | Left panel: The development in the share of electricity in global final energy demand until 2050 in integrated model scenarios (167 scenarios with 430 – 530 ppm 
CO2eq, 138 scenarios with ppm 530 – 650 CO2eq, and 149 scenarios exceeding 720 ppm CO2eq — for category descriptions see Chapter 6.3.3), and right panel decomposition of 
the annual change in electricity demand share into final energy demand change rate and electricity demand change rate (each gray line indicates a set of points with the same 








































































































This section first outlines the policy options to promote energy effi-
ciency in buildings, then provides more detail on the emerging policy 
instruments since AR4, then focuses on the key new instruments for 
financing and finally considers the policy issues specific to developing 
countries. 
9�10�1 Policies for energy efficiency in buildings
Section 9.8 shows that many strong barriers prevent the full uptake of 
energy saving measures. Market forces alone will not achieve the nec-
essary transformation towards low carbon buildings without external 
policy intervention to correct market failures and to encourage new 
business and financial models that overcome the first-investment cost 
hurdle, which is one of the key barriers. There is a broad portfolio of 
effective policy instruments available that show reductions of emis-
sions at low and negative costs; many of them have been implemented 
in developed countries and, more recently, in developing countries. 
When these policies are implemented in a coordinated manner, they 
can be effective in reversing the trend of growing energy consump-
tion. This chapter shows that building energy use has fallen in several 
European countries in recent years where strong policies have been 
implemented. Beside technological improvement in energy efficiency, 
which has been so far the main focus of most polices, policymakers 
have recently focused on the need to change consumer behaviour and 
lifestyle, based on the concept of sufficiency. Particularly in developed 
countries, the existing building stock is large and renewed only very 
slowly, and therefore it is important to introduce policies that spe-
cifically target the existing stock, e. g., aiming at accelerating rates 
of energy refurbishment and avoiding lock-in to suboptimal retro-
fits — for example, the case of China (Dongyan, 2009). Policies also 
need to be dynamic, with periodic revision to follow technical and 
market changes; in particular, regulations need regular strengthening, 
for example for equipment minimum efficiency standards (Siderius and 
Nakagami, 2013) or building codes (Weiss et al., 2012). Recently there 
has been more attention to enforcement, which is needed if countries 
are to achieve the full potential of implemented or planned policies 
(Ellis et al., 2009; Weiss et al., 2012). 
The most common policies for the building sector are summarized in 
Table 9.9, which includes some examples of the results achieved. Policy 
instruments for energy efficiency in buildings may be classified in the 
following categories: (1) Regulatory measures are one of the most 
effective and cost-effective instruments, for example, building codes 
and appliance standards (Boza-Kiss et al., 2013) if properly enforced 
(Weiss et al., 2012); see also (Koeppel and Ürge-Vorsatz, 2007; McCor-
mick and Neij, 2009). Standards need to be set at appropriate levels 
and periodically strengthened to avoid lock-in to sub-optimal perfor-
mance. (2) Information instruments including equipment energy labels, 
building labels and certificates, and mandatory energy audits can be 
Figure 9�24 | Global buildings final energy demands by fuel for the seven baseline 
scenarios of seven integrated models and their corresponding mitigation scenarios 
(480 – 580 ppm CO2eq concentration in 2100). AIM-Enduse 1.0 = AIM-Enduse (Back-
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































relatively effective on their own depending on their design, but can also 
support other instruments, in particular standards (Kelly, 2012; Boza-
Kiss et  al., 2013). (3) Direct market intervention instruments include 
public procurement, which can have an important role in transforming 
the market. More recently, governments have supported the develop-
ment of energy service companies (ESCOs) (see section 9.10.3). (4) 
Economic Instruments include several options, including both tradable 
permits, taxes, and more focussed incentives. Tradable permits (often 
called market-based instruments) include tradable white certificates 
(see section 9.10.2), as well as broader carbon markets (see Chapter 
13). Taxes include energy and carbon taxes and have increasingly been 
implemented to accelerate energy efficiency (UNEP SBCI, 2007). They 
are discussed in more detail in Chapter 15, and can complement and 
reinforce other policy instruments in the building sector. Sector specific 
tax exemptions and reductions, if appropriately structured, can provide 
a more effective mechanism than energy taxes (UNEP SBCI, 2007). 
Options include tax deductions building retrofits (Valentini and Pisto-
chini, 2011), value-added tax exemption, and various tax reliefs (Dong-
yan, 2009), as well as exemptions from business taxes for CDM proj-
ects (RSA, 2009). More focussed incentives include low interest loans 
and incentives which can be very effective in enlarging the market for 
new efficient products and to overcome first cost barriers for deep ret-
rofits (McGilligan et al., 2010). (5) Voluntary agreements include pro-
grammes such as industry agreements. Their effectiveness depends on 
the context and on accompanying policy measures (Bertoldi, 2011). (6) 
Advice and leadership programmes include policies such as informa-
tion campaigns, advice services, and public leadership programmes to 
build public awareness and capacity.
A large number of countries have successfully adopted building sec-
tor policies. The most popular instruments in developing countries so 
far have been appliance standards, public procurement, and leader-
ship programmes. Table 9.9 provides more detailed descriptions of the 
various instruments, a brief identification of some key issues related to 
their success, and a quantitative evaluation of their environmental and 
cost-effectiveness from the literature. Although there is a significant 
spread in the results, and the samples are small for conclusive judg-
ments on individual instruments, the available studies indicate that 
among the most cost-effective instruments have been building codes 
and labels, appliance standards and labels, supplier obligations, public 
procurement, and leadership programmes. Most of these are regula-
tory instruments. However, most instruments have best practice appli-
cations that have achieved CO2 reductions at low or negative social 
costs, signalling that a broad portfolio of tools is available to govern-
ments to cost-effectively cut building-related emissions. 
Appliance standards and labels, building codes, promotion of ESCOs, 
Clean Development Mechanisms and Joint Implementation (CDM 
JI), and financing tools (grants and subsidies) have so far performed 
as the most environmentally effective tools among the documented 
cases. However, the environmental effectiveness also varies a lot by 
case. Based on a detailed analysis of policy evaluations, virtually any 
of these instruments can perform very effectively (environmentally 
and / or cost-wise) if tailored to local conditions and policy settings, and 
if implemented and enforced well (Boza-Kiss et al., 2013). Therefore, it 
is likely that the choice of instrument is less crucial than whether it is 
designed, applied, implemented, and enforced well and consistently. 
Most of these instruments are also effective in developing countries, 
where it is essential that the co-benefits of energy-efficiency policies 
(see Section 10.7) are well-mapped, quantified and well understood by 
the policy-makers (Ryan and Campbell, 2012; Koeppel and Ürge-Vor-
satz, 2007). Policy integration with other policy domains is particularly 
effective to leverage these co-benefits in developing countries, and 
energy-efficiency goals can often be pursued more effectively through 
other policy goals that have much higher ranking in political agen-
das and thus may enjoy much more resources and a stronger political 
momentum than climate change mitigation.
9�10�1�1 Policy packages
No single policy is sufficient to achieve the potential energy savings 
and that combination (packages) of polices can have combined results 
that are bigger than the sum of the individual policies (Harmelink et al., 
2008; Tambach et  al., 2010; Weiss et  al., 2012; Murphy et  al., 2012). 
The EU’s Energy Efficiency Directive (EED) (European Union, 2012) has, 
since 2008, required Member States to describe co-ordinated packages 
of policies in their National Energy Efficiency Action Plans (NEEAP). 
Market transformation of domestic appliances in several developed 
countries has been achieved through a combination of minimum stan-
dards, energy labels, incentives for the most efficient equipment, and 
an effective communication campaign for end-users (Boza-Kiss et al., 
2013). The specific policies, regulations, programmes and incentives 
needed are highly dependent on the product, market structure, institu-
tional capacity, and the background conditions in each country. Other 
packages of measures are mandatory audits and financial incentives 
for the retrofitting of existing buildings, with incentives linked to the 
implementation of the audit findings and minimum efficiency require-
ments; voluntary programmes coupled with tax exemptions and other 
financial incentives (Murphy et  al., 2012); and suppliers’ obligations 
and white certificates (and, in France, tax credits) in addition to equip-
ment labelling and standards — in order to promote products beyond 
the standards’ requirements (Bertoldi et al., 2010b).
9�10�1�2 A holistic approach
Energy efficiency in buildings requires action beyond the point of 
investment in new buildings, retrofit, and equipment. A holistic 
approach considers the whole lifespan of the building, including master 
planning, lifecycle assessment and integrated building design to obtain 
the broadest impact possible, and therefore needs to begin at the 
neighbourhood or city level (see Chapter 12). In the holistic approach, 
building codes, design, operation, maintenance, and post occupancy 
evaluation are coordinated. Continuous monitoring of building energy 





goals and actual building energy performance. The use of modern 
technologies to provide feedback on consumption in real time allows 
adjustment of energy performance and as a function of external energy 
supply. Dynamic information can also be used for energy certificates 
and databases to disclose building energy performance. Moreover, 
studies on durability and climate change mitigation show that the lifes-
pan of a technical solution is as important as the choice of material, 
which signals to the importance of related policies such as eco-design 
directives and mandatory warranties (Mequignon et al., 2013a; b). 
Another challenge is the need to develop the skills and training to 
deliver, maintain, and manage low carbon buildings. To implement the 
large number of energy saving projects (building retrofits or new con-
struction) a large, skilled workforce is needed to carry out high-quality 
work at relatively low cost. 
Implementation and enforcement of policies are key components of 
effective policy. These two components used together are the only way 
to ensure that the expected results of the policy are achieved. Devel-
oped countries are now increasing attention to proper implementation 
and enforcement (Jollands et al., 2010), for example, to survey equip-
ment efficiency when minimum standards are in place and to check 
compliance with building codes. For example, EU Member States are 
required to develop independent control systems for their building 
labelling schemes (European Union, 2012). Public money invested in 
implementation and enforcement will be highly cost effective (Tambach 
et al., 2010), as it contributes to the overall cost-effectiveness of poli-
cies. In addition to enforcement, ex-post evaluation of policies is needed 
to assess their impact and to review policy design and stringency or to 
complement it with other policies. Implementation and enforcement is 
still a major challenge for developing countries that lack much of the 
capacity (e. g., testing laboratories for equipment efficiency) and knowl-
edge to implement policies such as standards, labels and building codes.
9�10�2 Emerging policy instruments in 
buildings
Recent reports have comprehensively reviewed building-related poli-
cies (IPCC, 2007; GEA, 2012); the remainder of this chapter focuses on 
recent developments and important emerging instruments.
While technical efficiency improvements are still needed and are impor-
tant to reduce energy demand (Alcott, 2008), increases in energy use 
are driven primarily by increasing demand for energy services (e. g., 
built space per capita and additional equipment). To address this, poli-
cies need to influence consumer behaviour and lifestyle (Herring, 2006; 
Sanquist et  al., 2012) and the concept of sufficiency has been intro-
duced in the energy efficiency policy debate (Herring, 2006; Oikonomou 
et al., 2009). Policies to target sufficiency aim at capping or discourag-
ing increasing energy use due to increased floor space, comfort levels, 
and equipment. Policy instruments in this category include: (1) personal 
carbon trading (i. e., carbon markets with equitable personal alloca-
tions) — this has not yet been introduced and its social acceptability 
(Fawcett, 2010) and implementation (Eyre, 2010) have to be further 
demonstrated; (2) property taxation (e. g., related to a building’s CO2 
emissions); and (3) progressive appliance standards and building codes, 
for example, with absolute consumption limits (kWh / person / year) 
rather than efficiency requirements (kWh / m2 / year) (Harris et al., 2007).
In order to reduce energy demand, policies may include promoting 
density, high space utilization, and efficient occupant behaviour as 
increased floor space entails more energy use. This might be achieved, 
for example, through incentives for reducing energy consumption — the 
so-called energy saving feed-in tariff (Bertoldi et al., 2010a; 2013a).
9�10�2�1 New developments in building codes (ordinance, 
regulation, or by-laws)
A large number of jurisdictions have now set, or are considering, 
very significant strengthening of the requirements for energy per-
formance in building codes. There are debates about the precise 
level of ambition that is appropriate, especially with regard to NZEB 
mandates, which can be problematic (see 9.3). The EU is requiring 
its Member States to introduce building codes set at the cost opti-
mal point using a lifecycle calculation, both for new buildings and 
those undergoing major renovation. As a result, by the end of 2020, 
all new buildings must be nearly zero energy by law. Many Mem-
ber States (e. g., Denmark, Germany) have announced progressive 
building codes to gradually reduce the energy consumption of build-
ings towards nearly net zero levels. There is also action within local 
jurisdictions, e. g., the city of Brussels has mandated that all new 
social and public buildings must meet Passive House levels from 
2013, while all new buildings have to meet these norms from 2015 
(Moniteur Belge, 2011; BE, 2012; CSTC, 2012). In China, building 
codes have been adopted that seek saving of 50 % from pre-existing 
levels, with much increased provision for enforcement, leading to 
high expected savings (Zhou et al., 2011b). As demonstrated in sec-
tions 9.2 and 9.9, the widespread proliferation of these ambitious 
building codes, together with other policies to encourage efficiency, 
have already contributed to total building energy use trends stabiliz-
ing, or even slowing down.
9�10�2�2 Energy efficiency obligation schemes and ‘white’ 
certificates
Energy efficiency obligation schemes with or without so-called ‘white 
certificates’ as incentive schemes have been applied in some Member 
States of the European Union (Bertoldi et  al., 2010a) and Australia 
(Crossley, 2008), with more recent uses in Brazil and India. White cer-
tificates evolved from non-tradable obligations on monopoly energy 
utilities, also known as suppliers’ obligations or energy efficiency 
resources standards, largely but not only in the United States. Market 





et al., 2012b), driven by a belief that such approaches were not needed 
in, or incompatible with, competitive markets, although this is not cor-
rect (Vine et al., 2003). Their main use has been in regulated markets 
driven by obligations on energy companies to save energy (Bertoldi 
and Rezessy, 2008). The use of suppliers’ obligations began in the UK 
in 2000, and these obligations are now significant in a number of EU 
countries, notably UK, France and Italy (Eyre et al., 2009). Energy sup-
plier obligation schemes are a key part of EU policy for energy effi-
ciency and the Energy Efficiency Directive (European Union, 2012) 
requires all EU Member States to introduce this policy or alternative 
schemes. Precise objectives, traded quantity and rules differ across 
countries. Cost effectiveness is typically very good (Bertoldi, 2012). 
However, white certificates tend to incentivize low cost, mass market 
measures rather than deep retrofits, and therefore there are concerns 
that this policy approach may not be best suited to future policy objec-
tives (Eyre et al., 2009).
9�10�3 Financing opportunities
9�10�3�1 New financing schemes for deep retrofits
Energy efficiency in buildings is not a single market: it covers a diverse 
range of end-use equipment and technologies and requires very large 
numbers of small, dispersed projects with a diverse range of decision 
makers. As the chapter has demonstrated, many technologies in the 
building sector are proven and economic: if properly financed, the 
investment costs are paid back over short periods from energy cost 
savings. However, many potentially attractive energy investments do 
not meet the short-term financial return criteria of businesses, inves-
tors, and individuals, or there is no available financing. While signifi-
cant savings are possible with relatively modest investment premiums, 
a first-cost sensitive buyer, or one lacking financing, will never adopt 
transformative solutions. Major causes of this gap are the shortage of 
relevant finance and of delivery mechanisms that suit the specifics of 
energy efficiency projects and the lack — in some markets — of pipe-
lines of bankable energy efficiency projects. Creative business models 
from energy utilities, businesses, and financial institutions can over-
come first-cost hurdles (Veeraboina and Yesuratnam, 2013). One inno-
vative example is for energy-efficiency investment funds to capitalize 
on the lower risk of mortgage lending on low-energy housing; the 
funds to provide such investment can be attractive to socially respon-
sible investment funds. In Germany, through the KfW development 
bank, energy efficiency loans with low interest rate are offered mak-
ing it attractive to end-users. The scheme has triggered many building 
refurbishments (Harmelink et al., 2008). 
Another example is the ‘Green Deal’, which is a new initiative by the 
UK government designed to facilitate the retrofitting of energy sav-
ing measures to all buildings. Such schemes allows for charges on 
electricity bills in order to recoup costs of building energy efficiency 
improvements by private firms to consumers (Bichard and Thurairajah, 
2013). The finance is tied to the energy meter rather than the building 
owner. The Green Deal was expected primarily to finance short pay-
back measures previously covered by the suppliers’ obligation, rather 
than deep retrofits. However, the UK government does not subsidize 
the loan interest rate, and commercial interest rates are not generally 
attractive to end-users. Take-up of energy efficiency in the Green Deal 
is therefore expected to be much lower than in a supplier obligation 
(Rosenow and Eyre, 2013). 
In areas of the United States with Property Assessed Clean Energy 
(PACE) legislation in place, municipality governments offer a specific 
bond to investors and then use this to finance lending to consumers 
and businesses for energy retrofits (Headen et al., 2010). The loans are 
repaid over the assigned term (typically 15 or 20 years) via an annual 
assessment on their property tax bill. Legal concerns about the effect 
of PACE lending on mortgages for residential buildings (Van Nostrand, 
2011) have resulted in the approach being mainly directed to non-
domestic buildings. 
ESCOs provide solutions for improving energy efficiency in buildings 
by guaranteeing that energy savings are able to repay the efficiency 
investment, thus overcoming financial constraints to energy efficiency 
investments. The ESCO model has been found to be effective in devel-
oped countries such as Germany (Marino et al., 2011) and the United 
States. In the last decade ESCOs have been created in number of devel-
oping countries (e. g., China, Brazil, and South Korea) supported by 
international financial institutions and their respective governments 
(UNEP SBCI, 2007; Da-li, 2009). Since the introduction of an interna-
tional cooperation project by the Chinese government and World Bank 
in 1998, a market-based energy performance contract mechanism and 
ESCO industry has developed in China (Da-li, 2009) with Chinese gov-
ernment support. Policies for the support of ESCOs in developing coun-
tries include the creation of a Super ESCOs (Limaye and Limaye, 2011) 
by governmental agencies. Financing environments for ESCOs need to 
be improved to ensure they operate optimally and sources of financ-
ing, such as debt and equity, need to be located. Possible financing 
sources are commercial banks, venture capital firms, equity funds, leas-
ing companies, and equipment manufacturers (Da-li, 2009). In social 
housing in Europe, funding can be provided through Energy Perfor-
mance Certificates (EPC), in which an ESCO invests in a comprehensive 
refurbishment and repays itself through the generated savings. Social 
housing operators and ESCOs have established the legal, financial, and 
technical framework to do this (Milin and Bullier, 2011). 
9�10�3�2 Opportunities in financing for green buildings
The existing global green building market is valued at approximately 
550 billion USD2010 and is expected to grow through to 2015, with Asia 
anticipated to be the fastest growing region (Lewis, 2010). A survey 
on responsible property investing (RPI) (UNEP FI, 2009), covering key 
markets around the world, has shown it is possible to achieve a com-





tively tackling environmental and social issues when investing in real 
estate (UNEP FI and PRI signatories, 2008). For example, in Japan, new 
rental-apartment buildings equipped with solar power systems and 
energy-saving devices had significantly higher occupancy rates than 
the average for other properties in the neighbourhood, and investment 
return rates were also higher (MLIT, 2010a; b). A survey comparing rent 
and vacancy rates of buildings (Watson, 2010) showed rents for LEED 
certified buildings were consistently higher than for uncertified build-
ings. In many municipalities in Japan, assessment by the Comprehen-
sive Assessment System for Built Environment Efficiency (CASBEE) and 
notification of assessment results are required at the time of construc-
tion (Murakami et al., 2004). Several financial products are available 
that provide a discount of more than 1 % on housing loans, depending 
on the grade received by the CASBEE assessment. This has been con-
tributing to the diffusion of green buildings through financial schemes 
(IBEC, 2009). In addition, a housing eco-point system was implemented 
in 2009 in Japan, broadly divided between a home appliances eco-
point system and a housing eco-point system. In the housing eco-point 
system, housing which satisfies the Top Runner-level standards are tar-
geted, both newly constructed and existing buildings. This programme 
has contributed to the promotion of green buildings, with 160,000 
(approximately 20 % of the total market) applications for subsidies for 
newly constructed buildings in 2010. In existing buildings, the number 
of window replacements has increased, and has attracted much atten-
tion (MLIT, 2012).
9�10�4 Policies in developing countries
Economic instruments and incentives are very important means to 
encourage stakeholders and investors in the building sector to adopt 
more energy efficient approaches in the design, construction, and 
operation of buildings (Huovila, 2007). This section provides an over-
view of financial instruments commonly applied in the developing 
world to promote emissions reduction in building sector. 
In terms of carbon markets, the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) has a great potential to promote energy efficiency and lower 
emissions in building sector. However, until recently it has bypassed 
the sector entirely, due to some methodological obstacles to energy 
efficiency projects (Michaelowa et al., 2009). However, a ‘whole build-
ing’ baseline and monitoring methodology approved in 2011 may pave 
the way for more building projects (Michaelowa and Hayashi, 2011). 
Since 2009, the share of CDM projects in the buildings sector has 
increased, particularly with regard to efficient lighting schemes (UNEP 
Risoe, 2012). The voluntary market has complemented the CDM as a 
financing mechanism, for example for solar home systems projects 
(Michaelowa et al., 2009; Michaelowa and Hayashi, 2011). 
Public benefits charges are financing mechanisms meant to raise funds 
for energy efficiency measures and to accelerate market transforma-
tion in both developed and developing countries (UNEP SBCI, 2007). 
In Brazil, all energy distribution utilities are required to spend a mini-
mum of 1 % of their revenue on energy efficiency interventions while 
at least a quarter of this fund is expected to be spent on end-user effi-
ciency projects (UNEP SBCI, 2007). 
Utility demand side management (DSM) may be the most viable option 
to implement and finance energy efficiency programs in smaller devel-
oping countries (Sarkar and Singh, 2010). In a developing country 
context, it is common practice to house DSM programmes within the 
local utilities due to their healthy financial means and strong techni-
cal and implementation capacities, for example, in Argentina, South 
Africa, Brazil, India, Thailand, Uruguay and Vietnam (Winkler and Van Es, 
2007; Sarkar and Singh, 2010). Eskom, the South African electricity util-
ity, uses its DSM funds mainly to finance load management and energy 
efficiency improvement including millions of free issued compact fluo-
rescent lamps that have been installed in households (Winkler and Van 
Es, 2007). 
Capital subsidies, grants and subsidized loans are among the most 
frequently used instruments for implementation of increased energy 
efficiency projects in buildings. Financial subsidy is used as the primary 
supporting fund in the implementation of retrofit projects in China 
(Dongyan, 2009). In recent years, the World Bank Group has steadily 
increased energy efficiency lending to the highest lending ever in the 
fiscal year of 2009 of USD2010 3.3 billion, of which USD2010 1.7 billion 
committed investments in the same year alone (Sarkar and Singh, 
2010). Examples include energy efficient lighting programmes in 
Mali, energy efficiency projects in buildings in Belarus, carbon finance 
blended innovative financing to replace old chillers (air conditioning) 
with energy efficient and chlorofluorocarbon-free (CFC) chillers in com-
mercial buildings in India (Sarkar and Singh, 2010). The Government 
of Nepal has been providing subsidies in the past few years to pro-
mote the use of solar home systems (SHS) in rural households (Dhakal 
and Raut, 2010). The certified emission reductions (CERs) accumulated 
from this project were expected to be traded in order to supplement 
the financing of the lighting program. The Global Environmental Facil-
ity (GEF) has directed a significant share of its financial resources to 
SHS and the World Bank similarly has provided a number of loans for 
SHS projects in Asia (Wamukonya, 2007). The GEF has provided a grant 
of 219 million USD2010 to finance 23 off-grid SHS projects in 20 coun-
tries (Wamukonya, 2007). 
9.11 Gaps in  knowledge 
and data
Addressing these main gaps and problems would improve the under-
standing of mitigation in buildings:
•	 The lack of adequate bottom-up data leads to a dominance of top 





•	 Misinformation and simplified techniques pose risks to providing a 
full understanding of integrated and regionally adequate building 
systems, and this leads to fragmented actions and weaker results.
•	 Weak or poor information about opportunities and costs affects 
optimal decisions and appropriate allocation of financial resources.
•	 Energy indicators relate to efficiency, but rarely to sufficiency.
•	 Improved and more comprehensive databases on real, measured 
building energy use, and capturing behaviour and lifestyles are 
necessary to develop exemplary practices from niches to standard.
•	 Continuous monitoring and constant modification of performance 
and dynamics of codes would allow implementation to catch up 
with the potential for efficiency improvements and co-benefits; 
this would also provide better feedback to the policymaking pro-
cess, to education, to capacity building, and to training.
•	 Quantification and monetization of (positive and negative) exter-
nalities over the building life cycle should be well-integrated into 
decision-making processes.
9.12 Frequently Asked 
Questions
FAQ 9�1 What are the recent advances in 
building sector technologies and know-
how since the AR4 that are important 
from a mitigation perspective?
Recent advances in information technology, design, construction, 
and know-how have opened new opportunities for a transforma-
tive change in building-sector related emissions that can contribute 
to meeting ambitious climate targets at socially acceptable costs, or 
often at net benefits. Main advances do not lie in major technologi-
cal developments, but rather in their extended systemic application, 
partially as a result of advanced policies, as well as in improvements 
in the performance and reductions in the cost of several technologies. 
For instance, there are over 57,000 buildings meeting Passive House 
standard and ‘nearly zero energy’ new construction has become the 
law in the 27 Member States of the European Union. Even higher 
energy performance levels are being successfully applied to new and 
existing buildings, including non-residential buildings. The costs have 
been gradually declining; for residential buildings at the level of Pas-
sive House standard they account for 5 – 8 % of conventional building 
costs, and some net zero or nearly zero energy commercial buildings 
having been built at equal or even lower costs than conventional ones 
(see 9.3 and 9.7). 
FAQ 9�2 How much could the building sector 
contribute to ambitious climate change 
mitigation goals, and what would be the 
costs of such efforts?
According to the GEA ‘efficiency’ pathway, by 2050 global heating and 
cooling energy use could decrease by as much as 46 % as compared to 
2005, if today’s best practices in construction and retrofit know-how 
are broadly deployed (Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2012c). This is despite the 
over 150 % increase in floor area during the same period, as well as 
significant increase in thermal comfort, as well as the eradication of 
fuel poverty (Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2012c). The costs of such scenarios are 
also significant, but according to most models, the savings in energy 
costs typically more than exceed the investment costs. For instance, 
GEA (2012) projects an approximately 24 billion USD2010 in cumulative 
additional investment needs for realizing these advanced scenarios, 
but estimates an over 65 billion USD2010 in cumulative energy cost sav-
ings until 2050. 
FAQ 9�3 Which policy instrument(s) have been 
particularly effective and / or cost-
effective in reducing building-sector 
GHG emission (or their growth, in 
developing countries)? 
Policy instruments in the building sector have proliferated since the 
AR4, with new instruments such as white certificates, preferential 
loans, grants, progressive building codes based on principles of cost-
optimum minimum requirements of energy performance and life cycle 
energy use calculation, energy saving feed-in tariffs as well as suppli-
ers’ obligations, and other measures introduced in several countries. 
Among the most cost-effective instruments have been building codes 
and labels, appliance standards and labels, supplier obligations, public 
procurement and leadership programs. Most of these are regulatory 
instruments. However, most instruments have best practice applica-
tions that have achieved CO2 reductions at low or negative social 
costs, signalling that a broad portfolio of tools is available to govern-
ments to cut building-related emissions cost-effectively. Appliance 
standards and labels, building codes, promotion of ESCOs, CDM and 
JI, and financing tools (grants and subsidies) have so far performed 
as the most environmentally effective tools among the documented 
cases. However, the environmental effectiveness also varies a lot by 
case. Based on a detailed analysis of policy evaluations, virtually any of 
these instruments can perform very effective (environmentally and / or 
cost-wise) if tailored to local conditions and policy settings, and if 
implemented and enforced well (Boza-Kiss et al., 2013). Therefore it 
is likely that the choice of instrument is less crucial than whether it is 
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An absolute reduction in emissions from the industry sector will 
require deployment of a broad set of mitigation options beyond 
energy efficiency measures (medium evidence, high agreement). In 
the last two to three decades there has been continued improvement in 
energy and process efficiency in industry, driven by the relatively high 
share of energy costs. In addition to energy efficiency, other strategies 
such as emissions efficiency (including e. g., fuel and feedstock switch-
ing, carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS)), material use efficiency 
(e. g., less scrap, new product design), recycling and re-use of materials 
and products, product service efficiency (e. g., car sharing, maintain-
ing buildings for longer, longer life for products), or demand reductions 
(e. g., less mobility services, less product demand) are required in paral-
lel (medium evidence, high agreement). [Section 10.4, 10.7] 
Industry-related greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have continued 
to increase and are higher than GHG emissions from other end-
use sectors (high confidence). Despite the declining share of industry in 
global gross domestic product (GDP), global industry and waste / waste-
water GHG emissions grew from 10.4 GtCO2eq in 1990 to 13.0 GtCO2eq 
in 2005 to 15.4 GtCO2eq in 2010. Total global GHG emissions for indus-
try and waste / wastewater in 2010, which nearly doubled since 1970, 
were comprised of direct energy-related CO2 emissions of 5.3 GtCO2eq, 
indirect CO2 emissions from production of electricity and heat for indus-
try of 5.2 GtCO2eq, process CO2 emissions of 2.6 GtCO2eq, non-CO2 
GHG emissions of 0.9 GtCO2eq, and waste / wastewater emissions of 
1.4 GtCO2eq. 2010 direct and indirect emissions were dominated by CO2 
(85.1 %) followed by CH4 (8.6 %), HFC (3.5 %), N2O (2.0 %), PFC (0.5 %) 
and SF6 (0.4 %) emissions. Currently, emissions from industry are larger 
than the emissions from either the buildings or transport end-use sec-
tors and represent just over 30 % of global GHG emissions in 2010 (just 
over 40 % if Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land Use (AFOLU) emis-
sions are not included). (high confidence) [10.2, 10.3] 
Globally, industrial GHG emissions are dominated by the 
Asia region, which was also the region with the fastest emis-
sion growth between 2005 and 2010 (high confidence). In 2010, 
over half (52 %) of global direct GHG emissions from industry and 
waste / wastewater were from the Asia region (ASIA), followed by the 
member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development in 1990 (OECD-1990) (25 %), Economies in Transition 
(EIT) (9 %), Middle East and Africa (MAF) (8 %), and Latin America 
(LAM) (6 %). Between 2005 and 2010, GHG emissions from industry 
grew at an average annual rate of 3.5 % globally, comprised of 7 % 
average annual growth in the ASIA region, followed by MAF (4.4 %), 
LAM (2 %), and the EIT countries (0.1 %), but declined in the OECD-
1990 countries (– 1.1 %). [10.3]
The energy intensity of the sector could be reduced by approxi-
mately up to 25 % compared to current level through wide-
scale upgrading, replacement and deployment of best available 
technologies, particularly in countries where these are not in 
practice and for non-energy intensive industries (robust evidence, 
high agreement). Despite long-standing attention to energy efficiency 
in industry, many options for improved energy efficiency remain. [10.4, 
10.7]
Through innovation, additional reductions of approximately up 
to 20 % in energy intensity may potentially be realized before 
approaching technological limits in some energy intensive 
industries (limited evidence, medium agreement). Barriers to imple-
menting energy efficiency relate largely to the initial investment costs 
and lack of information. Information programmes are the most preva-
lent approach for promoting energy efficiency, followed by economic 
instruments, regulatory approaches, and voluntary actions. [10.4, 10.7, 
10.9, 10.11] 
Besides sector specific technologies, cross-cutting technologies 
and measures applicable in both large energy intensive indus-
tries and Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) can help to 
reduce GHG emissions (robust evidence, high agreement). Cross-cut-
ting technologies such as efficient motors, electronic control systems, 
and cross-cutting measures such as reducing air or steam leaks help to 
optimize performance of industrial processes and improve plant effi-
ciency cost-effectively with both energy savings and emissions benefits 
[10.4].
Long-term step-change options can include a shift to low car-
bon electricity, radical product innovations (e� g�, alternatives 
to cement), or carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS)� Once 
demonstrated, sufficiently tested, cost-effective, and publicly accepted, 
these options may contribute to significant climate change mitigation 
in the future (medium evidence, medium agreement). [10.4] 
The level of demand for new and replacement products has a 
significant effect on the activity level and resulting GHG emis-
sions in the industry sector (medium evidence, high agreement). 
Extending product life and using products more intensively could 
contribute to reduction of product demand without reducing the ser-
vice. Absolute emission reductions can also come through changes in 
lifestyle and their corresponding demand levels, be it directly (e. g. for 
food, textiles) or indirectly (e. g. for product / service demand related to 
tourism). [10.4]
Mitigation activities in other sectors and adaptation measures 
may result in increased industrial product demand and corre-
sponding emissions (robust evidence, high agreement). Production 
of mitigation technologies (e. g., insulation materials for buildings) or 
material demand for adaptation measures (e. g., infrastructure materi-
als) contribute to industrial GHG emissions. [10.4, 10.6]
Systemic approaches and collaboration within and across indus-
trial sectors at different levels, e� g�, sharing of infrastructure, 





and cooling, may provide further mitigation potential in certain 
regions or industry types (robust evidence, high agreement). The 
formation of industrial clusters, industrial parks, and industrial symbio-
sis are emerging trends in many developing countries, especially with 
SMEs. [10.5]
Several emission-reducing options in the industrial sector are 
cost-effective and profitable (medium evidence, medium agree-
ment). While options in cost ranges of 20 – 50, 0 – 20, and even below 
0 USD2010 / tCO2eq exist, to achieve near-zero emission intensity levels 
in the industry sector would require additional realization of long-
term step-change options (e. g., CCS) associated with higher levelized 
costs of conserved carbon (LCCC) in the range of 50 – 150 USD2010 / tCO2. 
However, mitigation costs vary regionally and depend on site-specific 
conditions. Similar estimates of costs for implementing material effi-
ciency, product-service efficiency, and service demand reduction strat-
egies are not available. [10.7]
Mitigation measures in the industry sector are often associated 
with co-benefits (robust evidence, high agreement). Co-benefits of 
mitigation measures could drive industrial decisions and policy choices. 
They include enhanced competitiveness through cost reductions, new 
business opportunities, better environmental compliance, health ben-
efits through better local air and water quality and better work condi-
tions, and reduced waste, all of which provide multiple indirect private 
and social benefits. [10.8]
Unless barriers to mitigation in industry are resolved, the pace 
and extent of mitigation in industry will be limited and even 
profitable measures will remain untapped (robust evidence, high 
agreement). There are a broad variety of barriers to implementing 
energy efficiency in the industry sector; for energy-intensive industry, 
the issue is largely initial investment costs for retrofits, while barriers 
for other industries include both cost and a lack of information. For 
material efficiency, product-service efficiency, and demand reduction, 
there is a lack of experience with implementation of mitigation mea-
sures and often there are no clear incentives for either the supplier 
or consumer. Barriers to material efficiency include lack of human and 
institutional capacities to encourage management decisions and pub-
lic participation. [10.9]
There is no single policy that can address the full range of miti-
gation measures available for industry and overcome associ-
ated barriers (robust evidence, high agreement). In promoting energy 
efficiency, information programs are the most prevalent approach, 
followed by economic instruments, regulatory approaches and volun-
tary actions. To date, few policies have specifically pursued material or 
product service efficiency. [10.11]
While the largest mitigation potential in industry lies in reduc-
ing CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use, there are also signifi-
cant mitigation opportunities for non-CO2 gases� Key opportuni-
ties comprise, for example, reduction of HFC emissions by leak repair, 
refrigerant recovery and recycling, and proper disposal and replace-
ment by alternative refrigerants (ammonia, HC, CO2). Nitrous oxide 
(N2O) emissions from adipic and nitric acid production can be reduced 
through the implementation of thermal destruction and secondary 
catalysts. The reduction of non-CO2 GHGs also faces numerous barriers. 
Lack of awareness, lack of economic incentives, and lack of commer-
cially available technologies (e. g., for HFC recycling and incineration) 
are typical examples. [10.4, 10.7, 10.9]
Long-term scenarios for industry highlight improvements in 
emissions efficiency as an important future mitigation strategy 
(robust evidence, high agreement). Detailed industry sector scenarios 
fall within the range of more general long-term integrated scenarios. 
Improvements in emissions efficiency in the mitigation scenarios result 
from a shift from fossil fuels to electricity with low (or negative) CO2 
emissions and use of CCS for industry fossil fuel use and process emis-
sions. The crude representation of materials, products, and demand in 
scenarios limits the evaluation of the relative importance of material 
efficiency, product-service efficiency, and demand reduction options. 
(robust evidence, high agreement) [6.8, 10.10]
The most effective option for mitigation in waste manage-
ment is waste reduction, followed by re-use and recycling and 
energy recovery (robust evidence, high agreement) [10.4, 10.14]. 
Direct emissions from the waste sector almost doubled during the 
period from 1970 to 2010. Globally, approximately only 20 % of 
municipal solid waste (MSW) is recycled and approximately 13.5 % 
is treated with energy recovery while the rest is deposited in open 
dumpsites or landfills. Approximately 47 % of wastewater produced 
in the domestic and manufacturing sectors is still untreated. As the 
share of recycled or reused material is still low, waste treatment tech-
nologies and energy recovery can also result in significant emission 
reductions from waste disposal. Reducing emissions from landfilling 
through treatment of waste by anaerobic digestion has the largest 
cost range, going from negative cost to very high cost. Also, advanced 
wastewater treatment technologies may enhance GHG emissions 
reduction in the wastewater treatment but they tend to concentrate 
in the higher costs options (medium evidence, medium agreement). 
[10.14]
A key challenge for the industry sector is the uncertainty, incom-
pleteness, and quality of data available in the public domain 
on energy use and costs for specific technologies on global and 
regional scales that can serve as a basis for assessing perfor-
mance, mitigation potential, costs, and for developing policies 
and programmes with high confidence� Bottom-up information 
on cross-sector collaboration and demand reduction as well as their 
implications for mitigation in industry is particularly limited. Improved 
modelling of material flows in integrated models could lead to a better 
understanding of material efficiency and demand reduction strategies 






This chapter provides an update to developments on mitigation in the 
industry sector since the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change) Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) (IPCC, 2007), but has much 
wider coverage. Industrial activities create all the physical products 
(e. g., cars, agricultural equipment, fertilizers, textiles, etc.) whose use 
delivers the final services that satisfy current human needs. Compared 
to the industry chapter in AR4, this chapter analyzes industrial activi-
ties over the whole supply chain, from extraction of primary mate-
rials (e. g., ores) or recycling (of waste materials), through product 
manufacturing, to the demand for the products and their services. It 
includes a discussion of trends in activity and emissions, options for 
mitigation (technology, practices, and behavioural aspects), estimates 
of the mitigation potentials of some of these options and related 
costs, co-benefits, risks and barriers to their deployment, as well as 
industry-specific policy instruments. Findings of integrated models 
(long-term mitigation pathways) are also presented and discussed 
from the sector perspective. In addition, at the end of the chapter, 
the hierarchy in waste management and mitigation opportunities are 
synthesized, covering key waste-related issues that appear across 
all chapters in the Working Group III contribution to the IPCC Fifth 
Assessment Report (AR5).
Figure 10.1, which shows a breakdown of total global anthropogenic 
GHG emissions in 2010 based on Bajželj et al. (2013), illustrates the 
logic that has been used to distinguish the industry sector from other 
sectors discussed in this report. The figure shows how human demand 
for energy services, on the left, is provided by economic sectors, 
through the use of equipment in which devices create heat or work 
from final energy. In turn, the final energy has been created by pro-
cessing a primary energy source. Combustion of carbon-based fuels 
leads to the release of GHG emissions as shown on the right. The 
remaining anthropogenic emissions arise from chemical reactions in 
industrial processes, from waste management and from the agriculture 
and land-use changes discussed in Chapter 11. 
Mitigation options can be chosen to reduce GHG emissions at all 
stages in Figure 10.1, but caution is needed to avoid ‘double count-
ing’. The figure also demonstrates that care is needed when allocat-
ing emissions to specific products and services (‘carbon footprints’, for 
example) while ensuring that the sum of all ‘footprints’ adds to the 
sum of all emissions.
Emissions from industry (30 % of total global GHG emissions) arise 
mainly from material processing, i. e., the conversion of natural 
resources (ores, oil, biomass) or scrap into materials stocks which are 
then converted in manufacturing and construction into products. Pro-
Figure 10�1 | A Sankey diagram showing the system boundaries of the industry sector and demonstrating how global anthropogenic emissions in 2010 arose from the chain of 
technologies and systems required to deliver final services triggered by human demand. The width of each line is proportional to GHG emissions released, and the sum of these 



















































duction of just iron and steel and non-metallic minerals (predominately 
cement) results in 44 % of all carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (direct, 
indirect, and process-related) from industry. Other emission-intensive 
sectors are chemicals (including plastics) and fertilizers, pulp and 
paper, non-ferrous metals (in particular aluminium), food processing 
(food growing is covered in Chapter 11), and textiles. 
Decompositions of GHG emissions have been used to analyze the dif-
ferent drivers of global industry-related emissions. An accurate decom-
position for the industry sector would involve great complexity, so 
instead this chapter uses a simplified conceptual expression to identify 
the key mitigation opportunities available within the sector:
G =  G _
E
×  E _ 
M
×  M _
P
 ×  P _
S
× S
where G is the GHG emissions of the industrial sector within a speci-
fied time period (usually one year), E is industrial sector energy con-
sumption and M is the total global production of materials in that 
period. P is stock of products created from these materials (including 
both consumables and durables added to existing stocks), and S is the 
services delivered in the time period through use of those products.
The expression is indicative only, but leads to the main mitigation 
strategies discussed in this chapter:
G / E is the emissions intensity of the sector expressed as a ratio to 
the energy used: the GHG emissions of industry arise largely from 
energy use (directly from combusting fossil fuels, and indirectly 
through purchasing electricity and steam), but emissions also arise 
from industrial chemical reactions. In particular, producing cement, 
chemicals, and non-ferrous metals leads to the inevitable release 
of significant ‘process emissions’ regardless of energy supply. We 
refer to reductions in G / E as emissions efficiency for the energy 
inputs and the processes.
E / M is the energy intensity: approximately three quarters of industrial 
energy use is required to create materials from ores, oil or biomass, 
with the remaining quarter used in the downstream manufactur-
ing and construction sectors that convert materials to products. 
The energy required can in some cases (particularly for metals and 
paper) be reduced by production from recycled scrap, and can be 
further reduced by material re-use, or by exchange of waste heat 
and exchange of by-products between sectors. Reducing E / M is the 
goal of energy efficiency.
M / P is the material intensity of the sector: the amount of material required 
to create a product and maintain the stock of a product depends both 
on the design of the product and on the scrap discarded during its 
production. Both can be reduced by material efficiency.
Figure 10�2 | A schematic illustration of industrial activity over the supply chain. Options for climate change mitigation in the industry sector are indicated by the circled numbers: 
(1) Energy efficiency (e. g., through furnace insulation, process coupling, or increased material recycling); (2) Emissions efficiency (e. g., from switching to non-fossil fuel electricity 
supply, or applying CCS to cement kilns); (3a) Material efficiency in manufacturing (e. g., through reducing yield losses in blanking and stamping sheet metal or re-using old struc-
tural steel without melting); (3b) Material efficiency in product design (e. g., through extended product life, light-weight design, or de-materialization); (4) Product-Service efficiency 
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P / S is the product-service intensity: the level of service provided by a 
product depends on its intensity of use. For consumables (e. g., food 
or detergent) that are used within the accounting period in which 
they are produced, service is provided solely by the production 
within that period. For durables that last for longer than the account-
ing period (e. g., clothing), services are provided by the stock of prod-
ucts in current use. In this case P is the flow of material required to 
replace retiring products and to meet demand for increases in total 
stock. Thus for consumables, P / S can be reduced by more precise use 
(for example using only recommended doses of detergents or apply-
ing fertilizer precisely) while for durables, P / S can be reduced both 
by using durable products for longer and by using them more inten-
sively. We refer to reductions in P / S as product-service efficiency.
S: The total global demand for service is a function of population, 
wealth, lifestyle, and the whole social system of expectations and 
aspirations. If the total demand for service were to decrease, it 
would lead to a reduction in industrial emissions, and we refer to 
this as demand reduction.
Figure 10.2 expands on this simplified relationship to illustrate the 
main options for GHG emissions mitigation in industry (circled num-
bers). The figure also demonstrates how international trade of prod-
ucts leads to significant differences between ‘production’ and ‘con-
sumption’ measures of national emissions, and demonstrates how the 
‘waste’ industry, which includes material recycling as well as options 
like ‘waste to energy’ and disposal, has a significant potential for influ-
encing future industrial emissions. 
Figure 10.2 clarifies the terms used for key sectors in this chapter: 
‘Industry’ refers to the totality of activities involving the physical trans-
formation of materials within which ‘extractive industry’ supplies feed-
stock to the energy-intensive ‘materials industries’ which create refined 
materials. These are converted by ‘manufacturing’ into products and 
by ‘construction’ into buildings and infrastructure. ‘Home scrap’ from 
the materials processing industries, ‘new scrap’ from downstream con-
struction and manufacturing, and products retiring at end-of-life are 
processed in the ‘waste industry.’ This ‘waste’ may be recycled (particu-
larly bulk metals, paper, glass and some plastics), may be re-used to 
save the energy required for recycling, or may be discarded to landfills 
or incinerated (which can lead to further emissions on one hand and 
energy recovery on the other hand).




World production trends of mineral extractive industries, manufactur-
ing, and services, have grown steadily in the last 40 years (Figure 10.3). 
However, the service sector share in world GDP increased from 50 % in 
1970 to 70 % in 2010; while the industry world GDP share decreased 
from 38.2 to 26.9 % (World Bank, 2013). 



































Concerning extractive industries for metallic minerals, from 2005 to 
2012 annual mining production of iron ore, gold, silver, and copper 
increased by 10 %, 1 %, 2 %, and 2 % respectively (Kelly and Matos, 
2013). Most of the countries in Africa, Latin America, and the tran-
sition economies produce more than they use; whereas use is being 
driven mainly by consumption in China, India, and developed coun-
tries (UNCTAD, 2008)1. Extractive industries of rare earths are gain-
ing importance because of their various uses in high-tech industry 
(Moldoveanu and Papangelakis, 2012). New mitigation technologies, 
such as hybrid and electric vehicles (EVs), electricity storage and 
renewable technologies, increase the demand for certain miner-
als, such as lithium, gallium, and phosphates (Bebbington and Bury, 
2009). Concerns over depletion of these minerals have been raised, 
but important research on extraction methods as well as increasing 
recycling rates are leading to increasing reserve estimates for these 
materials (Graedel et al., 2011; Resnick Institute, 2011; Moldoveanu 
and Papangelakis, 2012; Eckelman et  al., 2012). China accounts for 
97 % of global rare earth extraction (130 Mt in 2010) (Kelly and 
Matos, 2013).
Regarding manufacturing production, the annual global production 
growth rate of steel, cement, ammonia, aluminium, and paper — the 
most energy-intensive industries — ranged from 2 % to 6 % between 
2005 and 2012 (Table 10.1). Many trends are responsible for this devel-
opment (e. g., urbanization significantly triggered demand on construc-
tion materials). Over the last decades, as a general trend, the world has 
witnessed decreasing industrial activity in developed countries with a 
major downturn in industrial production due to the economic reces-
sion in 2009 (Kelly and Matos, 2013). There is continued increase in 
industrial activity and trade of some developing countries. The increase 
in manufacturing production and consumption has occurred mostly in 
Asia. China is the largest producer of the main industrial outputs. In 
many middle-income countries industrialization has stagnated, and in 
general Africa and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) have remained 
marginalized (UNIDO, 2009; WSA, 2012a). In 2012, 1.5 billion tonnes 
of steel (212 kg / cap) were manufactured; 46 % was produced and 
consumed in mainland China (522 kg / cap). China also dominates 
global cement production, producing 2.2 billion tonnes (1,561 kg / cap) 
in 2012, followed by India with only 250 Mt (202 kg / cap) (Kelly and 
Matos, 2013; UNDESA, 2013). More subsector specific trends are in 
Section 10.4. 
Globally large-scale production dominates energy-intensive indus-
tries; however small- and medium-sized enterprises are very impor-
tant in many developing countries. This brings additional challenges 
for mitigation efforts (Worrell et al., 2009; Roy, 2010; Ghosh and Roy, 
2011). 
1 For example, in 2008, China imported 50 % of the world’s total iron ore exports 
and produced about 50 % of the world’s pig iron (Kelly and Matos, 2013). India 
demanded 35 % of world´s total gold production in 2011 (WGC, 2011), and the 
United States consumed 33 % of world´s total silver production in 2011 (Kelly and 
Matos, 2013).
Table 10�1 | Total production of energy-intensive industrial goods for the world top-5 
producers of each commodity: 2005, 2012, and average annual growth rate (AAGR) 







Iron ore      
World 1540 3000 10 %
China 420 1300 18 %
Australia 262 525 10 %
Brazil 280 375 4 %
India 140 245 8 %
Russia 97 100 0.4 %
Steel
World 1130 1500 4 %
China 349 720 11 %
Japan 113 108 – 1 %
U. S. 95 91 – 1 %
India 46 76 8 %
Russia 66 76 2 %
Cement      
World 2310 3400 6 %
China 1040 2150 11 %
India 145 250 8 %
U. S. 101 74 – 4 %
Brazil 37 70 10 %
Iran 33 65 10 %
Ammonia      
World 121.0 137.0 2 %
China 37.8 44.0 2 %
India 10.8 12.0 2 %
Russia 10.0 10.0 0 %
U. S. 8.0 9.5 2 %
Trinidad & Tobago 4.2 5.5 4 %
Aluminium      
World 31.9 44.9 5 %
China 7.8 19.0 14 %
Russia 3.7 4.2 2 %
Canada 2.9 2.7 – 1 %
U. S. 2.5 2.0 – 3 %
Australia 1.9 1.9 0 %
Paper      
World 364.7 401.1 1 %
China 60.4 106.3 8 %
U. S. 83.7 75.5 – 1 %
Japan 31.0 26.0 – 2 %
Germany 21.7 22.6 1 %





Another important change in the world´s industrial output over the 
last decades has been the rise in the proportion of international 
trade. Manufactured products are not only traded, but the produc-
tion process is increasingly broken down into tasks that are them-
selves outsourced and / or traded; i. e., production is becoming less 
vertically integrated. In addition to other drivers such as population 
growth, urbanization, and income increase, the rise in the propor-
tion of trade has been driving production increase for certain coun-
tries (Fisher-Vanden et  al., 2004; Liu and Ang, 2007; Reddy and 
Ray, 2010; OECD, 2011). The economic recession of 2009 reduced 
industrial production worldwide because of consumption reduction, 
low optimism in credit market, and a decline in world trade (Nis-
sanke, 2009). More discussion on GHG emissions embodied in trade 
is presented in Chapter 14. Similar to industry, the service sector is 
heterogeneous and has significant proportion of small and medium 
sized enterprises. The service sector covers activities such as public 
administration, finance, education, trade, hotels, restaurants, and 
health. Activity growth in developing countries and structural shift 
with rising income is driving service sector growth (Fisher-Vanden 
et al., 2004; Liu and Ang, 2007; Reddy and Ray, 2010; OECD, 2011). 
OECD countries are shifting from manufacturing towards service-ori-
ented economies (Sun, 1998; Schäfer, 2005; US EIA, 2010), however, 
this is also true for some non-OECD countries. For example, India has 
almost 64 % – 66 % of GDP contribution from service sector (World 
Bank, 2013). 
10.3 New  developments 
in emission trends 
and drivers
In 2010, the industry sector accounted for around 28 % of final energy 
use (IEA, 2013). Global industry and waste / wastewater GHG emis-
sions grew from 10.37 GtCO2eq in 1990 to 13.04 GtCO2eq in 2005 to 
15.44 GtCO2eq in 2010. These emissions are larger than the emissions 
from either the buildings or transport end-use sectors and represent 
just over 30 % of global GHG emissions in 2010 (just over 40 % if 
AFOLU emissions are not included). These total emissions are com-
prised of:
•	 Direct energy-related CO2 emissions for industry2 
•	 Indirect CO2 emissions from production of electricity and heat for 
industry3 
•	 Process CO2 emissions
•	 Non-CO2 GHG emissions
•	 Direct emissions for waste / wastewater 
2 This also includes CO2 emissions from non-energy uses of fossil fuels.
3 The methodology for calculating indirect CO2 emissions is based on de la Rue du 
Can and Price (2008) and described in Annex II.5. 
Figure 10.4 shows global industry and waste / wastewater direct and 
indirect GHG emissions by source from 1970 to 2010. Table 10.2 shows 
primary energy4 and GHG emissions for industry by emission type 
(direct energy-related, indirect from electricity and heat production, 
process CO2, and non-CO2), and for waste / wastewater for five world 
regions and the world total.5
Figure 10.5 shows global industry and waste / wastewater direct and 
indirect GHG emissions by region from 1970 to 2010. This regional 
breakdown shows that:
•	 Over half (52 %) of global direct GHG emissions from industry and 
waste / wastewater are from the ASIA region, followed by OECD-
1990 (25 %), EIT (9.4 %), MAF (7.6 %), and LAM (5.7 %).
•	 Between 2005 and 2010, GHG emissions from industry grew at an 
average annual rate of 3.5 % globally, comprised of 7.0 % average 
annual growth in the ASIA region, followed by MAF (4.4 %), LAM 
(2.0 %), and the EIT countries (0.1 %), but declined in the OECD-
1990 countries (– 1.1 %).
Regional trends are further discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1.
Table 10.3 provides 2010 direct and indirect GHG emissions by source 
and gas. 2010 direct and indirect emissions were dominated by CO2 
(85.1 %), followed by methane (CH4) (8.6 %), hydrofluorocarbons (HFC) 
(3.5 %), nitrous oxide (N2O) (2.0 %), Perfluorocarbons (PFC) (0.5 %) 
and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) (0.4 %) emissions.
10�3�1 Industrial CO2 emissions
As shown in Table 10.3, industrial CO2 emissions were 13.14 GtCO2 
in 2010. These emissions were comprised of 5.27 GtCO2 direct 
energy-related emissions, 5.25 GtCO2 indirect emissions from elec-
tricity and heat production, 2.59 GtCO2 from process CO2 emissions 
and 0.03 GtCO2 from waste / wastewater. Process CO2 emissions are 
comprised of process-related emissions of 1.352 GtCO2 from cement 
production,6 0.477 GtCO2 from production of chemicals, 0.242 GtCO2 
from lime production, 0.134 GtCO2 from coke ovens, 0.074 GtCO2 from 
non-ferrous metals production, 0.072 GtCO2 from iron and steel produc-
tion, 0.061 GtCO2 from ferroalloy production, 0.060 GtCO2 from lime-
stone and dolomite use, 0.049 GtCO2 from solvent and other product 
use, 0.042 GtCO2 from production of other minerals and 0.024 GtCO2 
from non-energy use of lubricants / waxes (JRC / PBL, 2013). Total indus-
trial CO2 values include emissions from mining and quarrying, from 
manufacturing, and from construction.
4 See Glossary in Annex I for definition of primary energy.
5 The IEA also recently published CO2 emissions with electricity and heat allocated 
to end-use sectors (IEA, 2012a). However, the methodology used in this report 
differs slightly from the IEA approach as explained in Annex II.5
6 Another source, Boden et al., 2013, indicates that cement process CO2 emissions 





Energy-intensive processes in the mining sector include excavation, 
mine operation, material transfer, mineral preparation, and separa-
tion. Energy consumption for mining7 and quarrying, which is included 
in ‘other industries’ in Figure 10.4, represents about 2.7 % of world-
wide industrial energy use, varying regionally, and a significant share 
of national industrial energy use in Botswana and Namibia (around 
80 %), Chile (over 50 %), Canada (30 %), Zimbabwe (18.6 %), Mongo-
lia (16.5 %), and South Africa (almost 15 %) in 2010 (IEA, 2012b; c). 
7 Discussion of extraction of energy carriers (e. g., coal, oil, and natural gas) takes 
place in Chapter 7.
Manufacturing is a subset of industry that includes production of all 
products (e. g., steel, cement, machinery, textiles) except for energy 
products, and does not include energy used for construction. Manu-
facturing is responsible for about 98 % of total direct CO2 emissions 
from the industrial sector (IEA, 2012b; c). Most manufacturing CO2 
emissions arise due to chemical reactions and fossil fuel combustion 
largely used to provide the intense heat that is often required to bring 
about the physical and chemical transformations that convert raw 
materials into industrial products. These industries, which include pro-
duction of chemicals and petrochemicals, iron and steel, cement, pulp 
and paper, and aluminium, usually account for most of the sector’s 
Figure 10�4 | Total global industry and waste / wastewater direct and indirect GHG emissions by source, 1970 – 2010 (GtCO2eq / yr) (de la Rue du Can and Price, 2008; IEA, 2012a; 
JRC / PBL, 2013). See also Annex II.9, Annex II.5.
Note: For statistical reasons ‘Cement production’ only covers process CO2 emissions (i. e., emissions from cement-forming reactions); energy-related direct emissions from cement 
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energy consumption in many countries. In India, the share of energy 
use by energy-intensive manufacturing industries in total manufactur-
ing energy consumption is 62 % (INCCA, 2010), while it is about 80 % 
in China (NBS, 2012).
Overall reductions in industrial energy use / manufacturing value-
added were found to be greatest in developing economies during 
1995 – 2008. Low-income developing economies had the highest 
industrial energy intensity values while developed economies had the 
lowest. Reductions in intensity were realized through technological 
changes (e. g., changes in product mix, adoption of energy-efficient 
technologies, etc.) and structural change in the share of energy-
intensive industries in the economy. During 1995 – 2008, developing 
economies had greater reductions in energy intensity while developed 
economies had greater reductions through structural change (UNIDO, 
2011).
The share of non-energy use of fossil fuels (e. g., the use of fossil fuels 
as a chemical industry feedstock, of refinery and coke oven products, 
and of solid carbon for the production of metals and inorganic chemi-
cals) in total manufacturing final energy use has grown from 20 % in 
2000 to 24 % in 2009 (IEA, 2012b; c). Fossil fuels used as raw materi-
Figure 10�5 | Total global industry and waste / wastewater direct and indirect GHG emissions by region, 1970 – 2010 (GtCO2eq / yr) (de la Rue du Can and Price, 2008; IEA, 2012a; 
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als / feedstocks in the chemical industry may result in CO2 emissions at 
the end of their life-span in the disposal phase if they are not recovered 
or recycled (Patel et al., 2005). These emissions need to be accounted 
for in the waste disposal sector’s emissions, although data on waste 
imports / exports and ultimate disposition are not consistently compiled 
or reliable (Masanet and Sathaye, 2009). Subsector specific details are 
also in Section 10.4. 
Trade is an important factor that influences production choice deci-
sions and hence CO2 emissions at the country level. Emission invento-
ries based on consumption rather than production reflect the fact that 
products produced and exported for consumption in developed coun-
tries are an important contributing factor of the emission increase for 
certain countries such as China, particularly since 2000 (Ahmad and 
Wyckoff, 2003; Wang and Watson, 2007; Peters and Hertwich, 2008; 
Table 10�2 | Industrial Primary Energy (EJ) and GHG emissions (GtCO2eq) by emission type (direct energy-related, indirect from electricity and heat production, process CO2, and 
non-CO2), and waste / wastewater for five world regions and the world total (IEA, 2012a; b; c; JRC / PBL, 2013; see Annex II.9). For definitions of regions see Annex II.2.
Primary Energy (EJ) GHG Emissions (Gt CO 2 eq)
1990 2005 2010 1990 2005 2010
ASIA
Direct (energy-related) 20.89 42.83 56.80 1.21 2.08 2.92
Indirect (electricity + heat) 5.25 15.11 24.38 0.65 2.14 3.08
Process CO2 emissions 0.36 0.96 1.49
Non-CO2 GHG emissions 0.05 0.25 0.27
Waste / wastewater 0.35 0.54 0.60
Total 26�14 57�93 81�17 2�62 5�98 8�36
EIT
Direct (energy-related) 21.98 13.47 13.68 0.79 0.41 0.45
Indirect (electricity + heat) 6.84 4.10 3.42 1.09 0.59 0.51
Process CO2 emissions 0.32 0.23 0.23
Non-CO2 GHG emissions 0.11 0.12 0.12
Waste / wastewater 0.12 0.13 0.15
Total 28�82 17�56 17�10 2�43 1�48 1�47
LAM
Direct (energy-related) 5.85 8.64 9.45 0.19 0.26 0.28
Indirect (electricity + heat) 0.97 1.67 1.93 0.08 0.15 0.17
Process CO2 emissions 0.08 0.11 0.13
Non-CO2 GHG emissions 0.03 0.03 0.03
Waste / wastewater 0.10 0.14 0.14
Total 6�82 10�31 11�38 0�48 0�68 0�75
MAF
Direct (energy-related) 5.59 8.91 11.43 0.22 0.30 0.37
Indirect (electricity + heat) 1.12 1.99 2.58 0.14 0.24 0.29
Process CO2 emissions 0.08 0.15 0.21
Non-CO2 GHG emissions 0.02 0.02 0.02
Waste / wastewater 0.10 0.16 0.17
Total 6�71 10�90 14�01 0�56 0�86 1�07
OECD-1990
Direct (energy-related) 40.93 45.63 42.45 1.55 1.36 1.24
Indirect (electricity + heat) 11.25 10.92 9.71 1.31 1.37 1.19
Process CO2 emissions 0.57 0.56 0.52
Non-CO2 GHG emissions 0.35 0.35 0.44
Waste / wastewater 0.50 0.40 0.39
Total 52�18 56�55 52�16 4�28 4�04 3�79
World
Direct (energy-related) 95.25 119.47 133.81 3.96 4.41 5.27
Indirect (electricity + heat) 25.42 33.78 42.01 3.27 4.48 5.25
Process CO2 emissions 1.42 2.01 2.59
Non-CO2 GHG emissions 0.55 0.77 0.89
Waste / wastewater 1.17 1.37 1.45
Total 120�67 153�25 175�82 10�37 13�04 15�44
Note: Includes energy and non-energy use. Non-energy use covers those fuels that are used as raw materials in the different sectors and are not consumed as a fuel or transformed 





Weber et al., 2008). Chapter 14 provides an in-depth discussion and 
review of the literature related to trade, embodied emissions, and con-
sumption-based emissions inventories.
10�3�2 Industrial non-CO2 GHG emissions
Table 10.4 provides emissions of non-CO2 gases for some key industrial 
processes (JRC / PBL, 2013). N2O emissions from adipic acid and nitric acid 
production and PFC emissions from aluminium production decreased 
while emissions from HFC-23 from HCFC-22 production increased 
from 0.075 GtCO2eq in 1990 to 0.207 GtCO2eq in 2010. In the period 
from 1990 – 2010, fluorinated gases (F-gases) and N2O were the most 
important non-CO2 GHG emissions in manufacturing industry. Most of 
the F-gases arise from the emissions from different processes including 
the production of aluminium and HCFC-22 and the manufacturing of 
flat panel displays, magnesium, photovoltaics, and semiconductors. The 
rest of the F-gases correspond mostly to HFCs that are used in refrigera-
tion equipment used in industrial processes. Most of the N2O emissions 
from the industrial sector are contributed by the chemical industry, par-
ticularly from the production of nitric and adipic acids (EPA, 2012a). A 
summary of the issues and trends that concern developing countries and 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in this chapter is found in Box 10.1.
10.4 Mitigation technology 
options, practices and 
behavioural aspects 
Figure 10.2, and its associated identity, define six options for climate 
change mitigation in industry. 
•	 Energy efficiency (E / M): Energy is used in industry to drive chem-
ical reactions, to create heat, and to perform mechanical work. The 
required chemical reactions are subject to thermodynamic limits. 
The history of industrial energy efficiency is one of innovating to 




HFC-23 from HCFC-22 production 75 194 207
ODS substitutes (Industrial process refrigeration)2 0 13 21
PFC, SF6, NF3 from flat panel display manufacturing 0 4 6
N2O from adipic acid and nitric acid production 232 153 104
PFCs and SF6 from photovoltaic manufacturing 0 0 1
PFCs from aluminium production 107 70 52
SF6 from manufacturing of electrical equipment 12 7 10
HFCs, PFCs, SF6 and NF3 from semiconductor manufacturing 7 21 17
SF6 from magnesium manufacturing 12 9 8
CH4 and N2O from other industrial processes 3 5 6
Note: 
1 the data from US EPA (EPA, 2012a) show emissions of roughly the same mag-
nitude, but differ in total amounts per source as well as the growth trends. The 
differences are significant in some particular sources like HFC-23 from HCFC-22 
production, PFCs from aluminium production and N2O from adipic acid and nitric 
acid production.
2 Ozone depleting substances (ODS) substitutes values from EPA (2012a).
Table 10�3 | Industry and waste / wastewater direct and indirect GHG emissions by 

















Indirect (electricity + heat) CO2 5,246.79



















Carbon dioxide CO2 13,139
Methane CH4 1,326.93
Hydrofluorocarbons HFC 539.28
Nitrous oxide N2O 303.35
Perfluorocarbons PFC 72.93
Sulphur hexafluoride SF6 61.21
Carbon Dioxide Equivalent 
(total of all gases)
CO2eq 15,443
Note: CO2 emissions from cement-forming reactions only; cement energy-related direct 





Box 10�1 | Issues regarding Developing and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
Reductions in energy intensity (measured as final energy use per 
industrial GDP) from 1995 to 2008 were larger in developing 
economies than in developed economies (UNIDO, 2011). The shift 
from energy-intensive industries towards high-tech sectors (struc-
tural change) was the main driving force in developed economies, 
while the energy intensity reductions in large developing econo-
mies such as China, India, and Mexico and transition economies 
such as Azerbaijan and Ukraine were related to technological 
changes (Reddy and Ray, 2010; Price et al., 2011; UNIDO, 2011; 
Sheinbaum-Pardo et al., 2012; Roy et al., 2013). Brazil is a special 
case were industrial energy intensity increased (UNIDO, 2011; 
Sheinbaum et al., 2011). The potential for industrial energy effi-
ciency is still very important for developing countries (see Sections 
10.4 and 10.7), and possible industrialization development opens 
the opportunity for the installation of new plants with highly 
efficient energy and material technologies and processes (UNIDO, 
2011).
Other strategies for mitigation in developing countries such as 
emissions efficiency (e. g., fuel switching) depend on the fuel mix 
and availability for each country. Product-service efficiency (e. g., 
using products more intensively) and reducing overall demand 
for product services must be accounted differently depending on 
the country’s income and development levels. Demand reduction 
strategies are more relevant for developed countries because 
of higher levels of consumption. However, some strategies for 
material efficiency such as manufacturing lighter products (e. g., 
cars) and modal shifts in the transport sector that reduce energy 
consumption in industry can have an important role in future 
energy demand (see Chapter 8.4.2.2).
LDCs have to be treated separately because of their small 
manufacturing production base. The share of manufacturing value 
added (MVA) in the GDP of LDCs in 2011 was 9.7 % (7.2 % Africa 
LDCs; Asia and the Pacific LDCs 13.3 % and no data for Haiti), 
while it was 21.8 % in developing countries and 16.5 % in devel-
oped countries. The LDCs’ contribution to world MVA represented 
only 0.46 % in 2010 (UNIDO, 2011; UN, 2013).
In most LDCs, the share of extractive industries has increased (in 
many cases with important economic, social, and environmental 
problems (Maconachie and Hilson, 2013)), while that of manu-
facturing either decreased in importance or stagnated, with the 
exceptions of Tanzania and Ethiopia where their relative share of 
agriculture decreased while manufacturing, services, and mining 
increased (UNCTAD, 2011; UN, 2013). 
Developed and developing countries are changing their industrial 
structure, from low technology to medium and high technology 
products (level of technology in production process), but LDCs 
remain highly concentrated in low technology products. The 
share of low technology products in the years 1995 and 2009 in 
LDCs MVA was 68 % and 71 %, while in developing countries it 
was 38 % and 30 % and in developed countries 33 % and 21 %, 
respectively (UNIDO, 2011).
Among other development strategies, two alternative possible 
scenarios could be envisaged for the industrial sector in LDCs: 
(1) continuing with the present situation of concentration in 
labour intensive and resource intensive industries or (2) moving 
towards an increase in the production share of higher technol-
ogy products (following the trend in developing countries). The 
future evolution of the industrial sector will be successful only 
if the technologies adopted are consistent with the resource 
endowments of LDCs. However, the heterogeneity of LDCs 
circumstances needs to be taken into account when analyzing 
major trends in the evolution of the group. A report prepared by 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) Secretariat summarizes the findings of 70 Technology 
Needs Assessments (TNA) submitted, including 24 from LDCs. 
Regarding the relationship between low carbon and sustainable 
development, the relevant technologies for most of the LDCs are 
related to poverty and hunger eradication, avoiding the loss of 
resources, time and capital. Almost 80 % of LDCs considered the 
industrial structure in their TNA, evidencing that they consider 
this sector as a key element in their development strategies. The 
technologies identified in the industrial sector and the propor-
tion of countries selecting them are: fuel switching (42 %), 
energy efficiency (35 %), mining (30 %), high efficiency motors 
(25 %), and cement production (25 %) (UNFCCC SBSTA, 2009). 
A low carbon development strategy facilitated by access to 
financial resources, technology transfer, technologies, and 
capacity building would contribute to make the deployment of 
national mitigation efforts politically viable. As adaptation is the 
priority in almost all LDCs, industrial development strategies and 
mitigation actions look for synergies with national adaptation 
strategies.
create ‘best available technologies’ and implementing these tech-
nologies at scale to define a reference ‘best practice technology’, 
and investing in and controlling installed equipment to raise ‘aver-
age performance’ nearer to ‘best practice’ (Dasgupta et al., 2012).
Energy efficiency has been an important strategy for industry for 
various reasons for a long time. Over the last four decades there 
has been continued improvement in energy efficiency in energy-





ingly approaching technical limits. However, many options for 
energy efficiency improvement remain and there is still significant 
potential to reduce the gap between actual energy use and the 
best practice in many industries and in most countries. For all, but 
particularly for less energy intensive industries, there are still many 
energy efficiency options both for process and system-wide tech-
nologies and measures. Several detailed analyses related to par-
ticular sectors estimate the technical potential of energy efficiency 
measures in industry to be approximately up to 25 % (Schäfer, 
2005; Allwood et  al., 2010; UNIDO, 2011; Saygin et  al., 2011b; 
Gutowski et al., 2013). Through innovation, additional reductions 
of approximately up to 20 % in energy intensity may potentially be 
realized before approaching technological limits in some energy-
intensive industries (Allwood et al., 2010).
In industry, energy efficiency opportunities are found within sector-
specific processes as well as in systems such as steam systems, 
process heating systems (furnaces and boilers), and electric motor 
systems (e. g., pumps, fans, air compressor, refrigerators, material 
handling). As a class of technology, electronic control systems help 
to optimize performance of motors, compressors, steam combus-
tion, heating, etc. and improve plant efficiency cost-effectively with 
both energy savings and emissions benefits, especially for SMEs 
(Masanet, 2010).
Opportunities to improve heat management include better heat 
exchange between hot and cold gases and fluids, improved insula-
tion, capture and use of heat in hot products, and use of exhaust 
heat for electricity generation or as an input to lower temperature 
processes (US DoE, 2004a, 2008). However, the value of these 
options is in many cases limited by the low temperature of ‘waste 
heat’ — industrial heat exchangers generally require a temperature 
difference of ~200 °C — and the difficulty of exchanging heat out 
of solid materials.
Recycling can also help to reduce energy demand, as it can be a 
strategy to create material with less energy. Recycling is already 
widely applied for bulk metals (steel, aluminium, and copper in 
particular), paper, and glass and leads to an energy saving when 
producing new material from old avoids the need for further 
energy intensive chemical reactions. Plastics recycling rates in 
Europe are currently around 25 % (Plastics Europe, 2012) due to 
the wide variety of compositions in common use in small prod-
ucts, and glass recycling saves little energy as the reaction energy 
is small compared to that needed for melting (Sardeshpande 
et al., 2007). Recycling is applied when it is cost effective, but in 
many cases leads to lower quality materials, is constrained by lack 
of supply because collection rates, while high for some materi-
als (particularly steel), are not 100 %, and because with growing 
global demand for material, available supply of scrap lags total 
demand. Cement cannot be recycled, although concrete can be 
crushed and down-cycled into aggregates or engineering fill. How-
ever, although this saves on aggregate production, it may lead to 
increased emissions, due to energy used in concrete crushing and 
refinement and because more cement is required to achieve target 
properties (Dosho, 2008). 
•	 Emissions efficiency (G / E): In 2008, 42 % of industrial energy 
supply was from coal and oil, 20 % from gas, and the remainder 
from electricity and direct use of renewable energy sources. These 
shares are forecast to change to 30 % and 24 % respectively by 
2035 (IEA, 2011a) resulting in lower emissions per unit of energy, 
as discussed in Chapter 7. Switching to natural gas also favours 
more efficient use of energy in industrial combined heat and 
power (CHP) installations (IEA, 2008, 2009a). For several renew-
able sources of energy, CHP (IEA, 2011b) offers useful load bal-
ancing opportunities if coupled with low-grade heat storage; this 
issue is discussed further in Chapter 7. The use of wastes and 
biomass in the energy industry is currently limited, but forecast 
to grow (IEA, 2009b). The cement industry incinerates (with due 
care for e. g., dioxins / furans) municipal solid waste and sewage 
sludge in kilns, providing ~17 % of the thermal energy required 
by European Union (EU) cement production in 2004 (IEA ETSAP, 
2010). The European paper industry reports that over 50 % of its 
energy supply is from biomass (CEPI, 2012). If electricity genera-
tion is decarbonized, greater electrification, for example appro-
priate use of heat pumps instead of boilers (IEA, 2009b; HPTCJ, 
2010), could also reduce emissions. Solar thermal energy for dry-
ing, washing, and evaporation may also be developed further (IEA, 
2009c) although to date this has not been implemented widely 
(Sims et al., 2011). 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) forecasts that a large part 
of emission reduction in industry will occur by carbon dioxide cap-
ture and storage (CCS) (up to 30 % in 2050) (IEA, 2009c). Carbon 
dioxide capture and storage is largely discussed in Chapter 7. In 
gas processing (Kuramochi et al., 2012a) and parts of the chemical 
industry (ammonia production without downstream use of CO2), 
there might be early opportunities for application of CCS as the 
CO2 in vented gas is already highly concentrated (up to 85 %), 
compared to cement or steel (up to 30 %). Industrial utilization of 
CO2 was assessed in the IPCC Special Report on Carbon Dioxide 
Capture and Storage (SRCCS) (Mazzotti et  al., 2005) and it was 
found that potential industrial use of CO2 was rather small and the 
storage time of CO2 in industrial products often short. Therefore 
industrial uses of CO2 are unlikely to contribute to a great extent 
to climate change mitigation. However, currently CO2 use is subject 
of various industrial RD&DD projects (Research and Development, 
Demonstration and Diffusion).
•	 In terms of non-CO2-emissions from industry, HFC-23 emis-
sions, which arise in HCFC-22 production, can be reduced by 
process optimization and by thermal destruction. N2O emis-
sions from adipic and nitric acid production have decreased 
almost by half between 1990 and 2010 (EPA, 2012a) due to the 





Box 10�2 | Service demand reduction and mitigation opportunities in industry sector: 
Besides technological mitigation measures, an additional mitiga-
tion option (see Figure 10.2.) for the industry sector involves the 
end uses of industrial products that provide services to consumers 
(e. g., diet, mobility, shelter, clothing, amenities, health care and ser-
vices, hygiene). Assessment of the mitigation potential associated 
with this option is nascent, however, and important knowledge 
gaps exist (for a more general review of sustainable consumption 
and production (SCP) policies, see Section 10.11.3 and 4.4.3). The 
nature of the linkage between service demand and the demand 
for industrial products is different and shown here through two 
examples representing both a direct and an indirect link:
•	 clothing demand, which is linked directly to the textile indus-
try products (strong link)
•	 tourism demand, which is linked directly to mobility and shel-
ter demand but also indirectly to industrial materials demand 
(weak link)
Clothing demand: Even in developed economies, consumers 
appear to have no absolute limit to their demand for clothing, and 
if prices fall, will continue to purchase more garments: during the 
period 2000 – 2005, the advent of ‘fast fashion’ in the UK led to 
a drop in prices, but an increase in sales equivalent to one third 
more garments per year per person with consequent increases 
in material production and hence industrial emissions (Allwood 
et al., 2008). This growth in demand relates to ‘fashion’ and 
‘conspicuous consumption’ (Roy and Pal, 2009) rather than ‘need’, 
and has triggered a wave of interest in concepts like ‘sustainable 
lifestyle / fashion’. While much of this interest is related to market-
ing new fabrics linked to environmental claims, authors such as 
Fletcher (2008) have examined the possibility that ‘commodity’ 
clothing, which can be discarded easily, would be used for longer 
and valued more, if given personal meaning by some shared activ-
ity or association.
Tourism demand: GHG emissions triggered by tourism signifi-
cantly contribute to global anthropogenic CO2 emissions. Esti-
mates show a range between 3.9 % to 6 % of global emissions, 
with a best estimate of 4.9 % (UNWTO et al., 2008). Worldwide, 
three quarters (75 %) of tourism-related emissions are generated 
by transport and just over 20 % by accommodation (UNWTO et al., 
2008). A minority of travellers (frequent travellers using the plane 
over long distances) (Gössling et al., 2009) are responsible for the 
greater share of these emissions (Gössling et al., 2005; TEC and 
DEEE, 2008; de Bruijn et al., 2010) (see Sections 8.1.2 and 8.2.1).
Mitigation options for tourism (Gössling, 2010; Becken and Hay, 
2012) include technical, behavioural, and organizational aspects. 
Many mitigation options and potentials are the same as those 
identified in the transport and buildings chapters (see Chapters 8 
and 9). However, the demand reduction of direct tourism-related 
products delivered by the industry in addition to products for 
buildings and other infrastructure e. g., snow-lifts and associated 
accessories, artificial snow, etc. can also impact the industry sector 
as they determine product and material demand of the sector. 
Thus, the industry sector has only limited influence on emissions 
from tourism (via reduction of the embodied emissions), but 
is affected by decisions in mitigation measures in tourism. For 
example, a sustainable lifestyle resulting in a lower demand for 
transportation can reduce demand for steel to manufacture cars 
and contribute to reducing emissions in the industry sector. 
A business-as-usual (BAU) scenario (UNWTO et al., 2008) projects 
emissions from tourism to grow by 130 % from 2005 to 2035 
globally; notably the emissions of air transport and accommoda-
tion will triple. Two alternative scenarios show that the contribu-
tion of technology is limited in terms of achievable mitigation 
potentials and that even when combining technological and 
behavioural potentials, no significant reduction can be achieved 
in 2035 compared to 2005. Insufficient technological mitigation 
potential and the need for drastic changes in the forms of tourism 
(e. g., reduction in long haul travel; UNWTO et al., 2008), in the 
place of tourism (Gössling et al., 2010; Peeters and Landré, 2011) 
and in the uses of leisure time, implying changes in lifestyles 
(Ceron and Dubois, 2005; Dubois et al., 2011) are the limiting 
factors. 
Several studies show that for some countries (e. g., the UK) an 
unrestricted growth of tourism would consume the whole carbon 
budget compatible with the +2 °C target by 2050 (Bows et al., 
2009; Scott et al., 2010). However, some authors also point out 
that by reducing demand in some small subsectors of tourism 
(e. g., long haul, cruises) effective emission reductions may be 
reached with a minimum of damage to the sector (Peeters and 
Dubois, 2010).
Tourism is an example of human activity where the discussion of 
mitigation is not only technology-driven, but strongly correlated 
with lifestyles. For many other activities, the question is how 
certain mitigation goals would result in consequences for the 






Hydrofluorocarbons used as refrigerants can be replaced by 
alternatives (e. g., ammonia, hydrofluoro-olefins, HC, CO2). 
Replacement is also an appropriate measure to reduce HFC emis-
sions from foams (use of alternative blowing agents) or solvent 
uses. Emission reduction (in the case of refrigerants) is possible 
by leak repair, refrigerant recovery and recycling, and proper dis-
posal. Emissions of PFCs, SF6 and nitrogen trifluoride (NF3) are 
growing rapidly due to flat panel display manufacturing. Ninety-
eight percent of these emissions are in China (EPA, 2012a) and 
can be countered by fuelled combustion, plasma, and catalytic 
technologies. 
•	 Material efficiency in production (M / P): Material effi-
ciency — delivering services with less new material — is a signifi-
cant opportunity for industrial emissions abatement, that has had 
relatively little attention to date (Allwood et  al., 2012). Two key 
strategies would significantly improve material efficiency in manu-
facturing existing products: 
•	 Reducing yield losses in materials production, manufactur-
ing, and construction. Approximately one-tenth of all paper, a 
quarter of all steel, and a half of all aluminium produced each 
year is scrapped (mainly in downstream manufacturing) and 
internally recycled — see Figure 10.2� This could be reduced by 
process innovations and new approaches to design (Milford 
et al., 2011).
•	 Re-using old material. A detailed study (Allwood et al., 2012) 
on re-use of structural steel in construction concluded that 
there are no insurmountable technical barriers to re-use, that 
there is a profit opportunity, and that the potential supply is 
growing.
•	 Material efficiency in product design (M / P): Although new 
steels and production techniques have allowed relative light-
weighting of cars, in practice cars continue to become heavier as 
they are larger and have more features. However, many products 
could be one-third lighter without loss of performance in use (Car-
ruth et al., 2011) if design and production were optimized. At pres-
ent, the high costs of labour relative to materials and other barri-
ers inhibit this opportunity, except in industries such as aerospace 
where the cost of design and manufacture for lightness is paid back 
through reduced fuel use. Substitution of one material by another 
is often technically possible (Ashby, 2009), but options for material 
substitution as an abatement strategy are limited: global steel and 
cement production exceeds 200 and 380 (kg / cap) / yr respectively, 
and no other materials capable of delivering the same functions 
are available in comparable quantities; epoxy based composite 
materials and magnesium alloys have significantly higher embod-
ied energy than steel or aluminium (Ashby, 2009) (although for 
vehicles this may be worthwhile if it allows significant savings in 
energy during use); wood is kiln dried, so in effect is energy inten-
sive (Puettmann and Wilson, 2005); and blast furnace slag and fly 
ash from coal-fired power stations can substitute to some extent 
for cement clinker. 
•	 Using products more intensively (P / S): Products, such as food, 
that are intended to be consumed in use are in many cases used 
inefficiently, and estimates show that up to one-third of all food in 
developed countries is wasted (Gustavsonn et al., 2011). This indi-
cates the opportunity for behaviour change to reduce significantly 
the demand for industrial production of what currently becomes 
waste without any service provision. In contrast to these consum-
able products, most durable goods are owned in order to deliver a 
‘product service’ rather than for their own sake, so potentially the 
same level of service could be delivered with fewer products. Using 
products for longer could reduce demand for replacement goods, 
and hence reduce industrial emissions (Allwood et al., 2012). New 
business models could foster dematerialization and more intense 
use of products. The ambition of the ‘sustainable consumption’ 
agenda and policies (see Sections 10.11 and 4.4.3) aims towards 
this goal, although evidence of its application in practice remains 
scarce. 
•	 Reducing overall demand for product services (S) (see Box 
10.2): Industrial emissions would be reduced if overall demand 
for product services were reduced (Kainuma et al., 2013) — if the 
population chose to travel less (e. g., through more domestic tour-
ism or telecommuting), heat or cool buildings only to the degree 
required, or reduce unnecessary consumption or products. Clear 
evidence that, beyond some threshold of development, popula-
tions do not become ‘happier’ (as reflected in a wide range of 
socio-economic measures) with increasing wealth, suggests that 
reduced overall consumption might not be harmful in developed 
economies (Layard, 2011; Roy and Pal, 2009; GEA, 2012), and a 
literature questioning the ultimate policy target of GDP growth is 
growing, albeit without clear prescriptions about implementation 
(Jackson, 2011).
In the rest of this section, the application of these six strategies, where 
it exists, is reviewed for the major emitting industrial sectors.
10�4�1 Iron and steel 
Steel continues to dominate global metal production, with total crude 
steel production of around 1,490 Mt in 2011. In 2011, China produced 
46 % of the world’s steel. Other significant producers include the 
EU-27 (12 %), the United States (8 %), Japan (7 %), India (5 %) and 
Russia (5 %) (WSA, 2012b). Seventy percent (70 %) of all steel is made 
from pig iron produced by reducing iron oxide in a blast furnace using 
coke or coal before reduction in an oxygen blown converter (WSA, 
2011). Steel is also made from scrap (23 %) or from iron oxide reduced 
in solid state (direct reduced iron, 7 %) melted in electric-arc furnaces 
before refining. The specific energy intensity of steel production var-





mated to be 2.6 GtCO2 in 2006, including direct and indirect emissions 
(IEA, 2009c; Oda et al., 2012). 
Energy efficiency. The steel industry is pursuing: improved heat and 
energy recovery from process gases, products and waste streams; 
improved fuel delivery through pulverized coal injection; improved fur-
nace designs and process controls; and reduced number of temperature 
cycles through better process coupling such as in Endless Strip Produc-
tion (ESP) (Arvedi et  al., 2008) and use of various energy efficiency 
technologies (Worrell et al., 2010; Xu et al., 2011a) including coke dry 
quenching and top pressure recovery turbines (LBNL and AISI, 2010). 
Efforts to promote energy efficiency and to reduce the production of 
hazardous wastes are the subject of both international guidelines on 
environmental monitoring (International Finance Corporation, 2007) 
and regional benchmarks on best practice techniques (EC, 2012a). 
Emissions efficiency: The coal and coke used in conventional iron-mak-
ing is emissions intensive; switching to gas-based direct reduced iron 
(DRI) and oil and natural gas injection has been used, where economic 
and practicable. However, DRI production currently occurs at smaller 
scale than large blast furnaces (Cullen et al., 2012), and any emissions 
benefit depends on the emissions associated with increased electric-
ity use for the required electric arc furnace (EAF) process. Charcoal, 
another coke substitute, is currently used for iron-making, notably in 
Brazil (Taibi et al.; Henriques Jr. et al., 2010), and processing to improve 
charcoal’s mechanical properties is another substitute under develop-
ment, although extensive land area is required to produce wood for 
charcoal. Other substitutions include use of ferro-coke as a reductant 
(Takeda et al., 2011) and the use of biomass and waste plastics to dis-
place coal (IEA, 2009c). The Ultra-Low CO2 Steelmaking (ULCOS) pro-
gramme has identified four production routes for further development: 
top-gas recycling applied to blast furnaces, HIsarna (a smelt reduc-
tion technology), advanced direct reduction, and electrolysis. The first 
three of these routes would require CCS (discussion of the costs, risks, 
deployment barriers and policy aspects of CCS can be found in Sections 
7.8.2, 7.9, 7.10, and 7.12), and the fourth would reduce emissions only 
if powered by low carbon electricity. Hydrogen fuel might reduce emis-
sions if a cost effective emissions free source of hydrogen were avail-
able at scale, but at present this is not the case. Hydrogen reduction 
is being investigated in the United States (Pinegar et  al., 2011) and 
in Japan as Course 50 (Matsumiya, 2011). Course 50 aims to reduce 
CO2 emissions by approximately 30 % by 2050 through capture, sepa-
ration and recovery. Molten oxide electrolysis (Wang et al., 2011) could 
reduce emissions if a low or CO2-free electricity source was available. 
However this technology is only at the very early stages of develop-
ment and identifying a suitable anode material has proved difficult. 
Material efficiency: Material efficiency offers significant potential for 
emissions reductions (Allwood et al., 2010) and cost savings (Roy et 
al., 2013) in the iron and steel sector. Milford et al. (2011) examined 
the impact of yield losses along the steel supply chain and found that 
26 % of global liquid steel is lost as process scrap, so its elimination 
could have reduced sectoral CO2 emissions by 16 % in 2008. Cooper 
et al. (2012) estimate that nearly 30 % of all steel produced in 2008 
could be re-used in future. However, in many economies steel is rela-
tively cheap in comparison to labour, and this difference is amplified by 
tax policy, so economic logic currently drives a preference for material 
inefficiency to reduce labour costs (Skelton and Allwood, 2013b).
Reduced product and service demand: Commercial buildings in 
developed economies are currently built with up to twice the steel 
required by safety codes, and are typically replaced after around 
30 – 60 years (Michaelis and Jackson, 2000; Hatayama et  al., 2010; 
Pauliuk et  al., 2012). The same service (e. g., office space provision) 
could be achieved with one quarter of the steel, if safety codes were 
met accurately and buildings replaced not as frequently, but after 80 
years. Similarly, there is a strong correlation between vehicle fuel con-
sumption and vehicle mass. For example, in the UK, 4- or 5-seater cars 
are used for an average of around 4 hours per week by 1.6 people 
(DfT, 2011), so a move towards smaller, lighter fuel efficient vehicles 
(FEVs), used for more hours per week by more people could lead to a 
four-fold or more reduction in steel requirements, while providing a 
similar mobility service. There is a well-known tradeoff between the 
emissions embodied in producing goods and those generated during 
use, so product life extension strategies should account for different 
anticipated rates of improvement in embodied and use-phase emis-
sions (Skelton and Allwood, 2013a).
10�4�2 Cement 
Emissions in cement production arise from fuel combustion (to heat 
limestone, clay, and sand to 1450 °C) and from the calcination reaction. 
Fuel emissions (0.8 GtCO2 (IEA, 2009d), around 40 % of the total) can be 
reduced through improvements in energy efficiency and fuel switching 
while process emissions (the calcination reaction, ~50 % of the total) are 
unavoidable, so can be reduced only through reduced demand, including 
through improved material efficiency. The remaining 10 % of CO2 emis-
sions arise from grinding and transport (Bosoaga et al., 2009).
Energy efficiency: Estimates of theoretical minimum primary energy 
consumption for thermal (fuel) energy use ranges between 1.6 and 
1.85 GJ / t (Locher, 2006). For large new dry kilns, the ‘best possible’ 
energy efficiency is 2.7 GJ / t clinker with electricity consumption of 80 
kWh / t clinker or lower (Muller and Harnish, 2008). ‘International best 
practice’ final energy ranges from 1.8 to 2.1 to 2.9 GJ / t cement and 
primary energy ranges from 2.15 to 2.5 to 3.4 GJ / t cement for produc-
tion of blast furnace slag, fly ash, and Portland cement, respectively 
(Worrell et  al., 2008b). Klee et  al. (2011) shows that CO2 emissions 
intensities have declined in most regions of the world, with a 2009 
global average intensity (excluding emissions from the use of alterna-
tive fuels) of 633 kg CO2 per tonne of cementitious product, a decline 
of 6 % since 2005 and 16 % since 1990. Many options still exist to 
improve the energy efficiency of cement manufacturing (Muller and 






Emissions efficiency and fuel switching: The majority of cement kilns 
burn coal (IEA / WBCSD, 2009), but fossil or biomass wastes can also be 
burned. While these alternatives have a lower CO2 intensity depend-
ing on their exact composition (Sathaye et al., 2011) and can result in 
reduced overall CO2 emissions from the cement industry (CEMBUREAU, 
2009), their use can also increase overall energy use per tonne of clin-
ker produced if the fuels require pre-treatment such as drying (Hand, 
2007). Waste fuels have been used in cement production for the past 
20 years in Europe, Japan, the United States, and Canada (GTZ / Holcim, 
2006; Genon and Brizio, 2008); the Netherlands and Switzerland use 
83 % and 48 % waste, respectively, as a cement fuel (WBCSD, 2005). It 
is important that wastes are burned in accordance with strict environ-
mental guidelines as emissions resulting from such wastes can cause 
adverse environmental impacts such as extremely high concentrations 
of particulates in ambient air, ground-level ozone, acid rain, and water 
quality deterioration (Karstensen, 2007)8. 
Cement kilns can be fitted to harvest CO2, which could then be stored, 
but this has yet to be piloted and “commercial-scale CCS in the cement 
industry is still far from deployment” (Naranjo et al., 2011). CCS poten-
tial in the cement sector has been investigated in several recent stud-
ies: IEAGHG, 2008; Barker et al., 2009; Croezen and Korteland, 2010; 
Bosoaga et  al., 2009. A number of emerging technologies aim to 
reduce emissions and energy use in cement production (Hasanbeigi 
et  al., 2012b), but there are regulatory, supply chain, product confi-
dence and technical barriers to be overcome before such technologies 
(such as geopolymer cement) could be widely adopted (Van Deventer 
et al., 2012).
Material efficiency: Almost all cement is used in concrete to construct 
buildings and infrastructure (van Oss and Padovani, 2002). For con-
crete, which is formed by mixing cement, water, sand, and aggregates, 
two applicable material efficiency strategies are: using less cement 
initially and reusing concrete components at end of first product life 
(distinct from down-cycling of concrete into aggregate which is widely 
applied). Less cement can be used by placing concrete only where 
necessary, for example Orr et al. (2010) use curved fabric moulds to 
reduce concrete mass by 40 % compared with a standard, prismatic 
shape. By using higher-strength concrete, less material is needed; CO2 
savings of 40 % have been reported on specific projects using ‘ultra-
high-strength’ concretes (Muller and Harnish, 2008). Portland cement 
comprises 95 % clinker and 5 % gypsum, but cement can be produced 
with lower ratios of clinker through use of additives such as blast fur-
nace slag, fly ash from power plants, limestone, and natural or artifi-
cial pozzolans. The weighted average clinker-to-cement ratio for the 
companies participating in the WBCSD GNR project was 76 % in 2009 
(WBCSD, 2011). In China, this ratio was 63 % in 2010 (NDRC, 2011a). 
In India the ratio is 80 % but computer optimization is improving this 
(India Planning Commission, 2007). Reusing continuous concrete ele-
ments is difficult because it requires elements to be broken up but 
8 See also: http: / / www2. epa. gov / enforcement / cement-manufacturing-enforce 
ment-initiative
remain undamaged. Concrete blocks can be reused, as masonry blocks 
and bricks are reused already, but to date there is little published lit-
erature in this area. 
Reduced product and service demand: Cement, in concrete, is used in 
the construction of buildings and infrastructure. Reducing demand for 
these products can be achieved by extending their lifespans or using 
them more intensely. Buildings and infrastructure have lifetimes less 
than 80 years — less than 40 years in East Asia — (Hatayama et  al., 
2010), however their core structural elements (those that drive demand 
for concrete) could last over 200 years if well maintained. Reduced 
demand for building and infrastructure services could be achieved by 
human settlement design, increasing the number of people living and 
working in each building, or decreasing per-capita demand for utilities 
(water, electricity, waste), but has as yet had little attention.
10�4�3 Chemicals (plastics / fertilizers / others) 
The chemicals industry produces a wide range of different products on 
scales ranging over several orders of magnitude. This results in meth-
odological and data collection challenges, in contrast to other sectors 
such as iron and steel or cement (Saygin et al., 2011a). However, emis-
sions in this sector are dominated by a relatively small number of key 
outputs: ethylene, ammonia, nitric acid, adipic acid and caprolactam 
used in producing plastics, fertilizer, and synthetic fibres. Emissions 
arise both from the use of energy in production and from the venting 
of by-products from the chemical processes. The synthesis of chlorine 
in chlor-alkali electrolysis is responsible for about 40 % of the electric-
ity demand of the chemical industry.
Energy efficiency: Steam cracking for the production of light olefins, 
such as ethylene and propylene, is the most energy consuming process 
in the chemical industry, and the pyrolysis section of steam cracking 
consumes about 65 % of the total process energy (Ren et al., 2006). 
Upgrading all steam cracking plants to best practice technology could 
reduce energy intensity by 23 % (Saygin et al., 2011a; b) with a fur-
ther 12 % saving possible with best available technology. Switching 
to a biomass-based route to avoid steam cracking could reduce CO2 
intensity (Ren and Patel, 2009) but at the cost of higher energy use, 
and with high land-use requirements. Fertilizer production accounts 
for around 1.2 % of world energy consumption (IFA, 2009), mostly 
to produce ammonia (NH3). 22 % energy savings are possible (Say-
gin et al., 2011b) by upgrading all plants to best practice technology. 
Nitrous oxide (N2O) is emitted during production of adipic and nitric 
acids. By 2020 annual emissions from these industries are estimated 
to be 125 MtCO2eq (EPA, 2012a). Many options exist to reduce emis-
sions, depending on plant operating conditions (Reimer et al., 2000). 
A broad survey of options in the petrochemicals industry is given by 
Neelis et al. (2008). Plastics recycling saves energy, but to produce a 
high value recycled material, a relatively pure waste stream is required: 
impurities greatly degrade the properties of the recycled material. 





erally have a lower value than virgin material. A theoretical estimate 
suggest that increasing use of combined heat and power plants in the 
chemical and petrochemical sector from current levels of 10 to 25 % 
up to 100 % would result in energy savings up to 2 EJ for the activity 
level in 2006 (IEA, 2009e).
Emissions efficiency: There are limited opportunities for innovation 
in the current process of ammonia production via the Haber-Bosch 
process (Erisman et  al., 2008). Possible improvements relate to the 
introduction of new N2O emission reduction technologies in nitric 
acid production such as high-temperature catalytic N2O decomposi-
tion (Melián-Cabrera et  al., 2004) which has been shown to reduce 
N2O emissions by up to 70 – 90 % (BIS Production Partner, 2012; Yara, 
2012). While implementation of this technology has been largely 
completed in regions pursuing carbon emission reduction (e. g., the 
EU through the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) or China and other 
developing countries through Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), 
the implementation of this technology still offers large mitigation 
potential in other regions like the former Soviet Union and the United 
States (Kollmus and Lazarus, 2010). Fuel switching can also lead to 
significant emission reductions and energy savings. For example, natu-
ral gas based ammonia production results in 36 % emission reductions 
compared to naphtha, 47 % compared to fuel oil and 58 % compared 
to coal. The total potential mitigation arising from this fuel switch-
ing would amount to 27 MtCO2eq / year GHG emissions savings (IFA, 
2009). 
Material efficiency: Many of the material efficiency measures identi-
fied above can be applied to the use of plastics, but this has had little 
attention to date, although Hekkert et al. (2000) anticipate a potential 
51 % saving in emissions associated with the use of plastic packaging 
in the Netherlands from application of a number of material efficiency 
strategies. More efficient use of fertilizer gives benefits both in reduced 
direct emissions of N2O from the fertilizer itself and from reduced fertil-
izer production (Smith et al., 2008). 
10�4�4 Pulp and paper 
Global paper production has increased steadily during the last three 
decades (except for a minor production decline associated with the 
2008 financial crisis) (FAO, 2013), with global demand expansion cur-
rently driven by developing nations. Fuel and energy use are the main 
sources of GHG emissions during the forestry, pulping, and manufac-
turing stages of paper production.
Energy efficiency: A broad range of energy efficiency technologies are 
available for this sector, reviewed by Kramer et al. (2009), and Laurijs-
sen et al. (2012). Over half the energy used in paper making is to create 
heat for drying paper after it has been laid and Laurijssen et al. (2010) 
estimate that this could be reduced by ~32 % by the use of additives, 
an increased dew point, and improved heat recovery. Energy savings 
may also be obtained from emerging technologies (Jacobs and IPST, 
2006; Worrell et al., 2008b; Kong et al., 2012) such as black liquor gas-
ification, which uses the by-product of the chemical pulping process 
to increase the energy efficiency of pulp and paper mills (Naqvi et al., 
2010). With commercial maturity expected within the next decade 
(Eriksson and Harvey, 2004), black liquor gasification can be used as 
a waste-to-energy method with the potential to achieve higher over-
all energy efficiency (38 % for electricity generation) than the conven-
tional recovery boiler (9 – 14 % efficiency) while generating an energy-
rich syngas from the liquor (Naqvi et al., 2010). The syngas can also be 
utilized as a feedstock for production of renewable motor fuels such 
as bio-methanol, dimethyl ether, and FT-diesel or hydrogen (Pettersson 
and Harvey, 2012). Gasification combined cycle systems have poten-
tial disadvantages (Kramer et al., 2009), including high energy invest-
ments to concentrate sufficient black liquor solids and higher lime kiln 
and causticizer loads compared to Tomlinson systems. Paper recycling 
generally saves energy and may reduce emissions (although electric-
ity in some primary paper making is derived from biomass-powered 
CHP plants) and rates can be increased (Laurijssen et al., 2010b). Paper 
recycling is also important as competition for biomass will increase 
with population growth and increased use of biomass for fuel.
Emissions efficiency: Direct CO2 emissions from European pulp and 
paper production reduced from 0.57 to 0.34 ktCO2 per kt of paper 
between 1990 and 2011, while indirect emissions reduced from 0.21 
to 0.09 ktCO2 per kt of paper (CEPI, 2012). Combined heat and power 
(CHP) accounted for 95 % of total on-site electricity produced by EU 
paper makers in 2011, compared to 88 % in 1990 (CEPI, 2012), so has 
little further potential in Europe, but may offer opportunities glob-
ally. The global pulp and paper industry usually has ready access to 
biomass resources and it generates approximately a third of its own 
energy needs from biomass (IEA, 2009c), 53 % in the EU (CEPI, 2012). 
Paper recycling can have a positive impact on energy intensity and CO2 
emissions over the total lifecycle of paper production (Miner, 2010; 
Laurijssen et al., 2010). Recycling rates in Europe and North America 
reached 70 % and 67 % in 2011, respectively9 (CEPI, 2012), leaving a 
small range for improvement when considering the limit of 81 % esti-
mated by CEPI (2006). In Europe, the share of recovered paper used 
in paper manufacturing has increased from roughly 33 % in 1991 to 
around 44 % in 2009 (CEPI, 2012). GHG fluxes from forestry are dis-
cussed in Section 11.2.3.
Material efficiency: Higher material efficiency could be achieved 
through increased use of duplex printing, print on demand, improved 
recycling yields and the manufacturing of lighter paper. Recycling yields 
could be improved by the design of easy to remove inks and adhesives 
and less harmful de-inking chemicals; paper weights for newspapers 
and office paper could be reduced from 45 and 80 g / m2 to 42 and 70 
g / m2 respectively and might lead to a 37 % saving in paper used for 
current service levels (Van den Reek, 1999; Hekkert et al., 2002). 
9 American Forest and Paper Association, Paper Recycles — Statistics — Paper & 






Reduced demand: Opportunities to reduce demand for paper prod-
ucts in the future include printing on demand, removing print to allow 
paper re-use (Leal-Ayala et  al., 2012), and substituting e-readers for 
paper. The latter has been the subject of substantial academic research 
(e. g., Gard and Keoleian, 2002; Reichart and Hischier, 2003) although 
the substitution of electronic media for paper has mixed environmental 
outcomes, with no clear statistics yet on whether such media reduces 
paper demand, or whether it leads to a net reduction in emissions.
10�4�5 Non-ferrous (aluminium / others) 
Annual production of non-ferrous metals is small compared to steel, 
and is dominated by aluminium, with 56 Mt made globally in 2009, of 
which 18 Mt was through secondary (recycled) production. Production 
is expected to rise to 97 Mt by 2020 (IAI, 2009). Magnesium is also 
significant, but with global primary production of only 653 Kt in 2009 
(IMA, 2009), is dwarfed by aluminium.
Energy efficiency: Aluminium production is particularly associated with 
high electricity demand. Indirect (electricity-related) emissions account 
for over 80 % of total GHG emissions in aluminium production. The 
sector accounts for 3.5 % of global electricity consumption (IEA 2008) 
and energy accounts for nearly 40 % of aluminium production costs. 
Aluminium can be made from raw materials (bauxite) or through 
recycling. Best practice primary aluminium production — from alu-
mina production through ingot casting — consumes 174 GJ / t primary 
energy (accounting for electricity production, transmission, distribu-
tion losses) and 70.6 GJ / t final energy (Worrell et  al., 2008b). Best 
practice for electrolysis — which consumes roughly 85 % of the energy 
used for production of primary aluminium — is about 47 GJ / t final 
energy while the theoretical energy requirement is 22 GJ / t final energy 
(BCS Inc., 2007). Best practice for recycled aluminium production is 7.6 
GJ / t primary energy and 2.5 GJ / t final energy (Worrell et al., 2008b), 
although in reality, recycling uses much more energy due to pre-pro-
cessing of scrap, ‘sweetening’ with virgin aluminium and downstream 
processing after casting. The U. S. aluminium industry consumes 
almost three times the theoretical minimum energy level (BCS Inc., 
2007). The options for new process development in aluminium pro-
duction — multipolar electrolysis cells, inert anodes and carbothermic 
reactions — have not yet reached commercial scale (IEA, 2012d). The 
IEA estimates that application of best available technology can reduce 
energy use for aluminium production by about 10 % compared with 
current levels (IEA, 2012d). 
At present, post-consumer scrap makes up only 20 % of total alu-
minium recycling (Cullen and Allwood, 2013), which is dominated by 
internal ‘home’ or ‘new’ scrap (see Figure 10.2). As per capita stock 
levels saturate in the 21st century, there could be a shift from primary 
to secondary aluminium production (Liu et al., 2012a) if recycling rates 
can be increased, and the accumulation of different alloying elements 
in the scrap stream can be controlled. These challenges will require 
improved end of life management and even new technologies for sep-
arating the different alloys (Liu et al., 2012a).
Emissions efficiency: Data on emissions intensities for a range of non-
ferrous metals are given by (Sjardin, 2003). The aluminium industry 
alone contributed 3 % of CO2 emissions from industry in 2006 (Allwood 
et al., 2010). In addition to CO2 emissions resulting from electrode and 
reductant use, the production of non-ferrous metals can result in the 
emission of high-global warming potential (GWP) GHGs, for example 
PFCs (such as CF4) in aluminium or SF6 in magnesium. PFCs result from 
carbon in the anode and fluorine in the cryolite. The reaction can be 
minimized by controlling the process to prevent a drop in alumina con-
centrations, which triggers the process10. 
Material efficiency: For aluminium, there are significant carbon abate-
ment opportunities in the area of material efficiency and demand 
reduction. From liquid aluminium to final product, the yield in form-
ing and fabrication is only 59 %, which could be improved by near-net 
shape casting and blanking and stamping process innovation (Milford 
et  al., 2011). For chip scrap produced from machining operations (in 
aluminium, for example (Tekkaya et al., 2009), or magnesium (Wu et al., 
2010)) extrusion, processes are being developed to bond scrap in the 
solid state to form a relatively high quality product potentially offering 
energy savings of up to 95 % compared to re-melting. Aluminium build-
ing components (window frames, curtain walls, and cladding) could be 
reused when a building is demolished (Cooper and Allwood, 2012) and 
more modular product designs would allow longer product lives and 
an overall reduction in demand for new materials (Cooper et al., 2012).
10�4�6 Food processing
The food industry as discussed in this chapter includes all process-
ing beyond the farm gate, while everything before is in the agricul-
ture industry and discussed in Chapter 11. In the developed world, 
the emissions released beyond the farm gate are approximately equal 
to those released before. Garnett (2011) suggests that provision of 
human food drives around 17.7 GtCO2eq in total.
Energy efficiency: The three largest uses of energy in the food industry 
in the United States are animal slaughtering and processing, wet corn 
milling, and fruit and vegetable preservation, accounting for 19 %, 
15 %, and 14 % of total use, respectively (US EIA, 2009). Increased use 
of heat exchanger networks or heat pumps (Fritzson and Berntsson, 
2006; Sakamoto et  al., 2011), combined heat and power, mechani-
cal dewatering compared to rotary drying (Masanet et al., 2008), and 
thermal and mechanical vapour recompression in evaporation further 
enhanced by use of reverse osmosis can deliver energy use efficiency. 
Many of these technologies could also be used in cooking and drying 
in other parts of the food industry. Savings in energy for refrigeration 






could be made with better insulation and reduced ventilation in fridges 
and freezers. Dairy processing is also among the most energy- and 
carbon-intensive activities within the global food production industry, 
with estimated annual emissions of over 128 MtCO2 (Xu and Flapper, 
2009, 2011). Within dairy processing, cheese production is the most 
energy intensive sector (Xu et  al., 2009). Ramirez and Block (2006) 
report that EU dairy operations, having improved in the 1980s and 
1990s, are now reaching a plateau of energy intensity, but Brush et al. 
(2011) provide a survey of best practice opportunities for energy effi-
ciency in dairy operations.
Emissions efficiency: The most cost effective reduction in CO2 emis-
sions from food production is by switching from heavy fuel oil to nat-
ural gas. Other ways of improving emissions efficiency involve using 
lower-emission modes of transport (Garnett, 2011). In transporting 
food, there is a tradeoff between local sourcing and producing the 
food in areas where there are other environmental benefits (Sim et al., 
2007; Edwards-Jones et al., 2008). Landfill emissions associated with 
food waste could be reduced by use of anaerobic digestion processes 
(Woods et al., 2010). 
Demand reduction: Overall demand for food could be reduced without 
sacrificing well-being (GEA, 2012). Up to one-third of food produced 
for human consumption is wasted in either in the production / retail-
ing stage, or by consumers (Gunders (2012) estimates 40 % waste in 
the United States). Gustavsonn et al. (2011) suggest that, in developed 
countries, consumer behaviour could be changed, and ‘best-before-
dates’ reviewed. Increasing cooling demand, the globalization of the 
food system with corresponding transport distances, and the growing 
importance of processed convenience food are also important drivers 
(GEA, 2012). Globally, approximately 1.5 billion out of 5 billion people 
over the age of 20 are overweight and 500 million are obese (Bed-
dington et al., 2011). Demand for high-emission food such as meat and 
dairy products could be replaced by demand for other, lower-emission 
foods. Meat and dairy products contribute to half of the emissions from 
food (when the emissions from the up-stream processes are included) 
according to Garnett (2009), while Stehfest et al. (2009) puts the figure 
at 18 % of global GHG emissions, and Wirsenius (2003) estimates that 
two-thirds of food-related phytomass is consumed by animals, which 
provide just 13 % of the gross energy of human diets. Furthermore, 
demand is set to double by 2050, as developing nations grow wealth-
ier and eat more meat and dairy foods (Stehfest et al., 2009; Garnett, 
2009). In order to maintain a constant total demand for meat and 
dairy, Garnett (2009) suggests that by 2050 average per capita con-
sumption should be around 0.5 kg meat and 1 litre of milk per week, 
which is around the current averages in the developing world today.
10�4�7 Textiles and leather
In 2009, textiles and leather manufacturing consumed 2.15 EJ final 
energy globally. Global consumption is dominated by Asia, which 
was responsible for 65 % of total world energy use for textiles and 
leather manufacturing in 2009. In the United States, about 45 % of 
the final energy used for textile mills is natural gas, about 35 % is net 
electricity (site), and 14 % coal (US EIA, 2009). In China, final energy 
consumption for textiles production is dominated by coal (39 %) and 
site electricity (38 %) (NBS, 2012). In the US textile industry, motor 
driven systems and steam systems dominate energy end uses. Around 
36 % of the energy input to the US textile industry is lost onsite, 
with motor driven systems responsible for 13 %, followed by energy 
distribution and boiler losses of 8 % and 7 %, respectively (US DoE, 
2004b). 
Energy and emissions efficiency: Numerous energy efficiency tech-
nologies and measures exist that are applicable to the textile indus-
try (CIPEC, 2007; Hasanbeigi and Price, 2012). For Taiwan, Province of 
China, Hong et al. (2010) report energy savings of about 1 % in tex-
tile industry following the adoption of energy-saving measures in 303 
firms (less than 10 % of the total number of local textile firms in 2005) 
(Chen Chiu, 2009). In India, CO2 emissions reductions of at least 13 % 
were calculated based on implementation of operations and mainte-
nance improvements, fuel switching, and adoption of five energy-effi-
cient technologies (Velavan et al., 2009).
Demand reduction: see Box 10.2. 
10�4�8 Mining
Energy efficiency: The energy requirements of mining are dominated 
by grinding (comminution) and the use of diesel-powered material 
handling equipment (US DoE, 2007; Haque and Norgate, 2013). The 
major area of energy usage — up to 40 % of the total — is in elec-
tricity for comminution (Smith, 2012). Underground mining requires 
more energy than surface mining due to greater requirements for 
hauling, ventilation, water pumping, and other operations (US DoE, 
2007). Strategies for GHG mitigation are diverse. An overall scheme 
to reduce energy consumption is the implementation of strategies 
that upgrade the ore body concentration before crushing and grind-
ing, through resource characterization by geo-metallurgical data and 
methods (Bye, 2005, 2007, 2011; CRC ORE, 2011; Smith, 2012). Selec-
tive blast design, combined with ore sorting and gangue rejection, 
significantly improve the grade of ore being fed to the crusher and 
grinding mill, by as much as 2.5 fold. This leads to large reductions of 
energy usage compared to business-as-usual (CRC ORE, 2011; Smith, 
2012). 
There is also a significant potential to save energy in comminution 
through the following options: more crushing, less grinding, using 
more energy-efficient crushing technologies, removing minerals and 
gangue from the crushing stage, optimizing the particle size feed for 
grinding mills from crushing mills, selecting target product size(s) at 
each stage of the circuit, using advanced flexible comminution circuits, 
using more efficient grinding equipment, and by improving the design 





Other important energy savings opportunities are in the following areas: 
a) separation processes — mixers, agitators and froth flotation cells, b) 
drying and dewatering in mineral processing, c) materials movement, d) 
air ventilation and conditioning opportunities, e) processing site energy 
demand management and waste heat recovery options, f) technology 
specific for lighting, motors, pumps and fans and air compressor sys-
tems, and g) improvement in energy efficiency of product transport 
from mine site to port (Rathmann, 2007; Raaz and Mentges, 2009; Dan-
iel et al., 2010; Norgate and Haque, 2010; DRET, 2011; Smith, 2012). 
Recycling represents an important source of world’s metal supply and 
it can be increased as a means of waste reduction (see Section 10.14) 
and thus energy saving in metals production. In recent years, around 
36 % of world’s gold supply was from recycled scrap (WGC, 2011), 
25 % of silver (SI and GFMS, 2013), and 35 % of copper (ICSG, 2012).
Emissions efficiency: Substitution of onsite fossil fuel electricity gener-
ators with renewable energy is an important mitigation strategy. Cost 
effectiveness depends on the characteristics of each site (Evans & Peck, 
2011; Smith, 2012).
Material efficiency: In the extraction of metal ores, one of the greatest 
challenges for energy efficiency enhancement is that of the recovery 
ratio, which refers to the percentage of valuable ore within the total 
mine material. Lower grades inevitably require greater amounts of 
material to be moved per unit of product. The recovery ratio for metals 
averages about 4.5 % (US DoE, 2007). The ‘grade’ of recyclable materi-
als is often greater than the one of ores being currently mined; for 
this reason, advancing recycling for mineral commodities would bring 
improvements in the overall energy efficiency (IIED, 2002).
10.5 Infrastructure and 
 systemic perspectives
Improved understanding of interactions among different industries, 
and between industry and other economic sectors, is becoming more 
important in a mitigation and sustainable development context. Strat-
egies adopted in other sectors may lead to increased (or decreased) 
emissions from the industry sector. Collaborative activities within and 
across the sector may enhance the outcome of climate change miti-
gation. Initiatives to adopt a system-wide view face a barrier as cur-
rently practiced system boundaries often pose a challenge. A systemic 
approach can be at different levels, namely, at the micro-level (within 
a single company, such as process integration and cleaner production), 
the meso-level (between three or more companies, such as eco-indus-
trial parks) and the macro-level (cross-sectoral cooperation, such as 
urban symbiosis or regional eco-industrial network). Systemic collab-
orative activities can reduce the total consumption of materials and 
energy and can contribute to the reduction of GHG emissions. The rest 
of this section focuses mainly on the meso- and macro-levels as micro-
level options have already been covered in Section 10.4.
10�5�1 Industrial clusters and parks 
( meso-level)
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) often suffer not only from dif-
ficulties arising due to their size and lack of access to information, but 
also from being isolated while in operation (Sengenberger and Pyke, 
1992). Clustering of SMEs usually in the form of industrial parks can 
facilitate growth and competitiveness (Schmitz, 1995). In terms of 
implementation of mitigation options, SMEs in clusters / parks can bene-
fit from by-products exchange (including waste heat) and infrastructure 
sharing, as well as joint purchase (e. g., of energy efficient technolo-
gies). Cooperation in eco-industrial parks (EIPs) reduces the cumulative 
environmental impact of the whole industrial park (Geng and Dober-
stein, 2008). Such an initiative reduces the total consumption of virgin 
materials and final waste and improves the efficiency of companies and 
their competitiveness. Since the extraction and transformation of virgin 
materials is usually energy intensive, EIP efforts can abate industrial 
GHG emissions. For example, in order to encourage target-oriented 
cooperation, Chinese ‘eco-industrial park standards’ contain quantita-
tive indicators for material reduction and recycling, as well as pollu-
tion control (Geng et al., 2009). Two pioneering eco-industrial parks in 
China achieved over 80 % solid waste reuse ratio and over 82 % indus-
trial water reuse ratio during 2002 – 2005 (Geng et al., 2008). The Japa-
nese eco-town project in Kawasaki achieved substitution of 513,000 
tonnes of raw material, resulting in the avoidance of 1 % of the current 
total landfill in Japan during 1997 – 2006 (van Berkel et al., 2009).
In order to encourage industrial symbiosis11 at the industrial cluster 
level, different kinds of technical infrastructure (e. g., pipelines) as well 
as non-technical infrastructure (e. g., information exchange platforms) 
are necessary so that both material and energy use can be optimized 
(Côté and Hall, 1995). Although additional investment for infrastruc-
ture building is unavoidable, such an investment can bring both eco-
nomic and environmental benefits. In India there have been several 
instances where the government has taken proactive approaches to 
provide land and infrastructure, access to water, non-conventional 
(MSW-based) power to private sector industries (such as chemicals, 
textile, paper, pharmaceutical companies, cement) operating in clusters 
(IBEF, 2013). A case study in the Tianjin Economic Development Area in 
northern China indicates that the application of an integrated water 
optimization model (e. g., reuse of treated wastewater by other firms) 
can reduce the total water related costs by 10.4 %, fresh water con-
sumption by 16.9 % and wastewater discharge by 45.6 % (Geng et al., 
2007). As an additional consequence, due to the strong energy-water 
nexus, energy use and release of GHG emissions related to fresh water 
provision or wastewater treatment can be reduced.
11 Note that industrial symbiosis is further covered in Chapter 4 (Sustainable Devel-





10�5�2 Cross-sectoral cooperation (macro-level)
Besides inter-industry cooperation, opportunities arise from the geo-
graphic proximity of urban and industrial areas, leading to transfer 
of urban refuse as a resource to industrial applications, and vice 
versa (Geng et  al., 2010a). For instance, the cement industry can 
accept as their inputs not only virgin materials such as limestone 
and coal, but also various wastes / industrial by-products (see Sec-
tion 10.4), thus contributing up to 15 – 20 % CO2 emission reduction 
(Morimoto et al., 2006; Hashimoto et al., 2010). In Northern Europe 
(e. g., Sweden, Finland, and Denmark), for example, both exhaust 
heat from industries and heat generated from burning municipal 
wastes are supplied to local municipal users through district heat-
ing (Holmgren and Gebremedhin, 2004). Industrial waste can also 
be used to reduce conventional fuel demand in other sectors. For 
example, the European bio-DME project12 aims to supply heavy-duty 
trucks and industry with dimethyl-ether fuel made from black liquor 
produced by the pulp industry. However, careful design of regional 
recycling networks has to be undertaken because different types of 
waste have different characteristics and optimal collection and recy-
cling boundaries and therefore need different infrastructure support 
(Chen et al., 2012). 
The reuse of materials recovered from urban infrastructures can reduce 
the demand for primary products (e. g., ore) and thus contribute to cli-
mate change mitigation in extractive industries (Klinglmair and Fellner, 
2010). So far, reuse of specific materials is only partly established and 
the potential for future urban mining is growing as the urban stock 
of materials still increases. While in the 2011 fiscal year in Japan only 
5.79 Mt of steel scrap came from the building sector, 13.6 Mt were 
consumed by the building sector. In total, urban stock of steel is esti-
mated to be 1.33 Gt in Japan where the total annual crude steel pro-
duction was 0.106 Gt (NSSMC, 2013). 
10�5�3 Cross-sectoral implications of mitigation 
efforts
Currently much attention is focused on improving energy efficiency 
within the industry sector (Yeo and Gabbai, 2011). However, many mit-
igation strategies adopted in other sectors significantly affect activities 
of the industrial sector and industry-related GHG emissions. For exam-
ple, consumer preference for lightweight cars can incentivize material 
substitution for car manufacturing (e. g., potential lightweight materi-
als: see Chapter 8), growing demand for rechargeable vehicle batter-
ies (see Chapter 8) and the demand for new materials (e. g., innovative 
building structures or thermal insulation for buildings: see Chapter 
9; high-temperature steel demand by power plants: see Chapter 7). 
These materials or products consume energy at the time of manufac-
turing, so changes outside the industry sector that lead to changes in 
12 Production of DME from biomass and utilization of fuel for transport and industrial 
use. Project website at: http: / / www. biodme. eu.
demand for energy-saving products within the industry sector can be 
observed over a long period of time (ICCA, 2009). Thus, for a careful 
assessment of mitigation options, a lifecycle perspective is needed so 
that a holistic emission picture (including embodied emissions) can be 
presented. For instance, the increase in GHG emissions from increased 
aluminium production could under specific circumstances be larger 
than the GHG savings from vehicle weight reduction (Geyer, 2008). 
Kim et al. (2010) have, however, indicated that in about two decades, 
closed-loop recycling can significantly reduce the impacts of alumin-
ium-intensive vehicles. 
Increasing demand on end-use related mitigation technologies could 
contribute to potential material shortages. Moss et al. (2011) exam-
ined market and political risks for 14 metals that are used in signifi-
cant quantities in the technologies of the EU’s Strategic Energy Tech-
nology Plan (SET Plan) so that metal requirements and associated 
bottlenecks in green technologies, such as electric vehicles, low-car-
bon lighting, electricity storage and fuel cells and hydrogen, can be 
recognized.
Following a systemic perspective enables the identification of unex-
pected outcomes and even potential conflicts between different tar-
gets when implementing mitigation options. For example, the quality 
of many recycled metals is maintained solely through the addition of 
pure primary materials (Verhoef et al., 2004), thus perpetuating the use 
of these materials and creating a challenge for the set up of closed 
loop recycling (e. g., automotive aluminium; Kim et al., 2011). Addition-
ally, due to product retention (the period of use) and growing demand, 
secondary materials needed for recycling are limited.
10.6 Climate change feed-
back and interaction 
with adaptation 
There is currently a distinct lack of knowledge on how climate change 
feedbacks may impact mitigation options and potentials as well as 
costs in industry13.
Insights into potential synergy effects (how adaptation options 
could reduce emissions in industry) or tradeoffs (how adaptation 
options could lead to additional emissions in industry) are also 
lacking. However, it can be expected that many adaptation options 
will generate additional industrial product demand and will lead 
to additional emissions in the sector. Improving flood defence, for 
example, in response to sea level rise may lead to a growing demand 
13 There is limited literature on the impacts of climate change on industry (e. g., avail-
ability of water for the food industry and in general for cooling and processing in 





for materials for embankment and similar infrastructure. Manufac-
turers of textile products, machinery for agriculture or construction, 
and heating / cooling equipment may be affected by changing prod-
uct requirements in both number and quality due to climate change. 
There is as yet no comprehensive assessment of these effects, nor 
any estimate on market effects resulting from changes in demand 
for products. 
10.7 Costs and potentials
The six main categories of mitigation options discussed in Section 
10.4 for manufacturing industries can deliver GHG emission reduction 
benefits at varying levels and at varying costs over varying time peri-
ods across subsectors and countries. There is not much comparable, 
comprehensive, detailed quantitative information and literature on 
costs and potentials associated with each of the mitigation options. 
Available mitigation potential assessments (e. g., UNIDO, 2011; IEA, 
2012d) are not always supplemented by cost estimates. Also, available 
cost estimates (e. g., McKinsey&Company, 2009; Akashi et al., 2011) 
are not always comparable across studies due to differences in the 
treatment of costs and energy price estimates across regions. There 
are many mitigation potential assessments for individual industries 
(examples are included in Section 10.4) with varying time horizons; 
some studies report the mitigation potential of energy efficiency mea-
sures with associated initial investment costs which do not account 
for the full life time energy cost savings benefits of investments, while 
other studies report marginal abatement costs (MACs) based on 
selected technological options. Many sector- or system-specific miti-
gation potential studies use the concept of cost of conserved energy 
(CCE) that accounts for annualized initial investment costs, operation 
and maintenance (O&M) costs, and energy savings using either social 
or private discount rates (Hasanbeigi et al., 2010b). Those mitigation 
options with a CCE below the unit cost of energy are referred to as 
‘cost-effective’. Some studies (e. g., McKinsey&Company, 2009) iden-
tify ‘negative abatement costs’ by including the energy cost savings in 
the abatement cost calculation. 
The sections below provide an assessment of option-specific poten-
tial and associated cost estimates using information available in 
the literature (including underlying databases used by some of such 
studies) and expert judgement (see Annex  III, Technology-specific 
cost and performance parameters) and distinguish mitigation of CO2 
and non-CO2 emissions. Generally, the assessment of costs is rela-
tively more uncertain but some indicative results convey information 
about the wide cost range (costs per tonne of CO2 reduction) within 
which various options can deliver GHG reduction benefit. The inclu-
sion of additional multiple benefits of mitigation measures might 
change the cost-effectiveness of a technology completely, but are 
not included in this section. Co-benefits are discussed in Section 
10.8. 
10�7�1 CO2 emissions
Quantitative assessments of CO2 emission reduction potential for 
the industrial sector explored in this section are mainly based on: (1) 
studies with a global scope (e. g., IEA, UNIDO), (2) MAC studies and 
(3) various information sources on available technology at industrial 
units along with plant level and country specific data. IEA estimates 
a global mitigation potential for the overall industry sector of 5.5 to 
7.5 GtCO2 for the year 2050 (IEA, 2012d)14. The IEA report (2012d) 
shows a range of 50 % reduction in four key sectors (iron and steel, 
cement, chemicals, and paper) and in the range of 20 % for the alu-
minium sector. From a regional perspective, China and India comprise 
44 % of this potential. In terms of how different options contribute to 
industry mitigation potential, with regard to CO2 emissions reduction 
compared with 2007 values, the IEA (2009c) shows implementation of 
end use fuel efficiency can achieve 40 %, fuel and feedstock switch-
ing can achieve 21 %, recycling and energy recovery can achieve 9 %, 
and CCS can achieve 30 %. McKinsey (2009) provides a global mitiga-
tion potential estimate for the overall industry sector of 6.9 GtCO2 for 
2030. The potential is found to be the largest for iron and steel, fol-
lowed by chemicals and cement at 2.4, 1.9 and 1.0 GtCO2 for the year 
2030, respectively (McKinsey&Company, 2010). The United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) analyzed the poten-
tial of energy savings based on universal application of best avail-
able technologies. All the potential mitigation values are higher in 
developing countries (30 to 35 %) compared with developed countries 
(15 %) (UNIDO, 2011).
Other studies addressing the industrial sector as a whole found 
potential for future improvements in energy intensity of industrial 
production to be in the range of up to 25 % of current global indus-
trial final energy consumption per unit output (Schäfer, 2005; Allwood 
et al., 2010; UNIDO, 2011; Saygin et al., 2011b; Gutowski et al., 2013) 
(see Section 10.4). Additional savings can be realized in the future 
through adoption of emerging technologies currently under devel-
opment or that have not yet been fully commercialized (Kong et al., 
2012; Hasanbeigi et al., 2012b, 2013a). Examples of industries from 
India show that specific energy consumption is steadily declining in 
all energy intensive sectors (Roy et al., 2013), and a wide variety of 
measures at varying costs have been adopted by the energy intensive 
industries (Figure 10.6). However, all sectors still have energy savings 
potential when compared to world best practice (Dasgupta et  al., 
2012). 
Bottom-up country analyses provide energy savings estimates for 
specific industrial sub-sectors based on individual energy efficiency 
technologies and measures. Because results vary among studies, these 
estimates should not be considered as the upper bound of energy sav-
ing potential but rather should give an orientation about the general 
possibilities. 
14 Expressed here in the form of a deployment potential (difference between the 6 °C 





In the cement sector, global weighted average thermal energy inten-
sity could drop to 3.2 GJ / t clinker and electric energy intensity to 90 
kWh / t cement by 2050 (IEA / WBCSD, 2009). Emissions of 510 MtCO2 
would be saved if all current cement kilns used best available technol-
ogy and increased use of clinker substitutes (IEA, 2009c). Oda et al. 
(2012) found large differences in regional thermal energy consump-
tion for cement manufacture, with the least efficient region consum-
ing 75 % more energy than the best in 2005. Even though process-
ing alternative fuels requires additional electricity consumption (Oda 
et  al., 2012), their use could reduce cement sector emissions by 
0.16 GtCO2eq per year by 2030 (Vattenfall, 2007) although increasing 
costs may in due course limit uptake (IEA / WBCSD, 2009). Implement-
ing commercial-scale CCS in the cement industry could contribute to 
climate change mitigation, but would increase cement production 
costs by 40 – 90 % (IEAGHG, 2008). From the cumulative energy sav-
ings potential for China’s cement industry (2010 to 2030), 90 % is 
assessed as cost-effective using a discount rate of 15 % (Hasanbeigi 
et al., 2012a). Electricity and fuel savings of 6 and 1.5 times the total 
electricity and fuel use in the Indian cement industry in 2010, respec-
tively, can be realized for the period 2010 – 2030, almost all of which 
is assessed as cost-effective using a discount rate of 15 % (Morrow III 
et al., 2013a). About 50 % of the electricity used by Thailand’s cement 
industry in 2005 could have been saved (16 % cost-effectively), while 
about 20 % of the fuel use could have been reduced (80 % cost-effec-
tively using a discount rate of 30 %) (Hasanbeigi et al., 2010a, 2011). 
Some subnational level information also shows negative CO2 abate-
ment costs associated with emissions reductions in the cement sector 
(e. g., CCAP, 2005). 
Nearly 60 % of the estimated electricity savings and all of the fuel 
savings of the Chinese steel industry for the period 2010 – 2030 can 
be realized cost-effectively using a discount rate of 15 % (Hasanbeigi 
et  al., 2013c). Total technical primary energy savings potential of 
the Indian steel industry from 2010 – 2030 is equal to around 87 % 
of total primary Indian steel industry energy use in 2007, of which 
91 % of the electricity savings and 64 % of the fuel savings can be 
achieved cost-effectively using a discount rate of 15 % (Morrow III 
et  al., 2013b). Akashi et  al. (2011) indicate that the largest poten-
tial for CO2 emissions savings for some energy-intensive industries 
remains in China and India. They also indicate that with associated 
costs under 100 USD / tCO2 in 2030, the use of efficient blast furnaces 
in the steel industry in China and India can reduce total emissions by 
186 MtCO2 and 165 MtCO2, respectively. This represents a combined 
total of 75 % of the global CO2 emissions reduction potential for this 
technology. 
Total technical electricity and fuel savings potential for China’s pulp 
and paper industry in 2010 are estimated to be 4.3 % and 38 %, respec-
tively. All of the electricity and 70 % of the fuel savings can be realized 
cost-effectively using a discount rate of 30 % (Kong et al., 2013). Fleiter 
et  al. (2012a) found energy saving potentials for the German pulp 
and paper industry of 21 % and 16 % of fuel and electricity demand 
in 2035, respectively. The savings result in 3 MtCO2 emissions reduc-
tion with two-thirds of this having negative private abatement cost 
(Fleiter et al., 2012a). Zafeiris (2010) estimates energy saving potential 
of 6.2 % of the global energy demand of the pulp and paper industry in 
year 2030. More than 90 % of the estimated savings potential can be 
realized at negative cost using a discount rate of 30 % (Zafeiris, 2010). 
The energy intensity of the European pulp and paper industry reduced 
from 16 to 13.5 GJ per tonne of paper between 1990 and 2008 (All-
wood et al., 2012, p. 318; CEPI, 2012). However, energy intensity of the 
European pulp and paper industry has now stabilized, and few signifi-
cant future efficiency improvements are forecasted.
In non-ferrous production (aluminium / others), energy accounts for 
nearly 40 % of aluminium production costs. The IEA forecasts a max-
imum possible 12 % future saving in energy requirements by future 
efficiencies. In food processing, reductions between 5 % and 35 % 
of total CO2 emissions can be made by investing in increased heat 
exchanger networks or heat pumps (Fritzson and Berntsson, 2006). 
Combined heat and power can reduce energy demand by 20 – 30 %. 
Around 83 % of the energy used in wet corn milling is for dewatering, 
drying, and evaporation processes (Galitsky et al., 2003), while 60 % of 
that used in fruit and vegetable processing is in boilers (Masanet et al., 
2008). Thermal and mechanical vapour recompression in drying allows 
for estimated 15 – 20 % total energy savings, which could be increased 
further by use of reverse osmosis (Galitsky et al., 2003). Cullen et al. 
(2011) suggest that about 88 % savings in energy for refrigeration 
could be made with better insulation, and reduced ventilation in refrig-
erators and freezers. 
There is very little data available on mineral extractive industries in 
general. Some analyses reveal that investments in state-of-the-art 
equipment and further research could reduce energy consumption by 
almost 50 % (SWEEP, 2011; US DoE, 2007). 
Figure 10�6 | Range of unit cost of avoided CO2 emissions (USD2010 / tCO2) in India. 
Source: Database of energy efficiency measures adopted by the winners of the National 
Awards on Energy Conservations for aluminium (26 measures), cement (42), chemicals 
(62), ISP: integrated steel plant (30), pulp and paper (46), and textile (75) industry in 
India during the period of 2007 – 2012 (BEE, 2012).






















Allwood et al. (2010) assessed different strategies to achieve a 50 % 
cut in the emissions of five sectors (cement, steel, paper, aluminium, 
and plastics) assuming doubling of demand by 2050. They found that 
gains in efficiency could result in emissions intensity reductions in 
the range of 21 % – 40 %. Further reductions to reach the required 
75 % reduction in emissions intensity can only be achieved by imple-
menting strategies at least partly going beyond the sectors bound-
aries: i. e., non destructive recycling, reducing demand through light 
weighting, product life extension, increasing intensity of product use 
or substitution for other materials, and radical process innovations, 
notwithstanding significant implementation barriers (see Section 
10.9).
Mitigation options can also be analyzed from the perspective of some 
industry-wide technologies. Around two-thirds of electricity consump-
tion in the industrial sector is used to drive motors (McKane and Hasan-
beigi, 2011). Steam generation represents 30 % of global final indus-
trial energy use. Efficiency of motor systems and steam systems can 
be improved by 20 – 25 % and 10 %, respectively (GEA, 2012; Brown 
et al., 2012). Improvements in the design and especially the operation 
of motor systems, which include motors and associated system com-
ponents in compressed air, pumping, and fan systems (McKane and 
Hasanbeigi, 2010, 2011; Saidur, 2010), have the potential to save 2.58 
EJ in final energy use globally (IEA, 2007). McKane and Hasanbeigi 
(2011) developed energy efficiency supply curve models for the United 
States, Canada, the European Union, Thailand, Vietnam, and Brazil and 
found that the cost-effective potential for electricity savings in motor 
system energy use compared to the base year varied between 27 % 
and 49 % for pumping, 21 % and 47 % for compressed air, and 14 % 
and 46 % for fan systems. The total technical saving potential varied 
between 43 % and 57 % for pumping, 29 % and 56 % for compressed 
air, and 27 % and 46 % for fan systems. Ways to reduce emissions from 
many industries include more efficient operation of process heating 
systems (LBNL and RDC, 2007; Hasanuzzaman et al., 2012) and steam 
systems (NREL et  al., 2012), minimized waste heat loss and waste 
heat recovery (US DoE, 2004a, 2008), advanced cooling systems, use 
of cogeneration (or combined heat and power) (Oland, 2004; Shipley 
et al., 2008; Brown et al., 2013), and use of renewable energy sources. 
Recent analysis show, for example, that recuperators can reduce fur-
nace energy use by 25 % while economizers can reduce boiler energy 
use by 10 % to 20 %, both with payback periods typically under two 
years (Hasanuzzaman et al., 2012).
According to data from McKinsey (2010) on MACs for cement, iron, 
and steel and chemical sectors, and from Akashi et  al. (2011) for 
cement and iron and steel, around 40 % mitigation potential in indus-
try can be realized cost-effectively. Due to methodological reasons, 
MACs always have to be discussed with caution. It has to be consid-
ered that the information about the direct additional cost associated 
with additional reduction of CO2 through technological options is lim-
ited. Moreover, system perspectives and system interdependencies are 
not typically taken into account for MACs (McKinsey&Company, 2010; 
Akashi et al., 2011).
Unless barriers to mitigation in industry are resolved, the pace and 
extent of mitigation in industry will be limited, and even cost-effective 
measures will remain untapped. Various barriers that block technol-
ogy adoption despite low direct costs are often not appropriately 
accounted for in mitigation cost assessments. Such barriers are dis-
cussed in Section 10.9.
In the long term, however, it may be more relevant to look at radically 
new ways of producing energy-intensive products. Low-carbon cement 
and concrete might become relevant (Hasanbeigi et al., 2012b); how-
ever, from current perspective cost assessments for these technologies 
are connected with high uncertainties.
10�7�2 Non-CO2 emissions
Emissions of non-CO2 gases from different industrial sources are pro-
jected to be 0.70 GtCO2eq in the year 2030 (EPA, 2013), dominated 
by HFC-23 from HCFC-22 production (46 %) and N2O from nitric acid 
and from adipic acid (24 %). In 2030, it is projected that HFC-23 emis-
sions will be related mainly to the production of HCFC-22 for feedstock 
use, as its use as refrigerant will be phased out in 2035 (Miller and 
Kuijpers, 2011). The EPA (2013) provides MACs for all non-CO2 emis-
sions. Emissions resulting from the production of flat panel displays 
and from photovoltaic cell manufacturing are projected to be small (2 
and 12 MtCO2eq respectively in 2030), but particularly uncertain due 
to limited information on emissions rates, use of fluorinated gases, and 
production growth rates.
10�7�3 Summary results on costs and potentials 
Based on the available bottom-up information from literature and 
through expert consultation, a global picture of the four industrial 
key sub-sectors (cement, steel, chemicals, and pulp and paper) is 
assessed and presented in Figures 10.7 to 10.10 below. Detailed jus-
tification of the figures and description of the options are provided in 
Annex  III. Globally, in 2010, these four selected sub-sectors contrib-
uted 5.3 GtCO2 direct energy- and process-related CO2 emissions (see 
Section 10.3): iron and steel 1.9 GtCO2, non-metallic minerals (which 
includes cement) 2.6 GtCO2, chemicals and petrochemicals 0.6 GtCO2, 
and pulp and paper 0.2 GtCO2. This amounts to 73 % of all direct15 
energy- and process-related CO2 emissions from the industry sector.
For each of the sub-sectors, only selected mitigation options are cov-
ered (for other feasible options in the industry sector refer to Section 
10.4): energy efficiency, shift in raw material use to less carbon-inten-
sive alternatives (e. g., reducing the clinker to cement ratio, recycling 
etc.), fuel mix options, end-of-pipe emission abatement options such 






Figure 10�7 | Indicative CO2 emission intensities and levelized cost of conserved carbon in cement production for various production practices / technologies and in 450 ppm sce-
narios of selected models (AIM, DNE21+, IEA ETP 2DS) (for data and methodology, see Annex III).
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Figure 10�8 | Indicative CO2 emission intensities and levelized cost of conserved carbon in steel production for various production practices / technologies and in 450 ppm scenarios 
of selected models (AIM, DNE21+, and IEA ETP 2DS) (for data and methodology, see Annex III).
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Figure 10�9 | Indicative global indirect (left) and direct (right) CO2eq emissions and levelized cost of conserved carbon resulting from chemicals production for various production 
practices / technologies and CO2 emissions in IEA ETP 2DS scenario (for data and methodology, see Annex III). 
Notes: Graph includes energy-related emissions (including process emissions from ammonia production), N2O emissions from nitric and adipic acid production and HFC-23 emis-
sions from HFC-22 production. Costs for N2O abatement from nitric / adipic acid production and for HFC-23 abatement in HFC-22 production based on EPA (2013) and Miller and 
Kuijpers (2011), respectively.
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Figure 10�10 | Indicative global indirect (left) and direct (right) CO2 emission intensities and levelized cost of conserved carbon in paper production for various production prac-
tices / technologies and in IEA ETP 2DS scenario (for data and methodology, see Annex III).
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as carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS), use of decarbonized 
electricity and options for the two most important current sources 
of non-CO2 GHG emissions (HFC 23 emissions from HFC 22 produc-
tion and N2O emissions from nitric and adipic acid production) in 
the chemical industry. The potentials are given related to the 2010 
emission intensity or absolute emissions. Cost estimates relate to the 
current costs (expressed in USD2010) of the abatement options unless 
otherwise stated. 
Potentials and costs to decarbonize the electricity sector are covered 
in Chapter 7. To ensure consistency with that chapter, no estimates are 
given for the costs related to decarbonizing the electricity mix for the 
industrial sector.
Costs and potentials are global averages, but based on region-specific 
information. The technology options are given relative to the global 
average emission intensity. Some options are not mutually exclusive 
and potentials can therefore not always be added. As such, none of 
the individual options can yield full GHG emission abatement, because 
of the multiple emission sources included (e. g., in the chemical sector 
CCS and fuel mix improvements cannot reduce N2O emissions).
Costs relate to costs of abatement taking into account total incremen-
tal operational and capital costs. The figures give indicatively the costs 
of implementing different options; they also exclude options related 
to material efficiency (e. g., reduction of demand), but include some 
recycling options (although not in pulp and paper). Figure 10.7 about 
cement production includes process CO2 emissions. 
Emissions after implementing potential options to reduce the GHG 
emission intensity of cement, steel, pulp and paper sectors are pre-
sented in tCO2 / t product compared to 2010 global average respec-
tively. Future relevant scenarios are also presented. However, for the 
chemical sector, due to its heterogeneity in terms of products and pro-
cesses, the information is presented in terms of total emissions. This 
can be an under-representation of relatively higher mitigation poten-
tial in e. g., ammonia production. In addition, unknown / unexplored 
options such as hydrogen / electricity-based chemicals and fuels are 
not included, so it is worth noting that the options are exemplary. In 
the cement industry (Figure 10.7), the potential and costs for clinker 
substitution and fuel mix changes are dependent on regional availabil-
ity and the price of clinker substitutes and alternative fuels. Negative 
cost options in cement manufacturing are in switching to best practice 
clinker-to-cement ratio. In the iron and steel industry (Figure 10.8), a 
shift from blast furnace based steelmaking to electric arc furnace steel-
making provides significant negative cost opportunities. However, this 
potential is highly dependent on scrap availability. The chemical sec-
tor (Figure 10.9) includes options related to energy efficiency improve-
ments and options related to reduction of N2O emissions from nitric 
and adipic acid production and HFC-23 emissions from HFC-22 produc-
tion. In pulp and paper manufacturing (Figure 10.10), the estimates 
exclude increased recycling because the effect on CO2 emissions is 
uncertain. 
The costs of the abatement options shown in Figure 10.7 vary widely 
between individual regions and from plant to plant in the cement 
industry. Factors influencing the costs include typical capital stock 
turnover rates (some measures can only be applied when plants are 
replaced), relative energy costs, etc. For clinker substitution and fuel 
mix improvements, costs depend heavily on the regional availability 
and price of clinker substitutes and alternative fuels.
For all subsectors, negative abatement cost options exist to a certain 
extent for shifting to best practice technologies and for fuel shift-
ing. While options in cost ranges of 0 – 20 and 20 – 50 USD2010 / tCO2eq 
are somewhat limited, larger opportunities exist in the 50 – 150 
USD2010 / tCO2eq range (particularly since CCS is included here). The 
feasibility of CCS depends on global CCS developments. CCS is cur-
rently not yet applied (with some exceptions) at commercial scale in 
the cement, iron and steel, chemical, or pulp / paper industries.
10.8 Co-benefits, risks 
and spillovers
In addition to mitigation costs and potentials (see Section 10.7), the 
deployment of mitigation measures will depend on a variety of other 
factors that relate to broader economic, social, and environmen-
tal objectives that drive decisions in the industry sector and policy 
choices. The implementation of mitigation measures can have posi-
tive or negative effects on these other objectives. To the extent that 
these side-effects are positive, they can be deemed ‘co-benefits’; if 
adverse and uncertain, they imply risks.16 Co-benefits and adverse 
side-effects of mitigation measures (10.8.1), the associated techni-
cal risks and uncertainties (10.8.2) as well as their public perception 
(10.8.3) and technological spillovers (10.8.4), can significantly affect 
investment decisions, individual behaviour, and policymaker priori-
ties. Table 10.5 provides an overview of the potential co-benefits and 
adverse side-effects of the mitigation measures that are assessed 
in this chapter. In accordance with the three sustainable develop-
ment pillars described in Chapter 4, the table presents effects on 
objectives that may be economic, social, environmental, and health 
related. The extent to which co-benefits and adverse side-effects will 
materialize in practice as well as their net effect on social welfare 
differ greatly across regions, and is strongly dependent on local cir-
cumstances and implementation practices, as well as on the scale 
and pace of the deployment of the different mitigation measures 
(see Section 6.6).
16 Co-benefits and adverse side-effects describe effects in non-monetary units 
without yet evaluating the net effect on overall social welfare. Please refer to the 
respective sections in the framing chapters (particularly Sections 2.4, 3.6.3, and 





10�8�1 Socio-economic and environmental 
effects
Social embedding of technologies depends on compatibility with exist-
ing systems, social acceptance, divisibility, eco-friendliness, relative 
advantage, etc. (Geels and Schot, 2010; Roy et  al., 2013). A typical 
example is the tradeoff or the choice that is made between investing 
in mitigation in industry and adaptation in the absence of right incen-
tives for mitigation action (Chakraborty and Roy, 2012a). Slow diffu-
sion of mitigation options (UNIDO, 2011) can be overcome by focusing 
on, and explicit consideration of, non-direct cost-related characteristics 
of the technologies (Fleiter et al., 2012c). It is unanimously understood 
that maintaining competitiveness of industrial products in the market 
place is an important objective of industries, so implementation of 
mitigation measures will be a major favoured strategy for industries if 
they contribute to cost reduction (Bernstein et al., 2007; Winkler et al., 
2007; Bassi et al., 2009). Increasing demand for energy in many coun-
tries has led to imports and increasing investment in high-cost reliable 
electric power generation capacity; so mitigation via implementation 
of energy efficiency measures help to reduce import dependency and 
investment pressure (Winkler et al., 2007). Labour unions are increas-
ingly expressing their desire for policies to address climate change and 
support for a transition to ‘green’ jobs (Räthzel and Uzzell, 2012). Local 
air and water pollution in areas near industries have led to regulatory 
restrictions in almost all countries. In many countries, new industrial 
developments face increasing public resistance and litigation. If miti-
gation options deliver local air pollution benefits, they will have indi-
rect value and greater acceptance. 
The literature (cited in the following sections and in Table 10.5) docu-
ments that mitigation measures interact with multiple economic, social, 
and environmental objectives, although these associated impacts 
are not always quantified. In general, quantifying the corresponding 
welfare effects that a mitigation technology or practice entails is chal-
lenging, because they are very localized and different stakeholders 
may have different perspectives of the corresponding losses and gains 
(Fleiter et al., 2012c) (see Sections 2.4, 3.6.3, 4.2, and 6.6). It is impor-
tant to note that co-benefits need to be assessed together with direct 
benefits to overcome barriers in implementation of the mitigation 
options (e. g., training requirements, losses during technology instal-
lation) (Worrell et  al., 2003), which may appear otherwise larger for 
SMEs or isolated enterprises (Crichton, 2006; Zhang and Wang, 2008; 
Ghosh and Roy, 2011).
Energy efficiency (E / M): Energy efficiency includes a wide variety 
of measures that also achieve economic efficiency and natural / energy 
resource saving, which contribute to the achievement of environ-
mental goals and other macro benefits (Roy et al., 2013). At the com-
pany level, the impact of energy efficient technology is often found 
to enhance productivity growth (Zuev et  al., 1998; Boyd and Pang, 
2000; Murphy, 2001; Worrell et  al., 2003; Gallagher, 2006; Winkler 
et  al., 2007; Zhang and Wang, 2008; May et  al., 2013). Other ben-
efits to companies, industry, and the economy as a whole come in the 
form of reduced fuel consumption requirements17 and imports as well 
as reduced requirements for new electricity general capacity addition 
(Sarkar et al., 2003; Geller et al., 2006; Winkler et al., 2007; Sathaye 
and Gupta, 2010) which contribute to energy security (see Sections 
6.6.2.2 and 7.9.1). Energy security in the industrial sector is primarily 
affected by concerns related to the sufficiency of resources to meet 
national energy demand at competitive and stable prices. Supply-side 
vulnerabilities in this sector arise if there is a high share of imported 
fuels in the industrial energy mix (Cherp et al., 2012a). Cherp et al. 
(2012a) estimate that the overall vulnerability of industrial energy 
consumption is lower than in the transport and residential and com-
mercial (R&C) sectors in most countries. Nevertheless, since mitigation 
policies in industry would likely lead to higher energy efficiency, they 
may reduce exposure to energy supply and price shocks (Gnansou-
nou, 2008; Kruyt et al., 2009; Sovacool and Brown, 2010; Cherp et al., 
2012b). 
Reduced fossil fuel burning brings associated reduced costs (Winkler 
et al., 2007), and reduced local impacts on ecosystems related to fossil 
fuel extraction and waste disposal liability (Liu and Diamond, 2005; 
Zhang and Wang, 2008; Chen et  al., 2012; Ren et  al., 2012; Hasan-
beigi et al., 2013b; Lee and van de Meene, 2013; Xi et al., 2013; Liu 
et al., 2013) (see also Sections 7.9.2 and 7.9.3). In addition, other pos-
sible benefits of reduced reliance on fossil fuels include increases in 
employment and national income (Sathaye and Gupta, 2010) with new 
business opportunities (Winkler et al., 2007; Nidumolu et al., 2009; Wei 
et al., 2010; Horbach and Rennings, 2013). 
There is wide consensus in the literature on local air pollution reduc-
tion benefits from energy efficiency measures in industries (Winkler 
et al., 2007; Bassi et al., 2009; Ren et al., 2012), such as positive health 
effects, increased safety and working conditions, and improved job sat-
isfaction (Getzner, 2002; Worrell et  al., 2003; Wei et  al., 2010; Walz, 
2011; Zhang et al., 2011; Horbach and Rennings, 2013) (see also Sec-
tions 7.9.2, 7.9.3 and WGII 11.9). Energy efficient technologies can 
also have positive impacts on employment (Getzner, 2002; Wei et al., 
2010; UNIDO, 2011; OECD / IEA, 2012). Despite these multiple co-ben-
efits, sometimes the relatively large initial investment required and 
the relatively long payback period of some energy efficiency measures 
can be a disincentive and an affordability issue, especially for SMEs, 
since the co-benefits are often not monetized (Brown, 2001; Thollander 
et al., 2007; Ghosh and Roy, 2011; UNIDO, 2011). 
Emission efficiency (G / E): The literature documents well that 
increases in emissions efficiency can lead to multiple benefits (see 
Table 10.5). Local air pollution reduction is well documented as co-
benefit of emissions efficiency measures (Winkler et  al., 2007; Bassi 
et al., 2009; Ren et al., 2012). Associated health benefits (Aunan et al., 
2004; Haines et al., 2009) and reduced ecosystem impacts (please refer 
to Section 7.9.2 for details) are society-wide benefits, while reduc-
17 Please see Section 10.4 and references cited therein (e. g., Schäfer, 2005; Allwood 





tions in emission-related taxes or payment liabilities (Metcalf, 2009) 
are specific to industries, even though compliance costs might increase 
(Dasgupta et al., 2000; Mestl et al., 2005; Rivers, 2010). The net effect 
of these benefits and costs has not been studied comprehensively. 
Quantification of benefits is often done on a case-by-case basis. For 
example, Mestl et al. (2005) found that the environmental and health 
benefits of using electric arc furnaces for steel production in the city 
of Tiyuan (China) could potentially lead to higher benefits than other 
options, despite being the most costly option. For India, a detailed 
study (Chakraborty and Roy, 2012b) of 13 energy-intensive industrial 
units showed that several measures to reduce GHG emissions were 
adopted because the industries could realize positive effects on their 
own economic competitiveness, resource conservation such as water, 
and an enhanced reputation / public image for their commitment to 
corporate social responsibility towards a global cause. 
If existing barriers (see Section 10.9) can be overcome, industrial appli-
cations of CCS deployed in the future could provide environmental co-
benefits because CCS-enabled facilities have very low emissions rates 
for critical pollutants even without specific policies being in place for 
those emissions (Kuramochi et al., 2012b) (see Section 7.9.2 and Figure 
7.8 for the air pollution effects of CCS deployment in power plants).
Mitigations options to reduce PFC emissions from aluminium pro-
duction, N2O emissions from adipic and nitric acid production (EPA, 
2010a), and PFC emissions from semiconductor manufacturing (ISMI, 
2005) have proven to enhance productivity and reduce the cost of pro-
duction. Simultaneously, these measures provide health benefits and 
better working conditions for labour and local ambient air quality (Hei-
jnes et al., 1999).18 
Material efficiency (M / P): There is a wide range of benefits to be 
harnessed from implementing material efficiency options. Private ben-
efits to industry in terms of cost reduction (Meyer et  al., 2007) can 
enhance competitiveness, but national and subnational sales revenue 
might decline in the medium term due to reduction in demand for inter-
mediate products used in manufacturing (Thomas, 2003). Material use 
efficiency increases can often be realized via cooperation in industrial 
clusters (see Section 10.5), while associated infrastructure develop-
ment (new industrial parks) and associated cooperation schemes lead 
to additional societal gains (e. g., more efficient use of land through 
bundling activities) (Lowe, 1997; Chertow, 2000). With the reduction 
in need for virgin materials (Allwood et  al., 2013; Stahel, 2013) and 
the prioritization of prevention in line with the waste management 
hierarchy (see Section 10.14.2, Figure 10.16), mining-related social 
conflicts can decrease (Germond-Duret, 2012), health and safety can 
be enhanced, recycling-related employment can increase, the amount 
of waste material (see Section 10.14.2.1 and Figure 10.17) going 
into landfills can decrease, and new business opportunities related to 
material efficiency can emerge (Clift and Wright, 2000; Rennings and 
18 See also EPA Voluntary Aluminum Industrial Partnership: http: / / www. epa. 
gov / highgwp / aluminum-pfc / faq.html. 
Zwick, 2002; Widmer et al., 2005; Clift, 2006; Zhang and Wang, 2008; 
Walz, 2011; Allwood et al., 2011; Raghupathy and Chaturvedi, 2013; 
Menikpura et al., 2013).
Demand reductions (P / S and S): Demand reduction through adop-
tion of new diverse lifestyles (see Section 10.4) (Roy and Pal, 2009; 
GEA, 2012; Kainuma et al., 2012; Allwood et al., 2013) and implemen-
tation of healthy eating (see Section 11.4.3) and sufficiency goals can 
result in multiple co-benefits related to health that enhance human 
well-being (GEA, 2012). Well-being indicators can be developed to 
evaluate industrial economic activities in terms of multiple effects of 
sustainable consumption on a range of policy objectives (GEA, 2012).
10�8�2 Technological risks and uncertainties
There are some specific risks and uncertainties with adoption of miti-
gation options in industry. Potential health, safety, and environmental 
risks could arise from additional mining activities as some mitigation 
technologies could substantially increase the need for specific materi-
als (e. g., rare earths, see Section 7.9.2) and the exploitation of new 
extraction locations or methods. Industrial production is closely linked 
to extractive industry (see Figure 10.2) and there are risks associated 
with closing mines if post-closure measures for environmental pro-
tection are not adopted due to a lack of appropriate technology or 
resources. Carbon dioxide capture and storage for industry is an exam-
ple of a technological option subject to several risks and uncertainties 
(see Sections 10.7, 7.5.5, 7.6.4 and 7.9.4 for more in-depth discussion 
on CO2 storage, transport, and the public perception thereof, respec-
tively).
Specific literature on accidents and technology failure related to miti-
gation measures in the industry sector is lacking. In general, industrial 
activities are subject to the main categories of risks and emergencies, 
namely natural disasters, malicious activities, and unexpected conse-
quences arising from overly complex systems (Mitroff and Alpaslan, 
2003; Olson and Wu, 2010). For example, process safety is still a major 
issue for the chemical industry. Future improvements in process safety 
will likely involve a holistic integration of complementary activities and 
be supported by several layers of detail (Pitblado, 2011).
10�8�3 Public perception
From a socio-constructivist perspective, the social response to 
industrial activity depends on three sets of factors related to: 1) 
the dynamics of regional development and the historical place of 
industry in the community, 2) the relationship between residents 
and the industry and local governance capacities, and 3) the social 
or socio-economic impacts experienced (Fortin and Gagnon, 2006). 
Public hearings and stakeholder participation — especially on envi-
ronmental and social impact assessments — prior to issuance of per-
mission to operate has become mandatory in almost all countries, 
Table 10�5 | Overview of potential co-benefits (green arrows) and adverse side-effects (orange arrows) of the main mitigation measures in the industry sector. Arrows pointing 
up / down denote positive / negative effect on the respective objective or concern. Co-benefits and adverse side-effects depend on local circumstances as well as on the implementa-
tion practice, pace, and scale (see Section 6.6). For possible upstream effects of low-carbon energy supply (incl. CCS), see Section 7.9. For possible upstream effects of biomass 
supply, see Sections 11.7 and 11.13.6. For an assessment of macroeconomic, cross-sectoral effects associated with mitigation policies (e. g., on energy prices, consumption, growth, 
and trade), see Sections 3.9, 6.3.6, 13.2.2.3, and 14.4.2. Numbers correspond to references below the table.
Mitigation measures
Effect on additional objectives / concerns
Economic Social (including health) Environmental   
Technical energy 
efficiency improvements 






Energy security (via reduced energy 
intensity) [1, 2, 3, 4, 13, 29, 57];
Employment impact [14, 15, 19, 28]
Competitiveness and Productivity 
[4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12] 
Technological spillovers in DCs (due to 





Health impact via reduced local pollution [16] 
New business opportunities [4, 17 – 20]
Water availability and quality [26]
Safety, working conditions and 





Ecosystem impact via 
Fossil fuel extraction [21]
Local pollution [11, 22 – 24, 25] and 
Waste [11, 27]
CO2 and non-CO2 
GHG emissions 
intensity reduction
↑ Competitiveness [31, 55] and 
productivity [52, 53]
↓ Health impact via reduced local air pollution 
[30, 31, 32, 33, 53] and better work 















National sales tax revenue 
in medium term [35] 
Employment impact in waste 
recycling market [44, 45]
New infrastructure for industrial 
clusters [36, 37] 




New business opportunities [11, 39 – 43] 
Local conflicts (reduced 
resource extraction) [58]




Ecosystem impact via reduced local 
air and water pollution and waste 
material disposal [42, 46] 
Use of raw / virgin materials and 
natural resources implying reduced 
unsustainable resource mining [47, 48] 
Product demand 
reductions
↓ National sales tax revenue 
in medium term [35]
↑ Wellbeing via new diverse 
lifestyle choices [48, 50, 51]
↓ Post consumption waste [48]
[1] Sovacool and Brown, 2010; [2] Geller et al., 2006; [3] Gnansounou, 2008; [4] Winkler et al., 2007; [5] Worrell et al., 2003; [6] Boyd and Pang, 2000; [7] May et al., 2013; [8] 
Goldemberg, 1998; [9] Murphy, 2001; [10] Gallagher, 2006; [11] Zhang and Wang, 2008; [12] Roy et al., 2013; [13] see Section 10.4 and references cited therein; [14] UNIDO, 
2011; [15] OECD / IEA, 2012; [16] Zhang et al., 2011; [17] Nidumolu et al., 2009; [18] Horbach and Rennings, 2013; [19] Getzner, 2002; [20] Wei et al., 2010; [21] Liu and Diamond, 
2005; [22] Hasanbeigi et al., 2013a; [23] Xi et al., 2013; [24] Chen et al., 2012; [25] Ren et al., 2012; [26] Zhelev, 2005; [27] Lee and van de Meene, 2013; [28] Sathaye and 
Gupta, 2010; [29] Sathaye and Gupta, 2010; [30] Mestl et al., 2005; [31] Chakraborty and Roy, 2012a; [32] Haines et al., 2009; [33] Aunan et al., 2004; [34] Bassi et al., 2009; [35] 
Thomas, 2003; [36] Lowe, 1997; [37] Chertow, 2000; [38] Meyer et al., 2007; [39] Widmer et al., 2005; [40] Raghupathy and Chaturvedi, 2013; [41] Clift and Wright, 2000; [42] 
Allwood et al., 2011; [43] Clift, 2006; [44] Walz, 2011; [45] Rennings and Zwick, 2002; [46] Menikpura et al., 2013; [47] Stahel, 2013; [48] Allwood et al., 2013; [49] GEA, 2012; 
[50] Kainuma et al., 2012; [51] Roy and Pal, 2009; [52] EPA, 2010b; [53] ISMI, 2005; [54] Heijnes et al., 1999; [55] Rivers, 2010; [56] Chakraborty and Roy, 2012b; [57] Sarkar 





and industry expenditures for social corporate responsibility are now 
often disclosed. Mitigation measures in the industry sector might be 
considered socially acceptable if associated with co-benefits, such 
as reducing GHG emissions while also improving local environmen-
tal quality as a whole (e. g., energy efficiency measures that reduce 
local emissions). Public perception related to mitigation actions can 
be influenced by national political positions in international negotia-
tions and media.
Research on public perception and acceptance with regard to indus-
trial applications of CCS is lacking (for the general discussion of CCS 
see Chapter 7). To date, broad evidence related to whether public per-
ception of CCS for industrial applications will be significantly different 
from CCS in power generation units is not available, since CCS is not 
yet in place in the industry sector (Section 10.7).
Mining activities have generated social conflicts in different parts of 
the world (Martinez-Alier, 2001; World Bank, 2007; Germond-Duret, 
2012; Guha, 2013). The Observatory of Mining Conflicts in Latin 
America (OMCLA) reported more than 150 active mining conflicts in 
the region, most of which started in the 2000s19. Besides this general 
experience, the potential for interactions between social tensions and 
mitigation initiatives in this sector are unknown.
19 Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros de América Latina. Available at: http: / / www. 
conflictosmineros. net.
Zwick, 2002; Widmer et al., 2005; Clift, 2006; Zhang and Wang, 2008; 
Walz, 2011; Allwood et al., 2011; Raghupathy and Chaturvedi, 2013; 
Menikpura et al., 2013).
Demand reductions (P / S and S): Demand reduction through adop-
tion of new diverse lifestyles (see Section 10.4) (Roy and Pal, 2009; 
GEA, 2012; Kainuma et al., 2012; Allwood et al., 2013) and implemen-
tation of healthy eating (see Section 11.4.3) and sufficiency goals can 
result in multiple co-benefits related to health that enhance human 
well-being (GEA, 2012). Well-being indicators can be developed to 
evaluate industrial economic activities in terms of multiple effects of 
sustainable consumption on a range of policy objectives (GEA, 2012).
10�8�2 Technological risks and uncertainties
There are some specific risks and uncertainties with adoption of miti-
gation options in industry. Potential health, safety, and environmental 
risks could arise from additional mining activities as some mitigation 
technologies could substantially increase the need for specific materi-
als (e. g., rare earths, see Section 7.9.2) and the exploitation of new 
extraction locations or methods. Industrial production is closely linked 
to extractive industry (see Figure 10.2) and there are risks associated 
with closing mines if post-closure measures for environmental pro-
tection are not adopted due to a lack of appropriate technology or 
resources. Carbon dioxide capture and storage for industry is an exam-
ple of a technological option subject to several risks and uncertainties 
(see Sections 10.7, 7.5.5, 7.6.4 and 7.9.4 for more in-depth discussion 
on CO2 storage, transport, and the public perception thereof, respec-
tively).
Specific literature on accidents and technology failure related to miti-
gation measures in the industry sector is lacking. In general, industrial 
activities are subject to the main categories of risks and emergencies, 
namely natural disasters, malicious activities, and unexpected conse-
quences arising from overly complex systems (Mitroff and Alpaslan, 
2003; Olson and Wu, 2010). For example, process safety is still a major 
issue for the chemical industry. Future improvements in process safety 
will likely involve a holistic integration of complementary activities and 
be supported by several layers of detail (Pitblado, 2011).
10�8�3 Public perception
From a socio-constructivist perspective, the social response to 
industrial activity depends on three sets of factors related to: 1) 
the dynamics of regional development and the historical place of 
industry in the community, 2) the relationship between residents 
and the industry and local governance capacities, and 3) the social 
or socio-economic impacts experienced (Fortin and Gagnon, 2006). 
Public hearings and stakeholder participation — especially on envi-
ronmental and social impact assessments — prior to issuance of per-
mission to operate has become mandatory in almost all countries, 
Table 10�5 | Overview of potential co-benefits (green arrows) and adverse side-effects (orange arrows) of the main mitigation measures in the industry sector. Arrows pointing 
up / down denote positive / negative effect on the respective objective or concern. Co-benefits and adverse side-effects depend on local circumstances as well as on the implementa-
tion practice, pace, and scale (see Section 6.6). For possible upstream effects of low-carbon energy supply (incl. CCS), see Section 7.9. For possible upstream effects of biomass 
supply, see Sections 11.7 and 11.13.6. For an assessment of macroeconomic, cross-sectoral effects associated with mitigation policies (e. g., on energy prices, consumption, growth, 
and trade), see Sections 3.9, 6.3.6, 13.2.2.3, and 14.4.2. Numbers correspond to references below the table.
Mitigation measures
Effect on additional objectives / concerns
Economic Social (including health) Environmental   
Technical energy 
efficiency improvements 






Energy security (via reduced energy 
intensity) [1, 2, 3, 4, 13, 29, 57];
Employment impact [14, 15, 19, 28]
Competitiveness and Productivity 
[4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12] 
Technological spillovers in DCs (due to 





Health impact via reduced local pollution [16] 
New business opportunities [4, 17 – 20]
Water availability and quality [26]
Safety, working conditions and 





Ecosystem impact via 
Fossil fuel extraction [21]
Local pollution [11, 22 – 24, 25] and 
Waste [11, 27]
CO2 and non-CO2 
GHG emissions 
intensity reduction
↑ Competitiveness [31, 55] and 
productivity [52, 53]
↓ Health impact via reduced local air pollution 
[30, 31, 32, 33, 53] and better work 















National sales tax revenue 
in medium term [35] 
Employment impact in waste 
recycling market [44, 45]
New infrastructure for industrial 
clusters [36, 37] 




New business opportunities [11, 39 – 43] 
Local conflicts (reduced 
resource extraction) [58]




Ecosystem impact via reduced local 
air and water pollution and waste 
material disposal [42, 46] 
Use of raw / virgin materials and 
natural resources implying reduced 
unsustainable resource mining [47, 48] 
Product demand 
reductions
↓ National sales tax revenue 
in medium term [35]
↑ Wellbeing via new diverse 
lifestyle choices [48, 50, 51]
↓ Post consumption waste [48]
[1] Sovacool and Brown, 2010; [2] Geller et al., 2006; [3] Gnansounou, 2008; [4] Winkler et al., 2007; [5] Worrell et al., 2003; [6] Boyd and Pang, 2000; [7] May et al., 2013; [8] 
Goldemberg, 1998; [9] Murphy, 2001; [10] Gallagher, 2006; [11] Zhang and Wang, 2008; [12] Roy et al., 2013; [13] see Section 10.4 and references cited therein; [14] UNIDO, 
2011; [15] OECD / IEA, 2012; [16] Zhang et al., 2011; [17] Nidumolu et al., 2009; [18] Horbach and Rennings, 2013; [19] Getzner, 2002; [20] Wei et al., 2010; [21] Liu and Diamond, 
2005; [22] Hasanbeigi et al., 2013a; [23] Xi et al., 2013; [24] Chen et al., 2012; [25] Ren et al., 2012; [26] Zhelev, 2005; [27] Lee and van de Meene, 2013; [28] Sathaye and 
Gupta, 2010; [29] Sathaye and Gupta, 2010; [30] Mestl et al., 2005; [31] Chakraborty and Roy, 2012a; [32] Haines et al., 2009; [33] Aunan et al., 2004; [34] Bassi et al., 2009; [35] 
Thomas, 2003; [36] Lowe, 1997; [37] Chertow, 2000; [38] Meyer et al., 2007; [39] Widmer et al., 2005; [40] Raghupathy and Chaturvedi, 2013; [41] Clift and Wright, 2000; [42] 
Allwood et al., 2011; [43] Clift, 2006; [44] Walz, 2011; [45] Rennings and Zwick, 2002; [46] Menikpura et al., 2013; [47] Stahel, 2013; [48] Allwood et al., 2013; [49] GEA, 2012; 
[50] Kainuma et al., 2012; [51] Roy and Pal, 2009; [52] EPA, 2010b; [53] ISMI, 2005; [54] Heijnes et al., 1999; [55] Rivers, 2010; [56] Chakraborty and Roy, 2012b; [57] Sarkar 






Spillovers are difficult to measure, but existing studies (Bouoiyour and 
Akhawayn, 2005) show that a technology gap is one of the conditions 
for positive spillovers. Sections 10.4 and 10.7 have already shown that 
there is gap between the world best practices in energy efficiency and 
industrial practices in many countries. As such, cross-country invest-
ment in mitigation technologies can enhance positive spillovers in host 
countries. In the industrial technology context, multinational compa-
nies try to minimize imitation probability and technology leakage, but 
studies show that spillover works faster through supply chain link-
age inter-industry (Kugler, 2006; Bitzer and Kerekes, 2008; Zhao et al., 
2010). In general, studies suggest that technology spillovers in the 
mitigation context depend on additional technology policies besides 
direct investment (Gillingham et al., 2009; Le and Pomfret, 2011; Wang 
et al., 2012a; Costantini et al., 2013; Jeon et al., 2013). These results are 
relevant for investments on industrial mitigation technologies as well.
10.9 Barriers and opportunities 
Besides uncertainties in financial costs of mitigation options assessed 
in 10.7, a number of non-financial barriers and opportunities assessed 
in this section hinder or facilitate implementation of measures to 
reduce GHG emissions in industry. Barriers must be overcome to allow 
implementation (see Flannery and Kheshgi, 2005), however, in general 
they are not sufficiently captured in integrated model studies and sce-
narios (see Section 10.10). Barriers that are often common across sec-
tors are given in Chapter 3. Table 10.6 summarizes barriers and oppor-
tunities for the major mitigation options listed in Section 10.4.
Typically, barriers and opportunities can be distinguished into the fol-
lowing categories:
•	 Technology: includes maturity, reliability, safety, performance, cost 
of technology options and systems, and gaps in information
•	 Physical: includes availability of infrastructure, geography, and 
space available
•	 Institutional and legal: includes regulatory frameworks and institu-
tions that may enable investment
•	 Cultural: includes public acceptance, workforce capacity (e. g., edu-
cation, training, and knowledge), and cultural norms. 
10�9�1 Energy efficiency for reducing energy 
requirements
Even though energy consumption can be a significant cost for indus-
try, a number of barriers limit industrial sector steps to minimize 
energy use via energy efficiency measures. These barriers include: 
failure to recognize the positive impact of energy efficiency on profit-
ability, short investment payback thresholds (two to eight years; IEA, 
2012e), industrial organizational and behavioural barriers to imple-
menting change; limited access to capital; impact of non-energy poli-
cies on energy efficiency; public acceptance of unconventional manu-
facturing processes; and a wide range of market failures (Bailey et al., 
2009; IEA, 2009d). While large energy-intensive industries — such as 
iron and steel, and mineral processing — are often aware of potential 
cost savings and consider energy efficiency in investment decisions, 
this is less common in the commercial and service sectors where the 
energy cost share is usually low, or for smaller companies where over-
head costs for energy management and training personnel can be 
prohibitive (UNIDO, 2011; Ghosh and Roy, 2011; Schleich and Gruber, 
2008; Fleiter et al., 2012d; Hasanbeigi et al., 2009). Of course, invest-
ment decisions also consider investment risks, which are generally not 
reflected in the cost estimates assessed in Section 10.7. The impor-
tance of barriers depends on specific circumstances. For example, by 
surveying the Swedish foundry industry, Rohdin et  al. (2007) found 
that access to capital was reported to be the largest barrier, followed 
by technical risk and other barriers. 
Cogeneration, or combined heat and power (CHP), is an energy effi-
ciency option that can not only reduce GHG emissions by improving 
system energy efficiency, but can also reduce system cost and decrease 
dependence on grid power. For industry, however, (IEA, 2009d) CHP 
faces a complex set of economic, regulatory, social, and political bar-
riers that restrain its wider use including: market restriction securing 
a fair market value for electricity exported to the grid; high upfront 
costs compared to large power plants; difficulty concentrating suitable 
heat loads and lack of integrated planning; grid access; non-transpar-
ent and technically demanding interconnection procedures; lack of 
consumer and policymaker knowledge about CHP energy, cost and 
emission savings; and industry perceptions that CHP is an investment 
outside their core business. Regulatory barriers can stem from taxes, 
tariffs, or permits. For a cogeneration project of an existing facility, the 
electricity price paid to a cogeneration facility is the most important 
variable in determining the project’s success — more so than capital 
costs, operating and maintenance cost, and even fuel costs (Meidel, 
2005). Prices are affected by rules for electricity markets, which differ 
from region to region, and which can form either incentives or barriers 
for cogeneration (Meidel, 2005).
10�9�2 Emissions efficiency, fuel switching, and 
carbon dioxide capture and storage
There are a number of challenges associated with feedstock and 
energy substitution in industry. Waste materials and biomass as fuel 
and feedstock substitutes are limited by their availability, and hence 
competition could drive up prices and make industrial applications less 
attractive (IEA, 2009b). A decarbonized power sector would offer new 
opportunities to reduce CO2 intensity of some industrial processes via 
use of electricity, however, decarbonization of power also has barriers 





The application of CCS to the industries covered in this chapter share 
many of the barriers to its application to power generation (see Sec-
tion 7.10). Barriers for application of CCS in industry include space 
constraints when applied in retrofit situations (Concawe, 2011); high 
capital costs and long project development times; investment risk 
associated with poorly defined liability; the trade-exposed nature of 
many industries, which can limit viable CCS business models; current 
lack in general of financial incentives to offset the additional cost of 
CCS; and the immaturity of CO2 capture technology for cement, iron 
and steel, and petrochemical industries (Kheshgi et al., 2012). 
10�9�3 Material efficiency
There are technically feasible opportunities to improve material effi-
ciency in industry (Allwood et  al., 2011). One opportunity is a circu-
lar economy, which is a growing model across various countries and 
which aims to systematically fulfil the hierarchy principles of material 
efficiency “reduce, re-use, recycle” (see Section 10.14). This approach 
however, has barriers which include a lack of human and institutional 
capacities to encourage management decisions and public participa-
tion (Geng and Doberstein, 2008), as well as fragmented and weak 
Table 10�6 | Barriers (–) and opportunities (+) for GHG emission reduction options in industry. References and discussion appear in respective sub-sections of 10.9.
Energy efficiency for reducing 
energy requirements









+ many options available
– technical risk 
+ cogeneration mature in heavy industry
– non-transparent and technically demanding 
interconnection procedures for cogeneration
+ fuels and technologies readily available
– retrofit challenges
+ large potential scope for CCS in cement 
production, iron and steel, and petrochemicals
– limited CCS technology development, 
demonstration and maturity 
for industry applications






+ /– approaches and 
technologies available 
for some sources
– lack of lower cost 
technology for PFC 






+ less energy and fuel use, lower 
cooling needs, smaller size
– concentrating suitable heat 
loads for cogeneration
– retrofit constraints on cogeneration
– lack of sufficient feedstock to meet demand
– CCS retrofit constraints
– lack of CO2 pipeline infrastructure
– limited scope and lifetime for 
industrial CO2 utilization




industry proximity for 
material / waste reuse
+ reduction in 
raw materials and 
disposed products
– lack of control 




– impact of non-energy policies
+ energy efficiency policies (10.11)
– market barriers
– regulatory, tax / tariff and 
permitting of cogeneration
+ /– grid access for cogeneration
– fragmented and 
weak institutions
– regulatory and legal 
instruments generally 
do not take account 
of externalities
– lack of certification of 
refrigeration systems
– regulatory barriers 
to HFC alternatives 
in aerosols
Cultural
– lack of trained personnel
+ / – attention to energy efficiency
– lack of acceptance of unconventional 
manufacturing processes
– cogeneration outside core business
– lack of consumer and policymaker 
knowledge of cogeneration
– social acceptance of CCS + / – public 
participation
– human capacity 
for management 
decisions
+ /– user preferences 
drive demand 
– lack of 
information / education 
about solvent 
replacements
– lack of awareness of 
alternative refrigerants
Financial
– access to capital and short 
investment payback requirements
– high overhead costs for small or 
less energy intensive industries
+ /– factoring in efficiency into investment 
decisions (e. g., energy management)
+ cogeneration economic in many cases
+ /– market value of grid power for cogeneration
– high capital cost for cogeneration 
– lack of sufficient financial incentive 
for widespread CCS deployment
– liability risk for CCS
– high CCS capital cost and long 
project development times 







and labour favour 
increased production
– recycled HFCs not 
cost competitive 
with new HFCs






institutions (Geng et al., 2010b). Improving material efficiency by inte-
grating different industries (see Section 10.5) is often limited by spe-
cific local conditions, infrastructure requirements (e. g., pipelines) and 
the complexity of multiple users (Geng et al., 2010b).
10�9�4 Product demand reduction
Improved product design or material properties, respectively, can 
help to extend the product’s lifetime and can lead to lower product 
demand. However it has to be considered that extended lifetime may 
not actually satisfy current user preferences, and the user may choose 
to replace an older, functioning product with a new one (van Nes and 
Cramer, 2006; Allwood et  al., 2011). In addition, continually provid-
ing newer products may result in lower operational emissions (e. g., 
improved energy efficiency). In this case, longer product lifetimes 
might not automatically lead to lower overall emissions. For example, 
from a lifecycle balance point of view, it may be better to replace 
specific energy-intensive products such as washing machines, before 
their end-of-life to make use of more efficient substitutes (Scholl et al., 
2010; Intlekofer et al., 2010; Fischer et al., 2012; Agrawal et al., 2012). 
Businesses are rewarded for growing sales volumes and can prefer 
process innovation over product innovation (e. g., EIO 2011; 2012). 
Existing markets generally do not take into account negative exter-
nalities associated with resource use nor do they adequately incor-
porate the risks of resource-related conflicts (Bleischwitz et al., 2012; 
Transatlantic Academy, 2012), yet existing national accounting sys-
tems based on GDP indicators also support the pursuit of actions 
and policies that aim to increase demand spending for more prod-
ucts (Jackson, 2009; Roy and Pal, 2009). Labour unions often have 
an ambivalent position in terms of environmental policies and partly 
see environmental goals as a threat for their livelihood (Räthzel and 
Uzzell, 2012).
10�9�5 Non-CO2 greenhouse gases
Non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions are an important contributor to 
industry process emissions (note that emissions of CO2 from calcina-
tion are another important contributor: for barriers to controlling these 
emissions by CO2 capture and storage see Section 10.9.2). Barriers to 
preventing or avoiding the release of HFCs, CFCs, HCFCs, PFC, and SF6 
in industry and from its products include: lack of awareness of alterna-
tive refrigerants and lack of guidance as to their use in a given or new 
system (UNEP and EC, 2010); lack of certification and control of leak-
age of HFCs from refrigeration (Heijnes et al., 1999); cost of recycled 
HFCs in markets where there is direct competition from newly pro-
duced HFCs (Heijnes et al., 1999); lack of information and communica-
tion and education about solvent replacements (Heijnes et al., 1999; 
IPCC / TEAP, 2005); cost of adaptation of existing aluminium production 
for PFC emission reduction and the absence of lower cost technologies 
in such situations (Heijnes et  al., 1999); cost of incineration of HFCs 
emitted in HCFC production (Heijnes et al., 1999); regulatory barriers 
to alternatives to some HFC use in aerosols (IPCC / TEAP, 2005). UNEP 
(2010) found that there are technically and economically feasible 
substitutes for HCFCs, however, transitional costs remain a barrier for 
smaller enterprises. 




This section assesses transformation pathways for the industry sector 
over the 21st century by examining a wide range of published scenar-
ios. This section builds upon scenarios which were collated by Chapter 
6 in the WG III AR5 Scenario Database (see Annex II.10), which span 
a wide range of possible energy future pathways and which rely on a 
wide range of assumptions (e. g., population, economic growth, poli-
cies, and technology development and its acceptance). Against that 
background, scenarios for the industrial sector over the 21st century 
associated with different atmospheric CO2eq concentrations in 2100 
are assessed in Section 10.10.1, and corresponding implications for 
sustainable development and investment are assessed in Section 
10.10.2 from a sector perspective. 
10�10�1 Industry transformation pathways
The different possible trajectories for industry final energy demand 
(globally and for different regions), emissions, and carbon intensity 
under a wide range of CO2eq concentrations over the 21st century are 
shown in Figure 10.11, Figure 10.12 and Figure 10.1320. These scenar-
ios exhibit economic growth in general over the 21st century as well 
as growth specifically in the industry sector. Detailed scenarios of the 
industry sector extend to 2050 and exhibit increasing material produc-
tion, e. g., iron / steel and cement (Sano et al., 2013; IEA, 2009b; Akashi 
et  al., 2013). Scenarios generated by general equilibrium models, 
which include economic feedbacks (see Table 6.1), implicitly include 
changes in material flow due to, for example, changes in prices that 
may be driven by a price on carbon; however, these models do not gen-
erally provide detailed subsectoral material flows. Options for reduc-
ing material demand and inter-input substitution elasticities (Roy et al., 
20 This section builds upon emissions scenarios which were collated by Chapter 6 
in the WGIII AR5 scenario database (see Section 6.2.2), and compares them to 
detailed scenarios for industry referenced in this section. The scenarios included both 
baseline and mitigation scenarios. As described in more detail in Section 6.3.2, the 
scenarios shown in this section are categorized into bins based on 2100 concentra-
tions: between 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq, 530 – 650 ppm CO2eq, and > 650 ppm CO2eq 
by 2100. The relation between these bins of emission scenarios and the increase in 





2006; Sanstad et al., 2006) are used with various assumptions in the 
models that can better be characterized as gaps in integrated models 
currently in use. 
Final energy (FE) demand from industry increases in most scenarios, 
as seen in Figure 10.11(a) driven by the growth of the industry sector; 
however, FE is weakly dependent on the 2100 CO2eq concentration in 
the scenarios, and the range of FE demand spanned by the scenarios 
becomes wide in the latter half of the century (compare also Figure 
6.37). In these scenarios, energy productivity improvements help to 
limit the increase in FE. For example, results of the DNE21+ and AIM 
models include a 56 % and 114 % increase in steel produced from 
2010 to 2050 and a decrease in FE per unit production of 20 – 22 % 
and 28 – 34 % (these are the ranges spanned by the reference, 550 and 
450 ppm CO2eq scenarios for each model), respectively (Akashi et al., 
2013; Sano et al., 2013). While energy efficiency of industry improves 
with time, the growth of CCS in some scenarios leads to increases in 
FE demand. Growth of final energy for cement production to 2050, for 
example, is seen in Figure 10.11(a) due to energy required for CCS in 
the cement industry mitigation scenarios (i. e., going from AIM cement 
> 650 ppm CO2eq scenario to the < 650 ppm CO2eq scenarios). 
After 2050, emissions from industry, including indirect emissions 
resulting from industrial electricity demand become very low, and in 
some scenarios even negative as seen in Figure 10.11(b). The emis-
sion intensity of FE shown in Figure 10.11(c) decreases in most sce-
narios over the century, and decreases more strongly for low CO2eq 
concentration levels. A decrease in emission intensity is generally the 
dominant mechanism for decrease in direct plus indirect emissions in 
the < 650 ppm CO2eq scenarios shown in Figure 10.11. In scenarios 
Figure 10�11 | Industry sector scenarios over the 21st century that lead to low (430 – 530 ppm CO2eq), medium (530 – 650 ppm CO2eq) and high (> 650 ppm CO2eq) atmospheric 
CO2eq concentrations in 2100 (see Table 6.3 for definitions of categories). All results are indexed relative to 2010 values for each scenario. Panels show: (a) final energy demand; 
(b) direct plus indirect CO2eq emissions; (c) emission intensity (emissions from (b) divided by energy from (a)). Indirect emissions are emissions from industrial electricity demand. 
The median scenario (horizontal line symbol) surrounded by the darker colour bar (inner quartiles of scenarios) and lighter bar (full range) represent those 120 scenarios assessed 
in Chapter 6 with model default technology assumptions which submitted detailed final energy and emissions data for the industrial sector; white bars show the full range of 
scenarios including an additional 408, with alternate economic, resource, and technology assumptions (e. g., altering the economic and population growth rates, excluding some 
technology options or increasing response of energy efficiency improvement) (Source: WG III AR5 Scenario Database, see Annex II.10). Symbols are provided for selected scenarios 
for industry and industry sub-sectors (iron and steel, cement) for the IEA ETP (IEA, 2012d), AIM Enduse (Akashi et al., 2013 and Table A.II.14) and DNE21+ models (Sano et al., 
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with strong decreases in emission intensity, this is generally due to 
some combination of application of CCS to direct industry emissions, 
and a shift to a lower-carbon carrier of energy — for example, a shift 
to low- or negative-carbon sources of electricity. Low carbon electric-
ity is assessed in Chapter 7 and bioenergy with CCS — which could in 
theory result in net CO2 removal from the atmosphere — is assessed in 
Chapter 11, Section 11.13.
Figure 10.12 shows the regional breakdown of final energy demand 
by world regions for different scenarios for the industrial sector. Over 
the 21st century, scenarios indicate that the growth of industry FE 
demand continues to be greatest in Asia, followed by the Middle East 
and Africa, although at a slower growth rate than seen over the last 
decade (see Section 10.3). The OECD-1990, Latin America, and Reform-
ing Economies regions are expected to comprise a decreasing fraction 
of the world’s industrial FE.
Figure 10.13 shows the projected changes in the shares of industry 
sector energy carriers — electricity, solids (primarily coal), and liquids, 
gases and hydrogen — from 2010 to 2100 for 120 scenarios (com-
pare also Figure 6.38 with low carbon fuel shares in industrial final 
energy). Scenarios for all CO2eq concentration levels show an increase 
in the share of electricity in 2100 compared to 2010, and generally 
show a decrease in the share of liquids / gases / hydrogen. Some of the 
< 650 ppm CO2eq scenarios show an increase in the share of solids in 
2100 compared to 2010 and some show a decrease. For the > 650 ppm 
CO2eq scenarios, the change in shares from 2010 to 2100 is generally 
smaller than the change in shares for the < 650 ppm CO2eq scenarios. 
A shift towards solids could lead to reduced emissions if the scenarios 
include the application of CCS to the emissions from solids. A shift 
towards electricity could lead to reduced emissions if the electricity 
generation is from low emission energy sources. The strong decrease 
in indirect emissions from electricity demand in most 430 – 530 ppm 
CO2eq scenarios is shown in Figure 6.34 (see Section 6.8), with elec-
tricity emissions already negative in some scenarios by 2050. Each 
pathway implies some degree of lock-in of technology types and their 
supporting infrastructure, which has important implications; e. g., 
iron / steel in the basic oxygen furnace (BOF) route might follow a path-
way with a higher solid fuel share but with CCS for direct emissions 
reduction by the industry. A decarbonized power sector provides the 
means to reduce the emission intensity of electricity use in the indus-
trial sector, but barriers, such as a lack of a sufficient carbon price, exist 
(IEA, 2009b; Bassi et al., 2009). Barriers to decarbonization of electric-
ity are discussed in more detail in Section 7.10.
Figure 10�12 | Final energy demand from the industry sector shown for the RC5 regions (see Annex II.2 for definition) over the 21st century. Bars are compiled using information 
from 105 of the 120 scenarios assessed in Chapter 6, with model default technology assumptions that submitted detailed final energy and emissions data for the industrial sector. 
Bar height corresponds to the median scenario with respect to final energy demand relative to 2010; breakdown fractions correspond to the mean of scenarios. Source: WG III AR5 






















































































































































































The IEA (2012d) 2DS scenario (Figure 10.14) shows a primary contri-
bution to mitigation in 2050 from energy efficiency followed by recy-
cling and energy recovery, fuel and feedstock switching, and a strong 
application of CCS to direct emissions. Carbon dioxide capture and 
storage has limited application before 2030, since CO2 capture has yet 
to be applied at commercial scale in major industries such as cement 
or iron / steel and faces various barriers (see Section 10.9). Increased 
application of CCS is a precondition for rapid transitions and associ-
ated high levels of technology development and investment as well 
as social acceptance. The AIM 450 CO2eq scenario (Akashi et al., 2013) 
has, for example, a stronger contribution from CCS than the IEA 2DS 
from 2030 onward, whereas the DNE21+ 450 ppm CO2eq scenario 
(Sano et al., 2013) has a weaker contribution as shown in Figure 10.14� 
These more detailed industry sector scenarios fall within the range of 
the full set of scenarios shown in Figure 10.11�
10�10�2 Transition, sustainable development, 
and investment
Transitions in industry will require significant investment and offer 
opportunities for sustainable development (e. g., employment). Invest-
ment and development opportunities may be greatest in regions where 
industry is growing, particularly because investment in new facilities 
provides the opportunity to ‘leapfrog’, or avoid the use of less-efficient 
higher emissions technologies present in existing facilities, thus offer-
ing the opportunity for more sustainable development (for discussion 
of co-benefits and adverse side-effects when implementing mitigation 
options, see Section 10.8). 
The wide range of scenarios implies that there will be massive invest-
ments in the industry sector over the 21st century. Mitigation scenarios 
generally imply an even greater investment in industry with shifts in 
investment focus. For example, due to an intensive use of mitigation 
technologies in the IEA’s Blue Scenarios (IEA, 2009d), global invest-
ments in industry are 2 – 2.5 trillion USD higher by the middle of the 
century than in the reference case; successfully deploying these tech-
nologies requires not only consideration of competing investment 
options, but also removal of barriers and seizing of new opportunities 
(see Section 10.9). 
The stringent mitigation scenarios discussed in Section 10.10.1 envis-
age emission intensity reductions, in particular due to deployment of 
CCS. However, public acceptance of widespread diffusion of CCS might 
hinder the realization of such scenarios. Taking the potential resistance 
into account, some alternative mitigation scenarios may require reduc-
Figure 10�13 | The ternary panel on the left provides the industry final energy share trajectories across three groups of energy carriers: electricity, solids, and liquids-gases-hydrogen. The 
path of each scenario’s trajectory is shown by a single line with symbols at the start in 2010 (the diamond towards the lower right accounts for 3 of 120 trajectories generated from one 
model that start in 2010 at a higher solids and lower liquids, gases, hydrogen share than the remainder of the trajectories which start at the upper diamond), in 2050 and at the end in 
2100. The lines in the three panels on the right show the shares of energy carriers for each of the trajectories in the ternary diagram in 2100; the diamonds show the average share across 
a panel’s models in 2010. Results are shown for those 120 scenarios assessed in Chapter 6, with model default technology assumptions that submitted detailed final energy and emis-




















































tion of energy service demand (Kainuma et al., 2013). For the industry 
sector, options to reduce material demand or reduce demand for prod-
ucts become important as the latter do not rely on investment chal-
lenges, although they face a different set of barriers and can have high 
transaction costs (see Section 10.9).
Industry-related climate change mitigation options vary widely and 
may positively or negatively affect employment. Identifying mitiga-
tion options that enhance positive effects (e. g., due to some energy 
efficiency improvements) and minimize the negative outcomes is 
therefore critical. Some studies have argued that climate change 
mitigation policies can lead to unemployment and economic down-
turn (e. g. Babiker and Eckaus, 2007; Chateau et  al., 2011) because 
such policies can threaten labour demand (e. g. Martinez-Fernandez 
et  al., 2010) and can be regressive (Timilsina, 2009). Alternatively, 
other studies suggest that environmental regulation could stimulate 
eco-innovation and investment in more efficient production tech-
niques and result in increased employment (OECD, 2009). Particu-
larly, deployment of efficient energy technologies can lead to higher 
employment (Wei et al., 2010; UNIDO, 2011) depending on how redis-
tribution of investment funds takes place within an economy (Sath-
aye and Gupta, 2010). 
10.11 Sectoral policies
It is important to note that there is no single policy that can address 
the full variety of mitigation options for the industry sector. In addition 
to overarching policies (see Chapter 15 in particular, and Chapters 14 
and 16), combinations of sectoral policies are needed. The diverse and 
relatively even mix of policy types in the industrial sector reflects the 
fact that there are numerous barriers to energy and material efficiency 
in the sector (see Section 10.9), and that industry is quite heteroge-
neous. In addition, the level of energy efficiency of industrial facili-
ties varies significantly, both within subsectors and within and across 
regions. Most countries or regions use a mix of policy instruments, 
many of which interact. For example, energy audits for energy-inten-
sive manufacturing firms are regularly combined with voluntary / nego-
tiated agreements and energy management schemes (Anderson and 
Newell, 2004; Price and Lu, 2011; Rezessy and Bertoldi, 2011; Sten-
qvist and Nilsson, 2012). Tax exemptions are often combined with an 
obligation to conduct energy audits (Tanaka, 2011). Current practice 
acknowledges the importance of policy portfolios (e. g., Brown et al., 
2011), as well as the necessity to consider national contexts and unin-
Figure 10�14 | Mitigation of direct CO2eq annual emissions in five major industrial sectors: iron / steel, cement, chemicals / petrochemicals, pulp / paper, and aluminium. The left panel 
shows results from IEA scenarios (IEA, 2012d), broken down by mitigation option. The tops of the bars show the IEA 4DS low demand scenario, the light blue bars show the 2DS 
low demand scenario. The bar layers show the mitigation options that contribute to the emission difference from the 4DS to the 2DS low demand scenario. The right panel shows 
mitigation by CCS of direct industrial emissions in IEA, AIM Enduse (Akashi et al., 2013 and Table A.II.14) and DNE21+ (Sano et al., 2013a, b; and Table A.II.14) models. Scenarios 




































































































































































q2010 2020 2030 20502040




Recycling and Energy Recovery
Energy Efficiency
Fuel and Feedstock Switching
CCS





tended behaviour of industrial companies. In terms of the latter, carbon 
leakage is relevant in the discussion of policies for industry (for a more 
in-depth analysis of carbon leakage see Chapter 5). 
So far, only a few national governments have evaluated their industry-
specific policy mixes (Reinaud and Goldberg, 2011). For the UK, Barker 
et  al. (2007) modelled the impact of the UK Climate Change Agree-
ments (CCAs) and estimated that from 2000 to 2010 they would result 
in a reduction of total final demand for energy of 2.6 % and a reduc-
tion in CO2 emissions of 3.3 %. The CCAs established targets for indus-
trial energy-efficiency improvements in energy-intensive industrial sec-
tors; firms that met the targets qualified for a reduction of 80 % on 
the Climate Change Levy (CCL) rates on energy use in these sectors. 
Barker et al. (2007) also show that the macro-economic effect on the 
UK economy from the policies was positive.
In addition to dedicated sector-specific mitigation policies, co-benefits 
(see Section 10.8 and this report’s framing chapters) should be consid-
ered. For example, local air quality standards have an indirect effect 
on mitigation as they set incentives for substitution of inefficient pro-
duction technologies. Given the priorities of many governments, these 
indirect policies have played a relatively more effective role than cli-
mate policies, e. g. in India (Roy, 2010). 
10�11�1 Energy efficiency
The use of energy efficiency policy in industry has increased appre-
ciably in many IEA countries as well as major developing countries 
since the late 1990s (Roy, 2007; Worrell et  al., 2009; Tanaka, 2011; 
Halsnæs et  al., 2014). A review of 575 policy measures found that, 
as of 2010, information programmes are the most prevalent (40 %), 
followed by economic instruments (35 %), and measures such as 
regulatory approaches and voluntary actions (24 %) (Tanaka, 2011). 
Identification of energy efficiency opportunities through energy audits 
is the most popular measure, followed by subsidies, regulations for 
equipment efficiency, and voluntary / negotiated agreements. A classi-
fication of the various types of policies and their coverage are shown 
in Figure 10.15 and experiences in a range of these policies are ana-
lyzed below.
Figure 10�15 | Selected policies for energy efficiency in industry and their coverage (from Tanaka, 2011).














































Greenhouse gas cap-and-trade and carbon tax schemes that aim to 
enhance energy efficiency in energy-intensive industry have been 
established in developed countries, particularly in the last decade, and 
are recently emerging in some developing countries. The largest exam-
ple of these economic instruments by far is the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme (ETS). A more in-depth analysis of these overarching 
mechanisms is provided in Chapter 15. 
Among regulatory approaches, regulations and energy efficiency stan-
dards for equipment have increased dramatically since 1992 (Tanaka, 
2011). With regards to target-driven policies, one of the key initiatives 
for realizing the energy intensity reduction goals in China was the Top-
1,000 Energy-Consuming Enterprises programme that required the 
establishment of energy-saving targets, energy use reporting systems 
and energy conservation plans, adoption of incentives and investments, 
and audits and training. The programme resulted in avoided CO2 emis-
sions of approximately 400 MtCO2 compared to a business-as-usual 
baseline, and has been expanded to include more facilities under the 
new Top-10,000 enterprise programme. (Lin et  al., 2011; Price et  al., 
2011; NDRC, 2011b)
Many firms (in particular SMEs) with rather low energy costs as a 
share of their revenue allocate fewer resources to improving energy 
efficiency, resulting in a low level of knowledge about the availabil-
ity of energy-efficiency options (Gruber and Brand, 1991; Ghosh and 
Roy, 2011). Energy audits help to overcome such information barriers 
(Schleich, 2004) and can result in the faster adoption of energy-effi-
cient measures (Fleiter et al., 2012b). The effectiveness of 22 industrial 
energy auditing programmes in 15 countries has been reviewed by 
Price and Lu (2011), who give recommendations on the success factors 
(e. g., use of public databases for benchmarking, use of incentives for 
participation in audits). 
Energy Management Systems (EnMS) are a collection of business 
processes, carried out at plants and firms, designed to encourage 
and facilitate systematic improvement in energy efficiency. The typi-
cal elements of EnMS include maintenance checklists, measurement 
processes, performance indicators and benchmarks, progress reporting, 
and on-site energy managers (McKane, 2007). The adoption of EnMS 
schemes in industry can be mandatory, as in Japan, Italy, Turkey, or 
Portugal (Tanaka, 2011) or voluntary, and can be guided by standards, 
such as the international standard ISO 5000121. Backlund et  al. and 
Thollander and Palm (2012; 2013) argue that improvement in practices 
identified by EnMS and audits should be given a greater role in studies 
of potential for energy efficiency, as most studies concentrate only on 
the technological and economic potentials. 
There are a number of case studies that argue for the environmen-
tal and economic effectiveness of EnMS and energy audits (Ander-
son and Newell, 2004; Ogawa et  al., 2011; Shen et  al., 2012). Some 
21 http: / / www. iso. org / iso / home / standards / management-standards / iso50001.htm.
studies report very quick payback for energy efficiency investments 
identified during such assessments (Price et al., 2008). For example, a 
programme in Germany offering partial subsidies to SMEs for energy 
audits was found to have saved energy at a cost to the German gov-
ernment of 2.4 – 5.7 USD2010 / tCO2 (Fleiter et al., 2012b). In another case, 
the energy audit program by the Energy Conservation Centre of Japan 
(ECCJ), was found to provide positive net benefits for society, defined 
as the net benefit to private firms minus the costs to government, of 
65 USD2010 / tCO2 (Kimura and Noda, 2010). On the other hand, there 
are also studies that report mixed results of some mandatory EMS and 
energy audits, where some companies did not achieve any energy effi-
ciency improvements (Kimura and Noda, 2010).
Many countries use benchmarking to compare energy use among 
different facilities within a particular sector (Tanaka, 2008; Price and 
McKane, 2009). In the Netherlands, for example, the Benchmarking 
Covenants encourage companies to compare themselves to others and 
to commit to becoming among the most energy-efficient in the world. 
However, in many countries high-quality energy efficiency data for 
benchmarking is lacking (Saygin et al., 2011b).
Negotiated, or voluntary agreements (VAs), have been found in 
various assessments to be effective and cost-efficient (Rezessy and 
Bertoldi, 2011). Agreement programmes (e. g., in Ireland, France, 
the Netherlands, Denmark, UK, Sweden) were often responsible for 
increasing the adoption of energy-efficiency and mitigation technolo-
gies by industries beyond what would have been otherwise adopted 
without the programmes (Price et  al., 2010; Stenqvist and Nilsson, 
2012). Some key factors contributing to successful VAs appear to be 
a strong institutional framework, a robust and independent moni-
toring and evaluation system, credible mechanisms for dealing with 
non-compliance, capacity-building and — very importantly — accom-
panying measures such as free or subsidized energy audits, manda-
tory energy management plans, technical assistance, information and 
financing for implementation (Rezessy and Bertoldi, 2011), as well as 
dialogue between industry and government (Yamaguchi, 2012). Fur-
ther discussion and examples of the effectiveness of VAs can be found 
in Chapter 15. 
10�11�2 Emissions efficiency
Policies directed at increasing energy efficiency (discussed above) most 
often result in reduction of CO2 intensity as well, in particular when the 
aim is to make the policy part of a wider policy mix addressing multiple 
policy objectives. Examples of emissions efficiency policy strategies 
include support schemes and fiscal incentives for fuel switching, R&D 
programmes for CCS, and inclusion of reduction of non-CO2 gases in 
voluntary agreements (e. g., Japanese voluntary action plan Keidanren, 
see Chapter 15). 
Regarding gases with a relatively high GWP such as HFCs, PFCs, 





sector (e. g., Japan; Nishimura and Sugiyama, 2008), but there is 
not much experience in the industry sector. The CDM has driven 
abatement of the industrial gases HFC-23 and N2O in developing 
countries because of monetary incentives (Michaelowa and Buen, 
2012)22. Including high GWP emissions within the same cap and 
trade programme (and therefore prices) as energy-related emissions 
may draw opposition from the industries concerned, so special pro-
grammes for these gases could be a better alternative (Hall, 2007). 
Another option suggested is to charge an upfront fee that would 
then be refunded when the gases are later captured and destroyed 
(Hall, 2007).
10�11�3 Material efficiency
Policy instruments for material or resource use efficiency in general 
are only just starting to be promoted for mitigation of GHG emissions 
in industry; consequently, effective communication to industry on the 
need and potential for an integrated approach is still lacking (Letten-
meier et al., 2009). Similarly, waste management policies are still not 
driven by climate concerns, although the potential for GHG emission 
reductions through waste management is increasingly recognized 
and accounted for (see Section 10.14, e. g., Worrell and van Sluisveld, 
2013). Several economic instruments (e. g., taxes and charges) related 
to waste disposal have been shown to be effective in preventing waste, 
although they do not necessarily lead to improved design measures 
being taken further upstream (Hogg et al., 2011). 
A number of policy packages are directly and indirectly aimed 
at reducing material input per unit of product or unit of service 
demand. Some examples are the European Action Plan on Sustain-
able Consumption and Production (SCP) and Sustainable Industry 
(EC, 2008a), the EU’s resource efficiency strategy and roadmap (EC, 
2011, 2012b), and Germany’s resource efficiency programme, Prog-
Ress (BMU, 2012). SCP policies23 include both voluntary and regula-
tory instruments, such as the EU Eco-design Directive, as well as the 
Green Public Procurement policies. Aside from setting a framework 
and long-term goals for future legislation and setting up networks 
and knowledge bases, these packages include few specific policies 
and, most importantly, do not set quantitative targets nor explic-
itly address the link between material efficiency and GHG emission 
reductions.
Some single policies (as opposed to policy packages) related to mate-
rial efficiency do include an assessment of their impacts in terms of 
GHG emissions. For example, the UK’s National Industrial Symbiosis 
Programme (NISP) brokers the exchange of resources between com-
panies (for an explanation of industrial symbiosis, see Section 10.5). 
22 For a more in-depth analysis of CDM as a policy instrument, see Chapter 13, 
Sections 13.7.2 and 13.13.1.2.
23 SCP policies are also covered in Chapter 4 (Sustainable Development and Equity, 
Section 4.4.3.1 SCP policies and programmes)
An assessment of the savings through the NISP estimated that over 6 
MtCO2eq were saved over the first five years (Laybourn and Morrissey, 
2009). The PIUS-Check initiative by the German state of North Rhine-
Westphalia (NRW) offers audits to companies where the relevant 
material flows are analyzed and recommendations for improvements 
are made. These PIUS-checks have been particularly successful in metal 
processing industries, and it is estimated that they have saved 20 thou-
sand tonnes of CO2 (EC, 2009).
In the Asia and Pacific region there are a number of region-specific 
policy instruments for climate change mitigation through SCP, such 
as the China Refrigerator Project, which realized emissions reductions 
of about 11 MtCO2 between 1999 and 2005 by combining several 
practices including sustainable product design, technological innova-
tion, eco-labelling, and awareness raising of consumers and retailers 
(SWITCH-Asia Network Facility, 2009). However, there is still a lack of 
solid ex-post assessments on SCP policy impacts. 
Besides industry-specific policies there are policies with a different sec-
tor focus that influence industrial activity indirectly, by reducing the 
need for products (e. g., car pooling incentive schemes can lead to 
the production of less cars) or industrial materials (e. g., vehicle fuel 
economy targets can incentivize the design of lighter vehicles). A stra-
tegic approach in order to reflect the economy-wide resource use and 
the global risks may consist of national accounting systems beyond 
GDP24 (Jackson, 2009; Roy and Pal, 2009; Arrow et  al., 2010; GEA, 
2012), including systems to account for increasing resource productiv-
ity (OECD, 2008; Bringezu and Bleischwitz, 2009) and of new inter-
national initiatives to spur systemic eco-innovations in key areas such 
as cement and steel production, light-weight cars, resource efficient 
construction, and reducing food waste. 
10.12 Gaps in  knowledge 
and data
The key challenge for making an assessment of the industry sector is 
the diversity in practices, which results in uncertainty, lack of com-
parability, incompleteness, and quality of data available in the pub-
lic domain on process and technology specific energy use and costs. 
This diversity makes assessment of mitigation potential with high con-
fidence at global and regional scales extremely difficult. Sector data 
are generally collected by industry / trade associations (international 
or national), are highly aggregated, and generally give little informa-
tion about individual processes. The enormous variety of processes 
and technologies adds to the complexity of assessment (Tanaka, 2008, 
2012; Siitonen et al., 2010).





Other major gaps in knowledge identified are:
•	 A systematic approach and underlying methodologies to avoid 
double counting due to the many different ways of attributing 
emissions (10.1).
•	 An in-depth assessment of mitigation potential and associated 
costs achievable particularly through material efficiency and 
demand-side options (10.4).
•	 Analysis of climate change impacts on industry and industry-spe-
cific mitigation options, as well as options for adaptation (10.6).
•	 Comprehensive information on sector and sub-sector specific 
option-based mitigation potential and associated costs based on a 
comparable methodology and transparent assumptions (10.7).
•	 Effect on long-term scenarios of demand reduction strategies 
through an improved modelling of material flows, inclusion of 
regional producer behaviour model parameters in integrated mod-
els (10.10). 
•	 Understanding of the net impacts of different types of policies, 
the mitigation potential of linked policies e. g., resource effi-
ciency / energy efficiency policies, as well as policy as drivers of car-
bon leakage effects (10.11). 
10.13 Frequently Asked 
Questions 
FAQ 10�1 How much does the industry sector 
 contribute to GHG emissions? 
Global industrial GHG emissions accounted for just over 30 % of 
global GHG emissions in 2010. Global industry and waste / wastewater 
GHG emissions grew from 10 GtCO2eq in 1990 to 13 GtCO2eq in 2005 
to 15 GtCO2eq in 2010. Over half (52 %) of global direct GHG emis-
sions from industry and waste / wastewater are from the ASIA region, 
followed by OECD-1990 (25 %), EIT (9 %), MAF (8 %), and LAM (6 %). 
GHG emissions from industry grew at an average annual rate of 3.5 % 
globally between 2005 and 2010. This included 7 % average annual 
growth in the ASIA region, followed by MAF (4.4 %) and LAM (2 %), 
and the EIT countries (0.1 %), but declined in the OECD-1990 coun-
tries (– 1.1 %). (10.3)
In 2010, industrial GHG emissions were comprised of direct energy-
related CO2 emissions of 5.3 GtCO2eq, 5.2 GtCO2eq indirect CO2 emis-
sions from production of electricity and heat for industry, process CO2 
emissions of 2.6 GtCO2eq, non-CO2 GHG emissions of 0.9 GtCO2eq, 
and waste / wastewater emissions of 1.4 GtCO2eq. (10.3)
2010 direct and indirect emissions were dominated by CO2 (85.1 %) 
followed by CH4 (8.6 %), HFC (3.5 %), N2O (2.0 %), PFC (0.5 %) and SF6 
(0.4 %) emissions. Between 1990 and 2010, N2O emissions from adipic 
acid and nitric acid production and PFC emissions from aluminium pro-
duction decreased while HFC-23 emissions from HCFC-22 production 
increased. In the period 1990 – 2005, fluorinated gases (F-gases) were 
the most important non-CO2 GHG source in manufacturing industry. 
(10.3)
FAQ 10�2 What are the main mitigation options 
in the industry sector and what is the 
potential for reducing GHG emissions? 
Most industry sector scenarios indicate that demand for materials 
(steel, cement, etc.) will increase by between 45 % to 60 % by 2050 
relative to 2010 production levels. To achieve an absolute reduc-
tion in emissions from the industry sector will require a broad set 
of mitigation options going beyond current practices. Options for 
mitigation of GHG emissions from industry fall into the following 
categories: energy efficiency, emissions efficiency (including fuel and 
feedstock switching, carbon dioxide capture and storage), material 
efficiency (for example through reduced yield losses in production), 
re-use of materials and recycling of products, more intensive and 
longer use of products, and reduced demand for product services. 
(10.4, 10.10)
In the last two to three decades there have been strong improve-
ments in energy and process efficiency in industry, driven by the rela-
tively high share of energy costs. Many options for energy efficiency 
improvement still remain, and there is still potential to reduce the gap 
between actual energy use and the best practice in many industries. 
Based on broad deployment of best available technologies, the GHG 
emissions intensity of the sector could be reduced through energy effi-
ciency by approximately 25 %. Through innovation, additional reduc-
tions of approximately 20 % in energy intensity may potentially be 
realized before approaching technological limits in some energy inten-
sive industries. (10.4, 10.7) 
In addition to energy efficiency, material efficiency — using less new 
material to provide the same final service — is an important and prom-
ising option for GHG reductions that has had little attention to date. 
Long-term step-change options, including a shift to low carbon elec-
tricity or radical product innovations (e. g., alternatives to cement), may 
have the potential to contribute to significant mitigation in the future. 
(10.4)
FAQ 10�3 How will the level of product demand, 
interactions with other sectors, and 
collaboration within the industry sector 
affect emissions from industry? 
The level of demand for new and replacement products has a sig-
nificant effect on the activity level and resulting GHG emissions in 





intensively could contribute to reduction of product demand without 
reducing the service. However, assessment of such strategies needs 
a careful net-balance (including calculation of energy demand in the 
production process and associated GHG emissions). Absolute emis-
sion reductions can also come about through changes in lifestyle and 
their corresponding demand levels, be it directly (e. g., for food, tex-
tiles) or indirectly (e. g., for product / service demand related to tour-
ism). (10.4)
Mitigation strategies in other sectors may lead to increased emissions 
in industry if they require enhanced use of energy intensive materials 
(e. g., higher production of solar cells (PV) and insulation materials for 
buildings). Moreover, collaborative interactions within the industry sec-
tor and between the industry sector and other economic sectors have 
significant potential for mitigation (e. g., heat cascading). In addition, 
inter-sectoral cooperation, i. e., collaborative interactions among indus-
tries in industrial parks or with regional eco-industrial networks, can 
contribute to mitigation. (10.5)
FAQ 10�4 What are the barriers to reducing emis-
sions in industry and how can these be 
overcome? Are there any co-benefits 
associated with mitigation actions in 
industry? 
Implementation of mitigation measures in industry faces a variety of 
barriers. Typical examples include: the expectation of high return on 
investment (short payback period); high capital costs and long proj-
ect development times for some measures; lack of access to capital 
for energy efficiency improvements and feedstock / fuel change; fair 
market value for cogenerated electricity to the grid; and costs / lack 
of awareness of need for control of HFC leakage. In addition, busi-
nesses today are mainly rewarded for growing sales volumes and 
can prefer process innovation over product innovation. Existing 
national accounting systems based on GDP indicators also support 
the pursuit of actions and policies that aim to increase demand for 
products and do not trigger product demand reduction strategies. 
(10.9)
Addressing the causes of investment risk, and better provisioning of 
user demand in the pursuit of human well-being could enable the 
reduction of industry emissions. Improvements in technologies, effi-
cient sector specific policies (e. g., economic instruments, regulatory 
approaches and voluntary agreements), and information and energy 
management programmes could all contribute to overcome tech-
nological, financial, institutional, legal, and cultural barriers. (10.9, 
10.11)
Implementation of mitigation measures in industries and related poli-
cies might gain momentum if co-benefits (10.8) are considered along 
with direct economic costs and benefits (10.7). Mitigation actions can 
improve cost competitiveness, lead to new market opportunities, and 
enhance corporate reputation through indirect social and environmen-
tal benefits at the local level. Associated positive health effects can 
enhance public acceptance. Mitigation can also lead to job creation 
and wider environmental gains such as reduced air and water pollu-
tion and reduced extraction of raw materials which in turn leads to 
reduced GHG emissions. (10.8)
10.14 Appendix: Waste
10�14�1 Introduction
Waste generation and reuse is an integral part of human activity. 
Figure 10.2 and Section 10.4 have shown how industries enhance 
resource use efficiency through recycling or reuse before discarding 
resources to landfills, which follows the waste hierarchy shown in Fig-
ure 10.16� Several mitigation options exist at the pre-consumer stage. 
Most important is reduction in waste during production processes. 
With regard to post-consumer waste, associated GHG emissions heav-
ily depend on how waste is treated. 
This section provides a summary of knowledge on current emissions 
from wastes generated from various economic activities (focusing on 
solid waste and wastewater) and discusses the mitigation options 
to reduce emissions and recover materials and energy from solid 
wastes. 
10�14�2 Emissions trends
10�14�2�1 Solid waste disposal
The ‘hierarchy of waste management’ as shown in Figure 10.16, places 
waste reduction at the top, followed by re-use, recycling, energy recov-
ery (including anaerobic digestion), treatment without energy recov-
ery (including incineration and composting) and four types of land-
fills ranging from modern sanitary landfills that treat liquid effluents 
and also attempt to capture and use the generated biogas, through 
to traditional non-sanitary landfills (waste designated sites that lack 
controlled measures) and open burning. Finally, at the bottom of the 
pyramid are crude disposal methods in the form of waste dumps 
(designated or non-designated waste disposal sites without any kind 
of treatment) that are still dominant in many parts of the world. The 
hierarchy shown in Figure 10.16 provides general guidance. However, 
lifecycle assessment of the overall impacts of a waste management 
strategy for specific waste composition and local circumstances may 
change the priority order (EC, 2008b).
Municipal solid wastes (MSW) are the most visible and trouble-





ated globally has been estimated at about 1.5 Gt per year (Theme-
lis, 2007) and it is expected to increase to approximately 2.2 Gt by 
2025 (Hoornweg and Bhada-Tata, 2012). Of the current amount, 
approximately 300 Mt are recycled, 200 Mt are treated with energy 
recovery, another 200 Mt are disposed in sanitary landfills, and the 
remaining 800 Mt are discarded in non-sanitary landfills or dumps. 
Thus, much of the recoverable matter in MSW is dispersed through 
mixing with other materials and exposure to reactive environmental 
conditions. The implications for GHG and other emissions are related 
not only to the direct emissions from waste management, but also 
to the emissions from production of materials to replace those lost 
in the waste.
Figure 10.17 presents global emissions from waste from 1970 until 
2010 based on EDGAR version 4.2. Methane emissions from solid 
waste disposal almost doubled between 1970 and 2010. The drop in 
CH4 emissions from solid waste disposal sites (SWDS) starting around 
1990 is most likely related to the decrease in such emissions in Europe 
and the United States. However, it is important to note that the First 
Order Decay (FOD) model used in estimating emissions from solid 
waste disposal sites in the EDGAR database does not account for cli-
mate and soil micro-climate conditions like California Landfill Methane 
Inventory Model (CALMIM) (see Spokas et al., 2011; Spokas and Bog-
ner, 2011; Bogner et al., 2011). 
Global waste emissions per unit of GDP decreased 27 % from 1970 to 
1990 and 34 % from 1990 to 2010, with a decrease of 48 % for the 
entire period (1970 – 2010). Global waste emissions per capita 
increased 10 % between 1970 and 1990, decreased 5 % from 1990 to 
2010, with a net increase of 5 % for the entire period 1970 – 2010 (Fig-
ure 10.17). Several reasons may explain these trends: GHG emissions 
from waste in EU, mainly from solid waste disposal on land and waste-
water handling decreased by 19.4 % in the decade 2000 – 2009; the 
decline is notable when compared to total EU27 emissions over the 
same period, which decreased by 9.3 %25. Energy production from 
waste in the EU in 2009 was more than double that generated in 2000, 
while biogas has experienced a 270 % increase in the same period. 
With the introduction of the Landfill Directive 10 1999 / 31 / EC, the EU 
has established a powerful tool to reduce the amount of biodegrad-
able municipal waste disposed in landfills (Blodgett and Parker, 2010). 
Moreover, methane emissions from landfills in the United States 
25 Eurostat 2013, available at http: / / epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu / statistics_
explained / index.php / Climate_change_-_driving_forces.
Figure 10�16 | The hierarchy of waste management. The priority order and colour coding is based on the five main groups of waste hierarchy classification (Prevention; Preparing 
for Re-Use; Recycling; Other Recovery e. g., Energy Recovery; and Disposal) outlined by the European Commission (EC, 2008b).
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decreased by approximately 27 % from 1990 to 2010. This net emis-
sions decrease can be attributed to many factors, including changes in 
waste composition, an increase in the amount of landfill gas collected 
and combusted, a higher frequency of composting, and increased rates 
of recovery of degradable materials for recycling, e. g., paper and 
paperboard (EPA, 2012b). 
China’s GHG emissions in the waste sector increased rapidly in the 
1981 to 2009 period, along with the growing scale of waste genera-
tion by industries as well as households in urban and rural areas (Qu 
and Yang, 2011). A 79 % increase in landfill methane emissions was 
estimated between 1990 (2.4 Mt) and 2000 (4.4 Mt) due to changes 
in both the amount and composition of municipal waste gener-
ated (Streets et  al., 2001) and emission of China’s waste sector will 
peak at 33.2 MtCO2eq in 2024 (Qu and Yang, 2011). In India (INCCA, 
2010), the waste sector contributed 3 % of total national CO2 emis-
sion equivalent of which 22 % is from municipal solid waste and the 
rest are from domestic wastewater (40 %) and industrial wastewater 
(38 %). Domestic wastewater is the dominant source of CH4 in India. 
The decrease of GHG emissions in the waste sector in the EU and the 
United States from 1990 to 2009 has not been enough to compensate 
for the increase of emissions in other regions resulting in an overall 
increasing trend of total waste-related GHG emissions in that period. 
10�14�2�2 Wastewater 
Methane and nitrous oxide emissions from wastewater steadily 
increased during the last decades reaching 667 and 108 MtCO2eq in 
2010, respectively. Methane emissions from domestic / commercial 
and industrial categories are responsible for 86 % of wastewater GHG 
emissions during the period 1970 – 2010, while the domestic / commer-
cial sector was responsible for approximately 80 % of the methane 
emissions from wastewater category. 
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10�14�3 Technological options for mitigation of 
emissions from waste 
10�14�3�1 Pre-consumer waste
Waste reduction
Pre-consumer (or post-industrial) waste is the material diverted from 
the waste stream during a manufacturing process that does not reach 
the end user. This does not include the reutilization of materials gener-
ated in a process that can be re-used as a substitute for raw materials 
(10.4) without being modified in any way. Waste reduction at the pre-
consumer stage can be achieved by optimizing the use of raw materi-
als, e. g., arranging the pattern of pieces to be cut on a length of fabric 
or metal sheet enable maximum utilization of material with minimum 
of waste.
Recycling and reuse
Material substitution through waste generated from an industrial 
process or manufacturing chain can lead to reduction in total energy 
requirements (10.4) and hence emissions. Section 10.4 discusses 
options for recycling and reuse in the manufacturing industries. The 
same section also discusses the use of municipal solid waste as 
energy source or feedstock, e. g., for the cement industry, as well as 
the possible use of industrial waste for mineralization approaches for 
CCS. 
10�14�3�2 Post-consumer waste
Pre-consumer (or post-industrial) waste is the material resulting from 
a manufacturing process, which joins the waste stream and does not 
reach the end use. The top priority of the post-consumer waste man-
agement is reduction followed by re-use and recycling. 
Waste reduction
To a certain extent, the amount of post-consumer waste is related to 
lifestyle. On a per capita basis, Japan and the EU have about 60 % of 
the US waste generation rates based significantly on different con-
sumer behavior and regulations. Globally, a visionary goal of ‘zero 
waste’ assists countries in designing waste reduction strategies, tech-
nologies, and practices, keeping in mind other resource availability like 
land. Home composting has been successfully used in some regions, 
which reduces municipal waste generation rates (Favoino and Hogg, 
2008; Andersen et al., 2010).
Non-technological behavioural strategies aim to avoid or reduce 
waste, for instance by decoupling waste generation from economic 
activity levels such as GDP (Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2008). In addition, 
strategies are in place that aim to enhance the use of materials and 
products that are easy to recycle, reuse, and recover (Sections 10.4, 
10.11) in close proximity facilities.
Post-consumer waste can be linked with pre-consumer material 
through the principle of Extended Producer Responsibility in order 
to divert the waste going to landfills. This principle or policy is the 
explicit attribution of responsibility to the waste-generating par-
ties, preferably already in the pre-consumer phase. In Germany, for 
example, the principle of producer responsibility for their products in 
the post-consuming phase is made concrete by the issuing of regula-
tions (de Jong, 1997). Sustainable consumption and production and 
its influence on waste minimization are discussed also in Section 
10.11. 
Recycling / reuse
If reduction of post-consumer waste cannot be achieved, reuse and 
recycling is the next priority in order to reduce the amount of waste 
produced and to divert it from disposal (Valerio, 2010). Recycling of 
post-consumer waste can be achieved with high economic value to 
protect the environment and conserve the natural resources (El-Hag-
gar, 2010). Section 10.4 discusses this in the context of reuse in indus-
tries. 
As cities have become hotspots of material flows and stock density 
(Baccini and Brunner, 2012, p.  31) (see Chapter 12), MSW can be 
seen as a material reservoir that can be mined. This can be done 
not only through current recycling and / or energy recovery processes 
(10.4), but also by properly depositing and concentrating substances 
(e. g., metals, paper, plastic) in order to make their recuperation tech-
nically and economically viable in the future. The current amount 
of materials accumulated mainly in old / mature settlements, for the 
most part located in developed countries (Graedel, 2010), exceeds 
the amount of waste currently produced (Baccini and Brunner, 2012, 
p. 50). 
With a high degree of agreement, it has been suggested that urban 
mining (as a contribution towards a zero waste scenario) could 
reduce important energy inputs of material future demands in con-
trast to domestically produced and, even more important for some 
countries, imported materials, while contributing to future material 
accessibility. 
Landfilling and methane capture from landfills
It has been estimated (Themelis and Ulloa, 2007) that annually about 
50 Mt of methane is generated in global landfills, 6 Mt of which are 
captured at sanitary landfills. Sanitary landfills that are equipped to 
capture methane at best capture 50 % of the methane generated; 
however, significantly higher collection efficiencies have been dem-
onstrated at certain well designed and operated landfills with final 
caps / covers of up to 95 %.
The capital investment needed to build a sanitary landfill is less than 
30 % of a waste-to-energy (WTE) plant of the same daily capacity. 
However, because of the higher production of electricity (average of 





MWh for a sanitary landfill), a WTE plant is usually more economic 
over its lifetime of 30 years or more (Themelis and Ulloa, 2007). In 
other regions, however, the production of methane from landfills may 
be lower due to the reduction of biodegradable fraction entering the 
landfills or operating costs may be lower. Therefore, economics of both 
options may be different in such cases.
Landfill aeration
Landfill aeration can be considered as an effective method for GHG 
emissions reduction in the future (Ritzkowski and Stegmann, 2010). In 
situ aeration is one technology that introduces ambient air into MSW 
landfills to enhance biological processes and to inhibit methane pro-
duction (Chai et al., 2013). Ambient air is introduced in the landfill via 
a system of gas wells, which results in accelerated aerobic stabilization 
of deposited waste. The resulting gas is collected and treated (Heyer 
et al., 2005; Prantl et al., 2006). Biological stabilization of the waste 
using in-situ aeration provides the possibility to reduce both the actual 
emissions and the emission potential of the waste material (Prantl 
et al., 2006).
Landfill aeration, which is not widely applied yet, is a promising tech-
nology for treating the residual methane from landfills utilizing land-
fill gas for energy when energy recovery becomes economically unat-
tractive (Heyer et al., 2005; Ritzkowski et al., 2006; Rich et al., 2008). 
In the absence of mandatory environmental regulations that require 
the collection and flaring of landfill gas, landfill aeration might be 
applied to closed landfills or landfill cells without prior gas collection 
and disposal or utilization. For an in situ aerated landfill in north-
ern Germany, for example, landfill aeration achieved a reduction in 
methane emissions by 83 % to 95 % under strictly controlled condi-
tions (Ritzkowski and Stegmann, 2010). Pinjing et  al. (2011) show 
that landfill aeration is associated with increased N2O emissions.
Composting and anaerobic digestion
Municipal solid waste (MSW) contains ‘green’ wastes such as leaves, 
grass, and other garden and park residues, and also food wastes. 
Generally, green wastes are source-separated and composted aer-
obically (i. e., in presence of oxygen) in windrows. However, food 
wastes contain meat and other substances that, when composted 
in windrows, emit unpleasant odours. Therefore, food wastes need 
to be anaerobically digested in closed biochemical reactors. The 
methane generated in these reactors can be used in a gas engine to 
produce electricity, or for heating purposes. Source separation, col-
lection, and anaerobic digestion of food wastes are costly and so far 
have been applied to small quantities of food wastes in a few cit-
ies (e. g., Barcelona, Toronto, Vienna; Arsova, 2010), except in cases 
where some food wastes are co-digested with agricultural residues. 
In contrast, windrow composting is practiced widely; for example, 
62 % of the U. S. green wastes (22.7 million tonnes) were compos-
ted aerobically in 2006 (Arsova et al., 2008), while only 0.68 million 
tonnes of food wastes (i. e., 2.2 % of total food wastes; EPA, 2006a) 
were recovered. 
Energy recovery from waste
With the exception of metals, glass, and other inorganic materials, 
MSW consists of biogenic and petrochemical compounds made of car-
bon and hydrogen atoms. 
The energy contained in solid wastes can be recovered by means of 
several thermal treatment technologies including combustion of as-
received solid wastes on a moving grate, shredding of MSW and com-
bustion on a grate or fluidized bed, mechanical-biological treatment 
(MBT) of MSW into compost, refuse-derived fuel (RDF) or biogas from 
anaerobic digestion, partial combustion and gasification to a synthetic 
gas that is then combusted in a second chamber, and pyrolysis of 
source-separated plastic wastes to a synthetic oil. At this time, an esti-
mated 90 % of the world’s WTE capacity (i. e., about 180 Mt per year) is 
based on combustion of as-received MSW on a moving grate; the same 
is true of the nearly 120 new WTE plants that were built worldwide in 
the period of 2000 – 2007 (Themelis, 2007). 
WTE plants require sophisticated Air Pollution Control (APC) sys-
tems that constitute a large part of the plant. In the last twenty 
years, because of the elaborate and costly APC systems, modern WTE 
plants have become one of the cleanest high temperature industrial 
processes (Nzihou et  al., 2012). Source separation of high moisture 
organic wastes from the MSW increases the thermal efficiency of WTE 
plants. 
Most of the mitigation options mentioned above require expenditures 
and, therefore, are more prevalent in developed countries with higher 
GDP levels. A notable exception to this general rule is China, where 
government policy has encouraged the construction of over 100 WTE 
plants during the first decade of the 21st century (Dong, 2011). Figure 
10.18 shows the share of different management practices concern-
ing the MSW generated in several nations (Themelis and Bourtsalas, 
2013). China, with 18 % WTE and less than 3 % recycling, is at the level 
of Slovakia.
The average chemical energy stored in MSW is about 10 MJ / kg (lower 
heating value, LHV), corresponding to about 2.8 MWh per tonne. The 
average net thermal efficiency of U. S. WTE plants (i. e., electricity to 
the grid) is 20 %, which corresponds to 0.56 MWh per tonne of MSW. 
However, additional energy can be recovered from the exhaust steam 
of the turbine generator. For example, some plants in Denmark and 
elsewhere recover 0.5 MWh of electricity plus 1 MWh of district heat-
ing. A full discussion of the R1 factor, used in the EU for defining over-
all thermal efficiency of a WTE plant can be found in Themelis et al. 
(2013).
Studies of the biogenic and fossil-based carbon based on C14-C12 
measurements on stack gas of nearly forty WTE plants in the United 
States have shown that about 65 % of the carbon content of MSW 







As a preventive measure, primary and secondary aerobic and land treat-
ment help reduce CH4 emissions during wastewater treatment. Alter-
natively, CH4 emissions from wastewater, including sludge treatment 
under anaerobic conditions, can be captured and used as an energy 
source (Karakurt et al., 2012). Nitrous oxide is mainly released during 
biological nitrogen removal in wastewater treatment plants, primarily 
in aerated zones thus improved plant design and operational strategies 
(availability of dissolved oxygen, chemical oxygen demand and nitro-
gen ratio COD / N) have to be achieved in order to avoid the stripping of 
nitrous emissions (Kampschreur et al., 2009; Law et al., 2012).
Most developed countries rely on centralized aerobic / anaerobic waste-
water treatment plants to handle their municipal wastewater. In devel-
oping countries, there is little or no collection and treatment of waste-
water, anaerobic systems such as latrines, open sewers, or lagoons 
(Karakurt et  al., 2012). Approximately 47 % of wastewater produced 
in the domestic and manufacturing sectors is untreated, particularly 
in South and Southeast Asia, but also in Northern Africa as well as 
Central and South America (Flörke et al., 2013). Wastewater treatment 
plants are highly capital-intensive but inflexible to adapt to growing 
demands, especially in rapidly expanding cities. Therefore, innovations 
related to decentralized wastewater infrastructure are becoming prom-
ising. These innovations include satellite systems, actions to achieve 
reduced wastewater flows, recovery and utilization of the energy con-
tent present in wastewater, recovery of nutrients, and the production 
of water for recycling, which will be needed to address the impacts of 
population growth and climate change (Larsen et al., 2013). 
Industrial wastewater from the food industry usually has both high 
biochemical and chemical oxygen demand and suspended solid con-
centrations of organic origin that induce a higher GHG production 
per volume of wastewater treated compared to municipal wastewa-
ter treatment. The characteristics of the wastewater and the off-site 
GHG emissions have a significant impact on the total GHG emis-
sions attributed to the wastewater treatment plants (Bani Shahabadi 
et al., 2009). For example, in the food processing industry with aero-
bic / anaerobic / hybrid process, the biological processes in the treat-
ment plant made for the highest contribution to GHG emissions in the 
aerobic treatment system, while off-site emissions are mainly due to 
material usage and represent the highest emissions in anaerobic and 
hybrid treatment systems. Industrial cluster development in develop-
ing countries like China and India are enhancing wastewater treatment 
and recycling (see also Section 10.5). 
Regional variation in wastewater quality matters in terms of perfor-
mance of technological options. Conventional systems may be tech-
nologically inadequate to handle the locally produced sewage in arid 
areas like the Middle East. In these areas, domestic wastewater are up 
to five times more concentrated in the amount of biochemical and / or 
chemical oxygen demand per volume of sewage in comparison with 
United States and Europe, causing large amounts of sludge production. 
In these cases, choosing an appropriate treatment technology for the 
community could be a sustainable solution for wastewater manage-
ment and emissions control. Example solutions include upflow anaero-
bic sludge blanket, hybrid reactors, soil aquifer treatment, approaches 
based on pathogens treatment, and reuse of the treated effluent for 
agricultural reuse (Bdour et al., 2009). 
Wetlands can be a sustainable solution for municipal wastewater 
treatment due to their low cost, simple operation and maintenance, 
minimal secondary pollution, favourable environmental appearance, 
and other ecosystem service benefits (Mukherjee, 1999; Chen et  al., 
2008, 2011; Mukherjee and Gupta, 2011). It has been demonstrated 
that wetlands are a less energy intensive option than conventional 
wastewater treatment systems despite differences in costs across tech-
nologies and socio-economic contexts (Gao et al., 2012), but such sys-
Figure 10�18 | Management practices concerning MSW in several nations (based on 
World Bank and national statistics, methodology described in Themelis and Bourtsalas 
(2013).
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tems are facing challenges in urban areas from demand for land for 
other economic activities (Mukherjee, 1999). 
It has been highlighted that wastewater treatment with anaerobic 
sludge digestion and methane recovery and use for energy purposes 
reduces methane emissions (Bani Shahabadi et al., 2009; Foley et al., 
2010; Massé et al., 2011; Fine and Hadas, 2012; Abbasi et al., 2012; Liu 
et al., 2012b; Wang et al., 2012b). Anaerobic digestion also provides an 
efficient means to reduce pollutant loads when high-strength organic 
wastewater (food waste, brewery, animal manure) have to be treated 
(Shin et al., 2011), although adequate regulatory policy incentives are 
needed for widespread implementation in developed and developing 
countries (Massé et al., 2011). 
Advanced treatment technologies such as membrane filtration, ozona-
tion, aeration efficiency, bacteria mix, and engineered nanomaterials 
(Xu et  al., 2011b; Brame et  al., 2011) may enhance GHG emissions 
reduction in wastewater treatment, and some such technologies, for 
example membranes, have increased the competitiveness and decen-
tralization (Fane, 2007; Libralato et al., 2012).
The existence of a shared location and infrastructure can also facilitate 
the identification and implementation of more synergy opportunities 
to reduce industrial water provision and wastewater treatment, there-
fore abating GHG emissions from industry. The concept of eco-indus-
trial parks is discussed in Section 10.5.
10�14�4 Summary results on costs and potentials
Figure 10.19 and Figure 10.20 present the potentials and costs of 
selected mitigation options to reduce the GHG emissions of the two 
waste sectors that represent 90 % of waste related emissions: solid 
waste disposal (0.67 GtCO2eq) and domestic wastewater 
(0.77 GtCO2eq) emissions (JRC / PBL, 2013). For solid waste, potentials 
are presented in tCO2eq / t solid waste and for wastewater and in 
tCO2eq / t BOD5 as % compared to current global average.
Six mitigation options for solid waste and three mitigation options for 
wastewater are assessed and presented in the figures. The reference 
case and the basis for mitigation potentials were derived from IPCC 
2006 guidelines. Abatement costs and potentials are based on EPA 
(2006b; 2013). 
The actual costs and potentials of the abatement options vary widely 
across regions and design of a treatment methodology. Given that 
technology options to reduce emissions from industrial and municipal 
waste are the same, it is not further distinguished in the approach. 
Furthermore, the potential of reductions from emissions from land-
fills are directly related to climatic conditions as well as to the age 
and amount of landfill, both of which are not included in the chosen 
approach. Emission factors are global annual averages (derived from 
IPCC 2006 guideline aggregated regional averages). The actual emis-
sion factor differs between types of waste, climatic regions, and age of 
Figure 10�19 | Indicative CO2eq emission intensities and levelized cost of conserved carbon of municipal solid waste disposal practices / technologies (for data and methodology, 
see Annex III).
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Figure 10�20 | Indicative CO2eq emission intensities and levelized cost of conserved carbon of different wastewater treatments (for underlying data and methodology, see 
Annex III).
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the landfill, explaining the wide range for each technology. The mitiga-
tion potential for waste is derived by comparing the emission range 
from a reference technology (e. g., a landfill) with the emission range 
for a chosen technology. The GHG coverage for solid waste is focused 
on methane, which is the most significant emission from landfilling; 
other GHG gases such as N2O only play a minor role in the landfill 
solid waste sector and are neglected in this study (except for compost-
ing).
In the case of landfills, the top five emitting countries account for 
27 % of the total abatement potential in the sector (United States 2 %, 
China 6 %, Mexico 9 %, Malaysia 3 %, and Russia 2 %). The distribu-
tion of the remaining potential per region is: Africa 16 %, Central and 
South America 9 %, Middle East 9 %, Europe 19 %, Eurasia 2 %, Asia 
15 %, and North America 4 % (EPA, 2013).
In the case of wastewater, 58 % of the abatement potential is concen-
trated in the top five emitting countries (United States 7 %, Indonesia 
9 %, Mexico 10 %, Nigeria 10 %, and China 23 %). The distribution of 
the remaining potential per region is: Africa 5 %, Central and South 
America 5 %, Middle East 14 %, Europe 5 %, Eurasia 4 %, and Asia 
10 % (EPA, 2013).
The United States EPA has produced two studies with cost estimates of 
abatement in the solid waste sector (EPA, 2006b, 2013) which found a 
large range for options to reduce landfill (e. g., incineration, anaerobic 
digestion, and composting) of up to 590 USD2010 / tCO2eq if the technol-
ogy is only implemented for the sake of GHG emission reduction. How-
ever, the studies highlight that there are significant opportunities for 
CH4 reductions in the landfill sector at carbon prices below 20 USD2010. 
Improving landfill practices mainly by flaring and CH4 utilization are 
low cost options, as both generate costs in the lower range (0 — 50 
USD2010 / tCO2eq). 
The costs of the abatement options shown vary widely between indi-
vidual regions and from plant to plant. The cost estimates should, for 
that reason, be regarded as indicative only and depend on a number of 
factors including capital stock turnover, relative energy costs, regional 
climate conditions, waste fee structures, etc. Furthermore, the method 
does not reflect the time variation in solid waste disposal and the deg-
radation process as it assumes that all potential methane is released 
the year the solid waste is disposed.
The unit tonne biological oxygen demand (t BOD) stands for the 
organic content of wastewater (‘loading’) and represents the oxy-
gen consumed by wastewater during decomposition. The average for 
domestic wastewater is in a range of 110 – 400 mg / l and is directly 
connected to climate conditions. Costs and potentials are global aver-
ages, but based on region-specific information. Options that are more 
often used in developing countries are not considered since data avail-
ability is limited. However, options like septic tanks, open sewers, and 
lagoons are low cost options with an impact of reducing GHG emission 
compared to untreated wastewater that is stored in a stagnant sewer 
under open and warm conditions.
The methane correction factor applied is based on the IPCC guidelines 
and gives an indication of the amount of methane that is released by 
applying the technology; furthermore emissions from N2O have not 
been included as they play an insignificant role in domestic wastewa-
ter. Except in countries with advanced centralized wastewater treat-
ment plants with nitrification and denitrification steps (IPCC, 2006), 
establishing a structured collection system for wastewater will always 
have an impact on GHG emissions in the waste sector. 
Cost estimates of abatement in the domestic wastewater are provided 
in EPA (2006b; 2013), which find a large range for the options of 0 to 
530 USD2010 / tCO2eq with almost no variation across options. The actual 
costs of the abatement options shown vary widely between individ-
ual regions and from the design set up of a treatment methodology. 
Especially for wastewater treatment, the cost ranges largely depend on 
national circumstances like climate conditions (chemical process will 
be accelerated under warm conditions), economic development, and 
cultural aspects. The data availability for domestic wastewater options, 
especially on costs, is very low and would result in large ranges, which 
imply large uncertainties for each of the option. Mitigation potentials 
for landfills (in terms of % of potential above emissions for 2030) is 
double compared with wastewater (EPA, 2013). The mitigation poten-
tial for wastewater tends to concentrate in the higher costs options 
due to the significant costs of constructing public wastewater collec-
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Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land Use (AFOLU) is unique 
among the sectors considered in this volume, since the mitiga-
tion potential is derived from both an enhancement of removals 
of greenhouse gases (GHG), as well as reduction of emissions 
through management of land and livestock (robust evidence; 
high agreement). The land provides food that feeds the Earth’s human 
population of ca. 7 billion, fibre for a variety of purposes, livelihoods 
for billions of people worldwide, and is a critical resource for sustain-
able development in many regions. Agriculture is frequently central to 
the livelihoods of many social groups, especially in developing coun-
tries where it often accounts for a significant share of production. In 
addition to food and fibre, the land provides a multitude of ecosystem 
services; climate change mitigation is just one of many that are vital 
to human well-being (robust evidence; high agreement). Mitigation 
options in the AFOLU sector, therefore, need to be assessed, as far as 
possible, for their potential impact on all other services provided by 
land. [Section 11.1]
The AFOLU sector is responsible for just under a quarter 
(~10 – 12 GtCO2eq / yr) of anthropogenic GHG emissions mainly 
from deforestation and agricultural emissions from livestock, 
soil and nutrient management (robust evidence; high agreement) 
[11.2]. Anthropogenic forest degradation and biomass burning (forest 
fires and agricultural burning) also represent relevant contributions. 
Annual GHG emissions from agricultural production in 2000 – 2010 
were estimated at 5.0 – 5.8 GtCO2eq / yr while annual GHG flux from 
land use and land-use change activities accounted for approximately 
4.3 – 5.5 GtCO2eq / yr. Leveraging the mitigation potential in the sec-
tor is extremely important in meeting emission reduction targets 
(robust evidence; high agreement) [11.9]. Since publication of the IPCC 
Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), emissions from the AFOLU sector 
have remained similar but the share of anthropogenic emissions has 
decreased to 24 % (in 2010), largely due to increases in emissions in 
the energy sector (robust evidence, high agreement). In spite of a large 
range across global Forestry and Other Land Use (FOLU) flux estimates, 
most approaches indicate a decline in FOLU carbon dioxide (CO2) emis-
sions over the most recent years, largely due to decreasing defores-
tation rates and increased afforestation (limited evidence, medium 
agreement). As in AR4, most projections suggest declining annual net 
CO2 emissions in the long run. In part, this is driven by technological 
change, as well as projected declining rates of agriculture area expan-
sion, which, in turn, is related to the expected slowing in population 
growth. However, unlike AR4, none of the more recent scenarios proj-
ects growth in the near-term [11.9].
Opportunities for mitigation include supply-side and demand-
side options� On the supply side, emissions from land-use change 
(LUC), land management and livestock management can be reduced, 
terrestrial carbon stocks can be increased by sequestration in soils and 
biomass, and emissions from energy production can be saved through 
the substitution of fossil fuels by biomass (robust evidence; high agree-
ment) [11.3]. On the demand side, GHG emissions could be mitigated 
by reducing losses and wastes of food, changes in diet and changes in 
wood consumption (robust evidence; high agreement) [11.4] though 
quantitative estimates of the potential are few and highly uncertain. 
Increasing production without a commensurate increase in emissions 
also reduces emission intensity, i. e., the GHG emissions per unit of 
product that could be delivered through sustainable intensification; 
another mechanism for mitigation explored in more detail here than in 
AR4. Supply-side options depend on the efficacy of land and livestock 
management (medium evidence; high agreement) [11.6]. Considering 
demand-side options, changes in human diet can have a significant 
impact on GHG emissions from the food production lifecycle (medium 
evidence; medium agreement) [11.4]. There are considerably different 
challenges involved in delivering demand-side and supply-side options, 
which also have very different synergies and tradeoffs.
The nature of the sector means that there are potentially many 
barriers to implementation of available mitigation options, 
including accessibility to AFOLU financing, poverty, institutional, 
ecological, technological development, diffusion and transfer 
barriers (medium evidence; medium agreement) [11.7, 11.8]. Simi-
larly, there are important feedbacks to adaptation, conservation of nat-
ural resources, such as water and terrestrial and aquatic biodiversity 
(robust evidence; high agreement) [11.5, 11.8]. There can be competi-
tion between different land uses if alternative options to use available 
land are mutually exclusive, but there are also potential synergies, e. g., 
integrated systems or multi-functionality at landscape scale (medium 
evidence; high agreement) [11.4]. Recent frameworks, such as those 
for assessing environmental or ecosystem services, provide one mecha-
nism for valuing the multiple synergies and tradeoffs that may arise 
from mitigation actions (medium evidence; medium agreement) [11.1]. 
Sustainable management of agriculture, forests, and other land is an 
underpinning requirement of sustainable development (robust evi-
dence; high agreement) [11.4].
AFOLU emissions could change substantially in transformation 
pathways, with significant mitigation potential from agriculture, 
forestry, and bioenergy mitigation measures (medium evidence; 
high agreement). Recent multi-model comparisons of idealized imple-
mentation transformation scenarios find land emissions (nitrous oxide, 
N2O; methane, CH4; CO2) changing by – 4 to 99 % through 2030, and 7 
to 76 % through 2100, with the potential for increased emissions from 
land carbon stocks. Land-related mitigation, including bioenergy, could 
contribute 20 to 60 % of total cumulative abatement to 2030, and 15 to 
40 % to 2100. However, policy coordination and implementation issues 
are challenges to realizing this potential [11.9]. Large-scale biomass 
supply for energy, or carbon sequestration in the AFOLU sector provide 
flexibility for the development of mitigation technologies in the energy 
supply and energy end-use sectors, as many technologies already exist 
and some of them are commercial (limited evidence; medium agree-
ment) [11.3], but there are potential implications for biodiversity, food 
security, and other services provided by land (medium evidence, high 
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agreement) [11.7]. Implementation challenges, including institutional 
barriers and inertia related to governance issues, make the costs and 
net emission reduction potential of near-term mitigation uncertain. In 
mitigation scenarios with idealized comprehensive climate policies, 
agriculture, forestry, and bioenergy contribute substantially to the 
reduction of global CO2, CH4, and N2O emissions, and to the energy 
system, thereby reducing policy costs (medium evidence; high agree-
ment) [11.9]. More realistic partial and delayed policies for global land 
mitigation have potentially significant spatial and temporal leakage, 
and economic implications, but could still be cost-effectively deployed 
(limited evidence; limited agreement) [11.9].
Economic mitigation potential of supply-side measures in the 
AFOLU sector is estimated to be 7�18 to 10�60 (full range: 
0�49 – 10�60) GtCO2eq / yr in 2030 for mitigation efforts consis-
tent with carbon prices up to 100 USD / tCO2eq, about a third of 
which can be achieved at <  20 USD / tCO2eq (medium evidence; 
medium agreement) [11.6]. These estimates are based on studies that 
cover both forestry and agriculture and that include agricultural soil 
carbon sequestration. Estimates from agricultural sector-only studies 
range from 0.3 to 4.6 GtCO2eq / yr at prices up to 100 USD / tCO2eq, and 
estimates from forestry sector-only studies from 0.2 to 13.8 GtCO2eq / yr 
at prices up to 100 USD / tCO2eq (medium evidence; medium agree-
ment) [11.6]. The large range in the estimates arises due to widely 
different collections of options considered in each study, and because 
not all GHGs are considered in all of the studies. The composition of 
the agricultural mitigation portfolio varies with the carbon price, with 
the restoration of organic soils having the greatest potential at higher 
carbon prices (100 USD / tCO2eq) and cropland and grazing land man-
agement at lower (20 USD / tCO2eq). In forestry there is less difference 
between measures at different carbon prices, but there are significant 
differences between regions, with reduced deforestation dominat-
ing the forestry mitigation potential in Latin America and Caribbean 
(LAM) and Middle East and Africa (MAF), but very little potential in 
the member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD-1990) and Economies in Transition (EIT). For-
est management, followed by afforestation, dominate in OECD-1990, 
EIT, and Asia (medium evidence, strong agreement) [11.6]. Among 
demand-side measures, which are under-researched compared to sup-
ply-side measures, changes in diet and reductions of losses in the food 
supply chain can have a significant, but uncertain, potential to reduce 
GHG emissions from food production (0.76 – 8.55 GtCO2eq / yr by 2050), 
with the range being determined by assumptions about how the 
freed land is used (limited evidence; medium agreement) [11.4]. More 
research into demand-side mitigation options is merited. There are 
significant regional differences in terms of mitigation potential, costs, 
and applicability, due to differing local biophysical, socioeconomic, and 
cultural circumstances, for instance between developed and develop-
ing regions, and among developing regions (medium evidence; high 
agreement) [11.6].
The size and regional distribution of future mitigation potential 
is difficult to estimate accurately because it depends on a num-
ber of inherently uncertain factors� Critical factors include popu-
lation (growth), economic and technological developments, changes 
in behaviour over time (depending on cultural and normative back-
grounds, market structures and incentives), and how these translate 
into demand for food, fibre, fodder and fuel, as well as development in 
the agriculture, aquaculture and forestry sectors. Other factors impor-
tant to mitigation potential are potential climate change impacts on 
carbon stocks in soils and forests including their adaptive capacity 
(medium evidence; high agreement) [11.5]; considerations set by bio-
diversity and nature conservation requirements; and interrelations with 
land degradation and water scarcity (robust evidence; high agreement) 
[11.8].
Bioenergy can play a critical role for mitigation, but there are 
issues to consider, such as the sustainability of practices and 
the efficiency of bioenergy systems (robust evidence, medium 
agreement) [11.4.4, Box 11.5, 11.13.6, 11.13.7]. Barriers to large-scale 
deployment of bioenergy include concerns about GHG emissions from 
land, food security, water resources, biodiversity conservation and live-
lihoods. The scientific debate about the overall climate impact related 
to land use competition effects of specific bioenergy pathways remains 
unresolved (robust evidence, high agreement) [11.4.4, 11.13]. Bioen-
ergy technologies are diverse and span a wide range of options and 
technology pathways. Evidence suggests that options with low lifecy-
cle emissions (e. g., sugar cane, Miscanthus, fast growing tree species, 
and sustainable use of biomass residues), some already available, can 
reduce GHG emissions; outcomes are site-specific and rely on efficient 
integrated ‘biomass-to-bioenergy systems’, and sustainable land-use 
management and governance. In some regions, specific bioenergy 
options, such as improved cookstoves, and small-scale biogas and 
biopower production, could reduce GHG emissions and improve liveli-
hoods and health in the context of sustainable development (medium 
evidence, medium agreement) [11.13].
Policies governing practices in agriculture and in forest conser-
vation and management need to account for both mitigation 
and adaptation� One of the most visible current policies in the AFOLU 
sector is the implementation of REDD+ (see Annex I), that can repre-
sent a cost-effective option for mitigation (limited evidence; medium 
agreement) [11.10], with economic, social, and other environmental 
co-benefits (e. g., conservation of biodiversity and water resources).
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Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land Use (AFOLU1) plays a central role 
for food security and sustainable development (Section 11.9). Plants take 
up carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere and nitrogen (N) from the 
soil when they grow, re-distributing it among different pools, including 
above and below-ground living biomass, dead residues, and soil organic 
matter. The CO2 and other non-CO2 greenhouse gases (GHG), largely 
methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O), are in turn released to the atmo-
sphere by plant respiration, by decomposition of dead plant biomass 
and soil organic matter, and by combustion (Section 11.2). Anthropo-
genic land-use activities (e. g., management of croplands, forests, grass-
lands, wetlands), and changes in land use / cover (e. g., conversion of for-
est lands and grasslands to cropland and pasture, afforestation) cause 
changes superimposed on these natural fluxes. AFOLU activities lead to 
both sources of CO2 (e. g., deforestation, peatland drainage) and sinks of 
CO2 (e. g., afforestation, management for soil carbon sequestration), and 
to non-CO2 emissions primarily from agriculture (e. g., CH4 from livestock 
and rice cultivation, N2O from manure storage and agricultural soils and 
biomass burning (Section 11.2).
The main mitigation options within AFOLU involve one or more of 
three strategies: reduction / prevention of emissions to the atmosphere 
by conserving existing carbon pools in soils or vegetation that would 
otherwise be lost or by reducing emissions of CH4 and N2O (Section 
11.3); sequestration — enhancing the uptake of carbon in terrestrial 
reservoirs, and thereby removing CO2 from the atmosphere (Section 
11.3); and reducing CO2 emissions by substitution of biological prod-
ucts for fossil fuels (Appendix 1) or energy-intensive products (Sec-
tion 11.4). Demand-side options (e. g., by lifestyle changes, reducing 
losses and wastes of food, changes in human diet, changes in wood 
consumption), though known to be difficult to implement, may also 
play a role (Section 11.4). 
Land is the critical resource for the AFOLU sector and it provides food 
and fodder to feed the Earth’s population of ~7 billion, and fibre and 
fuel for a variety of purposes. It provides livelihoods for billions of 
people worldwide. It is finite and provides a multitude of goods and 
ecosystem services that are fundamental to human well-being (MEA, 
2005). Human economies and quality of life are directly dependent on 
the services and the resources provided by land. Figure 11.1 shows the 
many provisioning, regulating, cultural and supporting services pro-
vided by land, of which climate regulation is just one. Implementing 
mitigation options in the AFOLU sector may potentially affect other 
services provided by land in positive or negative ways.
In the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Second 
Assessment Report (SAR) (IPCC, 1996) and in the IPCC Fourth Assess-
1 The term AFOLU used here consistent with the (IPCC, 2006) Guidelines is also 
consistent with Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) (IPCC, 2003), 
and other similar terms used in the scientific literature.
ment Report (AR4) (IPCC, 2007a), agricultural and forestry mitigation 
were dealt with in separate chapters. In the IPCC Third Assessment 
Report (TAR) (IPCC, 2001), there were no separate sectoral chapters 
on either agriculture or forestry. In the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report 
(AR5), for the first time, the vast majority of the terrestrial land surface, 
comprising agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU) (IPCC, 
2006), is considered together in a single chapter, though settlements 
(which are important, with urban areas forecasted to triple in size from 
2000 global extent by 2030; Section 12.2), are dealt with in Chapter 
12. This approach ensures that all land-based mitigation options can 
be considered together; it minimizes the risk of double counting or 
inconsistent treatment (e. g., different assumptions about available 
land) between different land categories, and allows the consideration 
of systemic feedbacks between mitigation options related to the land 
surface (Section 11.4). Considering AFOLU in a single chapter allows 
phenomena common across land-use types, such as competition for 
land (Smith et al., 2010; Lambin and Meyfroidt, 2011) and water (e. g., 
Jackson et  al., 2007), co-benefits (Sandor et  al., 2002; Venter et  al., 
2009), adverse side-effects (Section 11.7) and interactions between 
mitigation and adaptation (Section 11.5) to be considered consistently. 
The complex nature of land presents a unique range of barriers and 
opportunities (Section 11.8), and policies to promote mitigation in the 
AFOLU sector (Section 11.10) need to take account of this complexity.
In this chapter, we consider the competing uses of land for mitigation 
and for providing other services (Sections 11.7; 11.8). Unlike the chap-
ters on agriculture and forestry in AR4, impacts of sourcing bioenergy 
from the AFOLU sector are considered explicitly in a dedicated appen-
dix (Section 11.13). Also new to this assessment is the explicit con-
sideration of food / dietary demand-side options for GHG mitigation in 
the AFOLU sector (Section 11.4), and some consideration of freshwa-
ter fisheries and aquaculture, which may compete with the agriculture 
and forestry sectors, mainly through their requirements for land and / or 
water, and indirectly, by providing fish and other products to the same 
markets as animal husbandry.
This chapter deals with AFOLU in an integrated way with respect to 
the underlying scenario projections of population growth, economic 
growth, dietary change, land-use change (LUC), and cost of mitigation. 
We draw evidence from both ‘bottom-up’ studies that estimate mitiga-
tion potentials at small scales or for individual options or technologies 
and then scale up, and multi-sectoral ‘top-down’ studies that consider 
AFOLU as just one component of a total multi-sector system response 
(Section 11.9). In this chapter, we provide updates on emissions trends 
and changes in drivers and pressures in the AFOLU sector (Section 11.2), 
describe the practices available in the AFOLU sector (Section 11.3), 
and provide refined estimates of mitigation costs and potentials for 
the AFOLU sector, by synthesising studies that have become available 
since AR4 (Section 11.6). We conclude the chapter by identifying gaps in 
knowledge and data (Section 11.11), providing a selection of Frequently 
Asked Questions (Section 11.12), and presenting an Appendix on bioen-
ergy to update the IPCC Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources 
and Climate Change Mitigation (SRREN) (IPCC, 2011; see Section 11.13).
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11.2 New  developments 
in emission trends 
and drivers
Estimating and reporting the anthropogenic component of gross and 
net AFOLU GHG fluxes to the atmosphere, globally, regionally, and 
at country level, is difficult compared to other sectors. First, it is not 
always possible to separate anthropogenic and natural GHG fluxes 
from land. Second, the input data necessary to estimate GHG emis-
sions globally and regionally, often based on country-level statistics 
or on remote-sensing information, are very uncertain. Third, methods 
for estimating GHG emissions use a range of approaches, from simple 
default methodologies such as those specified in the IPCC GHG Guide-
lines2 (IPCC, 2006), to more complex estimates based on terrestrial car-
bon cycle modelling and / or remote sensing information. Global trends 
in total GHG emissions from AFOLU activities between 1971 and 2010 
are shown in Figure 11.2; Figure 11.3 shows trends of major drivers of 
emissions.
2 Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) report net GHG emissions according to IPCC methodologies (IPCC, 
2006). Reporting is based on a range of methods and approaches dependent on 
available data and national capacities, from default equations and emission fac-
tors applicable to global or regional cases and assuming instantaneous emissions 
of all carbon that will be eventually lost from the system following human action 
(Tier 1) to more complex approaches such as model-based spatial analyses (Tier 3).
Figure 11�1 | Multiple ecosystem services, goods and benefits provided by land (after MEA, 2005; UNEP-WCMC, 2011). Mitigation actions aim to enhance climate regulation, but 
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Figure 11�2 | Top: AFOLU emissions for the last four decades. For the agricultural sub-sectors emissions are shown for separate categories, based on FAOSTAT, (2013). Emissions 
from crop residues, manure applied to soils, manure left on pasture, cultivated organic soils, and synthetic fertilizers are typically aggregated to the category ‘agricultural soils’ for 
IPCC reporting. For the Forestry and Other Land Use (FOLU) sub-sector data are from the Houghton bookkeeping model results (Houghton et al., 2012). Emissions from drained 
peat and peat fires are, for the 1970s and the 1980s, from JRC / PBL (2013), derived from Hooijer et al. (2010) and van der Werf et al. (2006) and for the 1990s and the 2000s, from 
FAOSTAT, 2013. Bottom: Emissions from AFOLU for each RC5 region (see Annex II.2) using data from JRC / PBL (2013), with emissions from energy end-use in the AFOLU sector 
from IEA (2012a) included in a single aggregated category, see Annex II.9, used in the AFOLU section of Chapter 5.7.4 for cross-sectoral comparisons. The direct emission data 
from JRC / PBL (2013; see Annex II.9) represents land-based CO2 emissions from forest and peat fires and decay that approximate to CO2 flux from anthopogenic emission sources 
in the FOLU sub-sector. Differences between FAOSTAT / Houghton data and JRC / PBL (2013) are discussed in the text. See Figures 11.4 and 11.6 for the range of differences among 



































Crop Residues and Savannah 
Burning (N2O,CH4)
Cultivated Organic Soils (N2O)
Crop Residues (N2O)
Manure Applied to Soils (N2O)
Manure on Pasture (N2O)
Synthetic Fertilizers (N2O)
Manure Management (CH4 and N2O)
Rice Cultivation (CH4)
Enteric Fermentation (CH4)
Drained Peat and Peat Fires 
(CO2, N2O, CH4)




















































Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU)
11
Chapter 11
Figure 11�3 | Global trends from 1971 to 2010 in (top) area of land use (forest land — available only from 1990; 1000 Mha) and amount of N fertilizer use (million tonnes), and 
(bottom) number of livestock (million heads) and poultry (billion heads). Data presented by regions: 1) Asia, 2) LAM, 3) MAF, 4) OECD-1990, 5) EIT (FAOSTAT, 2013). The area extent 
of AFOLU land-use categories, from FAOSTAT, (2013): ‘Cropland’ corresponds to the sum of FAOSTAT categories ‘arable land’ and ‘temporary crops’ and coincides with the IPCC 
category (IPCC, 2003); ‘Forest’ is defined according to FAO (2010); countries reporting to UNFCCC may use different definitions. ‘Permanent meadows and pasture’, are a subset of 
IPCC category ‘grassland’ (IPCC, 2003), as the latter, by definition, also includes unmanaged natural grassland ecosystems.
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11�2�1 Supply and consumption trends in 
 agriculture and forestry
In 2010 world agricultural land occupied 4889 Mha, an increase of 
7 % (311 Mha) since 1970 (FAOSTAT, 2013). Agricultural land area has 
decreased by 53 Mha since 2000 due to a decline of the cropland area 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)-
1990, Economies in Transition (EIT)) and a decrease in permanent 
meadows and pastures (OECD-1990 and Asia). The average amount of 
cropland and pasture land per capita in 1970 was 0.4 and 0.8 ha and 
by 2010 this had decreased to 0.2 and 0.5 ha per capita, respectively 
(FAOSTAT, 2013).
Changing land-use practices, technological advancement and varietal 
improvement have enabled world grain harvests to double from 1.2 to 
2.5 billion tonnes per year between 1970 and 2010 (FAOSTAT, 2012). 
Average world cereal yields increased from 1600 to 3030 kg / ha over 
the same period (FAOSTAT, 2012) while there has also been a 233 % 
increase in global fertilizer use from 32 to 106 Mt / yr, and a 73 % 
increase in the irrigated cropland area (FAOSTAT, 2013).
Globally, since 1970, there has been a 1.4-fold increase in the num-
bers of cattle and buffalo, sheep and goats (which is closely linked to 
the trend of CH4 emissions in the sector; Section 11.2.2), and increases 
of 1.6- and 3.7-fold for pigs and poultry, respectively (FAOSTAT, 2013). 
Major regional trends between 1970 and 2010 include a decrease in 
the total number of animals in Economies in Transition (EIT) and OECD-
1990 (except poultry), and continuous growth in other regions, particu-
larly Middle East and Africa (MAF) and Asia (Figure 11.3, bottom panel). 
The soaring demand for fish has led to the intensification of freshwater 
and marine fisheries worldwide, and an increased freshwater fisheries 
catch that topped 11 Mt in 2010, although the marine fisheries catch 
has slowly declined (78 Mt in 2010; FAOSTAT, 2013). The latter is, how-
ever, compensated in international markets by tremendous growth of 
aquaculture production to 60 Mt wet weight in 2010, of which 37 Mt 
originate from freshwater, overwhelmingly in Asia (FAOSTAT, 2013).
Between 1970 and 2010, global daily per capita food availability, 
expressed in energy units, has risen from 10,008 to 11,850 kJ (2391 to 
2831 kcal), an increase of 18.4 %; growth in MAF (10,716 kJ in 2010) 
has been 22 %, and in Asia, 32 % (11,327 kJ in 2010; FAOSTAT, 2013). 
The percentage of animal products in daily per capita total food con-
sumption has increased consistently in Asia since 1970 (7 to 16 %), 
remained constant in MAF (8 %) and, since 1985, has decreased in 
OECD-1990 countries (32 to 28 %), comprising, respectively, 1,790, 
870 and 3,800 kJ in 2010 (FAOSTAT, 2013).
11�2�2 Trends of GHG emissions from 
 agriculture 
Organic and inorganic material provided as inputs or output in the 
management of agricultural systems are typically broken down 
through bacterial processes, releasing significant amounts of CO2, CH4, 
and N2O to the atmosphere. Only agricultural non-CO2 sources are 
reported as anthropogenic GHG emissions, however. The CO2 emitted 
is considered neutral, being associated to annual cycles of carbon fixa-
tion and oxidation through photosynthesis. The agricultural sector is 
the largest contributor to global anthropogenic non-CO2 GHGs, 
accounting for 56 % of emissions in 2005 (U. S. EPA, 2011). Other 
important, albeit much smaller non-CO2 emissions sources from other 
AFOLU categories, and thus not treated here, include fertilizer applica-
tions in forests. Annual total non-CO2 GHG emissions from agriculture 
in 2010 are estimated to be 5.2 – 5.8 GtCO2eq / yr (FAOSTAT, 2013; Tubi-
ello et al., 2013) and comprised about 10 – 12 % of global anthropo-
genic emissions. Fossil fuel CO2 emissions on croplands added another 
Figure 11�4 | Data comparison between FAOSTAT (2013), U. S. EPA (2006), and EDGAR (JRC / PBL, 2013) databases for key agricultural emission categories, grouped as agricultural 
soils, enteric fermentation, manure management systems, and rice cultivation, for 2005 | Whiskers represent 95 % confidence intervals of global aggregated categories, computed 
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0.4 – 0.6 GtCO2eq / yr in 2010 from agricultural use in machinery, such 
as tractors, irrigation pumps, etc. (Ceschia et al., 2010; FAOSTAT, 2013), 
but these emissions are accounted for in the energy sector rather than 
the AFOLU sector. Between 1990 and 2010, agricultural non-CO2 emis-
sions grew by 0.9 % / yr, with a slight increase in growth rates after 
2005 (Tubiello et al., 2013). 
Three independent sources of disaggregated non-CO2 GHG emissions 
estimates from agriculture at global, regional, and national levels are 
available. They are mostly based on FAOSTAT activity data and IPCC 
Tier 1 approaches (IPCC, 2006; FAOSTAT, 2012; JRC / PBL, 2013; U. S. 
EPA, 2013). EDGAR and FAOSTAT also provide data at country level. 
Estimates of global emissions for enteric fermentation, manure man-
agement and manure, estimated using IPCC Tier 2 / 3 approaches are 
also available (e. g., (Herrero et  al., 2013). The FAOSTAT, EDGAR and 
U. S. EPA estimates are slightly different, although statistically con-
sistent given the large uncertainties in IPCC default methodologies 
(Tubiello et  al., 2013). They cover emissions from enteric fermenta-
tion, manure deposited on pasture, synthetic fertilizers, rice cultivation, 
manure management, crop residues, biomass burning, and manure 
applied to soils. Enteric fermentation, biomass burning, and rice cul-
tivation are reported separately under IPCC inventory guidelines, with 
the remaining categories aggregated into ‘agricultural soils’. According 
to EDGAR and FAOSTAT, emissions from enteric fermentation are the 
largest emission source, while US EPA lists emissions from agricultural 
soils as the dominant source (Figure 11.4).
The following analyses refer to annual total non-CO2 emissions by all 
categories. All three databases agree that that enteric fermentation 
and agricultural soils represent together about 70 % of total emis-
sions, followed by paddy rice cultivation (9 – 11 %), biomass burning 
(6 – 12 %) and manure management (7 – 8 %). If all emission catego-
ries are disaggregated, both EDGAR and FAOSTAT agree that the larg-
est emitting categories after enteric fermentation (32 – 40 % of total 
agriculture emissions) are manure deposited on pasture (15 %) and 
synthetic fertilizer (12 %), both contributing to emissions from agricul-
tural soils. Paddy rice cultivation (11 %) is a major source of global CH4 
emissions, which in 2010 were estimated to be 493 – 723 MtCO2eq / yr. 
The lower end of the range corresponds to estimates by FAO (FAOSTAT, 
2013), with EDGAR and US EPA data at the higher end. Independent 
analyses suggest that emissions from rice may be at the lower end of 
the estimated range (Yan et al., 2009).
Figure 11�5 | Regional data comparisons for key agricultural emission categories in 2010 | Whiskers represent 95 % confidence intervals computed using IPCC guidelines (IPCC, 
2006; Tubiello et al., 2013). The data show that most of the differences between regions and databases are of the same magnitude as the underlying emission uncertainties. [FAO-
STAT, 2013; JRC/PBL, 2013; U.S. EPA, 2013]
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Enteric Fermentation. Global emissions of this important category 
grew from 1.4 to 2.1 GtCO2eq / yr between 1961 and 2010, with aver-
age annual growth rates of 0.70 % (FAOSTAT, 2013). Emission growth 
slowed during the 1990s compared to the long-term average, but 
became faster again after the year 2000. In 2010, 1.0 – 1.5 GtCO2eq / yr 
(75 % of the total emissions), were estimated to come from devel-
oping countries (FAOSTAT, 2013). Over the period 2000 – 2010, Asia 
and the Americas contributed most, followed by Africa and Europe 
(FAOSTAT, 2013); see Figure 11.5). Emissions have grown most in 
Africa, on average 2.4 % / yr. In both Asia (2.0 % / yr) and the Ameri-
cas (1.1 % / yr), emissions grew more slowly, and decreased in Europe 
(– 1.7 % / yr). From 2000 to 2010, cattle contributed the largest share 
(75 % of the total), followed by buffalo, sheep and goats (FAOSTAT, 
2013).
Manure. Global emissions from manure, as either organic fertilizer 
on cropland or manure deposited on pasture, grew between 1961 
and 2010 from 0.57 to 0.99 GtCO2eq / yr. Emissions grew by 1.1 % / yr 
on average. Manure deposited on pasture led to far larger emissions 
than manure applied to soils as organic fertilizer, with 80 % of emis-
sions from deposited manures coming from developing countries (FAO-
STAT, 2013; Herrero et  al., 2013). The highest emitting regions from 
2000 – 2010 were the Americas, Asia and Africa. Growth over the same 
period was most pronounced in Africa, with an average of 2.5 % / yr, 
followed by Asia (2.3 % / yr), and the Americas (1.2 % / yr), while there 
was a decrease in Europe of – 1.2 % / yr. Two-thirds of the total came 
from grazing cattle, with smaller contributions from sheep and goats. 
In this decade, emissions from manure applied to soils as organic fertil-
izer were greatest in Asia, then in Europe and the Americas. Though the 
continent with the highest growth rates of 3.4 % / yr, Africa’s share in 
total emissions remained small. In this sub-category, swine and cattle 
contributed more than three quarters (77 %) of the emissions. Emis-
sions from manure management grew from 0.25 to 0.36 GtCO2eq / yr, 
resulting in average annual growth rates of only 0.6 % / yr during the 
period 1961 – 2010. From 2000 – 2010 most emissions came from Asia, 
then Europe, and the Americas (Figure 11.5).
Synthetic Fertilizer. Emissions from synthetic fertilizers grew at an aver-
age rate of 3.9 % / yr from 1961 to 2010, with absolute values increas-
ing more than 9-fold, from 0.07 to 0.68 GtCO2eq / yr (Tubiello et  al., 
2013). Considering current trends, synthetic fertilizers will become a 
larger source of emissions than manure deposited on pasture in less 
than 10 years and the second largest of all agricultural emission cat-
egories after enteric fermentation. Close to three quarters (70 %) of 
these emissions were from developing countries in 2010. In the decade 
2000 – 2010, the largest emitter by far was Asia, then the Americas 
and then Europe (FAOSTAT, 2012). Emissions grew in Asia by 5.3 % / yr, 
in Africa by 2.0 % / yr, and in the Americas by 1.5 % / yr. Emissions 
decreased in Europe (– 1.8 % / yr). 
Rice. Emissions from rice are limited to paddy rice cultivation. From 
1961 to 2010, global emissions increased with average annual growth 
rates of 0.4 % / yr (FAOSTAT, 2013) from 0.37 to 0.52 GtCO2eq / yr. The 
growth in global emissions has slowed in recent decades, consistent 
with trends in rice cultivated area. During 2000 – 2010, the largest 
share of emissions (94 %) came from developing countries, with Asia 
being responsible for almost 90 % of the total (Figure 11.5). The larg-
est growth of emissions took place in in Africa (2.7 % / yr), followed by 
Europe (1.4 % / yr). Growth rates in Asia and the Americas were much 
smaller over the same period (0.4 – 0.7 % / yr).
Figure 11�6 | Global net CO2 emission estimates from FOLU including LUC. Black line: 
Houghton bookkeeping model approach updated to 2010 as in (Houghton et al., 2012), 
including LUC and forest management but no peatlands. Red lines: EDGAR ‘LULUCF’ 
emissions derived from the GFED 2.0 database (van der Werf et al., 2006) of emissions 
due to all forest fires (includes both FOLU and non-FOLU fires), with (solid line) and 
without (dotted line) peat fires and decay. Green lines: emissions from land-use change 
and management from FAO agricultural and forest inventory data (FAOSTAT, 2013), 
shown with (solid line) and without (dotted line) peat fires and peat degradation. Dark 
red line: deforestation and degradation fires only based on satellite fire data from GFED 
3.0 database (van der Werf et al., 2010). Light blue lines: a selection of process-based 
vegetation model results, updated for WGI Chapter 6; (Le Quéré et al., 2013) include 
LUC, some include forest management, none include peatlands. LPJ-wsl: (Poulter et al., 
2010); BernCC: (Stocker et al., 2011); VISIT: (Kato et al., 2011); ISAM: (Jain et al., 2013), 
IMAGE 2.4 (Van Minnen et al., 2009, deforestation only). The symbols and transparent 
rectangles represent mean values for the tropics only. Circles: tropical deforestation and 
forest management (Pan et al., 2011), using the Houghton (2003) bookkeeping model 
approach and FAO data. Triangle: tropical deforestation only, based on satellite forest 
area and biomass data (Baccini et al., 2012; Harris et al., 2012). Square: tropical defor-
estation and forest management, based on satellite forest area and biomass data and 
FAO data using bookkeeping model (Baccini et al., 2012; Harris et al., 2012).
Pan 1990-1999 
and 2000 to 2007 
Harris 2000 to 2005
Baccini 2000 to 2010GFED 3.0 Deforestation Fires only
EDGAR 4.2 all Forest Fires 
and Peat
EDGAR 4.2 all Forest Fires
FAOSTAT 2013: incl. Peat
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11�2�3 Trends of GHG fluxes from forestry and 
other land use3
This section focuses on the most significant non-agricultural GHG 
fluxes to the atmosphere for which there are global trend data. Fluxes 
resulting directly from anthropogenic FOLU activity are dominated by 
CO2 fluxes, primarily emissions due to deforestation, but also uptake 
due to reforestation / regrowth. Non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions 
from FOLU are small in comparison, and mainly arise from peat degra-
dation through drainage and biomass fires (Box 11.1; Box 11.2).
FOLU accounted for about a third of anthropogenic CO2 emissions 
from 1750 to 2011 and 12 % of emissions in 2000 to 2009 (Table 
11.1). At the same time, atmospheric measurements indicate the land 
as a whole was a net sink for CO2, implying a ‘residual’ terrestrial 
sink offsetting FOLU emissions (Table 11.1). This sink is confirmed by 
inventory measurements in both managed and unmanaged forests in 
temperate and tropical regions (Phillips et al., 1998; Luyssaert et al., 
2008; Lewis et al., 2009; Pan et al., 2011). A sink of the right order of 
magnitude has been accounted for in models as a result of the indirect 
effects of human activity on ecosystems, i. e., the fertilizing effects of 
increased levels of CO2 and N in the atmosphere and the effects of 
climate change (WGI Chapter 6; (Le Quéré et al., 2013), although some 
of it may be due to direct AFOLU activities not accounted for in current 
estimates (Erb et al., 2013). This sink capacity of forests is relevant to 
AFOLU mitigation through forest protection.
3 The term ‘forestry and other land use’ used here, is consistent with AFOLU in the 
(IPCC, 2006) Guidelines and consistent with LULUCF (IPCC, 2003).
Global FOLU CO2 flux estimates (Table 11.1 and Figure 11.6) are based 
on a wide range of data sources, and include different processes, defi-
nitions, and different approaches to calculating emissions (Houghton 
et  al., 2012; Le Quéré et  al., 2013; Pongratz et  al., 2013). This leads 
to a large range across global FOLU flux estimates. Nonetheless, most 
approaches agree that there has been a decline in FOLU CO2 emissions 
over the most recent years. This is largely due to a decrease in the rate 
of deforestation (FAO, 2010; FAOSTAT, 2013).
Regional trends in FOLU CO2 emissions are shown in Figure 11.7. 
Model results indicate FOLU emissions peaked in the 1980s in Asia and 
LAM regions and declined thereafter. This is consistent with a reduced 
rate of deforestation, most notably in Brazil4, and some areas of affor-
estation, the latter most notably in China, Vietnam and India (FAO-
STAT, 2013). In MAF the picture is mixed, with the Houghton model 
(Houghton et al., 2012) showing a continuing increase from the 1970s 
to the 2000s, while the VISIT model (Kato et al., 2011) indicates a small 
sink in the 2000s. The results for temperate and boreal areas repre-
sented by OECD and EIT regions are very mixed ranging from large 
net sources (ISAM) to small net sinks. The general picture in temperate 
and boreal regions is of declining emissions and / or increasing sinks. 
These regions include large areas of managed forests subjected to har-
vest and regrowth, and areas of reforestation (e. g., following cropland 
abandonment in the United States and Europe). Thus results are sensi-
tive to whether and how the models include forest management and 
environmental effects on regrowing forests.
4 For annual deforestation rates in Brazil see http: / / www. obt. inpe. br / prodes / index.
php
Table 11�1 | Net global CO2 flux from AFOLU.
1750 – 2011 1980 – 1989 1990 – 1999 2000 – 2009
Cumulative GtCO2 GtCO2 / yr GtCO2 / yr GtCO2 / yr
IPCC WGI Carbon Budget, Table 6�1a:
Net AFOLU CO2 fluxb 660 ± 293 5.13 ± 2.93 5.87 ± 2.93 4.03 ± 2.93
Residual terrestrial sinkc – 550 ± 330 – 5.50 ± 4.03 – 9.90 ± 4.40 – 9.53 ± 4.40
Fossil fuel combustions and cement productiond 1338 ± 110 20.17 ± 1.47 23.47 ± 1.83 28.60 ± 2.20
Meta-analyses of net AFOLU CO2 flux:
WGI, Table 6.2e 4.77 ± 2.57 4.40 ± 2.20 2.93 ± 2.20
Houghton et al., 2012f 4.18 ± 1.83 4.14 ± 1.83 4.03 ± 1.83
Notes: Positive fluxes represent net emissions and negative fluxes represent net sinks.
(a) Selected components of the carbon budget in IPCC WGI AR5, Chapter 6, Table 6.1.
(b) From the bookkeeping model accounting method of Houghton (2003) updated in Houghton et al., (2012), uncertainty based on expert judgement; 90 % confidence uncer-
tainty interval.
(c) Calculated as residual of other terms in the carbon budget. 
(d) Fossil fuel flux shown for comparison (Boden et al., 2011).
(e) Average of estimates from 12 process models, only 5 were updated to 2009 and included in the 2000 – 2009 mean. Uncertainty based on standard deviation across models, 
90 % confidence uncertainty interval (WGI Chapter 6).
(f) Average of 13 estimates including process models, bookkeeping model and satellite / model approaches, only four were updated to 2009 and included in the 2000 – 2009 
mean. Uncertainty based on expert judgment.
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Figure 11�7 | Regional trends in net CO2 fluxes from FOLU (including LUC). Houghton bookkeeping model approach updated to 2010 as in Houghton et al., (2012) and five 
process-based vegetation models updated to 2010 for WGI Chapter 6; (Le Quéré et al., 2013): LPJ-wsl: (Poulter et al., 2010); BernCC: (Stocker et al., 2011); VISIT: (Kato et al., 2011); 









































































The bookkeeping model method (Houghton, 2003; Houghton et  al., 
2012) uses regional biomass, growth and decay rates from the inven-
tory literature that are not varied to account for changes in climate 
or CO2. It includes forest management associated with shifting cul-
tivation in tropical forest regions as well as global wood harvest 
and regrowth cycles. The primary source of data for the most recent 
decades is FAO forest area and wood harvest (FAO, 2010). FAOSTAT 
(2013) uses the default IPCC methodologies to compute stock-differ-
ence to estimate emissions and sinks from forest management, car-
bon loss associated with forest conversion to other land uses as a 
proxy for emissions from deforestation, GFED4 data on burned area to 
estimate emissions from peat fires, and spatial analyses to determine 
emissions from drained organic soils (IPCC, 2007b). The other mod-
els in Figures 11.6 and 11.7 are process-based terrestrial ecosystem 
models that simulate changing plant biomass and carbon fluxes, and 
include climate and CO2 effects, with a few now including the nitro-
gen cycle (Zaehle et al., 2011; Jain et al., 2013). Inclusion of the nitro-
gen cycle results in much higher modelled net emissions in the ISAM 
model (Jain et al., 2013) as N limitation due to harvest removals lim-
its forest regrowth rates, particularly in temperate and boreal forests. 
Change in land cover in the process models is from the HYDE dataset 
(Goldewijk et al., 2011; Hurtt et al., 2011), based on FAO cropland and 
pasture area change data. Only some process models include forest 
management in terms of shifting cultivation (VISIT) or wood harvest 
and forest degradation (ISAM); none account for emissions from peat-
lands (see Box 11.1).
Satellite estimates of change in land cover have been combined with 
model approaches to calculate tropical forest emissions (Hansen et al., 
2010). The data is high resolution and verifiable, but only covers recent 
decades, and does not account for fluxes due to LUC that occurred 
prior to the start of the study period (e. g., decay or regrowth). Sat-
ellite data alone cannot distinguish the cause of change in land use 
(deforestation, natural disturbance, management), but can be used in 
conjunction with activity data for attribution (Baccini et al., 2012). A 
recent development is the use of satellite-based forest biomass esti-
mates (Saatchi et al., 2011) together with satellite land cover change 
in the tropics to estimate ‘gross deforestation’ emissions (Harris et al., 
2012) or further combining it with FAO and other activity data to esti-
mate net fluxes from forest area change and forest management (Bac-
cini et al., 2012).
A detailed breakdown of the component fluxes in (Baccini et al., 2012) 
is shown in Figure 11.8. Where there is temporary forest loss through 
management, ‘gross’ forest emissions can be as high as for permanent 
forest loss (deforestation), but are largely balanced by ‘gross’ uptake 
in regrowing forest, so net emissions are small. When regrowth does 
not balance removals, it leads to a degradation of forest carbon stocks. 
In Baccini et al. (2012) this degradation was responsible for 15 % of 
total net emissions from tropical forests (Houghton, 2013; Figure 11.8). 
Huang and Asner (2010) estimated that forest degradation in the Ama-
zon, particularly from selective logging, is responsible for 15 – 19 % 
higher C emissions than reported from deforestation alone. Pan et al. 
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Figure 11�8 | Breakdown of mean annual CO2 fluxes from deforestation and forest management in tropical countries (GtCO2 / yr). Pan et al. (2011) estimates are based on FAO 
data and the Houghton bookkeeping model (Houghton, 2003). Baccini et al. (2012) estimates are based on satellite land cover change and biomass data with FAO data, and the 
Houghton (2003) bookkeeping model, with the detailed breakdown of these results shown in Houghton, (2013). Harris et al. (2012) estimates are based on satellite land cover 
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(2011) separated ‘gross emissions’ from deforestation and forest man-
agement on the one hand, from uptake in regrowing vegetation on the 
other. Deforestation emissions decline from the 1990s to 2000 – 2007, 
and uptake in regrowing vegetation increases, both contributing to the 
decline in net tropical CO2 emissions.
Satellite fire data have also been used to estimate FOLU emissions 
(van der Werf et al., 2006); Box 11.2). The EDGAR5 database ‘Land-
5 http: / / edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu / index.php
Use Change and Forestry’ emissions are based on forest and peat 
fire data from GFED 2.0 (van der Werf et al., 2006), with additional 
estimates of post-burn decay, and emissions from degraded peat-
lands based on (Joosten, 2010); Box 11.1). However, GFED 2.0 fire 
data does not distinguish anthropogenic AFOLU fires from other fires, 
unlike GFED 3.0 (van der Werf et al., 2010); Box 11.2). Fire data also 
does not capture significant additional AFOLU fluxes due to land 
clearing and forest management that is by harvest rather than fire 
(e. g., deforestation activities outside the humid tropics) or regrowth 
following clearing. Thus EDGAR data only approximates the FOLU 
flux.
Box 11�1 | AFOLU GHG emissions from peatlands and mangroves
Undisturbed waterlogged peatlands (organic soils) store a large 
amount of carbon and act as small net sinks (Hooijer et al., 2010). 
Drainage of peatlands for agriculture and forestry results in a 
rapid increase in decomposition rates, leading to increased emis-
sions of CO2, and N2O, and vulnerability to further GHG emissions 
through fire. The FAO emissions database estimates globally 
250,000 km2 of drained organic soils under cropland and grass-
land, with total GHG emissions of 0.9 GtCO2eq / yr in 2010 — with 
the largest contributions from Asia (0.44 GtCO2eq / yr) and Europe 
(0.18 GtCO2eq / yr) (FAOSTAT, 2013). Joosten (2010), estimated 
that there are > 500,000 km2 of drained peatlands in the world 
including under forests, with CO2 emissions having increased 
from 1.06 GtCO2 / yr in 1990 to 1.30 GtCO2 / yr in 2008, despite a 
decreasing trend in Annex I countries, from 0.65 to 0.49 GtCO2 / yr, 
primarily due to natural and artificial rewetting of peatlands. 
In Southeast Asia, CO2 emissions from drained peatlands in 
2006 were 0.61 ± 0.25 GtCO2 / yr (Hooijer et al., 2010). Satel-
lite estimates indicate that peat fires in equatorial Asia emitted 
on average 0.39 GtCO2 eq / yr over the period 1997 – 2009 (van 
der Werf et al., 2010), but only 0.2 GtCO2 eq / yr over the period 
1998 – 2009. This lower figure is consistent with recent indepen-
dent FAO estimates over the same period and region. Mangrove 
ecosystems have declined in area by 20 % (36 Mha) since 1980, 
although the rate of loss has been slowing in recent years, reflect-
ing an increased awareness of the value of these ecosystems (FAO, 
2007). A recent study estimated that deforestation of mangroves 
released 0.07 to 0.42 GtCO2 / yr (Donato et al., 2011).
Box 11�2� | AFOLU GHG emissions from fires
Burning vegetation releases CO2, CH4, N2O, ozone-precursors 
and aerosols (including black carbon) to the atmosphere. When 
vegetation regrows after a fire, it takes up CO2 and nitrogen. 
Anthropogenic land management or land conversion fire activities 
leading to permanent clearance or increasing levels of disturbance 
result in net emissions to the atmosphere over time. Satellite-
detection of fire occurrence and persistence has been used to 
estimate fire emissions (e. g., GFED 2.0 database; (van der Werf 
et al., 2006). It is hard to separate the causes of fire as natural 
or anthropogenic, especially as the drivers are often combined. 
An update of the GFED methodology now distinguishes FOLU 
deforestation and degradation fires from other management fires 
(GFED 3.0 database; (van der Werf et al., 2010); Figure 11.6). The 
estimated tropical deforestation and degradation fire emissions 
were 1.39 GtCO2eq / yr during 1997 to 2009 (total carbon including 
CO2, CH4, CO and black carbon), 20 % of all fire emissions. Carbon 
dioxide FOLU fire emissions are already included as part of the 
global models results such as those presented in Table 1.1 and 
Figures 11.6 and 11.7. According to (FAOSTAT, 2013)1, in 2010 the 
non-CO2 component of deforestation and forest degradation fires 
totalled 0.1 GtCO2eq / yr, with forest management and peatland 
fires (Box 11.1) responsible for an additional 0.2 GtCO2eq / yr.
1 FOLU GHG emissions by fires include, as per IPCC GHG guidelines, all fires 
on managed land. Most current FOLU estimates are limited however to fires 
associated to deforestation, forest management and peat fires. Emissions 
from prescribed burning of savannahs are reported under agriculture. Both 
CO2 and non-CO2 emissions are accounted under these FOLU components, 
but CO2 emissions dominate.
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FAO estimates AFOLU GHG emissions (FAOSTAT, 2013)6 based on 
IPCC Tier 1 methodology7. With reference to the decade 2001 – 2010, 
total GHG FOLU emissions were 3.2 GtCO2eq / yr including defor-
estation (3.8 GtCO2eq / yr), forest degradation and forest manage-
ment (– 1.8 GtCO2eq / yr), biomass fires including peatland fires 
(0.3 GtCO2eq / yr), and drained peatlands (0.9 GtCO2eq / yr). The FAO 
estimated total mean net GHG FOLU flux to the atmosphere decreased 
from 3.9 GtCO2eq / yr in 1991 – 2000 to 3.2 GtCO2eq / yr in 2001 – 2010 
(FAOSTAT, 2013).
11.3 Mitigation technology 
options and practices, 
and behavioural aspects
Greenhouse gases can be reduced by supply-side mitigation options (i. e., 
by reducing GHG emissions per unit of land / animal, or per unit of prod-
uct), or by demand-side options (e. g., by changing demand for food and 
fibre products, reducing waste). In AR4, the forestry chapter (Nabuurs 
et al., 2007) considered some demand-side options, but the agriculture 
chapter focused on supply-side options only (Nabuurs et al., 2007; Smith 
et al., 2007). In this section, we discuss only supply-side options (Section 
11.3.1). Demand-side options are discussed in Section 11.4.
Mitigation activities in the AFOLU sector can reduce climate forcing in 
different ways:
•	 Reductions in CH4 or N2O emissions from croplands, grazing lands, 
and livestock.
•	 Conservation of existing carbon stocks, e. g., conservation of forest 
biomass, peatlands, and soil carbon that would otherwise be lost.
•	 Reductions of carbon losses from biota and soils, e. g., through 
management changes within the same land-use type (e. g., reduc-
ing soil carbon loss by switching from tillage to no-till cropping) or 
by reducing losses of carbon-rich ecosystems, e. g., reduced defor-
estation, rewetting of drained peatlands.
•	 Enhancement of carbon sequestration in soils, biota, and long-
lived products through increases in the area of carbon-rich eco-
systems such as forests (afforestation, reforestation), increased 
carbon storage per unit area, e. g., increased stocking density in 
6 http: / / faostat.fao.org / 
7 Parties to the UNFCCC report net GHG emissions according to IPCC method-
ologies (IPCC, 2003, 2006). Reporting is based on a range of methods and 
approaches dependent on available data and national capacities, from default 
equations and emission factors applicable to global or regional cases and assum-
ing instantaneous emissions of all carbon that will be eventually lost from the 
system following human action (Tier 1) to more complex approaches such as 
model-based spatial analyses (Tier 3).
forests, carbon sequestration in soils, and wood use in construction 
activities.
•	 Changes in albedo resulting from land-use and land-cover change 
that increase reflection of visible light.
•	 Provision of products with low GHG emissions that can replace 
products with higher GHG emissions for delivering the same ser-
vice (e. g., replacement of concrete and steel in buildings with 
wood, some bioenergy options; see Section 11.13).
•	 Reductions of direct (e. g., agricultural machinery, pumps, fishing 
craft) or indirect (e. g., production of fertilizers, emissions result-
ing from fossil energy use in agriculture, fisheries, aquaculture, and 
forestry or from production of inputs); though indirect emission 
reductions are accounted for in the energy end-use sectors (build-
ings, industry, energy generation, transport) so are not discussed 
further in detail in this chapter.
11�3�1 Supply-side mitigation options
Mitigation potentials for agricultural mitigation options were given on 
a ‘per-area’ and ‘per-animal’ in AR4 (Nabuurs et al., 2007; Smith et al., 
2007). All options are summarized in Table 11.2 with impacts on each 
GHG noted, and a categorization of technical mitigation potential, 
ease of implementation, and availability (supported by recent refer-
ences). These mitigation options can have additive positive effects, but 
can also work in opposition, e. g., zero tillage can reduce the effective-
ness of residue incorporation. Most mitigation options were described 
in detail in AR4 so are not described further here; additional practices 
that were not considered in AR4, i. e., biochar, reduced emissions from 
aquaculture, and bioenergy are described in Boxes 11.3, 11.4, and 
11.5, respectively.
In addition to the per-area and per-animal mitigation options described 
in AR4, more attention has recently been paid to options that reduce 
emissions intensity by improving the efficiency of production (i. e., less 
GHG emissions per unit of agricultural product; (Burney et al., 2010; 
Bennetzen et  al., 2012); a reduction in emissions intensity has long 
been a feature of agricultural emissions reduction and is one compo-
nent of a process more broadly referred to as sustainable intensifica-
tion (Tilman et  al., 2009; Godfray et  al., 2010; Smith, 2013; Garnett 
et al., 2013). This process does not rely on reducing inputs per se, but 
relies on the implementation of new practices that result in an increase 
in product output that is larger than any associated increase in emis-
sions (Smith, 2013). Even though per-area emissions could increase, 
there is a net benefit since less land is required for production of the 
same quantity of product. The scope to reduce emissions intensity 
appears considerable since there are very large differences in emis-
sions intensity between different regions of the world (Herrero et al., 
2013). Sustainable intensification is discussed further in Section 11.4.2, 
and trends in changes in emissions intensity are discussed further in 
Section 11.6.
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Table 11�2 | Summary of supply-side mitigation options in the AFOLU sector. Technical Mitigation Potential: Area = (tCO2eq / ha) / yr; Animal = percent reduction of enteric emissions. 
Low = < 1; < 5 % (white), Medium = 1 – 10; 5 – 15 % (light grey), High = > 10, > 15 % (grey); Ease of Implementation (acceptance or adoption by land manager): Difficult (white), 
Medium (light grey), Easy, i. e., universal applicability (grey); Timescale for Implementation: Long-term (at research and development stage; white), Mid-term (trials in place, within 
5 – 10 years; light grey), Immediate (technology available now, grey).













































C: Conservation of existing C pools in forest vegetation and soil by controlling deforestation 
protecting forest in reserves, and controlling other anthropogenic disturbances such as 
fire and pest outbreaks. Reducing slash and burn agriculture, reducing forest fires.
1
CH4, N2O: Protection of peatland forest, reduction of wildfires. 2
Afforestation / Reforestation
C: Improved biomass stocks by planting trees on non-forested agricultural lands. 
This can include either monocultures or mixed species plantings. These activities may 
also provide a range of other social, economic, and environmental benefits. 
3, 4, 5
Forest management
C: Management of forests for sustainable timber production including 
extending rotation cycles, reducing damage to remaining trees, reducing 
logging waste, implementing soil conservation practices, fertilization, and using 
wood in a more efficient way, sustainable extortion of wood energy
6, 7, 8, 9
CH4, N2O: Wildfire behaviour modification. 10, 11, 12
Forest restoration
C: Protecting secondary forests and other degraded forests whose biomass and soil 
C densities are less than their maximum value and allowing them to sequester C by 
natural or artificial regeneration, rehabilitation of degraded lands, long-term fallows.
13, 14
CH4, N2O : Wildfire behaviour modification.
Land-based agriculture
Cropland management
Croplands — plant 
management
C: High input carbon practices, e. g., improved crop varieties, crop rotation, use 
of cover crops, perennial cropping systems, agricultural biotechnology.
15, 16, 17
N2O: Improved N use efficiency. 18
Croplands — nutrient 
management
C: Fertilizer input to increase yields and residue inputs 
(especially important in low-yielding agriculture).
19, 20
N2O: Changing N fertilizer application rate, fertilizer type, 
timing, precision application, inhibitors.
21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 105, 106
Croplands — tillage / residues 
management
C: Reduced tillage intensity; residue retention. 17, 24, 26, 27
N2O: 28, 96, 97
CH4: 96
Croplands — water 
management
C: Improved water availability in cropland including water harvesting and application. 29
CH4: Decomposition of plant residues.
N2O: Drainage management to reduce emissions, reduce N runoff leaching.
Croplands — rice management
C: Straw retention. 30
CH4: Water management, mid-season paddy drainage. 31, 32, 98
N2O: Water management, N fertilizer application rate, 
fertilizer type, timing, precision application.
32, 98, 99
Rewet peatlands drained 
for agriculture
C: Ongoing CO2 emissions from reduced drainage (but CH4 emissions may increase). 33
Croplands — set-aside and LUC
C: Replanting to native grasses and trees. Increase C sequestration. 34, 35, 36, 37, 38
N2O: N inputs decreased resulting in reduced N2O.
Biochar application
C: Soil amendment to increase biomass productivity, and sequester C 
(biochar was not covered in AR4 so is described in Box 11.3).
39, 40, 41
N2O: Reduced N inputs will reduce emissions. 39, 42
⇒
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Grazing lands — plant 
management
C: Improved grass varieties / sward composition, e. g., deep rooting grasses, 
increased productivity, and nutrient management. Appropriate stocking densities, 
carrying capacity, fodder banks, and improved grazing management.
43, 44, 45
N2O 46
Grazing lands — animal 
management
C: Appropriate stocking densities, carrying capacity management, fodder banks and 
improved grazing management, fodder production, and fodder diversification.
43, 47
CH4
N2O: Stocking density, animal waste management.
Grazing land — fire 
management
C: Improved use of fire for sustainable grassland management. 
Fire prevention and improved prescribed burning.
Revegetation
Revegetation
C: The establishment of vegetation that does not meet the definitions 
of afforestation and reforestation (e. g., Atriplex spp.).
48
CH4: Increased grazing by ruminants may increase net emissions.
N2O: Reduced N inputs will reduce emissions.
Other
Organic soils — restoration 
C: Soil carbon restoration on peatlands; and avoided net soil 
carbon emissions using improved land management.
49
CH4: May increase.
Degraded soils — restoration
Land reclamation (afforestation, soil fertility management, water 
conservation soil nutrients enhancement, improved fallow).
100, 101, 102, 103, 104
Biosolid applications
C: Use of animal manures and other biosolids for improved management 





CH4: Improved feed and dietary additives to reduce emissions from 
enteric fermentation; including improved forage, dietary additives 
(bioactive compounds, fats), ionophores / antibiotics, propionate 
enhancers, archaea inhibitors, nitrate and sulphate supplements.
50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 
55, 56, 57, 58, 59
Livestock — breeding and 
other long-term management
CH4: Improved breeds with higher productivity (so lower emissions per unit 
of product) or with reduced emissions from enteric fermentation; microbial 
technology such as archaeal vaccines, methanotrophs, acetogens, defaunation 
of the rumen, bacteriophages and probiotics; improved fertility.
54, 55, 56, 58, 60, 61, 
62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 
67, 68, 69, 70, 71
Manure management
CH4: Manipulate bedding and storage conditions, anaerobic 
digesters; biofilters, dietary additives.
56, 58, 72, 73
N2O: Manipulate livestock diets to reduce N excreta, soil applied and animal 
fed nitrification inhibitors, urease inhibitors, fertilizer type, rate and timing, 
manipulate manure application practices, grazing management.





C: Mixed production systems can increase land productivity and 
efficiency in the use of water and other resources and protect against 
soil erosion as well as serve carbon sequestration objectives.
79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 
84, 85, 86, 87, 88
N2O: Reduced N inputs will reduce emissions.
Other mixed biomass 
production systems
C: Mixed production systems such as double-cropping systems and mixed crop-livestock 
systems can increase land productivity and efficiency in the use of water and other resources 
as well as serve carbon sequestration objectives. Perennial grasses (e. g., bamboo) can in 
the same way as woody plants be cultivated in shelter belts and riparian zones / buffer strips 
provide environmental services and supports C sequestration and biomass production.
82, 89, 90
N2O: Reduced N inputs will reduce emissions.
⇒
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11�3�2 Mitigation effectiveness 
(non- permanence: saturation,  
human and natural impacts, 
 displacement)
Since carbon sequestration in soil and vegetation and the retention of 
existing carbon stocks forms a significant component of the mitigation 
potential in the AFOLU sector, this section considers the factors affect-
ing this strategy compared to avoided GHG emissions.
Non-permanence / reversibility. Reversals are the release of previously 
sequestered carbon, which negates some or all of the benefits from 
sequestration that has occurred in previous years. This issue is some-
times referred to as ‘non-permanence’ (Smith, 2005). Various types of 
carbon sinks (e. g., afforestation / reforestation, agricultural soil C) have 
an inherent risk of future reversals. 
Certain types of mitigation activities (e. g., avoided N2O from fertilizer, 
emission reductions from changed diet patterns or reduced food-chain 
losses) are effectively permanent since the emissions, once avoided, 
cannot be re-emitted. The same applies to the use of bioenergy to dis-
place fossil-fuel emissions (Section 11.13) or the use of biomass-based 
products to displace more emissions-intensive products (e. g., wood in 
place of concrete or steel) in construction. 
Reversals may be caused by natural events that affect yields / growth. 
In some cases (e. g., frost damage, pest infestation, or fire; (Reichstein 
et al., 2013), these effects may be temporary or short-term. Although 
these events will affect the annual increment of C sequestration, they 
may not result in a permanent decline in carbon stocks. In other cases, 
such as stand replacing forest fires, insect or disease outbreaks, or 
drought, the declines may be more profound. Although a substantial 
loss of above-ground stored carbon could occur following a wildfire, 
whether this represents a loss depends on what happens following the 
fire and whether the forest recovers, or changes to a lower carbon-
storage state (see Box 11.2). Similarly, some systems are naturally 
adapted to fire and carbon stocks will recover following fire, whereas 
in other cases the fire results in a change to a system with a lower 
carbon stock (e. g., Brown and Johnstone, 2011). For a period of time 
following fire (or other disruptive event), the stock of carbon will be 
less than that before the fire. Similarly, emissions of non-CO2 gases 
also need to be considered. 
The permanence of the AFOLU carbon stock relates to the longevity of 
the stock, i. e., how long the increased carbon stock remains in the soil 
or vegetation. This is linked to consideration of the reversibility of the 
increased carbon stock (Smith, 2005), as discussed in Section 11.5.2. 
Saturation. Substitution of fossil fuel and material with biomass, and 
energy-intensive building materials with wood can continue in perpe-
tuity. In contrast, it is often considered that carbon sequestration in 
soils (Guldea et al., 2008) or vegetation cannot continue indefinitely. 
The carbon stored in soils and vegetation reaches a new equilibrium 
(as the trees mature or as the soil carbon stock saturates). As the 











































Integration of biomass 
production with subsequent 
processing in food and 
bioenergy sectors
C: Integrating feedstock production with conversion, typically producing animal feed 
that can reduce demand for cultivated feed such as soy and corn and can also reduce 
grazing requirements. Using agricultural and forestry residues for energy production.
91, 92, 93, 94, 95
N2O: Reduced N inputs will reduce emissions.
Bioenergy (see Box 11�5 and Section 11�13)
1Van Bodegom et al., 2009; 2Malmsheimer et al., 2008; 3Reyer et al., 2009; 4Sochacki et al., 2012; 5IPCC, 2000; 6DeFries and Rosenzweig, 2010; 7Takimoto et al., 2008; 8Masera 
et al., 2003; 9Silver et al., 2000; 10Dezzeo et al., 2005; 11Ito, 2005; 12Sow et al., 2013; 13Reyer et al., 2009; 14Palm et al., 2004; 15Godfray et al., 2010; 16Burney et al., 2010; 17Conant 
et al., 2007; 18Huang and Tang, 2010; 19Lemke et al., 2010; 20Eagle and Olander, 2012; 21Snyder et al., 2007; 22Akiyama et al., 2010; 23Barton et al., 2011; 24Powlson et al., 2011; 
25van Kessel et al., 2013; 26Farage et al., 2007; 27Smith, 2012; 28Abdalla et al., 2013; 29Bayala et al., 2008; 30Yagi et al., 1997; 31Tyagi et al., 2010; 32Feng et al., 2013; 33Lohila 
et al., 2004; 34Seaquist et al., 2008; 35Mbow, 2010; 36Assogbadjo et al., 2012; 37Laganiere et al., 2010; 38Bayala et al., 2011; 39Singh et al., 2010; 40Woolf et al., 2010; 41Lehmann 
et al., 2003; 42Taghizadeh-Toosi et al., 2011; 43Franzluebbers and Stuedemann, 2009; 44Follett and Reed, 2010; 45McSherry and Ritchie, 2013; 46Saggar et al., 2004; 47Thornton 
and Herrero, 2010; 48Harper et al., 2007; 49Smith and Wollenberg, 2012; 50Beauchemin et al., 2008; 51Beauchemin et al., 2009; 52Martin et al., 2010; 53Grainger and Beauchemin, 
2011; 54Clark, 2013; 55Cottle et al., 2011; 56Eckard et al., 2010; 57Sauvant and Giger-Reverdin, 2007; 58Hristov et al., 2013; 59Bryan et al., 2013; 60Attwood and McSweeney, 2008; 
61Attwood et al., 2011; 62Hegarty et al., 2007; 63Hook et al., 2010; 64Janssen and Kirs, 2008; 65Martin et al., 2010; 66Morgavi et al., 2008; 67Morgavi et al., 2010; 68Place and Mit-
loehner, 2010; 69Waghorn and Hegarty, 2011; 70Wright and Klieve, 2011; 71Yan et al., 2010 72Chadwick et al., 2011; 73Petersen and Sommer, 2011; 74de Klein et al., 2010; 75de 
Klein and Eckard, 2008; 76Dijkstra et al., 2011 77Schils et al., 2013; 78VanderZaag et al., 2011; 79Oke and Odebiyi, 2007; 80Rice, 2008; 81Takimoto et al., 2008; 82Lott et al., 2009; 
83Sood and Mitchell, 2011; 84Assogbadjo et al., 2012; 85Wollenberg et al., 2012; 86Semroc et al., 2012; 87Souza et al. 2012; 88Luedeling and Neufeldt, 2012; 89Heggenstaller et al., 
2008; 90Herrero et al., 2010; 91Dale et al., 2009; 92Dale et al., 2010; 93Sparovek et al. 2007; 94Sood and Mitchell, 2011; 95Vermeulen et al., 2012; 96Metay et al., 2007 ; 97Rochette, 
2008; 98Ma et al., 2009; 99Yao et al., 2010; 100Arnalds, 2004; 101Batjes, 2004; 102Hardner et al., 2000; 103May et al., 2004; 104Zhao et al., 2005; 105Huang and Tang, 2010; 106Kim 
et al., 2013.
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Box 11�3 | Biochar
This box summarizes the mitigation potential for biochar tech-
nologies, which were not considered in AR4. Biomass C stabiliza-
tion could be combined with (or substitute) bioenergy capture 
as part of a land-based mitigation strategy (Lehmann, 2007). 
Heating biomass with air excluded (pyrolysis) generates energy-
containing volatiles and gases. Hydrogen and O are preferentially 
eliminated, creating a stable (biologically recalcitrant) C-rich co-
product (char). By adding char to soil as ‘biochar’ a system can be 
established that may have a higher carbon abatement than typical 
bioenergy alternatives (Woolf et al., 2010). The gain is probably 
highest where efficient bioenergy is constrained by a remote, sea-
sonal, or diffuse biomass resource (Shackley et al., 2012). The ben-
efit of pyrolysis-biochar systems (PBS) is increased considerably if 
allowance is made for the indirect effects of using biochar via the 
soil. These effects include increased crop and biomass production 
and decreased N2O and CH4 emissions. Realizing the mitigation 
potential for biochar technologies will be constrained by the need 
for sustainable feedstock acquisition, competing biomass use 
options are an important influence of the production process on 
biochar properties. Considering sustainable feedstock production 
and targeting biochar deployment on less fertile land, Woolf et al. 
(2010) calculated maximum global abatement of 6.6 GtCO2eq / yr 
from 2.27 Gt biomass C. Allowing for competition for virgin non-
waste biomass the value was lower (3.67 GtCO2eq / yr from 1.01 
Gt biomass C), accruing 240 – 480 GtCO2eq abatement within 100 
years.
Meta-analysis shows that in experimental situations crop produc-
tivity has, on average, been enhanced by circa 15 % near-term, 
but with a wide range of effects (Jeffery et al., 2011; Biederman 
and Harpole, 2013). This range is probably explained by the nature 
and extent of pre-existing soil constraints. The Woolf et al. (2010) 
analysis accordingly assumed crop yield increases of 0 – 90 % (rela-
tive). Relaxing this assumption by one-half decreased projected 
abatement by 10 %. Decreasing an assumed 25 % suppression on 
soil N2O flux by the same proportion had a smaller impact. Ben-
eficial interactions of biochar and the soil N cycle are beginning 
to be understood with effects on mineralization, nitrification, 
denitrification, immobilization and adsorption persisting at least 
for days and months after biochar addition (Nelissen et al., 2012; 
Clough et al., 2013). Although the often large suppression of soil 
N2O flux observed under laboratory conditions can be increasingly 
explained (Cayuela et al., 2013), this effect is not yet predictable 
and there has been only limited validation of N2O suppression by 
biochar in planted field soils (Liu et al., 2012; Van Zwieten et al., 
2013) or over longer timeframes (Spokas, 2013). The potential to 
gain enhanced mitigation using biochar by tackling gaseous emis-
sions from manures and fertilizers before and after application to 
soil are less well-explored (Steiner et al., 2010; Angst et al., 2013). 
The abatement potential for PBS remains most sensitive to the 
absolute stability of the C stored in biochar. Estimates of ‘half-
life’ have been inferred from wildfire charcoal (Lehmann, 2007) 
or extrapolated from direct short-term observation. These give 
values that range from < 50 to > 10,000 years, but predominantly 
between 100 – 1000 years (Singh et al., 2012; Spokas, 2013). 
Nonetheless, the assumption made by Woolf et al. (2010) for the 
proportion of biochar C that is stable long-term (85 %) is subject 
to refinement and field validation.
Demonstration of the equipment and infrastructure required for 
effective use of energy products from biomass pyrolysis is still 
limited, especially across large and small unit scales. Preliminary 
analyses shows, however, that the break-even cost of biochar 
production is likely to be location- and feedstock-specific (Shack-
ley et al., 2012; Field et al., 2013). Until economic incentives are 
established for the stabilization of C, biochar adoption will depend 
on predictable, positive effects on crop production. This requires 
more research on the use of biochar as a regular low-dose soil 
input, rather than single applications at rates > 10t / ha, which 
have so far been the norm (Sohi, 2012). Product standards are 
also required, to ensure that biochar is produced in a way that 
does not create or conserve problematic concentrations of toxic 
contaminants, and to support regulated deployment strategies (IBI 
Biochar, 2012; Downie et al., 2012).
soils / vegetation approach the new equilibrium, the annual removal 
(sometimes referred to as the sink strength) decreases until it becomes 
zero at equilibrium. This process is called saturation (Smith, 2005; 
Körner, 2006, 2009; Johnston et al., 2009b) , and the uncertainty asso-
ciated with saturation has been estimated (Kim and McCarl, 2009). An 
alternative view is that saturation does not occur, with studies from 
old-growth forests, for example, showing that they can continue to 
sequester C in soil and dead organic matter even if net living biomass 
increment is near zero (e. g., Luyssaert et  al., 2008). Peatlands are 
unlikely to saturate in carbon storage, but the rate of C uptake may be 
very slow (see Box 11.1). 
Human and natural impacts. Soil and vegetation carbon sinks can be 
impacted upon by direct human-induced, indirect human-induced, and 
natural changes (Smith, 2005). All of the mitigation practices discussed 
in Section 11.3.1 arise from direct human-induced impacts (deliberate 
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management). Both sink processes and carbon stocks can be affected 
by natural factors such as soil and hydrological conditions. Indirect 
human-induced changes can impact carbon sinks and are influenced by 
human activity, but are not directly related to the management of that 
piece of land; examples include climate change and atmospheric nitro-
gen deposition. For some tree species, rising concentrations of tropo-
spheric ozone caused by human activities may counteract the effects of 
increased atmospheric CO2 or N deposition on tree growth (Sitch et al., 
2008; Matyssek et al., 2010). Natural changes that threaten to impact 
the efficacy of mitigation measures are discussed in Section 11.5.
Displacement / leakage. Displacement / leakage arises from a change in 
land use or land management that causes a positive or negative change 
in emissions elsewhere. This can occur within or across national bound-
aries, and the efficacy of mitigation practices must consider the leak-
age implications. For example, if reducing emissions in one place leads 
to increased emissions elsewhere, no net reduction occurs; the emis-
sions are simply displaced (Powlson et al., 2011; Kastner et al., 2011b; 
a). However, this assumes a one-to-one correspondence. Murray et al. 
(2004) estimated the leakage from different forest carbon programmes 
and this varied from < 10 % to > 90 % depending on the nature of the 
activity. West et al. (2010a) examined the impact of displaced activities 
in different geographic contexts; for example, land clearing in the trop-
ics will release twice the carbon, but only produce half the crop yield 
of temperate areas. Indirect land-use change is an important compo-
nent to consider for displaced emissions and assessments of this are an 
emerging area. Indirect land-use change is discussed further in Section 
11.4 and in relation to bioenergy in Section 11.13.
The timing of mitigation benefits from actions (e. g., bioenergy, forest 
management, forest products use / storage) can vary as a result both of 
the nature of the activity itself (e. g., from the temporal pattern of soil 
or forest sequestration compared to biomass substitution), and rates 
of adoption. Timing thus needs to be considered when judging the 
effectiveness of a mitigation action. Cherubini et al. (2012) modelled 
the impact of timing of benefits for three different wood applications 
(fuel, non-structural panels, and housing construction materials) and 
showed that the options provide mitigation over different timeframes, 
and thus have different impacts on CO2 concentrations and radiative 
forcing. The temporal pattern of emissions and removals is especially 
important in mitigating emissions of short-lived gases through carbon 
sequestration (Lauder et al., 2013). 
Box 11�4 | Aquaculture
Aquaculture is defined as the farming of fish, shellfish, and 
aquatic plants (Hu et al., 2013). Although it is an ancient practice 
in some parts of world, this sector of the food system is growing 
rapidly. Since the mid-1970s, total aquaculture production has 
grown at an average rate of 8.3 % per year (1970 – 2008; (Hu 
et al., 2013). The estimated aquaculture production in 2009 was 
55.10 Mt, which accounts for approximately 47 % of all the fish 
consumed by humans (Hu et al., 2013). The sector is diverse, being 
dominated by shellfish and herbivorous and omnivorous pond 
fish, either entirely or partly utilizing natural productivity, but 
globalizing trade and favourable economic conditions are driving 
intensive farming at larger scales (Bostock et al., 2010). Potential 
impacts of aquaculture, in terms emissions of N2O, have recently 
been considered (Williams and Crutzen, 2010; Hu et al., 2012). 
Global N2O emissions from aquaculture in 2009 were estimated to 
be 93 ktN2O-N (~43 MtCO2eq), and will increase to 383  ktN2O-N 
(~178 MtCO2eq) by 2030, which could account for 5.7 % of 
anthropogenic N2O-N emissions if aquaculture continues to grow 
at the present growth rate (~7.1 % / yr; Hu et al., 2012).
Some studies have focused on rice-fish farming, which is a 
practice associated with wet rice cultivation in Southeast Asia, 
providing protein, especially for subsistence-oriented farmers 
(Bhattacharyya et al., 2013). Cultivation of fish along with rice 
increases emissions of CH4 (Frei et al., 2007; Bhattacharyya et al., 
2013), but decreases N2O emissions, irrespective of the fish spe-
cies used (Datta et al., 2009; Bhattacharyya et al., 2013). Although 
rice-fish farming systems might be globally important in terms 
of climate change, they are also relevant for local economy, food 
security, and efficient water use (shared water), which makes 
it difficult to design appropriate mitigation measures, because 
of the tradeoffs between mitigation measures and rice and fish 
production (Datta et al., 2009; Bhattacharyya et al., 2013). Feeding 
rate and dissolved oxygen (DO) concentration could affect N2O 
emissions from aquaculture systems significantly, and nitrifica-
tion and denitrification processes were equally responsible for the 
emissions of N2O in these systems. Measures to control N2O from 
aquaculture are described by Hu et al. (2012), and include the 
maintenance of optimal operating conditions of the system, such 
as appropriate pH and temperature, sufficient DO and good qual-
ity feed. Additionally, two potential ways to minimize N2O emis-
sions from aquaculture systems include ‘Aquaponic Aquaculture’ 
(polyculture consisting of fish tanks (aquaculture) and plants that 
are cultivated in the same water cycle (hydroponic)), and Bioflocs 
Technology (BFT) Aquaculture (which involves the development 
and control of heterotrophic bacteria in flocs within the fish 
culture component), where the growth of heterotrophic bacteria is 
stimulated, leading to nitrogen uptake (Hu et al., 2012).
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Box 11�5 | Bioenergy
Bioenergy deployment offers significant potential for climate 
change mitigation, but also carries considerable risks. The SRREN 
(IPCC, 2011) suggested potential bioenergy deployment levels to 
be between 100 – 300 EJ. This assessment agrees on a technical 
bioenergy potential of around 100 EJ, and possibly 300 EJ and 
higher. Integrated models project between 15 – 245 EJ / yr deploy-
ment in 2050, excluding traditional bioenergy. Achieving high 
deployment levels would require, amongst others, extensive use 
of agricultural residues and second-generation biofuels to miti-
gate adverse impacts on land use and food production, and the 
co-processing of biomass with coal or natural gas with carbon 
dioxide capture and storage (CCS) to produce low net GHG-
emitting transportation fuels and / or electricity. Integration of 
crucial sectoral research (albedo effects, evaporation, counterfac-
tual land carbon sink assumptions) into transformation pathways 
research, and exploration of risks of imperfect policy settings 
(for example, in absence of a global CO2 price on land carbon) 
is subject of further research (Sections 11.9, 11.13.2, 11.13.4). 
Small-scale bioenergy systems aimed at meeting rural energy 
needs synergistically provide mitigation and energy access 
benefits. Decentralized deployment of biomass for energy, in 
combination with improved cookstoves, biogas, and small-scale 
biopower, could improve livelihoods and health of around 2.6 
billion people. Both mitigation potential and sustainability hinges 
crucially on the protection of land carbon (high-density carbon 
ecosystems), careful fertilizer application, interaction with food 
markets, and good land and water management. Sustainability 
and livelihood concerns might constrain beneficial deployment of 
dedicated biomass plantations to lower values (Sections 11.13.3, 
11.13.5, 11.13.7).
Lifecycle assessments for bioenergy options demonstrate a 
plethora of pathways, site-specific conditions and technologies 
that produce a wide range of climate-relevant effects. Specifically, 
LUC emissions, N2O emissions from soil and fertilizers, co-prod-
ucts, process design and process fuel use, end-use technology, 
and reference system can all influence the total attributional 
lifecycle emissions of bioenergy use. The large variance for specific 
pathways points to the importance of management decisions in 
reducing the lifecycle emissions of bioenergy use. The total mar-
ginal global warming impact of bioenergy can only be evaluated 
in a comprehensive setting that also addresses equilibrium effects, 
e. g., indirect land-use change (iLUC) emissions, actual fossil fuel 
substitution, and other effects. Structural uncertainty in modelling 
decisions renders such evaluation exercises uncertain. Available 
data suggest a differentiation between options that offer low 
lifecycle emissions under good land-use management (e. g., sug-
arcane, Miscanthus, and fast-growing tree species) and those that 
are unlikely to contribute to climate change mitigation (e. g., corn 
and soybean), pending new insights from more comprehensive 
consequential analyses (Sections 8.7, 11.13.4).
Coupling bioenergy and CCS (BECCS) has attracted particular 
attention since AR4 because it offers the prospect of negative 
emissions. Until 2050, the economic potential is estimated to be 
between 2 – 10 GtCO2 per year. Some climate stabilization sce-
narios see considerable higher deployment towards the end of the 
century, even in some 580 – 650 ppm scenarios, operating under 
different time scales, socioeconomic assumptions, technology 
portfolios, CO2 prices, and interpreting BECCS as part of an overall 
mitigation framework. Technological challenges and potential 
risks of BECCS include those associated with the provision of the 
biomass feedstock as well as with the capture, transport and long-
term underground storage of CO2. BECCS faces large challenges in 
financing and currently no such plants have been built and tested 
at scale (Sections 7.5.5, 7.9, 11.13.3).
Land demand and livelihoods are often affected by bioenergy 
deployment. Land demand for bioenergy depends on (1) the share 
of bioenergy derived from wastes and residues; (2) the extent to 
which bioenergy production can be integrated with food and fibre 
production, and conservation to minimize land-use competition; 
(3) the extent to which bioenergy can be grown on areas with 
little current production; and (4) the quantity of dedicated energy 
crops and their yields. Considerations of tradeoffs with water, 
land, and biodiversity are crucial to avoid adverse effects. The total 
impact on livelihood and distributional consequences depends on 
global market factors, impacting income and income-related food-
security, and site-specific factors such as land tenure and social 
dimensions. The often site-specific effects of bioenergy deploy-
ment on livelihoods have not yet been comprehensively evaluated 
(Section 11.13.7).
Additionality: Another consideration for gauging the effectiveness of 
mitigation is determining whether the activity would have occurred 
anyway, with this encompassed in the concept of ‘additionality’ (see 
Glossary).
Impacts of climate change: An area of emerging activity is predicting 
the likely impacts of climate change on mitigation potential, both in 
terms of impacts on existing carbon stocks, but also on the rates of 
carbon sequestration. This is discussed further in Section 11.5.
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11.4 Infrastructure and 
 systemic perspectives
Only supply-side mitigation options are considered in Section 11.3. 
In this section, we consider infrastructure and systemic perspec-
tives, which include potential demand-side mitigation options in the 
AFOLU sector. Since infrastructure is a minor issue in AFOLU com-
pared to energy end-use sectors, this section focusses on systemic 
perspectives.
11�4�1 Land: a complex, integrated system
Mitigation in the AFOLU sector is embedded in the complex interactions 
between socioeconomic and natural factors simultaneously affecting 
land systems (Turner et al., 2007). Land is used for a variety of purposes, 
including housing and infrastructure (Chapter 12), production of goods 
and services through agriculture, aquaculture and forestry, and absorp-
tion or deposition of wastes and emissions (Dunlap and Catton, Jr., 2002). 
Agriculture and forestry are important for rural livelihoods and employ-
ment (Coelho et al., 2012), while aquaculture and fisheries can be region-
ally important (FAO, 2012). More than half of the planet’s total land area 
Figure 11�9 | Global land use and biomass flows arising from human economic activity in 2000 from the cradle to the grave. Values in Gt dry matter biomass / yr. Figure source: 
(Smith et al., 2013b). If a source reported biomass flows in energy units, the numbers were converted to dry matter assuming a gross energy value of 18.5 MJ / kg. The difference 
between inputs and outputs in the consumption compartment is assumed to be released to the atmosphere (respiration, combustion); small differences may result from rounding. 
Note that data sources a) area: (Erb et al., 2007; Schneider et al., 2009; FAO, 2010) ; b) biomass flows: (Wirsenius, 2003; Sims et al., 2006; Krausmann et al., 2008; FAOSTAT, 2012; 
Kummu et al., 2012) are incomplete; more research is needed to close data gaps between different statistical sources such as agricultural, forestry, and energy statistics (Section 
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(134 Mkm2) is used for urban and infrastructure land, agriculture, and for-
estry. Less than one quarter shows relatively minor signs of direct human 
use (Erb et al., 2007; Ellis et al., 2010; Figure 11.9). Some of the latter 
areas are inhabited by indigenous populations, which depend on the land 
for the supply of vitally important resources (Read et al., 2010).
Land-use change is a pervasive driver of global environmental change 
(Foley et al., 2005, 2011) . From 1950 to 2005, farmland (cropland plus 
pasture) increased from 28 to 38 % of the global land area excluding 
ice sheets and inland waters (Hurtt et al., 2011). The growth of farmland 
area (+33 %) was lower than that of population, food production, and 
gross domestic product (GDP) due to increases in yields and biomass 
conversion efficiency (Krausmann et al., 2012). In the year 2000, almost 
one quarter of the global terrestrial net primary production (one third 
of the above-ground part) was ‘appropriated’ by humans. This means 
that it was either lost because the net primary productivity (the bio-
mass production of green plants, net primary production, NPP) of agro-
ecosystems or urban areas was lower than that of the vegetation they 
replaced or it was harvested for human purposes, destroyed during har-
vest or burned in human-induced fires (Imhoff et al., 2004; Haberl et al., 
2007). The fraction of terrestrial NPP appropriated by humans doubled 
in the last century (Krausmann et al., 2013), exemplifying the increasing 
human domination of terrestrial ecosystems (Ellis et al., 2010). Growth 
trajectories of the use of food, energy, and other land-based resources, 
as well as patterns of urbanization and infrastructure development are 
influenced by increasing population and GDP, as well as the on-going 
agrarian-industrial transition (Haberl et al., 2011b; Kastner et al., 2012).
Growing resource use and land demand for biodiversity conservation 
and carbon sequestration (Soares-Filho et al., 2010), result in increas-
ing competition for land (Harvey and Pilgrim, 2011; Section 11.4.2). 
Influencing ongoing transitions in resource use is a major challenge 
(WBGU, 2011; Fischer-Kowalski, 2011). Changes in cities, e. g., in terms 
of infrastructure, governance, and demand, can play a major role in 
this respect (Seto et al., 2012b; Seitzinger et al., 2012; Chapter 12).
Many mitigation activities in the AFOLU sector affect land use or land 
cover and, therefore, have socioeconomic as well as ecological con-
sequences, e. g., on food security, livelihoods, ecosystem services or 
emissions (Sections 11.1; 11.4.5; 11.7). Feedbacks involved in imple-
menting mitigation in AFOLU may influence different, sometimes 
conflicting, social, institutional, economic, and environmental goals 
(Madlener et al., 2006). Climate change mitigation in the AFOLU sector 
faces a complex set of interrelated challenges (Sections 11.4.5; 11.7):
•	 Full GHG impacts, including those from feedbacks (e. g., iLUC) or 
leakage, are often difficult to determine (Searchinger et al., 2008).
•	 Feedbacks between GHG reduction and other important objectives 
such as provision of livelihoods and sufficient food or the mainte-
nance of ecosystem services and biodiversity are not completely 
understood.
•	 Maximizing synergies and minimizing negative effects involves 
multi-dimensional optimization problems involving various social, 
economic, and ecological criteria or conflicts of interest between 
different social groups (Martinez-Alier, 2002). 
•	 Changes in land use and ecosystems are scale-dependent and may 
proceed at different speeds, or perhaps even move in different 
directions, at different scales.
11�4�2 Mitigation in AFOLU — feedbacks with 
land-use competition
Driven by economic and population growth, increased demand for food 
and bioenergy as well as land demand for conservation and urbanization 
(e. g., above-ground biomass carbon losses associated with land-clearing 
from new urban areas in the pan-tropics are estimated to be 5 % of the 
tropical deforestation and land-use change emissions, (Seto et al., 2012a; 
Section 12.2), competition for land is expected to intensify (Smith et al., 
2010; Woods et al., 2010). Maximization of one output or service (e. g., 
crops) often excludes, or at least negatively affects, others (e. g., conser-
vation; (Phalan et al., 2011). Mitigation in the AFOLU sector may affect 
land-use competition. Reduced demand for AFOLU products generally 
decreases inputs (fertilizer, energy, machinery) and land demand. The 
ecological feedbacks of demand-side options are mostly beneficial since 
they reduce competition for land and water (Smith et al., 2013b).
Some supply-side options, though not all, may intensify competition 
for land and other resources. Based on Figure 11.9 one may distinguish 
three cases:
•	 Optimization of biomass-flow cascades; that is, increased use 
of residues and by-products, recycling of biogenic materials and 
energetic use of wastes (WBGU, 2009). Such options increase 
resource use efficiency and may reduce competition, but there may 
also be tradeoffs. For example, using crop residues for bioenergy 
or roughage supply may leave less C and nutrients on cropland, 
reduce soil quality and C storage in soils, and increase the risk of 
losses of carbon through soil erosion. Residues are also often used 
as forage, particularly in the tropics. Forest residues are currently 
also used for other purposes, e. g., chipboard manufacture, pulp 
and paper production (González-Estrada et al., 2008; Blanco-Can-
qui and Lal, 2009; Muller, 2009; Ceschia et al., 2010).
•	 Increases in yields of cropland (Burney et al., 2010; Foley et al., 
2011; Tilman et al., 2011; Mueller et al., 2012; Lobell et al., 2013), 
grazing land or forestry and improved livestock feeding efficiency 
(Steinfeld et  al., 2010; Thornton and Herrero, 2010) can reduce 
land competition if yield increases relative to any additional inputs 
and the emission intensity (i. e., GHG emissions per unit of prod-
uct) decreases. This may result in tradeoffs with other ecological, 
social, and economic costs (IAASTD, 2009) although these can to 
some extent be mitigated if intensification is sustainable (Tilman 
et al., 2011). Another caveat is that increases in yields may result in 
rebound effects that increase consumption (Lambin and Meyfroidt, 
2011; Erb, 2012) or provide incentives to farm more land (Matson 
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and Vitousek, 2006), and hence may fail to spare land (Section 
11.10).
•	 Land-demanding options reduce GHG emissions by harness-
ing the potential of the land for either C sequestration or growing 
energy crops (including food crops used as feedstocks for bioenergy 
production). These options result in competition for land (and some-
times other resources such as water) that may have substantial 
social, economic, and ecological effects (positive or negative; (UNEP, 
2009; WBGU, 2009; Chum et al., 2011; Coelho et al., 2012). Such 
options may increase pressures on ecosystems (e. g., forests) and 
GHG emissions related to direct and indirect LUC, contribute to price 
increases of agricultural products, or negatively affect livelihoods 
of rural populations. These possible impacts need to be balanced 
against possible positive effects such as GHG reduction, improved 
water quality (Townsend et al., 2012), restoration of degraded land 
(Harper et al., 2007), biodiversity protection (Swingland et al., 2002), 
and job creation (Chum et al., 2011; Coelho et al., 2012).
Therefore, an integrated energy / agriculture / land-use approach for mit-
igation in AFOLU can help to optimize synergies and mitigate negative 
effects (Popp et al., 2011; Smith, 2012; Creutzig et  al., 2012a; Smith 
et al., 2013b).
11�4�3 Demand-side options for reducing GHG 
emissions from AFOLU
Some changes in demand for food and fibre can reduce GHG emissions 
in the production chain (Table 11.3) through (i) a switch to the con-
sumption of products with higher GHG emissions in the process chain to 
products with lower GHG emissions and (ii) by making land available for 
other GHG reduction activities e. g., afforestation or bioenergy (Section 
11.4.4). Food demand change is a sensitive issue due to the prevalence 
of hunger, malnutrition, and the lack of food security in many regions 
(Godfray et al., 2010). Sufficient production of, and equitable access to, 
food are both critical for food security (Misselhorn et al., 2012). GHG 
emissions may be reduced through changes in food demand without 
jeopardizing health and well-being by (1) reducing losses and wastes of 
food in the supply chain as well as during final consumption; (2) chang-
ing diets towards less GHG-intensive food, e. g., substitution of animal 
products with plant-based food, while quantitatively and qualitatively 
maintaining adequate protein content, in regions with high animal 
product consumption; and (3) reduction of overconsumption in regions 
where this is prevalent. Substituting plant-based diets for animal-based 
diets is complex since, in many circumstances, livestock can be fed on 
plants not suitable for human consumption or growing on land with 
high soil carbon stocks not suitable for cropping; hence, food produc-
tion by grazing animals contributes to food security in many regions of 
the world (Wirsenius, 2003; Gill et al., 2010).
Reductions of losses in the food supply chain — Globally, rough esti-
mates suggest that ~30 – 40 % of all food produced is lost in the sup-
ply chain from harvest to consumption (Godfray et al., 2010). Energy 
embodied in wasted food is estimated at ~36 EJ / yr (FAO, 2011). In 
developing countries, up to 40 % is lost on farm or during distribution 
due to poor storage, distribution, and conservation technologies and 
procedures. In developed countries, losses on farm or during distribu-
tion are smaller, but the same amount is lost or wasted in service sec-
tors and at the consumer level (Foley et al., 2005; Parfitt et al., 2010; 
Godfray et al., 2010; Gustavsson et al., 2011; Hodges et al., 2011). How-
ever, uncertainties related to losses in the food supply chain are large 
and more research is needed.
Not all losses are (potentially) avoidable because losses in households 
also include parts of products normally not deemed edible (e. g., peels of 
some fruits and vegetables). According to Parfitt et al. (2010), in the UK, 
18 % of the food waste is unavoidable, 18 % is potentially avoidable, 
and 64 % is avoidable. Data for Austria, Netherlands, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States, derived with a variety of methods, 
show that food wastes at the household level in industrialized countries 
are 150 – 300 kg per household per year (Parfitt et al., 2010). According 
to a top-down mass-flow modelling study based on FAO commodity 
balances completely covering the food supply chain, but excluding non-
edible fractions, food loss values range from 120 – 170 kg / cap / yr in Sub-
Saharan Africa to 280 – 300 kg / cap / yr in Europe and North America. 
Table 11�3 | Overview of demand-side mitigation options in the AFOLU sector.
Measure Description References
Reduced losses in the 
food supply chain
Reduced losses in the food supply chain and in final consumption reduces energy use and GHG 
emissions from agriculture, transport, storage and distribution, and reduce land demand.
(Godfray et al., 2010; Gustavsson 
et al., 2011), see text.
Changes in human diets 
towards less emission-
intensive products
Where appropriate, reduced consumption of food items with high GHG emissions per unit 
of product, to those with low GHG products can reduce GHG emissions. Such demand 
changes can reduce energy inputs in the supply chain and reduces land demand.
(Stehfest et al., 2009; 
FAO, 2011), see text
Demand-side options related 
to wood and forestry
Wood harvest in forests releases GHG and at least temporarily reduces forest C stocks. Conservation of wood (products) 
through more efficient use or replacement with recycled materials and replacing wood from illegal logging or destructive 
harvest with wood from certified sustainable forestry (Section 11.10) can save GHG emissions. Substitution of wood 
for non-renewable resources can reduce GHG emissions, e. g., when wood is substituted for emission-intensive 
materials such as aluminium, steel, or concrete in buildings. Integrated optimization of C stocks in forests and in 
long-lived products, as well as the use of by-products and wastes for energy, can deliver the highest GHG benefits.
(Gustavsson et al., 2006; 
Werner et al., 2010; 
Ingerson, 2011), see text.
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Losses ranging from 20 % in Sub-Saharan Africa to more than 30 % in 
the industrialized countries were calculated (Gustavsson et al., 2011).
A range of options exist to reduce wastes and losses in the supply 
chain: investments into harvesting, processing and storage technolo-
gies in the developing countries, awareness raising, taxation and other 
incentives to reduce retail and consumer-related losses primarily in the 
developed countries. Different options can help to reduce losses (i. e., 
increase efficiency) in the supply chain and at the household level. Sub-
stantial GHG savings could be realized by saving one quarter of the 
wasted food according to (Gustavsson et al., 2011); see Table 11.4.
Changes in human diets — Land use and GHG effects of changing diets 
require widespread behavioural changes to be effective; i. e., a strong 
deviation from current trajectories (increasing demand for food, in par-
ticular for animal products). Cultural, socioeconomic and behavioural 
aspects of implementation are discussed in Sections 11.4.5 and 11.7.
Studies based on Lifecycle Assessment (LCA) methods show substan-
tially lower GHG emissions for most plant-based food than for ani-
mal products (Carlsson-Kanyama and González, 2009; Pathak et  al., 
2010; Bellarby et  al., 2012; Berners-Lee et  al., 2012), although there 
are exceptions, e. g., vegetables grown in heated greenhouses or 
transported by airfreight (Carlsson-Kanyama and González, 2009). 
A comparison of three meals served in Sweden with similar energy 
and protein content based on (1) soy, wheat, carrots, and apples, (2) 
pork, potatoes, green beans, and oranges, and (3) beef, rice, cooked 
frozen vegetables, and tropical fruits revealed GHG emissions of 0.42 
kgCO2eq for the first option, 1.3 kgCO2eq for the second, and 4.7 
kgCO2eq for the third, i. e., a factor of > 10 difference (Carlsson-Kan-
yama and González, 2009). Most LCA studies quoted here use attribu-
tional LCA; differences to results from consequential LCA (see Annex 
II) are generally not large enough to reverse the picture (Thomassen 
et al., 2008). The GHG benefits of plant-based food over animal prod-
ucts hold when compared per unit of protein (González et al., 2011). 
In addition to plant-based foods having lower emissions than animal-
based ones, GHG emissions of livestock products also vary consider-
ably; emissions per unit of protein are highest for beef and lower for 
pork, chicken meat, eggs and dairy products (de Vries and de Boer, 
2010) due to their feed and land-use intensities. Figure 11.10 presents 
a comparison between milk and beef for different production systems 
and regions of the world (Herrero et al., 2013). Beef production can use 
up to five times more biomass for producing 1 kg of animal protein 
than dairy. Emissions intensities for the same livestock product also 
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vary largely between different regions of the world due to differences 
in agro-ecology, diet quality, and intensity of production (Herrero et al., 
2013). In overall terms, Europe and North America have lower emis-
sions intensities per kg of protein than Africa, Asia, and Latin America. 
This shows that the highest potential for improving emissions inten-
sities lies in developing countries, if intensification strategies can be 
matched to local resources and contexts.
Studies based on integrated modelling show that changes in diets 
strongly affect future GHG emissions from food production (Stehfest 
et al., 2009; Popp et al., 2010; Davidson, 2012). Popp et al. (2010) esti-
mated that agricultural non-CO2 emissions (CH4 and N2O) would triple 
by 2055 to 15.3 GtCO2eq / yr if current dietary trends and population 
growth were to continue. Technical mitigation options on the sup-
ply side, such as improved cropland or livestock management, alone 
could reduce that value to 9.8 GtCO2eq / yr, whereas emissions were 
reduced to 4.3 GtCO2eq / yr in a ‘decreased livestock product’ scenario 
and to 2.5 GtCO2eq / yr if both technical mitigation and dietary change 
were assumed. Hence, the potential to reduce GHG emissions through 
changes in consumption was found to be substantially higher than 
that of technical mitigation measures. Stehfest et  al., (2009) evalu-
ated effects of dietary changes on CO2 (including C sources / sinks of 
ecosystems), CH4, and N2O emissions. In a ‘business-as-usual’ scenario 
largely based on FAO (2006), total GHG emissions were projected to 
reach 11.9 GtCO2eq / yr in 2050. The following changes were evaluated: 
no ruminant meat, no meat, and a diet without any animal products. 
Changed diets resulted in GHG emission savings of 34 – 64 % compared 
to the ‘business-as-usual’ scenario; a switch to a ‘healthy diet’ recom-
mended by the Harvard Medical School would save 4.3 GtCO2eq / yr 
(– 36 %). Adoption of the ‘healthy diet’ (which includes a meat, fish and 
egg consumption of 90 g / cap / day) would reduce global GHG abatement 
costs to reach a 450 ppm CO2eq concentration target by ~50 % com-
pared to the reference case (Stehfest et al., 2009). The analysis assumed 
nutritionally sufficient diets; reduced supply of animal protein was com-
pensated by plant products (soy, pulses, etc.). Considerable cultural and 
social barriers against a widespread adoption of dietary changes to low-
GHG food may be expected (Davidson, 2012; Smith et al., 2013, 11.4.5).
A limitation of food-related LCA studies is that they have so far sel-
dom considered the emissions resulting from LUC induced by chang-
ing patterns of food production (Bellarby et al., 2012) . A recent study 
(Schmidinger and Stehfest, 2012) found that cropland and pastures 
required for the production of beef, lamb, calf, pork, chicken, and 
milk could annually sequester an amount of carbon equivalent to 
30 – 470 % of the GHG emissions usually considered in LCA of food 
products if the land were to be reforested. Land-related GHG costs dif-
fer greatly between products and depend on the time horizon (30 – 100 
yr) assumed (Schmidinger and Stehfest, 2012). If cattle production 
contributes to tropical deforestation (Zaks et  al., 2009; Bustamante 
et al., 2012; Houghton et al., 2012), land-use related GHG emissions 
are particularly high (Cederberg et al., 2011). These findings underline 
the importance of diets for GHG emissions in the food supply chain 
(Garnett, 2011; Bellarby et al., 2012). A potential co-benefit is a reduc-
tion in diet-related health risks in regions where overconsumption of 
animal products is prevalent (McMichael et al., 2007).
Demand-side options related to wood and forestry — A comprehen-
sive global, long-term dataset on carbon stocks in long-lived wood 
Table 11�4 | Changes in global land use and related GHG reduction potentials in 2050 assuming the implementation of options to increase C sequestration on farmland, and use 
of spared land for either biomass production for energy or afforestation. Afforestation and biomass for bioenergy are both assumed to be implemented only on spare land and are 
mutually exclusive (Smith et al., 2013b).
Cases Food crop area
Livestock 
grazing area












[Gha] GtCO2eq / yr
Reference 1.60 4.07 3.5 6.1 1.2 – 9.4 4.6 – 12.9 0
Diet change 1.38 3.87 3.2 11.0 2.1 – 17.0 5.3 – 20.2 0.7 – 7.3
Yield growth 1.49 4.06 3.4 7.3 1.4 – 11.4 4.8 – 14.8 0.2 – 1.9
Feeding efficiency 1.53 4.04 3.4 7.2 1.4 – 11.1 4.8 – 14.5 0.2 – 1.6
Waste reduction 1.50 3.82 3.3 10.1 1.9 – 15.6 5.2 – 18.9 0.6 – 6.0
Combined 1.21 3.58 2.9 16.5 3.2 – 25.6 6.1 – 28.5 1.5 – 15.6
Notes:
1 Potential for C sequestration on cropland for food production and livestock grazing land with improved soil C management. The potential C sequestration rate was derived 
from Smith et al., (2008).
2 Spare land is cropland or grazing land not required for food production, assuming increased but still sustainable stocking densities of livestock based on Haberl et al., (2011); 
Erb et al., (2012).
3 Assuming 11.8 (tCO2eq / ha) / yr (Smith et al., 2000).
4 Assumptions were as follows. High bioenergy value: short-rotation coppice or energy grass directly replaces fossil fuels, energy return on investment 1:30, dry-matter biomass 
yield 190 GJ / ha / yr (WBGU, 2009). Low bioenergy value: ethanol from maize replaces gasoline and reduces GHG by 45 %, energy yield 75 GJ / ha / yr (Chum et al., 2011). 
Some energy crops may, under certain conditions, sequester C in addition to delivering bioenergy; the effect is context-specific and was not included. Whether bioenergy or 
afforestation is a better option to use spare land for mitigation needs to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
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products in use (excluding landfills) shows an increase from approxi-
mately 2.2 GtC in 1900 to 6.9 GtC in 2008 (Lauk et  al., 2012). Per 
capita, carbon stored in wood products amounted to ~1.4 tC / cap in 
1900 and ~1.0 tC / cap in 2008. The net yearly accumulation of long-
lived wood products in use varied between 35 and 91 MtC / yr in the 
period 1960 – 2008 (Lauk et al., 2012). The yearly accumulation of C in 
products and landfills was ~200 MtC / yr in the period 1990 – 2008 (Pan 
et al., 2011). If more long-lived wood products were used, C sequestra-
tion and mitigation could be enhanced.
Increased wood use does not reduce GHG emissions under all circum-
stances because wood harvest reduces the amount of carbon stored in 
the forest, at least temporarily, and increases in wood harvest levels 
may result in reduced long-term carbon storage in forests (Ingerson, 
2011; Böttcher et  al., 2012; Holtsmark, 2012; Lamers and Junginger, 
2013). Reducing wood consumption, e. g., through paper recycling, can 
reduce GHG emissions (Acuff and Kaffine, 2013), as may the use of 
wood from sustainable forestry in place of emission-intensive materi-
als such as concrete, steel, or aluminium. Recent studies suggest that, 
where technically possible, substitution of wood from sustainably 
managed forests for non-wood materials in the construction sector 
(concrete, steel, etc.) in single-family homes, apartment houses, and 
industrial buildings, reduces GHG emissions in most cases (Werner 
et  al., 2010; Sathre and O’Connor, 2010; Ximenes and Grant, 2013). 
Most of the emission reduction results from reduced production emis-
sions, whereas the role of carbon sequestration in products is relatively 
small (Sathre and O’Connor, 2010). Werner et al. (2010) show that GHG 
benefits are highest when wood is primarily used for long-lived prod-
ucts, the lifetime of products is maximized, and energy use of woody 
biomass is focused on by-products, wood wastes, and end-of-lifecycle 
use of long-lived wood products.
11�4�4 Feedbacks of changes in land demand
Mitigation options in the AFOLU sector, including options such as bio-
mass production for energy, are highly interdependent due to their 
direct and indirect impacts on land demand. Indirect interrelation-
ships, mediated via area demand for food production, which in turn 
affects the area available for other purposes, are difficult to quan-
tify and require systemic approaches. Table 11.4 (Smith et al., 2013b) 
shows the magnitude of possible feedbacks in the land system in 
2050. It first reports the effect of single mitigation options compared 
to a reference case, and then the combined effect of all options. The 
reference case is similar to the (FAO, 2006a) projections for 2050 and 
assumes a continuation of on-going trends towards richer diets, con-
siderably higher cropland yields (+54 %) and moderately increased 
cropland areas (+9 %). The diet change case assumes a global con-
tract-and-converge scenario towards a nutritionally sufficient low 
animal product diet (8 % of food calories from animal products). The 
yield growth case assumes that yields in 2050 are 9 % higher than 
those in the reference case, according to the ‘Global Orchestration’ 
scenario in (MEA, 2005). The feeding efficiency case assumes on aver-
age 17 % higher livestock feeding efficiencies than the reference case. 
The waste reduction case assumes a reduction of the losses in the 
food supply chain by 25 % (Section 11.4.3). The combination of all 
options results in a substantial reduction of cropland and grazing 
areas (Smith et al., 2013b), even though the individual options cannot 
simply be added up due to the interactions between the individual 
compartments.
Table 11.4 shows that demand-side options save GHG by freeing up 
land for bioenergy or afforestation and related carbon sequestration. 
The effect is strong and non-linear, and more than cancels out reduced 
C sequestration potentials on farmland. Demand-side potentials are 
substantial compared to supply-side mitigation potentials (Section 
11.3), but implementation may be difficult (Sections 11.7; 11.8). Esti-
mates of GHG savings from bioenergy are subject to large uncertain-
ties related to the assumptions regarding power plants, utilization 
pathway, energy crop yields, and effectiveness of sustainability criteria 
(Sections 11.4.5; 11.7; 11.13).
The systemic effects of land-demanding mitigation options such as 
bioenergy or afforestation depend not only on their own area demand, 
but also on land demand for food and fibre supply (Chum et al., 2011; 
Coelho et al., 2012; Erb et al., 2012b). In 2007, energy crops for trans-
port fuels covered about 26.6 Mha or 1.7 % of global cropland (UNEP, 
2009). Assumptions on energy crop yields (Section 11.13) are the main 
reason for the large differences in estimates of future area demand 
of energy crops in the next decades, which vary from < 100 Mha to 
> 1000 Mha, i. e., 7 – 70 % of current cropland (Sims et al., 2006; Smeets 
et al., 2007; Pacca and Moreira, 2011; Coelho et al., 2012). Increased 
pressure on land systems may also emerge when afforestation claims 
land, or forest conservation restricts farmland expansion (Murtaugh 
and Schlax, 2009; Popp et al., 2011).
Land-demanding mitigation options may result in feedbacks such as 
GHG emissions from land expansion or agricultural intensification, 
higher yields of food crops, higher prices of agricultural products, 
reduced food consumption, displacement of food production to other 
regions and consequent land clearing, as well as impacts on biodiver-
sity and non-provisioning ecosystem services (Plevin et al., 2010; Popp 
et al., 2012). 
Restrictions to agricultural expansion due to forest conservation, 
increased energy crop area, afforestation and reforestation may 
increase costs of agricultural production and food prices. In a model-
ling study, conserving C-rich natural vegetation such as tropical forests 
was found to increase food prices by a factor of 1.75 until 2100, due 
to restrictions of cropland expansion, even if no growth of energy crop 
area was assumed (Wise et  al., 2009). Food price indices (weighted 
average of crop and livestock products) are estimated to increase until 
2100 by 82 % in Africa, 73 % in Latin America, and 52 % in Pacific Asia 
if large-scale bioenergy deployment is combined with strict forest con-
servation, compared to a reference scenario without forest conserva-
tion and bioenergy (Popp et al., 2011). Further trade liberalization can 
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lead to lower costs of food, but also increases the pressure on land, 
especially on tropical forests (Schmitz et al., 2011).
Increased land demand for GHG mitigation can be partially compen-
sated by higher agricultural yield per unit area (Popp et  al., 2011). 
While yield increases can lead to improvements in output from less 
land, generate better economic returns for farmers, help to reduce 
competition for land, and alleviate environmental pressures (Burney 
et  al., 2010; Smith et  al., 2010), agricultural intensification if poorly 
implemented incurs economic costs (Lotze-Campen et al., 2010) and 
may also create social and environmental problems such as nutrient 
leaching, soil degradation, pesticide pollution, impact on animal wel-
fare, and many more (IAASTD, 2009). Maintaining yield growth while 
reducing negative environmental and social effects of agricultural 
intensification is, therefore, a central challenge, requiring sustainable 
management of natural resources as well as the increase of resource 
efficiency (DeFries and Rosenzweig, 2010), two components of sustain-
able intensification (Garnett et al., 2013).
Additional land demand may put pressures on biodiversity, as LUC 
is one of the most important drivers of biodiversity loss (Sala et  al., 
2000). Improperly managed large-scale agriculture (or bioenergy) may 
negatively affect biodiversity (Groom et al., 2008), which is a key pre-
requisite for the resilience of ecosystems, i. e., their ability to adapt to 
changes such as climate change, and to continue to deliver ecosystem 
services in the future (Díaz et al., 2006; Landis et al., 2008). However, 
implementing appropriate management, such as establishing bioen-
ergy crops or plantations for carbon sequestration in already degraded 
ecosystems areas represents an opportunity where bioenergy can be 
used to achieve positive environmental outcomes (e. g., Hill et al., 2006; 
Semere and Slater, 2007; Campbell et  al., 2008; Nijsen et  al., 2012). 
Because climate change is also an important driver of biodiversity loss 
(Sala et al., 2000), bioenergy for climate change mitigation may also be 
beneficial for biodiversity if it is planned with biodiversity conservation 
in mind (Heller and Zavaleta, 2009; Dawson et al., 2011; Section 11.13). 
Tradeoffs related to land demand may be reduced through multifunc-
tional land use, i. e., the optimization of land to generate more than 
one product or service such as food, animal feed, energy or materials, 
soil protection, wastewater treatment, recreation, or nature protection 
(de Groot, 2006; DeFries and Rosenzweig, 2010; Section 11.7). This 
also applies to the potential use of ponds and other small water bodies 
for raising fish fed with agricultural waste (Pullin et al., 2007).
11�4�5 Sustainable development and behaviou-
ral aspects
The assessment of impacts of AFOLU mitigation options on sustainable 
development requires an understanding of a complex multilevel system 
where social actors make land-use decisions aimed at various develop-
ment goals, one of them being climate change mitigation. Depending 
on the specific objectives, the beneficiaries of a particular land-use 
choice may differ. Thus tradeoffs between global, national, and local 
concerns and various stakeholders need to be considered (see also Sec-
tion 4.3.7 and WGII Chapter 20). The development context provides 
opportunities or barriers for AFOLU (May et al., 2005; Madlener et al., 
2006; Smith and Trines, 2006; Smith et al., 2007; Angelsen, 2008; How-
den et al., 2008; Corbera and Brown, 2008; Cotula et al., 2009; Catta-
neo et al., 2010; Junginger et al., 2011; Section 11.8 and Figure 11.11).
Further, AFOLU measures have additional effects on development, 
beyond improving the GHG balance (Foley et  al., 2005; Alig et  al., 
2010; Calfapietra et al., 2010; Busch et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2013b; 
Branca et al., 2013; Albers and Robinson, 2013). These effects can be 
positive (co-benefits) or negative (adverse side-effects) and do not 
necessarily overlap geographically, socially or in time (Section 11.7 
and Figure 11.11). This creates the possibility of tradeoffs, because an 
AFOLU measure can bring co-benefits to one social group in one area 
(e. g., increasing income), while bringing adverse side-effects to others 
somewhere else (e. g., reducing food availability).
Table 11.5 summarizes the issues commonly considered when assess-
ing the above-mentioned interactions at various levels between sus-
tainable development and AFOLU.
Social complexity: Social actors in the AFOLU sector include indi-
viduals (farmers, forest users), social groups (communities, indigenous 
groups), private companies (e. g., concessionaires, food-producer multi-
nationals), subnational authorities, and national states (see Table 11.6).
 





























Effects of AFOLU measures 
on sustainable development 
(Section 11.7 Co-benefits, 
risks and spillovers)
Enabling conditions to AFOLU 
measures as provided by the 
development context (Section 
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Table 11�5 | Issues related to AFOLU measures and sustainable development.
Dimensions Issues
Social and human assets Population growth and migration, level of education, human capacity, individual skills, indigenous and traditional 
knowledge, cultural values, equity and health, animal welfare, organizational capacity
Natural assets Availability of natural resources (land, forest, water, agricultural land, minerals, fauna), GHG balance, ecosystem integrity, 
biodiversity conservation, ecosystem services, the productive capacity of ecosystems, ecosystem health and resilience
State of infrastructure 
and technology
Availability of infrastructure and technology and industrial capacity, technology development, appropriateness, acceptance
Economic factors Credit capacity, employment creation, income, wealth distribution / distribution mechanisms, carbon finance, available capital / investments, market access
Institutional arrangements Land tenure and land-use rights, participation and decision making mechanisms (e. g., through Free, Prior and Informed Consent), sectoral and cross-
sectoral policies, investment in research, trade agreements and incentives, benefit sharing mechanisms, existence and forms of social organization
Based on Madlener et al. (2006), Sneddon et al. (2006), Pretty (2008), Corbera and Brown (2008), Macauley and Sedjo (2011), and de Boer et al. (2011).
Spatial scale refers on the one hand to the size of an intervention 
(e. g., in number of hectares) and on the other hand to the biophysical 
characterization of the specific land (e. g., soil type, water availability, 
slope). Social interactions tend to become more complex the bigger 
the area of an AFOLU intervention, on a social-biophysical continuum: 
family / farm — neighbourhood — community — village — city — prov-
ince — country — region — globe. Impacts from AFOLU measures on 
sustainable development are different along this spatial-scale con-
tinuum (Table 11.6). The challenge is to provide landscape governance 
that responds to societal needs as well as biophysical capacity at dif-
ferent spatial scales (Görg, 2007; Moilanen and Arponen, 2011; van 
der Horst and Vermeylen, 2011). 
Temporal scale: As the concept of sustainable development includes 
current and future generations, the impacts of AFOLU over time need 
to be considered (see Chapter 4). Positive and negative impacts of 
AFOLU measures can be realized at different times. For instance, while 
reducing deforestation has an immediate positive impact on reducing 
GHG emissions, reforestation will have a positive impact on C seques-
tration over time. Further, in some circumstances, there is the risk of 
reversing current emission reductions in the future (see Section 11.3.2 
on non-permanence).
Behavioural aspects: Level of education, cultural values and tradi-
tion, as well as access to markets and technology, and the decision 
power of individuals and social groups, all influence the perception of 
potential impacts and opportunities from AFOLU measures, and con-
sequently have a great impact on local land management decisions 
(see Chapters 2, 3, and 4; Guthinga, 2008; Durand and Lazos, 2008; 
Gilg, 2009; Bhuiyan et al., 2010; Primmer and Karppinen, 2010; Durand 
and Vázquez, 2011). When decisions are taken at a higher adminis-
trative level (e. g., international corporations, regional authorities or 
national states), other factors or values play an important role, includ-
ing national and international development goals and priorities, poli-
cies and commitments, international markets or corporate image (see 
Chapters 3 and 4). Table 11.7 summarizes the emerging behavioural 
aspects regarding AFOLU mitigation measures.
Land-use policies (Section 11.10) have the challenge of balancing 
impacts considering these parameters: social complexity, spatial scale, 
temporal scale, and behavioural aspects. Vlek and Keren (1992) and 
Vlek (2004) indicate the following dilemmas relevant to land-manage-
ment decisions: Who should take the risks, when (this generation or 
future generations) and where (specific place) co-benefits and poten-
tial adverse effects will take place, and how to mediate between indi-
vidual vs. social benefits. Addressing these dilemmas is context-spe-
cific. Nevertheless, the fact that a wide range of social actors need to 
face these dilemmas explains, to a certain extent, disagreements about 
environmental decision making in general, and land-management 
decisions in particular (Villamor et al., 2011; Le et al., 2012; see Section 
11.10) .
11.5 Climate change  feedback 
and  interaction with 
adaptation (includes 
vulnerability)
When reviewing the inter-linkages between climate change mitiga-
tion and adaptation within the AFOLU sector the following issues need 
to be considered: (i) the impact of climate change on the mitigation 
potential of a particular activity (e. g., forestry and agricultural soils) 
over time, (ii) potential synergies / tradeoffs within a land-use sector 
between mitigation and adaptation objectives, and (iii) potential trad-
eoffs across sectors between mitigation and adaptation objectives. 
Mitigation and adaptation in land-based ecosystems are closely inter-
linked through a web of feedbacks, synergies, and tradeoffs (Section 
11.8). The mitigation options themselves may be vulnerable to climatic 
change (Section 11.3.2) or there may be possible synergies or tradeoffs 
between mitigation and adaptation options within or across AFOLU 
sectors.
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Table 11�6 | Characterization of social actors in AFOLU.
Social actors Characterization
Individuals (legal and illegal forest users, farmers) Rather small-scale interventions, although some can be medium-scale 
Decisions taken rather at the local level
Social groups (communities, indigenous peoples) Small to medium interventions
Decisions taken at the local or regional levels
Sub-national authorities (provinces, states) Medium to large interventions
Decisions taken at the national or sub-national level, depending on the governance structure
State (national level) Rather large interventions
Decisions taken at the national level, often in line with international agreements
Corporate (at the national or multinational levels) Rather large interventions. Decisions can be taken within a specific region / country, in another country, or at global 
level (e. g., for multinational companies). National and international markets play a key role in decision making
 Table 11�7 | Emerging behavioural aspects relevant for AFOLU mitigation measures.
Change in Emerging behavioural aspects in AFOLU
Consumption patterns Dietary change: Several changes in diet can potentially reduce GHG emissions, including reduction of food waste and reduction of or 
changes in meat consumption (especially in industrialized countries). On the other hand, increasing income and evolving lifestyles with 
increasing consumption of animal protein in developing countries are projected to increase food-related GHG emissions.
The potential of reducing GHG emissions in the food sector needs to be understood in a wider and changing socio-cultural context that determines nutrition.
Potential drivers of change: Health awareness and information, income increase, lifestyle
References 1, 2,3, 4, 5
Production patterns Large-scale land acquisition: The acquisition of (long-term rights) of large areas of farmland in lower-income countries, by 
transnational companies, agribusiness, investments funds or government agencies. There are various links between these acquisitions 
and GHG emissions in the AFOLU sector. On one hand because some acquisitions are aimed at producing energy crops (through non-
food or ‘flex-crops’), on the other because these can cause the displacement of peoples and activity, increasing GHG leakage.
Impacts on livelihood, local users rights, local employment, economic activity, or on biodiversity conservation are of concern.
Potential drivers of change: International markets and their mechanisms, national and international policies
References 6, 7, 8
Production and 
consumption patterns
Switching to low-carbon products: Land managers are sensitive to market changes. The promotion of low-carbon products as a means for 
reducing GHG emissions can increase the land area dedicated to these products. Side-effects from this changes in land management (positive and 
negative), and acceptability of products and technologies at the production and consumption sides are context-related and cannot be generalized
Potential drivers of change: International agreements and markets, accessibility to rural energy, changes in energy demand
References 9, 10, 11
Relation between 
producers and consumers
Certification: Labelling, certification, or other information-based instruments have been developed for promoting 
behavioural changes towards more sustainable products (Section 11.10). Recently, the role of certification in reducing 
GHG while improving sustainability has been explored, especially for bioenergy (Section 11.13).
Potential drivers of change: Consumer awareness, international agreements, cross-national sector policies and initiatives.
References 11, 12, 13, 14
Management priorities Increasing interest in conservation and sustainable (land) management: Changing management practices towards 
more sustainable ones as alternative for gaining both environmental and social co-benefits, including climate change mitigation, 
is gaining recognition. Concerns about specific management practices, accountability methods of co-benefits, and sharing 
mechanisms seem to be elements of concerns when promoting a more sustainable management of natural resources.
Potential drivers of change: Policies and international agreements and their incentive mechanisms, schemes for payments for environmental services.
References 15, 16, 17, 18, 19
1 Stehfest et al. (2009); 2Roy et al. (2012); 3González et al. (2011); 4Popp et al. (2010); 5Schneider et al. (2011); 6Cotula (2012); 7Messerli et al. (2013); 8German et al. (2013); 9Muys 
et al. (2014); 10MacMillan Uribe et al. (2012); 11Chakrabarti (2010); 12Karipidis et al. (2010); 13Auld et al. (2008); 14Diaz-Chavez (2011); 15Calegari et al. (2008); 16Deal et al. (2012); 
17DeFries and Rosenzweig (2010); 18Hein and van der Meer (2012);19 Lippke et al. (2003).
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The IPCC WGI presents feedbacks between climate change and the car-
bon cycle (WGI Chapter 6; Le Quéré et al., 2013), while WGII assesses 
the impacts of climate change on terrestrial ecosystems (WGII Chapter 
4) and crop production systems (WGII Chapter 7), including vulnerabil-
ity and adaptation. This section focuses particularly on the impacts of 
climate change on mitigation potential of land-use sectors and inter-
actions that arise with adaptation, linking to the relevant chapters of 
WGI and WGII reports.
11�5�1 Feedbacks between ALOFU and climate 
change
AFOLU activities can either reduce or accelerate climate change by 
affecting biophysical processes (e. g., evapotranspiration, albedo) and 
change in GHG fluxes to and from the atmosphere (WGI). Whether a 
particular ecosystem is functioning as sink or source of GHG emission 
may change over time, depending on its vulnerability to climate change 
and other stressors and disturbances. Hence, mitigation options avail-
able today (Section 11.3) in the AFOLU sectors may no longer be avail-
able in the future.
There is robust evidence that human-induced land-use changes have 
led to an increased surface albedo (WGI Chapter 8; Myhre and Shin-
dell, 2013). Changes in evapotranspiration and surface roughness may 
counteract the effect of changes in albedo. Land-use changes affect 
latent heat flux and influence the hydrological cycle. Biophysical cli-
mate feedbacks of forest ecosystems differ depending on regional 
climate regime and forest types. For example, a decrease in tropical 
forests has a positive climate forcing through a decrease in evapora-
tive cooling (Bala et  al., 2007; Bonan, 2008). An increase in conifer-
ous-boreal forests compared to grass and snow provides a positive cli-
mate forcing through lowering albedo (Bala et al., 2007; Bonan, 2008; 
Swann et al., 2010). There is currently low agreement on the net bio-
physical effect of land-use changes on the global mean temperature 
(WGI Chapter 8; Myhre and Shindell, 2013). By contrast, the biogeo-
chemical effects of LUC on radiative forcing through emissions of GHG 
is positive (WGI Chapter 8; Sections 11.2.2; 11.2.3).
11�5�2 Implications of climate change on 
terrestrial carbon pools and mitigation 
potential of forests
Projections of the global carbon cycle to 2100 using ‘Coupled Model 
Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) Earth System Models’ (WGI 
Chapter 6; Le Quéré et al., 2013) that represent a wider range of com-
plex interactions between the carbon cycle and the physical climate 
system consistently estimate a positive feedback between climate and 
the carbon cycle, i. e., reduced natural sinks or increased natural CO2 
sources in response to future climate change. Implications of climate 
change on terrestrial carbon pools biomes and mitigation potential of 
forests.
Rising temperatures, drought, and fires may lead to forests becoming a 
weaker sink or a net carbon source before the end of the century (Sitch 
et al., 2008). Pervasive droughts, disturbances such as fire and insect 
outbreaks, exacerbated by climate extremes and climate change put 
the mitigation benefits of the forests at risk (Canadell and Raupach, 
2008; Phillips et al., 2009; Herawati and Santoso, 2011). Forest distur-
bances and climate extremes have associated carbon balance implica-
tions (Millar et al., 2007; Kurz et al., 2008; Zhao and Running, 2010; 
Potter et al., 2011; Davidson, 2012; Reichstein et al., 2013). Allen et al. 
(2010) suggest that at least some of the world’s forested ecosystems 
may already be responding to climate change.
Experimental studies and observations suggest that predicted changes 
in temperature, rainfall regimes, and hydrology may promote the die-
back of tropical forests (e. g., Nepstad et  al., 2007). The prolonged 
drought conditions in the Amazon region during 2005 contributed to 
a decline in above-ground biomass and triggered a release of 4.40 to 
5.87 GtCO2 (Phillips et al., 2009). Earlier model studies suggested Ama-
zon die-back in the future (Cox et al., 2013; Huntingford et al., 2013). 
However, recent model estimates suggest that rainforests may be more 
resilient to climate change, projecting a moderate risk of tropical forest 
reduction in South America and even lower risk for African and Asian 
tropical forests (Gumpenberger et al., 2010; Cox et al., 2013; Hunting-
ford et al., 2013).
Arcidiacono-Bársony et al., (2011) suggest that the mitigation benefits 
from deforestation reduction under REDD+ (Section 11.10.1) could be 
reversed due to increased fire events, and climate-induced feedbacks, 
while Gumpenberger et  al., (2010) conclude that the protection of 
forests under the forest conservation (including REDD) programmes 
could increase carbon uptake in many tropical countries, mainly due to 
CO2 fertilization effects, even under climate change conditions. 
11�5�3 Implications of climate change on 
 peatlands, grasslands, and croplands
Peatlands: Wetlands, peatlands, and permafrost soils contain higher 
carbon densities relative to mineral soils, and together they comprise 
extremely large stocks of carbon globally (Davidson and Janssens, 
2006). Peatlands cover approximately 3 % of the Earth’s land area 
and are estimated to contain 350 – 550 Gt of carbon, roughly between 
20 to 25 % of the world’s soil organic carbon stock (Gorham, 1991; 
Fenner et al., 2011). Peatlands can lose CO2 through plant respiration 
and aerobic peat decomposition (Clair et al., 2002) and with the onset 
of climate change, may become a source of CO2 (Koehler et al., 2010). 
Large carbon losses are likely from deep burning fires in boreal peat-
lands under future projections of climate warming and drying (Flanni-
gan et al., 2009). A study by Fenner et al. (2011) suggests that climate 
change is expected to increase the frequency and severity of drought 
in many of the world’s peatlands which, in turn, will release far more 
GHG emissions than thought previously. Climate change is projected 
to have a severe impact on the peatlands in northern regions where 
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most of the perennially frozen peatlands are found (Tarnocai, 2006). 
According to Schuur et al. (2008), the thawing permafrost and conse-
quent microbial decomposition of previously frozen organic carbon, is 
one of the most significant potential feedbacks from terrestrial ecosys-
tems to the atmosphere in a changing climate. Large areas of perma-
frost will experience thawing (WGI Chapter 12), but uncertainty over 
the magnitude of frozen carbon losses through CO2 or CH4 emissions 
to the atmosphere is large, ranging between 180 and 920 GtCO2 by 
the end of the 21st century under the Representative Concentration 
Pathways (RCP) 8.5 scenario (WGI Chapter 6; Le Quéré et al., 2013).
Grasslands: Tree cover and biomass in savannah has increased over 
the past century (Angassa and Oba, 2008; Witt et al., 2009; Lunt et al., 
2010; Rohde and Hoffman, 2012) leading to increased carbon storage 
per hectare (Hughes et al., 2006; Liao et al., 2006; Throop and Archer, 
2008; Boutton et al., 2009), which has been attributed to land man-
agement, rising CO2, climate variability, and climate change. Climate 
change and CO2 may affect grazing systems by altering species compo-
sition; for example, warming will favour tropical (C4) species over tem-
perate (C3) species but CO2 increase would favour C3 grasses (Howden 
et al., 2008).
Croplands: Climate change impacts on agriculture will affect not only 
crop yields, but also soil organic carbon (SOC) levels in agricultural 
soils (Rosenzweig and Tubiello, 2007). Such impacts can be either posi-
tive or negative, depending on the particular effect considered, which 
highlights the uncertainty of the impacts. Elevated CO2 concentrations 
alone are expected to have positive effects on soil carbon storage, 
because of increased above- and below-ground biomass production 
in agro-ecosystems. Similarly, the lengthening of the growing season 
under future climate will allow for increased carbon inputs into soils. 
Warmer temperatures could have negative impacts on SOC, by speed-
ing decomposition and by reducing inputs by shortening crop lifecycles 
(Rosenzweig and Tubiello, 2007), but increased productivity could 
increase SOC stocks (Gottschalk et al., 2012).
11�5�4 Potential adaptation options to 
 minimize the impact of climate change 
on carbon stocks in forests and 
 agricultural soils
Forests: Forest ecosystems require a longer response time to adapt. 
The development and implementation of adaptation strategies is also 
lengthy (Leemans and Eickhout, 2004; Ravindranath, 2007). Some 
examples of the adaptation practices (Murthy et al., 2011) are as fol-
lows: anticipatory planting of species along latitude and altitude, 
assisted natural regeneration, mixed-species forestry, species mix 
adapted to different temperature tolerance regimes, fire protection 
and management practices, thinning, sanitation and other silvicultural 
practices, in situ and ex situ conservation of genetic diversity, drought 
and pest resistance in commercial tree species, adoption of sustain-
able forest management practices, increase in Protected Areas and 
linking them wherever possible to promote migration of species, for-
ests conservation and reduced forest fragmentation enabling species 
migration, and energy-efficient fuel-wood cooking devices to reduce 
pressure on forests.
Agricultural soils: On current agricultural land, mitigation and adap-
tation interaction can be mutually re-enforcing, particularly for improv-
ing resilience to increased climate variability under climate change 
(Rosenzweig and Tubiello, 2007). Many mitigation practices imple-
mented locally for soil carbon sequestration will increase the ability 
of soils to hold soil moisture and to better withstand erosion and will 
enrich ecosystem biodiversity by establishing more diversified crop-
ping systems, and may also help cropping systems to better withstand 
droughts and floods, both of which are projected to increase in fre-
quency and severity under a future warmer climate (Rosenzweig and 
Tubiello, 2007).
11�5�5 Mitigation and adaptation synergies and 
tradeoffs
Mitigation choices taken in a particular land-use sector may further 
enhance or reduce resilience to climate variability and change within or 
across sectors, in light of the multiple, and often competing, pressures 
on land (Section 11.4), and shifting demographics and consumption 
patterns (e. g., (O’Brien et al., 2004; Sperling et al., 2008; Hunsberger 
and Evans, 2012). Land-use choices driven by mitigation concerns 
(e. g., forest conservation, afforestation) may have consequences for 
adaptive responses and / or development objectives of other sectors 
(e. g., expansion of agricultural land). For example, reducing emis-
sions from deforestation and degradation may also yield co-benefits 
for adaptation by maintaining biodiversity and other ecosystem goods 
and services, while plantations, if they reduce biological diversity may 
diminish adaptive capacity to climate change (e. g., Chum et al., 2011). 
Primary forests tend to be more resilient to climate change and other 
human-induced environmental changes than secondary forests and 
plantations (Thompson et al., 2009). The impact of plantations on the 
carbon balance is dependent on the land-use system they replace. 
While plantation forests are often monospecies stands, they may be 
more vulnerable to climatic change (see IPCC WGII Chapter 4). Smith 
and Olesen (2010) identified a number of synergies between options 
that deliver mitigation in agriculture while also enhancing resilience to 
future climate change, the most prominent of which was enhancement 
of soil carbon stocks.
Adaptation measures in return may help maintain the mitigation 
potential of land-use systems. For example, projects that prevent 
fires and restore degraded forest ecosystems also prevent release of 
GHGs and enhance carbon stocks (CBD and GiZ, 2011). Mitigation 
and adaptation benefits can also be achieved within broader-level 
objectives of AFOLU measures, which are linked to sustainable devel-
opment considerations. Given the exposure of many livelihoods and 
communities to multiple stressors, recommendations from case stud-
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ies suggest that climate risk-management strategies need to appreci-
ate the full hazard risk envelope, as well as the compounding socio-
economic stressors (O’Brien et al., 2004; Sperling et al., 2008). Within 
this broad context, the potential tradeoffs and synergies between 
mitigation, adaptation, and development strategies and measures 
need to be considered. Forest and biodiversity conservation, protected 
area formation, and mixed-species forestry-based afforestation are 
practices that can help to maintain or enhance carbon stocks, while 
also providing adaptation options to enhance resilience of forest 
ecosystems to climate change (Ravindranath, 2007). Use of organic 
soil amendments as a source of fertility could potentially increase 
soil carbon (Gattinger et  al., 2012). Most categories of adaptation 
options for climate change have positive impacts on mitigation. In 
the agriculture sector, cropland adaptation options that also contrib-
ute to mitigation are ‘soil management practices that reduce fertilizer 
use and increase crop diversification; promotion of legumes in crop 
rotations; increasing biodiversity, the availability of quality seeds and 
integrated crop / livestock systems; promotion of low energy produc-
tion systems; improving the control of wildfires and avoiding burning 
of crop residues; and promoting efficient energy use by commercial 
agriculture and agro-industries’ (FAO, 2008, 2009a). Agroforestry is 
an example of mitigation-adaptation synergy in the agriculture sec-
tor, since trees planted sequester carbon and tree products provide 
livelihood to communities, especially during drought years (Verchot 
et al., 2007).
11.6 Costs and potentials
This section deals with economic costs and potentials of climate 
change mitigation (emission reduction or sequestration of carbon) 
within the AFOLU sector. Economic mitigation potentials are distin-
guished from technical or market mitigation potentials (Smith, 2012). 
Technical mitigation potentials represent the full biophysical potential 
of a mitigation option, without accounting for economic or other con-
straints. These estimates account for constraints and factors such as 
land availability and suitability (Smith, 2012), but not any associated 
costs (at least explicitly). By comparison, economic potential refers to 
mitigation that could be realized at a given carbon price over a specific 
period, but does not take into consideration any socio-cultural (for 
example, lifestyle choices) or institutional (for example, political, policy, 
and informational) barriers to practice or technology adoption. Eco-
nomic potentials are expected to be lower than the corresponding 
technical potentials. Also, policy incentives (e. g., a carbon price; see 
also Section 11.10) and competition for resources across various miti-
gation options, tend to affect the size of economic mitigation poten-
tials in the AFOLU sector (McCarl and Schneider, 2001). Finally, market 
potential is the realized mitigation outcome under current or forecast 
market conditions encompassing biophysical, economic, socio-cultural, 
and institutional barriers to, as well as policy incentives for, technologi-
cal and / or practice adoption, specific to a sub-national, national or 
supra-national market for carbon. Figure 11.12 (Smith, 2012) provides 
a schematic view of the three types of mitigation potentials.
Economic (as well as market) mitigation potentials tend to be con-
text-specific and are likely to vary across spatial and temporal scales. 
Unless otherwise stated, in the rest of this section, economic potentials 
are expressed in million tonnes (Mt) of mitigation in carbon dioxide 
equivalent (CO2eq) terms, that can arise from an individual mitiga-
tion option or from an AFOLU sub-sector at a given cost per tonne of 
CO2eq. (USD / tCO2eq) over a given period to 2030, which is ‘additional’ 
to the corresponding baseline or reference case levels.
Various supply-side mitigation options within the AFOLU sector are 
described in Section 11.3, and Section 11.4 considers a number of 
potential demand-side options. Estimates for costs and potentials are 
not always available for the individual options described. Also, aggre-
gate estimates covering both the supply- and demand-side options for 
mitigation within the AFOLU sector are lacking, so this section mostly 
focuses on the supply-side options. Key uncertainties and sensitivities 
around mitigation costs and potentials in the AFOLU sector are (1) car-
bon price, (2) prevailing biophysical and climatic conditions, (3) existing 
management heterogeneity (or differences in the baselines), (4) man-
agement interdependencies (arising from competition or co-benefits 
across tradition production, environmental outcomes and mitigation 
strategies or competition / co-benefits across mitigation options), (5) the 
extent of leakage, (6) differential impact on different GHGs associated 
with a particular mitigation option, and (7) timeframe for abatement 
activities and the discount rate. In this section, we (a) provide aggregate 
mitigation potentials for the AFOLU sector (because these wereprovided 
separately for agriculture and forestry in AR4), (b) provide estimates of 
 













Physically / Biologically 
Constrained Potential
Economic Potential









Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU)
11
Chapter 11
global mitigation costs and potentials published since AR4, and (c) pro-
vide a regional disaggregation of the potentials to show how potential, 
and the portfolio of available options, varies in different world regions.
11�6�1 Approaches to estimating economic 
mitigation potentials
Bottom-up and top-down modelling approaches are used to estimate 
AFOLU mitigation potentials and costs. While both approaches provide 
useful estimates for mitigation costs and potentials, comparing bot-
tom-up and top-down estimates is not straightforward. 
Bottom-up estimates are typically derived for discrete abatement 
options in agriculture at a specific location or time, and are often based 
on detailed technological, engineering and process information, and 
data on individual technologies (DeAngelo et al., 2006). These studies 
provide estimates of how much technical potential of particular AFOLU 
mitigation options will become economically viable at certain carbon 
dioxide-equivalent prices. Bottom-up mitigation responses are typically 
restricted to input management (for example, changing practices with 
fertilizer application and livestock feeding) and mitigation costs esti-
mates are considered ‘partial equilibrium’ in that the relevant input-
output prices (and, sometimes, quantities such as area or production 
levels) are held fixed. As such, unless adjusted for potential overlaps 
and tradeoffs across individual mitigation options, adding up various 
individual estimates to arrive at an aggregate for a particular land-
scape or at a particular point in time could be misleading.
With a ‘systems’ approach, top-down models (described in Chapter 6; 
Section 11.9) typically take into account possible interactions between 
individual mitigation options. These models can be sector-specific or 
economy-wide, and can vary across geographical scales: sub-national, 
national, regional, and global. Mitigation strategies in top-down mod-
els may include a broad range of management responses and practice 
changes (for example, moving from cropping to grazing or grazing to 
forestry) as well as changes in input-output prices (for example, land 
and commodity prices). Such models can be used to assess the cost 
competitiveness of various mitigation options and implications across 
input-output markets, sectors, and regions over time for large-scale 
domestic or global adoption of mitigation strategies. In top-down 
modelling, dynamic cost-effective portfolios of abatement strategies 
are identified incorporating the lowest cost combination of mitigation 
strategies over time from across sectors, including agricultural, forestry, 
and other land-based sectors across the world that achieve the climate 
stabilization target (see Chapter 6). Top-down estimates for 2030 are 
included in this section, and are revisited in Section 11.9 when consid-
ering the role of the AFOLU sector in transformation pathways.
Providing consolidated estimates of economic potentials for mitigation 
within the AFOLU sector as a whole is complicated because of complex 
interdependencies, largely stemming from competing demands on land 
for various agricultural and forestry (production and mitigation) activi-
ties, as well as for the provision of many ecosystem services (Smith et al., 
2013a). These interactions are discussed in more detail in Section 11.4.
11�6�2 Global estimates of costs and potentials 
in the AFOLU sector
Through combination of forestry and agriculture potentials from AR4, 
total mitigation potentials for the AFOLU sector are estimated to be ~3 
to ~7.2 GtCO2eq / yr in 2030 at 20 and 100 USD / tCO2eq, respectively 
(Figure 11.13), including only supply-side options in agriculture (Smith 
et al., 2007) and a combination of supply- and demand-side options for 
forestry (Nabuurs et al., 2007). 
Estimates of global economic mitigation potentials in the AFOLU sec-
tor published since AR4 are shown in Figure 11.14, with AR4 estimates 
shown for comparison (IPCC, 2007a).
Table 11.8 summarizes the ranges of global economic mitigation 
potentials from AR4 (Nabuurs et  al., 2007; Smith et  al., 2007), and 
studies published since AR4 that are shown in full in Figure 11.14, for 
agriculture, forestry, and AFOLU combined.
As described in Section 11.3, since AR4, more attention has been paid 
to options that reduce emissions intensity by improving the efficiency 
of production (i. e., less GHG emissions per unit of agricultural prod-
uct; Burney et  al., 2010; Bennetzen et  al., 2012). As agricultural and 
silvicultural efficiency have improved over recent decades, emissions 
intensities have declined (Figure 11.15). Whilst emissions intensity has 
increased (1960s to 2000s) by 45 % for cereals, emissions intensities 
have decreased by 38 % for milk, 50 % for rice, 45 % for pig meat, 
76 % for chicken, and 57 % for eggs.
The implementation of mitigation measures can contribute to further 
decrease emission intensities of AFOLU commodities (Figure 11.16; 
which shows changes of emissions intensities when a commodity-
specific mix of mitigation measures is applied). For cereal production, 
mitigation measures considered include improved cropland agronomy, 
nutrient and fertilizer management, tillage and residue management, 
and the establishment of agro-forestry systems. Improved rice manage-
ment practices were considered for paddy rice cultivation. Mitigation 
measures applied in the livestock sector include improved feeding and 
dietary additives. Countries can improve emission intensities of AFOLU 
commodities through increasing production at the same level of input, 
the implementation of mitigation measures, or a combination of both. 
In some regions, increasing current yields is still an option with a signifi-
cant potential to improve emission intensities of agricultural production. 
Foley et al. (2011) analyzed current and potential yields that could be 
achieved for 16 staple crops using available agricultural practices and 
technologies and identified large ‘yield gaps’, especially across many 
parts of Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. Better crop manage-
ment practices can help to close yield gaps and improve emission inten-
sities if measures are selected that also have a mitigation potential.
 
Figure 11�13 | Mitigation potential for the AFOLU sector, plotted using data from AR4 (Nabuurs et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2007). Whiskers show the range of estimates (+ / - 1 
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ties, as well as for the provision of many ecosystem services (Smith et al., 
2013a). These interactions are discussed in more detail in Section 11.4.
11�6�2 Global estimates of costs and potentials 
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Through combination of forestry and agriculture potentials from AR4, 
total mitigation potentials for the AFOLU sector are estimated to be ~3 
to ~7.2 GtCO2eq / yr in 2030 at 20 and 100 USD / tCO2eq, respectively 
(Figure 11.13), including only supply-side options in agriculture (Smith 
et al., 2007) and a combination of supply- and demand-side options for 
forestry (Nabuurs et al., 2007). 
Estimates of global economic mitigation potentials in the AFOLU sec-
tor published since AR4 are shown in Figure 11.14, with AR4 estimates 
shown for comparison (IPCC, 2007a).
Table 11.8 summarizes the ranges of global economic mitigation 
potentials from AR4 (Nabuurs et  al., 2007; Smith et  al., 2007), and 
studies published since AR4 that are shown in full in Figure 11.14, for 
agriculture, forestry, and AFOLU combined.
As described in Section 11.3, since AR4, more attention has been paid 
to options that reduce emissions intensity by improving the efficiency 
of production (i. e., less GHG emissions per unit of agricultural prod-
uct; Burney et  al., 2010; Bennetzen et  al., 2012). As agricultural and 
silvicultural efficiency have improved over recent decades, emissions 
intensities have declined (Figure 11.15). Whilst emissions intensity has 
increased (1960s to 2000s) by 45 % for cereals, emissions intensities 
have decreased by 38 % for milk, 50 % for rice, 45 % for pig meat, 
76 % for chicken, and 57 % for eggs.
The implementation of mitigation measures can contribute to further 
decrease emission intensities of AFOLU commodities (Figure 11.16; 
which shows changes of emissions intensities when a commodity-
specific mix of mitigation measures is applied). For cereal production, 
mitigation measures considered include improved cropland agronomy, 
nutrient and fertilizer management, tillage and residue management, 
and the establishment of agro-forestry systems. Improved rice manage-
ment practices were considered for paddy rice cultivation. Mitigation 
measures applied in the livestock sector include improved feeding and 
dietary additives. Countries can improve emission intensities of AFOLU 
commodities through increasing production at the same level of input, 
the implementation of mitigation measures, or a combination of both. 
In some regions, increasing current yields is still an option with a signifi-
cant potential to improve emission intensities of agricultural production. 
Foley et al. (2011) analyzed current and potential yields that could be 
achieved for 16 staple crops using available agricultural practices and 
technologies and identified large ‘yield gaps’, especially across many 
parts of Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. Better crop manage-
ment practices can help to close yield gaps and improve emission inten-
sities if measures are selected that also have a mitigation potential.
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Mitigation potentials and costs differ largely between AFOLU com-
modities (Figure 11.16). While average abatement costs are low for 
roundwood production under the assumption of perpetual rotation, 
costs of mitigation options applied in meat and dairy production sys-
tems have a wide range (1:3 quartile range: 58 – 856 USD / tCO2eq). 
Calculations of emission intensities are based on the conservative 
assumption that production levels stay the same after the applica-
tion of the mitigation option. However, some mitigation options can 
increase production. This would not only improve food security but 
could also increase the cost-effectiveness of mitigation actions in the 
agricultural sector.
Agriculture and forestry-related mitigation could cost-effectively 
contribute to transformation pathways associated with long-run 
climate change management (Sections 11.9 and 6.3.5). Transforma-
tion pathway modelling includes LUC, as well as land-management 
options that reduce emissions intensities and increase sequestration 
intensities. However, the resulting transformation pathway emissions 
(sequestration) intensities are not comparable to those discussed 
here. Transformation pathways are the result of integrated modelling 
and the resulting intensities are the net result of many effects. The 
intensities capture mitigation technology adoption, but also changes 
in levels of production, land-cover change, mitigation technology 
competition, and model-specific definitions for sectors / regions / and 
assigned emissions inventories. Mitigation technology competition, 
in particular, can lead to intensification (and increases in agricultural 
emissions intensities) that support cost-effective adoption of other 
mitigation strategies, such as afforestation or bioenergy (Sections 
11.9 and 6.3.5).
11�6�3 Regional disaggregation of global costs 
and potentials in the AFOLU sector
Figure 11.17 shows the economically viable mitigation opportunities 
in AFOLU in 2030 by region and by main mitigation option at carbon 
prices of up to 20, 50, and 100 USD / tCO2eq. The composition of the 
agricultural mitigation portfolio varies greatly with the carbon price 
(Smith, 2012), with low cost options such as cropland management 
being favoured at low carbon prices, but higher cost options such as 
restoration of cultivated organic soils being more cost-effective at 
higher prices. Figure 11.17 also reveals some very large differences in 
mitigation potential, and different ranking of most effective options, 
between regions. Across all AFOLU options, Asia has the largest mitiga-
tion potential, with the largest mitigation in both forestry and agricul-
ture, followed by LAM, OECD-1990, MAF, and EIT.
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Figure 11�14 | Estimates of economic mitigation potentials in the AFOLU sector published since AR4, (AR4 estimates shown for comparison, denoted by arrows), including 
bottom-up, sectoral studies, and top-down, multi-sector studies. Some studies estimate potential for agriculture and forestry, others for one or other sector. Supply-side mitigation 
potentials are estimated for around 2030, but studies range from estimates for 2025 (Rose et al., 2012) to 2035 (Rose and Sohngen, 2011). Studies are collated for those reporting 
potentials at carbon prices of up to ~20 USD / tCO2eq (actual range 1.64 – 21.45), up to ~50 USD / tCO2eq (actual range 31.39 – 50.00), and up to ~100 USD / tCO2eq (actual range 
70.0 – 120.91). Demand-side options (shown on the right-hand side of the figure) are for ~2050 and are not assessed at a specific carbon price, and should be regarded as techni-










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 11�15 | GHG emissions intensities of selected major AFOLU commodities for decades 1960s – 2000s, based on (Tubiello et al., 2012). i) Cattle meat, defined as GHG (enteric 
fermentation + manure management of cattle, dairy and non-dairy) / meat produced; ii) Pig meat, defined as GHG (enteric fermentation + manure management of swine, market 
and breeding) / meat produced; iii) Chicken meat, defined as GHG (manure management of chickens) / meat produced; iv) Milk, defined as GHG (enteric fermentation + manure man-
agement of cattle, dairy) / milk produced; v) Eggs, defined as GHG (manure management of chickens, layers) / egg produced; vi) Rice, defined as GHG (rice cultivation) / rice produced; 
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Figure 11�16 | Potential changes of emission intensities of major AFOLU commodities through implementation of commodity-specific mitigation measures (left panel) and related 
mitigation costs (right panel). Commodities and GHG emission sources are defined as in Figure 11.15, except for roundwood, expressed as the amount of carbon sequestered 
per unit roundwood from reforestation and afforestation within dedicated plantation cycles. Agricultural emission intensities represent regional averages, calculated based on 
2000 – 2010 data (FAOSTAT, 2013) for selected commodities. Data on mitigation potentials and costs of measures are calculated using the mean values reported by (Smith et al., 
2008) and the maximum and minimum are defined by the highest and lowest values for four climate zones for cereals and rice, or five geographical regions for milk and cattle 
meat. Emission intensities and mitigation potentials of roundwood production are calculated using data from Sathaye et al. (2005; 2006), FAO (2006), and IPCC (2006); maximum 
and minimum values are defined by the highest and lowest values for 10 geographical regions. The right panel shows the mitigation costs (in USD / tCO2eq) of commodity-specific 
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Table 11�8 | Ranges of global mitigation potential (GtCO2eq / yr) reported since AR4 | All values are for 2030 except demand-side options that are for ~2050 (full data shown in 
Figure 11.14).
up to 20 USD / tCO2eq up to 50 USD / tCO2eq up to 100 USD / tCO2eq Technical potential only
Agriculture onl y 1 0 – 1.59 0.03 – 2.6 0.26 – 4.6 -
Forestry only 0.01 – 1.45 0.11 – 9.5 0.2 – 13.8 -
AFOLU tota l 1,2 0.12 – 3.03 0.5 – 5.06 0.49 – 10.6 -
Demand-side options - - - 0.76 – 8.55
Notes:
1 All lower range values for agriculture are for non-CO2 GHG mitigation only and do not include soil C sequestration
2 AFOLU total includes only estimates where both agriculture and forestry have been considered together.
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Differences between the most effective forestry options in each region 
(Figure 11.18) are particularly striking, with reduced deforestation 
dominating the forestry mitigation potential LAM and MAF, but very 
little potential in OECD-1990 and EIT. Forest management, followed 
by afforestation, dominate in OECD-1990, EIT, and Asia (Figure 11.18). 
Among agricultural options, among the most striking of regional dif-
ferences are the rice management practices for which almost all of the 
global potential is in Asia, and the large potential for restoration of 
organic soils also in Asia (due to cultivated Southeast Asian peats), and 
OECD-1990 (due to cultivated northern peatlands; Figure 11.18).
11.7 Co-benefits, risks, 
and spillovers
Implementation of AFOLU mitigation measures (Section 11.3) will 
result in a range of outcomes beyond changes in GHG balances with 
respect to institutional, economic, social, and environmental objectives. 
To the extent these effects are positive, they can be deemed ‘co-bene-
fits’; if adverse and uncertain, they imply risks.8 A global assessment of 
8 Co-benefits and adverse side-effects describe effects in non-monetary units 
without yet evaluating the net effect on overall social welfare. Please refer to the 
respective sections in the framing chapters as well as to the glossary in Annex I for 
concepts and definitions — particularly Sections 2.4, 3.6.3, and 4.8.
the co-benefits and adverse side-effects of AFOLU mitigation measures 
is challenging for a number of reasons. First, co-benefits and adverse 
side-effects depend on the development context and the scale of the 
intervention (size), i. e., implementing the same AFOLU mitigation mea-
sure in two different areas (different countries or different regions 
within a country) can have different socio-economic, institutional, or 
environmental effects (Forner et al., 2006; Koh and Ghazoul, 2008; Tra-
bucco et al., 2008; Zomer et al., 2008; Alves Finco and Doppler, 2010; 
Alig et  al., 2010, p.  201; Colfer, 2011; Davis et  al., 2013; Albers and 
Robinson, 2013; Muys et  al., 2014). Thus the effects are site-specific 
and generalizations are difficult. Second, these effects do not necessar-
ily overlap geographically, socially, or over the same time scales (Sec-
tion 11.4.5). Third, there is no general agreement on attribution of co-
benefits and adverse side-effects to specific AFOLU mitigation 
measures; and fourth there are no standardized metrics for quantifying 
many of these effects. Modelling frameworks are being developed that 
allow an integrated assessment of multiple outcomes at landscape 
(Bryant et  al., 2011), project (Townsend et  al., 2012), and smaller 
(Smith et  al., 2013a) scales. Table 11.9 presents an overview of the 
potential effects from AFOLU mitigation measures, while the text pres-
ents the most relevant co-benefits and potential adverse side-effects 
from the recent literature.
Maximizing co-benefits of AFOLU mitigation measures can increase 
efficiency in achieving the objectives of other international agree-
ments, including the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertifi-
cation (UNCCD, 2011), or the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 
and mitigation actions may also contribute to a broader global sus-
 
Figure 11�18 | Regional differences in forestry options, shown as a proportion of total potential available in forestry in each region. Global forestry activities (annual amount 
sequestered or emissions avoided above the baseline for forest management, reduced deforestation and afforestation), at carbon prices up to 100 USD / tCO2 are aggregated to 
regions from results from three models of global forestry and land use: the Global Timber Model (GTM; Sohngen and Sedjo, 2006), the Generalized Comprehensive Mitigation 
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Figure 11�17 | Economic mitigation potentials in the AFOLU sector by region. Agriculture values are from Smith et al. (2007). Forestry values are from Nabuurs et al. (2007). For 
forestry, 20 USD values correspond to ‘low’, and 100 USD values correspond to ‘high’ values from Nabuurs et al. (2007). Values of 50 USD represent the mean of the ‘high’ and 
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tainability agenda (Harvey et al., 2010; Gardner et al., 2012; see Chap-
ter 4). In many cases, implementation of these agendas is limited by 
capital, and mitigation may provide a new source of finance (Tubiello 
et al., 2009).
11�7�1 Socio-economic effects
AFOLU mitigation measures can affect institutions and living conditions 
of the various social groups involved. This section includes potential 
effects of AFOLU mitigation measures on three dimensions of sustain-
able development: institutional, social, and economic (Section 11.4.5).
AFOLU mitigation measures may have impacts on land tenure and 
land-use rights for several social groups including indigenous peoples, 
local communities and other social groups, dependant on natural 
assets. Co-benefits from AFOLU mitigation measures can be clarifica-
tion of land tenure and harmonization of rights, while adverse side-
effects can be lack of recognition of customary rights, loss of tenure or 
possession rights, and even displacement of social groups (Sunderlin 
et al., 2005; Chhatre and Agrawal, 2009; Blom et al., 2010; Sikor et al., 
2010; Robinson et al., 2011; Rosemary, 2011; Larson, 2011; Rosendal 
and Andresen, 2011). Whether an impact on land tenure and use rights 
is positive or negative depends upon two factors: (a) the institutions 
regulating land tenure and land-use rights (e. g., laws, policies), and 
(b) the level of enforcement by such institutions (Corbera and Brown, 
2008; Araujo et al., 2009; Rosemary, 2011; Larson et al., 2013; Albers 
and Robinson, 2013). More research is needed on specific tenure forms 
(e. g., individual property, state ownership or community rights), and 
on the specific effects from tenure and rights options, on enabling 
AFOLU mitigation measures and co-benefits in different regions under 
specific circumstances (Sunderlin et  al., 2005; Katila, 2008; Chhatre 
and Agrawal, 2009; Blom et al., 2010; Sikor et al., 2010; Robinson et al., 
2011; Rosemary, 2011; Larson, 2011; Rosendal and Andresen, 2011). 
AFOLU mitigation measures can support enforcement of sectoral 
policies (e. g., conservation policies) as well as cross-sectoral coordi-
nation (e. g., facilitating a landscape view for policies in the agricul-
ture, energy, and forestry sectors (Brockhaus et al., 2013). However, 
AFOLU mitigation activities can also introduce or reduce clashes with 
existing policies in other sectors (e. g., if a conservation policy covers 
a forest area, where agricultural land is promoted by another policy 
(Madlener et  al., 2006; Halsnæs and Verhagen, 2007; Smith et  al., 
2007; Beach et al., 2009; Alig et al., 2010; Jackson and Baker, 2010; 
DeFries and Rosenzweig, 2010; Pettenella and Brotto, 2011; Section 
11.10).
An area of increasing concern since AR4 is the potential impact of 
AFOLU mitigation measures on food security. Efforts to reduce hun-
ger and malnutrition will increase individual food demand in many 
developing countries, and population growth will increase the num-
ber of individuals requiring secure and nutritionally sufficient food 
production. Thus, a net increase in food production is an essential 
component for securing sustainable development (Ericksen et  al., 
2009; FAO, WFP, and IFAD, 2012). AFOLU mitigation measures linked 
to increases in food production (e. g., agroforestry, intensification 
of agricultural production, or integrated systems) can increase food 
availability and access especially at the local level, while other mea-
sures (e. g., forest or energy crop plantations) can reduce food pro-
duction at least locally (Foley et  al., 2005; McMichael et  al., 2007; 
the co-benefits and adverse side-effects of AFOLU mitigation measures 
is challenging for a number of reasons. First, co-benefits and adverse 
side-effects depend on the development context and the scale of the 
intervention (size), i. e., implementing the same AFOLU mitigation mea-
sure in two different areas (different countries or different regions 
within a country) can have different socio-economic, institutional, or 
environmental effects (Forner et al., 2006; Koh and Ghazoul, 2008; Tra-
bucco et al., 2008; Zomer et al., 2008; Alves Finco and Doppler, 2010; 
Alig et  al., 2010, p.  201; Colfer, 2011; Davis et  al., 2013; Albers and 
Robinson, 2013; Muys et  al., 2014). Thus the effects are site-specific 
and generalizations are difficult. Second, these effects do not necessar-
ily overlap geographically, socially, or over the same time scales (Sec-
tion 11.4.5). Third, there is no general agreement on attribution of co-
benefits and adverse side-effects to specific AFOLU mitigation 
measures; and fourth there are no standardized metrics for quantifying 
many of these effects. Modelling frameworks are being developed that 
allow an integrated assessment of multiple outcomes at landscape 
(Bryant et  al., 2011), project (Townsend et  al., 2012), and smaller 
(Smith et  al., 2013a) scales. Table 11.9 presents an overview of the 
potential effects from AFOLU mitigation measures, while the text pres-
ents the most relevant co-benefits and potential adverse side-effects 
from the recent literature.
Maximizing co-benefits of AFOLU mitigation measures can increase 
efficiency in achieving the objectives of other international agree-
ments, including the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertifi-
cation (UNCCD, 2011), or the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 
and mitigation actions may also contribute to a broader global sus-
 
Figure 11�18 | Regional differences in forestry options, shown as a proportion of total potential available in forestry in each region. Global forestry activities (annual amount 
sequestered or emissions avoided above the baseline for forest management, reduced deforestation and afforestation), at carbon prices up to 100 USD / tCO2 are aggregated to 
regions from results from three models of global forestry and land use: the Global Timber Model (GTM; Sohngen and Sedjo, 2006), the Generalized Comprehensive Mitigation 







100 USD50 USD20 USD 100 USD50 USD20 USD 100 USD50 USD20 USD 100 USD50 USD20 USD 100 USD50 USD20 USD
OECD-1990 EIT LAM MAF ASIA
Proportion from Forest Management


















Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU)
11
Chapter 11
Pretty, 2008; Godfray et al., 2010; Jackson and Baker, 2010; Graham-
Rowe, 2011; Jeffery et al., 2011).
Regarding human health reduced emissions from agriculture and for-
estry may also improve air, soil, and water quality (Smith et al., 2013a), 
thereby indirectly providing benefits to human health and well-being. 
Demand-side measures aimed at reducing the proportion of livestock 
products in human diets that are high in animal products are also 
associated with multiple health benefits (McMichael et al., 2007; Ste-
hfest et  al., 2009; Marlow et al., 2009). AFOLU mitigation measures, 
particularly in the livestock sector, can have an impact on animal wel-
fare (Sundrum, 2001; Lund and Algers, 2003; Keeling et al., 2011; Kehl-
bacher et al., 2012; Koknaroglu and Akunal, 2013).
A major area of concern is related to the potential impacts of 
AFOLU mitigation measures on equity (Sections 3.3; 4.2; 4.7; 
Box 11�6 | Challenges for mitigation in developing countries in the AFOLU sector
Mitigation challenges related to the AFOLU sector
The contribution of developing countries to future GHG emissions 
is expected to be very significant due to projected increases in food 
production by 2030 driving short-term land conversion in these 
countries. Mitigation efforts in the AFOLU sector rely mainly on 
reduction of GHG emissions and an increase in carbon sequestra-
tion (Table 11.2). Potential activities include reducing deforesta-
tion, increasing forest cover, agroforestry, agriculture and livestock 
management, and production of sustainable renewable energy 
(Sathaye et al., 2005; Smith et al., 2013b). Although agriculture and 
forestry are important sectors for GHG abatement (Section 11.2.3), 
it is likely that technology alone will not be sufficient to deliver the 
necessary transitions to a low-GHG future (Alig et al., 2010; Section 
11.3.2). Other barriers include access to market and credits, techni-
cal capacities to implement mitigation options, including accurate 
reporting of emission levels and emission factors based on activity 
data, and institutional frameworks and regulations (Corbera and 
Schroeder, 2011; Mbow et al., 2012; Sections 11.7; 11.8). Addition-
ally, the diversity of circumstances among developing countries 
makes it difficult to establish the modelled relationships between 
GDP and CO2 emissions per capita found by using the Kaya 
identity. This partly arises from the wide gap between rural and 
urban communities, and the difference in livelihoods (e. g., the use 
of fuel wood, farming practices in various agro-ecological condi-
tions, dietary preferences with a rising middle class in developing 
countries, development of infrastructure, and behavioural change, 
etc.; Lambin and Meyfroidt, 2011). Also, some mitigation pathways 
raise the issue of non-permanence and leakage that can lead to 
the transfer activities to non-protected areas, which may threaten 
conservation areas in countries with low capacities (Lippke et al., 
2003; Jackson and Baker, 2010; Section 11.3.2).
Critical issues to address are the co-benefits and adverse side-
effects associated with changed agricultural production, the 
necessary link between mitigation and adaptation, and how to 
manage incentives for a substantial GHG abatement initiative 
without compromising food security (Smith and Wollenberg, 2012; 
Sections 11.5; 11.7). The challenge is to strike a balance between 
emissions reductions / adaptation and development / poverty 
alleviation priorities, or to find policies that co-deliver. Mitigation 
pathways in developing countries should address the dual need 
for mitigation and adaptation through clear guidelines to manage 
multiple options (Section 11.5.4). Prerequisites for the successful 
implementation of AFOLU mitigation projects are ensuring that 
(a) communities are fully engaged in implementing mitigation 
strategies, (b) any new strategy is consistent with ongoing policies 
or programmes, and (c) a priori consent of small holders is given. 
Extra effort is required to address equity issues including gender, 
challenges, and prospects (Mbow et al., 2012).
Mitigation challenges related to the bioenergy sector
Bioenergy has a significant mitigation potential, provided that the 
resources are developed sustainably and that bioenergy sys-
tems are efficient (Chum et al., 2011; Section 11.9.1). Bioenergy 
production can be integrated with food production in developing 
countries, e. g., through suitable crop rotation schemes, or use of 
by-products and residues (Berndes et al., 2013). If implemented 
sustainably this can result in higher food and energy outcomes 
and hence reduce land-use competition. Some bioenergy options 
in developing countries include perennial cropping systems, use of 
biomass residues and wastes, and advanced conversion systems 
(Beringer et al., 2011; Popp et al., 2011; Box 7.1). Agricultural and 
forestry residues can provide low-carbon and low-cost feedstock 
for bioenergy. Biomass from cellulosic bioenergy crops feature 
substantially in future energy systems, especially in the framework 
of global climate policy that aims at stabilizing CO2 concentration 
at low levels (Popp et al., 2011; Section 11.13). The large-scale 
use of bioenergy is controversial in the context of developing 
countries because of the risk of reducing carbon stocks and 
releasing carbon to the atmosphere (Bailis and McCarthy, 2011), 
threats to food security in Africa (Mbow, 2010), and threats to 
biodiversity via the conversion of forests to biofuel (e. g., palm oil) 
plantations. Several studies underline the inconsistency between 
the need for bioenergy and the requirement for, e. g., Africa, to 
use its productive lands for sustainable food production (Cotula 
et al., 2009). Efficient biomass production for bioenergy requires a 
range of sustainability requirements to safeguard food production, 
biodiversity, and terrestrial carbon storage.
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4.8). Depending on the actual and perceived distribution of socio-
economic benefits, responsibilities (burden sharing), as well the 
access to decision making, financing mechanisms, and technology, 
AFOLU mitigation measures can promote inter- and intra-genera-
tional equity (Di Gregorio et  al., 2013). Conversely, depending on 
the policy instruments and the implementation schemes of these 
mitigation measures, they can increase inequity and land conflicts, 
or marginalize small-scale farm / forest owners or users (Robinson 
et al., 2011; Kiptot and Franzel, 2012; Huettner, 2012; Mattoo and 
Subramanian, 2012). Potential impacts on equity and benefit-shar-
ing mechanisms arise for AFOLU activities using forestry measures 
in developing countries including conservation, restoration, reduced 
deforestation and degradation, as well as sustainable management 
and afforestation / reforestation (Combes Motel et al., 2009; Catta-
neo et al., 2010; Rosemary, 2011).
Large-scale land acquisition (often referred to as ‘land grabbing’) 
related to the promotion of AFOLU mitigation measures (especially for 
production of bioenergy crops) and its links to sustainable develop-
ment in general, and equity in particular, are emerging issues in the 
literature (Cotula et al., 2009; Scheidel and Sorman, 2012; Mwakaje, 
2012; Messerli et al., 2013; German et al., 2013).
In many cases, the implementation of agricultural and forestry systems 
with positive impacts mitigating climate change are limited by capi-
tal, and carbon payments or compensation mechanisms may provide 
a new source of finance (Tubiello et al., 2009). For instance, in some 
cases, mitigation payments can help to make production of non-timber 
forest products (NTFP) economically viable, further diversifying income 
at the local level (Singh, 2008). However, depending on the accessibil-
ity of the financing mechanisms (payments, compensation, or other) 
economic benefits can become concentrated, marginalizing many 
local stakeholders (Combes Motel et al., 2009; Alig et al., 2010; Asante 
et al., 2011; Asante and Armstrong, 2012; Section 11.8). The realiza-
tion of economic co-benefits is related to the design of the specific 
mechanisms and depends upon three main variables: (a) the amount 
and coverage of these payments, (b) the recipient of the payments, and 
(c) timing of payments (ex-ante or ex-post; Corbera and Brown, 2008; 
Skutsch et al., 2011)� Further considerations on financial mechanisms 
and carbon payments, both within and outside UNFCCC agreements, 
are described in Section 11.10. 
Financial flows supporting AFOLU mitigation measures (e. g., those 
resulting from the REDD+) can have positive effects on conserving 
biodiversity, but could eventually create conflicts with conservation 
of biodiversity hotspots, when their respective carbon stocks are low 
(Gardner et al., 2012; Section 11.10). Some authors propose that car-
bon payments can be complemented with biodiversity payments as an 
option for reducing tradeoffs with biodiversity conservation (Phelps 
et  al., 2010a). Bundling of ecosystem service payments, and links to 
carbon payments, is an emerging area of research (Deal and White, 
2012).
11�7�2 Environmental effects
Availability of land and land competition can be affected by AFOLU 
mitigation measures. Different stakeholders may have different views 
on what land is available, and when considering several AFOLU mitiga-
tion measures for the same area, there can be different views on the 
importance of the goods and ecosystem services provided by the land, 
e. g., some AFOLU measures can increase food production but reduce 
water availability or other environmental services. Thus decision mak-
ers need to be aware of potential site-specific tradeoffs within the sec-
tor. A further potential adverse side-effect is that of increasing land 
rents and food prices due to a reduction in land availability for agricul-
ture in developing countries (Muller, 2009; Smith et al., 2010, 2013b; 
Rathmann et al., 2010; Godfray et al., 2010; de Vries and de Boer, 2010; 
Harvey and Pilgrim, 2011; Amigun et al., 2011; Janzen, 2011; Cotula, 
2012; Scheidel and Sorman, 2012; Haberl et al., 2013a).
AFOLU mitigation options can promote conservation of biological 
diversity (Smith et al., 2013a) both by reducing deforestation (Chhatre 
et al., 2012; Murdiyarso et al., 2012; Putz and Romero, 2012; Visseren-
Hamakers et  al., 2012), and by using reforestation / afforestation to 
restore biodiverse communities on previously developed farmland 
(Harper et  al., 2007). However, promoting land-use changes (e. g., 
through planting monocultures on biodiversity hot spots) can have 
adverse side-effects, reducing biodiversity (Koh and Wilcove, 2008; 
Beringer et al., 2011; Pandit and Grumbine, 2012; Ziv et al., 2012; Hert-
wich, 2012; Gardner et al., 2012).
In addition to potential climate impacts, land-use intensity drives the 
three main N loss pathways (nitrate leaching, denitrification, and ammo-
nia volatilization) and typical N balances for each land use indicate that 
total N losses also increase with increasing land-use intensity (Steven-
son et al., 2010). Leakages from the N cycle can cause air (e. g., ammo-
nia (NH3+), nitrogen oxides (NOx))9, soil nitrate (NO3-) and water pollu-
tion (e. g., eutrophication), and agricultural intensification can lead to 
a variety of other adverse environmental impacts (Smith et al., 2013a). 
Combined strategies (e. g., diversified crop rotations and organic N 
sources) or single-process strategies (e. g., reduced N rates, nitrification 
inhibitors, and changing chemical forms of fertilizer) can reduce N losses 
(Bambo et al., 2009; Gardner and Drinkwater, 2009). Integrated systems 
may be an alternative approach to reduce leaching (Section 11.10).
AFOLU mitigation measures can have either positive or negative 
impacts on water resources, with responses dependant on the miti-
gation measure used, site conditions (e. g., soil thickness and slope, 
hydrological setting, climate; Yu et al., 2013) and how the particular 
mitigation measure is managed. There are two main components: 
water yield and water quality. Water yields can be manipulated 
with forest management, through afforestation, reforestation, for-
9 Please see Section 7.9.2 and WGII Section 11.9 for a discussion of health effects 
related to air pollution.
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Table 11�9 | Summary of potential co-benefits (green arrows) and adverse side-effects (orange arrows) from AFOLU mitigation measures; arrows pointing up / down denote posi-
tive / negative effect on the respective issue. These effects depend on the specific context (including bio-physical, institutional, and socio-economic aspects) as well as on the scale 
of implementation. For an assessment of macroeconomic, cross-sectoral effects associated with mitigation policies (e. g., on energy prices, consumption, growth, and trade), see 
Sections 3.9, 6.3.6, 13.2.2.3, and 14.4.2. Note: Co-benefits / adverse side-effects of bioenergy are discussed in Section 11.13.








Land tenure and 
use rights
Improving (↑) or diminishing (↓) tenure and use rights for local 
communities and indigenous peoples, including harmonization of 
land tenure and use regimes (e.g., with customary rights)
Local to national Forestry (4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 20)
Sectoral policies Promoting (↑) or contradicting (↓) the enforcement of 
sectoral (forest and/or agriculture) policies
National Forestry (2, 5, 6, 9, 20); land-based 
agriculture (7, 11, 20)
Cross-sectoral 
policies
Cross-sectoral coordination (↑) or clashes (↓) between 
forestry, agriculture, energy, and/or mining policies
Local to national Forestry (7, 20); agriculture (7, 11, 20)
Participative 
mechanisms
Creation/use of participative mechanisms (↑) for decision making 
regarding land management (including participation of various 
social groups, e.g., indigenous peoples or local communities)
Local to national Forestry (4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 14, 20); agriculture 
(20, 32); integrated systems (20, 34)
Benefit sharing 
mechanisms




Food security Increase (↑) or decrease (↓) on food availability and access Local to national Forestry (18, 19); agriculture (7, 15, 18, 
19, 23, 28, 30); livestock (2, 3, 19, 35, 36); 
integrated systems (18, 19); biochar (17, 26) 
Local/traditional 
knowledge
Recognition (↑) or denial (↓) of indigenous and local 
knowledge in managing (forest/agricultural) land
Local/sub-national Forestry (4, 5, 6, 8, 20); agriculture (20, 28); 
integrated systems (2); livestock (2, 3, 35); biochar (2)
Animal welfare Changes in perceived or measured animal welfare (perceived due to 
cultural values or measured, e.g., through amount of stress hormones)
Local to national Livestock (2, 31, 35, 37, 38)
Cultural values Respect and value cultural habitat and traditions (↑), reduce (↓), or 
increase (↑) existing conflicts or social discomfort (4, 5, 6, 20, 8)
Local to trans-
boundary
Forestry (4, 5, 6, 9, 20)
Human health Impacts on health due to dietary changes, especially in societies 
with a high consumption of animal protein (↓) 
Local to global Changes in demand patterns (31, 36)
Equity Promote (↑) or not (↓) equal access to land, decision making, value chain, 
and markets as well as to knowledge- and benefit-sharing mechanisms 





Income Increase (↑) or decrease (↓) in income. There are 
concerns regarding income distribution (↑)
Local Forestry (6, 7, 8, 16, 20, 21, 22); agriculture (16, 19, 
20, 23, 28); livestock (2, 3); integrated systems (7, 
20); biochar (24); changes in demand patterns (2)
Employment Employment creation (↑) or reduction of employment 
(especially for small farmers or local communities) (↓)
Local Forestry (8, 20); agriculture (20, 23); livestock 
(2, 3); integrated systems (7, 20)
Financing 
mechanisms
Access (↑) or lack of access (↓) to new financing schemes Local to global Forestry (6, 8, 16, 20); agriculture 
(16, 20); livestock (2, 3)
Economic activity Diversification and increase in economic activity (↑) while concerns on equity (↑) Local Forestry (6, 7, 8, 20); land-based agriculture 








Land availability Competition between land uses and risk of activity or community displacement (↑) Local to trans-
boundary
Forestry and land-based-agriculture (5, 6, 15, 
18, 20, 29, 30); livestock (2, 3, 29, 40)
Biodiversity Monocultures can reduce biodiversity (↓). Ecological restoration 
increases biodiversity and ecosystem services (↑) by 44 and 25% 
respectively (28). Conservation, forest management, and integrated 
systems can keep biodiversity (↑) and/or slow desertification (↓) 
Local to trans-
boundary
Forestry (1, 19, 20, 27); on conservation and 
forest management (1, 19, 21, 27, 30); agriculture 
and integrated systems (15, 19, 20, 28, 30)
Albedo Positive impacts (↑) on albedo and evaporation and interactions with ozone Local to global See Section 11.5
N and P cycles Impacts on N and P cycles in water (↓/↑) especially from 
monocultures or large agricultural areas
Local to trans-
boundary
Agriculture (19, 23, 30, 35); livestock (2, 3, 30)
Water resources Monocultures and /or short rotations can have negative impacts on water availability 
(↓). Potential water depletion due to irrigation (↓). Some management practices 
can support regulation of the hydrological cycle and protection of watersheds (↑)
Local to trans-
boundary
Forestry (1, 19, 20, 27); land-based agriculture 
(30, 44); integrated systems (2, 30, 44)
Soil Soil conservation (↑) and improvement of soil quality and fertility (↑). Reduction 
of erosion. Positive or negative carbon mineralization priming effect (↑/↓)
Local Forestry (44, 45); land-based agriculture (13, 19, 
23, 28, 30); integrated systems biochar (39, 40)
New products Increase (↑) or decrease (↓) on fibre availability as well 
as non-timber/non-wood products output 
Local to national Forestry (18, 19, 41, 42); agriculture (7, 15, 18, 
19, 23, 28, 30); integrated systems (18, 19)
Ecosystem resilience Increase (↑) or reduction (↓) of resilience, reduction of disaster risks (↓) Local to trans-
boundary
Forestry, integrated systems (11, 33; see Section 11.5)
⇒
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est thinning, or deforestation. In general, reduction in water yields 
in afforestation / reforestation projects has been reported in both 
groundwater or surface catchments (Jackson et al., 2005), or where 
irrigation water is used to produce bioenergy crops. For water sup-
ply security, it is important to consider the relative yield reduction 
and this can have severe consequences in dry regions with inherent 
water shortages (Wang et al., 2011c). Where there is a water imbal-
ance, however, this additional water use can be beneficial by reduc-
ing the efflux of salts (Jackson et al., 2005). Another aspect of water 
yield is the reduction of flood peaks, and also prolonged periods of 
water flow, because discharge is stabilized (Jackson et  al., 2005), 
however low flows can be reduced because of increased forest 
water use. Water quality can be affected by AFOLU in several ways. 
For example, minimum tillage systems have been reported to reduce 
water erosion and thus sedimentation of water courses (Lal, 2011). 
Deforestation is well known to increase erosion and thus efflux of 
silt; avoiding deforestation will prevent this. In other situations, 
watershed scale reforestation can result in the restoration of water 
quality (e. g., Townsend et  al., 2012). Furthermore, strategic place-
ment of tree belts in lands affected by dryland salinity can remedi-
ate the affected lands by lowering the water table (Robinson et al., 
2004) . Various types of AFOLU mitigation can result in degradation 
of water sources through the losses of pesticides and nutrients to 
water (Smith et al., 2013a).
AFOLU mitigation measures can have several impacts on soil. Increas-
ing or maintaining carbon stocks in living biomass (e. g., through forest 
or agroforestry systems) will reduce wind erosion by acting as wind 
breaks and may increase crop production; and reforestation, conserva-
tion, forest management, agricultural systems, or bioenergy systems 
can be used to restore degraded or abandoned land (Smith et al., 2008; 
Stickler et  al., 2009; Chatterjee and Lal, 2009; Wicke et  al., 2011b; 
Sochacki et al., 2012). Silvo-pastoral systems can help to reverse land 
degradation while providing food (Steinfeld et al., 2008, 2010; Janzen, 
2011). Depending on the soil type, production temperature regimes, 
the specific placement and the feedstock tree species, biochar can 
have positive or negative carbon mineralization priming effects over 
time (Zimmerman et al., 2011; Luo et al., 2011).
AFOLU mitigation options can promote innovation, and many technolog-
ical supply-side mitigation options outlined in Section 11.3 also increase 
agricultural and silvicultural efficiency. At any given level of demand for 
agricultural products, intensification increases output per unit area and 
would therefore, if all else were equal, allow the reduction in farmland 
area, which would in turn free land for C sequestration and / or bioen-
ergy production (Section 11.4). For example, a recent study calculated 
potentially large GHG reductions from global agricultural intensification 
by comparing the past trajectory of agriculture (with substantial yield 
improvements), with a hypothetical trajectory with constant technol-
ogy (Burney et al., 2010). However, in real-world situations increases in 
yield may result in feedbacks such as increased consumption (‘rebound 
effects’; see Section 11.4; Lambin and Meyfroidt, 2011; Erb, 2012).
11�7�3 Public perception
Mitigation measures that support sustainable development are likely to 
be viewed positively in terms of public perception, but a large-scale drive 
towards mitigation without inclusion of key stakeholder communities 
involved would likely not be greeted favourably (Smith and Wollenberg, 
2012). However, there are concerns about competition between food and 
AFOLU outcomes, either because of an increasing use of land for biofuel 
plantations (Fargione et  al., 2008; Alves Finco and Doppler, 2010), or 
afforestation / reforestation (Mitchell et al., 2012), or by blocking the trans-
formation of forest land into agricultural land (Harvey and Pilgrim, 2011).
Further, lack of clarity regarding the architecture of the future inter-
national climate regime and the role of AFOLU mitigation measures is 
perceived as a potential threat for long-term planning and long-term 
investments (Streck, 2012; Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2012). Certain tech-






Infrastructure Increase (↑) or decrease (↓) in availability of and access to infrastructure. 
Competition for infrastructure for agriculture (↑), can increase social conflicts




Promote (↑) or delay (↓) technology development and transfer Local to global Forestry (7, 13, 25); agriculture (23); livestock (2, 3)
Technology
Acceptance
Can facilitate acceptance of sustainable technologies (↑) Local to national Forestry (7, 13, 25); livestock (2, 3, 35)
Notes: AFOLU mitigation measures are grouped following the structure given in Table 11.2 
Sources: 1Trabucco et al., 2008; 2Steinfeld et al., 2010; 3Gerber et al., 2010; 4Sikor et al., 2010; 5Rosemary, 2011; 6Pettenella and Brotto, 2011; 7Jackson and Baker, 2010; 8Corbera 
and Schroeder, 2011; 9Colfer, 2011; 10Blom et al., 2010; 11Halsnæs and Verhagen, 2007; 12Larson, 2011; 13Lichtfouse et al., 2009; 14Thompson et al., 2011; 15Graham-Rowe, 2011; 
16Tubiello et al., 2009; 17Barrow, 2012; 18Godfray et al., 2010; 19Foley et al., 2005 ; 20Madlener et al., 2006; 21Strassburg et al., 2012; 22Canadell and Raupach, 2008; 23Pretty, 2008; 
24Galinato et al., 2011; 25Macauley and Sedjo, 2011; 26Jeffery et al., 2011; 27Benayas et al., 2009; 28Foley et al., 2011; 29Haberl et al., 2013; 30Smith et al., 2013; 31Stehfest et al., 
2009; 32Chhatre et al., 2012; 33Seppälä et al., 2009; 34Murdiyarso et al., 2012; 35de Boer et al., 2011; 36McMichael et al., 2007; 37Koknaroglu and Akunal, 2013; 38Kehlbacher et al., 
2012; 39Zimmerman et al., 2011; 40Luo et al., 2011; 41Mirle, 2012; 42Albers and Robinson, 2013; 43Smith et al., 2013a; 44Chatterjee and Lal, 2009; 45Smith, 2008; 46Ziv et al., 2012; 
47Beringer et al., 2011; 48Douglas et al., 2009
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nologies, such as animal feed additives and genetically modified organ-
isms are banned in some jurisdictions due to perceived health and / or 
environmental risks. Public perception is often as important as scien-
tific evidence of hazard / risk in considering government policy regarding 
such technologies (Royal Society, 2009; Smith and Wollenberg, 2012).
11�7�4 Spillovers
Emerging knowledge on the importance of ecosystems services as a 
means for addressing climate change mitigation and adaptation have 
brought attention to the role of ecosystem management for achiev-
ing several development goals, beyond climate change adaptation 
and mitigation. This knowledge has enhanced the creation of ecosys-
tem markets (Section 11.10). In some jurisdictions ecosystem markets 
are developing (MEA, 2005; Engel et al., 2008; Deal and White, 2012; 
Wünscher and Engel, 2012)and these allow valuation of various com-
ponents of land-use changes, in addition to mitigation (Mayrand and 
Paquin, 2004; Barbier, 2007). Different approaches are used; in some 
cases the individual components (both co-benefits and adverse side-
effects) are considered singly (bundled), in other situations they are 
considered together (stacked) (Deal and White, 2012). Ecosystem mar-
ket approaches can serve as a framework to assess the benefits of miti-
gation actions from project, to regional and national level (Farley and 
Costanza, 2010). Furthermore, designing ecosystem market approaches 
yields methodologies for the evaluation of individual components (e. g., 
water quality response to reforestation, timber yield), and other types of 
ecosystem service (e. g., biodiversity, social amenity; Bryan et al., 2013).
11.8 Barriers and opportunities
Barriers and opportunities refer to the conditions provided by the devel-
opment context (Section 11.4.5). These conditions can enable and facil-
itate (opportunities) or hinder (barriers) the full use of AFOLU mitiga-
tion measures. AFOLU programmes and policies can help to overcome 
barriers, but countries being affected by many barriers will need time, 
financing, and capacity support. In some cases, international negotia-
tions have recognized these different circumstances among countries 
and have proposed corresponding approaches (e. g., a phased approach 
in the REDD+, Green Climate Fund; Section 11.10). Corresponding to 
the development framework presented in Section 11.4.5, the following 
types of barriers and benefits are discussed: socio-economic, environ-
mental, institutional, technological, and infrastructural.
11�8�1 Socio-economic barriers and 
 opportunities
The design and coverage of the financing mechanisms is key to suc-
cessful use of the AFOLU mitigation potential (Section 11.10; Chapter 
16). Questions remain over which costs will be covered by such mecha-
nisms. If financing mechanisms fail to cover at least transaction and 
monitoring costs, they will become a barrier to the full implementation 
of AFOLU mitigation. According to some studies, opportunity costs also 
need to be fully covered by any financing mechanism for the AFOLU 
sector, especially in developing countries, as otherwise AFOLU mitiga-
tion measures would be less attractive compared to returns from other 
land uses (Angelsen, 2008; Cattaneo et al., 2010; Böttcher et al., 2012). 
Conversely, if financing mechanisms are designed to modify economic 
activity, they could provide an opportunity to leverage a larger propor-
tion of AFOLU mitigation potential. 
Scale of financing sources can become either a barrier (if a relevant 
financial volume is not secured) or create an opportunity (if finan-
cial sources for AFOLU suffice) for using AFOLU mitigation potential 
(Streck, 2012; Chapter 16). Another element is the accessibility to 
AFOLU financing for farmers and forest stakeholders (Tubiello et  al., 
2009, p.  200; Havemann, 2011; Colfer, 2011). Financial concerns, 
including reduced access to loan and credits, high transaction costs or 
reduced income due to price changes of carbon credits over the project 
duration, are potential risks for AFOLU measures, especially in develop-
ing countries, and when land holders use market mechanisms (e. g., 
Afforestation and Reforestation (A / R) Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM); Madlener et al., 2006).
Poverty is characterized not only by low income, but also by insuf-
ficient food availability in terms of quantity and / or quality, limited 
access to decision making and social organization, low levels of 
education and reduced access to resources (e. g., land or technology; 
UNDP International Poverty Centre, 2006). High levels of poverty can 
limit the possibilities for using AFOLU mitigation options, because of 
short-term priorities and lacking resources. In addition, poor communi-
ties have limited skills and sometimes lack of social organization that 
can limit the use and scaling up of AFOLU mitigation options, and can 
increase the risk of displacement, with other potential adverse side-
effects (Smith and Wollenberg, 2012; Huettner, 2012). This is especially 
relevant when forest land sparing competes with other development 
needs e. g., increasing land for agriculture or promoting some types of 
mining (Forner et  al., 2006), or when large-scale bioenergy compro-
mises food security (Nonhebel, 2005; Section 11.13).
Cultural values and social acceptance can determine the feasibility of 
AFOLU measures, becoming a barrier or an opportunity depending of 
the specific circumstances (de Boer et al., 2011).
11�8�2 Institutional barriers and opportunities
Transparent and accountable governance and swift institutional estab-
lishment are very important for a sustainable implementation of AFOLU 
mitigation measures. This includes the need to have clear land tenure 
and land-use rights regulations and a certain level of enforcement, as 
well as clarity about carbon ownership (Palmer, 2011; Thompson et al., 
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2011; Markus, 2011; Rosendal and Andresen, 2011; Murdiyarso et al., 
2012 Sections 11.4.5; 11.10; Chapters 14; 15).
Lack of institutional capacity (as a means for securing creation of equal 
institutions among social groups and individuals) can reduce feasibil-
ity of AFOLU mitigation measures in the near future, especially in areas 
where small-scale farmers or forest users are the main stakeholders 
(Laitner et al., 2000; Madlener et al., 2006; Thompson et al., 2011a). Lack 
of an international agreement that supports a wide implementation of 
AFOLU measures can become a major barrier for realizing the mitiga-
tion potential from the sector globally (Section 11.10; Chapter 13).
11�8�3 Ecological barriers and opportunities
Mitigation potential in the agricultural sector is highly site-specific, 
even within the same region or cropping system (Baker et  al., 2007; 
Chatterjee and Lal, 2009). Availability of land and water for different 
uses need to be balanced, considering short- and long-term priorities, 
and global differences in resource use. Consequently, limited resources 
can become an ecological barrier and the decision of how to use them 
needs to balance ecological integrity and societal needs (Jackson, 
2009).
At the local level, the specific soil conditions, water availability, GHG 
emission-reduction potential as well as natural variability and resil-
ience to specific systems will determine the level of realization of miti-
gation potential of each AFOLU measure (Baker et al., 2007; Halvorson 
et  al., 2011). Frequent droughts in Africa and changes in the hydro-
meteorological events in Asia and Central and South America are 
important in defining the specific regional potential (Bradley et  al., 
2006; Rotenberg and Yakir, 2010). Ecological saturation (e. g., soil car-
bon or yield) means that some AFOLU mitigation options have their 
own limits (Section 11.5). The fact that many AFOLU measures can 
provide adaptation benefits provides an opportunity for increasing 
ecological efficiency (Guariguata et al., 2008; van Vuuren et al., 2009; 
Robledo et al., 2011; Section 11.5).
11�8�4 Technological barriers and 
opportunities
Technological barriers refer to the limitations in generating, procuring, 
and applying science and technology to identify and solve an environ-
mental problem. Some mitigation technologies are already applied now 
(e. g., afforestation, cropland, and grazing land management, improved 
livestock breeds and diets) so there are no technological barriers for 
these options, but others (e. g., some livestock dietary additives, crop 
trait manipulation) are still at the development stage (see Table 11.2).
The ability to manage and re-use knowledge assets for scientific com-
munication, technical documentation and learning is lacking in many 
areas where mitigation could take place. Future developments pres-
ent opportunities for additional mitigation to be realized if efforts to 
deliver ease-of-use and range-of-use are guaranteed. There is also a 
need to adapt technology to local needs by focusing on existing local 
opportunities (Kandji et al., 2006), as proposed in Nationally Appropri-
ate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) (Section 11.10).
Barriers and opportunities related to monitoring, reporting, and veri-
fication of the progress of AFOLU mitigation measures also need be 
considered. Monitoring activities, aimed at reducing uncertainties, pro-
vide the opportunity of increasing credibility in the AFOLU sector. How-
ever there are technical challenges. For instance, monitoring carbon 
in forests with high spatial variability in species composition and tree 
density can pose a technical barrier to the implementation of some 
AFOLU activities (e. g., REDD+; Baker et al., 2010; Section 11.10). The 
IPCC National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Guidelines (Paustian et  al., 
2006) also provide an opportunity, because they offer standard sci-
entific methods that countries already use to report AFOLU emissions 
and removals under the UNFCCC. Also, field research in high-biomass 
forests (Gonzalez et  al., 2010) shows that remote sensing data and 
Monte Carlo quantification of uncertainty offer a technical opportu-
nity for implementing REDD+ (Section 11.10). Exploiting the exist-
ing human skills within a country is essential for realizing full AFOLU 
potential. A lack of trained people can therefore become a barrier to 
implementation of appropriate technologies (Herold and Johns, 2007).
Technology improvement and technology transfer are two crucial 
components for the sustainable increase of agricultural production 
in developed and developing regions with positive impacts in terms 
of mitigation, soil, and biodiversity conservation (Tilman et al., 2011). 
International and national policy instruments are relevant to foster 
technology transfer and to support research and development (Section 
11.10.4), overcoming technological barriers.




Some climate change management objectives require large-scale 
transformations in human societies, in particular in the produc-
tion and consumption of energy and the use of the land resource. 
Chapter 6 describes alternative ‘transformation pathways’ of societ-
ies over time from now into the future, consistent with different cli-
mate change outcomes. Many pathways that foresee large efforts in 
mitigation will have implications for sustainable development, and 
corrective actions to move toward sustainability may be possible. 
However, impacts on development are context specific and depend 
upon scale and institutional agreements of the AFOLU options, and 
not merely on the type of option (see Sections 11.4 for development 
860
Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU)
11
Chapter 11
context and systemic view, 11.7 for potential co-benefits and adverse 
effects, and 11.8 for opportunities and challenges). To evaluate sec-
toral implications of transformation pathways, it is useful to first 
characterize the pathways in terms of mitigation technologies and 
policy assumptions.
11�9�1 Characterization of transformation 
pathways
Uncertainty about reference AFOLU emissions is significant both his-
torically (Section 11.2) and in projections (Section 6.3.1.3). The trans-
formation projections of the energy system, AFOLU emissions and 
land-use are characterized by the reference scenario, as well as the 
abatement policy assumptions regarding eligible abatement options, 
regions covered, and technology costs over time. Many mitigation 
scenarios suggest a substantial cost-effective mitigation role for land 
related mitigation assuming idealized policy implementation, with 
immediate, global, and comprehensive availability of land-related miti-
gation options. However, policy implementation of large-scale land-
based mitigation will be challenging. In addition, the transformation 
pathways often ignore, or only partially cover, important mitigation 
risks, costs, and benefits (e. g., transaction costs or Monitoring Report-
ing and Verification (MRV) costs), and other developmental issues 
including intergenerational debt or non-monetary benefits (Ackerman 
et al., 2009; Lubowski and Rose, 2013). 
In recent idealized implementation scenarios from a model compari-
son study, land-related changes can represent a significant share of 
emissions reductions (Table 11.10). In these scenarios, models assume 
an explicit terrestrial carbon stock incentive, or a global forest protec-
tion policy, as well as an immediate global mitigation policy in general. 
Bioenergy is consistently deployed (because it is considered to reduce 
net GHG emissions over time; see Section 6.3.5), and agricultural emis-
sions are priced. Note that bioenergy related mitigation is not captured 
in Table 11.10. The largest land emission reductions occur in net CO2 
emissions, which also have the greatest variability across models. 
Some models exhibit increasing land CO2 emissions under mitigation, 
as bioenergy feedstock production leads to LUC, while other models 
exhibit significant reductions with protection of existing terrestrial car-
bon stocks and planting of new trees to increase carbon stocks. Land-
related CO2 and N2O mitigation is more important in the nearer-term 
Table 11�10 | Cumulative land-related emissions reductions, land reduction share of global reductions, and percent of baseline land emissions reduced for CH4, CO2, and N2O in 
idealized implementation 550 and 450 ppm CO2eq scenarios. The number of scenarios is indicated for each GHG and atmospheric concentration goal. Negative values represent 
increases in emissions (Kriegler et al., 2013). Bioenergy-related mitigation is not captured in the table.
550 ppm 450 ppm
2010 – 2030 2010 – 2050 2010 – 2100 2010 – 2030 2010 – 2050 2010 – 2100
Cumulative global land-related 
emissions reductions (GtCO2eq)
CH4 min 3.5 17.5 51.4 0.0 4.5 52.3
(n = 5 / 5) max 9.8 46.0 201.7 12.7 50.5 208.6
CO2 min – 20.2 – 43.2 – 129.8 – 20.3 – 50.8 – 153.9
(n = 11 / 10) max 280.9 543.0 733.4 286.6 550.5 744.6
N2O min 3.1 8.4 25.5 3.1 8.4 25.5
(n = 4 / 4) max 8.2 27.7 96.6 9.7 29.3 96.8
Sum min – 8.7 2.5 53.9 – 3.7 5.6 69.7
(n = 4 / 4) max 295.2 587.7 903.5 301.4 596.9 940.3
Land reductions share of total 
global emissions reductions
CH4
min 25 % 20 % 20 % 22 % 20 % 16 %
max 37 % 40 % 42 % 30 % 31 % 36 %
CO2
min – 43 % – 12 % – 4 % – 20 % -8 % -4 %
max 74 % 48 % 17 % 73 % 47 % 15 %
N2O
min 52 % 61 % 65 % 53 % 61 % 65 %
max 95 % 90 % 87 % 78 % 83 % 85 %
Sum
min -11 % 0 % 1 % -2 % 1 % 1 %
max 70 % 47 % 19 % 69 % 46 % 17 %
Percent of baseline land 
emissions reduced
CH4
min 3 % 8 % 10 % 0 % 2 % 10 %
max 8 % 16 % 28 % 10 % 18 % 30 %
CO2
min -42 % -89 % 0 % -42 % -104 % 0 %
max 373 % 417 % 504 % 381 % 423 % 512 %
N2O
min 4 % 6 % 8 % 4 % 6 % 8 %
max 10 % 16 % 22 % 12 % 17 % 22 %
Sum
min -4 % 1 % 7 % -2 % 1 % 8 %
max 97 % 100 % 73 % 99 % 101 % 76 %
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for some models. Land-related N2O and CH4 reductions are a signifi-
cant part of total N2O and CH4 reductions, but only a small fraction 
of baseline emissions, suggesting that models have cost-effective rea-
sons to keep N2O and CH4 emissions. Emissions reductions from land 
increase only slightly with the stringency of the atmospheric concen-
tration goal, as energy and industry emission reductions increase faster 
with target stringency. This result is consistent with previous studies 
(Rose et al., 2012). Land-based CO2 reductions can be over 100 % of 
baseline emissions, from the expansion of managed and unmanaged 
forests for sequestration.
Emissions reductions from individual land-related technologies, espe-
cially bioenergy, are not generally reported in transformation path-
way studies. In part, this is due to emphasis on the energy system, but 
also other factors that make it difficult to uniquely quantify mitiga-
tion by technology. An exception is Rose et al. (2012) who reported 
agriculture, forest carbon, and bioenergy abatement levels for vari-
ous atmospheric concentration goals. Cumulatively, over the century, 
bioenergy was the dominant strategy, followed by forestry, and then 
agriculture. Bioenergy cumulatively generated approximately 5 to 
52 GtCO2eq and 113 to 749 GtCO2eq mitigation by 2050 and 2100, 
respectively. In total, land-related strategies contributed 20 to 60 % 
of total cumulative abatement to 2030, 15 to 70 % to 2050, and 15 
to 40 % to 2100.
Within models, there is a positive correlation between emissions 
reductions and GHG prices. However, across models, it is less clear, as 
some estimate large reductions with a low GHG price, while others 
estimate low reductions despite a high GHG price (Rose et al., 2012). 
For the most part, these divergent views are due to differences in 
model assumptions and are difficult to disentangle. Overall, while a 
tighter target and higher carbon price results in a decrease in land-use 
emissions, emissions decline at a decreasing rate. This is indicative of 
the rising relative cost of land mitigation, the increasing demand for 
bioenergy, and subsequent increasing need for overall energy system 
GHG abatement and energy consumption reductions. For additional 
discussion of land’s potential role in transformation pathways, espe-
cially regarding physical land-use and bioenergy, see sections 6.3.2.4 
and 6.3.5.
Models project increased deployment of, and dependence on, modern 
bioenergy (i. e., non-traditional bioenergy that is produced centrally to 
service communities rather than individual household production for 
heat and cooking), with some models projecting up to 95 EJ per year 
by 2030, and up to 245 EJ per year by 2050. Models universally project 
that the majority of agriculture and forestry mitigation, and bioenergy 
primary energy, will occur in developing and transitional economies 
(Section 6.3.5).
More recently, the literature has begun analyzing more realistic policy 
contexts. This work has identified a number of policy coordination and 
implementation issues. There are many dimensions to policy coordina-
tion: technologies, sectors, regions, climate and non-climate policies, 
and timing. There are three prominent issues. First, there is coordina-
tion between mitigation activities. For instance, increased bioenergy 
incentives without global terrestrial carbon stock incentives or global 
forest protection policy, could result in substantial land conversion 
and emissions with large-scale deployment of energy crops. The pro-
jected emissions come primarily from the displacement of pasture, 
grassland, and natural forest (Sections 6.3.5 and 11.4.3). Energy crop-
land expansion also results in non-energy cropland conversion. These 
studies find that ignoring land conversion emissions with energy crop 
expansion, results in the need for deeper emissions reductions in the 
fossil and industrial sectors, and increased total mitigation costs. 
However, illustrative scenarios by (Calvin et al., 2013a) suggest that 
extensive forest protection policies may be needed for managing bio-
energy driven deforestation. Note that providing energy crops, espe-
cially while protecting terrestrial carbon stocks, could result in a sig-
nificant increase in food prices, potentially further exacerbated if also 
expanding forests (Wise et al., 2009; Popp et al., 2011; Reilly et al., 
2012; Calvin et  al., 2013a; see also Sections 11.4.3 and 11.13.7). 
In addition to competition between energy crops and forest carbon 
strategies, there is also competition between avoided deforestation 
and afforestation mitigation strategies, but synergies between forest 
management and afforestation (Rose and Sohngen, 2011). Bioenergy 
sustainability policies across sectors also need to be coordinated 
(Frank et al., 2013).
The second major concern is coordination of mitigation activity over 
time. The analyses noted in the previous paragraph assume the abil-
ity to globally protect or incentivize all, or a portion, of forest carbon 
stocks. A few studies to date have evaluated the implications of stag-
gered forest carbon incentives — across regions and forest carbon 
activities. For instance, (Calvin et  al., 2009) estimate land CO2 emis-
sions increases of 4 and 6 GtCO2 / yr in 2030 and 2050, respectively, 
from scenarios with staggered global regional climate policies that 
include forest carbon incentives. And, Rose and Sohngen (2011) find 
that fragmented or delayed forest carbon policy could accelerate defor-
estation. They project 60 – 100 GtCO2 of leakage by 2025 with a carbon 
price of 15 USD2010 / tCO2 that rises at 5 % per year. Regional agriculture 
and forestry mitigation supply costs are also affected by regional par-
ticipation / non-participation, with non-participating regions potentially 
increasing the mitigation costs for participating regions (Golub et al., 
2009). Staggered adoption of land-mitigation policies will likely have 
institutional and socioeconomic implications as well (Madlener et al., 
2006). Institutional issues, especially clarification of land tenure and 
property rights and equity issues (Section 11.7), will also be critical for 
successful land mitigation in forestry over time (Palmer, 2011; Gupta, 
2012; Karsenty et al., 2014).
Finally, the type of incentive structure has implications. International 
land-related mitigation projects are currently regarded as high risk car-
bon market investments, which may affect market appeal. Also, mitiga-
tion scenarios assume that all emissions and sequestration changes 
are priced (similar to capping all emissions). However, mitigation, 
especially in agriculture and forestry, may be sought through volun-
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tary markets, where mitigation suppliers choose whether to participate 
(Section 11.10). For instance, Rose et al. (2013) estimate reduced miti-
gation potential, as well as over-crediting, for United States agriculture 
and forestry with voluntary mitigation supply incentives, e. g., mitiga-
tion decreased 25 – 55 % at 15 USD2010 / tCO2eq due to non-participant 
leakage and non-additional crediting.
11�9�2 Implications of transformation pathways 
for the AFOLU sector
Transformation pathways indicate that a combination of forces can 
result in very different projected landscapes relative to today, even 
in baseline scenarios (Section 6.3.5). For instance, Popp et al. (2013) 
evaluate three models, and show that projected 2030 baseline changes 
from today alone vary sharply across models in all regions (Figure 
11.19). See Section 6.3.5 for global land cover change results for a 
broader set of studies and policy contexts. In the examples in Figure 
11.19, projections exhibit growth and reductions in both non-energy 
cropland (e. g., ASIA), and energy cropland (e. g., ASIA, OECD-1990, 
EIT). Furthermore, different kinds of land are converted when baseline 
cropland expands (e. g., MAF). Mitigation generally induces greater 
land cover changes than in baseline scenarios, but there are very differ-
ent potential transformation visions. Overall, it is difficult to generalize 
on regional land cover effects of mitigation. For the same atmospheric 
concentration goal, some models convert significant area, some do 
not. There is energy cropland expansion in many regions that supports 
the production of bioenergy. Less consistent is the response of forest 
land, primarily due to differences in the land carbon options / policies 
modelled (Section 6.3.5). Finally, there is relatively modest additional 
land conversion in the 450 ppm, compared to the 550 ppm, scenarios, 
which is consistent with the declining role of land-related mitigation 
with policy stringency.
The implications of transformation pathway scenarios with large 
regional expansion of forest cover for carbon sequestration, depends 
in part on how the forest area increases (Figure 11.19; Popp et  al., 
2013). If forest areas increase through the expansion of natural veg-
etation, biodiversity and a range of other ecosystem services pro-
vided by forests could be enhanced. If afforestation occurs through 
large-scale plantation, however, some negative impacts on biodiver-
sity, water, and other ecosystem services could arise, depending on 
what land cover the plantation replaces and the rotation time (Sec-
tion 11.7). Similar issues arise with large-scale bioenergy, and envi-
ronmental impacts of energy crop plantations, which largely depend 
upon where, how, and at what scale they are implemented, and how 
they are managed (Davis et al., 2013; see Section 11.13.6). Not sur-
prisingly, the realistic policy coordination and implementation issues 
discussed in Section 11.9.1 could have significant land-use conse-
quences, and additional policy design research is essential to better 
characterize mitigation costs, net emissions, and other social implica-
tions.
11�9�3 Implications of transformation pathways 
for sustainable development
The implications of the transformation pathways on sustainable 
development are context- and time-specific. A detailed discussion of 
the implications of large-scale LUC, competition between different 
demands for land, and the feedbacks between LUC and other services 
provided by land is provided in Section 11.4, potential co-benefits 
and adverse side-effects are discussed in Section 11.7, and Section 
6.6 compares potential co-benefits and adverse side-effects across 
sectors, while Section 11.8 presents the opportunities and barriers 
for promoting AFOLU mitigation activities in the future. Finally, Sec-
tion 11.13 discusses the specific implications of increasing bioenergy 
crops.
11.10 Sectoral policies
Climate change and different policy and management choices inter-
act. The interrelations are particularly strong in agriculture and for-
estry: climate has a strong influence on these sectors that also con-
stitute sources of GHG as well as sinks (Golub et al., 2009). The land 
provides a multitude of ecosystem services, climate change mitigation 
being just one of many services that are vital to human well-being. 
The nature of the sector means that there are, potentially, many bar-
riers and opportunities as well as a wide range of potential impacts 
related to the implementation of AFOLU mitigation options (Sections 
11.7 and 11.8). Successful mitigation policies need to consider how 
to address the multi-functionality of the sector. Furthermore, physi-
cal environmental limitations are central for the implementation of 
mitigation options and associated policies (Pretty, 2013). The cost-
effectiveness of different measures is hampered by regional variabil-
ity. National and international agricultural and forest climate policies 
have the potential to redefine the opportunity costs of international 
land-use in ways that either complement or hinder the attainment 
of climate change mitigation goals (Golub et al., 2009). Policy inter-
actions could be synergistic (e. g., research and development invest-
ments and economic incentives for integrated production systems) or 
conflicting (e. g., policies promoting land conversion vs. conservation 
policies) across the sector (see Table 11.11). Additionally, adequate 
policies are needed to orient practices in agriculture and in forestry 
toward global sharing of innovative technologies for the efficient use 
of land resources to support effective mitigation options (see Table 
11.2).
Forty-three countries in total (as of December 2010) have pro-
posed NAMAs to the UNFCCC. Agriculture and forestry activities 
were considered as ways to reduce their GHG emissions in 59 and 
94 % of the proposed NAMAs. For the least developed countries, 
the forestry sector was quoted in all the NAMAs, while the agricul-
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tural sector was represented in 70 % of the NAMAs (Bockel et  al., 
2010). Policies related to the AFOLU sector that affect mitigation are 
discussed below according to the instruments through which they 
may be implemented (economic incentives, regulatory and control 
approaches, information, communication and outreach, research 
and development). Economic incentives (e. g., special credit lines for 
low-carbon agriculture, sustainable agriculture and forestry prac-
tices, tradable credits, payment for ecosystem services) and regula-
tory approaches (e. g., enforcement of environmental law to reduce 
deforestation, set-aside policies, air and water pollution control 
reducing nitrate load and N2O emissions) have been effective in dif-
ferent cases. Investments in research, development, and diffusion 
(e. g., improved fertilizer use efficiency, livestock improvement, better 
forestry management practices) could result in positive and synergis-
tic impacts for adaptation and mitigation (Section 11.5). Emphasis 
is given to REDD+, considering its development in recent years, and 
relevance for the discussion of mitigation policies in the forestry sec-
tor.
 
Figure 11�19 | Regional land cover change by 2030 from 2005 from three models for baseline (left) and idealized policy implementation 550 ppm CO2eq (centre) and 450 ppm 
CO2eq (right) scenarios. (Popp et al., 2013).
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Emissions trading: Carbon markets occur under both compliance 
schemes and as voluntary programmes. A review of existing offset 
programmes was provided by Kollmuss et al. (2010). More details are 
also presented in Section 15.5.3. Compliance markets (Kyoto offset 
mechanisms, mandatory cap-and-trade systems, and other manda-
tory GHG systems) are created and regulated by mandatory national, 
regional, or international carbon reduction regimes (Kollmuss et al., 
2010). The three Kyoto Protocol mechanisms are very important for 
the regulatory market: CDM, Joint Implementation (JI) and the Emis-
sions Trading System (ETS). Currently, AFOLU projects in CDM only 
include specific types of projects: for agriculture — methane avoid-
ance (manure management), biogas projects, agricultural residues 
for biomass energy; for forestry — reforestation and afforestation. By 
June 2013, the total number of registered CDM projects was 6989, 
0.6 and 2.5 % of this total being related to afforestation / reforestation 
and agriculture, respectively (UNFCCC — CDM); therefore, finance 
streams coming from A / R CDM Projects are marginal from the global 
perspective. An analysis of A / R CDM projects suggests crucial fac-
tors for the performance of these projects are initial funding support, 
design, and implementation guided by large organizations with tech-
nical expertise, occurrence on private land (land with secured prop-
erty rights attached), and that most revenue from Certified Emission 
Reductions (CERs) is directed back to local communities (Thomas 
et al., 2010).
Table 11�11 | Some regional and global programs and partnerships related to illegal logging, forest management and conservation and REDD+.
Programme / Institution / Source Context Objectives and Strategies
Forest Law Enforcement and 
Governance (FLEG) / 
World Bank / 
www. worldbank. org / eapfleg
Illegal logging and lack of appropriate forest governance 
are major obstacle to countries to alleviate poverty, to 
develop their natural resources and to protect global 
and local environmental services and values 
Support regional forest law enforcement and governance (FLEG)
Improving Forest Law Enforcement 
and Governance in the European 
Neighbourhood Policy East Countries 
and Russia (ENPI-FLEG) / EU / 
www. enpi-fleg. org
Regional cooperation in the European Neighbourhood 
Policy Initiative East Countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine), and Russia 
following up on the St. Petersburg Declaration
Support governments, civil society, and the private sector in participating 
countries in the development of sound and sustainable forest management 
practices, including reducing the incidence of illegal forestry activities.
Forest Law Enforcement, Governance 
and Trade (FLEGT) / European Union / 
www. euflegt. efi. int / 
Illegal logging has a devastating impact on some of the 
world’s most valuable forests. It can have not only serious 
environmental, but also economic and social consequences.
Exclude illegal timber from markets, to improve the supply of legal timber and to increase 
the demand for responsible wood products. Central elements are trade accords to 
ensure legal timber trade and support good forest governance in the partner countries. 
There are a number of countries in Africa, Asia, South and Central America currently 
negotiating FLEGT Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs) with the European Union. 
Program on Forests (PROFOR) / multiple 
donors including the European 
Union, European countries, 
Japan and the World Bank / 
www. profor. info
Well-managed forests have the potential to reduce 
poverty, spur economic development, and contribute 
to a healthy local and global environment
Provide in-depth analysis and technical assistance on key forest questions 
related to livelihoods, governance, financing, and cross-sectoral issues. PROFOR 
activities comprise analytical and knowledge generating work that support the 
strategy’s objectives of enhancing forests‘ contribution to poverty reduction, 
sustainable development and the protection of environmental services.
UN-REDD Programme / United Nations / 
www. un-redd. org
The UN collaborative initiative on Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) in developing 
countries was launched in 2008 and builds on the convening 
role and technical expertise of the FAO, UNDP, and the UNEP. 
The Programme supports national REDD+ readiness efforts in 46 partner 
countries (Africa, Asia-Pacific, and Latin America) through (i) direct support 
to the design and implementation of REDD+ National Programmes; 
and (ii) complementary support to national REDD+ action (common 
approaches, analyses, methodologies, tools, data, and best practices). 
REDD+ Partnership / International 
effort (50 different countries) / 
www. reddpluspartnership. org
The UNFCCC has encouraged the Parties to coordinate their 
efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation. As a response, countries attending the March 
2010 International Conference on the Major Forest Basins, 
hosted by the Government of France, agreed on the need 
to forge a strong international partnership on REDD+. 
The REDD+ Partnership serves as an interim platform for its partner countries to 
scale up actions and finance for REDD+ initiatives in developing countries (including 
improving the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, and coordination of REDD+ 
and financial instruments), to facilitate knowledge transfer, capacity enhancement, 
mitigation actions and technology development, and transfer among others.
Forest Investment Program 
(FIP) / Strategic Climate Fund (a 
multi-donor Trust Fund within the 
Climate Investment Funds)
www. climateinvestmentfunds. org / cif / 
Reduction of deforestation and forest degradation 
and promotion of sustainable forest management, 
leading to emission reductions and the 
protection of carbon terrestrial sinks.
Support developing countries’ efforts to REDD and promote sustainable 
forest management by providing scaled-up financing to developing 
countries for readiness reforms and public and private investments, 
identified through national REDD readiness or equivalent strategies.
Forest Carbon Partnership 
(FCPF) / World Bank / 
www. forestcarbonpartnership. org
Assistance to developing countries to implement 
REDD+ by providing value to standing forests.
Builds the capacity of developing countries to reduce emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation and to tap into any future system of REDD+.
Indonesia-Australia Forest 
Carbon Partnership / 
www. iafcp. or. id
Australia’s assistance on climate change and builds on long-
term practical cooperation between Indonesia and Australia. 
The Partnership supports strategic policy dialogue on climate change, 
the development of Indonesia‘s National Carbon Accounting System, 
and implementing demonstration activities in Central Kalimantan.
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There are compliance schemes outside the scope of the Kyoto Proto-
col, but these are carried out exclusively at the national level, with no 
relation to the Protocol. In 2011, Australia started the Carbon Farming 
Initiative (CFI) that allows farmers and investors to generate tradable 
carbon offsets from farmland and forestry projects. This followed sev-
eral years of state-based and voluntary activity that resulted in 65,000 
ha of A / R projects (Mitchell et al., 2012). Another example is The West-
ern Arnhem Land Fire Abatement Project (WALFA), a fire management 
project in Australia initiated in 2006 that produces a tradable carbon 
offset through the application of improved fire management using tra-
ditional management practices of indigenous land owners (Whitehead 
et  al., 2008; Bradstock et  al., 2012). Alberta’s offset credit system is 
a compliance mechanism for entities regulated under the province’s 
mandatory GHG emission intensity-based regulatory system (Koll-
muss et al., 2010). In the case of N2O emissions from agriculture, the 
Alberta Quantification Protocol for Agricultural N2O Emissions Reduc-
tions issues C offset credits for on-farm reductions of N2O emissions 
and fuel use associated with the management of fertilizer, manure, and 
crop residues for each crop type grown. Other N2O emission reduction 
protocols (e. g., Millar et al., 2010) are being considered for the Veri-
fied Carbon Standard, the American Carbon Registry, and the Climate 
Action Reserve (Robertson et al., 2013).
Agriculture and Forestry activities are not covered by the European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which is by far the largest 
existing carbon market. Forestry entered the New Zealand Kyoto Pro-
tocol compliant ETS in 2008, and mandatory reporting for agriculture 
began in 2012, although full entry of agriculture into the scheme has 
been delayed indefinitely. Agricultural participants include meat pro-
cessors, dairy processors, nitrogen fertilizer manufacturers and import-
ers, and live animal exporters, although some exemptions apply (Gov-
ernment of New Zealand). California’s Cap-and-Trade Regulation took 
effect on January 1, 2012, with amendments to the Regulation effec-
tive September 1, 2012. The enforceable compliance obligation began 
on January 1, 2013. Four types of projects were approved as eligible 
to generate carbon credits to regulated emitters in California: avoid-
ance of methane emissions from installation of anaerobic digesters on 
farms, carbon sequestration in urban and rural forestry, and destruc-
tion of ozone depleting substances (California Environmental Protec-
tion Agency).
Voluntary carbon markets operate outside of the compliance markets. 
By enabling businesses, governments, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), and individuals to purchase offsets that were created either 
in the voluntary market or through the CDM, they can offset their 
emissions (Verified or Voluntary Emissions Reductions (VERs)). The vol-
untary offset market includes a wide range of programmes, entities, 
standards, and protocols (e. g., Community & Biodiversity Standards, 
Gold Standard, Plan Vivo among others) to improve the quality and 
credibility of voluntary offsets. The most common incentives for the 
quantity buyers of carbon credits in the private sector are corporate 
social responsibility and public relations. Forest projects are increas-
ing in the voluntary markets. Transactions of carbon credits from this 
sector totalled 133 million USD in 2010, 95 % of them in voluntary 
markets (Peters-Stanley et al., 2011).
Reducing emissions from deforestation; reducing emissions from forest 
degradation; conservation of forest carbon stocks; sustainable man-
agement of forests; and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (REDD+): 
REDD+ consists of forest-related activities implemented voluntarily by 
developing countries that may, in isolation or jointly lead to significant 
climate change mitigation10. REDD+ was introduced in the agenda of 
the UNFCCC in 2005, and has since evolved to an improved under-
standing of the potential positive and negative impacts, methodologi-
cal issues, safeguards, and financial aspects associated with REDD+ 
implementation. Here, we first address the REDD+ discussions under 
the UNFCCC, but also introduce other REDD+-related initiatives. The 
novel aspects of REDD+ under the Convention, relative to previous 
forest-related mitigation efforts by developing countries under the 
UNFCCC are its national and broader coverage, in contrast to project-
based mitigation activities11 (e. g., under the CDM of the Kyoto Proto-
col). Its main innovation is its results-based approach, in which pay-
ments are done ex post in relation to a mitigation outcome already 
achieved, as opposed to project-based activities, where financing is 
provided ex ante in relation to expected outcomes. A phased approach 
to REDD+ was agreed at the UNFCCC, building from the develop-
ment of national strategies or action plans, policies and measures, 
and evolving into results-based actions that should be fully measured, 
reported, and verified — MRV (UNFCCC Dec. 1 / 16). REDD+ payments 
are expected for results-based actions, and although the UNFCCC has 
already identified potential ways to pay for these12, the financing archi-
tecture for the REDD+ mechanism is still under negotiation under the 
UNFCCC. 
Meanwhile, and as a result to the explicit request from the UNFCCC for 
early actions in REDD+, different regional and global programmes and 
partnerships address forest management and conservation and readi-
ness for REDD+ (Table 11.11), while some REDD+ strategies have 
started in countries with significant forest cover (see Box 11.7 for 
examples). Initiatives include multilateral activities (e. g., UN-REDD 
10 Decision 1 / CP.16 (FCCC / CP / 2010 / 7 / Add.1 , paragraph 70) “Encourages 
developing countries to contribute to mitigation actions in the forest sector by 
undertaking the following activities, as deemed appropriate by each Party and in 
accordance with their respective capabilities and national circumstances — reduc-
ing emissions from deforestation; reducing emissions from forest degradation; 
conservation of forest carbon stocks; sustainable management of forests; and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks”.
11 Decision 1 / CP.16 (FCCC / CP / 2010 / 7 / Add.1 , paragraph 73) “Decides that the 
activities undertaken by Parties referred to in paragraph 70 above should be 
implemented in phases, beginning with the development of national strategies 
or action plans, policies and measures, and capacity-building, followed by the 
implementation of national policies and measures and national strategies or 
action plans that could involve further capacity-building, technology development 
and transfer and results-based demonstration activities, and evolving into results-
based actions that should be fully measured, reported and verified”.
12 Decision 2 / CP.17 (FCCC / CP / 2011 / 9 / Add.1, paragraph 65) “Agrees that results-
based finance provided to developing country Parties that is new, additional and 
predictable may come from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral 
and multilateral, including alternative sources”.
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Programme, Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, Forest Investment Pro-
gram), bilateral activities (e. g., Tanzania-Norway, Indonesia-Norway), 
country driven initiatives (in addition to 16 UN-REDD Programme 
countries, the Programme also supports 31 other partner countries 
across Africa, Asia-Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean; UN-
REDD Programme — Support to Partner Countries).
REDD+ can be a very cost-effective option for mitigating climate change 
and could supply a large share of global abatement of emissions from 
the AFOLU sector from the extensive margin of forestry, especially 
through reducing deforestation in tropical regions (Golub et al., 2009). 
Issues of concern for REDD+ implementation have been captured under 
REDD+ safeguards in line with the UNFCCC Cancun Agreement. To 
respond to the requirements outlined in the UNFCCC agreement, a num-
ber of steps need to be considered in the development of country-level 
safeguard information systems for REDD+ including defining social and 
environmental objectives, assessing potential benefits and risks from 
REDD+, assessing current safeguard systems, drafting a strategic plan or 
policy, and establishing a governance system.
A growing body of literature has analyzed different aspects related to 
the implementation, effectiveness, and scale of REDD+, as well as the 
interactions with other social and environmental co-benefits (e. g., 
Angelsen et al., 2008; Levin et al., 2008; Larson, 2011; Gardner et al., 
2012). Results-based REDD+ actions, which are entitled to results-
based finance, require internationally agreed rules for MRV. Measur-
ing and monitoring the results will most likely rely on a combination of 
remotely-sensed data with ground-based inventories. The design of a 
REDD policy framework (and specifically its rules) can have a significant 
impact on monitoring costs (Angelsen et al., 2008; Böttcher et al., 2009). 
Forest governance is another central aspect in recent studies, including 
debate on decentralization of forest management, logging concessions 
in public-owned commercially valuable forests, and timber certifica-
tion, primarily in temperate forests (Agrawal et al., 2008). Although the 
majority of forests continue to be formally owned by governments, there 
are indications that the effectiveness of forest governance is increas-
ingly independent of formal ownership (Agrawal et al., 2008). However, 
there are widespread concerns that REDD+ will increase costs on forest-
dependent peoples and in this context, stakeholders rights, including 
rights to continue sustainable traditional land-use practices, appear as a 
precondition for REDD development (Phelps et al., 2010b).
Some studies have addressed the potential displacement of emissions, 
i. e., a reduction of emissions in one place resulting in an increase 
of emissions elsewhere (or leakage) (Santilli et  al., 2005; Forner 
et al., 2006; Nabuurs et al., 2007; Strassburg et al., 2008, 2009; Sec-
tion 11.3.2). The national coverage of REDD+ might ameliorate the 
issue of emissions displacement, a major drawback of project-based 
approaches (Herold and Skutsch, 2011). To minimize transnational dis-
placement of emissions, REDD+ needs to stimulate the largest number 
of developing countries to engage voluntarily. There are also concerns 
about the impacts of REDD+ design and implementation options on 
biodiversity conservation, as areas of high C content and high biodi-
versity are not necessarily coincident. Some aspects of REDD+ imple-
mentation that might affect biodiversity include site selection, man-
agement strategies, and stakeholder engagement (Harvey et al., 2010). 
From a conservation biology perspective, it is also relevant where 
the displacement occurs, as deforestation and exploitation of natural 
Box 11�7 | Examples of REDD+ initiatives at national scale in different regions with significant 
extension of forest cover
Amazon Fund: The Amazon Fund in Brazil was officially cre-
ated in 2008 by a presidential decree. The Brazilian Development 
Bank (BNDES) was given the responsibility of managing it. The 
Norwegian government played a key role in creating the fund by 
donating funds to the initiative in 2009. Since then, the Amazon 
Fund has received funds from two more donors: the Federal 
Republic of Germany and Petrobrás, Brazil’s largest oil company. 
As of February 2013, 1.03 billion USD has been pledged, with 227 
million USD approved for activities (Amazon Fund).
UN-REDD Democratic Republic of Congo: The Congo Basin 
rainforests are the second largest after Amazonia. In 2009, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), with support of UN-
REDD Programme and Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPC), 
started planning the implementation stages of REDD+ readiness. 
The initial DRC National Programme transitioned into the full 
National Programme (Readiness Plan) after it was approved by 
the UN-REDD Programme Policy Board in 2010 (UN-REDD Pro-
gramme). The budget comprises 5.5 million USD2010 and timeframe 
is 2010 – 2013.
Indonesia-Norway REDD+ Partnership: In 2010, the Indo-
nesia-Norway REDD+ Partnership was established through an 
agreement between governments of the two countries. The 
objective was to ‘support Indonesia’s efforts to reduce emissions 
from deforestation and degradation of forests and peatlands. 
Indonesia agreed to take systematic and decisive action to 
reduce its forest and peat-related GHG emissions, whereas Nor-
way agreed to support those efforts by making available up to 
1 billion USD2010, exclusively on a payment-for-results basis over 
the next few years’ (UN-REDD Programme). In 2013, Indonesia’s 
government has extended the moratorium on new forest conces-
sions for a further two years, protecting an additional 14.5 Mha 
of forest.
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resources could move from areas of low conservation value to those of 
higher conservation value, or to other natural ecosystems, threatening 
species native to these ecosystems (Harvey et al., 2010). Additionally, 
transnational displacement could cause deforestation to move into 
relatively intact areas of high biodiversity value, or into countries that 
currently have little deforestation (Putz and Redford, 2009).
Taxes, charges, subsidies: Financial regulations are another approach 
to pollution control. A range of instruments can be used: pollution 
charges, taxes on emission, taxes on inputs, and subsidies (Jakobsson 
et al., 2002). Nitrogen taxes are one possible instrument, since agri-
cultural emissions of N2O mainly derive from the use of nitrogenous 
fertilizers. An analysis of the tax on the nitrogen content of synthetic 
fertilizers in Sweden indicated that direct N2O emissions from agri-
cultural soils in Sweden (the tax abolished in 2010) would have been 
on average 160 tons or 2 % higher without the tax (Mohlin, 2013). 
Additionally, the study showed that removal of the N tax could com-
pletely counteract the decreases in CO2 emissions expected from 
the future tax increase on agricultural CO2. The mitigation potential 
of GHG-weighted consumption taxes on animal food products was 
estimated for the EU using a model of food consumption (Wirsenius 
et al., 2011). A 7 % reduction of current GHG emission in European 
Union (EU) agriculture was estimated with a GHG-weighted tax on 
animal food products of 79 USD2010 / tCO2eq (60 EUR2010 / tCO2eq). Low-
interest loans can also support the transition to sustainable agricul-
tural practices as currently implemented in Brazil, the second largest 
food exporter, through the national programme (launched in 2010; 
Plano ABC).
11�10�2 Regulatory and control approaches
Deforestation control and land planning (protected areas and land 
sparing / set-aside policies): The rate of deforestation in the tropics and 
relative contribution to anthropogenic carbon emissions has been 
declining (Houghton, 2012; see Section 11.2 for details). Public policies 
have had a significant impact by reducing deforestation rates in some 
tropical countries (see, e. g., Box 11.8).
Since agricultural expansion is one of the drivers of deforestation (espe-
cially in tropical regions), one central question is if intensification of 
agriculture reduces cultivated areas and results in land sparing by con-
centrating production on other land. Land sparing would allow released 
lands to sequester carbon, provide other environmental services, and 
protect biodiversity (Fischer et al., 2008). In the United States, over 13 
Mha of former cropland are enrolled in the US Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP), with biodiversity, water quality, and carbon sequestra-
tion benefits (Gelfand et al., 2011). In 1999, China launched the Grain 
for Green Program or Sloping Land Conversion Program as a national 
measure to increase vegetation cover and reduce erosion. Cropland and 
barren land were targeted and over 20 Mha of land were converted into 
mostly tree-based plantations. Over its first 10 years between ~800 to 
1700 MtCO2eq (Moberg, 2011) were sequestered.
Environmental regulation (GHG and their precursors emissions con-
trol): In many developed countries, environmental concerns related 
to water and air pollution since the mid-1990s led to the adoption of 
laws and regulations that now mandate improved agricultural nutrient 
management planning (Jakobsson et al., 2002). Some policy initiatives 
deal indirectly with N leakages and thus promote the reduction of N2O 
emissions. The EU Nitrates Directive (1991) sets limits on the use of fer-
tilizer N and animal manure N in nitrate-vulnerable zones. Across the 
27 EU Member States, 39.6 % of territory is subject to related action 
programmes. However, in terms of the effectiveness of environmen-
tal policies and agriculture, there has been considerable progress in 
controlling point pollution, but efforts to control non-point pollution of 
nutrients have been less successful, and potential synergies from vari-
ous soil-management strategies could be better exploited. Emission 
targets for the AFOLU sector were also introduced by different coun-
tries (e. g., Climate Change Acts in UK and Scotland; European Union). 
Bioenergy targets: Many countries worldwide, by 2012, have set tar-
gets or mandates or both for bioenergy, to deliver to multiple policy 
objectives, such as climate change mitigation, energy security, and 
rural development. The bulk of mandates continue to come from the 
EU-27 but 13 countries in the Americas, 12 in Asia-Pacific, and 8 in 
Africa have mandates or targets in place (Petersen, 2008; www. 
biofuelsdigest. com). For the sustainability of biofuels implementation, 
land-use planning and governance are central (Tilman et al., 2009), as 
related policy and legislation, e. g., in agriculture, forestry, environment 
and trade, can strongly influence the development of bioenergy pro-
grammes (Jull et al., 2007). A recent study analyzed the consequences 
of renewable targets of EU member states on the CO2 sink of EU for-
ests, and indicated a decrease in the forest sink by 4 – 11 % (Böttcher 
et al., 2012). Another possible tradeoff of biofuel targets is related to 
international trade. Global trade in biofuels might have a major impact 
on other commodity markets (e. g., vegetable oils or animal fodder) 
and has already caused a number of trade disputes, because of subsi-
dies and non-tariff barriers (Oosterveer and Mol, 2010).
Box 11�8 | Deforestation control in Brazil
The Brazilian Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of 
Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAm) includes coor-
dinated efforts among federal, state, and municipal govern-
ments, and civil organizations, remote-sensing monitoring, 
significant increase of new protected areas (Soares-Filho 
et al., 2010), and combination of economic and regulatory 
approaches. For example, since 2008 federal government 
imposed sanctions to municipalities with very high deforesta-
tion rates, subsidies were cut and new credit policies made 
rural credit dependent on compliance with environmental 
legislation (Macedo et al., 2012; Nolte et al., 2013).
868




Acceptability by land managers and practicability of mitigation mea-
sures (Table 11.2) need to be considered, because the efficiency of a 
policy is determined by the cost of achieving a given goal (Sections 
11.4.5; 11.7). Therefore, costs related to education and communica-
tion of policies should be taken into account (Jakobsson et al., 2002). 
Organizations created to foster the use of science in environmental 
policy, management, and education can facilitate the flow of informa-
tion from science to society, increasing awareness of environmental 
problems (Osmond et  al., 2010). In the agriculture sector, non-profit 
conservation organizations (e. g., The Sustainable Agriculture Network 
(SAN)) and governments (e. g., Farming for a Better Climate, Scotland) 
promote the social and environmental sustainability of activities by 
developing standards and educational campaigns. 
Certification schemes also support sustainable agricultural practices 
(Sections 11.4.5; 11.7). Climate-friendly criteria reinforce existing cer-
tification criteria and provide additional value. Different certification 
systems also consider improvements in forest management, reduced 
deforestation and carbon uptake by regrowth, reforestation, agrofor-
estry, and sustainable agriculture. In the last 20 years, forest certifica-
tion has been developed as an instrument for promoting sustainable 
forest management. Certification schemes encompass all forest types, 
but there is a concentration in temperate forests (Durst et al., 2006). 
Approximately 8 % of global forest area has been certified under a 
variety of schemes and 25 % of global industrial roundwood comes 
from certified forests (FAO, 2009b). Less than 2 % of forest area in 
African, Asian, and tropical American forests are certified, and most 
certified forests (82 %) are large and managed by the private sector 
(ITTO, 2008). In the forestry sector, many governments have worked 
towards a common understanding of sustainable forest management 
(Auld et  al., 2008). Certification bodies certify that farms or groups 
comply with standards and policies (e. g., Rainforest Alliance Certified). 
In some, specific voluntary climate change adaptation and mitigation 
criteria are included.
Forest certification as an instrument to promote sustainable forest 
management (SFM) and biodiversity maintenance was evaluated by 
(Rametsteiner and Simula, 2003) they indicated that standards used 
for issuing certificates upon compliance are diverse, but often include 
elements that set higher than minimum standards. 
Further, independent audits are an incentive for improving forest 
management. In spite of many difficulties, forest certification was 
considered successful in raising awareness, disseminating knowledge 
on the SFM concept worldwide, and providing a tool for a range of 
applications other than the assessment of sustainability, e. g., verify-
ing carbon sinks. Another evaluation of certification schemes for con-
serving biodiversity (Harvey et al., 2008) indicated some constraints 
that probably also apply to climate-friendly certification: weakness 
of compliance or enforcement of standards, transaction costs and 
paperwork often limit participation, and incentives are insufficient to 
attract high levels of participation. Biofuel certification is a specific 
case as there are multiple actors and several successive segments 
of biofuel production pathways: feedstock production, conversion of 
the feedstock to biofuels, wholesale trade, retail, and use of biofuels 
in engines (Gnansounou, 2011). Because of the length and the com-
plexity of biofuel supply chains assessing sustainability is challenging 
(Kaphengst et al., 2009).
11�10�4 Voluntary actions and agreements
Innovative agricultural practices and technologies can play a central 
role in climate change mitigation and adaptation, with policy and insti-
tutional changes needed to encourage the innovation and diffusion of 
these practices and technologies to developing countries. Under the 
UNFCCC, the 2007 Bali Action Plan identified technology development 
and transfer as a priority area. A Technology Mechanism was estab-
lished by Parties at the COP16 in 2010 “to facilitate the implementation 
of enhanced action on technology development and transfer, to sup-
port action on mitigation and adaptation, in order to achieve the full 
implementation of the Convention” (UNFCCC). For agriculture, Burney 
et al., (2010) indicated that investment in yield improvements compared 
favourably with other commonly proposed mitigation strategies.
Additionally, adaptation measures in agriculture can also generate 
significant mitigation effects. Lobell et  al. (2013) investigated the 
co-benefits of adaptation measures on farm level that reduced GHG 
emissions from LUC. The study focused on investments in research 
for developing and deploying new technologies (e. g., disease-resis-
tant or drought-tolerant crops, or soil-management techniques). It 
concluded that broad-based efforts to adapt agriculture to climate 
change have mitigation co-benefits that are associated with lower 
costs than many activities focusing on mitigation, especially in devel-
oped countries.
11.11 Gaps in  knowledge 
and data
Data and knowledge gaps include:
•	 Improved global high-resolution data sets of crop production 
systems (including crop rotations, variety selection, fertilization 
practices, and tillage practices), grazing areas (including quality, 
intensity of use, management), and freshwater fisheries and aqua-
culture, also comprising subsistence farming.
•	 Globally standardized and homogenized data on soil as well as 
forest degradation and a better understanding of the effects of 
degradation on carbon balances and productivity.
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•	 Improved understanding of the mitigation potential, interplay, and 
costs as well as environmental and socio-economic consequences 
of land use-based mitigation options such as improved agricul-
tural management, forest conservation, bioenergy production, and 
afforestation on the national, regional, and global scale.
•	 Better understanding of the effect of changes in climate param-
eters, rising CO2 concentrations and N deposition on productivity 
and carbon stocks of different types of ecosystems, and the related 
consequences for land-based climate change mitigation potentials.
11.12 Frequently Asked 
Questions
FAQ 11�1 How much does AFOLU contribute 
to GHG emissions and how is this 
 changing?
Agriculture and land-use change, mainly deforestation of tropical for-
ests, contribute greatly to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions 
and are expected to remain important during the 21st century. Annual 
GHG emissions (mainly CH4 and N2O) from agricultural production in 
2000 – 2010 were estimated at 5.0 – 5.8 GtCO2eq / yr, comprising about 
10 – 12 % of global anthropogenic emissions. Annual GHG flux from 
land use and land-use change activities accounted for approximately 
4.3 – 5.5 GtCO2eq / yr, or about 9 – 11 % of total anthropogenic green-
house gas emissions. The total contribution of the AFOLU sector to 
anthropogenic emissions is therefore around one quarter of the global 
anthropogenic total.
FAQ 11�2 How will mitigation actions in AFOLU 
affect GHG emissions over different 
timescales?
There are many mitigation options in the AFOLU sector that are already 
being implemented, e. g., afforestation, reducing deforestation, crop-
land and grazing land management, fire management, and improved 
livestock breeds and diets. These can be implemented now. Others 
(such as some forms of biotechnology and livestock dietary additives) 
are still in development and may not be applicable for a number of 
years. In terms of the mode of action of the options, in common with 
other sectors, non-CO2 greenhouse gas emission reduction is immedi-
ate and permanent. However, a large portion of the mitigation poten-
tial in the AFOLU sector is carbon sequestration in soils and vegetation. 
This mitigation potential differs, in that the options are time-limited 
(the potential saturates), and the enhanced carbon stocks created are 
reversible and non-permanent. There is, therefore, a significant time 
component in the realization and the duration of much of the mitiga-
tion potential available in the AFOLU sector.
FAQ 11�3 What is the potential of the main 
 mitigation options in AFOLU for 
 reducing GHG emissions?
In general, available top-down estimates of costs and potentials sug-
gest that AFOLU mitigation will be an important part of a global cost-
effective abatement strategy. However, potentials and costs of these 
mitigation options differ greatly by activity, regions, system boundaries, 
and the time horizon. Especially, forestry mitigation options — includ-
ing reduced deforestation, forest management, afforestation, and 
agro-forestry — are estimated to contribute 0.2 – 13.8 GtCO2 / yr of 
economically viable abatement in 2030 at carbon prices up to 100 
USD / tCO2eq. Global economic mitigation potentials in agriculture in 
2030 are estimated to be up to 0.5 – 10.6 GtCO2eq / yr. Besides supply-
side-based mitigation, demand-side mitigation options can have a sig-
nificant impact on GHG emissions from food production. Changes in 
diet towards plant-based and hence less GHG-intensive food can result 
in GHG emission savings of 0.7 – 7.3 GtCO2eq / yr in 2050, depending 
on which GHGs and diets are considered. Reducing food losses and 
waste in the supply chain from harvest to consumption can reduce 
GHG emissions by 0.6 – 6.0 GtCO2eq / yr.
FAQ 11�4 Are there any co-benefits associated 
with mitigation actions in AFOLU?
In several cases, the implementation of AFOLU mitigation measures 
may result in an improvement in land management and there-
fore have socio-economic, health, and environmental benefits: For 
example, reducing deforestation, reforestation, and afforestation 
can improve local climatic conditions, water quality, biodiversity 
conservation, and help to restore degraded or abandoned land. Soil 
management to increase soil carbon sequestration may also reduce 
the amount of wind and water erosion due to an increase in surface 
cover. Further considerations on economic co-benefits are related to 
the access to carbon payments either within or outside the UNFCCC 
agreements and new income opportunities especially in developing 
countries (particularly for labour-intensive mitigation options such as 
afforestation).
FAQ 11�5 What are the barriers to reducing 
 emissions in AFOLU and how can these 
be overcome?
There are many barriers to emission reduction. Firstly, mitigation prac-
tices may not be implemented for economic reasons (e. g., market 
failures, need for capital investment to realize recurrent savings), or a 
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range of factors including risk-related, political / bureaucratic, logistical, 
and educational / societal barriers. Technological barriers can be over-
come by research and development; logistical and political / bureau-
cratic barriers can be overcome by better governance and institutions; 
education barriers can be overcome through better education and 
extension networks; and risk-related barriers can be overcome, for 
example, through clarification of land tenure uncertainties.
11.13 Appendix  Bioenergy: 
 Climate effects, 




SRREN (IPCC, 2011) provided a comprehensive overview on bioenergy 
(Chum et  al., 2011). However, a specific bioenergy Appendix in the 
context of the WGIII AR5 contribution is necessary because (1) many 
of the more stringent mitigation scenarios (resulting in 450 ppm, but 
also 550 ppm CO2eq concentration by 2100, see Section 11.9.1) heav-
ily rely on a large-scale deployment of bioenergy with carbon dioxide 
capture and storage (BECCS); (2) there has been a large body of lit-
erature published since SRREN, which complements and updates the 
analysis presented in this last report; (3) bioenergy is important for 
many chapters (Chapters 6; 7; 8; 10; 11), which makes it more use-
ful to treat it in a single section instead of in many scattered chapter 
sections throughout the report. Chapter 11 is the appropriate location 
for the Appendix, as bioenergy analysis relies crucially on land-use 
assessments.
Bioenergy is energy derived from biomass, which can be deployed 
as solid, liquid, and gaseous fuels for a wide range of uses, includ-
ing transport, heating, electricity production, and cooking (Chum et al., 
2011). Bioenergy has a significant mitigation potential, but there are 
issues to consider, such as the sustainability of practices and the effi-
ciency of bioenergy systems (Chum et al., 2011). Bioenergy systems can 
cause both positive and negative effects and their deployment needs 
to balance a range of environmental, social, and economic objectives 
that are not always fully compatible. The consequences of bioenergy 
implementation depend on (1) the technology used; (2) the location, 
scales, and pace of implementation; (3) the land category used (for-
est, grassland, marginal lands, and crop lands); and (4) the business 
models and practices adopted — including how these integrate with or 
displace the existing land use.
As an update to the SRREN, this report presents (1) a more fine-grained 
assessment of the technical bioenergy potential reflecting diverse per-
spectives in the literature; (2) recent potential estimates on techno-
logical solutions such as BECCS; (3) an in-depth description of differ-
ent lifecycle emission accounting methods and their results; (4) a small 
increase in uncertainty on the future economic bioenergy potential; (5) 
a comprehensive assessment of diverse livelihood and sustainability 
effects of bioenergy deployment, identifying the need for systematic 
aggregation.
11�13�2 Technical bioenergy potential
The technical bioenergy potential, also known as the technical pri-
mary biomass potential for bioenergy, is the amount of the theoretical 
bioenergy output obtainable by full implementation of demonstrated 
technologies or practices (IPCC, 2011). Unfortunately there is no 
standard methodology to estimate the technical bioenergy potential, 
which leads to diverging estimates. Most of the recent studies estimat-
ing technical bioenergy potentials assume a ‘food / fibre first principle’ 
and exclude deforestation, eventually resulting in an estimate of the 
‘environmentally sustainable bioenergy potential’ when a comprehen-
sive range of environmental constraints is considered (Batidzirai et al., 
2012).
Recently published estimates that are based in this extended defini-
tion of global technical bioenergy potentials in 2050 span a range of 
almost three orders of magnitude, from < 50 EJ / yr to > 1,000 EJ / yr 
(Smeets et al., 2007; Field et al., 2008; Haberl et al., 2010; Batidzirai 
et al., 2012). For example, Chum et al. reported global technical bioen-
ergy potentials of 50 – 500 EJ / yr for the year 2050 (IPCC, 2011), and the 
Global Energy Assessment gave a range of 160 – 270 EJ / yr (Johansson 
et al., 2012). The discussion following the publication of these global 
reports has not resulted in a consensus on the magnitude of the future 
global technical bioenergy potential, but has helped to better under-
stand some of its many structural determinants (Wirsenius et al., 2011; 
Berndes, 2012; Erb et  al., 2012a). How much biomass for energy is 
technically available in the future depends on the evolution of a mul-
titude of social, political, and economic factors, e. g., land tenure and 
regulation, trade, and technology (Dornburg et al., 2010).
Figure 11.20 shows estimates of the global technical bioenergy poten-
tial in 2050 by resource categories. Ranges were obtained from assess-
ing a large number of studies based on a food / fibre first principle and 
various restrictions regarding resource limitations and environmental 
concerns but no explicit cost considerations (Hoogwijk et  al., 2005; 
Smeets et al., 2007; Smeets and Faaij, 2007; van Vuuren et al., 2009; 
Hakala et al., 2009; Dornburg et al., 2010; Haberl et al., 2010, 2011a; 
Gregg and Smith, 2010; Chum et al., 2011; GEA, 2012; Rogner et al., 
2012). Most studies agree that the technical bioenergy potential in 
2050 is at least approximately 100 EJ / yr with some modelling assump-
tions leading to estimates exceeding 500 EJ / yr (Smeets et al., 2007). As 
stated, different views about sustainability and socio-ecological con-
straints lead to very different estimates, with some studies reporting 
much lower figures.
871
Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU)
11
Chapter 11
As shown in Figure 11.20, the total technical bioenergy potential is 
composed of several resource categories that differ in terms of their 
absolute potential, the span of the ranges — which also reflect the 
relative agreement / disagreement in the literature — and the implica-
tions of utilizing them. Regional differences — which are not addressed 
here — are also important as the relative size of each biomass resource 
within the total potential and its absolute magnitude vary widely 
across countries and world regions.
Forest and Agriculture residues� Forest residues (Smeets and Faaij, 
2007; Smeets et al., 2007; Dornburg et al., 2010; Haberl et al., 2010; 
Gregg and Smith, 2010; Rogner et al., 2012) include residues from silvi-
cultural thinning and logging; wood processing residues such as saw-
dust, bark, and black liquor; and dead wood from natural disturbances, 
such as storms and insect outbreaks (irregular source). The use of these 
resources is in general beneficial and any adverse side-effects can be 
mitigated by controlling residue removal rates considering biodiversity, 
climate, topography, and soil factors. There is a near-term tradeoff, par-
ticularly within temperate and boreal regions, in that organic matter 
retains organic C for longer if residues are left to decompose slowly 
instead of being used for energy. Agricultural residues (Smeets et al., 
2007; Hakala et al., 2009; Haberl et al., 2010, 2011a; Gregg and Smith, 
2010; Chum et al., 2011; Rogner et al., 2012) include manure, harvest 
residues (e. g., straw), and processing residues (e. g., rice husks from 
rice milling) and are also in general beneficial. However, mitigating 
potential adverse side-effects — such as the loss of soil C — associated 
to harvesting agriculture residues is more complex as they depend on 
the different crops, climate, and soil conditions (Kochsiek and Knops, 
2012; Repo et  al., 2012). Alternative uses of residues (bedding, use 
as fertilizer) need to be considered. Residues have varying collection 
and processing costs (in both agriculture and forestry) depending on 
residue quality and dispersal, with secondary residues often having the 
benefits of not being dispersed and having relatively constant qual-
ity. Densification and storage technologies would enable cost-effective 
collections over larger areas. Optimization of crop rotation for food 
and bioenergy output and the use of residues in biogas plants may 
result in higher bioenergy yields from residues without food-energy 
competition.
Optimal forest harvesting is defined as the fraction of sustainable 
harvest levels (often set equal to net annual increment) in forests 
available for wood extraction, which is additional to the projected bio-
mass demand for producing other forest products. This includes both 
biomass suitable for other uses (e. g., pulp and paper production) and 
biomass that is not used commercially (Smeets and Faaij, 2007; Chum 
et al., 2011). The resource potential depends on both environmental 
and socio-economic factors. For example, the change in forest man-
agement and harvesting regimes due to bioenergy demand depends 
on forest ownership and the structure of the associated forest indus-
try. Also, the forest productivity — and C stock — response to changes 
in forest management and harvesting depends on the character of 
the forest ecosystem, as shaped by historic forest management and 
events such as fires, storms, and insect outbreaks, but also on the 
management scheme (e. g., including replanting after harvest, soil 
protection, recycling of nutrients, and soil types (Jonker et al., 2013; 
Lamers et al., 2013). In particular, optimizing forest management for 
mitigation is a complex issue with many uncertainties and still sub-
ject to scientific debate. Intensive forest management activities of the 
early- to mid-twentieth century as well as other factors such as recov-
ery from past overuse, have led to strong forest C sinks in many OECD 
regions (Pan et al., 2011; Loudermilk et al., 2013; Nabuurs et al., 2013; 
Erb et al., 2013). However, the capacity of these sinks is being reduced 
as forests approach saturation (Smith, 2005; Körner, 2006; Guldea 
et al., 2008; Nabuurs et al., 2013; Sections 11.2.3, 11.3.2). Active for-
est management, including management for bioenergy, is therefore 
important for sustaining the strength of the forest carbon sink well 
into the future (Nabuurs et  al., 2007, 2013; Canadell and Raupach, 
2008; Ciais et  al., 2008), although countries should realize that for 
some old forest areas, conserving carbon stocks may be preferential, 
and that the actively managed forests may for some time (decades) 
act as sources.
Organic wastes include waste from households and restaurants, 
discarded wood products such as paper, construction, and demolition 
wood waste, and waste waters suitable for anaerobic biogas produc-
tion (Haberl et al., 2010; Gregg and Smith, 2010). Organic waste may 
be dispersed and also heterogeneous in quality but the health and 
environmental gains from collection and proper management through 
 
Figure 11�20 | Global Technical Bioenergy Potential by main resource category for the 
year 2050 | The figure shows the ranges in the estimates by major resource category of 
the global technical bioenergy potential. The color grading is intended to show quali-
tatively the degree of agreement in the estimates, from blue (large agreement in the 
literature) to purple (medium agreement) to red (small agreement). In addition, reduc-
ing traditional biomass demand by increasing its use efficiency could release the saved 
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Detailed country studies have estimated the fraction of non-renewable 
biomass from traditional bioenergy use to vary widely, e. g., from 1.6 % 
for the Democratic Republic of Congo to 73 % for Burundi (CDM-SSC 
WG, 2011) with most countries in the range between 10 – 30 % (i. e., 
meaning that 70 – 90 % of total traditional bioenergy use is managed 
sustainably). Thus a fraction of the traditional biomass saved through 
better technology, should not be used for other energy purposes but 
simply not consumed to help restore the local ecosystems.
11�13�3 Bioenergy conversion: technologies and 
management practices
Numerous conversion technologies can transform biomass to heat, 
power, liquid, and gaseous fuels for use in the residential, industrial, 
transport, and power sectors (see Chum et al., 2011; GEA, 2012) for a 
comprehensive coverage of each alternative, and Figure 11.21 for the 
pathways concerning liquid and gaseous fuels). Since SRREN, the 
major advances in the large-scale production of bioenergy include the 
increasing use of hybrid biomass-fossil fuel systems. For example, cur-
rent commercial coal and biomass co-combustion technologies are the 
lowest-cost technologies for implementing renewable energy policies, 
enabled by the large-scale pelletized feedstocks trade (REN21, 2013; 
Junginger et al., 2014). Direct biopower use is also increasing commer-
cially on a global scale (REN21, 2013, p. 21). In fact, using biomass for 
electricity and heat, for example, co-firing of woody biomass with coal 
in the near term and large heating systems coupled with networks for 
district heating, and biochemical processing of waste biomass, are 
among the most cost-efficient and effective biomass applications for 
GHG emission reduction in modern pathways (Sterner and Fritsche, 
2011). 
Integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) technologies for co-
production of electricity and liquid fuels from coal and biomass with 
higher efficiency than current commercial processes are in demonstra-
tion phase to reduce cost (Williams et  al., 2011; GEA, 2012; Larson 
et al., 2012). Coupling of biomass and natural gas for fuels is another 
option for liquid fuels (Baliban et al., 2013) as the biomass gasification 
technology development progresses. Simulations suggest that inte-
grated gasification facilities are technically feasible (with up to 50 % 
biomass input; Meerman et  al., 2011), and economically attractive 
with a CO2 price of about 66 USD2010 / tCO2 (50 EUR2010 / tCO2) (Meerman 
et al., 2012). Many gasification technology developments around the 
world are in pilot, demonstration, operating first commercial scale for 
a variety of applications (see examples in Bacovsky et al., 2013; Balan 
et al., 2013). 
Many pathways and feedstocks (Figure 11.21) can lead to biofuels for 
aviation. The development of biofuel standards started and enabled 
testing of 50 % biofuel in jet fuel for commercial domestic and trans-
atlantic flights by consortia of governments, aviation industry, and 
associations (IEA, 2010; REN21, 2013). Advanced ‘drop in’ fuels, such 
as iso-butanol, synthetic aviation kerosene from biomass gasification 
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combustion or anaerobic digestion can be significant. Competition 
with alternative uses of the wastes may limit this resource potential.
Dedicated biomass plantations include annual (cereals, oil, and 
sugar crops) and perennial plants (e. g., switchgrass, Miscanthus) and 
tree plantations (both coppice and single-stem plantations (e. g., wil-
low, poplar, eucalyptus, pine; (Hoogwijk et  al., 2005, 2009; Smeets 
et al., 2007; van Vuuren et al., 2009; Dornburg et al., 2010; Wicke et al., 
2011b; Haberl et al., 2011a). The range of estimates of technical bio-
energy potentials from that resource in 2050 is particularly large (< 50 
to >  500 EJ / yr). Technical bioenergy potentials from dedicated bio-
mass plantations are generally calculated by multiplying (1) the area 
deemed available for energy crops by (2) the yield per unit area and 
year (Batidzirai et al., 2012; Coelho et al., 2012). Some studies have 
identified a sizable technical potential (up to 100 EJ) for bioenergy pro-
duction using marginal and degraded lands (e. g., saline land) that are 
currently not in use for food production or grazing (Nijsen et al., 2012). 
However, how much land is really unused and available is contested 
(Erb et al., 2007; Haberl et al., 2010; Coelho et al., 2012). Contrasting 
views on future technical bioenergy potentials from dedicated biomass 
plantations can be explained by differences in assumptions regarding 
feasible future agricultural crop yields, livestock feeding efficiency, 
land availability for energy crops and yields of energy crops (Dornburg 
et al., 2010; Batidzirai et al., 2012; Erb et al., 2012a). Most scientists 
agree that increases in food crop yields and higher feeding efficiencies 
and lower consumption of animal products results in higher techni-
cal bioenergy potential. Also, there is a large agreement that careful 
policies for implementation focused on land-use zoning approaches 
(including nature conservation and biodiversity protection), multifunc-
tional land use, integration of food and energy production, avoidance 
of detrimental livelihood impacts, e. g., on livestock grazing and subsis-
tence farming, and consideration of equity issues, and sound manage-
ment of impacts on water systems are crucial for sustainable solutions.
Reduced traditional biomass demand� A substantial quantity of 
biomass will become available for modern applications by improving 
the end-use efficiency of traditional biomass consumption for energy, 
mostly in households but also within small industries (such as char-
coal kilns, brick kilns, etc.). Traditional bioenergy represents approxi-
mately 15 % of total global energy use and 80 % of current bioenergy 
use (≈35 EJ / yr) and helps meeting the cooking needs of ~2.6 billion 
people (Chum et al., 2011; IEA, 2012b). Traditional bioenergy use cov-
ers several end-uses including cooking, water, and space heating, and 
small-industries (such as brick and pottery kilns, bakeries, and many 
others). Cooking is the dominant end use; it is mostly done in open 
fires and rudimentary stoves, with approximately 10 – 20 % conversion 
efficiency, leading to very high primary energy consumption. Advanced 
woodburning and biogas stoves can potentially reduce biomass fuel 
consumption by 60 % or more (Jetter et al., 2012) and further lower 
the atmospheric radiative forcing, reducing CO2 emissions, and in many 
cases black carbon emissions, by up to 90 % (Anenberg et al., 2013). 
Assuming that actual savings reach on average 30 – 60 % of current 
consumption, the total bioenergy potential from reducing traditional 
bioenergy demand can be estimated at 8 – 18 EJ / yr. An unknown frac-
tion of global traditional biomass is consumed in a non-environmen-
tally sustainable way, leading to forest degradation and deforestation. 
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Detailed country studies have estimated the fraction of non-renewable 
biomass from traditional bioenergy use to vary widely, e. g., from 1.6 % 
for the Democratic Republic of Congo to 73 % for Burundi (CDM-SSC 
WG, 2011) with most countries in the range between 10 – 30 % (i. e., 
meaning that 70 – 90 % of total traditional bioenergy use is managed 
sustainably). Thus a fraction of the traditional biomass saved through 
better technology, should not be used for other energy purposes but 
simply not consumed to help restore the local ecosystems.
11�13�3 Bioenergy conversion: technologies and 
management practices
Numerous conversion technologies can transform biomass to heat, 
power, liquid, and gaseous fuels for use in the residential, industrial, 
transport, and power sectors (see Chum et al., 2011; GEA, 2012) for a 
comprehensive coverage of each alternative, and Figure 11.21 for the 
pathways concerning liquid and gaseous fuels). Since SRREN, the 
major advances in the large-scale production of bioenergy include the 
increasing use of hybrid biomass-fossil fuel systems. For example, cur-
rent commercial coal and biomass co-combustion technologies are the 
lowest-cost technologies for implementing renewable energy policies, 
enabled by the large-scale pelletized feedstocks trade (REN21, 2013; 
Junginger et al., 2014). Direct biopower use is also increasing commer-
cially on a global scale (REN21, 2013, p. 21). In fact, using biomass for 
electricity and heat, for example, co-firing of woody biomass with coal 
in the near term and large heating systems coupled with networks for 
district heating, and biochemical processing of waste biomass, are 
among the most cost-efficient and effective biomass applications for 
GHG emission reduction in modern pathways (Sterner and Fritsche, 
2011). 
Integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) technologies for co-
production of electricity and liquid fuels from coal and biomass with 
higher efficiency than current commercial processes are in demonstra-
tion phase to reduce cost (Williams et  al., 2011; GEA, 2012; Larson 
et al., 2012). Coupling of biomass and natural gas for fuels is another 
option for liquid fuels (Baliban et al., 2013) as the biomass gasification 
technology development progresses. Simulations suggest that inte-
grated gasification facilities are technically feasible (with up to 50 % 
biomass input; Meerman et  al., 2011), and economically attractive 
with a CO2 price of about 66 USD2010 / tCO2 (50 EUR2010 / tCO2) (Meerman 
et al., 2012). Many gasification technology developments around the 
world are in pilot, demonstration, operating first commercial scale for 
a variety of applications (see examples in Bacovsky et al., 2013; Balan 
et al., 2013). 
Many pathways and feedstocks (Figure 11.21) can lead to biofuels for 
aviation. The development of biofuel standards started and enabled 
testing of 50 % biofuel in jet fuel for commercial domestic and trans-
atlantic flights by consortia of governments, aviation industry, and 
associations (IEA, 2010; REN21, 2013). Advanced ‘drop in’ fuels, such 
as iso-butanol, synthetic aviation kerosene from biomass gasification 
or upgrading of pyrolysis liquids, can be derived through a number 
of possible conversion routes such as hydro treatment of vegetable 
oils, iso-butanol, and Fischer-Tropsch synthesis from gasification of 
biomass (Hamelinck and Faaij, 2006; Bacovsky et al., 2010; Meerman 
et al., 2011, 2012; Rosillo-Calle et  al., 2012); see also Chapter 8). In 
specific cases, powering electric cars with electricity from biomass has 
higher land-use efficiency and lower global-warming potential (GWP) 
effects than the usage of bioethanol from biofuel crops for road trans-
port across a range of feedstocks, conversion technologies, and vehicle 
classes (Campbell et  al., 2009; Schmidt et  al., 2011)13, though costs 
are likely to remain prohibitive for considerable time (van Vliet et al., 
2011a; b; Schmidt et al., 2011).
The number of routes from biomass to a broad range of biofuels, 
shown in Figure 11.21, includes hydrocarbons connecting today’s fos-
sil fuels industry in familiar thermal / catalytic routes such as gasifica-
tion (Williams et al., 2011; Larson et al., 2012) and pyrolysis (Brown 
et  al., 2011; Bridgwater, 2012; Elliott, 2013; Meier et  al., 2013). In 
addition, advances in genomic technology, the emphasis in systems 
approach, and the integration between engineering, physics, chem-
istry, and biology bring together many new approaches to biomass 
conversion (Liao and Messing, 2012) such as (1) biomolecular engi-
neering (Li et al., 2010; Favaro et al., 2012; Peralta-Yahya et al., 2012; 
Lee et  al., 2013; Yoon et  al., 2013); (2) deconstruction of lignocellu-
losic biomass through combinations of mild thermal and biochemi-
cal routes in multiple sequential or consolidated steps using similar 
biomolecular engineering tools (Rubin, 2008; Chundawat et al., 2011; 
Beckham et al., 2012; Olson et al., 2012; Tracy et al., 2012; Saddler and 
Kumar, 2013; Kataeva et al., 2013); and (3) advances in (bio)catalysis 
and basic understanding of the synthesis of cellulose are leading to 
routes for many fuels and chemicals under mild conditions (Serrano-
Ruiz et al., 2010; Carpita, 2012; Shen et al., 2013; Triantafyllidis et al., 
2013; Yoon et al., 2013). Fundamental understanding of biofuel pro-
duction increased for microbial genomes by forward engineering of 
cyanobacteria, microalgae, aiming to arrive at minimum genomes for 
synthesis of biofuels or chemicals (Chen and Blankenship, 2011; Eckert 
et  al., 2012; Ungerer et  al., 2012; Jones and Mayfield, 2012; Kontur 
et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2013).
Bioenergy coupled with CCS (Spath and Mann, 2004; Liu et al., 2010) 
is seen as an option to mitigate climate change through negative emis-
sions if CCS can be successfully deployed (Cao and Caldeira 2010; 
Lenton and Vaughan 2009). BECCS features prominently in long-run 
mitigation scenarios (Sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.5) for two reasons: (1) The 
potential for negative emissions may allow shifting emissions in time; 
and (2) in scenarios, negative emissions from BECCS compensate for 
residual emissions in other sectors (most importantly transport) in the 
second half of the 21st century. As illustrated in Figure 11.22, BECCS 
is markedly different than fossil CCS because it not only reduces CO2 
emissions by storing C in long-term geological sinks, but it continu-
13 Biomass can be used for electric transport and biofuels within one pathway 
(Macedo et al., 2008)
 
















































Figure 11�22 | Illustration of the sum of CO2eq (GWP100)* emissions from the process chain of alternative transport and power generation technologies both with and without 
CCS. (*Differences in C-density between forest biomass and switchgrass are taken into account but not calorific values (balance-of-plant data are for switchgrass, ref. Larson et al., 
2012). Specific emissions vary with biomass feedstock and conversion technology combinations, as well as lifecycle GHG calculation boundaries. For policy relevant purposes, 
counterfactual and market-mediated aspects (e. g., iLUC), changes in soil organic carbon, or changes in surface albedo need also to be considered, possibly leading to significantly 
different outcomes, quantitatively (Section 11.13.4, Figures 11.23 and 11.24). Unit: gCO2eq / MJEl (left y-axis, electricity); gCO2eq / MJ combusted (right y-axis, transport fuels). Direct 
CO2 emissions from energy conversion (‘vented’ and ‘stored’) are adapted from the mean values in Tables 12.7, 12.8, and 12.15 of ref. [1], which are based on the work of refs. 
[2, 3], and characterized with the emission metrics in ref. [4]. Impacts upstream in the supply chain associated with feedstock procurement (i. e., sum of GHGs from mining / cultiva-
tion, transport, etc.) are adapted from refs. [5, 6] and Figure 11.23 (median values). 
1Larson, et al. (2012); 2Woods, et al., (2007) ; 3Liu et al. (2010); 4Guest et al. (2013); 5Turconi et al. (2013); 6Jaramillo et al. (2008)
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ally sequesters CO2 from the air through regeneration of the biomass 
resource feedstock.
BECCS deployment is in the development and exploration stages. The 
most relevant BECCS project is the ‘Illinois Basin — Decatur Project’ 
that is projected to inject 1 MtCO2 / yr (Gollakota and McDonald, 2012; 
Senel and Chugunov, 2013). In the United States, two ethanol fuel pro-
duction by fermentation facilities are currently integrated commercially 
with carbon dioxide capture, pipeline transport, and use in enhanced 
oil recovery in nearby facilities at a rate of about 0.2 MtCO2 / yr (DiP-
ietro et  al., 2012). Altogether, there are 16 global BECCS projects in 
exploration stage (Karlsson and Byström, 2011).
Critical to overall CO2 storage is the realization of a lignocellulosic 
biomass supply infrastructure for large-scale commodity feedstock 
production and efficient advanced conversion technologies at scale; 
both benefit from cost reductions and technological learning as does 
the integrated system with CCS, with financial and institutional con-
ditions that minimize the risks of investment and facilitate dissemi-
nation (Eranki and Dale, 2011; IEA, 2012c, 2013). Integrated analy-
sis is needed to capture system and knock-on effects for bioenergy 
potentials. A nascent feedstock infrastructure for densified biomass 
trading globally could indicate decreased pressure on the need for 
closely co-located storage and production (IEA, 2011; Junginger 
et al., 2014).
The overall technical potential is estimated to be around 10 GtCO2 
storage per year for both Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle 
(IGCC)-CCS co-firing (IGCC with co-gasification of biomass), and Bio-
mass Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (BIGCC)-CCS dedicated, 
and around 6 GtCO2 storage for biodiesel based on gasification and 
Fischer-Tropsch synthesis (FT diesel), and 2.7 GtCO2 for biomethane 
production (Koornneef et al., 2012, 2013). Another study estimates the 
potential capacity (similar to technical potential) to be between 2.4 
and 10 GtCO2 per year for 2030 – 2050 (McLaren, 2012). The economic 
potential, at a CO2 price of around 70 USD / t is estimated to be around 
3.3 GtCO2, 3.5 GtCO2, 3.1 GtCO2 and 0.8 GtCO2 in the corresponding 
four cases, judged to be those with highest economic potential (Koorn-
neef et  al., 2012, 2013). Potentials are assessed on a route-by-route 
basis and cannot simply be added, as they may compete and substitute 
each other. Practical figures might be not much higher than 2.4 GtCO2 
per year at 70 – 250 USD / tCO2 (McLaren, 2012). Altogether, until 2050, 
the economic potential is anywhere between 2 – 10 GtCO2 per year. 
Some climate stabilization scenarios see considerable higher deploy-
ment towards the end of the century, even in some 580 – 650 ppm sce-
narios, operating under different time scales, socioeconomic assump-
tions, technology portfolios, CO2 prices, and interpreting BECCS as part 
of an overall mitigation framework (e. g., Rose et  al., 2012; Kriegler 
et al., 2013; Tavoni and Socolow, 2013).
Possible climate risks of BECCS relate to reduction of land carbon 
stock, feasible scales of biomass production and increased N2O emis-
sions, and potential leakage of CO2, which has been stored in deep 
geologic reservoirs (Rhodes and Keith, 2008). The assumptions of suf-
ficient spatially appropriate CCS capture, pipeline, and storage infra-
structure are uncertain. The literature highlights that BECCS as well as 
CCS deployment is dependent on strong financial incentives, as they 
are not cost competitive otherwise (Sections 7.5.5; 7.6.4; 7.9; 7.12).
Figure 11.22 illustrates some GHG effects associated with BECCS 
pathways. Tradeoffs between CO2 capture rate and feedstock conver-
sion efficiency are possible. Depicted are pathways with the highest 
removal rate but not necessarily with the highest feedstock conver-
sion rate. Among all BECCS pathways, those based on integrated gas-
ification combined cycle produce most significant geologic storage 
potential from biomass, alone (shown in Figure 11.23, electricity) or 
coupled with coal. Fischer-Tropsch diesel fuel production with biomass 
as feedstock and CCS attached to plant facilities could enable BECCS 
for transport; uncertainties in input factors, and output metrics warrant 
further research (van Vliet et  al., 2009). Fischer-Tropsch diesel would 
also allow net removal but at lower rates than BIGCC.
Economics of scale in power plant size are crucial to improve economic 
viability of envisaged BECCS projects. Increasing power plant size 
requires higher logistic challenges in delivering biomass. 
Scales of 4,000 to 10,000 Mg / day needed for > 600 MW power plants 
could become feasible as the biomass feedstock supply logistic devel-
opment with manageable logistic costs if biomass is derived from 
high-yield monocrops; logistical costs are more challenging when bio-
mass is derived from residues (e. g., Argo et al., 2013; Junginger et al., 
2014). Large-scale biomass production with flexible integrated poly-
generation facilities for fuels and / or power can improve the techno-
economic performance, currently above market prices to become more 
economically competitive over time (Meerman et  al., 2011). In the 
future, increased operating experience of BECCS IGCC-CCS through 
technological improvements and learning could enable carbon neutral 
electricity and, in combination with CCS, could result in net removal of 
CO2 (Figure 11.22). BECCS is among the lowest cost CCS options for a 
number of key industrial sectors (Meerman et al., 2013). It should be 
noted that primary empiric cost and performance data for dedicated 
bioenergy plants are not yet available and needed for comprehensively 
assessing BECCS. The current status of CCS and on-going research 
issues are discussed in Sections 7.5.5 and 7.6.4. Social concerns con-
stitute a major barrier for implement demonstration and deployment 
projects. 
Integrated bio-refineries continue to be developed; for instance, 10 % 
of the ethanol or corresponding sugar stream goes into bio-products 
in Brazil (REN21, 2012) including making ethylene for polymers (IEA-
ETSAP and IRENA, 2013). Multi product bio-refineries could produce a 
wider variety of co-products to enhance the economics of the overall 
process, facilitating learning in the new industry (IEA, 2011); Lifecycle 
Analyses (LCAs) for these systems are complex (Pawelzik et al., 2013). 
876




Figure 11�23 | Direct CO2eq (GWP100) emissions from the process chain or land-use disturbances of major bioenergy product systems, not including impacts from LUC (see Figure 
11.24). The interpretation of values depends also on baseline assumption about the land carbon sink when appropriate and the intertemporal accounting frame chosen, and should 
also consider information from Figure 11.24. The lower and upper bounds of the bars represent the minimum and the maximum value reported in the literature. Whenever possible, 
peer-reviewed scientific literature published post SRREN is used (but results are comparable). Note that narrow ranges may be an artefact of the number of studies for a given case. 
Results are disaggregated in a manner showing the impact of Feedstock production (in gCO2eq / MJ lower heating value (LHV) of feedstock) and the contributions from end prod-
uct / conversion technology. Results from conversion into final energy products Heat, Power, and Transport fuels include the contribution from Feedstock production and are shown 
in gCO2eq / MJ of final product. For some pathways, additional site-specific climate forcing agents apply and are presented as separate values to be added or subtracted from the 
value indicated by the median in the Feedstock bar (dark grey). Final products are also affected by these factors, but this is not displayed here. References: Corn 1 – 7; Oil crops 1, 
8, 8 – 12; Crop residues 1, 4, 13 – 24; Sugarcane 2, 3, 5, 6, 25 – 27; Palm Oil 2, 3, 10, 28 – 31; Perennial grasses 1, 3, 11, 18, 22, 32 – 40; Short Rotation Woody Crops 1, 3, 6, 12, 22, 
33, 35, 37, 38, 41 – 53; Forestry 5, 6, 38, 49, 54 – 66; Biogas, open storage: 67 – 69; Biogas, closed storage 69 – 71; Waste cooking oil: 22, 72 – 74. Note that the biofuels technolo-
gies for transport from lignocellulosic feedstocks, short rotation woody crops, and crop residues, including collection and delivery, are developing so larger ranges are expected than 
for more mature commercial technologies such as sugarcane ethanol and waste cooking oil (WCO) biodiesel. The biogas electricity bar represents scenarios using LCAs to explore 
treating mixtures of a variety of lignocellulosic feedstocks (e. g., ensiled grain or agricultural residues or perennial grasses) with more easily biodegradable wastes (e. g., from animal 
husbandry), to optimize multiple outputs. Some of the scenarios assume CH4 leakage, which leads to very high lifecycle emissions.
1Gelfand et al. (2013); 2Nemecek et al. (2012); 3Hoefnagels et al. (2010); 4Kaufman et al. (2010); 5Cherubini et al. (2009); 6 Cherubini (2012); 7Wang et al. (2011b); 8Milazzo et al. 
(2013); 9Goglio et al. (2012); 10Stratton et al. (2011); 11Fazio and Monti (2011); 12Börjesson and Tufvesson (2011); 13Cherubini and Ulgiati (2010); 14Li et al. (2012); 15Luo et al. 
(2009); 16Gabrielle and Gagnaire (2008); 17Smith et al. (2012b); 18Anderson-Teixeira et al. (2009); 19Nguyen et al. (2013); 20Searcy and Flynn (2008); 21Giuntoli et al. (2013); 22Whita-
ker et al. (2010); 23Wang et al. (2013a); 24Patrizi et al. (2013); 25Souza et al. (2012a); 26Seabra et al. (2011); 27Walter et al. (2011); 28Choo et al. (2011); 29Harsono et al. (2012); 30Sian-
gjaeo et al. (2011); 31Silalertruksa and Gheewala (2012); 32Smeets et al. (2009b); 33Tiwary and Colls (2010); 34Wilson et al. (2011); 35Brandão et al. (2011); 36Cherubini and Jungmeier 
(2010); 37Don et al. (2012); 38Pucker et al. (2012); 39Monti et al. (2012); 40Bai et al. (2010); 41Bacenetti et al. (2012); 42Budsberg et al. (2012); 43González-García et al. (2012a); 
44González-García (2012b) ; 45Stephenson et al. (2010); 46Hennig and Gawor (2012);47Buonocore et al. (2012); 48Gabrielle et al. (2013); 49Dias and Arroja (2012); 50González-García 
et al. (2012b); 51Roedl (2010); 52Djomo et al. (2011); 53Njakou Djomo et al. (2013); 54McKechnie et al. (2011); 55Pa et al. (2012); 56Puettmann et al. (2010); 57Guest et al. (2011); 
58Valente et al. (2011); 59Whittaker et al. (2011); 60Bright and Strømman (2009); 61Felder and Dones (2007); 62Solli et al. (2009); 63Lindholm et al. (2011); 64Mallia and Lewis (2013); 
65Bright et al. (2010); 66Bright and Strømman (2010); 67Rehl et al. (2012); 68Blengini et al. (2011); 69Boulamanti et al. (2013); 70Lansche and Müller (2012); 71De Meester et al. (2012); 
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There are alternatives to land-based bioenergy. Microalgae, for exam-
ple, offer a high-end technical potential. However, it might be com-
promised by water supply, if produced in arid land, or by impacts on 
ocean ecosystems. To make microalgae cost competitive, maximizing 
algal lipid content (and then maximizing growth rate) requires techno-
logical breakthroughs (Davis et al., 2011a; Sun et al., 2011; Jonker and 
Faaij, 2013). The market potential depends on the co-use of products 
for food, fodder, higher value products, and fuel markets (Chum et al., 
2011). 
Similarly, lignocellulosic feedstocks produced from waste or residues, 
or grown on land unsupportive of food production (e. g., contaminated 
land for remediation as in previously mined land) have been suggested 
to reduce socio-environmental impact. In addition, lignocellulosic 
feedstocks can be bred specifically for energy purposes, and can be 
harvested by coupling collection and pre-processing (densification and 
others) in depots prior to final conversion, which could enable deliv-
ery of more uniform feedstocks throughout the year (Eranki and Dale, 
2011; U. S. DOE, 2011; Argo et al., 2013).
Various conversion pathways are in research and development (R&D), 
near commercialization, or in early deployment stages in several coun-
tries (see Section 2.6.3 in Chum et al., 2011). More productive land is 
also more economically attractive for cellulosic feedstocks, in which 
case competition with food production is more likely. Depending on 
the feedstock, conversion process, prior land use, and land demand, 
lignocellulosic bioenergy can be associated with high or low GHG 
emissions (e. g., Davis et al., 2011b). Improving agricultural lands and 
reducing non-point pollution emissions to watersheds remediate nitro-
gen run off and increase overall ecosystems’ health (Van Dam et al., 
2009a; b; Gopalakrishnan et  al., 2012). Also regeneration of saline 
lands by salt-tolerant tree and grass species can have a large potential 
on global scale as demonstrated by Wicke et al. (2011).
A range of agro-ecological options to improve agricultural practices 
such as no / low tillage conservation, agroforestry, etc., have potential 
to increase yields (e. g., in sub-Saharan Africa), while also providing a 
range of co-benefits such as increased soil organic matter. Such options 
require a much lower level of investment and inputs and are thus more 
readily applicable in developing countries, while also holding a low risk 
of increased GHG emissions (Keating et al., 2013).
Substantial progress has also been achieved in the last four years in 
small-scale bioenergy applications in the areas of technology inno-
vation, impact evaluation and monitoring, and in large-scale imple-
mentation programmes. For example, advanced combustion biomass 
cookstoves, which reduce fuel use by more than 60 % and hazardous 
pollutant as well as short-lived climate pollutants by up to 90 %, are 
now in the last demonstration stages or commercial (Kar et al., 2012; 
Anenberg et  al., 2013). Innovative designs include micro-gasifiers, 
stoves with thermoelectric generators to improve combustion efficiency 
and provide electricity to charge LED lamps while cooking, stoves with 
advanced combustion chamber designs, and multi-use stoves (e. g., 
cooking and water heating for bathing (Ürge-Vorsatz et  al., 2012; 
Anenberg et al., 2013). Biogas stoves, in addition to providing clean 
combustion, help reduce the health risks associated with the disposal 
of organic wastes. There has also been a boost in cookstove dissemi-
nation efforts ranging from regional (multi-country) initiatives (Wang 
et al., 2013b) to national, and project-level interventions. In total, more 
than 200 large-scale cookstove projects are in place worldwide, with 
several million efficient cookstoves installed each year (Cordes, 2011). 
A Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves has been launched that is pro-
moting the adoption of 100 million clean and efficient cookstoves per 
year by 2030 and several countries have launched National Cookstove 
Programs in recent years (e. g., Mexico, Peru, Honduras, and others). 
Many cookstove models are now manufactured in large-scale indus-
trial facilities using state-of-the-art materials and combustion design 
technology. Significant efforts are also in place to develop interna-
tional standards and regional stove testing facilities. In addition to pro-
viding tangible local health and other sustainable benefits, replacing 
traditional open fires with efficient biomass cookstoves has a global 
mitigation potential estimated to be between 0.6 and 2.4 GtCO2eq / yr 
(Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2012).
Small-scale decentralized biomass power generation systems based on 
biomass combustion and gasification and biogas production systems 
have the potential to meet the electricity needs of rural communities in 
the developing countries. The biomass feedstocks for these small-scale 
systems could come from residues of crops and forests, wastes from 
livestock production, and / or from small-scale energy plantations (Faaij, 
2006).
11�13�4 GHG emission estimates of bioenergy 
production systems
The combustion of biomass generates gross GHG emissions roughly 
equivalent to the combustion of fossil fuels. If bioenergy production 
is to generate a net reduction in emissions, it must do so by offset-
ting those emissions through increased net carbon uptake of biota and 
soils. The appropriate comparison is then between the net biosphere 
flux in the absence of bioenergy compared to the net biosphere flux in 
the presence of bioenergy production. Direct and indirect effects need 
to be considered in calculating these fluxes. 
Bioenergy systems directly influence local and global climate through 
(i) GHG emissions from fossil fuels associated with biomass produc-
tion, harvest, transport, and conversion to secondary energy carriers 
(von Blottnitz and Curran, 2007; van der Voet et al., 2010); (ii) CO2 and 
other GHG emissions from biomass or biofuel combustion (Cherubini 
et  al., 2011); (iii) atmosphere-ecosystem exchanges of CO2 following 
land disturbance (Berndes et al., 2013; Haberl, 2013); (iv) climate forc-
ing resulting from emissions of short-lived GHGs like black carbon and 
other chemically active gases (NOx, CO, etc.) (Tsao et al., 2012; Jetter 
et al., 2012); (v) climate forcing resulting from alteration of biophysi-
cal properties of the land surface affecting the surface energy balance 
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Figure 11�24 | Estimates of GHGLUC emissions — GHG emissions from biofuel production-induced LUC (as gCO2eq / MJfuel produced) over a 30-year time horizon organized by fuel(s), 
feedstock, and study. Assessment methods, LUC estimate types and uncertainty metrics are portrayed to demonstrate the diversity in approaches and differences in results within 
and across any given category. Points labeled ‘a’ on the Y-axis represent a commonly used estimate of lifecycle GHG emissions associated with the direct supply chain of petroleum 
gasoline (frame A) and diesel (frame B). These emissions are not directly comparable to GHGLUC because the emission sources considered are different, but are potentially of inter-
est for scaling comparison. Based on Warner et al. (2013). Please note: These estimates of global LUC are highly uncertain, unobservable, unverifiable, and dependent on assumed 
policy, economic contexts, and inputs used in the modelling. All entries are not equally valid nor do they attempt to measure the same metric despite the use of similar naming 
conventions (e. g., iLUC). In addition, many different approaches to estimating GHGLUC have been used. Therefore, each paper has its own interpretation and any comparisons should 
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(e. g., from changes in surface albedo, heat and water fluxes, surface 
roughness, etc.; (Bonan, 2008; West et  al., 2010a; Pielke Sr. et  al., 
2011); and (vi) GHGs from land management and perturbations to soil 
biogeochemistry, e. g., N2O from fertilizers, CH4, etc. (Cai, 2001; Allen 
et al., 2009). Indirect effects include the partial or complete substitu-
tion of fossil fuels and the indirect transformation of land use by equi-
librium effects. Hence, the total climate forcing of bioenergy depends 
on feedstock, site-specific climate and ecosystems, management con-
ditions, production pathways, end use, and on the interdependencies 
with energy and land markets. 
In contrast, bioenergy systems have often been assessed (e. g., in LCA 
studies, integrated models, policy directives, etc.) under the assump-
tion that the CO2 emitted from biomass combustion is climate neutral14 
because the carbon that was previously sequestered from the atmo-
sphere will be re-sequestered if the bioenergy system is managed sus-
tainably (Chum et al., 2011; Creutzig et al., 2012a; b). The shortcomings 
of this assumption have been extensively discussed in environmental 
impact studies and emission accounting mechanisms (Searchinger 
et al., 2009; Searchinger, 2010; Cherubini et al., 2011; Haberl, 2013).
Studies also call for a consistent and case-specific carbon stock / flux 
change accounting that integrates the biomass system with the 
global carbon cycle (Mackey et al., 2013). As shown in Chapter 8 of 
WGI (Myhre and Shindell, 2013) and (Plattner et al., 2009; Fuglestvedt 
et al., 2010), the climate impacts can be quantified at different points 
along a cause-effect chain, from emissions to changes in temperature 
and sea level rise. While a simple sum of the net CO2 fluxes over time 
can inform about the skewed time distribution between sources and 
sinks (‘C debt’; Marland and Schlamadinger, 1995; Fargione et  al., 
2008; Bernier and Paré, 2013), understanding the climate implication 
as it relates to policy targets (e. g., limiting warming to 2 °C) requires 
models and / or metrics that also include temperature effects and cli-
mate consequence (Smith et al., 2012c; Tanaka et al., 2013). While the 
warming from fossil fuels is nearly permanent as it persists for thou-
sands of years, direct impacts from renewable bioenergy systems cause 
a perturbation in global temperature that is temporary and even at 
14 The neutrality perception is linked to a misunderstanding of the guidelines for 
GHG inventories, e. g., IPCC — Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (2000) 
states “Biomass fuels are included in the national energy and carbon dioxide 
emissions accounts for informational purposes only. Within the energy module 
biomass consumption is assumed to equal its regrowth. Any departures from this 
hypothesis are counted within the Land Use Change and Forestry Model.” Carbon 
neutrality is valid if the countries account for LUC in their inventories for self-
produced bioenergy.
times cooling if terrestrial carbon stocks are not depleted (House et al., 
2002; Cherubini et al., 2013; Joos et al., 2013; Mackey et al., 2013). The 
direct, physical climate effects at various end-points need to be fully 
understood and characterized — despite the measurement challenges 
that some climate forcing mechanisms can entail (West et al., 2010b; 
Anderson-Teixeira et  al., 2012), and coherently embedded in mitiga-
tion policy scenarios along with the possible counterfactual effects. For 
example, in the specific case of existing forests that may continue to 
grow if not used for bioenergy, some studies employing counterfactual 
baselines show that forest bioenergy systems can temporarily have 
higher cumulative CO2 emissions than a fossil reference system (for a 
time period ranging from a few decades up to several centuries; (Repo 
et  al., 2011; Mitchell et  al., 2012; Pingoud et  al., 2012; Bernier and 
Paré, 2013; Guest et al., 2013; Helin et al., 2013; Holtsmark, 2013).
In some cases, cooling contributions from changes in surface albedo 
can mitigate or offset these effects (Arora and Montenegro, 2011; 
O’Halloran et al., 2012; Anderson-Teixeira et al., 2012; Hallgren et al., 
2013).
Accounting always depends on the time horizon adopted when assess-
ing climate change impacts, and the assumed baseline, and hence 
includes value judgements (Schwietzke et  al., 2011; Cherubini et  al., 
2013; Kløverpris and Mueller, 2013).
Two specific contributions to the climate forcing of bioenergy, not 
addressed in detail in SRREN include N2O and biogeophysical factors.
Nitrous oxide emissions: For first-generation crop-based biofuels, as 
with food crops (see Chapter 11), emissions of N2O from agricultural 
soils is the single largest contributor to direct lifecycle GHG emissions, 
and one of the largest contributors across many biofuel production 
cycles (Smeets et al., 2009a; Hsu et al., 2010). Emission rates can vary 
by as much as 700 % between different crop types for the same site, 
fertilization rate, and measurement period (Kaiser and Ruser, 2000; 
Don et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2012). Increased estimates of N2O emis-
sions alone can convert some biofuel systems from apparent net sinks 
to net sources (Crutzen et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2012c). Improvements 
in nitrogen use efficiency and nitrogen inhibitors can substantially 
reduce emissions of N2O (Robertson and Vitousek, 2009). For some 
specific crops, such as sugarcane, N2O emissions can be low (Macedo 
et  al., 2008; Seabra et  al., 2011) or high (Lisboa et  al., 2011). Other 
bioenergy crops require minimal or zero N fertilization and can reduce 
GHG emissions relative to the former land use where they replace con-
ventional food crops (Clair et al., 2008). 
 
Figure 11�24 | Estimates of GHGLUC emissions — GHG emissions from biofuel production-induced LUC (as gCO2eq / MJfuel produced) over a 30-year time horizon organized by fuel(s), 
feedstock, and study. Assessment methods, LUC estimate types and uncertainty metrics are portrayed to demonstrate the diversity in approaches and differences in results within 
and across any given category. Points labeled ‘a’ on the Y-axis represent a commonly used estimate of lifecycle GHG emissions associated with the direct supply chain of petroleum 
gasoline (frame A) and diesel (frame B). These emissions are not directly comparable to GHGLUC because the emission sources considered are different, but are potentially of inter-
est for scaling comparison. Based on Warner et al. (2013). Please note: These estimates of global LUC are highly uncertain, unobservable, unverifiable, and dependent on assumed 
policy, economic contexts, and inputs used in the modelling. All entries are not equally valid nor do they attempt to measure the same metric despite the use of similar naming 
conventions (e. g., iLUC). In addition, many different approaches to estimating GHGLUC have been used. Therefore, each paper has its own interpretation and any comparisons should 






LUC Estimate Type Assessment Method Uncertainty Bars




 Scenarios, Average LUC
 iLUC Factor
 Arithmetic Mean, Marginal LUC
 Switchgrass




  Causal Descriptive
  Optimization Modeling




















Soy Palm Rapeseed SunflowerJatropha
Yeh 2010 Unnasch 2009
(D) Petroleum Fuel
(GHG Emissions from
Land Disturbance Only) 
US EPA 2010 Fritsche 2010 US EPA 2010 Taheripouri 2013










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU)
11
Chapter 11
Biogeophysical factors: Land cover changes or land-use distur-
bances of the surface energy balance, such as surface albedo, sur-
face roughness, and evapotranspiration influence the climate system 
(Betts, 2001; Marland et al., 2003; Betts et  al., 2007; Bonan, 2008; 
Jackson et al., 2008; Mahmood et al., 2013). Perturbations to these 
can lead to both direct and indirect climate forcings whose impacts 
can differ in spatial extent (global and / or local) (Bala et  al., 2007; 
Davin et  al., 2007). Surface albedo is found to be the dominant 
direct biogeophysical climate impact mechanism linked to land 
cover change at the global scale, especially in areas with seasonal 
snow cover (Claussen et al., 2001; Bathiany et al., 2010), with radia-
tive forcing effects possibly stronger than those of the co-occuring 
C-cycle changes (Randerson et  al., 2006; Lohila et  al., 2010; Bright 
et  al., 2011; Cherubini et  al., 2012; O’Halloran et  al., 2012). Land 
cover changes can also affect other biogeophysical factors like 
evapotranspiration and surface roughness, which can have important 
local (Loarie et al., 2011; Georgescu et al., 2011) and global climatic 
consequences (Bala et al., 2007; Swann et al., 2010, 2011). Biogeo-
physical climate impacts from changes in land use are site-specific 
and show variations in magnitude across different geographic 
regions and biomes (Bonan, 2008; Anderson, 2010; Pielke Sr. et al., 
2011; Anderson-Teixeira et al., 2012). Biogeophysical impacts should 
be considered in climate impact assessments and in the design of 
land-use policies to adequately assess the net impacts of land-use 
mitigation options (Jackson et al., 2008; Betts, 2011; Arora and Mon-
tenegro, 2011) as their size may be comparable to impacts from 
changes to the C cycle. 
Figure 11.23 illustrates the range of lifecycle global direct climate 
impact (in g CO2 equivalents per MJ, after characterization with GWP 
time horizon=100 years) attributed to major global bioenergy products 
reported in the peer-reviewed literature after 2010. Results are broadly 
comparable to those of Chapter 2 in SRREN (Figures 2.10 and 2.11 in 
SRREN; Chum et al., 2011) Those figures displayed negative emissions, 
resulting from crediting emission reduction due to substitution effects. 
This appendix refrains from allocating credits to feedstocks to avoid 
double accounting.
Significant variation in the results reflects the wide range of conver-
sion technologies and the reported performances in addition to analyst 
assumptions affecting system boundary completeness, emission inven-
tory completeness, and choice of allocation method (among others). 
Additional ‘site-specific’ land-use considerations such as changes in soil 
organic carbon stocks (∆SOC), changes in surface albedo (∆albedo), 
and the skewed time distribution of terrestrial biogenic CO2 fluxes 
can either reduce or compound land-use impacts and are presented 
to exemplify that, for some bioenergy systems, these impacts can be 
greater in magnitude than lifecycle impacts from feedstock cultivation 
and bioenergy product conversion. ‘Site-specific’ land-use consider-
ations are geographically explicit and highly sensitive to background 
climate conditions, soil properties, biomass yields, and land manage-
ment regimes. The figure reveals that studies find very different values 
depending on the boundaries of analysis chosen, site-specific effects, 
and management methods. Nonetheless, it is clear that fuels from 
sugarcane, perennial grasses, crop residues, and waste cooking oil are 
more beneficial than other fuels (LUC emissions can still be relevant, 
see Figure 11.23). Another important result is that albedo effects and 
site-specific CO2 fluxes are highly variable for different forest systems 
and environmental conditions and determine the total climate forcing 
of bioenergy from forestry.
Direct and indirect land-use change: Direct land-use change 
occurs when bioenergy crops displace other crops or pastures or for-
ests, while iLUC results from bioenergy deployment triggering the 
conversion to cropland of lands, somewhere on the globe, to replace 
some portion of the displaced crops (Searchinger et al., 2008; Kløver-
pris et  al., 2008; Delucchi, 2010; Hertel et  al., 2010). Direct LUC to 
establish biomass cropping systems can increase the net GHG emis-
sions, for example, if carbon-rich ecosystems such as wetlands, for-
ests, or natural grasslands are brought into cultivation (Gibbs et al., 
2008; UNEP, 2009, p. 2009; Chum et al., 2011). Biospheric C losses 
associated with LUC from some bioenergy schemes can be, in some 
cases, more than hundred times larger than the annual GHG savings 
from the assumed fossil fuel replacement (Gibbs et al., 2008; Chum 
et  al., 2011). Impacts have been shown to be significantly reduced 
when a dynamic baseline includes future trends in global agricultural 
land use (Kløverpris and Mueller, 2013). Albeit at lower magnitude, 
beneficial LUC effects can also be observed, for example, when some 
semi-perennial crops, perennial grasses or woody plants replace 
annual crops grown with high fertilizer levels, or where such plants 
are produced on lands with carbon-poor soils (Tilman et  al., 2006; 
Harper et al., 2010; Sterner and Fritsche, 2011; Sochacki et al., 2012). 
In particular, Miscanthus improves soil organic carbon reducing over-
all GHG emissions (Brandão et  al., 2011); degraded USA Midwest 
land for economic agriculture, over a 20-year period, shows succes-
sional perennial crops without the initial carbon debt and indirect 
land-use costs associated with food-based biofuels (Gelfand et  al., 
2013). Palm oil, when grown on more marginal grasslands, can 
deliver a good GHG balance and net carbon storage in soil (Wicke 
et  al., 2008). Such lands represent a substantial potential for palm 
oil expansion in Indonesia without deforestation and draining peat 
lands (Wicke et al., 2011a).
In long-term rotation forests, the increased removal of biomass for 
bioenergy may be beneficial or not depending on the site-specific 
forest conditions (Cherubini et  al., 2012b). For long-term rotation 
biomass, the carbon debt (increased cumulative CO2 emissions for a 
duration in the order of a rotation cycle or longer) becomes increas-
ingly important (Schlamadinger and Marland, 1996; Marland and 
Schlamadinger, 1997; Fargione et  al., 2008; McKechnie et  al., 2011; 
Hudiburg et  al., 2011). Calculations of specific GHG emissions from 
long-term rotation forests need to account for the foregone CO2-accu-
mulation (Searchinger, 2010; Holtsmark, 2012; Pingoud et  al., 2012; 
Haberl et al., 2012). 
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If part of a larger forest is used as a feedstock for bioenergy while 
the overall forest carbon stock increases (the so-called landscape 
perspective), then the overall mitigation effects are positive, in par-
ticular over several harvesting cycles making use of the faster car-
bon sequestration rates of younger forests (Daigneault et al., 2012; 
Ximenes et al., 2012; Lamers and Junginger, 2013; Latta et al., 2013). 
Nabuurs et al. (2013) observe first signs of a carbon sink saturation 
in European forest biomass and suggest to focus less on the forest 
biomass sink strength but to consider a mitigation strategy that max-
imizes the sum of all the possible components: (1) carbon sequestra-
tion in forest biomass; (2) soil and wood products; and (3) the effects 
of material and energy substitution of woody biomass. In general, the 
use of easily decomposable residues and wastes for bioenergy can 
produce GHG benefits (Zanchi et al., 2012), similarly to increasing the 
biomass outtake from forests affected by high mortality rates (Lamers 
et  al., 2013), whereas the removal of slowly decomposing residues 
reduces soil carbon accumulation at a site and results in net emis-
sions (Repo et  al., 2011). The anticipation of future bioenergy mar-
kets may promote optimized forest management practices or affor-
estation of marginal land areas to establish managed plantations, 
thus contributing to increased forest carbon stocks (Sedjo and Tian, 
2012). Rather than leading to wide-scale loss of forest lands, growing 
markets for tree products can provide incentives for maintaining or 
increasing forest stocks and land covers, and improving forest health 
through management (Eisenbies et  al., 2009; Dale et  al., 2013). If 
managed to maximize CO2 storage rate over the long-term, long-term 
rotation forests offer low-cost mitigation options, in particular, when 
woody products keep carbon within the human-built environment 
over long time-scales (e. g., wood substituting for steel joist; (Lippke 
et al., 2011).
Indirect land-use change is difficult to ascertain because the magni-
tude of these effects must be modelled (Nassar et  al., 2011) raising 
important questions about model validity and uncertainty (Liska and 
Perrin, 2009; Plevin et al., 2010; Khanna et al., 2011; Gawel and Lud-
wig, 2011; Wicke et al., 2012) and policy implications (DeCicco, 2013; 
Finkbeiner, 2013; Plevin et  al., 2013). Available model-based studies 
have consistently found positive and, in some cases, high emissions 
from LUC and iLUC, mostly of first-generation biofuels (Figure 11.23), 
albeit with high variability and uncertainty in results (Hertel et  al., 
2010; Taheripour et al., 2011; Dumortier et al., 2011; Havlík et al., 2011; 
Chen et al., 2012; Timilsina et al., 2012; Warner et al., 2014). Causes 
of the great uncertainty include: incomplete knowledge on global 
economic dynamics (trade patterns, land-use productivity, diets, use 
of by-products, fuel prices, and elasticities); selection of specific poli-
cies modelled; and the treatment of emissions over time (O’Hare et al., 
2009; Khanna et al., 2011; Wicke et al., 2012). In addition, LUC mod-
elling philosophies and model structures and features (e. g., dynamic 
vs. static model) differ among studies. Variations in estimated GHG 
emissions from biofuel-induced LUC are also driven by differences 
in scenarios assessed, varying assumptions, inconsistent definitions 
across models (e. g., LUC, land type), specific selection of reference sce-
narios against which (marginal) LUC is quantified, and disparities in 
data availability and quality. The general lack of thorough sensitivity 
and uncertainty analysis hampers the evaluation of plausible ranges of 
estimates of GHG emissions from LUC. 
Wicke et al. (2012) identified the need to incorporate the impacts of 
iLUC prevention or mitigation strategies in future modelling efforts, 
including the impact of zoning and protection of carbon stocks, selec-
tive sourcing from low risk-areas, policies and investments to improve 
agricultural productivity, double cropping, agroforestry schemes, and 
the (improved) use of degraded and marginal lands (see Box 7.1). 
Indirect land-use change is mostly avoided in the modelled mitiga-
tion pathways in Chapter 6. The relatively limited fuel coverage in 
the literature precludes a complete set of direct comparisons across 
alternative and conventional fuels sought by regulatory bodies and 
researchers.
GHG emissions from LUC can be reduced, for instance through pro-
duction of bioenergy co-products that displace additional feedstock 
requirements, thus decreasing the net area needed (e. g., for corn, 
Wang et  al., 2011a; for wheat, Berndes et  al., 2011). Proper man-
agement of livestock and agriculture can lead to improved resource 
efficiency, lower GHG emissions, and lower land use while releas-
ing land for bioenergy production as demonstrated for Europe (de 
Wit et al., 2013) and Mozambique (van der Hilst et al., 2012b). For 
land transport, cellulosic biomass, such as Miscanthus, has been sug-
gested as a relatively low-carbon source for bioethanol that could 
be produced at scale, but only if iLUC can be avoided by not displac-
ing food and other commodities and if comprehensive national land 
management strategies are developed (e. g., Dornburg et al., 2010; 
Scown et al., 2012). Negative iLUC values are theoretically possible 
(RFA, 2008). Producing biofuels from wastes and sustainably har-
vested residues, and replacing first-generation biofuel feedstocks 
with lignocellulosic crops (e. g., grasses) would induce little or no 
iLUC (Davis et  al., 2011b; Scown et  al., 2012). While iLUC quanti-
fications remain uncertain, lower agricultural yields, land-intensive 
diets, and livestock feeding efficiencies, stronger climate impacts and 
higher energy crop production levels can result in higher LUC-related 
GHG emissions. Strong global and regional governance (forest pro-
tection, zoning), technological change in agriculture and biobased 
options, and high-yield bioenergy crops and use of residues and 
degraded land (if available) could all reduce iLUC (Van Dam et al., 
2009a; b; Wicke et al., 2009; Fischer et al., 2010; de Wit et al., 2011, 
2013; van der Hilst et al., 2012a; Rose et al., 2013). As with any other 
renewable fuel, bioenergy can replace or complement fossil fuel. 
The fossil fuel replacement effect, relevant when a global cap on 
CO2 emissions is absent, is discussed in Chapter 8.7. Indirect effects 
are not restricted to indirect GHG effects of production of biomass 
in agricultural systems; there are also indirect (market-mediated) 
effects of wood energy, but also effects in terms of biodiversity 
threats, environmental degradation, and external social costs, which 
are not considered here.
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11�13�5 Aggregate future potential deployment 
in integrated models
In SRREN scenarios (IPCC, 2011), bioenergy is projected to contribute 
80 – 190 EJ / yr to global primary energy supply by 2050 for 50 % of 
the scenarios in the two mitigation levels modelled. The min to max 
ranges were 20 – 265 EJ / yr for the less stringent scenarios and 25 – 300 
EJ for the tight mitigation scenarios (< 440 ppm). Many of these 
scenarios coupled bioenergy with CCS. The Global Energy Assessment 
(GEA, 2012) scenarios project 80 – 140 EJ by 2050, including extensive 
use of agricultural residues and second-generation bioenergy to try to 
reduce the adverse impacts on land use and food production, and the 
co-processing of biomass with coal or natural gas with CCS to make 
low net GHG-emitting transport fuels and or electricity. 
Traditional biomass demand is steady or declines in most scenarios 
from 34 EJ / yr. The transport sector increases nearly ten-fold from 2008 
to 18 – 20 EJ / yr while modern uses for heat, power, combinations, and 
industry increase by factors of 2 – 4 from 18 EJ in 2008 (Fischedick 
et al., 2011). The 2010 International Energy Agency (IEA) model proj-
ects a contribution of 12 EJ / yr (11 %) by 2035 to the transport sector, 
including 60 % of advanced biofuels for road and aviation. Bioenergy 
supplies 5 % of global power generation in 2035, up from 1 % in 2008. 
Modern heat and industry doubles their contributions from 2008 (IEA, 
2010). The future potential deployment level varies at the global and 
national level depending on the technological developments, land 
availability, financial viability, and mitigation policies. 
The WGIII AR5 transformation pathway studies suggest that modern 
bioenergy could play a significant role within the energy system (Sec-
tion 6.3.5) providing 5 to 95 EJ / yr in 2030, 10 to 245 EJ / yr in 2050, and 
105 to 325 EJ / yr in 2100 under idealized full implementation scenarios 
(see also Figure 7.12), with immediate, global, and comprehensive 
incentives for land-related mitigation options. The scenarios project 
increasing deployment of bioenergy with tighter climate change tar-
gets, both in a given year as well as earlier in time (see Figure 6.20). 
Models project increased dependence, as well as increased deploy-
ment, of modern bioenergy, with some models projecting 35 % of total 
primary energy from bioenergy in 2050, and as much as 50 % of total 
primary energy from modern bioenergy in 2100. Bioenergy’s share of 
regional total electricity and liquid fuels could be significant — up to 
35 % of global regional electricity from biopower by 2050, and up to 
70 % of global regional liquid fuels from biofuels by 2050. However, 
the cost-effective allocation of bioenergy within the energy system 
varies across models. Several sectoral studies, focusing on biophysical 
constraints, model assumptions (e. g., estimated increase in crop yields 
over large areas) and current observations, suggest to focus on the 
lower half of the ranges reported above (Field et al., 2008; Campbell 
et al., 2008; Johnston et al., 2009a, 2011; Haberl et al., 2013b).
BECCS features prominently in many mitigation scenarios. BECCS 
is deployed in greater quantities and earlier in time the more strin-
gent the climate policy (Section 6.3.5). Whether BECCS is essential for 
mitigation, or even sufficient, is unclear. In addition, the likelihood of 
BECCS deployment is difficult to evaluate and depends on safety con-
Box 11�9 | Examples of co-benefits from biofuel production
Brazilian sugar cane ethanol production provides six times more 
jobs than the Brazilian petroleum sector and spreads income bene-
fits across numerous municipalities (de Moraes et al., 2010). Worker 
income is higher than in nearly all other agricultural sectors (de 
Moraes et al., 2010; Satolo and Bacchi, 2013) and several sustain-
ability standards have been adopted (Viana and Perez, 2013). When 
substituting gasoline, ethanol from sugar cane also eliminates lead 
compounds and reduces noxious emissions (Goldemberg et al., 
2008). Broader strategic planning, understanding of cumulative 
impacts, and credible and collaborative decision making processes 
can help to enhance biodiversity and reverse ecological fragmenta-
tion, address direct and iLUC, improve the quality and durability of 
livelihoods, and other sustainability issues (Duarte et al., 2013). 
Co-benefits of palm oil production have been reported in the 
major producer countries, Malaysia and Indonesia (Sumathi et al., 
2008; Lam et al., 2009) as well as from new producer countries 
(Garcia-Ulloa et al., 2012). Palm oil production results in employ-
ment creation as well as in increment state and individual income 
(Sumathi et al., 2008; Tan et al., 2009; Lam et al., 2009; Sayer 
et al., 2012; von Geibler, 2013). When combined with agroforestry, 
palm oil plantations can increase food production locally and 
have a positive impact on biodiversity (Lam et al., 2009; Garcia-
Ulloa et al., 2012) and when palm oil plantations are installed 
on degraded land further co-benefits on biodiversity and carbon 
enhancement (Sumathi et al., 2008; Garcia-Ulloa et al., 2012; 
Sayer et al., 2012). Further, due to its high productivity, palm oil 
plantations can produce the same bioenergy input using less 
land than other bio-energy crops (Sumathi et al., 2008; Tan et al., 
2009). Certification in palm oil production can become a means 
for increasing sustainable production of biofuels (Tan et al., 2009; 
Edser, 2012; von Geibler, 2013). 
Similarly, co-benefits from the production of Jatropha as a biofuel 
crop in developing countries have been reported, mainly when 
Jatropha is planted on degraded land. These include increases 
in individuals’ incomes (Garg et al., 2011; Arndt et al., 2012), 
improvement in energy security at the local level (von Maltitz and 
Setzkorn, 2013; Muys et al., 2014), and reducing soil erosion (Garg 
et al., 2011).
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firmations, affordability and public acceptance (see Section 11.13.3 for 
details). BECCS may also affect the cost-effective emissions trajectory 
(Richels et al., In Review; Rose et al., 2013). 
Some integrated models are cost-effectively trading off lower land car-
bon stocks and increased land N2O emissions for the long-run mitiga-
tion benefits of bioenergy (Rose et  al., 2013; Popp et  al., 2013). The 
models find that bioenergy could contribute effectively to climate 
change mitigation despite land conversion and intensification emis-
sions. However, as discussed below and in Section 11.9, policy imple-
mentation and coordination are factors to consider. In these models, 
constraining bioenergy has a cost. For instance, limiting global bioen-
ergy availability to 100 EJ / year tripled marginal abatement costs and 
doubled consumption losses associated with transformation pathways 
(Rose et al., 2013). Overall outcomes may depend strongly on gover-
nance of land use and deployment of best practices in agricultural pro-
duction (see sections above). Progressive developments in governance 
of land and modernization of agriculture and livestock and effective 
sustainability frameworks can help realize large parts of the technical 
bioenergy potential with low associated GHG emissions.
With increasing scarcity of productive land, the growing demand for 
food and bioenergy could induce substantial LUC causing high GHG 
emissions and / or increased agricultural intensification and higher N2O 
emissions unless wise integration of bioenergy into agriculture and for-
estry landscapes occurs (Delucchi, 2010). Consideration of LUC emis-
sions in integrated models show that valuing or protecting global ter-
restrial carbon stocks reduces the potential LUC-related GHG emissions 
of energy crop deployment, and could lower the cost of achieving cli-
mate change objectives, but could exacerbate increases in agricultural 
commodity prices (Popp et  al., 2011; Reilly et  al., 2012). Many inte-
grated models are investigating idealized policy implementation path-
ways, assuming global prices on GHG (including the terrestrial land 
carbon stock); if such conditions cannot be realized, certain types of 
bioenergy could lead to additional GHG emissions. More specifically, if 
the global terrestrial land carbon stock remains unprotected, large GHG 
emissions from bioenergy-related LUC alone are possible (Melillo et al., 
2009; Wise et al., 2009; Creutzig et al., 2012a; Calvin et al., 2013b).
In summary, recent integrated model scenarios project between 
10 – 245 EJ / yr modern bioenergy deployment in 2050. Good gover-
nance and favourable conditions for bioenergy development may facil-
itate higher bioenergy deployment while sustainability and livelihood 
concerns might constrain deployment of bioenergy scenarios to low 
values (see Section 11.13.6).
11�13�6 Bioenergy and sustainable development
The nature and extent of the impacts of implementing bioenergy 
depend on the specific system, the development context, and on the 
size of the intervention (Section 11.4.5). The effects on livelihoods 
have not yet been systematically evaluated in integrated models (Davis 
et al., 2013; Creutzig et al., 2012b; Creutzig et al., 2013; Muys et al., 
2014), even if human geography studies have shown that bioenergy 
deployment can have strong distributional impacts (Davis et al., 2013; 
Muys et  al., 2014). The total effects on livelihoods will be mediated 
by global market dynamics, including policy regulations and incentives, 
the production model and deployment scale, and place-specific factors 
such as governance, land tenure security, labour and financial capabili-
ties, among others (Creutzig et al., 2013).
Bioenergy projects can be economically beneficial, e. g., by raising and 
diversifying farm incomes and increasing rural employment through 
the production of biofuels for domestic use (Gohin, 2008) or export 
markets (Wicke et al., 2009; Arndt et al., 2011).
The establishment of large-scale biofuels feedstock production can 
also cause smallholders, tenants, and herders to lose access to pro-
ductive land, while other social groups such as workers, investors, 
company owners, biofuels consumers, and populations who are 
more responsible for GHG emission reductions enjoy the benefits of 
this production (van der Horst and Vermeylen, 2011). This is particu-
larly relevant where large areas of land are still unregistered or are 
being claimed and under dispute by several users and ethnic groups 
(Dauvergne and Neville, 2010). Furthermore, increasing demand for 
first-generation biofuels is partly driving the expansion of crops like 
soy and oil palm, which in turn contribute to promote large-scale agri-
businesses at the expense of family and community-based agriculture, 
in some cases (Wilkinson and Herrera, 2010). Biofuels deployment can 
also translate into reductions of time invested in on-farm subsistence 
and community-based activities, thus translating into lower produc-
tivity rates of subsistence crops and an increase in intra-community 
conflicts as a result of the uneven share of collective responsibilities 
(Mingorría et al., 2010). 
Bioenergy deployment is more beneficial when it is not an additional 
land-use activity expanding over the landscape, but rather integrates 
into existing land uses and influences the way farmers and forest 
owners use their land. Various studies indicate the ecosystem services 
and values that perennial crops have in restoring degraded lands, via 
agroforestry systems, controlling erosion, and even in regional climate 
effects such as improved water retention and precipitation (Faaij, 2006; 
Wicke et al., 2011c; Immerzeel et al., 2013). Examples include adjust-
ments in agriculture practices where farmers, for instance, change their 
manure treatment to produce biogas, reduce methane and N losses. 
Changes in management practice may swing the net GHG balance 
of options and also have clear sustainable development implications 
(Davis et al., 2013).
Small-scale bioenergy options can provide cost-effective alternatives 
for mitigating climate change, at the same time helping advance sus-
tainable development priorities, particularly in rural areas of devel-
oping countries. IEA (2012b) estimates that 2.6 billion people world-
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Table 11�12 | Potential institutional, social, environmental, economic and technological implications of bioenergy options at local to global scale.
Institutional Scale
May contribute to energy independence (+), especially at the local level (reduce dependency on fossil fuels) (2, 20, 32, 39,50) + Local to national
Can improve (+) or decrease (–) land tenure and use rights for local stakeholders (2, 17, 38, 50) + / – Local
Cross-sectoral coordination (+) or conflicts (–) between forestry, agriculture, energy, and / or mining (2, 13, 26, 31, 60) + / – Local to national
Impacts on labor rights among the value chain (2, 6, 17) + / – Local to national
Promoting of participative mechanisms for small-scale producers (14, 15) + Local to national
Social Scale
Competition with food security including food availability (through reduced food production at the local level), food 
access (due to price volatility), usage (as food crops can be diverted towards biofuel production), and consequently to 
food stability. Bio-energy derived from residues, wastes, or by-products is an exception (1,2, 7, 9, 12, 18, 23) 
– Local to global
Integrated systems (including agroforestry) can improve food production at the local level creating a positive impact towards food security (51, 52, 
53, 69, 73, 74). Further, biomass production combined with improved agricultural management can avoid such competition and bring investment 
in agricultural production systems with overall improvements of management as a result (as observed in Brazil) (60, 63 66, 67, 70, 71)
+ Local
Increasing (+) or decreasing (–) existing conflicts or social tension (9, 14, 19, 26) + / – Local to national
Impacts on traditional practices: using local knowledge in production and treatment of bioenergy 
crops (+) or discouraging local knowledge and practices (–) (2, 50)
+ / – Local
Displacement of small-scale farmers (14, 15, 19). Bioenergy alternatives can also empower local farmers by creating local income opportunities + / – Local
Promote capacity building and new skills (3, 15, 50) + Local
Gender impacts (2, 4, 14, 15, 27) + / – Local to national
Efficient biomass techniques for cooking (e. g., biomass cookstoves) can have positive impacts on 
health, especially for women and children in developing countries (42, 43, 44)
+ Local to national
Environmental Scale
Biofuel plantations can promote deforestation and / or forest degradation, under weak or no regulation (1, 8, 22) – Local to global
When used on degraded lands, perennial crops offer large-scale potential to improve soil carbon and structure, abate 
erosion and salinity problems. Agroforestry schemes can have multiple benefits including increased overall biomass 
production, increase biodiversity and higher resilience to climate changes. (59, 64, 65, 69, 73)
+ Local to global
Some large-scale bio-energy crops can have negative impacts on soil quality, water pollution, and biodiversity. Similarly potential adverse side-effects 
can be a consequence of increments in use of fertilizers for increasing productivity (7, 12, 26, 30). Experience with sugarcane plantations has shown 
that they can maintain soil structure (56) and application of pesticides can be substituted by the use of natural predators and parasitoids (57, 71)
– / + Local to transboundary
Can displace activities or other land uses (8, 26) – Local to global
Smart modernization and intensification can lead to lower environmental impacts and more efficient land use (75, 76) + Local to transboundary
Creating bio-energy plantations on degraded land can have positive impacts on soil and biodiversity (12) + Local to transboundary
There can be tradeoffs between different land uses, reducing land availability for local stakeholders (45, 46, 47,48, 49). Multicropping 
system provide bioenergy while better maintaining ecological diversity and reducing land-use competition (58)
– / + Local to national
Ethanol utilization leads to the phaseout of lead addititives and methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MBTE) 
and reduces sulfur, particulate matter, and carbon monoxide emissions (55)
+ Local to global
Economic Scale
Increase in economic activity, income generation, and income diversification (1, 2, 3, 12, 20, 21, 27, 54) + Local
Increase (+) or decrease (–) market opportunities (16, 27, 31) + / – Local to national
Contribute to the changes in prices of feedstock (2, 3, 5, 21) + / – Local to global
May promote concentration of income and / or increase poverty if sustainability criteria and strong governance is not in place (2, 16, 26) – Local to regional
Using waste and residues may create socio-economic benefits with little environmental risks (2, 41, 36) + Local to regional
Uncertainty about mid- and long-term revenues (6, 30) – National
Employment creation (3, 14, 15) +  Local to regional
Technological Scale
Can promote technology development and / or facilitate technology transfer (2, 27, 31) + Local to global
Increasing infrastructure coverage (+). However if access to infrastructure and / or technology is 
reduced to few social groups it can increase marginalization (–) (27, 28, 29)
+ / – Local
Bioenergy options for generating local power or to use residues may increase labor demand, creating new job opportunities. 
Participatory technology development also increases acceptance and appropriation (6, 8, 10, 37, 40)
+ Local
Technology might reduce labor demand (–). High dependent of tech. transfer and / or acceptance – Local
⇒
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wide depend on traditional biomass for cooking, while 84 % of these 
belong to rural communities. Use of low-quality fuels and inefficient 
cooking and heating devices leads to pollution resulting in nearly 4 
million premature deaths every year, and a range of chronic illnesses 
and other health problems (Lim et  al., 2012; see Section 9.7.3.1). 
Modern small-scale bioenergy technologies such as advanced / effi-
cient cook stoves, biogas for cooking and village electrification, bio-
mass gasifiers, and bagasse-based co-generation systems for decen-
tralized power generation, can provide energy for rural communities 
with energy services that also promote rural development (IEA, 2011). 
Such bioenergy systems reduce CO2 emissions from unsustainable 
biomass harvesting and short-lived climate pollutants, e. g., black car-
bon, from cleaner combustion (Chung et al., 2012). Scaling up clean 
cookstove initiatives could not only save 2 million lives a year, but 
also significantly reduce GHG emissions (Section 11.13.3). Efficient 
biomass cook stoves and biogas stoves at the same time provide mul-
tiple benefits: They reduce the pressure on forests and biodiversity; 
they reduce exposure to smoke-related health hazards; they reduce 
drudgery for women in collection fuelwood; and they save money if 
fuel needs to be purchased (Martin et  al., 2011). Benefits from the 
dissemination of improved cookstoves outweigh their costs by seven-
fold, when their health, economic, and environmental benefits are 
accounted for (Garcia-Frapolli et al., 2010). 
Table 11.12 presents the implications of bioenergy options in the light 
of social, institutional, environmental, economic, and technological 
conditions. The relationship between bioenergy and these conditions is 
complex and there could be negative or positive implications, depend-
ing on the type of bioenergy option, the scale of the production sys-
tem and the local context. While biofuels can allow the reduction of 
fossil fuel use and of GHG emissions, they often shift environmental 
burdens towards land use-related impacts (i. e., eutrophication, acidifi-
cation, water depletion, ecotoxicity; EMPA, 2012; Smith and Torn, 2013; 
Tavoni and Socolow, 2013). Co-benefits and adverse side-effects do 
not necessarily overlap, neither geographically nor socially (Dauvergne 
and Neville, 2010; Wilkinson and Herrera, 2010; van der Horst and Ver-
meylen, 2011). The main potential co-benefits are related to access 
to energy and impacts on the economy and well-being, jobs creation, 
and improvement of local resilience (Walter et al., 2011; Creutzig et al., 
2013). Main risks of crop-based bioenergy for sustainable develop-
ment and livelihoods include competition for arable land (Haberl et al., 
2013b) and consequent impact on food security, tenure arrangements, 
displacement of communities and economic activities, creation of a 
driver of deforestation, impacts on biodiversity, water, and soil, or incre-
ment in vulnerability to climate change, and unequal distribution of 
benefits (Sala et al., 2000; Hall et al., 2009; German et al., 2011; Thomp-
son et al., 2011b; IPCC, 2012).
Good governance is an essential component of a sustainable energy 
system. Integrated studies that compare impacts of bioenergy produc-
tion between different crops and land management strategies show 
that the overall impact (both ecological and socio-economic) depends 
strongly on the governance of land use and design of the bioenergy 
system see van der Hilst et al. (2012) in the European context, and Van 
Dam et al. (2009a; b) for different crops and scenarios in Argentina). 
Van Eijck et  al. (2012) show similar differences in impacts between 
the production and use of Jatropha based on smallholder production 
versus plantation models. This implies that governance and planning 
have a strong impact on the ultimate result and impact of large-scale 
bioenergy deployment. Legislation and regulation of bioenergy as well 
as voluntary certification schemes are required to guide bioenergy 
production system deployment so that the resources and feedstocks 
be put to best use, and that (positive and negative) socioeconomic 
and environmental issues are addressed as production grows (van 
Dam et al., 2010). There are different options, from voluntary to legal 
and global agreements, to improve governance of biomass markets 
and land use that still require much further attention (Verdonk et al., 
2007). The integration of bioenergy systems into agriculture and for-
est landscapes can improve land and water use efficiency and help 
address concerns about environmental impacts of present land use 
(Berndes et  al., 2004, 2008; Börjesson and Berndes, 2006; Sparovek 
et  al., 2007; Gopalakrishnan et  al., 2009, 2011a; b, 2012; Dimitriou 
et al., 2009, 2011; Dornburg et al., 2010; Batidzirai et al., 2012; Parish 
et  al., 2012; Baum et  al., 2012; Busch, 2012), but the global poten-
tials of such systems are difficult to determine (Berndes and Börjesson, 
2007; Dale and Kline, 2013). Similarly, existing and emerging guiding 
principles and governance systems influence biomass resources avail-
ability (Stupak et al., 2011). Certification approaches can be useful, but 
they should be accompanied by effective territorial policy frameworks 
(Hunsberger et al., 2012).
1Alves Finco and Doppler (2010); 2Amigun et al. (2011); 3Arndt et al. (2012); 4Arndt et al. (2011); 5Arndt et al.(2012); 6Awudu and Zhang (2012); 7Beringer et al. (2011); 8Borzoni 
(2012); 9Bringezu et al. (2012); 10Cacciatore et al. (2012); 11Cançado et al. (2006); 12Danielsen et al. (2009); 13Diaz-Chavez (2011); 14Duvenage et al. (2013); 15Ewing and Msangi 
(2009); 16Gasparatos et al. (2011); 17German and Schoneveld (2012); 18Haberl et al. (2011a); 19Hall et al. (2009); 20Hanff et al. (2011); 21Huang et al. (2012); 22Koh and Wilcove 
(2008); 23Koizumi (2013); 24Kyu et al. (2010); 25Madlener et al. (2006); 26Martinelli and Filoso (2008); 27Mwakaje (2012); 28Oberling et al. (2012); 29Schut et al. (2010); 30Selfa et al. 
(2011); 31Steenblik (2007); 32Stromberg and Gasparatos (2012); 33Searchinger et al. (2009); 34Searchinger et al. (2008); 35Smith and Searchinger (2012); 36Tilman et al. (2009); 37Van 
de Velde et al. (2009); 38von Maltitz and Setzkorn (2013); 39Wu and Lin (2009); 40Zhang et al. (2011); 41Fargione et al. (2008); 42Jerneck and Olsson (2013); 43Gurung and Oh (2013); 
44O’Shaughnessy et al. (2013); 45German et al. (2013); 46Cotula (2012); 47Mwakaje (2012); 48Scheidel and Sorman (2012); 49Haberl et al.(2013b); 50Muys et al. (2014); 51Egeskog 
et al. (2011); 52Diaz-Chavez (2012); 53Ewing and Msangi (2009); 54de Moraes et al. (2010); 55Goldemberg (2007); 56Walter et al. (2011); 57Macedo (2005); 58Langeveld et al. (2013); 
59Van Dam et al. (2009a; b); 60van Dam et al. (2010); 61van Eijck et al. (2012); 62van Eijck et al. (2014); 63Martínez et al. (2013); 64van der Hilst et al. (2010); 65van der Hilst et al. 
(2012); 66van der Hilst and Faaij (2012); 67van der Hilst et al. (2012b); 68Hoefnagels et al. (2013); 69Immerzeel et al. (2013); 70Lynd et al. (2011); 71Smeets et al. (2008); 72Smeets and 
Faaij (2010); 73Wicke et al. (2013); 74Wiskerke et al. (2010); 75De Wit et al. (2011); 76de Wit et al. (2013)
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11�13�7 Tradeoffs and synergies with land, 
water, food, and biodiversity
This section summarizes results from integrated models (models that 
have a global aggregate view, but cannot disaggregate place-specific 
effects in biodiversity and livelihoods discussed above) on land, water, 
food, and biodiversity. In these models, at any level of future bioenergy 
supply, land demand for bioenergy depends on (1) the share of bioen-
ergy derived from wastes and residues (Rogner et  al., 2012); (2) the 
extent to which bioenergy production can be integrated with food or 
fiber production, which ideally results in synergies (Garg et al., 2011; 
Sochacki et al., 2013) or at least mitigates land-use competition (Ber-
ndes et  al., 2013); (3) the extent to which bioenergy can be grown 
on areas with little current or future production, taking into account 
growing land demand for food (Nijsen et al., 2012); and (4) the vol-
ume of dedicated energy crops and their yields (Haberl et  al., 2010; 
Batidzirai et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2012d). Energy crop yields per unit 
area may differ by factors of > 10 depending on differences in natural 
fertility (soils, climate), energy crop plants, previous land use, manage-
ment and technology (Johnston et al., 2009a; Lal, 2010; Beringer et al., 
2011; Pacca and Moreira, 2011; Smith et al., 2012a; Erb et al., 2012a). 
Assumptions on energy crop yields are one of the main reasons for 
the large differences in estimates of future area demand of energy 
crops (Popp et al., 2013). Likewise, assumptions on yields, strategies, 
and governance on future food / feed crops have large implications for 
assessments of the degree of land competition between biofuels and 
these land uses (Batidzirai et al., 2012; de Wit et al., 2013).
However, across models, there are very different potential landscape 
transformation visions in all regions (Sections 6.3.5 and 11.9.). Overall, 
it is difficult to generalize on regional land cover effects of mitigation. 
Some models assume significant land conversion while other models 
do not. In idealized implementation scenarios, there is expansion of 
energy cropland and forest land in many regions, with some models 
exhibiting very strong forest land expansion and others very little by 
2030. Land conversion is increased in the 450 ppm scenarios compared 
to the 550 ppm scenarios, but at a declining share, a result consistent 
with a declining land-related mitigation rate with policy stringency. 
The results of these integrated model studies need to be interpreted 
with caution, as not all GHG emissions and biogeophysical or socio-
economic effects of bioenergy deployment are incorporated into these 
models, and as not all relevant technologies are represented (e. g., cas-
cade utilization). 
Large-scale bioenergy production from dedicated crops may affect 
water availability and quality (see Section 6.6.2.6), which are highly 
dependent on (1) type and quantity of local freshwater resources; 
(2) necessary water quality; (3) competition for multiple uses (agri-
cultural, urban, industrial, power generation), and (4) efficiency in all 
sector end uses (Gerbens-Leenes et al., 2009; Coelho et al., 2012). In 
many regions, additional irrigation of energy crops could further inten-
sify existing pressures on water resources (Popp et al., 2011). Studies 
indicate that an exclusion of severe water scarce areas for bioenergy 
production (mainly to be found in the Middle East, parts of Asia, and 
western United States) would reduce global technical bioenergy poten-
tials by 17 % until 2050 (van Vuuren et al., 2009). A model compari-
son study with five global economic models shows that the aggregate 
food price effect of large-scale lignocellulosic bioenergy deployment 
(i. e., 100 EJ globally by the year 2050) is significantly lower (+5 % 
on average across models) than the potential price effects induced 
by climate impacts on crop yields (+25 % on average across models 
(Lotze-Campen et al., 2013). Possibly hence, ambitious climate change 
mitigation need not drive up global food prices much, if the extra land 
required for bioenergy production is accessible or if the feedstock, e. g., 
from forests, does not directly compete for agricultural land. Effective 
land-use planning and strict adherence to sustainability criteria need to 
be integrated into large-scale bioenergy projects to minimize competi-
tions for water (for example, by excluding the establishment of biofuel 
projects in irrigated areas). If bioenergy is not managed properly, addi-
tional land demand and associated LUC may put pressures on biodi-
versity (Groom et al., 2008; see Section 6.6.2.5). However, implement-
ing appropriate management, such as establishing bioenergy crops 
in degraded areas represents an opportunity where bioenergy can be 
used to achieve positive environmental outcomes (Nijsen et al., 2012).
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The shift from rural to more urban societies is a global trend with 
significant consequences for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and 
climate change mitigation. Across multiple dimensions, the scale and 
speed of urbanization is unprecedented: more than half of the world 
population live in urban areas and each week the global urban pop-
ulation increases by 1.3 million. Today there are nearly 1000 urban 
agglomerations with populations of 500,000 or greater; by 2050, the 
global urban population is expected to increase by between 2.5 to 3 
billion, corresponding to 64 % to 69 % of the world population (robust 
evidence, high agreement). Expansion of urban areas is on average 
twice as fast as urban population growth, and the expected increase 
in urban land cover during the first three decades of the 21st century 
will be greater than the cumulative urban expansion in all of human 
history (medium evidence, high agreement). Urban areas generate 
around 80 % of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (medium evi-
dence, medium agreement). Urbanization is associated with increases 
in income, and higher urban incomes are correlated with higher con-
sumption of energy use and GHG emissions (medium evidence, high 
agreement) [Sections 12.1, 12.2, 12.3]. 
Current and future urbanization trends are significantly dif-
ferent from the past (robust evidence, high agreement). Urbaniza-
tion is taking place at lower levels of economic development and the 
majority of future urban population growth will take place in small- 
to medium-sized urban areas in developing countries. Expansion of 
urban areas is on average twice as fast as urban population growth, 
and the expected increase in urban land cover during the first three 
decades of the 21st century will be greater than the cumulative urban 
expansion in all of human history (robust evidence, high agreement). 
[12.1, 12.2]
Urban areas account for between 71 % and 76 % of CO2 emis-
sions from global final energy use and between 67 – 76 % of 
global energy use (medium evidence, medium agreement). There 
are very few studies that have examined the contribution of all urban 
areas to global GHG emissions. The fraction of global CO2 emissions 
from urban areas depends on the spatial and functional boundary 
definitions of urban and the choice of emissions accounting method. 
Estimates for urban energy related CO2 emissions range from 71 % for 
2006 to between 53 % and 87 % (central estimate, 76 %) of CO2 emis-
sions from global final energy use (medium evidence, medium agree-
ment). There is only one attempt in the literature that examines the 
total GHG (CO2, CH4, N2O and SF6) contribution of urban areas globally, 
estimated at between 37 % and 49 % of global GHG emissions for the 
year 2000. Using Scope1 accounting, urban share of global CO2 emis-
sions is about 44 % (limited evidence, medium agreement). [12.2]
No single factor explains variations in per-capita emissions 
across cities, and there are significant differences in per capita 
GHG emissions between cities within a single country (robust 
evidence, high agreement). Urban GHG emissions are influenced by 
a variety of physical, economic and social factors, development lev-
els, and urbanization histories specific to each city. Key influences on 
urban GHG emissions include income, population dynamics, urban 
form, locational factors, economic structure, and market failures. There 
is a prevalence for cities in Annex I countries to have lower per capita 
final energy use and GHG emissions than national averages, and for 
per capita final energy use and GHG emissions of cities in non-Annex I 
countries tend to be higher than national averages (robust evidence, 
high agreement) [12.3].
The anticipated growth in urban population will require a mas-
sive build-up of urban infrastructure, which is a key driver of 
emissions across multiple sectors (limited evidence, high agree-
ment). If the global population increases to 9.3 billion by 2050 and 
developing countries expand their built environment and infrastruc-
ture to current global average levels using available technology of 
today, the production of infrastructure materials alone would gener-
ate approximately 470 Gt of CO2 emissions. Currently, average per 
capita CO2 emissions embodied in the infrastructure of industrialized 
countries is five times larger than those in developing countries. The 
continued expansion of fossil fuel-based infrastructure would produce 
cumulative emissions of 2,986 – 7,402 GtCO2 during the remainder of 
the 21st century (limited evidence, high agreement). [12.2, 12.3] 
The existing infrastructure stock of the average Annex I resident 
is three times that of the world average and about five times 
higher than that of the average non-Annex  I resident (medium 
evidence, medium agreement). The long life of infrastructure and the 
built environment, make them particularly prone to lock-in of energy 
and emissions pathways, lifestyles and consumption patterns that are 
difficult to change. The committed emissions from energy and trans-
portation infrastructures are especially high, with respective ranges 
of 127 – 336 and 63 – 132 Gt, respectively (medium evidence, medium 
agreement). [12.3, 12.4]
Infrastructure and urban form are strongly linked, especially 
among transportation infrastructure provision, travel demand 
and vehicle kilometres travelled (robust evidence, high agree-
ment). In developing countries in particular, the growth of transport 
infrastructure and ensuing urban forms will play important roles in 
affecting long-run emissions trajectories. Urban form and structure 
significantly affect direct (operational) and indirect (embodied) GHG 
emissions, and are strongly linked to the throughput of materials and 
energy in a city, the wastes that it generates, and system efficiencies of 
a city. (robust evidence, high agreement) [12.4, 12.5]
Key urban form drivers of energy and GHG emissions are den-
sity, land use mix, connectivity, and accessibility (medium evi-
dence, high agreement). These factors are interrelated and interde-
pendent. Pursuing one of them in isolation is insufficient for lower 
emissions. Connectivity and accessibility are tightly related: highly con-
nected places are accessible. While individual measures of urban form 
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have relatively small effects on vehicle miles travelled, they become 
more effective when combined. There is consistent evidence that co-
locating higher residential densities with higher employment densities, 
coupled with significant public transit improvements, higher land use 
mixes, and other supportive demand management measures can lead 
to greater emissions savings in the long run. Highly accessible com-
munities are typically characterized by low daily commuting distances 
and travel times, enabled by multiple modes of transportation (robust 
evidence, high agreement). [12.5]
Urban mitigation options vary across urbanization trajectories 
and are expected to be most effective when policy instruments 
are bundled (robust evidence, high agreement). For rapidly develop-
ing cities, options include shaping their urbanization and infrastructure 
development towards more sustainable and low carbon pathways. In 
mature or established cities, options are constrained by existing urban 
forms and infrastructure and the potential for refurbishing existing sys-
tems and infrastructures. Key mitigation strategies include co-locating 
high residential with high employment densities, achieving high land 
use mixes, increasing accessibility and investing in public transit and 
other supportive demand management measures. Bundling these 
strategies can reduce emissions in the short term and generate even 
higher emissions savings in the long term (robust evidence, high agree-
ment). [12.5]
Successful implementation of mitigation strategies at local 
scales requires that there be in place the institutional capacity 
and political will to align the right policy instruments to specific 
spatial planning strategies (robust evidence, high agreement). Inte-
grated land-use and transportation planning provides the opportunity 
to envision and articulate future settlement patterns, backed by zon-
ing ordinances, subdivision regulations, and capital improvements pro-
grammes to implement the vision. While smaller scale spatial planning 
may not have the energy conservation or emissions reduction benefits 
of larger scale ones, development tends to occur parcel by parcel and 
urbanized areas are ultimately the products of thousands of individual 
site-level development and design decisions (robust evidence, high 
agreement). [12.5, 12.6]
The largest opportunities for future urban GHG emissions 
reduction are in rapidly urbanizing areas where urban form and 
infrastructure are not locked-in, but where there are often lim-
ited governance, technical, financial, and institutional capaci-
ties (robust evidence, high agreement). The bulk of future infrastruc-
ture and urban growth is expected in small- to medium-size cities in 
developing countries, where these capacities are often limited or weak 
(robust evidence, high agreement). [12.4, 12.5, 12.6, 12.7]
Thousands of cities are undertaking climate action plans, but 
their aggregate impact on urban emissions is uncertain (robust 
evidence, high agreement). Local governments and institutions pos-
sess unique opportunities to engage in urban mitigation activities 
and local mitigation efforts have expanded rapidly. However, there 
has been little systematic assessment regarding the overall extent to 
which cities are implementing mitigation policies and emission reduc-
tion targets are being achieved, or emissions reduced. Climate action 
plans include a range of measures across sectors, largely focused on 
energy efficiency rather than broader land-use planning strategies and 
cross-sectoral measures to reduce sprawl and promote transit-oriented 
development. The majority of these targets have been developed for 
Annex  I countries and reflect neither their mitigation potential nor 
implementation. Few targets have been established for non-Annex  I 
country cities, and it is in these places where reliable city-level GHG 
emissions inventory may not exist (robust evidence, high agreement). 
[12.6, 12.7, 12.9]
The feasibility of spatial planning instruments for climate 
change mitigation is highly dependent on a city’s financial and 
governance capability (robust evidence, high agreement). Drivers 
of urban GHG emissions are interrelated and can be addressed by a 
number of regulatory, management, and market-based instruments. 
Many of these instruments are applicable to cities in both developed 
and developing countries, but the degree to which they can be imple-
mented varies. In addition, each instrument varies in its potential to 
generate public revenues or require government expenditures, and the 
administrative scale at which it can be applied. A bundling of instru-
ments and a high level of coordination across institutions can increase 
the likelihood of achieving emissions reductions and avoiding unin-
tended outcomes (robust evidence, high agreement). [12.6, 12.7]
For designing and implementing climate policies effectively, 
institutional arrangements, governance mechanisms, and finan-
cial resources should be aligned with the goals of reducing 
urban GHG emissions (robust evidence, high agreement). These goals 
will reflect the specific challenges facing individual cities and local 
governments. The following have been identified as key factors: (1) 
institutional arrangements that facilitate the integration of mitigation 
with other high-priority urban agendas; (2) a multilevel governance 
context that empowers cities to promote urban transformations; (3) 
spatial planning competencies and political will to support integrated 
land-use and transportation planning; and (4) sufficient financial flows 
and incentives to adequately support mitigation strategies (robust evi-
dence, high agreement). [12.6, 12.7]
Successful implementation of urban climate change mitigation 
strategies can provide co-benefits (robust evidence, high agree-
ment). Urban areas throughout the world continue to struggle with 
challenges, including ensuring access to energy, limiting air and water 
pollution, and maintaining employment opportunities and competi-
tiveness. Action on urban-scale mitigation often depends on the ability 
to relate climate change mitigation efforts to local co-benefits. The co-
benefits of local climate change mitigation can include public savings, 
air quality and associated health benefits, and productivity increases 
in urban centres, providing additional motivation for undertaking miti-
gation activities (robust evidence, high agreement). [12.5, 12.6, 12.7, 
12.8]
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This assessment highlights a number of key knowledge gaps. First, 
there is lack of consistent and comparable emissions data at local 
scales, making it particularly challenging to assess the urban share 
of global GHG emissions as well as develop urbanization typologies 
and their emissions pathways. Second, there is little scientific under-
standing of the magnitude of the emissions reduction from altering 
urban form, and the emissions savings from integrated infrastructure 
and land use planning. Third, there is a lack of consistency and thus 
comparability on local emissions accounting methods, making cross-
city comparisons of emissions or climate action plans difficult. Fourth, 
there are few evaluations of urban climate action plans and their effec-
tiveness. Fifth, there is lack of scientific understanding of how cities 
can prioritize mitigation strategies, local actions, investments, and pol-
icy responses that are locally relevant. Sixth, there are large uncertain-
ties about future urbanization trajectories, although urban form and 
infrastructure will play large roles in determining emissions pathways. 
[12.9]
12.1 Introduction
Urbanization is a global phenomenon that is transforming human 
settlements. The shift from primarily rural to more urban societies is 
evident through the transformation of places, populations, economies, 
and the built environment. In each of these dimensions, urbanization is 
unprecedented for its speed and scale: massive urbanization is a meg-
atrend of the 21st century. With disorienting speed, villages and towns 
are being absorbed by, or coalescing into, larger urban conurbations 
and agglomerations. This rapid transformation is occurring throughout 
the world, and in many places it is accelerating. 
Today, more than half of the global population is urban, compared 
to only 13 % in 1900 (UN DESA, 2012). There are nearly 1,000 urban 
agglomerations with populations of 500,000 or more, three-quarters 
of which are in developing countries (UN DESA, 2012). By 2050, the 
global urban population is expected to increase between 2.5 to 3 bil-
lion, corresponding to 64 % to 69 % of the world population (Grubler 
et al., 2007; IIASA, 2009; UN DESA, 2012). Put differently, each week 
the urban population is increasing by approximately 1.3 million. 
Future trends in the levels, patterns, and regional variation of urban-
ization will be significantly different from those of the past. Most of 
the urban population growth will take place in small- to medium-sized 
urban areas. Nearly all of the future population growth will be absorbed 
by urban areas in developing countries (IIASA, 2009; UN DESA, 2012). 
In many developing countries, infrastructure and urban growth will be 
greatest, but technical capacities are limited, and governance, finan-
cial, and economic institutional capacities are weak (Bräutigam and 
Knack, 2004; Rodrik et al., 2004). The kinds of towns, cities, and urban 
agglomerations that ultimately emerge over the coming decades will 
have a critical impact on energy use and carbon emissions.
The Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) did not have a chapter on human settle-
ments or urban areas. Urban areas were addressed through the lens of 
individual sector chapters. Since the publication of AR4, there has been 
a growing recognition of the significant contribution of urban areas to 
GHG emissions, their potential role in mitigating them, and a multi-fold 
increase in the corresponding scientific literature. This chapter provides 
an assessment of this literature and the key mitigation options that are 
available at the local level. The majority of this literature has focused 
on urban areas and cities in developed countries. With the exception of 
China, there are few studies on the mitigation potential or GHG emis-
sions of urban areas in developing countries. This assessment reflects 
these geographic limitations in the published literature. 
Urbanization is a process that involves simultaneous transitions and 
transformations across multiple dimensions, including demographic, eco-
nomic, and physical changes in the landscape. Each of these dimensions 
presents different indicators and definitions of urbanization. The chapter 
begins with a brief discussion of the multiple dimensions and definitions 
of urbanization, including implications for GHG emissions accounting, 
and then continues with an assessment of historical, current, and future 
trends across different dimensions of urbanization in the context of GHG 
emissions (12.2). It then discusses GHG accounting approaches and 
challenges specific to urban areas and human settlements. 
In Section 12.3, the chapter assesses the drivers of urban GHG emis-
sions in a systemic fashion, and examines the impacts of drivers on 
individuals sectors as well as the interaction and interdependence of 
drivers. In this section, the relative magnitude of each driver’s impact 
on urban GHG emissions is discussed both qualitatively and quantita-
tively, and provides the context for a more detailed assessment of how 
urban form and infrastructure affect urban GHG emissions (12.4). Here, 
the section discusses the individual urban form drivers such as density, 
connectivity, and land use mix, as well as their interactions with each 
other. Section 12.4 also examines the links between infrastructure and 
urban form, as well as their combined and interacting effects on GHG 
emissions.
Section 12.5 identifies spatial planning strategies and policy instru-
ments that can affect multiple drivers, and Section 12.6 examines 
the institutional, governance, and financial requirements to imple-
ment such policies. Of particular importance with regard to mitigation 
potential at the urban or local scale is a discussion of the geographic 
and administrative scales for which policies are implemented, overlap-
ping, and / or in conflict. The chapter then identifies the scale and range 
of mitigation actions currently planned and / or implemented by local 
governments, and assesses the evidence of successful implementa-
tion of the plans, as well as barriers to further implementation (12.7). 
Next, the chapter discusses major co-benefits and adverse side-effects 
of mitigation at the local scale, including opportunities for sustainable 
development (12.8). The chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
major gaps in knowledge with respect to mitigation of climate change 
in urban areas (12.9).
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12.2 Human settlements 
and GHG emissions
This section assesses past, current, and future trends in human settle-
ments in the context of GHG emissions. It aims to provide a multi-
dimensional perspective on the scale of the urbanization process. This 
section includes a discussion of the development trends of urban areas, 
including population size, land use, and density. Section 12.2.1 outlines 
historic urbanization dynamics in multiple dimensions as drivers of 
GHG emissions. Section 12.2.2 focuses on current GHG emissions. 
Finally, Section 12.2.3 assesses future scenarios of urbanization in 
order to frame the GHG emissions challenges to come. 
12�2�1 The role of cities and urban 
areas in energy use and GHG 
emissions
Worldwide, 3.3 billion people live in rural areas, the majority of whom, 
about 92 %, live in rural areas in developing countries (UN DESA, 
2012). In general, rural populations have lower per capita energy con-
sumption compared with urban populations in developing countries 
(IEA, 2008). Globally, 32 % of the rural population lack access to elec-
tricity and other modern energy sources, compared to only 5.3 % of the 
urban population (IEA, 2010). Hence, energy use and GHG emissions 
from human settlements is mainly from urban areas rather than rural 
areas, and the role of cities and urban areas in global climate change 
has become increasingly important over time. 
Box 12�1 | What is urban? The system boundary problem
Any empirical analysis of urban and rural areas, as well as human 
settlements, requires clear delineation of physical boundaries. 
However, it is not a trivial or unambiguous task to determine 
where a city, an urban area, or human settlement physically 
begins and ends. In the literature, there are a number of methods 
to establish the boundaries of a city or urban area (Elliot, 1987; 
Buisseret, 1998; Churchill, 2004). Three common types of boundar-
ies include:
1. Administrative boundaries, which refer to the territorial or 
political boundaries of a city (Hartshorne, 1933; Aguilar and 
Ward, 2003).
2. Functional boundaries, which are delineated according to 
connections or interactions between areas, such as economic 
activity, per capita income, or commuting zone (Brown and 
Holmes, 1971; Douglass, 2000; Hidle et al., 2009).
3. Morphological boundaries, which are based on the form 
or structure of land use, land cover, or the built environment. 
This is the dominant approach when satellite images are used 
to delineate urban areas (Benediktsson et al., 2003; Rashed 
et al., 2003). 
What approach is chosen will often depend on the particular 
research question under consideration. The choice of the physical 
boundaries can have a substantial influence on the results of the 
analysis. For example, the Global Energy Assessment (GEA) (GEA, 
2012) estimates global urban energy consumption between 
180 – 250 EJ / yr depending on the particular choice of the physical 
delineation between rural and urban areas. Similarly, depend-
ing on the choice of different administrative, morphological, 
and functional boundaries, between 37 % and 86 % in buildings 
and industry, and 37 % to 77 % of mobile diesel and gasoline 
consumption can be attributed in urban areas (Parshall et al., 
2010). Thus any empirical evidence presented in this chapter is 
dependent on the particular boundary choice made in the respec-
tive analysis.
Table 12�1 | Arithmetic growth of human settlement classes for five periods between 1950 – 2050. Number of human settlements by size class at four points in time.
Population
Average annual growth [%] Number of cities
1950 – 1970 1970 – 1990 1990 – 2010 1950 – 2010 2010 – 2050 1950 1970 1990 2010
10,000,000 and more 2.60 6.72 4.11 4.46 2.13 2 2 10 23
5,000,000 — 10,000,000 7.55 1.34 2.53 3.77 1.22 4 15 19 38
1,000,000 — 5,000,000 3.27 3.17 2.70 3.05 1.36 69 128 237 388
100,000 – 1,000,000 2.86 2.48 1.87 2.40 0.70
Not AvailableLess than 100,000 2.54 2.37 1.71 2.21 1.95
Rural 1.38 1.23 0.61 1.07 -0.50
Source: (UN DESA, 2012).
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Urbanization involves change across multiple dimensions and accord-
ingly is defined differently by different disciplines. Demographers 
define urbanization as a demographic transition that involves a popu-
lation becoming urbanized through the increase in the urban propor-
tion of the total population (Montgomery, 2008; Dorélien et al., 2013). 
Geographers and planners describe urbanization as a land change pro-
cess that includes the expansion of the urban land cover and growth in 
built-up areas and infrastructure (Berry et al., 1970; Blanco et al., 2011; 
Seto et  al., 2011). Economists characterize urbanization as a struc-
tural shift from primary economic activities such as agriculture and 
forestry to manufacturing and services (Davis and Henderson, 2003; 
Henderson, 2003). Sociologists, political scientists, and other social sci-
entists describe urbanization as cultural change, including change in 
social interactions and the growing complexity of political, social, and 
economic institutions (Weber, 1966; Berry, 1973). The next sections 
describe urbanization trends across the first three of these four dimen-
sions and point to the increasing and unprecedented speed and scale 
of urbanization.
12�2�1�1 Urban population dynamics
In the absence of any other independent data source with global cover-
age, assessments of historic urban and rural population are commonly 
based on statistics provided by the United Nations Department for Eco-
nomic and Social Affairs (UN DESA). The World Urbanization Prospects 
is published every two years by UN DESA and provides projections of 
key demographic and urbanization indicators for all countries in the 
world. Even within this dataset, there is no single definition of urban 
or rural areas that is uniformly applied across the data. Rather, each 
country develops its own definition of urban, often based on a com-
bination of population size or density, and other criteria such as the 
percentage of population not employed in agriculture; the availability 
of electricity, piped water, or other infrastructure; and characteristics of 
the built environment such as dwellings and built structures (UN DESA, 
2012). The large variation in criteria gives rise to significant differences 
in national definitions. However, the underlying variations in the data 
do not seriously affect an assessment of urbanization dynamics as 
long as the national definitions are sufficiently consistent over time 
(GEA, 2012; UN DESA, 2012). Irrespective of definition, the underlying 
assumption in all the definitions is that urban areas provide a higher 
standard of living than rural areas (UN DESA, 2013). A comprehensive 
assessment of urban and rural population dynamics is provided in the 
Global Energy Assessment (2012). Here, only key developments are 
briefly summarized. 
For most of human history, the world population mostly lived in rural 
areas and in small urban settlements, and growth in global urban 
population occurred slowly. In 1800, when the world population was 
around one billion, only 3 % of the total population lived in urban 
areas and only one city — Beijing — had had a population greater than 
one million (Davis, 1955; Chandler, 1987; Satterthwaite, 2007). Over 
the next one hundred years, the global share of urban population 
Figure 12�1 | Urban population as percentage of regional and world populations and 
in absolute numbers for RC5 regions (see Annex  II.2), 1950 – 2010 Source: UN DESA 
(2012).
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increased to 13 % in 1900. The second half of the 20th century expe-
rienced rapid urbanization. The proportion of world urban population 
increased from 13 % in 1900, to 29 % in 1950, and to 52 % in 2011 
(UN DESA, 2012). In 1960, the world reached a milestone when global 
urban population surpassed one billion (UN DESA, 2012). Although it 
took all previous human history to 1960 to reach one billion urban 
dwellers, it took only additional 26 years to reach two billion (Seto 
et  al., 2010). Since then, the time interval to add an additional one 
billion urban dwellers is decreasing, and by approximately 2030, the 
world urban population will increase by one billion every 13 years 
(Seto et al., 2010). Today, approximately 52 % of the global population, 
or 3.6 billion, are estimated to live in urban areas (UN DESA, 2012).
While urbanization has been occurring in all major regions of the 
world (Table 12.1) since 1950, there is great variability in urban tran-
sitions across regions and settlement types. This variability is shaped 
by multiple factors, including history (Melosi, 2000), migration patterns 
(Harris and Todaro, 1970; Keyfitz, 1980; Chen et al., 1998), technologi-
cal development (Tarr, 1984), culture (Wirth, 1938; Inglehart, 1997), 
governance institutions (National Research Council, 2003), as well as 
environmental factors such as the availability of energy (Jones, 2004; 
Dredge, 2008). Together, these factors partially account for the large 
variations in urbanization levels across regions. 
Urbanization rates in developed regions are high, between 73 % in 
Europe to 89 % in North America, compared to 45 % in Asia and 40 % 
in Africa (UN DESA, 2012).The majority of urbanization in the future is 
expected to take place primarily in Africa and Asia, and will occur at 
lower levels of economic development than the urban transitions that 
occurred in Europe and North America. While its urbanization rate is 
still lower than that of Europe and the Americas, the urban population 
in Asia increased by 2.3 billion between 1950 and 2010 (Figure 12.1).
Overall, urbanization has led to the growth of cities of all sizes (Figure 
12.2). Although mega-cities (those with populations of 10 million or 
greater) receive a lot of attention in the literature, urban population 
growth has been dominated by cities of smaller sizes. About one-third 
of the growth in urban population between 1950 and 2010 (1.16 bil-
lion) occurred in settlements with populations fewer than 100 thou-
sand. Currently, approximately 10 % of the 3.6 billion urban dwellers 
live in mega-cities of 10 million or greater (UN DESA, 2012). Within 
regions and countries, there are large variations in development lev-
els, urbanization processes, and urban transitions. While the dominant 
global urbanization trend is growth, some regions are experiencing 
significant urban population declines. Urban shrinkage is not a new 
phenomenon, and most cities undergo cycles of growth and decline, 
which is argued to correspond to waves of economic growth and reces-
sion (Kondratieff and Stolper, 1935). There are few systematic analyses 
on the scale and prevalence of shrinking cities (UN-Habitat, 2008). A 
recent assessment by the United Nations (UN) (UN DESA, 2012) indi-
cates that about 11 % of 3,552 cities with populations of 100,000 or 
more in 2005 experienced total population declines of 10.4 million 
between 1990 and 2005. These ‘shrinking cities’ are distributed glob-
ally but concentrated mainly in Eastern Europe (Bontje, 2005; Bernt, 
2009) and the rust belt in the United States (Martinez-Fernandez et al., 
2012), where de-urbanization is strongly tied with de-industrialization. 
Figure 12�2 | Population by settlement size using historical (1950 – 2010) and projected data to 2050. Source: UN DESA (2010), Grubler et al. (2012). Note: rounded population 
percentages displayed across size classes sum do not sum to 100 % for year 2010 due to rounding. Urbanization results in not only in growth in urban population, but also changes 
in household structures and dynamics. As societies industrialize and urbanize, there is often a decline in household size, as traditional complex households become more simple and 
less extended (Bongaarts, 2001; Jiang and O’Neill, 2007; O’Neill et al., 2010). This trend has been observed in Europe and North America, where household size has declined from 
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12�2�1�2 Urban land use
Another key dimension of urbanization is the increase in built-up area 
and urban land cover. Worldwide, urban land cover occupies a small 
fraction of global land surface, with estimates ranging between 0.28 to 
3.5 million km2, or between 0.2 % to 2.7 % of ice free terrestrial land 
(Schneider et al., 2009). Although the urban share of global land cover 
is negligible, urban land use at the local scale shows trends of declin-
ing densities and outward expansion. 
Analyses of 120 global cities show significant variation in densities 
across world regions, but the dominant trend is one of declining built-
up and population densities across all income levels and city sizes 
(Figure 12.3) (Angel et  al., 2010). For this sample of cities, built-up 
area densities have declined significantly between 1990 and 2000, at 
an average annual rate of 2.0± 0.4 % (Angel et  al., 2010). On aver-
age, urban population densities are four times higher in low-income 
countries (11,850 persons / km2 in 2000) than in high-income countries 
(2,855 persons / km2 in 2000). Urban areas in Asia experienced the larg-
est decline in population densities during the 1990s. Urban population 
densities in East Asia and Southeast Asia declined 4.9 % and 4.2 %, 
respectively, between 1990 and 2000 (World Bank, 2005). These urban 
population densities are still higher than those in Europe, North Amer-
ica, and Australia, where densities are on average 2,835 persons / km2. 
As the urban transition continues in Asia and Africa, it is expected that 
their urban population densities will continue to decline. Although 
urban population densities are decreasing, the amount of built-up area 
per person is increasing (Seto et al., 2010; Angel et al., 2011). A meta-
analysis of 326 studies using satellite data shows a minimum global 
increase in urban land area of 58,000km2 between 1970 and 2000, 
or roughly 9 % of the 2000 urban extent (Seto et al., 2011). At current 
rates of declining densities among developing country cities, a dou-
bling of the urban population over the next 30 years will require a tri-
pling of built-up areas (Angel et al., 2010). For a discussion on drivers 
of declining densities, see Box 12.4.
12�2�1�3 Urban economies and GDP
Urban areas are engines of economic activities and growth. Further, 
the transition from a largely agrarian and rural society to an industrial 
and consumption-based society is largely coincident with a country’s 
level of industrialization and economic development (Tisdale, 1942; 
Jones, 2004), and reflects changes in the relative share of GDP by both 
sector and the proportion of the labour force employed in these sectors 
(Satterthwaite, 2007; World Bank, 2009). The concentration and scale 
of people, activities, and resources in urban areas fosters economic 
growth (Henderson et al., 1995; Fujita and Thisse, 1996; Duranton and 
Puga, 2004; Puga, 2010), innovation (Feldman and Audretsch, 1999; 
Bettencourt et  al., 2007; Arbesman et  al., 2009), and an increase of 
economic and resource use efficiencies (Kahn, 2009; Glaeser and Kahn, 
2010). The agglomeration economies made possible by the concentra-
tion of individuals and firms make cities ideal settings for innovation, 
job, and wealth creation (Rosenthal and Strange, 2004; Carlino et al., 
2007; Knudsen et al., 2008; Puga, 2010). 
A precise estimate of the contribution of all urban areas to global GDP 
is not available. However, a downscaling of global GDP during the 
Global Energy Assessment (Grubler et  al., 2007; GEA, 2012) showed 
that urban areas contribute about 80 % of global GDP. Other studies 
show that urban economies generate more than 90 % of global gross 
value (Gutman, 2007; United Nations, 2011). In OECD countries, more 
than 80 % of the patents filed are in cities (OECD, 2006a). Not many 
cities report city-level GDP but recent attempts have been made by 
the Metropolitan Policy Program of the Brookings Institute, PriceWa-
terhouseCoopers (PWC), and the McKinsey Global Institute to provide 
such estimates. The PWC report shows that key 27 key global cities1 
accounted for 8 % of world GDP for 2012 but only 2.5 % of the global 
population (PwC and Partnership for New York City, 2012). 
In a compilation by UN-Habitat, big cities are shown to have dispro-
portionately high share of national GDP compared to their population 
(UN-Habitat, 2012). The importance of big cities is further underscored 
in a recent report that shows that 600 cities generated 60 % of global 
GDP in 2007 (McKinsey Global Institute, 2011). This same report shows 
that the largest 380 cities in developed countries account for half of 
the global GDP. More than 20 % of global GDP comes from 190 North 
American cities alone (McKinsey Global Institute, 2011). In contrast, 
the 220 largest cities in developing countries contribute to only 10 % 
global of GDP, while 23 global megacities generated 14 % of global 
GDP in 2007. The prevalence of economic concentration in big cities 
highlights their importance but does not undermine the role of small 
and medium size cities. Although top-down and bottom-up estimates 
suggest a large urban contribution to global GDP, challenges remain 
in estimating the size of this, given large uncertainties in the down-
scaled GDP, incomplete urban coverage, sample bias, methodological 
ambiguities, and limitations of the city-based estimations in the exist-
ing studies.
12�2�2 GHG emission estimates from human 
settlements
Most of the literature on human settlements and climate change is 
rather recent.2 Since AR4, there has been a considerable growth in 
scientific evidence on energy consumption and GHG emissions from 
human settlements. However, there are very few studies that have 
examined the contribution of all urban areas to global GHG emissions. 
1 Paris, Hong Kong, Sydney, San Francisco, Singapore, Toronto, Berlin, Stockholm, 
London, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Tokyo, Abu Dhabi, Madrid, Kuala Lumpur, 
Milan, Moscow, São Paulo, Beijing, Buenos Aires, Johannesburg, Mexico City, 
Shanghai, Seoul, Istanbul, and Mumbai.
2 A search on the ISI Web of Science database for keywords “urban AND climate 
change” for the years 1900 – 2007 yielded over 700 English language publica-
tions. The same search for the period from 2007 to present yielded nearly 2800 
English language publications.  
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Figure 12�3 | Left: Average annual percent change in density between 1990 and 2010 (light blue). Right: Average built-up area per person (m2) in 1990 (yellow) and 2000 (blue). 
Data from 120 cities. Source: Angel et al. (2005).
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The few studies that do exist will be discussed in Section 12.2.2.1. In 
contrast, a larger number of studies have quantified GHG emissions for 
individual cities and other human settlements. These will be assessed 
in Section 12.2.2.2. 
12�2�2�1 Estimates of the urban share of global emissions 
There are very few studies that estimate the relative urban and rural 
shares of global GHG emissions. One challenge is that of boundary def-
initions and delineation: it is difficult to consistently define and delin-
eate rural and urban areas globally (see Box 12.1). Another challenge is 
that of severe data constraints about GHG emissions. There is no com-
prehensive statistical database on urban or rural GHG emissions. Avail-
able global estimates of urban and rural emission shares are either 
derived bottom-up or top-down. Bottom-up, or up-scaling studies, use 
a representative sample of estimates from regions or countries and 
scale these up to develop world totals (see IEA, 2008). Top-down stud-
ies use global or national datasets and downscale these to local grid 
cells. Urban and rural emissions contributions are then estimated based 
on additional spatial information such as the extent of urban areas or 
the location of emission point sources (GEA, 2012). In the absence of 
a more substantive body of evidence, large uncertainties remain sur-
rounding the estimates and their sensitivities (Grubler et al., 2012).
The World Energy Outlook 2008 estimates urban energy related CO2 
emissions at 19.8 Gt, or 71 % of the global total for the year 2006 (IEA, 
2008). This corresponds to 330 EJ of primary energy, of which urban 
final energy use is estimated to be at 222 EJ. The Global Energy Assess-
ment provides a range of final urban energy use between 180 and 250 
EJ with a central estimate of 240 EJ for the year 2005. This is equivalent 
to an urban share between 56 % and 78 % (central estimate, 76 %) of 
global final energy use. Converting the GEA estimates on urban final 
energy (Grubler et al., 2012) into CO2 emissions (see Methodology and 
Metrics Annex) results in global urban energy related CO2 emissions of 
8.8 — 14.3 Gt (central estimate, 12.5Gt) which is between 53 % and 
87 % (central estimate, 76 %) of CO2 emissions from global final energy 
use and between 30 % and 56 % (central estimate, 43 %) of global pri-
mary energy related CO2 emissions (CO2 includes flaring and cement 
emissions which are small). Urban CO2 emission estimates refer to 
commercial final energy fuel use only and exclude upstream emissions 
from energy conversion.
Aside from these global assessments, there is only one attempt in the 
literature to estimate the total GHG (CO2, CH4, N2O and SF6) contribu-
tion of urban areas globally (Marcotullio et  al., 2013). Estimates are 
provided in ranges where the lower end provides an estimate of the 
direct emissions from urban areas only and the higher end provides 
an estimate that assigns all emissions from electricity consumption to 
the consuming (urban) areas. Using this methodology, the estimated 
total GHG emission contribution of all urban areas is lower than 
other approaches, and ranges from 12.8 GtCO2eq to 16.9 GtCO2eq, or 
between 37 % and 49 % of global GHG emissions in the year 2000. 
The estimated urban share of energy related CO2 emissions in 2000 
is slightly lower than the GEA and IEA estimate, at 72 % using Scope 
2 accounting and 44 % using Scope 1 accounting (see Figure 12.4). 
The urban GHG emissions (CO2, N2O, CH4, and SF6) from the energy 
share of total energy GHGs is between 42 % and 66 %. Hence, while 
the sparse evidence available suggests that urban areas dominate final 
energy consumption and associated CO2 emissions, the contribution to 
total global GHG emissions may be more modest as the large majority 
of CO2 emissions from land-use change, N2O emissions, and CH4 emis-
sions take place outside urban areas. 
Figure 12�4 | Estimates of urban CO2 emissions shares of total emissions across world 
regions. Grubler et al. (2012) estimates are based on estimates of final urban and total 
final energy use in 2005. Marcotullio et  al. (2013) estimates are based on emissions 
attributed to urban areas as share of regional totals reported by EDGAR. Scope 2 emis-
sions allocate all emissions from thermal power plants to urban areas.
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Figure 12.4 shows CO2 estimates derived from Grubler et  al. (2012) 
and Marcotullio et al. (2013). It highlights that there are large varia-
tions in the share of urban CO2 emissions across world regions. For 
example, urban emission shares of final energy related CO2 emissions 
range from 58 % in China and Central Pacific Asia to 86 % in North 
America. Ranges are from 31 % to 57 % in South Asia, if urban final 
energy related CO2 emissions are taken relative to primary energy 
related CO2 emissions in the respective region.
Although differences in definitions make it challenging to compare 
across regional studies, there is consistent evidence that large varia-
tions exist (Parshall et  al., 2010; Marcotullio et  al., 2011, 2012). For 
example, the International Energy Agency (IEA) (2008) estimates of the 
urban primary energy related CO2 emission shares are 69 % for the EU 
(69 % for primary energy), 80 % for the United States (85 % for primary 
energy, see also (Parshall et al., 2010), and 86 % for China (75 % for 
primary energy, see also Dhakal, 2009). Marcotullio et al. (2013) high-
light that non-energy related sectors can lead to substantially different 
urban emissions shares under consideration of a broader selection of 
greenhouse gases (CO2, CH4, N2O, SF6). For example, while Africa tends 
to have a high urban CO2 emissions share (64 % – 74 %) in terms of 
energy related CO2 emissions, the overall contribution of urban areas 
across all sectors and gases is estimated to range between 21 % and 
30 % of all emissions (Marcotullio et al., 2013). 
12�2�2�2 Emissions accounting for human settlements
Whereas the previous section discussed the urban proportion of total 
global emissions, this section assesses emissions accounting meth-
ods for human settlements. A variety of emission estimates have 
been published by different research groups in the scientific literature 
(e. g.,Ramaswami et  al., 2008; Kennedy et  al., 2009, 2011; Dhakal, 
2009; World Bank, 2010; Hillman and Ramaswami, 2010; Glaeser and 
Kahn, 2010; Sovacool and Brown, 2010; Heinonen and Junnila, 2011a, 
c; Hoornweg et  al., 2011; Chavez and Ramaswami, 2011; Chavez 
et al., 2012; Grubler et al., 2012; Yu et al., 2012; Chong et al., 2012). 
The estimates of GHG emissions and energy consumption for human 
settlements are very diverse. Comparable estimates are usually only 
available across small samples of human settlements, which currently 
limit the insights that can be gained from an assessment of these esti-
mates. The limited number of comparable estimates is rooted in the 
absence of commonly accepted GHG accounting standards and a lack 
of transparency over data availabilities, as well as choices that have 
been made in the compilation of particular estimates:
•	 Choice of physical urban boundaries� Human settlements are 
open systems with porous boundaries. Depending on how physi-
cal boundaries are defined, estimates of energy consumption and 
GHG emissions can vary significantly (see Box 12.1). 
•	 Choice of accounting approach / reporting scopes. There is 
widespread acknowledgement in the literature for the need to 
report beyond the direct GHG emissions released from within a 
settlement’s territory. Complementary accounting approaches 
have therefore been proposed to characterize different aspects of 
the GHG performance of human settlements (see Box 12.2). Cit-
ies and other human settlements are increasingly adopting dual 
approaches (Baynes et  al., 2011; Ramaswami et  al., 2011; ICLEI 
et al., 2012; Carbon Disclosure Project, 2013; Chavez and Ramas-
wami, 2013).
•	 Choice of calculation methods. There are differences in the 
methods used for calculating emissions, including differences in 
emission factors used, methods for imputing missing data, and 
methods for calculating indirect emissions (Heijungs and Suh, 2010; 
Ibrahim et al., 2012). 
A number of organizations have started working towards standardiza-
tion protocols for emissions accounting (Carney et  al., 2009; ICLEI, 
2009; Covenant of Mayors, 2010; UNEP et al., 2010; Arikan, 2011). Fur-
ther progress has been achieved recently when several key efforts 
joined forces to create a more broadly supported reporting framework 
(ICLEI et  al., 2012). Ibrahim et  al. (2012) show that the differences 
across reporting standards explains significant cross-sectional variabil-
ity in reported emission estimates. However, while high degrees of 
cross-sectional comparability are crucial in order to gain further insight 
into the emission patterns of human settlements across the world, 
many applications at the settlement level do not require this. Cities 
and other localities often compile these data to track their own perfor-
mance in reducing energy consumption and / or greenhouse gas emis-
sions (see Section 12.7). This makes a substantial body of evidence dif-
ficult to use for scientific inquiries.
Beyond the restricted comparability of the available GHG estimates, 
six other limitations of the available literature remain. First, the growth 
in publications is restricted to the analysis of energy consumption and 
GHG emissions from a limited set of comparable emission estimates. 
New estimates do not emerge at the same pace. Second, available 
evidence is particularly scarce for medium and small cities as well as 
rural settlements (Grubler et al., 2012). Third, there is a regional bias 
in the evidence. Most studies focus on emissions from cities in devel-
oped countries with limited evidence from a few large cities in the 
developing world (Kennedy et al., 2009, 2011; Hoornweg et al., 2011; 
Sugar et al., 2012). Much of the most recent literature provides Chi-
nese evidence (Dhakal, 2009; Ru et al., 2010; Chun et al., 2011; Wang 
et al., 2012a, b; Chong et al., 2012; Yu et al., 2012; Guo et al., 2013; 
Lin et  al., 2013; Vause et al., 2013; Lu et al., 2013), but only limited 
new emission estimates are emerging from that. Evidence on human 
settlements in least developed countries is almost non-existent with 
some notable exceptions in the non peer-reviewed literature (Lwasa, 
2013). Fourth, most of the available emission estimates are focus-
ing on energy related CO2 rather than all GHG emissions. Fifth, while 
there is a considerable amount of evidence for territorial emissions, 
studies that include Scope 2 and 3 emission components are grow-
ing but remain limited (Ramaswami et al., 2008, 2012b; Kennedy et al., 
Box 12�2 | Emission accounting at the local scale
Three broad approaches have emerged for GHG emissions 
accounting for human settlements, each of which uses different 
boundaries and units of analysis. 
1) Territorial or production-based emissions accounting 
includes all GHG emissions from activities within a city or settle-
ment’s territory (see Box 12.1). This is also referred to as Scope 
1 accounting (Kennedy et al., 2010; ICLEI et al., 2012). Territo-
rial emissions accounting is, for example, commonly applied by 
national statistical offices and used by countries under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) for 
emission reporting (Ganson, 2008; DeShazo and Matute, 2012; 
ICLEI et al., 2012). 
However, human settlements are typically smaller than the 
infrastructure in which they are embedded, and important emis-
sion sources may therefore be located outside the city’s territorial 
boundary. Moreover, human settlements trade goods and services 
that are often produced in one settlement but are consumed else-
where, thus creating GHG emissions at different geographic loca-
tions associated with the production process of these consumable 
items. Two further approaches have thus been developed in the 
literature, as noted below.
2) Territorial plus supply chain accounting approaches start 
with territorial emissions and then add a well defined set of 
indirect emissions which take place outside the settlement’s ter-
ritory. These include indirect emissions from (1) the consumption 
of purchased electricity, heat and steam (Scope 2 emissions), and 
(2) any other activity (Scope 3 emissions). The simplest and most 
frequently used territorial plus supply chain accounting approach 
includes Scope 2 emissions (Hillman and Ramaswami, 2010; Ken-
nedy et al., 2010; Baynes et al., 2011; ICLEI et al., 2012). 
3) Consumption-based accounting approaches include all 
direct and indirect emissions from final consumption activities 
associated with the settlement, which usually include consump-
tion by residents and government (Larsen and Hertwich, 2009, 
2010a, b; Heinonen and Junnila, 2011a, b; Jones and Kammen, 
2011; Minx et al., 2013). This approach excludes all emissions 
from the production of exports in the settlement territory and 
includes all indirect emissions occurring outside the settlement 
territory in the production of the final consumption items.
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2009; Larsen and Hertwich, 2009, 2010a, b; Hillman and Ramaswami, 
2010; White et  al., 2010; Petsch et  al., 2011; Heinonen and Junnila, 
2011a, b; Heinonen et al., 2011; Chavez et al., 2012; Paloheimo and 
Salmi, 2013; Minx et al., 2013). Finally, the comparability of available 
evidence of GHG emissions at the city scale is usually restricted across 
studies. There prevails marked differences in terms of the accounting 
methods, scope of covered sectors, sector definition, greenhouse gas 
covered, and data sources used (Bader and Bleischwitz, 2009; Kennedy 
et al., 2010; Chavez and Ramaswami, 2011; Grubler et al., 2012; Ibra-
him et al., 2012).
Across cities, existing studies point to a large variation in the magni-
tude of total and per capita emissions. For this assessment, emission 
estimates for several hundred individual cities were reviewed. Reported 
emission estimates for cities and other human settlements in the lit-
erature range from 0.5 tCO2 / cap to more than 190 tCO2 / cap (Carney 
et al., 2009; Kennedy et al., 2009; Dhakal, 2009; Heinonen and Junnila, 
2011a, c; Wright et al., 2011; Sugar et al., 2012; Ibrahim et al., 2012; 
Ramaswami et al., 2012b; Carbon Disclosure Project, 2013; Chavez and 
Ramaswami, 2013; Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2013). 
Local emission inventories in the UK for 2005 – 2011 show that end 
use activities and industrial processes of both rural and urban localities 
vary from below 3 to 190 tCO2 / cap and more (Department of Energy & 
Climate Change, 2013). The total CO2 emissions from end use activities 
for ten global cities range (reference year ranges 2003 – 2006) between 
4.2 and 21.5 tCO2eq / cap (Kennedy et  al., 2009; Sugar et  al., 2012), 
while there is variation reported in GHG estimates from 18 European 
city regions from 3.5 to 30 tCO2eq / cap in 2005 (Carney et al., 2009).
In many cases, a large part of the observed variability will be related to 
the underlying drivers of emissions such as urban economic structures 
(balance of manufacturing versus service sector), local climate and 
geography, stage of economic development, energy mix, state of pub-
lic transport, urban form and density, and many others (Carney et al., 
2009; Kennedy et  al., 2009, 2011; Dhakal, 2009, 2010; Glaeser and 
Kahn, 2010; Shrestha and Rajbhandari, 2010; Gomi et al., 2010; Par-
shall et al., 2010; Rosenzweig et al., 2011; Sugar et al., 2012; Grubler 
et al., 2012; Wiedenhofer et al., 2013). Normalizing aggregate city-level 
emissions by population therefore does not necessarily result in robust 
cross-city comparisons, since each city’s economic function, trade 
typology, and imports-exports balance can differ widely. Hence, using 
different emissions accounting methods can lead to substantial differ-
ences in reported emissions (see Figure 12.4). Therefore, understand-
ing differences in accounting approaches is essential in order to draw 
meaningful conclusions from cross-city comparisons of emissions. 
Evidence from developed countries such as the United States, Fin-
land, or the United Kingdom suggests that consumption-based 
emission estimates for cities and other human settlements tend to 
be higher than their territorial emissions. However, in some cases, 
report beyond the direct GHG emissions released from within a 
settlement’s territory. Complementary accounting approaches 
have therefore been proposed to characterize different aspects of 
the GHG performance of human settlements (see Box 12.2). Cit-
ies and other human settlements are increasingly adopting dual 
approaches (Baynes et  al., 2011; Ramaswami et  al., 2011; ICLEI 
et al., 2012; Carbon Disclosure Project, 2013; Chavez and Ramas-
wami, 2013).
•	 Choice of calculation methods. There are differences in the 
methods used for calculating emissions, including differences in 
emission factors used, methods for imputing missing data, and 
methods for calculating indirect emissions (Heijungs and Suh, 2010; 
Ibrahim et al., 2012). 
A number of organizations have started working towards standardiza-
tion protocols for emissions accounting (Carney et  al., 2009; ICLEI, 
2009; Covenant of Mayors, 2010; UNEP et al., 2010; Arikan, 2011). Fur-
ther progress has been achieved recently when several key efforts 
joined forces to create a more broadly supported reporting framework 
(ICLEI et  al., 2012). Ibrahim et  al. (2012) show that the differences 
across reporting standards explains significant cross-sectional variabil-
ity in reported emission estimates. However, while high degrees of 
cross-sectional comparability are crucial in order to gain further insight 
into the emission patterns of human settlements across the world, 
many applications at the settlement level do not require this. Cities 
and other localities often compile these data to track their own perfor-
mance in reducing energy consumption and / or greenhouse gas emis-
sions (see Section 12.7). This makes a substantial body of evidence dif-
ficult to use for scientific inquiries.
Beyond the restricted comparability of the available GHG estimates, 
six other limitations of the available literature remain. First, the growth 
in publications is restricted to the analysis of energy consumption and 
GHG emissions from a limited set of comparable emission estimates. 
New estimates do not emerge at the same pace. Second, available 
evidence is particularly scarce for medium and small cities as well as 
rural settlements (Grubler et al., 2012). Third, there is a regional bias 
in the evidence. Most studies focus on emissions from cities in devel-
oped countries with limited evidence from a few large cities in the 
developing world (Kennedy et al., 2009, 2011; Hoornweg et al., 2011; 
Sugar et al., 2012). Much of the most recent literature provides Chi-
nese evidence (Dhakal, 2009; Ru et al., 2010; Chun et al., 2011; Wang 
et al., 2012a, b; Chong et al., 2012; Yu et al., 2012; Guo et al., 2013; 
Lin et  al., 2013; Vause et al., 2013; Lu et al., 2013), but only limited 
new emission estimates are emerging from that. Evidence on human 
settlements in least developed countries is almost non-existent with 
some notable exceptions in the non peer-reviewed literature (Lwasa, 
2013). Fourth, most of the available emission estimates are focus-
ing on energy related CO2 rather than all GHG emissions. Fifth, while 
there is a considerable amount of evidence for territorial emissions, 
studies that include Scope 2 and 3 emission components are grow-
ing but remain limited (Ramaswami et al., 2008, 2012b; Kennedy et al., 
Box 12�2 | Emission accounting at the local scale
Three broad approaches have emerged for GHG emissions 
accounting for human settlements, each of which uses different 
boundaries and units of analysis. 
1) Territorial or production-based emissions accounting 
includes all GHG emissions from activities within a city or settle-
ment’s territory (see Box 12.1). This is also referred to as Scope 
1 accounting (Kennedy et al., 2010; ICLEI et al., 2012). Territo-
rial emissions accounting is, for example, commonly applied by 
national statistical offices and used by countries under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) for 
emission reporting (Ganson, 2008; DeShazo and Matute, 2012; 
ICLEI et al., 2012). 
However, human settlements are typically smaller than the 
infrastructure in which they are embedded, and important emis-
sion sources may therefore be located outside the city’s territorial 
boundary. Moreover, human settlements trade goods and services 
that are often produced in one settlement but are consumed else-
where, thus creating GHG emissions at different geographic loca-
tions associated with the production process of these consumable 
items. Two further approaches have thus been developed in the 
literature, as noted below.
2) Territorial plus supply chain accounting approaches start 
with territorial emissions and then add a well defined set of 
indirect emissions which take place outside the settlement’s ter-
ritory. These include indirect emissions from (1) the consumption 
of purchased electricity, heat and steam (Scope 2 emissions), and 
(2) any other activity (Scope 3 emissions). The simplest and most 
frequently used territorial plus supply chain accounting approach 
includes Scope 2 emissions (Hillman and Ramaswami, 2010; Ken-
nedy et al., 2010; Baynes et al., 2011; ICLEI et al., 2012). 
3) Consumption-based accounting approaches include all 
direct and indirect emissions from final consumption activities 
associated with the settlement, which usually include consump-
tion by residents and government (Larsen and Hertwich, 2009, 
2010a, b; Heinonen and Junnila, 2011a, b; Jones and Kammen, 
2011; Minx et al., 2013). This approach excludes all emissions 
from the production of exports in the settlement territory and 
includes all indirect emissions occurring outside the settlement 
territory in the production of the final consumption items.
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2009; Aumnad, 2010; Kennedy et  al., 2010; Sovacool and Brown, 
2010). Moreover, the literature suggests that differences in per capita 
energy consumption and CO2 emission patterns of cities in Annex  I 
and non-Annex I countries have converged more than their national 
emissions (Sovacool and Brown, 2010; Sugar et al., 2012). For con-
sumption-based CO2 emissions, initial evidence suggests that urban 
areas tend to have much higher emissions than rural areas in non-
Annex  I countries, but the evidence is limited to a few studies on 
India and China (Parikh and Shukla, 1995; Guan et al., 2008, 2009; 
Pachauri and Jiang, 2008; Minx et al., 2011). For Annex  I countries, 
studies suggest that using consumption based CO2 emission account-
ing, urban areas can, but do not always, have higher emissions than 
rural settlements (Lenzen et al., 2006; Heinonen and Junnila, 2011c; 
Minx et al., 2013). 
There are only a few downscaled estimates of CO2 emissions from 
human settlements and urban as well as rural areas, mostly at 
regional and national scales for the EU, United States, China, and 
India (Parshall et  al., 2010; Raupach et  al., 2010; Marcotullio et  al., 
2011, 2012; Gurney et al., 2012). However, these studies provide little 
to no representation of intra-urban features and therefore cannot 
be substitutes for place-based emission studies from cities. Recent 
studies have begun to combine downscaled estimates of CO2 emis-
sions with local urban energy consumption information to gener-
ate fine-scale maps of urban emissions (see Figure 12.7 and Gurney 
Figure 12�6 | Per capita (direct) total final consumption (TFC) of energy (GJ) versus cumulative population (millions) in urban areas. Source:  Grubler et al. (2012).
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Figure 12�7 | Total fossil fuel emissions of Marion County, Indiana, USA, for the year 2002. Left map: Top-down view with numbered zones. Right four panels: Blow ups of num-
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territorial or extended territorial emission estimates (Scope 1 and 
Scope 2 emissions) can be substantially higher. This is mainly due to 
the large fluctuations in territorial emission estimates that are highly 
dependent on a city’s economic structure and trade typology. Con-
sumption-based estimates tend to be more homogenous (see Figure 
12.5).
Based on a global sample of 198 cities by the Global Energy Assess-
ment, Grubler et  al. (2012) found that two out of three cities in 
Annex  I countries have a lower per capita final energy use than 
national levels. In contrast, per capita final energy use for more than 
two out of three cities in non-Annex  I countries have higher than 
national averages (see Figure 12.6). There is not sufficient compara-
ble evidence available for this assessment to confirm this finding for 
energy related CO2 emissions, but this pattern is suggested by the 
close relationship between final energy use and energy related CO2 
emissions. Individual studies for 35 cities in China, Bangkok, and 10 
global cities provide additional evidence of these trends (Dhakal, 
Figure 12�5 | Extended territorial and consumption-based per capita CO2 emissions for 354 urban (yellow / orange / red) and rural (blue) municipalities in England in 2004. The 
extended territorial CO2 emissions accounts assign CO2 emissions from electricity consumption to each municipality’s energy use. The consumption-based carbon footprint accounts 
assign all emissions from the production of goods and services in the global supply chain to the municipality where final consumption takes place. At the 45° line, per capita 
extended territorial and consumption-based CO2 emissions are of equal size. Below the 45° line, consumption-based CO2 emission estimates are larger than extended territorial 
emissions. Above the 45° line, estimates of extended territorial CO2 emissions are larger than consumption-based CO2 emissions. Robust regression lines are shown for the rural 
(blue) and urban (yellow / orange / red) sub-samples. In the inset, the x-axis shows 10 – 15 tonnes of CO2 emissions per capita and the y-axis shows 4 – 16 tonnes of CO2 emissions 
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2009; Aumnad, 2010; Kennedy et  al., 2010; Sovacool and Brown, 
2010). Moreover, the literature suggests that differences in per capita 
energy consumption and CO2 emission patterns of cities in Annex  I 
and non-Annex I countries have converged more than their national 
emissions (Sovacool and Brown, 2010; Sugar et al., 2012). For con-
sumption-based CO2 emissions, initial evidence suggests that urban 
areas tend to have much higher emissions than rural areas in non-
Annex  I countries, but the evidence is limited to a few studies on 
India and China (Parikh and Shukla, 1995; Guan et al., 2008, 2009; 
Pachauri and Jiang, 2008; Minx et al., 2011). For Annex  I countries, 
studies suggest that using consumption based CO2 emission account-
ing, urban areas can, but do not always, have higher emissions than 
rural settlements (Lenzen et al., 2006; Heinonen and Junnila, 2011c; 
Minx et al., 2013). 
There are only a few downscaled estimates of CO2 emissions from 
human settlements and urban as well as rural areas, mostly at 
regional and national scales for the EU, United States, China, and 
India (Parshall et  al., 2010; Raupach et  al., 2010; Marcotullio et  al., 
2011, 2012; Gurney et al., 2012). However, these studies provide little 
to no representation of intra-urban features and therefore cannot 
be substitutes for place-based emission studies from cities. Recent 
studies have begun to combine downscaled estimates of CO2 emis-
sions with local urban energy consumption information to gener-
ate fine-scale maps of urban emissions (see Figure 12.7 and Gurney 
et  al., 2012). Similarly, geographic-demographic approaches have 
been used for downscaling consumption-based estimates (Druckman 
and Jackson, 2008; Minx et al., 2013). Such studies may allow more 
detailed analyses of the drivers of urban energy consumption and 
emissions in the future. 
12�2�3 Future trends in urbanization and GHG 
emissions from human settlements
This section addresses two issues concerning future scenarios of 
urbanization. It summarizes projected future urbanization dynamics in 
multiple dimensions. It assesses and contextualizes scenarios of urban 
population growth, urban expansion, and urban emissions.
12�2�3�1 Dimension 1: Urban population
Worldwide, populations will increasingly live in urban settlements. By 
the middle of the century, the global urban population is expected 
to reach between 5.6 to 7.1 billion, with trends growth varying sub-
stantially across regions (Table 12.2). While highly urbanized North 
America, Europe, Oceania, and Latin America will continue to urbanize, 
the increase in urbanization levels in these regions is relatively small. 
Urbanization will be much more significant in Asia and Africa where 
Figure 12�6 | Per capita (direct) total final consumption (TFC) of energy (GJ) versus cumulative population (millions) in urban areas. Source:  Grubler et al. (2012).
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Figure 12�7 | Total fossil fuel emissions of Marion County, Indiana, USA, for the year 2002. Left map: Top-down view with numbered zones. Right four panels: Blow ups of num-
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the majority of the population is still rural. Urban population growth 
will also largely occur in the less developed Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America. The proportion of rural population in the developed regions 
have declined from about 60 % in 1950 to less than 30 % in 2010, and 
will continue to decline to less than 20 % by 2050. 
Uncertainties in future global urbanization trends are large, due in 
part to different trajectories in economic development and population 
growth. While the United Nations Development Programme (UNPD) 
produces a single urbanization scenario for each country through 2050, 
studies suggests that urbanization processes in different countries and 
different periods of time vary remarkably. Moreover, past UN urbaniza-
tion projections have contained large errors and have tended to overes-
timate urban growth, especially for countries at low and middle urban-
ization levels (Bocquier, 2005; Montgomery, 2008; Alkema et al., 2011).
Given these limitations, recent studies have begun to explore a range of 
urban population growth scenarios. A study undertaken at International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) extrapolates UN scenarios 
to 2100 and develops three alternative scenarios by making assump-
tions about long-term maximum urbanization levels (Grubler et  al., 
2007). However, missing from these scenarios is the full range of uncer-
tainty over the next twenty to thirty years, the period when the majority 
of developing countries will undergo significant urban transitions. For 
instance, variation across different urbanization scenarios before 2030 
is negligible (0.3 %) for India and also very small (< 4 %) for China (see 
Figure 12.8, dashed lines). By 2050, urbanization levels could realisti-
cally reach between 38 – 69 % in India, and 55 – 78 % in China (O’Neill 
et al., 2012). In other words, there are large uncertainties in urbaniza-
tion trajectories for both countries. The speed (fast or slow) as well as 
the nature (an increase in industrialization) of urbanization could lead 
to significant effects on future urban energy use and emissions. 
12�2�3�2 Dimension 2: Urban land cover
Recently, global forecasts of urban expansion that take into account 
population and economic factors have become available (Nelson et al., 
2010; Angel et al., 2011; Seto et al., 2011, 2012). These studies vary in 
their baseline urban extent, model inputs, assumptions about future 
trends in densities, economic and population growth, and modelling 
methods. They forecast that between 2000 and 2030, urban areas will 
expand between 0.3 million to 2.3 million km2, corresponding to an 
increase between 56 % to 310 % (see Table 12.3 and Angel et al., 2011; 
Seto et al., 2011, 2012). It is important to note that these studies fore-
cast changes in urban land cover (features of Earth’s surface) and not 
changes in the built environment and infrastructure (e. g., buildings, 
roads). However, these forecasts of urban land cover can be useful to 
project infrastructure development and associated emissions. Given 
worldwide trends of declining densities, the zero population density 
decline scenario and associated urban growth forecast (0.3 million) 
is unlikely, as is the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) A1 
scenario of very rapid economic growth and a peak in global popula-
tion mid-century. According to the studies, the most likely scenarios 
are SRES B2 (Seto et al., 2011), > 75 % probability (Seto et al., 2012), 
and 2 % decline (Angel et al., 2011), which reduces the range of fore-
cast estimates to between 1.1 to 1.5 million km2 of new urban land. 
This corresponds to an increase in urban land cover between 110 % 
to 210 % over the 2000 global urban extent. Hurtt et al. (2011) report 
Figure 12�8 | Projected urban population growth for India and China under fast, central, and slow growth scenarios (left) and associated growth in CO2 emissions (right). Sources: 































































Table 12�2 | Global urban population in 2050 (mid-year)
Source
Total Pop� % Urban Pop�
in billions Urban in billions
IIASA Greenhouse Gas Index, A2R Scenario 10.245 69 7.069
World Bank 9.417 67 6.308
United Nations 9.306 67 6.252
IIASA Greenhouse Gas Index, B2 Scenario 9.367 66 6.182
IIASA Greenhouse Gas Index, B1 Scenario 8.721 64 5.581
Sources: IIASA (2009), UN DESA (2012), World Bank (2013).
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projected land-use transitions including urbanization, out to 2100, for 
the intended use in Earth System Models (ESMs). However, they do not 
give a detailed account of the projected urban expansion in different 
parts of the world.
Depending on the scenario and forecast, 55 % of the total urban land in 
2030 is expected to be built in the first three decades of the 21st century. 
Nearly half of the global growth in urban land cover is forecasted to occur 
in Asia, and 55 % of the regional growth will take place in China and 
India (Seto et al., 2012). China’s urban land area is expected to expand by 
almost 220,000 km2 by 2030, and account for 18 % of the global increase 
in urban land cover (Seto et al., 2012). These forecasts provide first-order 
estimates of the likelihood that expansion of urban areas will occur in 
areas of increasing vulnerability to extreme climate events including 
floods, storm surges, sea level rise, droughts, and heat waves (see WGII 
AR5 Chapter 8). Urban expansion and associated land clearing and loss 
of aboveground biomass carbon in the pan-tropics is expected to be 1.38 
PgC between 2000 and 2030, or 0.05 PgC / yr (Seto et al., 2012). 
12�2�3�3 Dimension 3: GHG emissions
Recent developments in integrated models are beginning to capture the 
interdependence among urban population, urban land cover, and GHG 
emissions. Some integrated models have found that changes in urban-
ization in China and India have a less than proportional effect on aggre-
gate emissions and energy use (O’Neill et al., 2012). These studies find 
that income effects due to economic growth and urbanization result 
in household consumption shifts toward cleaner cooking fuels (O’Neill 
et al., 2012). In India, the urbanization level in 2050 will be 16 percent-
age points lower under the slow urbanization scenario than under the 
central scenario, or 15 percentage points higher under the fast scenario 
than under the central scenario. However, these large differences in 
potential urbanization levels in India lead to relatively small differences 
in emissions: 7 % between the slow and central urbanization scenarios, 
and 6 % between the fast and central urbanization scenarios (O’Neill 
et al., 2012). The relatively small effect of urbanization on emissions is 
likely due to relatively small differences in per capita income between 
rural and urban areas (O’Neill et al., 2012). In contrast, large differences 
in per capita income between urban and rural areas in China result in 
significant differences in household consumption, including for energy 
(O’Neill et al., 2012). Differences in urbanization pathways also reflect 
different speeds of transition away from the use of traditional fuels 
toward modern fuels such as electricity and natural gas (Krey et  al., 
2012). Slower rates of urbanization result in slower transitions away 
from traditional to modern fuels (Jiang and O’Neill, 2004; Pachauri and 
Jiang, 2008). A large share of solid fuels or traditional biomass in the 
final energy mix can have adverse health impacts due to indoor air pol-
lution (Bailis et al., 2005; Venkataraman et al., 2010).
Accounting for uncertainties in urban population growth, the scenarios 
show that urbanization as a demographic process does not lead to a 
Table 12�3 | Forecasts of global urban land expansion to 2030. Sources: Angel et al. (2011), Seto et al. (2011, 2012).
Study Scenario
Projected Urban Expansion to 2030 (km2) % of projected 
urban land in 
















SRES A1 726,943 107,551 1,354,001 296,638 407,214 73,176 16,996 2,255,576 
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corresponding growth in emissions and energy use (Figure 12.8b). In 
China, for example, under the central scenario (similar to UN projec-
tions) the country will reach 70 % urban population by 2050 and the 
total carbon emissions will reach 11 GtC / yr. Under the slow urbaniza-
tion scenario, the urbanization level is 13 % lower than the central 
urbanization scenario, but results in emissions that are 9 % lower than 
under the central urbanization scenario. Similarly, the fast urbanization 
scenario results in emissions that are 7 % higher than under the central 
scenario, but with urbanization levels that are 11 % higher.
Studies of the effects of demographic change on GHG emissions come to 
contradicting conclusions (Dalton et al., 2008; Kronenberg, 2009). Many 
of the forecasts on urbanization also do not explicitly account for the 
infrastructure for which there is a separate set of forecasts (Davis et al., 
2010; Kennedy and Corfee-Morlot, 2013; Müller et al., 2013) including 
those developed by the IEA (IEA, 2013) and the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (OECD, 2006b, 2007). 
However these infrastructure forecasts, typically by region or country, 
do not specify the portion of the forecasted infrastructure in urban areas 
and other settlements. One study finds that both ageing and urbaniza-
tion can have substantial impacts on emissions in certain world regions 
such as the United States, the EU, China, and India. Globally, a 16 – 29 % 
reduction in the emissions by 2050 (1.4 – 2.5 GtC / yr) could be achieved 
through slowing population growth (O’Neill et al., 2010).
12.3 Urban systems: 
Activities, resources, 
and performance
How does urbanization influence global or regional CO2 emissions? This 
section discusses drivers of urban GHG emissions, how they affect differ-
ent sectors, and their interaction and interdependence. The magnitude 
of their impact on urban GHG emissions is also discussed qualitatively 
and quantitatively to provide context for a more detailed assessment of 
urban form and infrastructure (12.4) and spatial planning (12.5). 
12�3�1 Overview of drivers of urban GHG 
emissions
Urban areas and nations share some common drivers of GHG emis-
sions. Other drivers of urban GHG emissions are distinct from national 
drivers and are locally specific. The previous section discussed impor-
tant accounting issues that affect the estimation of urban-scale GHG 
emissions. (For a more comprehensive review, see Kennedy et  al., 
2009; ICLEI et  al., 2012; Ramaswami et  al., 2012b; Steinberger and 
Weisz, 2013). Another characteristic of urban areas is that their physi-
cal form and structure in terms of land-use mix and patterns, density, 
and spatial configuration of infrastructure can strongly influence GHG 
emissions (see discussion below and in 12.4). The basic constituent 
elements of cities such as streets, public spaces, buildings, and their 
design, placement, and function reflect their socio-political, economic, 
and technological histories (Kostof, 1992; Morris, 1994; Kostof and 
Tobias, 1999). Hence, cities often portray features of ‘path dependency’ 
(Arthur, 1989), a historical contingency that is compounded by the 
extent of pre-existing policies and market failures that have lasting 
impacts on emissions (see Section 12.6 below). 
The following sections group and discuss urban GHG emission drivers 
into four clusters that reflect both the specificity of urban scale emis-
sions as well as their commonality with national-scale drivers of GHG 
emissions addressed in the other chapters of this assessment:
•	 Economic geography and income 
•	 Socio-demographic factors
•	 Technology
•	 Infrastructure and urban form
Economic geography refers to the function of a human settlement 
within the global hierarchy of places and the international division of 
labour, as well as the resulting trade flows of raw materials, energy, 
manufactured goods, and services. Income refers to the scale of eco-
nomic activity, often expressed through measures of Gross Regional 
Product (GRP) (i. e., the GDP equivalent at the scale of human settle-
ments), calculated either as an urban (or settlement) total, or normal-
ized on a per capita basis. 
Socio-demographic drivers of urban GHG emissions include popula-
tion structure and dynamics (e. g., population size, age distribution, 
and household characteristics) (O’Neill et al., 2010) as well as cultural 
norms (e. g., consumption and lifestyle choices) and distributional and 
equity factors (e. g., access or lack thereof to basic urban infrastruc-
ture). Unequal access to housing and electricity is a significant social 
problem in many rapidly growing cities of the Global South (Grubler 
and Schulz, 2013) and shapes patterns of urban development. Here, 
‘technology’ refers to macro-level drivers such as the technology of 
manufacturing and commercial activities. ‘Infrastructure’ and ‘urban 
form’ refer to the patterns and spatial arrangements of land use, trans-
portation systems, and urban design elements (Lynch, 1981; Handy, 
1996) and are discussed in greater detail in Section 12.4.
12�3�1�1 Emission drivers decomposition via IPAT
Explaining GHG emission growth trends via decomposition analy-
sis is a widely used technique in the scientific literature and within 
IPCC assessments ever since Kaya (1990). The so-called IPAT identity 
(for a review, see Chertow, 2000) is a multiplicative identity in which 
Impacts (e. g., emissions) are described as being the product of Popula-
tion x Affluence x Technology. First derivatives (growth rates) of the 
components of this identity become additive, thus allowing a first 
analysis on the relative weight of different drivers. The IPAT identity is 
Figure 12�9 | Decomposition of urban-scale CO2 emissions (absolute difference over time period specified (dark blue) and renormalized to index 1 (other colours)) for four Chinese 
cities 1985 to 2006. Source: Grubler et al. (2012) based on Dhakal (2009). Note the ‘economic effect’ in the graph corresponds to an income effect as discussed in the text. For 
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a growth accounting framework and does not lend itself to explaining 
differences between urban settlements in terms of absolute GHG emis-
sion levels and their driving forces (see discussion below). 
There is great interest in understanding the drivers of China’s urban 
GHG emissions, which has resulted in a large literature on the decom-
position of GHG emissions for Chinese megacities. With approximately 
10 tonnes of CO2 per urban capita — three times the national aver-
age — China approaches and in some cases, surpasses levels for Annex-
I countries and cities (Dhakal, 2009). Studies have used national emis-
sion inventory methods following the IPCC / OECD guidelines (Dhakal, 
2009; Chong et al., 2012) or input-output techniques (Wang et al., 2013) 
and thus have used both production and consumption accounting per-
spectives. Studies have also gone beyond the simple IPAT accounting 
framework, such as using index decomposition (Donglan et al., 2010). 
Together, these studies show considerable variation in per capita GHG 
emissions across Chinese cities (see, for example, Figure 12.9). Although 
the relative contribution of different drivers of emissions varies across 
cities and time periods, one study of several Chinese cities found that 
income is the most important driver of increases in urban carbon emis-
sions, far surpassing population growth, with improvements in energy 
efficiency serving as a critical counterbalancing factor to income 
growth (Dhakal, 2009). The importance of economic growth as a driver 
of urban CO2 emissions in China has been consistently corroborated in 
other studies, including those that examine relatively smaller cities and 
with the use of alternative types of data and methods (Li et al., 2010; 
Liu et al., 2012; Chong et al., 2012; Jiang and Lin, 2012). 
However, the evidence on whether the gains in efficiency can counterbal-
ance the scale of infrastructure construction and income growth in China 
is less conclusive. Several studies implemented at different spatial scales 
have found that the scale of urbanization and associated consumption 
growth in China have outpaced gains from improvements in efficiency 
(Peters et al., 2007; Feng et al., 2012; Güneralp and Seto, 2012). Other 
studies have found that improvements in efficiency offset the increase 
in consumption (Liu et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2009; Minx et al., 2011).
The literature on drivers of urban GHG emissions in other non-Annex I 
countries is more sparse, often focusing on emission drivers at the sec-
toral level such as transport (Mraihi et al., 2013) or household energy 
use (Ekholm et al., 2010). In these sectoral studies, income and other 
factors (that are highly correlated with income) such as vehicle owner-
ship and household discount rates, are also shown as important deter-
mining variables.
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Decomposition analyses are available for cities in the United States 
(Glaeser and Kahn, 2010), the UK (Minx et al., 2013), Japan (Makido 
et  al., 2012), and Australia (Wiedenhofer et  al., 2013). These studies 
show that income is an important driver of urban GHG emissions. 
Studies using more disaggregated emission accounts complement 
these findings by also identifying other significant influencing fac-
tors including automobile dependence, household size, and education 
(Minx et al., 2013) or additional variables such as climate represented 
by heating- or cooling-degree days (Wiedenhofer et al., 2013). The lat-
ter two studies are of particular interest as they provide an in-depth 
analysis of the determining variables of urban GHG emissions using 
both production and consumption-based accounting approaches. In 
both accounting approaches, income emerges as an important deter-
minant of urban GHG emissions. 
12�3�1�2 Interdependence between drivers 
The drivers outlined above vary in their ability to be influenced by local 
decision making. It is difficult to isolate the individual impact of any of 
these factors on urban energy use and GHG emissions since they are 
linked and often interact across different spatial and temporal scales. 
The interaction among the factors and the relative importance of each 
will vary from place to place. Moreover, many of these factors change 
over time and exhibit path dependence. 
A legitimate concern with the IPAT decomposition approach is that 
the analysis assumes variable independence, thus ignoring variable 
interdependence and co-variance. For instance, a study of 225 cities 
suggests a robust negative correlation between per capita income 
levels and energy intensity (Grubler et al., 2012) that holds for both 
high-income as well as low-income cities. Income growth has the 
potential to drive investment in technology, changing investment in 
newer and more efficient technologies, as higher income segments 
have lower discount rates or higher tolerance to longer payback 
times (Hausman, 1979).
12�3�1�3 Human settlements, linkages to sectors, and 
policies
The major drivers discussed above affect urban GHG emissions through 
their influence on energy demand in buildings, transport, industry, and 
services. These can be mitigated through demand-side management 
options. As such, human settlements cut across the assessment of miti-
gation options in sector-specific chapters of this Assessment (see Table 
12.4). The drivers also affect the demand for urban energy, water, and 
waste infrastructure systems, whose GHG emissions can be mitigated 
via technological improvements within each individual infrastructure 
system (e. g., methane recovery from municipal wastewater treatment 
plants and landfills) as well as through improved system integration 
(e. g., using urban waste as an energy source). Given the interdepen-
dence between drivers and across driver groups discussed above, 
independent sectoral assessments have limitations and risk omitting 
important mitigation potentials that arise from systems integration.
On one hand, governance and institutions for addressing mitigation 
options at the urban scale are more dispersed (see 12.6) and face 
a legacy of inadequately addressing a range of market failures (see 
Box 12.3). On the other hand, the urban scale also provides unique 
opportunities for policy integration between urban form and density, 
infrastructure planning, and demand management options. These are 
key, especially in the domain of urban transport systems. Lastly, gov-
ernance and institutional capacity are scale and income dependent, 
i. e., tend to be weaker in smaller scale cities and in low income / rev-
enue settings. In so far as the bulk of urban growth momentum is 
expected to unfold in small- to medium-size cities in non-Annex  I 
countries (see Section 12.2), mitigation of GHG emissions at the scale 
of human settlements faces a new type of ‘governance paradox’ 
(Grubler et  al., 2012): the largest opportunities for GHG emission 
reduction (or avoidance of unfettered emission growth) might be pre-
cisely in urban areas where governance and institutional capacities 
to address them are weakest (Bräutigam and Knack, 2004; Rodrik 
et al., 2004).
12�3�2 Weighing of drivers
This section assesses the relative importance of the GHG drivers in dif-
ferent urban contexts such as size, scale, and age, and examines the 
differences between cities in developed and developing countries.
12�3�2�1 Qualitative weighting
In the previous discussion of the respective role of different emission 
drivers, the emphasis was placed on the role of drivers in terms of 
emission growth. That perspective is complemented in this section by a 
consideration of the absolute level of emissions, and the issue of urban 
size / scale. This section also differentiates the role of emission drivers 
between mature versus growing human settlements.
Importance of size and scaling
Given the significance of human settlements for global resource use, 
an improved understanding of their size distribution and likely growth 
dynamics is crucial. For many physical, biological, social, and techno-
logical systems, robust quantitative regularities like stable patterns of 
rank distributions have been observed. Examples of such power law-
scaling patterns include phenomena like the frequency of vocabulary 
in languages, the hierarchy of urban population sizes across the world 
(Zipf, 1949; Berry and Garrison, 1958; Krugman, 1996) or the allome-
tric scaling patterns in biology, such as Kleiber’s Law, which observes 
the astonishing constancy in the relation between body mass and 
metabolic rates: for living organisms across many orders of magnitude 
in size that metabolic rate scales to the ¾ power of the body mass 
(Kleiber, 1961). There is a vigorous debate in many fields, including 
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Geography (Batty, 2007, 2008), Ecology (Levin, 1992; West et al., 1999; 
Brown et al., 2004), Architecture (Weinstock, 2011), and Physics (Car-
valho and Penn, 2004) about the extent to which underlying hierarchi-
cal networks of metabolic systems or transportation networks are the 
ultimate causes of the size, shape and rank-distribution of entities, be 
they organisms or urban systems (Decker et al., 2000, 2007).
With the scale of urbanization trends currently underway, whether the 
relationship between city size and GHG emissions is linear (i. e., one to 
one, or proportional increase), super-linear (i. e., increasing returns to 
scale) or sub-linear (i. e., economies of scale such as efficiency gains 
through shared infrastructure) will be critical for understanding future 
urban GHG emissions. Super-linear scaling has been observed for many 
urban phenomena: as a city’s population increases, there is a greater 
than one to one increase in productivity, wages, and innovation as well 
as crime (Bettencourt et  al., 2007, 2010). If cities exhibit sub-linear 
scaling with respective to energy and GHG emissions, it suggests that 
larger cities are more efficient than smaller ones. While there are many 
studies of urban scaling, few studies explicitly examine city size and 
GHG emissions or energy use, and the limited empirical evidence on 
the scaling relationship is inconclusive. A study of 930 urban areas in 
the United States — nearly all the urban settlements — shows a barely 
sub-linear relationship (coefficient=0.93) between urban population 
size and GHG emissions (Fragkias et al., 2013). 
In a study of 225 cities across both Annex I and non-Annex I countries, 
Grubler and Schulz (2013) find non-uniform scaling for urban final 
energy use, with a distribution characterized by threshold effects 
across an overall convex distribution (Figure 12.10). In terms of final 
energy use, which is an important determinant of urban GHG emis-
sions, increasing the urban scale in terms of energy use has different 
implications as a function of three different urban energy scale classes. 
Small cities with low levels of final energy use — below 30 PJ — pres-
ent the steepest growth in energy use with respect to increasing city 
size: a doubling of rank position tends to increase the urban energy 
use by a factor of 6.1. For medium-sized cities with moderate energy 
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use (between 30 and 500 PJ final energy use per city), a doubling of 
city rank corresponds to an increase in energy consumption only by a 
factor of 1.6. For the largest urban energy users in the dataset, cities 
with greater than 500 PJ of final energy use per year, a doubling of 
urban rank is associated with an increase in urban energy use by a fac-
tor of only 0.5. This indicates considerable positive agglomeration 
economies of bigger cities with respect to energy use. Only four urban 
agglomerations of the entire sample of 225 have an annual final 
energy use significantly greater than one EJ: Shanghai (2 EJ), Moscow 
(1.6 EJ), Los Angeles (1.5 EJ), and Beijing (1.2 EJ). With urban growth 
anticipated to be the most rapid in the smaller cities of fewer than 
500,000 inhabitants (UN DESA, 2010), the patterns observed by 
(Grubler and Schulz, 2013) suggest very high elasticities of energy 
demand growth with respect to future increases in urban population. 
Mature versus growing cities
The relative impacts of the four drivers on emissions differ depending 
upon whether urban areas are established and mature versus growing 
and developing. 
Economic geography and income have high impact for both mature 
and growing cities. Mature cities in developed countries often have 
high income, high consumption, and are net consumers of goods and 
services, with a large share of imports. These cities have high emis-
sions, depending upon the energy supply mix. Many imported goods 
are produced in growing cities in developing countries. The resulting 
differentiation within the international division of labour and corre-
sponding trade flows can be categorized into three types of cities: Net 
Producers, Trade Balanced, and Net Consumers (Chavez and Ramas-
wami, 2013). As a result, differences in reported urban GHG emissions 
are pronounced for Net Producer and Net Consumer cities, illustrat-
ing the critical importance of taking economic geography and inter-
national trade into account when considering urban GHG emission 
inventory frameworks. The degree to which economic growth drives 
GHG emissions includes the type of economic specialization of urban 
activities and the energy supply mix (Brownsword et  al., 2005; Ken-
nedy et  al., 2012). Cities with energy intensive industries are likely 
to contribute higher total and per capita GHG emissions than those 
whose economic base is in the service sector (Dhakal, 2009, 2010). 
 
Figure 12�10 | Rank size distribution of 225 cities in terms of their final energy use (in EJ) regrouped into 3 subsamples (> 0.5EJ, 0.03 – 0.5EJ, < 0.03EJ) and corresponding sample 
statistics. The rank of a city is its position in the list of all cities sorted by size, measured in terms of final energy use. Note the different elasticities of energy use with respect to 
changes in urban size rank. The factors (slopes) shown in the figure detail the increase of energy use when doubling the rank for the respective groups. Source: Grubler et al. (2012) 
based on Grubler and Schulz (2013).
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Specialization in energy-intensive sectors creates a strong correlation 
between economic growth and GHG emissions growth. This relation-
ship is further strengthened if the energy supply mix is carbon inten-
sive (Parikh and Shukla, 1995; Sugar et al., 2012). 
Higher urban incomes are correlated with higher consumption of 
energy and GHG emissions (Kahn, 2009; Satterthwaite, 2009; Kennedy 
et  al., 2009; Weisz and Steinberger, 2010; Zheng et  al., 2010; Hoo-
rnweg et  al., 2011; Marcotullio et  al., 2012). At the household level, 
studies in a variety of different countries (Netherland, India, Brazil, 
Denmark, Japan, and Australia) have also noted positive correlations 
between income and energy use (Vringer and Blok, 1995; Cohen et al., 
2005; Lenzen et  al., 2006; Pachauri and Jiang, 2008; Sahakian and 
Steinberger, 2011). As such, income exerts a high influence on GHG 
emissions. The Global Energy Assessment concluded that cities in non-
Annex  I countries generally have much higher levels of energy use 
compared to the national average, in contrast to cities in Annex I coun-
tries, which generally have lower energy use per capita than national 
averages (see Figure 12.6 and Grubler et  al., 2012). One reason for 
this inverse pattern is due to the significantly higher urban to rural 
income gradient in cities in non-Annex I countries compared to Annex I 
countries. That is, per capita incomes in non-Annex I cities tend to be 
several fold higher than rural per capita incomes, thus leading to much 
higher energy use and resulting emissions. 
Socio-demographic drivers are of medium importance in rapidly 
growing cities, further mediated as growth rates decline, incomes 
increase and lifestyle choices change. Social demographic drivers are 
of relatively small importance in mature cities, where growth is slow 
and populations are ageing.  Household size, defined as the number 
of persons in a household, has been steadily declining over the last 
fifty years. Worldwide, average household size declined from 3.6 to 
2.7 between 1950 to 1990, and this trend is occurring in both devel-
oped and developing countries although at different rates (MacKellar 
et  al., 1995; Bongaarts, 2001). Smaller household size is correlated 
with higher per capita emissions, whereas larger household size can 
take advantage of economies of scale. Evidence on the relationship 
between urban population size and per capita emissions is inconclu-
sive. Scale effects have been shown for cities in Asia (Marcotullio et al., 
2012) but little to no scaling effect for GHG emissions in the United 
States (Fragkias et al., 2013).
Infrastructure and urban form are of medium to high impor-
tance as drivers of emissions. In rapidly growing cities, infrastruc-
ture is of high importance where the largest share of infrastructure 
construction is occurring. In mature cities, urban form drivers are of 
high importance as they set in place patterns of transport and other 
energy use behaviour. In mature cities, infrastructure is of medium 
importance, as they are largely established, and thus refurbishing or 
repurposing of old infrastructures offers primary mitigation opportu-
nities. The global expansion of infrastructure used to support urban-
ization is a key driver of emissions across multiple sectors. Due to 
the high capital costs, increasing returns, and network externalities 
related to infrastructures that provide fundamental services to cit-
ies, emissions associated with infrastructure systems are particularly 
prone to lock-in (Unruh and Carrillo-Hermosilla, 2006; Unruh, 2002, 
2000). The committed emissions from energy and transportation 
infrastructures are especially high, with respective ranges of commit-
ted CO2 of 127 – 336 and 63 – 132 Gt (Davis et al., 2010). For example, 
the GHG emissions from primary production alone for new infrastruc-
ture development for non-Annex I countries are projected to be 350 
Gt CO2 (Müller et  al., 2013). For a detailed discussion see Sections 
12.4 and 12.5.
Technology is a driver of high importance. Income and scale exert 
important influences on the mitigation potential for technologies. 
While lock-in may limit the rate of mitigation in mature cities, the 
opportunity exists in rapidly growing cities to leapfrog to new technol-
ogies. For mature cities, technology is important due to agglomeration 
externalities, Research and Development (R&D) and knowledge con-
centration, and access to capital that facilitate the development and 
early deployment of low-carbon technologies (Grubler et  al., 2012). 
For rapidly growing cities, the importance of technology as a driver 
may be low for systems with high capital requirements but high for 
less capital-intensive (e. g., some demand-side efficiency or distributed 
supply) systems. The influence of all drivers depends upon governance, 
institutions, and finance (Section 12.6).
12�3�2�2 Relative weighting of drivers for sectoral 
mitigation options
Drivers affect GHG emissions via influence on energy demand (includ-
ing demand management) in buildings (households and services), 
transport, and industry, as well as on energy supply, water, and waste 
systems. Over time, structural transitions change both the shares of 
emissions by sectors — with industrial, then services and transport 
shares of final energy increasing with development (Schäfer, 2005; 
Hofman, 2007) — as well as the relative importance of drivers. Eco-
nomic geography has a large influence on emissions from the industry 
and service sectors (Ramaswami, 2013) plus international transport 
(bunkers fuels). These influences are particularly pronounced in urban 
agglomerations with very porous economies. For example Schulz 
(2010) analyzed Singapore and found that GHG emission embodied 
in the imports and exports of the city are five to six times larger than 
the emissions from the direct primary energy use of the city’s popula-
tion. Similarly, Grubler et al. (2012) examined New York and London, 
which are global transportation hubs for international air travel and 
maritime commerce. As a result, international aviation and maritime 
fuels (bunker fuels) make up about one-third of the total direct energy 
use of these cities, even if associated emissions are often excluded in 
inventories, following a practice also used in national GHG emission 
inventories (Macknick, 2011).
Income has a large influence on direct emissions due to energy use 
in buildings by influencing the floor area of residential dwellings, 
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the amount of commercial floor space and services purchased, and 
buildings’ energy intensities (see Table 9.2), and also on transport, 
including increasing vehicle ownership, activity, energy intensity and 
infrastructure (see Chapter 8.2). Income also has large indirect effects 
on emissions, for example influencing the number of products pur-
chased (e. g., increasing sales of electronics) (see Chapter 10.2) and 
their energy intensity (e. g., consumables like food) (see Chapter 11.4), 
perhaps produced by the industrial and services sectors somewhere 
else, and transported to the consumers (increasing freight transport 
activity).
Social demographic drivers have a large effect on emissions, particu-
larly in buildings (e. g., number of households, persons per household, 
see Chapter 9.2.2) and transport sectors (see Chapter 8.2.1). Infrastruc-
ture and urban form have a large impact on transport (Chapter 8.4) 
and medium impact on energy systems (grid layout and economics) 
(see Chapter 7.6). Technology has a large impact in all sectors. Income 
interacts with technology, increasing both innovative (e. g., R&D) and 
adoptive capacity (purchases and replacement rate of products, which 
in turn can increase energy efficiency). In demand sectors, mitigation 
from efficiency may be mediated by behaviours impacting consump-
tion (e. g., more efficient yet larger televisions or refrigerators, or more 
efficient but larger or more powerful vehicles). See the sectoral Chap-
ters 7 – 11 for further discussion of these issues.
12�3�2�3 Quantitative modelling to determine driver 
weights
An inherent difficulty in any assessment of emission drivers at the 
urban scale is that both mitigation options as well as policy levers 
are constrained by the legacy of past decisions as reflected in existing 
urban spatial structures and infrastructures, the built environment, and 
economic structures. Modelling studies that simulate alternative devel-
opment strategies, even the entire evolution of a human settlement, or 
that explore the effects of policy integration across sectors can shed 
additional light on the relative weight of drivers as less constrained or 
entirely unconstrained by the existing status quo or by more limited 
sectoral assessment perspectives. 
For instance, large-scale urban simulation models have been used to 
study the joint effects of policy integration such as pursuing smart-
growth planning that restricts urban sprawl with market-based pric-
ing mechanisms. One study of metropolitan regions in OECD countries 
concludes that policies such as those that encourage higher urban 
densities and road tolls such as congestion charges have lower sta-
bilization costs than economy-wide approaches such as a carbon tax 
(Crassous et  al., 2006; OECD, 2010a) . Models suggest that adding 
substantially upgraded urban services to the mix of bundled strate-
gies yields even greater benefits. A meta-analysis of 14 urban simula-
tions of scenarios with varying degrees of urban containment, road 
pricing, and transit services upgrades forecasted median transporta-
tion demand volumes (VKT, vehicle-kilometre-travelled) reductions of 
3.9 % within 10 years, rising to 15.8 % declines over 40 years (Rodier, 
2009). Estimates from a review of published studies of U. S. cities fore-
casted a 5 % to 12 % VKT reduction from doubling residential densi-
ties and as high as 25 % reductions when combined with other strate-
gies, including road pricing (National Research Council, 2009a). GHG 
emissions were estimated to decline 11 % from the most aggressive 
combination of densification and market-based pricing. The combina-
tion of introducing VKT charges, upgrading transit, and more compact 
development from simulation studies in Helsinki, Dortmund, Edin-
burgh, and Sacramento yielded simulation-model estimates of 14.5 % 
reductions in VKT within 10 years and 24.1 % declines over 40 years 
(Rodier, 2009). 
A more holistic modelling strategy with a much larger system bound-
ary was followed with the Sincity model, a combined engineering-
type systems-optimization model that integrates agent-based and 
spatially explicit modelling of urban form and density with transport 
and energy infrastructure planning to simulate the entire evolution of 
a ‘synthetic’ city (Keirstead and Shah, 2013; Steinberger and Weisz, 
2013) or of large scale new urban developments (Hao et  al., 2011). 
Using an illustrative European city of 20,000 inhabitants and with a 
service dominated economy (i. e., holding the economic geography and 
income variables constant), alternative urban designs were explored to 
separate out the various effects of different policy measures in deter-
mining urban energy use. The results suggest that compared to a base-
line (sprawl city with current practice technologies), improvements by 
a factor of two each were possible by either a combination of energy 
efficiency measures for the urban building stock and the vehicle fleet, 
versus modifying urban form and density. Conversely energy systems 
optimization through cogeneration and distributed energy systems 
were found to yield improvements of between 15 – 30 % (Keirstead and 
Shah, 2013; Steinberger and Weisz, 2013). The largest improvements of 
a factor of three were found through an integration of policy measures 
across all domains. 
12�3�2�4 Conclusions on drivers of GHG emissions at the 
urban scale 
Perhaps the most significant conclusion emerging from Section 12.2 
and above discussion of urban GHG emission drivers is the realiza-
tion that the traditional distinction between Annex I and non-Annex I 
becomes increasingly blurred at the urban scale. There is an increas-
ing number of cities, particularly in the rapidly growing economies of 
Asia, where per capita resource use, energy consumption, and asso-
ciated GHG emissions are not different from the ones in developed 
economies. A second important conclusion is that economic geog-
raphy and income by themselves are often such important drivers 
of urban GHG emissions that they dwarf the effects of technology 
choices or of place-based policy variables of urban form and infra-
structures. However, the latter policy options are those for which 
urban-scale decision making can make the largest impact on GHG 
emissions.
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A more detailed discussion on the different leverage effects of urban 
scale policy options using the example of urban energy use is provided 
in the Global Energy Assessment, Chapter 18 (Grubler et  al., 2012), 
which can be combined with above assessment on the relative weight 
of emission drivers to derive a categorization of urban policy interven-
tion levels as a function of potential impacts on emissions as well as 
the degree to which policy interventions can be implemented by 
urban-scale decision making processes by local governments, firms, 
and individuals (Figure 12.11). 
The categorization in Figure 12.11 is necessarily stylized. It will vary 
across local contexts, but it helps to disentangle the impacts of 
macro- from micro-drivers. For instance, urban GHG emission levels 
will be strongly influenced by differences in urban function, such as 
the role of a city as a manufacturing centre for international markets, 
versus a city providing service functions to its regional or national 
hinterlands. Conversely, the emissions impact from smaller-scale 
decisions such as increasing local and urban-scale renewable energy 
flows — which has been assessed to be very limited, particularly for 
larger and more dense cities (Grubler et al., 2012) — is much smaller. 
The largest leverage on urban GHG emissions from urban scale deci-
sion making thus is at the ‘meso’ scale level of the energy / emissions 
and urban policy hierarchy: improving the efficiency of equipment 
used in a city, improving and integrating urban infrastructure, and 
shaping urban form towards low carbon pathways. Pursuing multi-
ple strategies simultaneously at this scale may be most effective at 
reducing the urban-related emissions. This conclusion echoes con-
cepts such as integrated community-energy-management strategies 
(Jaccard et al., 1997). 
12�3�3 Motivation for assessment of spatial 
planning, infrastructure, and urban form 
drivers 
Urban form and infrastructure significantly affect direct (operational) 
and indirect (embodied) GHG emissions, and are strongly linked to the 
throughput of materials and energy in a city, the waste that it gen-
erates, and system efficiencies of a city. Mitigation options vary by 
city type and development levels. The options available for rapidly 
developing cities include shaping their urbanization and infrastruc-
ture development trajectories. For mature, built-up cities, mitigation 
options lie in urban regeneration (compact, mixed-use development 
that shortens journeys, promotes transit / walking / cycling, adaptive 
reuse of buildings) and rehabilitation / conversion to energy-efficient 
building designs. Urban form and infrastructure are discussed in detail 
in Section 12.4. A combination of integrated sustainable infrastructure 
(Section 12.4), spatial planning (Section 12.5), and market-based and 
regulatory instruments (Section 12.6) can increase efficiencies and 
reduce GHG emissions in already built-up cities and direct urban and 
infrastructure development to reduce the growth of GHG emissions in 
rapidly expanding cities in developing countries.
12.4 Urban form and 
infrastructure
Urban form and structure are the patterns and spatial arrangements of 
land use, transportation systems, and urban design elements, including 
the physical urban extent, layout of streets and buildings, as well as 
the internal configuration of settlements (Lynch, 1981; Handy, 1996). 
Infrastructure comprises services and built-up structures that support 
the functions and operations of cities, including transport infrastruc-
ture, water supply systems, sanitation and wastewater management, 
solid waste management, drainage and flood protection, telecom-
munications, and power generation and distribution. There is a strong 
connection between infrastructure and urban form (Kelly, 1993; Guy 
and Marvin, 1996), but the causal order is not fully resolved (Handy, 
2005). Transport, energy, and water infrastructure are powerful instru-
ments in shaping where urban development occurs and in what forms 
(Hall, 1993; Moss, 2003; Muller, 2004). The absence of basic infrastruc-
ture often — but not always — inhibits urban development. 
This section assesses the literature on urban form and infrastructure 
drivers of GHG emissions, details what data exist, the ranges, effects 
on emissions, and their interplay with the drivers discussed in Sec-
tion 12.3. Based on this assessment, conclusions are drawn on the 
diversity of favourable urban forms and infrastructure highlighting 
caveats and conflicting goals. This literature is dominated by case 
studies of cities in developed countries. The literature on conditions 
in developing country cities, especially for large parts of Africa, is 
Figure 12�11 | Stylized hierarchy of drivers of urban GHG emissions and policy lever-
ages by urban scale decision making. Cities have little control over some of the most 
important drivers of GHG emissions and have large control over comparatively smaller 
drivers of emissions. Source: Synthesized from Jaccard et al. (1997), Grubler et al. (2012) 
and this assessment.
Level of Urban 
Policy Leverage











Technology: Efficiency of Energy End-Use 
(Buildings, Processes, Vehicles, Appliances)





Energy Systems Integration 
(Co-Generation, Heat-Cascading)





Human Settlements, Infrastructure, and Spatial Planning
12
Chapter 12
Figure 12�12 | (a) Total fuel-related per-capita CO2 emissions in 2008 by country (red / orange / yellow and blue bars) compared to the global per-capita emission level in 2050 to reach 
the 2 °C target with a 50 – 75 % probability; (b) Carbon Replacement Value (CRV2008) per capita of existing stocks by country (red / orange and blue) and as yet unbuilt stocks if develop-
ing countries converge on the current average Annex I level (light yellow background area); (c) comparison with emission budget for the period 2000 – 2050 to reach the 2 °C target 
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particularly limited. This assessment reflects this limitation in the lit-
erature. 
12�4�1 Infrastructure 
Infrastructure affects GHG emissions primarily during three phases in 
its lifecycle: 1) construction, 2) use / operation, and 3) end-of-life.  The 
production of infrastructure materials such as concrete and metals is 
energy and carbon intensive (Cole, 1998; Horvath, 2004). For example, 
the manufacturing of steel and cement, two of the most common infra-
structure materials, contributed to nearly 9 % and 7 %, respectively, of 
global carbon emissions in 2006 (Allwood et al., 2010). Globally, the 
carbon emissions embodied in built-up infrastructure as of 2008 was 
estimated to be 122 (−20 / +15) Gt CO2 (Müller et al., 2013). Much of 
the research on the mitigation potential of infrastructure focuses on 
the use / operation phase and increasing the efficiency of the technol-
ogy. Estimating emissions from urban infrastructure such as electricity 
grids and transportation networks is challenging because they often 
extend beyond a city’s administrative boundaries (Ramaswami et al., 
2012b) (see Section 12.2 for detailed discussion). Several studies show 
that the trans-boundary emissions of infrastructure can be as large as 
or even larger than the direct GHG emissions within city boundaries 
(Ramaswami et  al., 2008; Kennedy et  al., 2009; Hillman and Ramas-
wami, 2010; Chavez and Ramaswami, 2013). Thus, a full accounting of 
GHG emissions from urban infrastructure would need to include both 
primary and embodied energy of infrastructure materials, as well as 
energy from the use / operation phase and end-of-life, including reuse 
and recycling. 
Rates of infrastructure construction in mature versus rapidly devel-
oping cities lead to fundamentally different impacts on GHG emis-
sions. Infrastructure growth is hypothesized to follow an S-shaped 
curve starting with an early development phase, continuing with a 
rapid growth and expansion phase, and ending with a saturation 
phase (Ausubel and Herman, 1988). The build-up of infrastructure 
that occurs during early phases of urbanization is particularly emis-
sions intensive.  Currently, the average per capita emissions embod-
ied in the infrastructure of industrialized countries is 53 (± 6) t CO2 
(see Figure 12.12) which is more than five times larger than that in 
developing countries (10 (± 1) t CO2) (Müller et al., 2013). While there 
have been energy efficiency improvements in the industrial sector, 
especially steel and cement production, the scale and pace of urban-
ization can outstrip efficiency gains and lead to continued growth in 
emissions (Levine and Aden, 2008; Güneralp and Seto, 2012). China 
accounts for roughly 37 % of the global emissions commitments in 
part due to its large-scale urbanization – the United States adds 15 %; 
Europe 15 %, and Japan 4 %, together representing 71 % of total 
global emissions commitments by 2060 (Davis et al., 2010).
Emissions related to infrastructure growth are therefore tied to exist-
ing urban energy systems, investment decisions, and regulatory poli-
cies that shape the process of urban growth. The effects of these deci-
sions are difficult to reverse: high fixed costs, increasing returns, and 
network externalities make emissions intensive infrastructure systems 
particularly prone to lock-in (Unruh and Carrillo-Hermosilla, 2006; 
Unruh, 2002, 2000). Furthermore, the long lifespan of infrastructure 
affects the turnover rate of the capital stock, which can limit the speed 
at which emissions in the use / operation phase can be reduced (Jaccard 
and Rivers, 2007).
The build-up of infrastructure in developing countries as part of the 
massive urbanization currently underway will result in significant 
future emissions. Under one scenario, if the global population increases 
to 9.3 billion by 2050 and developing countries expand their built envi-
ronment and infrastructure to the current global average levels using 
available technology today, the production of infrastructure materials 
alone would generate approximately 470 Gt of CO2 emissions (see Fig-
ure 12.12). This is in addition to the “committed emissions” from exist-
ing energy and transportation infrastructure, estimated to be in the 
range of 282 to 701 Gt of CO2 between 2010 and 2060 (Davis et al., 
2010). 
The links between infrastructure and urban form are well established, 
especially among transportation infrastructure provision, travel 
demand, and VKT. In developing countries in particular, the growth of 
transport infrastructure and resulting urban forms are playing impor-
tant roles in affecting long-run emissions trajectories (see Chapter 8). 
The committed emissions from existing energy and transportation 
infrastructure are high, with ranges of CO2 of 127 – 336 and 63 – 132 
Gt, respectively (see Figure 12.13 and Davis et al., 2010). Transport 
infrastructure affects travel demand and emissions in the short-run 
by reducing the time cost of travel, and in the long-run by shaping 
land-use patterns (Vickrey, 1969; Downs, 2004). Development of 
transport infrastructure tends to promote ‘sprawl’, characterized by 
low-density, auto-dependent, and separated land uses (Brueckner, 
2000; Ewing et  al., 2003). Consistent evidence of short-run effects 
show that the demand elasticities range between 0.1 – 0.2. That is, 
a doubling of transport infrastructure capacity increases VKT by 
10 – 20 % in the short-run (Goodwin, 1996; Hymel et al., 2010). Other 
studies suggest larger short-run elasticities of 0.59 (Cervero and Han-
sen, 2002) and a range of 0.3 – 0.9 (Noland and Lem, 2002). Differ-
ences in short-run elasticities reflect fundamental differences in the 
methodologies underlying the studies (see Chapter 15.4 on policy 
evaluation). In the long-run, the elasticities of VKT with respect to 
road capacity are likely to be in the range 0.8 – 1.0 as land-use pat-
terns adjust (Hansen and Huang, 1997; Noland, 2001; Duranton and 
Turner, 2011). While the links between transport infrastructure, urban 
form, and VKT are well studied, there are few studies that extend the 
analysis to estimate emissions due to transport-induced increases 
in VKT. One exception is a study that concludes that freezing United 
States highway capacity at 1996 levels would reduce emissions by 43 
Mt C / yr by 2012, compared to continuing construction at historical 
rates (Noland, 2001). 
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Urban form can be characterized using four key metrics: density, land 
use mix, connectivity, and accessibility. These dimensions are not inde-
pendent from one another. Rather, they measure different aspects of 
urban form and structure, and each dimension impacts greenhouse 
gas emissions differently (Figure 12.14). The urban form drivers of GHG 
emissions do not work in isolation. 
Impacts of changes in urban form on travel behaviour are commonly esti-
mated using elasticities, which measure the effect of a 1 % change in an 
urban form metric on the percent change in vehicle kilometres travelled 
(see Chapter 15.4 on policy evaluation). This allows for a comparison 
of magnitudes across different factors and metrics. A large share of the 
existing evidence is limited to studies of North American cities. Moreover, 
much of this work is focused on larger cities (for an extensive discussion 
of methodological considerations see National Research Council, 2009b).
12�4�2�1 Density
Urban density is the measure of an urban unit of interest (e. g., popula-
tion, employment, and housing) per area unit (e. g., block, neighbour-
hood, city, metro area, and nation) (Figure 12.14). There are many 
measures of density, and three common measures are population den-
sity (i. e., population per unit area), built-up area density (i. e., buildings 
or urban land cover per unit area), and employment density (i. e., jobs 
per unit area) (for a comprehensive review on density measures see 
Boyko and Cooper, 2011). Urban density affects GHG emissions in two 
primary ways. First, separated and low densities of employment, com-
merce, and housing increase the average travel distances for both 
work and shopping trips (Frank and Pivo, 1994; Cervero and Kockel-
man, 1997; Ewing and Cervero, 2001; Brownstone and Golob, 2009). 
These longer travel distances translate into higher VKT and emissions. 
Conversely, higher population densities, especially when co-located 
with high employment densities are strongly correlated with lower 
GHG emissions (Frank and Pivo, 1994; Kenworthy and Laube, 1999; 
Glaeser and Kahn, 2010; Clark, 2013). In the United States, households 
located in relatively low density areas (0 – 19 households / km2) produce 
twice as much GHG emissions as households located in relatively high 
density areas (1,900 – 3,900 households / km2) (U. S. Department of 
Transportation, 2009). 
Second, low densities make it difficult to switch over to less energy 
intensive and alternative modes of transportation such as public trans-
portation, walking, and cycling because the transit demand is both too 
dispersed and too low (Bunting et al., 2002; Saelens et al., 2003; For-
syth et al., 2007). In contrast, higher population densities at places of 
origin (e. g., home) and destination (e. g., work, shopping) concentrate 
demand that is necessary for mass transit alternatives. The density 
thresholds required for successful transit are not absolute, and vary by 
type of transit (e. g., bus, light rail, metro), their frequency, and charac-
teristics specific to each city. One of the most comprehensive studies 
of density and emission estimates that a doubling of residential densi-
ties in the United States can reduce VKT by 5 – 12 % in the short run, 
and if coupled with mixed land use, higher employment densities, and 
improvements in transit, can reduce VKT as much as 25 % over the 
long run (National Research Council, 2009a). Urban density is thus a 
necessary — but not a sufficient — condition for low-carbon cities.
Comparable and consistent estimates of urban densities and changes 
in urban densities are difficult to obtain in part because of different 
methodologies to calculate density. However, multiple studies using 
multiple lines of evidence including satellite data (Deng et al., 2008; 
Figure 12�14 | Four key aspects of urban form and structure (density, land use mix, connectivity, and accessibility), their Vehicle Kilometre Travelled (VKT) elasticities, commonly 
used metrics, and stylized graphics. The dark blue row segments under the VKT elasticities column provide the range of elasticities for the studies included. 
Sources: Numbers from Ewing and Cervero (2010), National Research Council (2009a), and Salon et al (2012) are based on the following original sources: Density (Schimek, 
1996; Kockelman, 1997; Sun et al., 1998; Pickrell and Schimek, 1999; Ewing and Cervero, 2001; Holtzclaw et al., 2002; Bhatia, 2004; Boarnet et al., 2003; Bento et al., 2005; 
Zhou and Kockelman, 2008; Fang, 2008; Kuzmyak, 2009a; Brownstone and Golob, 2009; Ewing et al., 2009; Greenwald, 2009; Heres-Del-Valle and Niemeier, 2011); Land Use 
(Kockelman, 1997; Sun et al., 1998; Pushkar et al., 2000; Ewing and Cervero, 2001, 2010; Chapman and Frank, 2007; Frank and Engelke, 2005; Kuzmyak et al., 2006; Vance and 
Hedel, 2007; Brownstone and Golob, 2009; Kuzmyak, 2009b; Frank et al., 2009); Connectivity (Ewing and Cervero, 2001; Boarnet et al., 2003; Chapman and Frank, 2007; Frank 
and Engelke, 2005; Ewing et al., 2009; Greenwald, 2009; Frank et al., 2009); Accessibility (Goodwin, 1996; Ewing et al., 1996, 2009; Kockelman, 1997; Cervero and Kockelman, 
1997; Sun et al., 1998; Pushkar et al., 2000; Ewing and Cervero, 2001, 2010; Boarnet et al., 2003; Næss, 2005; Cervero and Duncan, 2006; Zegras, 2007; Greenwald, 2009; 
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Figure 12�13 | Scenario of CO2 emissions from existing energy and transportation infrastructure by industry sector (left) and country / region (right). Numbers in panels show the 
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Angel et al., 2010, 2011; Seto et al., 2011) and economic and census 
data (Burchfield et al., 2006) show that both population and built-up 
densities are declining across all regions around the world (see Sec-
tion 12.2 for details). Although there is substantial variation in mag-
nitudes and rates of density decline across income groups, city sizes, 
and regions, the overarching trend is a persistent decline in densities 
(Angel et al., 2010). The dominant trend is declining density, however 
there are some exceptions. Analyses of 100 large cities worldwide 
using a microwave scatterometer show significant vertical expansion 
of built-up areas in East Asian cities, notably those in China (see Figure 
12.15 and Frolking et al., 2013).
A common misconception about density is that it can only be achieved 
through high-rise buildings configured in close proximity. However, 
the same level of density can be achieved through multiple land use 
configurations (Figure 12.16). Population density is strongly correlated 
with built density, but high population density does not necessarily 
imply high-rise buildings (Cheng, 2009; Salat, 2011).
Medium-rise (less than seven floors) urban areas with a high building 
footprint ratio can have a higher built density than high-rise urban areas 
with a low building footprint. These different configurations of high-den-
sity development involve important energy tradeoffs. Often, high-rise, 
man, 1997; Ewing and Cervero, 2001; Brownstone and Golob, 2009). 
These longer travel distances translate into higher VKT and emissions. 
Conversely, higher population densities, especially when co-located 
with high employment densities are strongly correlated with lower 
GHG emissions (Frank and Pivo, 1994; Kenworthy and Laube, 1999; 
Glaeser and Kahn, 2010; Clark, 2013). In the United States, households 
located in relatively low density areas (0 – 19 households / km2) produce 
twice as much GHG emissions as households located in relatively high 
density areas (1,900 – 3,900 households / km2) (U. S. Department of 
Transportation, 2009). 
Second, low densities make it difficult to switch over to less energy 
intensive and alternative modes of transportation such as public trans-
portation, walking, and cycling because the transit demand is both too 
dispersed and too low (Bunting et al., 2002; Saelens et al., 2003; For-
syth et al., 2007). In contrast, higher population densities at places of 
origin (e. g., home) and destination (e. g., work, shopping) concentrate 
demand that is necessary for mass transit alternatives. The density 
thresholds required for successful transit are not absolute, and vary by 
type of transit (e. g., bus, light rail, metro), their frequency, and charac-
teristics specific to each city. One of the most comprehensive studies 
of density and emission estimates that a doubling of residential densi-
ties in the United States can reduce VKT by 5 – 12 % in the short run, 
and if coupled with mixed land use, higher employment densities, and 
improvements in transit, can reduce VKT as much as 25 % over the 
long run (National Research Council, 2009a). Urban density is thus a 
necessary — but not a sufficient — condition for low-carbon cities.
Comparable and consistent estimates of urban densities and changes 
in urban densities are difficult to obtain in part because of different 
methodologies to calculate density. However, multiple studies using 
multiple lines of evidence including satellite data (Deng et al., 2008; 
Figure 12�14 | Four key aspects of urban form and structure (density, land use mix, connectivity, and accessibility), their Vehicle Kilometre Travelled (VKT) elasticities, commonly 
used metrics, and stylized graphics. The dark blue row segments under the VKT elasticities column provide the range of elasticities for the studies included. 
Sources: Numbers from Ewing and Cervero (2010), National Research Council (2009a), and Salon et al (2012) are based on the following original sources: Density (Schimek, 
1996; Kockelman, 1997; Sun et al., 1998; Pickrell and Schimek, 1999; Ewing and Cervero, 2001; Holtzclaw et al., 2002; Bhatia, 2004; Boarnet et al., 2003; Bento et al., 2005; 
Zhou and Kockelman, 2008; Fang, 2008; Kuzmyak, 2009a; Brownstone and Golob, 2009; Ewing et al., 2009; Greenwald, 2009; Heres-Del-Valle and Niemeier, 2011); Land Use 
(Kockelman, 1997; Sun et al., 1998; Pushkar et al., 2000; Ewing and Cervero, 2001, 2010; Chapman and Frank, 2007; Frank and Engelke, 2005; Kuzmyak et al., 2006; Vance and 
Hedel, 2007; Brownstone and Golob, 2009; Kuzmyak, 2009b; Frank et al., 2009); Connectivity (Ewing and Cervero, 2001; Boarnet et al., 2003; Chapman and Frank, 2007; Frank 
and Engelke, 2005; Ewing et al., 2009; Greenwald, 2009; Frank et al., 2009); Accessibility (Goodwin, 1996; Ewing et al., 1996, 2009; Kockelman, 1997; Cervero and Kockelman, 
1997; Sun et al., 1998; Pushkar et al., 2000; Ewing and Cervero, 2001, 2010; Boarnet et al., 2003; Næss, 2005; Cervero and Duncan, 2006; Zegras, 2007; Greenwald, 2009; 
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Figure 12�15 | Changes in Urban Structure, 1999 – 2009 using backscatter and night time lights. The  top 12 panels show changes in vertical structure of major urban areas as 
characterized by backscatter power ratio (PR) and horizontal growth as measured by night time lights brightness (NL) for 12 large cities. Coloured arrows represent non-water, 
0.05° cells in an 11x11 grid around each city’s centre; tail and head are at 1999 and 2009 coordinates of cell PR and NL, respectively (see inset in top right panel). Arrow colour 
corresponds to percent urban cover circa 2001 (see legend in bottom right panel). Bottom right panel shows mean change of a total of 100 cities mapping into the respective urban 
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high-density urban areas involve a tradeoff between building height and 
spacing between buildings — higher buildings have to be more spaced 
out to allow light penetration. High-rise buildings imply higher energy 
costs in terms of vertical transport and also in heating, cooling, and light-
ing due to low passive volume ratios (Ratti et  al., 2005; Salat, 2009). 
Medium-rise, high-density urban areas can achieve similar levels of den-
sity as high-rise, high density developments but require less materials 
and embodied energy (Picken and Ilozor, 2003; Blackman and Picken, 
2010). Their building operating energy levels are lower due to high pas-
sive volume ratio (Ratti et  al., 2005; Salat, 2009). Single storey, free-
standing housing units are more GHG emissions intensive than multi-
family, semi-detached buildings (Myors et al., 2005; Perkins et al., 2009). 
Thus, while the effect of building type on energy use may be relatively 
small, the combination of dwelling type, design, location, and orientation 
together can generate significant energy savings (Rickwood et al., 2008).
12�4�2�2 Land use mix
Land use mix refers to the diversity and integration of land uses (e. g., 
residential, park, commercial) at a given scale (Figure 12.17). As with 
density, there are multiple measures of land use mix, including: (1) the 
ratio of jobs to residents; (2) the variety and mixture of amenities and 
activities; and (3) the relative proportion of retail and housing. Histori-
cally, the separation of land uses, especially of residential from other 
uses, was motivated by the noxious uses and pollution of the industrial 
city. However, as cities transition from industrial to service economies, 
resulting in a simultaneous reduction in air pollution and other nui-
sances, the rationale for such separation of land uses diminishes. 
In general, when land uses are separated, the distance between origin 
(e. g., homes) and destination (e. g., work or shopping) will be longer 
(Kockelman, 1997). Hence, diverse and mixed land uses can reduce travel 
distances and enable both walking and the use of non-motorized modes 
of travel (Kockelman, 1997; Permana et  al., 2008), thereby reducing 
aggregate amounts of vehicular movement and associated greenhouse 
gas emissions (Lipper et al., 2010). Several meta-analyses estimate the 
elasticity of land use mix related VKT from – 0.02 to – 0.10 (Ewing and 
Cervero, 2010; Salon et al., 2012) while simultaneously increasing walk-
ing. The average elasticity between walking and diversity of land uses 
is reported to be between 0.15 – 0.25 (Ewing and Cervero, 2010). The 
effects of mixed land use on VKT and GHG emissions can applied at 
three spatial scales; city-regional, neighbourhood, and block. 
At the city-scale, a high degree of land use mix can result in signifi-
cant reductions in VKT by increasing the proximity of housing to office 
developments, business districts, shops, and malls (Cervero and Duncan, 
2006). In service-economy cities with effective air pollution controls, 
mixed land use can also have a beneficial impact on citizen health and 
well-being by enabling walking and cycling (Saelens et al., 2003; Heath 
et al., 2006; Sallis et al., 2009). For cities with lower mixed land use, such 
as often found in North American cities and in many new urban develop-
Figure 12�16 | Same densities in three different layouts: low-rise single-story homes (left); multi-story medium-rise (middle); high-rise towers (right). Adapted from Cheng (2009).
CommercialParkResidental
Figure 12�17 | Three different land use mixes (Manaugh and Kreider, 2013).
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ments in Asia, large residential developments are separated from jobs or 
retail centres by long distances. A number of studies of such single-use 
zoning show strong tendencies for residents to travel longer overall dis-
tances and to carry out a higher proportion of their travel in private vehi-
cles than residents who live in mixed land use areas in cities (Mogridge, 
1985; Fouchier, 1998; Næss, 2005; Zhou and Kockelman, 2008).
Mixed use at the neighbourhood scale refers to a ‘smart’ mix of resi-
dential buildings, offices, shops, and urban amenities (Bourdic et  al., 
2012). Similar to the city-scale case, such mixed uses can decrease 
average travel distances (McCormack et  al., 2001). However, on the 
neighbourhood scale, the reduced travel is primarily related to non-
work trips, e. g., for shopping, services, and leisure. Research on US 
cities indicates that the presence of shops and workplaces near resi-
dential areas is associated with relatively low vehicle ownership rates 
(Cervero and Duncan, 2006), and can have a positive impact on trans-
portation patterns (Ewing and Cervero, 2010). The impacts of mixed 
use on non-motorized commuting such as cycling and walking and the 
presence or absence of neighbourhood shops can be even more impor-
tant than urban density (Cervero, 1996). 
At the block and building scale, mixed use allows space for small-
scale businesses, offices, workshops, and studios that are intermixed 
with housing and live-work spaces. Areas with a high mix of land uses 
encourages a mix of residential and retail activity and thus increases 
the area’s vitality, aesthetic interest, and neighbourhood (Hoppenbrou-
wer and Louw, 2005). 
12�4�2�3 Connectivity
Connectivity refers to street density and design. Common measures of 
connectivity include intersection density or proportion, block size, or 
intersections per road kilometre (Cervero and Kockelman, 1997; Push-
kar et al., 2000; Chapman and Frank, 2007; Lee and Moudon, 2006; 
Fan, 2007). Where street connectivity is high — characterized by finer 
grain systems with smaller blocks that allow frequent changes in direc-
tion — there is typically a positive correlation with walking and thereby 
lower GHG emissions. Two main reasons for this are that distances 
tend to be shorter and the system of small blocks promotes conve-
nience and walking (Gehl, 2010). 
Improving connectivity in areas where it is low (and thus associated 
with higher GHG emissions) requires varying amounts of street recon-
struction. Many street features, such as street size, four-way intersec-
tions or intersection design, sidewalk width, the number of traffic lanes 
(or street width) and street medians are designed at the time of the 
construction of the city. As the infrastructure already exists, increas-
ing connectivity requires investment either to redevelop the site or to 
retrofit it to facilitate walking and biking. In larger redevelopment proj-
ects, street patterns may be redesigned for smaller blocks with high 
connectivity. Alternatively, retrofitting often involves widening side-
walks, constructing medians, and adding bike lanes, as well as reduc-
ing traffic speeds, improving traffic signals, and providing parking for 
bikes (McCann and Rynne, 2010). Other features, such as street furni-
ture (e. g., benches, transit stops, and shelters), street trees, and traffic 
signals, can be added after the initial design without much disruption 
or large costs.
Systematic reviews show that transport network connectivity has a 
larger impact on VKT than density or land use mix, between – 0.06 
and – 0.26 (Ewing and Cervero, 2010; Salon et  al., 2012). For North 
American cities, the elasticity of walking with respect to sidewalk cov-
erage or length is between 0.09 to 0.27 (Salon et al., 2012). There are 
typically higher elasticities in other OECD countries than in the United 
States. 
12�4�2�4 Accessibility
Accessibility can be defined as access to jobs, housing, services, shop-
ping, and in general, to people and places in cities (Hansen, 1959; 
Ingram, 1971; Wachs and Kumagai, 1973). It can be viewed as a 
combination of proximity and travel time, and is closely related to 
land use mix. Common measures of accessibility include population 
centrality, job accessibility by auto or transit, distance to the city cen-
tre or central business district (CBD), and retail accessibility. Meta-
analyses show that VKT reduction is most strongly related to high 
accessibility to job destinations (Ewing and Cervero, 2001, 2010). 
Highly accessible communities (e. g., compact cities in Europe such as 
Copenhagen) are typically characterized by low daily commuting dis-
tances and travel times, enabled by multiple modes of transportation 
(Næss, 2006). Measures to increase accessibility that are accompa-
nied by innovative technologies and alternative energies can reduce 
VKT and associated GHG emissions in the cities of both developed 
and developing countries (Salomon and Mokhtarian, 1998; Axhau-
sen, 2008; Hankey and Marshall, 2010; Banister, 2011).  However, 
it should be noted that at least one study has shown that in cities 
where motorization is already mature, changing accessibility no lon-
ger influences automobile-dependent lifestyles and travel behaviours 
(Kitamura et al., 2001).
Countries and regions undergoing early stages of urbanization may 
therefore have a unique potential to influence accessibility, particu-
larly in cases where income levels, infrastructure, and motorization 
trends are rapidly changing (Kumar, 2004; Chen et al., 2008; Perkins 
et al., 2009; Reilly et al., 2009; Zegras, 2010; Hou and Li, 2011; Adey-
inka, 2013). In Shanghai, China, new transportation projects have 
influenced job accessibility and have thereby reduced commute times 
(Cervero and Day, 2008). In Chennai, India, differences in accessibil-
ity to the city centre between low-income communities have been 
shown to strongly affect transport mode choice and trip frequency 
(Srinivasan and Rogers, 2005). In the rapidly motorizing city of San-
tiago de Chile, proximity to the central business district as well as 
metro stations has a relatively strong association with VKT (Zegras, 
2010). The typical elasticity between job accessibility and VKT across 
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North American cities ranges from – 0.10 to – 0.30 (Ewing and Cer-
vero, 2010; Salon et al., 2012). 
12�4�2�5 Effects of combined options
While individual measures of urban form have relatively small effects 
on vehicle miles travelled, they become more effective when com-
bined. For example, there is consistent evidence that the combination 
of co-location of increased population and job densities, substantial 
investments in public transit, higher mix of land uses, and transporta-
tion or mobility demand management strategies can reduce VKT and 
travel-related carbon emissions (National Research Council, 2009a; 
Ewing and Cervero, 2010; Salon et al., 2012). The spatial concentration 
of population, coupled with jobs-housing balance, have a significant 
impact VKT by households. At the same time, urban form and the den-
sity of transportation networks also affect VKT (Bento et al., 2005). The 
elasticity of VKT with respect to each of these factors is relatively small, 
between 0.10 and 0.20 in absolute value. However, changing several 
measures of form simultaneously can reduce annual VKT significantly. 
Moving the sample households from a city with the characteristics of 
a low-density, automobile-centric city to a city with high public transit, 
connectivity, and mixed land use reduced annual VKT by 25 %. While in 
practice such change is highly unlikely in a mature city, it may be more 
relevant when considering cities at earlier stages of development.
A growing body of literature shows that traditional neighbourhood 
designs are associated with reduced travel and resource conservation 
(Krizek, 2003; Ewing and Cervero, 2010). A US study found those liv-
ing in neo-traditional neighbourhoods made as many daily trips as 
those in low-density, single-family suburban neighbourhoods, how-
ever the switch from driving to walking and the shortening of trip 
distances resulted in a 20 % less VKT per household (Khattak and 
Rodriguez, 2005). Empirical research shows that the design of streets 
have even stronger influences than urban densities on incidences of 
walking and reduced motorized travel in traditional neighbourhoods 
of Bogota, Tehran, Taipei, and Hong Kong SAR (China) (Zhang, 2004; 
Cervero et al., 2009; Lin and Yang, 2009; Lotfi and Koohsari, 2011). A 
study in Jinan, China, found the energy use of residents living in 
mixed-use and grid street enclaves to be one-third that of similar 
households in superblock, single-use developments (Calthorpe, 
2013).
Box 12�3 | Urban expansion: drivers, markets, and policies
While the literature that examines the impacts of changes in 
urban spatial structure and infrastructure on urban GHG emis-
sions is sparse, there is a well-established body of literature that 
discusses the drivers of urban development, and policies that aim 
to alter its pace and shape.
Drivers of Urban Expansion — The drivers of urban development 
can be broadly defined into the following categories: Economic 
Geography, Income, Technology (see Section 12.3.1), as well as 
Market Failures (see Chapter 15), and Pre-Existing Conditions, 
which are structured by Policies and Regulations (see Section 
12.5.2) that in turn shape Urban Form and Infrastructure (see Sec-
tion 12.4 and Box 12.4).
Primary drivers of urban spatial expansion unfold under the 
influence of economic conditions and the functioning of markets. 
These are however strongly affected by Market Failures and 
Pre-Existing Policies and Regulations that can exacerbate or 
alleviate the effect of the primary drivers on urban growth.
Market Failures are the result of individuals and firms ignoring 
the external costs and benefits they impose on others when mak-
ing economic decisions (see Chapter 15). These include:
•	 Failure to account for the social costs of GHG (and local) emis-
sions that result from production and consumption activities 
in cities.
•	 Failure to account for the social costs of traffic congestion (see 
Chapter 8).
•	 Failure to assign property rights and titles for land.
•	 Failure to account for the social benefits of spatial amenities 
and mix land uses (see Section 12.5.2.3).
•	 Failure to account for the social benefits of agglomeration 
that result from the interactions of individuals and firms in 
cities.
Although not precisely quantified in the literature, by altering the 
location of individuals and firms in space (and resulting travelling 
patterns and consumption of space), these market failures can 
lead to excessive growth (see Box 12.4).
For each failure, there is a policy solution, either in the form of 
regulations or market-based instruments (see Section 12.5.2)
Pre-Existing Policies and Regulations can also lead to exces-
sive growth. These include:
•	 Hidden Pre-Existing Subsidies — including the failure to 
charge new development for the infrastructure costs it gener-
ates (see Section 12.5.3 and Box 12.4).
•	 Outdated or Poorly Designed Pre-Existing Policies and 
Regulations — including zoning, building codes, ordinances, 
and property taxes that can distort real estate markets (see 
Section 12.5.2 and Box 12.4).
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12.5 Spatial planning and 
climate change mitigation
Spatial planning is a broad term that describes systematic and coordi-
nated efforts to manage urban and regional growth in ways that promote 
well-defined societal objectives such as land conservation, economic 
development, carbon sequestration, and social justice. Growth manage-
ment is a similar idea, aimed at guiding “the location, quality, and timing 
of development” (Porter, 1997) to minimize ‘sprawl’ (Nelson and Duncan, 
1995), which is characterized by low density, non-contiguous, automo-
bile-dependent development that prematurely or excessively consumes 
farmland, natural preserves, and other valued resources (Ewing, 1997).
This section reviews the range of spatial planning strategies that may 
reduce emissions through impacts on most if not all of the elements 
of urban form and infrastructure reviewed in Section 12.4. It begins 
with an assessment of key spatial planning strategies that can be 
implemented at the macro, meso, and micro geographic scales. It then 
assesses the range of regulatory, land use, and market-based policy 
instruments that can be employed to achieve these strategic objectives. 
Given evidence of the increased emissions reduction potential associ-
ated with affecting the collective set of spatial factors driving emissions 
(see Section 12.4), emphasis is placed on assessing the efficacy of strat-
egies or bundles that simultaneously impact multiple spatial outcomes 
(see Chapter 15.4 and 15.5 on policy evaluation and assessment).
The strategies discussed below aim to reduce sprawl and automobile 
dependence – and thus energy consumption, VKT, and GHG emissions – to 
varying degrees. Evidence on the energy and emission reduction bene-
fits of these strategies comes mainly from case studies in the developed 
world even though their greatest potential for reducing future emissions 
lies in developing countries undergoing early stages of urbanization. 
The existing evidence highlights the importance of an integrated infra-
structure development framework that combines analysis of mitigation 
reduction potentials alongside the long-term public provision of services.
12�5�1 Spatial planning strategies
Spatial planning occurs at multiple geographic scales: (1) Macro — regions 
and metropolitan areas; (2) Meso — sub-regions, districts, and corridors; 
and (3) Micro — neighbourhoods, streets, blocks. At each scale, some 
form of comprehensive land-use and transportation planning provides 
a different opportunity to envision and articulate future settlement pat-
terns, backed by zoning ordinances, subdivision regulations, and capital 
improvements programmes to implement the vision (Hack et al., 2009). 
Plans at each scale must also be harmonized and integrated to maxi-
mize effectiveness and efficiency (Hoch et al., 2000). Different strategy 
bundles invite different policy tools, adapted to the unique political, insti-
tutional, and cultural landscapes of cities in which they are applied (see 
Table 12.5). Successful implementation requires that there be in place 
the institutional capacity and political wherewithal to align the right 
policy instruments to specific spatial planning strategies.
12�5�1�1 Macro: Regions and metropolitan areas
Macro-scale strategies are regional in nature, corresponding to the 
territories of many economic transactions (e. g., laboursheds and 
tradesheds) and from where natural resources are drawn (e. g., water 
tributaries) or externalities are experienced (e. g., air basins).
Regional Plan� A regional plan shows where and when different types 
of development are allowed, and where and when they are not. In poly-
centric plans, sub-centres often serve as building blocks for designing 
regional rail-transit networks (Calthorpe and Fulton, 2001). Regional 
strategies can minimize environmental spillovers and economize on 
large-scale infrastructure investments (Calthorpe and Fulton, 2001; 
Seltzer and Carbonell, 2011). Polycentric metropolises like Singapore, 
Tokyo, and Paris have successfully linked sub-centres with high-qual-
ity, synchronized metro-rail and feeder bus services (Cervero, 1998; 
Gakenheimer, 2011). Spatial plans might be defined less in terms of a 
specific urban-form vision and more with regard to core development 
principles. In its ‘Accessible Ahmedabad’ plan, the city of Ahmedabad, 
India, embraced the principle of creating a city designed for accessibility 
rather than mobility, without specific details on the siting of new growth 
(Suzuki et al., 2013).
Urban containment� Urban containment encourages cities and their 
peripheries to grow inwards and upwards, not outwards (Pendall et al., 
2002). Urban containment can also contribute to climate change mitiga-
tion by creating more compact, less car-oriented built form as well as by 
preserving the carbon sequestration capacity of natural and agricultural 
areas in the surrounding areas (Daniels, 1998). The impact of develop-
ment restrictions is uncertain and varies with the geographic and regula-
tory context (Pendall, 1999; Dawkins and Nelson, 2002; Han et al., 2009; 
Woo and Guldmann, 2011). In the United States, regional measures such 
as the Portland urban growth boundary have been more effective at con-
taining development than local initiatives (DeGrove and Miness, 1992; 
Nelson and Moore, 1993; Boyle and Mohamed, 2007). In the UK, urban 
containment policies may have pushed growth to leapfrog the greenbelt 
to more distant locations and increased car commuting (Amati, 2008). In 
Seoul and in Swiss municipalities, greenbelts have densified the core city 
but made the metropolitan area as a whole less compact; in Seoul, com-
muting distances also increased by 5 % (Jun and Bae, 2000; Bae and Jun, 
2003; Bengston and Youn, 2006; Gennaio et al., 2009).
Regional jobs-housing balance� Separation of workers from job sites 
creates long-haul commutes and thus worsens traffic and environmental 
conditions (Cervero, 1996). Jobs-housing imbalances are often a product 
of insufficient housing in jobs-rich cities and districts (Boarnet and Crane, 
2001; Wilson, 2009; Pendall et al., 2012). One view holds that the market 
will eventually work around such problems – developers will build more 
housing near jobs because more profit can be made from such housing 
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Table 12�5 | Matching spatial planning strategies and policy instruments. Summary of the types of policy instruments that can be applied to different spatial planning strategies 
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Boundaries
 Park improvements; trail 
improvements
 
Balanced growth Affordable housing 
mandates




communities / new towns






  Service Districts4    
Transit-oriented corridors Transfer of development 
rights
    Urban rail; Bus rapid 
transit investments
  Joint Powers Authorities
Neighbourhood / Community
Urban Regeneration / Infill Mix-use zoning / small lot 
designations
Split-Rate Property Taxes; 
Tax increment finance5
















Design codes; flexible 
parking
Impact Fees; Betterment 
Taxes7
  Station siting; station 
access
  Joint development2
Eco-Communities Mixed-use zoning     District Heating / Cooling; 
co-generation (see 
Ch. 9.4)
Peak-load pricing Joint venture2
Site / Streetscape
Pedestrian Zones / Car-
Free Districts
Street code revisions8 Special Improvement 
Districts7
  Road entry restrictions; 
sidewalks8
Parking surcharges  
Traffic Calming / Context-
Sensitive Design
Street code revisions8 Benefit Assessment7       Property owner self-
assessments
Complete Streets Design standards     Bike infrastructure; 
Pedestrian facilities
  Design competitions
Additional sources referenced in table: 1: Nelson (1992), Alterman (1997); 2: Sagalyn (2007), Yescombe (2007); 3: Hagman and Misczynski (1978), Bauman and Ethier (1987); 4: 
Rolon (2008); 5: Dye and Sundberg (1998), Dye and Merriman (2000), Brueckner (2001b); 6: Sælensminde (2004), McAndrews et al. (2010); 7: Rolon (2008); 8: Brambilla and 
Longo (1977).
(Gordon et al., 1991; Downs, 2004). There is evidence of co-location in 
US cities like Boston and Atlanta (Weitz, 2003). Even in the developing 
world, co-location occurs as a means to economize on travel, such as the 
peri-urban zones of Dar es Salaam and Lagos where infill and densifica-
tion, often in the form of informal settlements and shantytowns, occurs 
in lieu of extended growth along peripheral radial roads (Pirie, 2011).
Research on balanced growth strategies provides mixed signals on 
mobility and environmental impacts. Studies of Atlanta estimate that 
jobs-housing balance can reduce traffic congestion, emissions, and 
related externalities (Weitz, 2003; Horner and Murray, 2003). In the 
San Francisco Bay Area, jobs-housing balance has reduced travel more 
than intermixing housing and retail development (Cervero and Duncan, 
2006). Other studies, however, suggest that jobs-housing balance has 
little impact on travel and traffic congestion since many factors besides 
commuting condition residential location choices (Levine, 1998).
Self-contained, ‘complete’ communities — wherein the jobs, retail com-
modities and services needed by workers and households exist within 
a community — is another form of balanced growth. Many master-
planned new towns in the United States, France, South Korea, and the 
UK were designed as self-contained communities, however their physi-
cal isolation and economic dependence on major urban centres resulted 
in high levels of external motorized travel (Cervero, 1995b; Hall, 1996). 
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How new towns are designed and the kinds of transport infrastructure 
built, experiences show, have strongly influenced travel and environ-
mental outcomes (Potter, 1984). In the UK, new towns designed for 
good transit access (e. g., Runcorn and Redditch) averaged far higher 
transit ridership and less VKT per capita than low-density, auto-oriented 
communities like Milton Keynes and Washington, UK (Dupree, 1987).
Telecommunities are a more contemporary version of self-contained 
communities, combining information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) with traditional neighbourhood designs in remote communities 
on the edges of cities like Washington, DC and Seattle (Slabbert, 2005; 
Aguilera, 2008). Until such initiatives scale up, their contributions to 
VKT and GHG reductions will likely remain miniscule (Choo et  al., 
2005; Andreev et al., 2010; Mans et al., 2012). 
12�5�1�2 Meso: Sub-regions, corridors, and districts
The corridor or district scale captures the spatial context of many day-to-
day activities, such as going to work or shopping for common household 
items. Significant challenges are often faced in coordinating transporta-
tion and land development across multiple jurisdictions along a corridor.
Corridor growth management� Corridor-level growth management 
plans aim to link land development to new or expanded infrastructure 
investments (Moore et al., 2007). Both land development and transport 
infrastructure need years to implement, so coordinated and strategic 
long-range planning is essential (Gakenheimer, 2011). Once a transport 
investment is committed and land use policies are adopted, the two can 
co-evolve over time. A good example of coordinated multi-jurisdictional 
management of growth is the 20 km Paris-Pike corridor outside of 
Lexington, Kentucky in the United States (Schneider, 2003). There, two 
county governments reached an agreement and created a new extra-ter-
ritorial authority to zone land parcels for agricultural activities within a 
0.5 km radius of a newly expanded road to preserve the corridor’s rural 
character, prevent sprawl, and maintain the road’s mobility function. 
Transit-oriented corridors� Corridors also present a spatial context 
for designing a network of Transit Oriented Developments (TODs), tra-
ditional (e. g., compact, mixed-use, and pedestrian-friendly) develop-
ment that is physically oriented to a transit station. TODs are expected 
to reduce the need to drive, and thus reduce VKT. Some global cities 
have directed land uses typically scattered throughout suburban devel-
opments (e. g., housing, offices, shops, restaurants, and strip malls) to 
transit-served corridors (Moore et al., 2007; Ferrell et al., 2011). Scan-
dinavian cities like Stockholm, Helsinki, and Copenhagen have created 
‘necklace of pearls’ built form not only to induce transit riding but also 
to produce balanced, bi-directional flows and thus more efficient use 
of infrastructure (Cervero, 1998; Suzuki et al., 2013).
Curitiba, Brazil, is often heralded as one of the world’s most sustain-
able cities and is a successful example of the use of Transit Oriented 
Corridors (TOCs) to shape and direct growth (Cervero, 1998; Duarte 
and Ultramari, 2012). The city has evolved along well-defined radial 
axes (e. g., lineal corridors) that are served by dedicated busways. 
Along some transportation corridors, double-articulated buses transport 
about 16,000 passengers per hour, which is comparable to the capacity 
of more expensive metro-rail systems (Suzuki et  al., 2013). To ensure 
a transit-oriented built form, Curitiba’s government mandates that all 
medium- and large-scale urban development be sited along a Bus Rapid 
Transit (BRT) corridor (Cervero, 1998; Hidalgo and Gutiérrez, 2013). High 
transit use has appreciably shrunk the city’s environmental footprint. In 
2005, Curitiba’s VKT per capita of 7,900 was half as much as in Bra-
zil’s national capital Brasilia, a city with a similar population size and 
income level but a sprawling, auto-centric built form (Santos, 2011).
12�5�1�3 Micro: communities, neighbourhoods, 
streetscapes
The neighbourhood scale is where activities like convenience shopping, 
socializing with neighbours, and walking to school usually take place, 
and where urban design approaches such as gridded street patterns 
and transit-oriented development are often targeted. While smaller 
scale spatial planning might not have the energy conservation or 
emission reduction benefits of larger scale planning strategies, devel-
opment tends to occur parcel-by-parcel and urbanized areas are ulti-
mately the products of thousands of individual site-level development 
and design decisions. 
Urban Regeneration and Infill Development� The move to curb 
urban sprawl has spawned movements to revitalize and regenerate 
long-standing traditional urban centres (Oatley, 1995). Former indus-
trial sites or economically stagnant urban districts are often fairly close 
to central business districts, offering spatial proximity advantages. 
However, brownfield redevelopment (e. g., tearing down and replacing 
older buildings, remediating contaminated sites, or upgrading worn 
out or obsolete underground utilities) can often be more expensive 
than building anew on vacant greenfield sites (Burchell et al., 2005).
In recent decades, British planners have turned away from building 
expensive, master-planned new towns in remote locations to creating 
‘new towns / in town’, such as the light-rail-served Canary Wharf brown-
field redevelopment in east London (Gordon, 2001). Recycling former 
industrial estates into mixed-use urban centres with mixed-income 
housing and high-quality transit services have been successful models 
(Foletta and Field, 2011). Vancouver and several other Canadian cities 
have managed to redirect successfully regional growth to their urban 
cores by investing heavily in pedestrian infrastructure and emphasizing 
an urban milieu that is attractive to families. In particular, Vancouver has 
invested in developing attractive and inviting urban spaces, high quality 
and dedicated cycling and walking facilities, multiple and reliable pub-
lic transit options, and creating high-density residential areas that are 
integrated with public and cooperative housing (Marshall, 2008). Seoul, 
South Korea, has sought to regenerate its urban core through a mix 
of transportation infrastructure investments and de-investments, along 
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with urban renewal (Jun and Bae, 2000; Jun and Hur, 2001). Reclaiming 
valuable inner-city land in the form of tearing down an elevated free-
way and expropriating roadway lanes, replaced by expanded BRT ser-
vices and pedestrian infrastructure has been the centrepiece of Seoul’s 
urban regeneration efforts (Kang and Cervero, 2009).
Traditional neighbourhood design and new urbanism. Another 
movement, spearheaded by reform-minded architects and environ-
mental and sustainability planners, has been to return communities 
to their designs and qualities of yesteryear, before the ascendency of 
the private automobile (Nasar, 2003). Referred to as ‘compact cities’ in 
much of Europe and ‘New Urbanism’ in the United States, the move-
ment takes on features of traditional, pre-automobile neighbourhoods 
that feature grid iron streets and small rectilinear city blocks well 
suited to walking, narrow lots and building setbacks, prominent civic 
spaces that draw people together (and thus help build social capital), 
tree-lined narrow streets with curbside parking and back-lot alleys that 
slow car traffic, and a mix of housing types and prices (Kunstler, 1998; 
Duany et al., 2000; Talen, 2005).
In the United States, more than 600 New Urbanism neighbourhoods 
have been built, are planned, or are under construction (Trudeau, 
2013). In Europe, a number of former brownfield sites have been rede-
veloped since the 1980s based on traditional versus modernist design 
principles (Fraker, 2013). In developing countries, recent examples of 
neighbourhood designs and redevelopment projects that follow New 
Urbanism principles to varying degrees are found in Belize, Jamaica, 
Bhutan, and South Africa (Cervero, 2013).
Transit Oriented Development (TOD)� TODs can occur at a corridor 
scale, as discussed earlier for cities like Curitiba and Stockholm, or as 
is more common, take on a nodal, neighbourhood form.  Besides being 
the ‘jumping off’ point for catching a train or bus, TODs also serve other 
community purposes. Scandinavian TODs often feature a large civic 
square that functions as a community’s hub and human-scale entry-
way to rail stations (Bernick and Cervero, 1996; Curtis et al., 2009).
In Stockholm and Copenhagen, TOD has been credited with reducing 
VKT per capita to among the lowest levels anywhere among high-
income cities (Newman and Kenworthy, 1999). In the United States, 
studies show that TODs can decrease per capita use of cars by 50 %. In 
turn, this could save households about 20 % of their income (Arrington 
and Cervero, 2008). TOD residents in the United States typically com-
mute by transit four to five times more than the average commuter in a 
region (Lund et al., 2006). Similar ridership bonuses have been recorded 
for TOD projects in Toronto, Vancouver, Singapore, and Tokyo (Chorus, 
2009; Yang and Lew, 2009). In China, a recent study found smaller dif-
ferentials of around 25 % in rail commuting between those living near, 
versus away from suburban rail stations (Day and Cervero, 2010).
Many cities in the developing world have had long histories of being 
transit oriented, and feature fine-grain mixes of land uses, abundant 
pathways that encourage and enable walking and biking, and ample 
transit options along major roads (Cervero, 2006; Cervero et al., 2009; 
Curtis et al., 2009). In Latin America, TOD is being planned or has taken 
form to varying degrees around BRT stations in Curitiba, Santiago, 
Mexico City, and Guatemala City. TOD is also being implemented in 
Asian cities, such as in Kaohsiung, Qingdao and Jiaxing, China, and 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (Cervero, 2013).  Green TODs that feature low-
energy / low-emission buildings and the replacement of surface parking 
with community gardens are being built (Teriman et al., 2010; Cervero 
and Sullivan, 2011). A number of Chinese cities have embraced TOD for 
managing growth and capitalizing upon massive rail and BRT invest-
ments. For example, Beijing and Guangzhou adopted TOD as a guiding 
design principle in their most recent long-range master plans (Li and 
Huang, 2010). However, not all have succeeded. TOD efforts in many 
Chinese cities have been undermined by a failure to articulate densities 
(e. g., tapering building heights with distances from stations), the siting 
of stations in isolated superblocks, poor pedestrian access, and a lack of 
co-benefiting mixed land uses (Zhang, 2007; Zhang and Wang, 2013).
Pedestrian zones / car-restricted districts� Many European cities have 
elevated liveability and pedestrian safety to the top of transportation 
planning agendas, and have invested in programmes that reduce depen-
dence on and use of private automobiles (Banister, 2005, 2008; Dupuy, 
2011). One strategy for this is traffic calming, which uses speed humps, 
realigned roads, necked down intersections along with planted trees and 
other vegetation in the middle of streets to slow down traffic (Ewing 
and Brown, 2009). With these traffic calming approaches, automobile 
passage becomes secondary. A related concept is ‘complete streets,’ 
which — through dedicated lanes and traffic-slowing designs — provide 
safe passage for all users of a street, including drivers as well as pedes-
trians, cyclists, and transit patrons (McCann and Rynne, 2010).
An even bolder urban-design / traffic-management strategy has been 
the outright banning of cars from the cores of traditional neighbour-
hoods and districts, complemented by an upgrading and beautification 
of pedestrian spaces. This practice has become commonplace in many 
older European cities whose narrow and winding inner-city street were 
never designed for motorized traffic (Hass-Klau, 1993). Multi-block car-
free streets and enhanced pedestrian zones are also found in cities of 
the developing world, including Curitiba, Buenos Aires, Guadalajara, 
and Beirut (Cervero, 2013).
Empirical evidence reveals a host of benefits from street redesigns and 
auto-restraint measures like these. The traffic-calming measures imple-
mented in Heidelberg, Germany during the early 1990s lead to a 31 % 
decline in car-related accidents, 44 % fewer casualties, and less central-
city traffic (Button, 2010). A study of pedestrianization in German cit-
ies recorded increases in pedestrian flows, transit ridership, land values, 
and retail transactions, as well as property conversions to more inten-
sive land uses, matched by fewer traffic accidents and fatalities (Hass-
Klau, 1993). Research on over 100 case studies in Europe, North Amer-
ica, Japan, and Australia, found that road-capacity reductions including 
car-free zones, creation of pedestrian streets, and street closures, results 
in an overall decline in motorized traffic of 25 % (Goodwin et al., 1998).
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Spatial planning strategies rely on a host of policy instruments and 
levers (see Chapter 15.3 for a classification of policy instruments). Some 
instruments intervene in markets, aimed at correcting market failures 
(e. g., negative externalities). Others work with markets, aimed at shap-
ing behaviours through price signals or public-private partnerships. 
Interventionist strategies can discourage or restrict growth through 
government fiat but they can also incentivize development, such as 
through zoning bonuses or property tax abatements (Bengston et al., 
2004). Policy instruments can be applied to different spatial planning 
strategies and carried out at different geographic scales (see Table 
12.5). Different strategy bundles can be achieved through a mix of dif-
ferent policy tools, adapted to the unique political, institutional, and cul-
tural landscapes of cities in which they are applied.  Successful imple-
mentation requires institutional capacity and political wherewithal to 
align the right policy instruments to specific spatial planning strategies.
The effectiveness of particular instruments introduced depends on legal 
and political environments. For example, cities in the Global South can 
lack the institutional capacity to regulate land or to enforce develop-
ment regulations and tax incentives may have little impact on develop-
ment in the informal sector (Farvacque and McAuslan, 1992; Sivam, 
2002; Bird and Slack, 2007; UN-Habitat, 2013). Infrastructure provision 
and market-based instruments such as fuel taxes will more likely affect 
development decisions in the informal sectors, although there is little 
direct empirical evidence. The impact of instruments on urban form 
and spatial outcomes can be difficult to assess since regulations like 
land-use zoning are often endogenous. That is, they codify land use 
patterns that would have occurred under the free market rather than 
causing changes in urban form (Pogodzinski and Sass, 1994).
12�5�2�1 Land use regulations
Land-use regulations specify the use, size, mass and other aspects 
of development on a particular parcel of land. They are also known 
as development controls or zoning regulations. In countries like the 
United States and India, land-use regulations usually promote low-
density, single-use developments with large amounts of parking that 
increase car dependence and emissions (Talen 2012; Levine 2005; 
Glaeser, 2011). For example, densities in the United States are often 
lower than developers would choose under an unregulated system 
(Fischel, 1999; Levine and Inam, 2004). Thus, regulatory reforms that 
relax or eliminate overly restrictive land-use controls could contribute 
to climate change mitigation. In Europe, by contrast, land-use regula-
tions have been used to promote more compact, mixed-use, transit-
friendly cities (Beatley, 2000). The following are the primary land-use 
regulations to reduce urban form-related GHG emissions.
Use restrictions specify which land uses, such as residential, retail or 
office, or a mix of uses, may be built on a particular parcel. Single-
use zoning regulations which rigidly separate residential and other 
uses are prevalent in the United States, although some cities such as 
Miami have recently adopted form-based codes which regulate physi-
cal form and design rather than use (Parolek et al., 2008; Talen, 2012). 
Use restrictions are rare in European countries such as Germany and 
France, where mixed-use development is permitted or encouraged 
(Hirt, 2007, 2012). 
Density regulations specify minimum and / or maximum permissible 
densities in terms of the number of residential units, floor area on a 
parcel, or restrictions on building height or mass. Density regulations 
can provide incentives for open space or other public benefits by allow-
ing higher density development in certain parts of a city. In India, densi-
ties or heights are capped in many cities, creating a pattern of mid-rise 
buildings horizontally spread throughout the city and failing to allow 
TOD to take form around BRT and urban rail stations (Glaeser, 2011; 
Brueckner and Sridhar, 2012; Suzuki et  al., 2013). In Europe, by con-
trast, land-use regulations have been used to promote more compact, 
mixed-use, transit-friendly cities (Beatley, 2000; Parolek et  al., 2008; 
Talen, 2012). In Curitiba, Brazil, density bonuses provide incentives for 
mixed-use development (Cervero, 1998; Duarte and Ultramari, 2012). A 
density bonus (Rubin and Seneca, 1991) is an option where an incentive 
is created for the developer to set aside land for open spaces or other 
benefits by being allowed to develop more densely, typically in CBDs. 
One challenge with density bonus is that individuals may have prefer-
ences for density levels (high, low) and adjust their location accordingly. 
Urban containment instruments include greenbelts or urban growth 
boundaries and have been employed in London, Berlin, Portland, Bei-
jing, and Singapore. In the UK and in South Korea, greenbelts delineate 
the edges of many built-up and rural areas (Hall, 1996; Bengston and 
Youn, 2006). In many European cities, after the break-up of the city 
walls in the 18th and 19th centuries, greenbelts were used to delineate 
cities (Elson, 1986; Kühn, 2003). Some US states have passed growth 
management laws that hem in urban sprawl through such initiatives 
as creating urban growth boundaries, geographically restricting utility 
service districts, enacting concurrency rules to pace the rate of land 
development and infrastructure improvements, and tying state aid 
to the success of local governments in controlling sprawl (DeGrove 
and Miness, 1992; Nelson et  al., 2004). The mixed evidence on the 
impacts of urban containment instruments on density and compact-
ness (decreases in some cases and increases in others) indicates the 
importance of instrument choice and particularities of setting.
Building codes provide a mechanism to regulate the energy effi-
ciency of development. Building codes affect the energy efficiency of 
new development, and cities provide enforcement of those regula-
tions in some countries (Chapter 9). City policies influence emissions 
through energy use in buildings in several other ways, which can influ-
ence purchases and leasing of commercial and residential real estate 
properties. Some cities participate in energy labelling programmes for 
buildings (see Chapter 9.10.2.6) or have financing schemes linked to 
property taxes (see Property Assess Clean Energy (PACE) in Chapter 
9.10.3.1). Energy efficient equipment in buildings can further reduce 
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energy consumption and associated emissions, including electronics, 
appliances, and equipment (see Table 9.3). Cities that operate utilities 
can influence energy usage directly by using smart meters and infor-
mation infrastructures (see 9.4.1.3).
Parking regulations specify minimum and / or maximum numbers 
of parking spaces for a particular development. Minimum parking 
standards are ubiquitous in much of the world, including cities in the 
United States, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, China, and India (Bar-
ter, 2011; Al-Fouzan, 2012; Wang and Yuan, 2013). Where regulations 
require developers to provide more parking than they would have oth-
erwise, as in place like New York and Los Angeles (McDonnell et al., 
2011; Cutter and Franco, 2012), they induce car travel by reducing the 
cost of driving. Minimum parking requirements also have an indirect 
impact on emissions through land-use, as they reduce the densities 
that are physically or economically feasible on a site, by 30 % – 40 % or 
more in typical cases in the United States (Willson, 1995; Talen, 2012). 
Maximum parking standards, in contrast, have been used in cities such 
as San Francisco, London, and Zurich (Kodransky and Hermann, 2011) 
to reduce the costs of development, use urban land efficiently, and 
encourage alternate transportation modes. In London, moving from 
minimum to maximum residential parking standards reduced parking 
supply by 40 %, with most of the impact coming through the elimina-
tion of parking minimums (Guo and Ren, 2013). 
Design regulations can be used to promote pedestrian and bicycle 
travel. For example, site-design requirements may require buildings to 
face the street or prohibit the placement of parking between build-
ing entrances and street rights-of-way (Talen, 2012). Design regula-
tions can also be used to increase albedo or reduce urban heat island 
effects, through requiring light-coloured or green roofs or regulating 
impervious surfaces (Stone et  al., 2012), as in Montreal and Toronto 
(Richardson and Otero, 2012). 
Affordable housing mandates can reduce the spatial mismatch 
between jobs and housing (Aurand, 2010)� Incentives, such as floor 
area ratios and credits against exactions and impact fee obligations, 
can be arranged for developers to provide social housing units within 
their development packages (Cervero, 1989; Weitz, 2003).
12�5�2�2 Land management and acquisition
The previous section discussed regulatory instruments that are primar-
ily used to shape the decisions of private landowners. Land manage-
ment and acquisition include parks, lease air rights, utility corridors, 
transfer development rights, and urban service districts. Urban govern-
ments can also directly shape urban form through land that is publicly 
owned — particularly around public transport nodes, where municipali-
ties and public transport agencies have acquired land, assembled par-
cels, and taken the lead on development proposals (Cervero et al., 2004; 
Curtis et al., 2009; Curtis, 2012). In Hong Kong SAR, China, the ‘Rail + 
Property’ development programme, which emphasizes not only density 
but also mixed uses and pedestrian linkages to the station, increases 
patronage by about 35,000 weekday passengers at the average sta-
tion. In addition to supporting ridership, an important aim of many 
agencies is to generate revenue to fund infrastructure, as in Istanbul, 
Sao Paulo, and numerous Asian cities (Peterson, 2009; Sandroni, 2010). 
Transfer of Development Rights (TDR) allows the voluntary transfer 
or sale of development from one region or parcel where less develop-
ment is desired to another region or parcel where more development is 
desired. They can be used to protect heritage sites from redevelopment 
or to redistribute urban growth to transit station areas. The parcels that 
‘send’ development are protected through restrictive covenants or per-
manent conservation easements. TDR effectively redirects new growth 
from areas where current development is to be protected (historical 
Box 12�4 | What drives declining densities?
The global phenomenon of declining densities (Angel et al., 2010) 
is the combined result of (1) fundamental processes such as popu-
lation growth, rising incomes, and technological improvements in 
urban transportation systems (LeRoy and Sonstelie, 1983; Miesz-
kowski and Mills, 1993; Bertaud and Malpezzi, 2003; Glaeser and 
Kahn, 2004); (2) market failures that distort urban form during the 
process of growth (Brueckner, 2001a; Bento et al., 2006, 2011); 
and (3) regulatory policies that can have unintended impacts on 
density (Sridhar, 2007, 2010). A range of externalities can result in 
lower densities, such as the failure to adequately account for the 
cost of traffic congestion and infrastructure development and the 
failure to account for the social value of open space (Brueckner, 
2000). 
Regulatory policies, such as zoning and Floor Area Ratio (FAR) 
restrictions, as well as subsidies to particular types of transporta-
tion infrastructures can have large impacts on land development, 
which lead to leapfrog development (Mieszkowski and Mills, 1993; 
Baum-Snow, 2007; Brueckner and Sridhar, 2012). The emissions 
impacts of these interventions are often not fully understood.  
Finally, the spatial distribution of amenities and services can shape 
urban densities through housing demand (Brueckner et al., 1999). 
In the United States, deteriorating conditions in city centres have 
been an important factor in increased suburbanization (Bento et al., 
2011; Brueckner and Helsley, 2011). Conversely, the continued 
consolidation of amenities, services, and employment opportunities 
in the cores of European and Chinese cities has kept households in 
city centres (Brueckner et al., 1999; Zheng et al., 2006, 2009).
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sites or protected areas) to areas where more development is desired 
(e. g., transit station areas). 
Increasing green space and urban carbon sinks can sequester 
carbon and reduce energy consumption for cooling. Increasing green 
space offers co-benefits such as increased property values, regulat-
ing stormwater, reduced air pollution, increased recreational space, 
provision of shade and cooling, rainwater interception and infiltra-
tion, increased biodiversity support, and enhancement of well-being 
(Heynen et al., 2006; Gill et al., 2007; McDonald, 2008). However, many 
studies show that significantly increasing urban green space would 
have negligible effects on offsetting total urban carbon emissions, 
especially when emissions generated by fuel combustion, fertilizer use, 
and irrigation are also considered (Pataki et al., 2009; Jim and Chen, 
2009; Townsend-Small and Czimczik, 2010). Globally, urban soils could 
sequester 290 Mt carbon per year if designed with calcium-rich miner-
als (Renforth et al., 2009). Annual carbon uptake varies significantly by 
location and plant species. Carbon uptake per hectare for temperate 
urban green spaces is estimated to be 0.15 – 0.94 t / yr for seven cit-
ies in the United States: Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Jersey City, New 
York, Philadelphia, and Syracuse (Nowak and Crane, 2002); 0.38 t / yr 
in Beijing, China (Yang and Gakenheimer, 2007); and 0.53 – 0.8 t / yr in 
the South Korean cities of Chuncheon, Kangleung (Gangneung) and 
Seoul (Jo, 2002). United States cities in semi-tropical areas have higher 
levels of per hectare annual C sequestration, of 3.2 t / yr in Gainesville 
and 4.5 t / yr in Miami-Dade (Escobedo et al., 2010). Urban forests are 
estimated to sequester 1.66 t C / ha / yr in Hangzhou, China (Zhao et al., 
2010). The variation in estimates across cities can be partly ascribed to 
differences in tree species, sizes, and densities of planting (Zhao et al., 
2010), as well as land use (Whitford et  al., 2001) and tree life span 
(Strohbach et al., 2012; Raciti et al., 2012). 
12�5�2�3 Market-based instruments
Market-based instruments use taxation and pricing policies to shape 
urban form (see Chapter 15.5.2 for more in-depth discussion of mar-
ket-based instruments). Because much low-density, single-use urban 
development stems from market failures or pre-existing distorted poli-
cies or regulations, a variety of market-based instruments can be intro-
duced that correct these failures (Brueckner and Fansler, 1983; Brueck-
ner and Kim, 2003; Brueckner, 2000; Bento et al., 2006, 2011).
Property taxes� The property tax, a local tax widely used to fund local 
urban services and infrastructure, typically taxes both land and struc-
tures. A variant of the property tax, a land tax or split-rate tax, levies 
a higher rate of tax on the value of the land, and a lower or zero rate 
on the value of the buildings and other improvements. This variant of 
the property tax can promote compact urban form through increasing 
the capital to land ratio, i. e., the intensity of development. There are 
numerous examples of the land or split-rate tax worldwide, including 
Jamaica, Kenya, Denmark, parts of Australia, the United States, and 
South Africa (Bird and Slack, 2002, 2007; Franzsen and Youngman, 
2009; Banzhaf and Lavery, 2010) — although in these places, tax reform 
was not necessarily implemented with the aim of reducing sprawl. 
In principle, moving from a standard property tax to a land or split-
rate tax has ambiguous effects on urban form. The capital to land 
ratio could rise through an increase in dwelling size — promoting 
sprawl — and / or through an increase in density or units per acre — pro-
moting compact urban form (Brueckner and Kim, 2003). In practice, 
however, the density effect seems to dominate. Most of the empirical 
evidence supporting the role of property tax reform in promoting com-
pact urban form comes from the U. S. state of Pennsylvania, where the 
most thorough study found that the split-rate tax led to a 4 – 5 % point 
increase per decade in the number of housing units per hectare, with 
a minimal increase in unit size (for other evidence from Pennsylvania, 
see Oates and Schwab, 1997; Plassmann and Tideman, 2000; Banzhaf 
and Lavery, 2010). 
Prospective or simulation studies also tend to find that land or split-
rate taxes have the potential to promote compact urban form at least 
to some extent (many earlier studies are summarized in Roakes, 1996; 
Needham, 2000; for more recent work see Junge and Levinson, 2012). 
However, studies of land taxes in Australia have tended to find no effect 
on urban form (Skaburskis, 2003), although with some exceptions (e. g. 
Edwards, 1984; Lusht, 1992). There are several suggestions to tailor 
land or property taxes to explicitly support urban planning objectives. 
For example, the property tax could vary by use or by impervious area 
(Nuissl and Schroeter-Schlaack, 2009), or the tax could be on greenfield 
development only (Altes, 2009). However, there are few examples of 
these approaches in practice, and little or no empirical evidence of their 
impacts.
Moving from a standard property tax to a land or split-rate tax can 
yield efficiency and equity benefits (see Chapter 3 for definitions). The 
efficiency effect stems from the fact that the land tax is less distortion-
ary than a tax on improvements, as the supply of land is fixed (Brueck-
ner and Kim, 2003). The equity argument stems from the view that 
land value accrues because of the actions of the wider community, for 
example through infrastructure investments, rather than the actions of 
the landowner (Roakes, 1996). Indeed, some variants of the land tax in 
countries such as Colombia (Bird and Slack, 2007) take an explicit 
‘value capture’ approach, and attempt to tax the incremental increase 
in land value resulting from transport projects.
Development impact fees are imposed per unit of new development 
to finance the marginal costs of new infrastructure required by the 
development, and are levied on a one-time basis. The effects of impact 
fees on urban form will be similar to a property tax. The main dif-
ference is that impact fees are more likely to be used by urban gov-
ernments as a financing mechanism for transport infrastructure. For 
example, San Francisco and many British cities have impact fees dedi-
cated to public transport (Enoch et al., 2005), and other cities such as 
Santiago have fees that are primarily dedicated to road infrastructure 
(Zegras, 2003).
Box 12�5 | Singapore: TOD and Road Pricing
The island-state of Singapore has over the years introduced a series 
of cross-cutting, reinforcing spatial planning and supportive strate-
gies that promote sustainable urbanism and mobility (Suzuki et al., 
2013). Guided by its visionary Constellation Plan, Singapore built a 
series of new master-planned towns that interact with each other 
because they each have different functional niches. Rather than 
being self-contained entities, these new towns function together 
(Cervero, 1998). All are interlinked by high-capacity, high-quality 
urban rail and bus services, and correspondingly the majority of 
trips between urban centres are by public transport. Congestion 
charges and quota controls on vehicle registrations through an 
auctioning system also explain why Singapore’s transit services are 
so heavily patronized and not un-related, why new land develop-
ment is occurring around rail stations (Lam and Toan, 2006).
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Development taxes� To the extent that excessive urban development 
reflects the failure to charge developers for the full costs of infra-
structure and the failure to account for the social benefits of spatially 
explicit amenities or open space, some economists argue that develop-
ment taxes, a tax per unit of land converted to residential uses, are 
the most direct market-based instruments to correct for such failures 
(Brueckner, 2000; Bento et  al., 2006). According to these studies, in 
contrast to urban growth boundaries, development taxes can control 
urban growth at lower economic costs. Urban sprawl occurs in part 
because the costs associated with development are not fully accounted 
for. Development taxes could make up for the difference between the 
private costs and the social costs of development, and coupled with 
urban growth boundaries could be effective at reducing sprawl.
Fuel prices and transportation costs� Increases in fuel taxes or 
transportation costs more generally have a direct effect on reducing 
VKT (see Chapter 8 and Chapter 15). They are also likely to have a 
long-run mitigation effect as households adjust their location choices 
to reduce travel distances, and urban form responds accordingly. An 
urban area that becomes more compact as households bid up the price 
of centrally located land is a core result from standard theoretical eco-
nomic models of urban form (Romanos, 1978; Brueckner, 2001a, 2005; 
Bento et al., 2006).
Empirically, evidence for this relationship comes from cities in the United 
States, where a 10 % increase in fuel prices leads to a 10 % decrease in 
construction on the urban periphery (Molloy and Shan, 2013); Canada, 
2009; Banzhaf and Lavery, 2010) — although in these places, tax reform 
was not necessarily implemented with the aim of reducing sprawl. 
In principle, moving from a standard property tax to a land or split-
rate tax has ambiguous effects on urban form. The capital to land 
ratio could rise through an increase in dwelling size — promoting 
sprawl — and / or through an increase in density or units per acre — pro-
moting compact urban form (Brueckner and Kim, 2003). In practice, 
however, the density effect seems to dominate. Most of the empirical 
evidence supporting the role of property tax reform in promoting com-
pact urban form comes from the U. S. state of Pennsylvania, where the 
most thorough study found that the split-rate tax led to a 4 – 5 % point 
increase per decade in the number of housing units per hectare, with 
a minimal increase in unit size (for other evidence from Pennsylvania, 
see Oates and Schwab, 1997; Plassmann and Tideman, 2000; Banzhaf 
and Lavery, 2010). 
Prospective or simulation studies also tend to find that land or split-
rate taxes have the potential to promote compact urban form at least 
to some extent (many earlier studies are summarized in Roakes, 1996; 
Needham, 2000; for more recent work see Junge and Levinson, 2012). 
However, studies of land taxes in Australia have tended to find no effect 
on urban form (Skaburskis, 2003), although with some exceptions (e. g. 
Edwards, 1984; Lusht, 1992). There are several suggestions to tailor 
land or property taxes to explicitly support urban planning objectives. 
For example, the property tax could vary by use or by impervious area 
(Nuissl and Schroeter-Schlaack, 2009), or the tax could be on greenfield 
development only (Altes, 2009). However, there are few examples of 
these approaches in practice, and little or no empirical evidence of their 
impacts.
Moving from a standard property tax to a land or split-rate tax can 
yield efficiency and equity benefits (see Chapter 3 for definitions). The 
efficiency effect stems from the fact that the land tax is less distortion-
ary than a tax on improvements, as the supply of land is fixed (Brueck-
ner and Kim, 2003). The equity argument stems from the view that 
land value accrues because of the actions of the wider community, for 
example through infrastructure investments, rather than the actions of 
the landowner (Roakes, 1996). Indeed, some variants of the land tax in 
countries such as Colombia (Bird and Slack, 2007) take an explicit 
‘value capture’ approach, and attempt to tax the incremental increase 
in land value resulting from transport projects.
Development impact fees are imposed per unit of new development 
to finance the marginal costs of new infrastructure required by the 
development, and are levied on a one-time basis. The effects of impact 
fees on urban form will be similar to a property tax. The main dif-
ference is that impact fees are more likely to be used by urban gov-
ernments as a financing mechanism for transport infrastructure. For 
example, San Francisco and many British cities have impact fees dedi-
cated to public transport (Enoch et al., 2005), and other cities such as 
Santiago have fees that are primarily dedicated to road infrastructure 
(Zegras, 2003).
Box 12�5 | Singapore: TOD and Road Pricing
The island-state of Singapore has over the years introduced a series 
of cross-cutting, reinforcing spatial planning and supportive strate-
gies that promote sustainable urbanism and mobility (Suzuki et al., 
2013). Guided by its visionary Constellation Plan, Singapore built a 
series of new master-planned towns that interact with each other 
because they each have different functional niches. Rather than 
being self-contained entities, these new towns function together 
(Cervero, 1998). All are interlinked by high-capacity, high-quality 
urban rail and bus services, and correspondingly the majority of 
trips between urban centres are by public transport. Congestion 
charges and quota controls on vehicle registrations through an 
auctioning system also explain why Singapore’s transit services are 
so heavily patronized and not un-related, why new land develop-
ment is occurring around rail stations (Lam and Toan, 2006).
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where a 1 % increase in gas prices is associated with a 0.32 % increase in 
the population living in the inner city (Tanguay and Gingras, 2012); and 
cross-national datasets of 35 world cities (Glaeser et al., 2001; Glaeser 
and Kahn, 2004). However, another cross-national study using a larger 
dataset found no statistically significant link, which the authors attribute 
to noisiness in their (national-level) fuel price data (Angel et al., 2005). 
Similar impacts on urban form would be expected from other pricing 
instruments that increase the cost of driving. While there is clear evi-
dence that road and parking pricing schemes reduce emissions through 
direct impacts on mode and travel choices (see Chapter 8.10.1), there 
is more limited data on the indirect impacts through land-use patterns. 
One of the few simulation studies found that optimum congestion pric-
ing would reduce the radius of the Paris metropolitan area by 34 %, 
and the average travel distance by 15 % (De Lara et al., 2013).
12�5�3 Integrated spatial planning and 
implementation
A characteristic of effective spatial planning is interlinked and coor-
dinated efforts that are synergistic, and the sum of which are greater 
than each individual part incrementally or individually (Porter, 1997). 
Relying on a single instrument or one-size-fits-all approach can be 
ineffective or worse, have perverse, unintended consequences. Singa-
pore is a textbook example of successfully bundling spatial planning 
and supportive pricing strategies that reinforce and strengthen the 
influences of each other (see Box 12.5). Bundling spatial strategies in 
ways that produce positive synergies often requires successful insti-
tutional coordination and political leadership from higher levels of 
government (Gakenheimer, 2011). The U. S. state of Oregon has man-
aged to protect farmland and restrict urban sprawl through a com-
bination of measures, including urban growth boundaries (required 
for all metropolitan areas above 50,000 inhabitants), farm tax credit 
programmes, tax abatements for infill development, and state grants 
that have helped fund investments in high-quality transit, such as light 
rail and tramways in Portland and BRT in Eugene (Moore et al., 2007). 
Enabling legislation introduced by the state prompted cities like Port-
land to aggressively curb sprawl through a combination of urban con-
tainment, targeted infrastructure investments, aggressive expansion of 
pedestrian and bikeway facilities, and commercial-rate pricing of park-
ing (Nelson et al., 2004). 
Empirical evidence on the environmental benefits of policies that 
bundle spatial planning and market strategies continues to accumu-
late. A 2006 experiment in Portland, Oregon, replaced gasoline taxes 
with VKT charges, levied on 183 households that volunteered for the 
experiment.  Some motorists paid a flat VKT charge while others paid 
considerably higher rates during the peak than non-peak. The largest 
VKT reductions were recorded among households in compact, mixed-
use neighbourhoods that paid congestion charges matched by little 
change in travel among those living in lower density areas and pay-
ing flat rates (Guo et al., 2011). Another study estimated that compact 
development combined with technological improvements (e. g., more 
efficient vehicle fleets and low-carbon fuels) could reduce GHG emis-
sions by 15 % to 20 % (Hankey and Marshall, 2010). A general equilib-
rium model of urban regions in the OECD concluded that “urban den-
sity policies and congestion charges reduce the overall cost of meeting 
GHG emissions reduction targets more than economy-wide policies, 
such as a carbon tax, introduced by themselves” (OECD, 2010d).
12.6 Governance, institutions, 
and finance
The feasibility of spatial planning instruments for climate change 
mitigation depends greatly upon each city’s governance and finan-
cial capacities. Even if financial capacities are present, a number of 
other obstacles need to be surmounted. For example, many local gov-
ernments are disinclined to support compact, mixed-use, and dense 
development. Even in cases where there is political support for low-
carbon development, institutions may be ineffective in developing, 
implementing, or regulating land use plans. This section assesses the 
governance, institutional, and financial challenges and opportuni-
ties for implementing the mitigation strategies outlined in Section 
12.5.  It needs to be emphasized that both the demand for energy 
and for urban infrastructure services, as well as the efficiency of ser-
vice delivery, is also influenced by behaviour and individual choices. 
Cultural and lifestyle norms surrounding comfort, cleanliness, and con-
venience structure expectations and use of energy, water, waste, and 
other urban infrastructure services (Miller, 1998; Shove, 2003, 2004; 
Bulkeley, 2013). Individual and household choices and behaviour can 
also strongly affect the demand for, and the delivery efficiency of, pub-
lic infrastructure services, for instance by lowering or increasing load 
factors (utilization rates) of public transport systems (Sammer, 2013). 
Governance and institutions are necessary for the design and imple-
mentation of effective policy frameworks that can translate theoreti-
cal emission reduction potentials of a range of mitigation options into 
actual improved emission outcomes. 
12�6�1 Institutional and governance constraints 
and opportunities
The governance and institutional requirements most relevant to chang-
ing urban form and integrated infrastructure in urban areas relate to 
spatial planning. The nature of spatial planning varies significantly 
across countries, but in most national contexts, a framework for plan-
ning is provided by state and local governments. Within these frame-
works, municipal authorities have varying degrees of autonomy and 
authority. Furthermore, there are often divisions between land use 
planning, where municipalities have the authority for land regula-
tion within their jurisdiction, and transportation planning (which is 
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either centrally organized or done in a cross-cutting manner), in which 
municipal responsibilities are often more limited. Thus, spatial planning 
is one area where municipalities have both the authority and the insti-
tutions to address GHG emissions.
However, the best plans for advancing sustainable urbanization and 
low-carbon development, especially in fast-growing parts of the world, 
will not become a reality unless there is both the political will and 
institutional capacity to implement them. The ability to manage and 
respond to escalating demands for urban services and infrastructure is 
often limited in developing country cities. Multiple institutional short-
comings exist, such as an insufficiently trained and undereducated civil 
service talent pool or the absence of a transparent and corruption-free 
procurement process for providing urban infrastructure (UN-Habitat, 
2013). For example, limited experience with urban management, bud-
geting and accounting, urban planning, finance, and project supervi-
sion have thwarted Indonesia’s decentralization of infrastructure pro-
grammes from the central to local governments over the past decade 
(Cervero, 2013).
Although lack of coordination among local land management and 
infrastructure agencies is also a common problem in cities of industri-
alized countries (Kennedy et al., 2005), in developing cities institutional 
fragmentation undermines the ability to coordinate urban services 
within and across sectors (Dimitriou, 2011). Separating urban sector 
functions into different organizations — each with its own boards, 
staff, budgets, and by-laws — often translates into uni-sectoral actions 
and missed opportunities, such as the failure to site new housing proj-
ects near public transport stations. In addition, ineffective bureaucra-
cies are notorious for introducing waste and delays in the deployment 
of urban transport projects.
In rapidly urbanizing cities, limited capacities and the need to respond 
to everyday crises often occupy most of the available time in trans-
portation and public utility departments, with little attention left to 
strategically plan for prevention of such crises in the first place. As 
a result, strategic planning and coordination of land use and trans-
portation across different transport modes is practically non-existent. 
Institutions rarely have sufficient time or funds to expand transport 
infrastructure fast enough to accommodate the exponential growth in 
travel. Public utilities for water and sanitation face similar challenges, 
and most local agencies operate constantly in the catch-up mode. 
Water utilities in southeast Asian cities, for example, are so preoccu-
pied with fixing leaks, removing illegal connections, and meeting water 
purity standards that there is little time to strategically plan ahead for 
expanding trunk-line capacities in line with urban population growth 
projections. The ability to advance sustainable transport programmes, 
provide clean water connections, or introduce efficient pricing schemes 
implies the presence of conditions that rarely exist, namely a well-
managed infrastructure authority that sets clear, measurable objectives 
and rigorously appraises the expenditure of funds in a transparent and 
accountable way (Cervero, 2013). Lack of local institutional capacity 
among developing cities is a major barrier to achieving the full poten-
tial that such cities have to reduce GHG emissions (UN-Habitat, 2013). 
This highlights the urban institutional climate conundrum that rapidly 
urbanizing cities — cities with the greatest potential to reduce future 
GHG emissions — are the cities where the current lack of institutional 
capacity will most obstruct mitigation efforts. 
Curitiba, Brazil, regarded as one of the world’s most sustainable cit-
ies, is a product of not only visionary spatial planning but also strong 
institutions and political leadership (see Box 12.6.). Other global cit-
ies are striving to follow Curitiba’s lead. Bangkok recently announced 
a paradigm shift in planning that emphasizes redesigning the city to 
eliminate or shorten trips, creating complete streets, and making the 
city more liveable (Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, 2013). The 
Amman, Jordan, Master Plan of 2008 promotes high-density, mixed-
use development through the identification of growth centres, intensi-
fication along select corridors across the city, and the provision of safe 
and efficient public transportation (Beauregard and Marpillero-Colo-
mina, 2011). Similar transit-oriented master plans have been prepared 
for Islamabad, Delhi, Kuala Lumpur, and Johannesburg in recent years. 
Mexico City has aggressively invested in BRT and bicycle infrastruc-
ture to promote both a culture and built form conducive to sustainable 
mobility (Mejía-Dugand et al., 2013). 
In addition to the internal institutional challenges outlined above, cities 
face the problem of coordinating policies across jurisdictional boundar-
ies as their populations grow beyond the boundaries of their jurisdic-
tions. Effective spatial planning and infrastructure provision requires an 
integrated metropolitan approach that transcends traditional municipal 
boundaries, especially to achieve regional accessibility. The fragmented 
local government structure of metropolitan areas facilitates the conver-
sion of agricultural, forested, or otherwise undeveloped land to urban 
uses. These expanding urban areas also exhibit fiscal weaknesses, face 
heightened challenges of metropolitan transportation, and deficiencies 
in critical physical and social infrastructures (Rusk, 1995; Norris, 2001; 
Orfield, 2002; McCarney and Stren, 2008; Blanco et al., 2011; McCar-
ney et al., 2011). Several efforts to address urban climate change miti-
gation at a metropolitan scale are emerging. The U. S. state of Califor-
nia, for example, is requiring metropolitan transportation agencies to 
develop climate change mitigation plans in concert with municipalities 
in their region. California’s 2008 Sustainable Communities and Climate 
Protection Act, or SB 375, was the first legislation in the United States 
to link transportation and land use planning with climate change (State 
of California, 2008; Barbour and Deakin, 2012).
In order for integrated planning development to be successful, it must 
be supported at national levels (Gakenheimer, 2011). A recent example 
is India’s National Urban Transport Policy of 2006, which embraces 
integrated transport and land use planning as its top priority. In this 
policy, the central government covers half the costs of preparing inte-
grated transport and land use plans in Indian cities. Another example 
is that for the past 25 years, Brazil has had a national urban trans-
port policy that supports planning for sustainable transport and urban 
growth in BRT-served cities like Curitiba and Belo Horizonte. 
968
Human Settlements, Infrastructure, and Spatial Planning
12
Chapter 12
Box 12�6 | Sustainable Curitiba: Visionary planning and strong institutions
Developing cities such as Curitiba, Brazil, well-known for advancing 
sustainable transport and urbanism, owe part of their success to 
strong governance and institutions (Cervero, 2013). Early in Curi-
tiba’s planning process, the Instituto de Pesquisa e Planejamento 
Urbano de Curitiba (IPPUC) was formed and given the responsibility 
of ensuring the integration of all elements of urban growth.  Cre-
ative design elements, such as the trinary corridors (shown in Figure 
12.19) that concentrate vertically mixed development along high-
capacity dedicated busways and systematically taper densities away 
from transit corridors, were inventions of IPPUC’s professional staff. 
As an independent planning and research agency with dedicated 
funding support, IPPUC is insulated from the whims of day-to-day 
politics and able to cost effectively coordinate urban expansion and 
infrastructure development. Sustained political commitment has 
been another important element of Curitiba’s success. The harmoni-
zation of transport and urban development took place over 40 years, 
marked by a succession of progressive, forward-looking, like-minded 
mayors who built on the work of their predecessors. A cogent long-
term vision and the presence of a politically insulated regional plan-
ning organization, IPPUC, to implement the vision have been crucial 
in allowing the city to chart a sustainable urban pathway.
However, urban governance of land use and transport planning 
is not the sole province of municipal authorities or other levels of 
government. Increasingly, private sector developers are creating 
their own strategies to govern the nature of urban development 
that exceed codes and established standards. These strategies can 
relate both to the physical infrastructure being developed (e. g., 
the energy rating of housing on a particular development) or take 
the form of requirements and guides for those who will occupy 
new or refurbished developments (e. g., age limits, types of home 
appliance that can be used, energy contracts, and education about 
how to reduce GHG emissions). Non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) aimed at industry groups, such as the U. S. Green Build-
ing Council, the Korea Green Building Certification Criteria, and 
UK’s Building Research Establishment Environmental Assessment 
Method (BREEAM) have also become important in shaping urban 
development, particularly in terms of regeneration and the refur-
bishment or retrofitting of existing buildings. For example, this is 
the case in terms of community-based organizations in informal 
settlements, as well as in the redevelopment of brownfield sites in 
Europe and North America.
Figure 12�19 | Curitiba’s stylized trinary road system. The inclusion of mixed land uses and affordable housing allows developers to increase building heights, adding density to the 
corridor. Source: Suzuki et al. (2013).
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12�6�2 Financing urban mitigation
Urban infrastructure financing comes from a variety of sources, some 
of which may already be devoted to urban development. Some of these 
include direct central government budgetary investments, intergovern-
mental transfers to city and provincial governments, revenues raised 
by city and provincial governments, the private sector or public-private 
partnerships, resources drawn from the capital markets via municipal 
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bonds or financial intermediaries, risk management instruments, and 
carbon financing. Such sources provide opportunities for urban mitiga-
tion initiatives (OECD, 2010b), but access to these financial resources 
varies from one place to another. 
In many industrialized countries, national and supra-national poli-
cies and programmes have provided cities with the additional financ-
ing and facilitations for urban climate change mitigation. Where the 
national commitment is lacking, state and municipal governments 
can influence mitigation initiatives at the city scale. Cities in emerging 
economies are also increasingly engaging in mitigation, but they often 
rely on international sources of funding. GHG abatement is generally 
pursued as part of the urban development efforts required to improve 
access to infrastructure and services in the fast-growing cities of devel-
oping countries, and to increase the liveability of largely built-out cities 
in industrialized countries. Incorporating mitigation into urban devel-
opment has important financial implications, as many of the existing or 
planned urban investments can be accompanied through requirements 
to meet certain mitigation standards (OECD, 2010b). As decentraliza-
tion has progressed worldwide (the average share of sub-national 
expenditure in OECD countries reached 33 % in 2005), regional and 
local governments increasingly manage significant resources. 
Local fiscal policy itself can restrict mitigation efforts. When local bud-
gets rely on property taxes or other taxes imposed on new develop-
ment, there is a fiscal incentive to expand into rural areas or sprawl 
instead of pursuing more compact city strategies (Ladd, 1998; Song 
and Zenou, 2006). Metropolitan transportation policies and taxes 
also affect urban carbon emissions. Congestion charges reduce GHG 
emissions from transport by up to 19.5 % in London where proceeds 
are used to finance public transport, thus combining global and local 
benefits very effectively (Beevers and Carslaw, 2005). Parking charges 
have led to a 12 % decrease of vehicle miles of commuters in U. S. cit-
ies, a 20 % reduction in single car trips in Ottawa, and a 38 % increase 
of carpooling in Portland (OECD, 2010c). 
Another way to think about the policy instruments available to gov-
ernments for incentivizing GHG abatement is to consider each instru-
ment’s potential to generate public revenues or demand for govern-
ment expenditures, and the administrative scale at which it can be 
applied (Figure 12.20). Here, the policy instruments discussed earlier 
(Table 12.5) are categorized into four groups: (1) regulation; (2) taxa-
tion / charge; (3) land-based policy; and (4) capital investment. Many 
of these are applicable to cities in both the developed and developing 
countries, but they vary in degree of implementation due to limited 
institutional or governance capacities. Overcoming the lack of politi-
cal will, restricted technical capacities, and ineffective institutions for 
regulating or planning land use will be central to attaining low-carbon 
development at a city-scale.
Fiscal crises along with public investment, urban development, and 
environmental policy challenges in both developed and developing 
counties have sparked interest in innovative financial instruments to 
affect spatial development, including a variety of land-based tech-
niques (Peterson, 2009). One of these key financial / economic mecha-
nisms is land value capture. Land value capture consists of financing 
the construction of new transit infrastructures using the profits gen-
erated by the land value price increase associated with the presence 
of new infrastructure (Dewees, 1976; Benjamin and Sirmans, 1996; 
Batt, 2001; Fensham and Gleeson, 2003; Smith and Gihring, 2006). 
Also called windfall recapture, it is a local financing option based on 
recouping a portion or all of public infrastructure costs from private 
land betterments under the ‘beneficiary’ principle. In contrast, value 
compensation, or wipeout mitigation, is commonly viewed as a policy 
tool to alleviate private land worsements — the deterioration in the 
value or usefulness of a piece of real property — resulting from public 
regulatory activities (Hagman and Misczynski, 1978; Callies, 1979). 
The majority of the value capture for transit literature use U. S. cities as 
case studies in part because of the prevalence of low-density, automo-
bile-centred development. However, there is an emerging literature on 
value capture financing that focus on developing country cities, which 
tend to be denser than those in OECD countries, and where there are 
more even shares of distinct travel modes (Cervero et al., 2004). Value 
capture typically is used for public transit projects. There are various 
ways to implement value capture, including: land and property taxes, 
special assessment or business improvement districts, tax increment 
financing, development impact fees, public land leasing and develop-
ment right sales, land readjustment programmes, joint developments 
and cost / benefit sharing, connection fees (Johnson and Hoel, 1985; 
Landis et al., 1991; Bahl and Linn, 1998; Enoch et al., 2005; Smith and 
Gihring, 2006). There is much evidence that public transit investments 
often increase land values around new and existing stations (Du and 
Mulley, 2006; Debrezion et al., 2007).
In summary, the following are key factors for successful urban climate 
governance: (1) institutional arrangements that facilitate the inte-
gration of mitigation with other high-priority urban agendas; (2) an 
enabling multilevel governance context that empowers cities to pro-
mote urban transformations; (3) spatial planning competencies and 
political will to support integrated land-use and transportation plan-
ning; and (4) sufficient financial flows and incentives to adequately 
support mitigation strategies.
12.7 Urban climate 
mitigation: Experiences 
and opportunities
This section identifies the scale and range of mitigation actions being 
planned by municipal governments and assesses the evidence of 
successful implementation of the plans as well as barriers to further 
implementation. The majority of studies reviewed pertain to large 
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cities in North America, Japan, and Europe, although there are some 
cross-city comparisons and case studies that include smaller cities in 
industrialized economies (Yalçın and Lefèvre, 2012; Dierwechter and 
Wessells, 2013) and cities in developing countries and emerging econ-
omies (Romero Lankao, 2007; Pitt, 2010). 
Addressing climate change has become part of the policy landscape in 
many cities, and municipal authorities have begun to implement poli-
cies to reduce GHG emissions generated from within their administra-
tive boundaries (Acuto, 2013; OECD, 2010a). The most visible way in 
which cities undertake mitigation is under the auspices of a climate 
action plan — a policy document created by a local government agency 
that sets out a programme of action to mitigate greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Usually such plans include a GHG emissions inventory and an 
emissions reduction target, as well as a series of mitigation policies. 
This section focuses on such climate action plans, as they provide the 
most comprehensive and consistent, albeit limited, evidence available 
regarding urban mitigation efforts. However, there is not a one-to-one 
correspondence between climate action plans and urban mitigation 
Figure 12�20 | Key spatial planning tools and effects on government revenues and expenditures across administrative scales. Figure shows four key spatial planning tools (coded in 
colours) and the scale of governance at which they are administered (x-axis) as well as how much public revenue or expenditure the government generates by implementing each 
instrument (y-axis). 
Sources: Bahl and Linn (1998); Bhatt (2011); Cervero (2004); Deng (2005); Fekade (2000); Rogers (1999); Hong and Needham (2007); Peterson (2009); Peyroux (2012); Sandroni 
(2010); Suzuki et al. (2013); Urban LandMark (2012); U. S. EPA (2013); Weitz (2003).
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efforts. Even when included in climate action plans, mitigation mea-
sures may well have been implemented in the plan’s absence, whether 
for climate-related or other reasons (Millard-Ball, 2012b). Conversely, 
climate action plans are only one framework under which cities plan 
for mitigation policies, and similar recommendations may also occur as 
part of a municipal sustainability, land-use, or transport plan (Bulkeley 
and Kern, 2006; GTZ, 2009; Bassett and Shandas, 2010). In these other 
types of plans, climate change may be one motivation, but mitigation 
measures are often pursued because of co-benefits such as local air 
quality (Betsill, 2001; Kousky and Schneider, 2003). 
12�7�1 Scale of urban mitigation efforts
The number of cities that have signed up to voluntary frameworks for 
GHG emission reductions has increased from fewer than 50 at the start 
of the 1990s to several hundred by the early 2000s (Bulkeley and Bet-
sill, 2005), and several thousand by 2012 (Kern and Bulkeley, 2009; 
Pitt, 2010; Krause, 2011a). These voluntary frameworks provide techni-
cal assistance and political visibility. They include the C40 Cities Cli-
mate Leadership Group (C40), which by October 2013 counted most of 
the world’s largest cities among its 58 affiliates (C40 Cities, 2013), the 
Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) Campaign, and the 2013 European 
Covenant of Mayors, which had over 5,200 members representing over 
170 million people, or roughly one-third of the European population 
(The Covenant of Mayors, 2013). In the United States, nearly 1,100 
municipalities, representing approximately 30 % of the country’s popu-
lation, have joined the U. S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protection 
Agreement, thus committing to reduce their local GHG emissions to 
below 1990 levels (Krause, 2011a). 
Such estimates represent a lower bound, as cities may complete a 
climate action plan or undertake mitigation outside one of these vol-
untary frameworks. In California in 2009, 72 % of cities responding 
Box 12�7  Urban climate change mitigation in less developed countries
The majority of future population growth and demand for new 
infrastructure will take place in urban areas in developing coun-
tries. Africa and Asia will absorb the bulk of the urban population 
growth, and urbanization will occur at lower levels of economic 
development than the urban transitions that occurred in Annex I 
countries. There are currently multiple urban transitions taking 
place in developing countries, with differences in part due to their 
development histories, and with different impacts on energy use 
and greenhouse gas emissions. 
Urban areas in developing and least developed countries can 
have dual energy systems (Martinot et al., 2002; Berndes et al., 
2003). That is, one segment of the population may have access 
to modern energy and associated technology for heating and 
cooking. Another segment of the population — mainly those 
living in informal settlements — may rely mainly on wood-
based biomass. Such non-commercial biomass is a prominent 
source in the urban fuel mix in Sub-Saharan Africa (50 %) and 
in South Asia (23 %). In other regions, Latin America and the 
Caribbean (12 %), Pacific Asia (8 %) and China (7 %) traditional, 
non-commercial energy is not negligible but a relatively smaller 
proportion of overall energy portfolio (Grubler et al., 2012). The 
traditional energy system operates informally and inefficiently, 
using out-dated technology. It can be associated with signifi-
cant health impacts (see Section 9.7.3 in this report as well as 
Chapters 2 and 9 in IPCC, 2011). The unsustainable harvesting of 
woodfuels to supply large urban and industrial markets is signifi-
cantly contributing to forest degradation and coupled with other 
land-use changes to deforestation (see Chapter 11). However, 
recent technological advances suggest that energy production 
from biomass can be an opportunity for low carbon develop-
ment (Zeng et al., 2007; Fargione et al., 2008; Hoekman, 2009; 
Azar et al., 2010). Projections of significant growth in woodfuel 
demand (Mwampamba, 2007; Zulu, 2010; Agyeman et al., 2012) 
make it vital that this sector is overhauled and modernized using 
new technologies, approaches, and governance mechanisms.
Additionally, informal urbanization may not result in an increase 
in the provision of infrastructure services. Rather, unequal access 
to infrastructure, especially housing and electricity, is a significant 
problem in many rapidly growing urban centres in developing 
countries and shapes patterns of urban development. Mitigation 
options vary by development levels and urbanization trajecto-
ries. The rapid urbanization and motorization occurring in many 
developing and least developed countries is constrained by limited 
infrastructure and deteriorating transport systems. Integrated 
infrastructure development in these areas can have greater effects 
on travel demands and low-emission modal choices than in high-
income countries, where infrastructure is largely set in place (see 
Chapter 8.9). The scale of new building construction in developing 
countries follows a similar path. An estimated 3 billion people 
worldwide rely on highly polluting and unhealthy traditional solid 
fuels for household cooking and heating (Pachauri et al., 2012; 
IEA, 2012)and shifting their energy sources to electricity and clean 
fuels could strongly influence building-related emissions reduc-
tions (see Box 9.1 and Section 14.3.2.1). Thus, it is in developing 
and least developed country cities where opportunities for inte-
grated infrastructure and land-use planning may be most effective 
at shaping development and emissions trajectories, but where a 
‘governance paradox’ exists (see Section 12.3.1).
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to a survey stated they had adopted policies and / or programmes to 
address climate change, but only 14 % had adopted a GHG reduction 
target (Wang, 2013). In some countries, climate action plans are man-
datory for local governments, further adding to the total. For exam-
ple, in Japan, the Global Warming Law and the Kyoto Protocol Target 
Achievement Plan mandate that 1,800 municipal governments and 47 
Prefectures prepare climate change mitigation action plans (Sugiyama 
and Takeuchi, 2008). In France, climate action plans are mandatory for 
cities with populations larger than 50,000 (Yalçın and Lefèvre, 2012). 
Climate action planning has been most extensive in cities in Annex I 
countries, particularly those in Europe and Japan. This presents a mis-
match between the places with mitigation planning efforts and the 
places where most urban growth will occur — and where the greatest 
mitigation potential exists — largely in developing countries that are 
rapidly urbanizing. 
12�7�2 Targets and timetables
One way to assess the scale of planned mitigation is through the emis-
sion reduction targets set by cities, typically as part of their climate 
action plans. A central feature of municipal climate change responses 
is that targets and timetables have frequently exceeded national and 
international ambitions for emissions reduction. In Germany, nearly 
75 % of cities with a GHG target established their emissions goals 
based on national or international metrics rather than on a local analy-
sis of mitigation options and the average city reduction target of 1.44 % 
per year exceeds the national target (Sippel, 2011). In the United States, 
signatories to the Mayors Climate Protection Agreement have pledged 
to reduce GHG emissions by 7 % below 1990 levels by 2012, in line 
with the target agreed upon in the Kyoto Protocol for the United States 
(Krause, 2011b). Lutsey and Sperling (2008) find that these and other 
targets in 684 U. S. cities would reduce total emissions in the United 
States by 7 % below the 2020 business-as-usual (BAU) baseline.
In Europe and Australia, several municipalities have adopted targets of 
reducing GHG emissions by 20 % by 2020 and long-term targets for 
radically reducing GHG emissions, including ‘zero-carbon’ targets in 
the City of Melbourne and Moreland (Victoria), and a target of 80 % 
reduction over 1990 levels by 2050 in London (Bulkeley, 2009). This 
approach has not been limited to cities in developed economies. For 
example, the city of Cape Town has set a target of increasing energy 
efficiency within the municipality by 12 % by 2010 (Holgate, 2007), 
and Mexico City has implemented and achieved a target of reducing 7 
million tons of GHG from 2008 to 2012 (Delgado-Ramos, 2013). Data 
compiled for this assessment, although illustrative rather than system-
atic, indicate an average reduction of 2.74 t CO2eq / cap if cities were to 
achieve their targets, with percentage targets ranging from 10 % to 
100 %. In general, percentage reduction targets are larger for more dis-
tant years and in more affluent cities. However, the absolute level of 
the targeted reductions depends primarily on the city’s population and 
other determinants of baseline emissions (Figure 12.21.). 
Figure 12�22 | Mitigation measures in climate action plans. Sources: Compiled for this assessment from self-reported data submitted to Carbon Disclosure Project (2013).
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In some cases, targets may reflect patterns of potential mitigation. 
Targets are often arbitrary or aspirational, and reflect neither mitiga-
tion potential nor implementation. How targets translate into mitiga-
tion effort also depends on how they are quantified, e. g., whether fuel 
economy and similar improvements mandated at the national level are 
claimed by cities as part of their own reductions (Boswell et al., 2010; 
DeShazo and Matute, 2012). Mitigation targets are often set in abso-
lute terms, which may be less meaningful than per-capita reductions in 
assessing mitigation potential at the metropolitan scale. This is a particu-
larly important issue for central cities and inner suburbs, where popu-
lation and emissions may increase within the city boundary if policies 
to increase density and compactness are successful (see Section 12.4; 
Ganson, 2008; Salon et al., 2010).
Many cities, particularly those in developing countries, do not set tar-
gets at all. For example, the Delhi Climate Change Agenda only reports 
Delhi’s CO2 emissions from power, transport, and domestic sectors as 
22.49 MtCO2 for 2007 — 2008 (Government of NCT of Delhi, 2010), 
while the contributions from commercial sectors and industries com-
prise a larger share of the city’s total emissions. Furthermore, Delhi’s 
climate action plan lacks clear GHG reduction targets, an analysis of 
the total carbon reductions projected under the plan, and a strategy for 
how to achieve their emissions goals. Similar limitations are apparent 
in mitigation plans for other global cities such as Bangkok and Jakarta 
(Dhakal and Poruschi, 2010). For many cities in developing countries, a 
reliable city GHG inventory may not exist, making the climate change 
actions largely symbolic. However, these city action plans provide a 
foundation for municipal engagement in mitigation initiatives while 
building momentum for collective action on a global scale.
12�7�3 Planned and implemented mitigation 
measures
Limited information is available on the extent to which targets are 
being achieved or emissions reduced. Some cities have already 
achieved their initial GHG reduction targets, e. g., Seattle (Boswell 
et al., 2011), or are on track to do so, e. g. Stockholm (City of Stock-
sis of mitigation options and the average city reduction target of 1.44 % 
per year exceeds the national target (Sippel, 2011). In the United States, 
signatories to the Mayors Climate Protection Agreement have pledged 
to reduce GHG emissions by 7 % below 1990 levels by 2012, in line 
with the target agreed upon in the Kyoto Protocol for the United States 
(Krause, 2011b). Lutsey and Sperling (2008) find that these and other 
targets in 684 U. S. cities would reduce total emissions in the United 
States by 7 % below the 2020 business-as-usual (BAU) baseline.
In Europe and Australia, several municipalities have adopted targets of 
reducing GHG emissions by 20 % by 2020 and long-term targets for 
radically reducing GHG emissions, including ‘zero-carbon’ targets in 
the City of Melbourne and Moreland (Victoria), and a target of 80 % 
reduction over 1990 levels by 2050 in London (Bulkeley, 2009). This 
approach has not been limited to cities in developed economies. For 
example, the city of Cape Town has set a target of increasing energy 
efficiency within the municipality by 12 % by 2010 (Holgate, 2007), 
and Mexico City has implemented and achieved a target of reducing 7 
million tons of GHG from 2008 to 2012 (Delgado-Ramos, 2013). Data 
compiled for this assessment, although illustrative rather than system-
atic, indicate an average reduction of 2.74 t CO2eq / cap if cities were to 
achieve their targets, with percentage targets ranging from 10 % to 
100 %. In general, percentage reduction targets are larger for more dis-
tant years and in more affluent cities. However, the absolute level of 
the targeted reductions depends primarily on the city’s population and 
other determinants of baseline emissions (Figure 12.21.). 
Figure 12�22 | Mitigation measures in climate action plans. Sources: Compiled for this assessment from self-reported data submitted to Carbon Disclosure Project (2013).
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holm, 2013). In other places such as western Germany, few if any cit-
ies are likely to meet their targets (Sippel, 2011). Further data come 
from comparison of ‘before’ and ‘after’ GHG inventories. One study of 
six major cities found that emissions are falling by an average 0.27 t 
CO2eq / cap per year (Kennedy et al., 2012). Overall, however, the avail-
able data are usually incomplete, self-reported, and subject to various 
biases. More fundamentally, changes in aggregate emissions do not 
necessarily reflect the success or failure to implement mitigation mea-
sures, because so many drivers of emissions — including the electricity 
generation mix and fuel taxation — are normally beyond the control of 
cities (DeShazo and Matute, 2012). Whether a city achieves its target 
has less to do with its own actions and more to do with external driv-
ers of emissions.
An alternative way to gauge the extent of planned and implemented 
mitigation measures is through a bottom-up analysis of individual poli-
cies (Ramaswami et al., 2012a) or sector-specific data on green build-
ings, transport, or waste production (Millard-Ball, 2012a). However, 
there are no data from a large number of cities using these methods. 
Instead, available data are usually in the form of self-reported planned 
or implemented policies (Krause, 2011c; Castán Broto and Bulkeley, 
2012; Stone et  al., 2012; Bedsworth and Hanak, 2013). While these 
data do not reveal aggregate emission reductions, they indicate the 
sectoral breadth of city climate action plans and the types of measures 
that cities are planning. No single sector dominates mitigation plans, 
although transportation and building efficiency are the most common 
self-reported measures (Figure 12.22). Here it is worth noting that the 
relative contribution of sectors to total urban emissions varies greatly 
by city (see Section 12.3). 
The types of land-use strategies discussed in Section 12.5, such as 
compact development, are sometimes included in municipal efforts 
or plans, but the popularity of such land-use measures varies con-
siderably by context. In California, 80 % of municipal survey respon-
dents reported that they had policies for high-density or mixed-use 
development in place or under consideration, and the adoption of 
such land-use policies rose substantially between 2008 and 2010 
(Bedsworth and Hanak, 2013). In the United States, 70 % of climate 
action plans reviewed in one study include compact development 
strategies (Bassett and Shandas, 2010). In contrast, municipal cli-
mate plans in Norway and Germany focus on energy, transport and 
building efficiency, with little attention given to land use (Aall et al., 
2007; Sippel, 2011). At a global level, self-reported data from a small 
sample of cities (Figure 12.22) suggests that land-use measures are 
relatively uncommon in climate action plans — particularly outside 
Annex  I countries. Moreover, where land-use strategies exist, they 
focus on urban greenspace and / or biodiversity, rather than on the 
cross-sectoral measures to reduce sprawl and promote TOD that were 
discussed in Section 12.5.
Even if land use measures are listed in climate action plans, implemen-
tation has focused on win-win energy efficiency measures that lead to 
cost savings, rather than larger changes to land use, buildings or trans-
port. This is a consistent message from qualitative studies (Kousky and 
Schneider, 2003; Rutland and Aylett, 2008; Kern and Bulkeley, 2009), 
and some larger surveys of city efforts (Wang, 2013). There has been 
less engagement by municipalities with sectors such as energy and 
water supply that often lie outside of their jurisdiction (Bulkeley and 
Kern, 2006; ARUP, 2011) or with the GHG emissions embodied in pres-
ent patterns of urban resource use and consumption. More broadly, 
there is considerable variation in the nature and quality of climate 
change plans, particularly when it comes to specifying the detail of 
actions and approaches to implementation (Wheeler, 2008; Tang et al., 
2011; Bulkeley and Schroeder, 2012). 
Despite the implementation of comprehensive climate action plans 
and policies, progress for cities in developed countries is slow and the 
achievability of emissions targets remains uncertain. Although munic-
ipalities often highlight progress on mitigation projects, the impacts 
of these initiatives are not often evaluated (see Chapter 15 on policy 
evaluation). Cities’ mitigation reduction performance is largely cor-
related to the national performance in mitigation reduction. 
12.8 Sustainable development, 
co-benefits, trade-offs, 
and spill-over effects
Sustainable development (SD) is, and has always been, closely associ-
ated with human settlements. In fact, the very document that coined 
the phrase, the World Commission on Environment and Development 
(WCED) Report (WCED 1987), devoted a chapter to ‘the urban chal-
lenge’. While averting the adverse social and environmental effects of 
climate change remains at the core of the urban challenge today, cities 
throughout the world also continue to struggle with a host of other 
critical challenges, including, for instance, ensuring access to clean, 
reliable and affordable energy services for their citizens (particularly 
for the urban poor); limiting congestion, noise, air and water pollu-
tion, and health and ecosystem damages; and maintaining sufficient 
employment opportunities and competitiveness in an increasingly glo-
balized world.
Efforts to mitigate climate change will have important side-effects 
for these various policy objectives, as discussed in Sections 5.7, 6.6, 
7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 10.8, 11.7 and 11.A.6. To the extent these side-effects 
are positive, they can be deemed ‘co-benefits’; if adverse, they imply 
‘risks’.3 As such side-effects are likely to materialize first in urban set-
tings since these are the hubs of activity, commerce, and culture in 
3 Co-benefits and adverse side-effects describe co-effects without yet evaluating 
the net effect on overall social welfare. Please refer to the respective sections in 
the framing chapters as well as to the glossary in Annex I for concepts and defini-
tions — particularly Sections 2.4, 3.6.3, and 4.8.2.
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the modern world: this section will focus on the literature specifically 
linked to urban settings and refer to other sections of the report where 
appropriate.
Action on climate change mitigation often depends on the ability to 
‘reframe’ or ‘localize’ climate change with respect to the co-benefits 
that could be realized (Betsill, 2001). For example, in Canada “actions 
to reduce GHG emissions are also deeply connected to other goals and 
co-benefits such as human health improvements through improved air 
quality, cost savings, adaptability to real or potential vulnerabilities due 
to climate change, and overall improvements in short, medium and long-
term urban sustainability” (Gore et al., 2009). Sometimes called ‘local-
izing’ or ‘issue bundling’ (Koehn, 2008), these reframing strategies have 
proven to be successful in marshalling local support and action in devel-
oping country cities, and will continue to be an important component of 
developing local capacity for mitigation (Puppim de Oliveira, 2009).
12�8�1 Urban air quality co-benefits
Worldwide, only 160 million people live in cities with truly clean 
air — that is, in compliance with World Health Organization (WHO) 
guidelines (Grubler et  al., 2012) (Figure 12.23). Oxides of sulfur and 
nitrogen (SOx and NOx) and ozone (O3) — i. e., outdoor air pollut-
ants — are particularly problematic in cities because of high concen-
trations and exposures (Smith et al., 2012) (see Section 9.7 for a dis-
cussion of mitigation measures in the buildings sector on indoor air 
pollution and Section 7.9.2). Transport remains one of the biggest 
emitting sectors in the industrialized world. In developing countries, a 
wider range of sources is to blame, with vehicle emissions playing an 
ever increasing role also due to continuing urbanization trends (Kin-
ney et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2012; see also Sections 5.3.5.1 and 8.2). 
In a study of four Indian megacities, for instance, gasoline and diesel 
vehicle emissions already comprise 20 – 50 % of fine particulate mat-
ter (PM2.5) emissions (Chowdhury et al., 2007). The associated health 
burdens are particularly high in low-income communities due to high 
exposures and vulnerabilities (Campbell-Lendrum and Corvalán, 2007; 
Morello-Frosch et al., 2011).
Major air quality co-benefits can be achieved through mitigation 
actions in the urban context, especially in megacities in developing 
countries where outdoor air pollution tends to be higher than in urban 
centres in industrialized countries (Molina and Molina, 2004 and sec-
tion 5.7). Urban planning strategies and other policies that promote 
cleaner fuels, transport mode shifting, energy cogeneration and waste 
heat recycling, buildings, transport and industry efficiency standards 
can all contribute to lower rates of respiratory and cardiovascular 
disease (improved human health) as well as decreased impacts on 
urban vegetation (enhanced ecosystems) via simultaneous reductions 
in co-emitted air pollutant species (Campbell-Lendrum and Corvalán, 
2007; Creutzig and He, 2009; Milner et al., 2012; Puppim de Oliveira 
et al., 2013 and Sections 7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 10.8 as well as WGII AR5 Chap-
ter 11.9).4 Even an action like shading parking lots, which is generally 
thought of in the context of limiting the urban heat-island effect, can 
bring air pollution co-benefits through reductions in volatile organic 
compounds (VOC) and, thus, low-level ozone formation from parked 
vehicles (Scott et al., 1999). 
4 Monetized health co-benefits are found to be larger in developing countries than 
industrialized countries, a finding that results from the currently higher pollution 
levels of the former and, thus, the greater potential for improving health, particu-
larly in the transport and household energy demand sectors (Markandya et al., 
2009; Nemet et al., 2010; West et al., 2013 and Section 5.7). 
Table 12�6 | Potential co-benefits (green arrows) and adverse side-effects (orange arrows) of urban mitigation measures. Arrows pointing up / down denote a positive / negative 
effect on the respective objective or concern. The effects depend on local circumstances and the specific implementation strategy. For an assessment of macroeconomic, cross-
sectoral effects associated with mitigation policies (e. g., on energy prices, consumption, growth, and trade), see Sections 3.9, 6.3.6, 13.2.2.3 and 14.4.2. Numbers correspond to 
references listed below the table.
Mitigation 
measures
Effect on additional objectives / concerns







Higher rents & residential property values2
Efficient resource use and delivery5
↑ Health from increased physical activity3 ↑ Preservation of open space4
Increased accessibility ↑ Commute savings6 ↑
↑
Health from increased physical activity3
Social interaction and mental health7
↑ Air quality and reduced ecosystem and health 
impacts8
Mixed land use ↑
↑ ↑
Commute savings6
Higher rents & residential property values2
↑
↑
Health from increased physical activity3
Social interaction and mental health7
↑ Air quality and reduced ecosystem and health 
impacts8
References: 1: Ciccone and Hall (1996), Carlino et al. (2007); 2: Mayer and Somerville (2000), Quigley and Raphael (2005), Glaeser et al. (2006), Koster and Rouwendal (2012); 
3: Handy et al. (2002), Frank et al. (2004, 2009), Heath et al. (2006), Forsyth et al. (2007), Owen et al. (2007); 4: Brueckner (2000), Bengston et al. (2004), 5: Speir and Stephenson 
(2002), Guhathakurta and Gober (2007); 6: Krizek (2003), Cervero and Duncan (2006), Ma and Banister (2006), Day and Cervero (2010); 7: Galea et al. (2005), Berke et al. (2007), 
Duncan et al. (2013); 8: Campbell-Lendrum and Corvalán (2007), Creutzig and He (2009), Milner et al. (2012), Puppim de Oliveira et al. (2013).
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In the near-term (2030), air quality co-benefits of stringent mitigation 
actions (i. e., in line with achieving 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100) can be 
quite substantial in a highly urbanized region like Europe; decarboniza-
tion and energy efficiency (largely in transport) could reduce aggregate 
NOx emissions by a further 38 % relative to a baseline scenario that 
includes current and planned air quality legislation by 2030 but does 
not consider climate policies (Colette et al., 2012). Similar co-benefits 
have been reported for other pollutants in other regions (Rao et  al., 
2013), particularly in developing Asia (Doll and Balaban, 2013; Puppim 
de Oliveira et  al., 2013) (see Section 6.6). The potential for realizing 
these co-benefits depends on institutional frameworks and policy 
agendas at both the local and national level, as well as the interplay 
between the two (see Doll et  al., 2013, and Jiang et  al., 2013, for 
reviews of India and China). At the same time, the increasing role of 
decentralized power generation could lead to adverse air quality side-
effects if this trend is not coupled with a more intensive use of low-
carbon energy supply (Milner et al., 2012).
12�8�2 Energy security side-effects for urban 
energy systems
Mitigating climate change could have important side-effects for urban 
energy security (sufficient resources and resilient supply) — concerns 
that have re-emerged in many cities throughout the world in recent 
years (see Sections 6.6.2.1 and 7.9.1 for a broader discussion of energy 
security concerns). Perhaps the greatest energy-related vulnerability 
in this context is the fact that urban transport systems are at present 
almost entirely dependent on oil (Cherp et al., 2012). This is especially 
true in low-density areas where reliance on private vehicles is high 
(Levinson and Kumar, 1997). Therefore, any mitigation activities leading 
to a diversification of the transport sector away from oil could poten-
tially also contribute to a security co-benefit (see Jewell et al., 2013 and 
other references in Chapter 8.7.1). Such measures might range from 
technology standards (e. g., for vehicles and their fuels) to integrated 
infrastructure, spatial planning, and mass transit policies (Sections 12.5 
and 8.10). Energy efficiency regulations for buildings and industrial facil-
ities (both existing and new) can also help to enhance the resilience of 
fuel and electricity distribution networks (see Chapters 9.7 and 10.8). 
12�8�3 Health and socioeconomic co-benefits 
Spatial planning and TOD can yield other positive side-effects that may 
enhance a city’s liveability. For example, mass transit requires consid-
erably less physical space than private automobiles (transit: 0.75 – 2.5 
m2 / cap; auto: 21 – 28 m2 / cap) and generally emits less noise (Grubler 
et al., 2012), with health co-benefits in terms of cardiovascular disease 
and sleep disturbance (Kawada, 2011; Ndrepepa and Twardella, 2011 
see also 8.7; Milner et al., 2012). 
Neighbourhoods with walkable characteristics such as connectivity 
and proximity of destinations are correlated with higher frequency 
of physical activity among residents (Frank et al., 2004; Owen et al., 
2007), which is correlated with lower symptoms and incidences of 
depression (Galea et al., 2005; Berke et al., 2007; Duncan et al., 2013). 
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Compact neighbourhoods with more diversified land uses are cor-
related with higher housing prices and rents (Mayer and Somerville, 
2000; Quigley and Raphael, 2005; Glaeser et  al., 2006; Koster and 
Rouwendal, 2012). In a study of the Netherlands, neighbourhoods 
with more diverse land uses had a 2.5 % higher housing prices (Koster 
and Rouwendal, 2012). 
12�8�4 Co-benefits of reducing the urban heat 
island effect
The urban heat island (UHI) effect presents a major challenge to urban 
sustainability (see WG II AR5 Chapter 8). Not only does UHI increase 
the use of energy for cooling buildings (and thus increasing the miti-
gation challenge) and thermal discomfort in urban areas, but UHI 
also increases smoggy days in urban areas, with smog health effects 
present above 32 °C (Akbari et al., 2001; O’Neill and Ebi, 2009; Mav-
rogianni et al., 2011; Rydin et al., 2012). Proven methods for cooling 
the urban environment include urban greening, increasing openness 
to allow cooling winds (Smith and Levermore, 2008), and using more 
‘cool’ or reflective materials that absorb less solar radiation, i. e., 
increasing the albedo of the surfaces (Akbari et al, 2008; Akbari and 
Matthews, 2012). Reducing UHI is most effective when considered in 
conjunction with other environmental aspects of urban design, includ-
ing solar / daylight control, ventilation and indoor environment, and 
streetscape (Yang et al., 2010). On a global scale, increasing albedos 
of urban roofs and paved surfaces is estimated to induce a negative 
radiative forcing equivalent to offsetting about 44 Gt of CO2 emissions 
(Akbari et al., 2008).
Reducing summer heat in urban areas has several co-benefits. Electric-
ity use in cities increases 2 – 4 % for each 1 °C increase in temperature, 
due to air conditioning use (Akbari et al., 2001). Lower temperatures 
reduce energy requirements for air conditioning (which may result in 
decreasing GHG emissions from electricity generation, depending upon 
the sources of electricity), reduce smog levels (Rosenfeld et al., 1998), 
and reduce the risk of morbidity and mortality due to heat and poor air 
quality (Harlan and Ruddell, 2011). Cool materials decrease the tem-
perature of surfaces and increase the lifespan of building materials and 
pavements (Santero and Horvath, 2009; Synnefa et al., 2011). 
The projected global mean surface temperature increases under cli-
mate change will disproportionally impact cities already affected by 
UHI, thereby increasing the energy requirements for cooling buildings 
and increasing urban carbon emissions, as well as air pollution (Mick-
ley et al., 2004; Jacob and Winner, 2009). In addition, it is likely that cit-
ies will experience an increase in UHI as a result of projected increases 
in global mean surface temperature under climate change, which will 
result in additional global urban energy use, GHG emissions, and local 
air pollution. As reviewed here, studies indicate that several strategies 
are effective for decreasing the UHI. An effective strategy to mitigate 
UHI through increasing green spaces, however, can potentially con-
flict with a major urban climate change mitigation strategy, which is 
increasing densities to create more compact cities (Milner et al., 2012). 
This conflict illustrates the complexity of developing integrated and 
effective climate change policies for urban areas. 
More generally, reducing UHI effects — either through mitigation 
measures (e. g., improved waste heat recycling, co-generation, use of 
reflective building materials, increased vegetation) or through miti-
gation — can have co-benefits for urban water supplies (e. g., cooling 
water for thermal or industrial plants, drinking water), given that evap-
oration losses rise as water bodies warm (Grubler et al., 2012).
12.9 Gaps in  knowledge 
and data
This assessment highlights a number of key knowledge gaps:
•	 Lack of consistent and comparable emissions data at local 
scales� Although some emissions data collection efforts are under-
way, they have been undertaken primarily in large cities in devel-
oped countries. The lack of baseline data makes it particularly chal-
lenging to assess the urban share of global GHG emissions as well 
as develop urbanization and typologies and their emission path-
ways. Given the small number of city based estimates, more city 
data and research are needed, especially an urban emissions data 
system.
•	 Little scientific understanding of the magnitude of the emis-
sions reduction from altering urban form, and the emissions 
savings from integrated infrastructure and land use plan-
ning� Furthermore, there is little understanding of how different 
aspects of urban form interact and affect emissions. The existing 
research on the impact of policies designed to achieve emissions 
reductions through urban form do not conform to the standards of 
policy evaluation and assessment defined in Chapter 15.
•	 Lack of consistency and thus comparability on local emis-
sions accounting methods� Different accounting protocols yield 
significantly different results, making cross-city comparisons of 
emissions or climate action plans difficult. There is a need for stan-
dardized methodologies for local- or urban-level carbon account-
ing. 
•	 Few evaluations of urban climate action plans and their 
effectiveness� There is no systematic accounting to evaluate 
the efficacy of city climate action plans (Zimmerman and Faris, 
2011). Studies that have examined city climate action plans con-
clude that they are unlikely to have significant impact on reducing 
overall emissions (Stone et al., 2012; Millard-Ball, 2012a). Another 
major limitation to local or city climate action plans is their limited 
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coordination across city sectors and administrative / hierarchical 
levels of governance and lack of explicitly incorporating land-
based mitigation strategies. Successful local climate action plans 
will require coordination, integration, and partnerships among 
community organizations, local government, state and federal 
agencies, and international organizations (Yalçın and Lefèvre, 
2012; Zeemering, 2012). 
•	 Lack of scientific understanding of how cities can prioritize 
climate change mitigation strategies, local actions, invest-
ments, and policy responses that are locally relevant� Some 
cities will be facing critical vulnerability challenges, while other will 
be in the ‘red zone’ for their high levels of emissions. Local decision-
makers need clarity on where to focus their actions, and to avoid 
spending resources and efforts on policies and investments that are 
not essential. There is little scientific basis for identifying the right 
mix of policy responses to address local and urban level mitiga-
tion and adaptation. Policy packages will be determined based on 
the characteristics of individual cities and their urbanization and 
development pathways, as well as on forecasts of future climate 
and urbanization. They will be aimed at flexing the urban- and set-
tlement-related ‘drivers’ of emissions and vulnerability in order to 
ensure a less carbon-intensive and more resilient future for cities. 
•	 Large uncertainties as to how cities will develop in the future� 
There is robust scientific evidence that emissions vary across cities 
and that urban form and infrastructure play large roles in determin-
ing the relationship between urbanization and emissions.
12.10 Frequently Asked 
Questions
FAQ 12�1 Why is the IPCC including a new chapter 
on human settlements and spatial plan-
ning? Isn’t this covered in the individual 
sectoral chapters?
Urbanization is a global megatrend that is transforming societies. 
Today, more than 50 % of the world population lives in urban areas. By 
2050, the global urban population is expected to increase by between 
2.5 to 3 billion, corresponding to 64 % to 69 % of the world popula-
tion. By mid-century, more urban areas and infrastructure will be built 
than currently exist. The kinds of towns, cities, and urban agglomera-
tions that ultimately emerge over the coming decades will have a criti-
cal impact on energy use and carbon emissions. The Fourth Assessment 
Report (AR4) of the IPCC did not have a chapter on human settlements 
or urban areas. Urban areas were addressed through the lens of indi-
vidual sector chapters. Since the publication of AR4, there has been a 
growing recognition of the significant contribution of urban areas to 
GHG emissions, their potential role in mitigating them, and a multi-
fold increase in the corresponding scientific literature.
FAQ 12�2 What is the urban share of global energy 
and GHG emissions?
The exact share of urban energy and GHG emissions varies with emis-
sion accounting frameworks and definitions. Urban areas account for 
67 – 76 % of global energy use and 71 – 76 % of global energy-related 
CO2 emissions. Using Scope1 accounting, urban share of global CO2 
emissions is about 44 %.
Urban areas account for between 53 % and 87 % (central estimate, 
76 %) of CO2 emissions from global final energy use and between 30 % 
and 56 % (central estimate, 43 %) of global primary energy related CO2 
emissions. 
FAQ 12�3 What is the potential of human 
settlements to mitigate climate change?
Drivers of urban GHG emissions can be categorized into four major 
groups: economic geography and income, socio-demographic factors, 
technology, and infrastructure and urban form. Of these, the first three 
groups have been examined in greatest detail, and income is consis-
tently shown to exert a high influence on urban GHG emissions. Socio-
demographic drivers are of medium importance in rapidly growing cit-
ies, technology is a driver of high importance, and infrastructure and 
urban form are of medium to high importance as drivers of emissions. 
Key urban form drivers of GHG emissions are density, land use mix, 
connectivity, and accessibility. These factors are interrelated and inter-
dependent. As such, none of them in isolation are sufficient for lower 
emissions.
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This chapter critically examines and evaluates the ways in which agree-
ments and instruments for international cooperation to address global 
climate change have been and can be organized and implemented, 
drawing upon evidence and insights found in the scholarly literature. 
The retrospective analysis of international cooperation in the chapter 
discusses and quantifies what has been achieved to date and surveys 
the literature on explanations of successes and failures.
International cooperation is necessary to significantly miti-
gate climate change impacts (robust evidence, high agreement). 
This is principally due to the fact that greenhouse gases (GHGs) mix 
globally in the atmosphere, making anthropogenic climate change a 
global commons problem. International cooperation has the potential 
to address several challenges: multiple actors that are diverse in their 
perceptions of the costs and benefits of collective action, emissions 
sources that are unevenly distributed, heterogeneous climate impacts 
that are uncertain and distant in space and time, and mitigation costs 
that vary. [Section 13.2.1.1, 13.15]
International cooperation on climate change has become more 
institutionally diverse over the past decade (robust evidence, high 
agreement). The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) remains a primary international forum for climate 
negotiations, but other institutions have emerged at multiple scales: 
global, regional, national, and local, as well as public-private initiatives 
and transnational networks. [13.3.1, 13.4.14, 13.5, 13.12] This insti-
tutional diversity arises in part from the growing inclusion of climate 
change issues in other policy arenas (e. g., sustainable development, 
international trade, and human rights). These and other linkages cre-
ate opportunities, potential co-benefits, or harms that have not yet 
been thoroughly examined. Issue linkage also creates the possibility of 
forum shopping and increased negotiation costs, which could distract 
from or dilute the performance of international cooperation toward cli-
mate goals. [13.3, 13.4, 13.5]
Existing and proposed international climate agreements vary 
in the degree to which their authority is centralized (robust 
evidence, high agreement). The range of centralized formalization 
spans: strong multilateral agreements (such as the Kyoto Protocol tar-
gets), harmonized national policies (such as the Copenhagen / Cancún 
pledges), and decentralized but coordinated national policies (such 
as planned linkages of national and sub-national emissions trading 
schemes). [13.4.1, 13.4.3] Additionally, potential agreements vary in 
their degree of legal bindingness [13.4.2.1]. Three other design ele-
ments of international agreements have particular relevance: goals 
and targets, flexible mechanisms, and equitable methods for effort 
sharing. [13.4.2] 
The UNFCCC is currently the only international climate policy 
venue with broad legitimacy, due in part to its virtually univer-
sal membership (robust evidence, medium agreement). The UNFCCC 
continues to develop institutions and systems for governance of cli-
mate change. [13.2.2.4, 13.3.1, 13.4.1.4, 13.5]
Non-UN forums and coalitions of non-state actors, such as pri-
vate businesses and city-level governments, are also contrib-
uting to international cooperation on climate change (medium 
evidence, medium agreement). These forums and coalitions address 
issues including deforestation, technology transfer, adaptation, and 
fossil fuel subsidies. However, their actual mitigation performance is 
unclear. [13.5.1.3, 13.13.1.4] 
International cooperation may have a role in stimulating pub-
lic investment, financial incentives, and regulations to promote 
technological innovation, thereby more actively engaging the 
private sector with the climate regime (medium evidence, medium 
agreement). Technology policy can help lower mitigation costs, thereby 
increasing incentives for participation and compliance with interna-
tional cooperative efforts, particularly in the long run. Equity issues can 
be affected by domestic intellectual property rights regimes, which can 
alter the rate of both technology transfer and the development of new 
technologies. [13.3, 13.9, 13.12]
In the absence of — or as a complement to — a binding, inter-
national agreement on climate change, policy linkages among 
existing and nascent regional, national, and sub-national cli-
mate policies offer potential climate change mitigation and 
adaptation benefits (medium evidence, medium agreement) [13.3.1, 
13.5.1.3]. Direct and indirect linkages between and among sub-
national, national, and regional carbon markets are being pursued 
to improve market efficiency. Yet integrating climate policies raises a 
number of concerns about the performance of a system of linked legal 
rules and economic activities. Linkage between carbon markets can 
be stimulated by competition between and among public and private 
governance regimes, accountability measures, and the desire to learn 
from policy experiments. [13.3.1, 13.5.3, 13.6, 13.7, 13.13.2.3, Figure 
13.4] 
While a number of new institutions are focused on adaptation 
funding and coordination, adaptation has historically received 
less attention than mitigation in international climate policy, 
but inclusion of adaptation is increasingly important to reduce 
damages and may engage a greater number of countries (robust 
evidence, medium agreement). Other possible complementarities and 
tradeoffs between mitigation and adaptation, particularly the temporal 
distribution of actions, are not well-understood. [13.2, 13.3.3, 13.5.1.1, 
13.14]
Participation in international cooperation on climate change 
can be enhanced by monetary transfers, market-based mecha-
nisms, technology transfer, and trade-related measures (robust 
evidence, medium agreement). These mechanisms to enhance partici-
pation, along with compliance, legitimacy, and flexibility, affect the 
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institutional feasibility of international climate policy. [13.2.2.4, 13.3.3, 
13.8.1, 13.9.2]
International trade can offer a range of positive and negative 
incentives to promote international cooperation on climate 
change (robust evidence, medium agreement). Three issues are key to 
developing constructive relationships between international trade and 
climate agreements: how existing trade policies and rules can be modi-
fied to be more climate friendly; whether border adjustment measures 
(BAMs) or other trade measures can be effective in meeting the goals 
of international climate agreements; whether the UNFCCC, World 
Trade Organization (WTO), hybrid of the two, or a new institution is the 
best forum for a trade-and-climate architecture. [13.8]
Climate change policies can be evaluated using four criteria: 
environmental effectiveness, aggregate economic performance, 
distributional impacts, and institutional feasibility. These criteria 
are grounded in several principles: maximizing global net benefits; 
equity and the related principles of distributive justice and common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDRRC); 
precaution and the related principles of anticipation, and prevention of 
future risks; and sustainable development. These criteria may at times 
conflict, forcing tradeoffs among them. [13.2.1, 13.2.2]
International cooperation has produced political agreement 
regarding a long-term goal of limiting global temperature 
increase to no more than 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, but 
the overall level of mitigation achieved to date by cooperation 
appears inadequate to achieve this goal (robust evidence, medium 
agreement). Mitigation pledges by individual countries in the Copen-
hagen-Cancún regime, if fully implemented, will help reduce emissions 
in 2020 to below the projected business-as-usual level, but are unlikely 
to attain an emission level in 2020 consistent with cost-effective path-
ways, based on the immediate onset of mitigation, that achieve the 
long-term 2 °C goal with a greater than 50 % probability. The contribu-
tion of international cooperation outside of the UNFCCC is largely not 
quantified. [13.2.2.1, 13.13.1]
The Kyoto Protocol was the first binding step toward imple-
menting the principles and goals provided by the UNFCCC, but 
it has had limited effects on global emissions because some 
countries did not ratify the Protocol, some Parties did not meet 
their commitments, and its commitments applied to only a por-
tion of the global economy (medium evidence, low agreement). 
The Parties collectively surpassed their collective emission reduc-
tion target in the first commitment period, but the Protocol credited 
emissions reductions that would have occurred even in its absence. 
The Kyoto Protocol does not directly influence the emissions of non-
Annex  I countries, which have grown rapidly over the past decade. 
[13.13.1.1]
The flexible mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol have gener-
ally helped to improve its economic performance, but their envi-
ronmental effectiveness is less clear (medium evidence, medium 
agreement). The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) created a mar-
ket for emissions offsets from developing countries, generating credits 
equivalent to nearly 1.4 billion tCO2eq as of October 2013, many of 
which have been generated by low-cost mitigation technologies. The 
CDM showed institutional feasibility of a project-based market mecha-
nism under widely varying circumstances. The CDM’s environmental 
effectiveness has been mixed due to concerns about the additionality 
of projects, the validity of baselines, the possibility of emissions leak-
age, and recent price decreases. Its distributional impacts were limited 
due to the concentration of projects in a limited number of countries. 
The Protocol’s other flexible mechanisms, Joint Implementation and 
International Emissions Trading, have been undertaken both by gov-
ernments and private market participants, but have raised concerns 
related to government sales of emission units. [13.7.2, 13.13.1.2]
Recent UNFCCC negotiations have sought to include more 
ambitious mitigation commitments from countries with com-
mitmments under the Kyoto Protocol, mitigation contributions 
from a broader set of countries, and new finance and technol-
ogy mechanisms (medium evidence, low agreement). Under the 
2010 Cancún Agreement, developed countries formalized voluntary 
pledges of quantified, economy-wide emission reduction targets and 
some developing countries formalized voluntary pledges to mitigation 
actions. The distributional impact of the Agreement will depend in part 
on the magnitude and sources of financing, including the successful 
fulfilment by developed countries of their expressed joint commit-
ment to mobilize 100 billion USD per year by 2020 for climate action 
in developing countries. Under the 2011 Durban Platform for Enhanced 
Action, delegates agreed to craft a future legal regime that would be 
‘applicable to all Parties … under the Convention’ and would include 
substantial new financial support and technology arrangements to 
benefit developing countries, but the delegates did not specify means 
for achieving those ends. [13.5.1.1, 13.11, 13.13.1.3] 
The Montreal Protocol, aimed at protecting the stratospheric 
ozone layer, has also achieved significant reductions in global 
GHG emissions (robust evidence, high agreement). The Montreal Pro-
tocol set limits on emissions of ozone-depleting gases that are also 
potent GHGs, such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and hydrochlorofluo-
rocarbons (HCFCs). Substitutes for those ozone-depleting gases (such 
as hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), which are not ozone-depleting) may 
also be potent GHGs. Lessons learned from the Montreal Protocol, for 
example, about the effect of financial and technological transfers on 
broadening participation in an international environmental agreement, 
could be of value to the design of future international climate change 
agreements. [13.3.3, 13.3.4, 13.13.1.4]
Assessment of proposed cooperation structures reinforces the 
finding that there will likely be tradeoffs between the four cri-
teria, as they will inevitably conflict in some elements of any 
agreement (medium evidence, high agreement). Assessment of pro-
posed climate policy architectures reveals important tradeoffs that 
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depend on the specific design elements and regulatory mechanisms 
of a proposal. For example, there is a potential tradeoff between broad 
participation and the institutional feasibility of an ambitious environ-
mental performance goal. The extent of this tradeoff may depend on 
financial transfers, national enforcement mechanisms, and the distri-
bution and sharing of mitigation efforts. [13.2.2.5, 13.3.3, 13.13.1.4, 
13.13.2] 
Increasing interest in solar radiation management (SRM) and 
carbon dioxide removal (CDR) as strategies to mitigate the 
harms of climate change, pose new challenges for international 
cooperation (medium evidence, high agreement). Whereas emissions 
abatement poses challenges of engaging multilateral action to cooper-
ate, SRM may pose challenges of coordinating research and restrain-
ing unilateral deployment of measures with potentially adverse side-
effects. [13.4.4]
Gaps in knowledge and data: (1) comparisons among proposals in 
terms of aggregate and country-level costs and benefits per year, with 
incorporation of uncertainty; (2) assessment of the overall effect of 
emerging intergovernmental and transnational arrangements, includ-
ing ‘hybrid’ approaches; (3) understanding of complementarities and 
tradeoffs between policies affecting mitigation and adaptation; (4) 
understanding how international cooperation on climate change can 
help achieve co-benefits and development goals, including capacity 
building approaches; (5) understanding the factors that affect national 
decisions to join and form agreements.
13.1 Introduction
Due to global mixing of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere, 
anthropogenic climate change is a global commons problem. For this 
reason, international cooperation is necessary to achieve significant 
progress in mitigating climate change. Drawing on published research, 
this chapter critically examines and evaluates the ways in which agree-
ments and instruments for international cooperation have been and 
can be organized and implemented. The retrospective analysis of inter-
national cooperation in the chapter quantifies and discusses what has 
been achieved to date, and surveys the literature on explanations of 
successes and failures.
The scope of the chapter is defined by the range of feasible interna-
tional agreements and other policy instruments for cooperation on cli-
mate-change mitigation and adaptation. The disciplinary scope spans 
the social sciences of economics, political science, international rela-
tions, law, public policy, psychology, and sociology; relevant humani-
ties, including history and philosophy; and — where relevant to the 
discussion — the natural sciences. Where appropriate, the chapter 
synthesizes literature that utilizes econometric modelling, integrated 
modelling, game theory, comparative case studies, legal analysis, and 
political analysis. This chapter focuses on research and policy develop-
ments since the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007).
13.2 Framing concepts for an 
assessment of means for 
international cooperation
This section introduces the concept of a global commons problem to 
frame the challenge of international cooperation on climate change, 
principles for designing effective international climate policy, and crite-
ria for evaluating these policies.
13�2�1 Framing concepts and principles
13�2�1�1 The global commons and international climate 
cooperation
Climate change is a global commons problem, meaning reduction in 
emissions by any jurisdiction carries an economic cost, but the ben-
efits (in the form of reduced damages from climate change) are spread 
around the world — although unevenly — due to GHG emissions mix-
ing globally in the atmosphere. Mitigation of climate change is non-
excludable, meaning it is difficult to exclude any individual or institu-
tion from the shared global benefits of emissions reduction undertaken 
by any localized actor. Also, these benefits are non-rival, meaning they 
may be enjoyed by any number of individuals or institutions at the 
same time, without reducing the extent of the benefit any one of them 
receives. These public good characteristics of climate protection (non-
excludability and non-rivalry) create incentives for actors to ‘free ride’ 
on other actors’ investments in mitigation. Therefore, lack of ambition 
in mitigation and overuse of the atmosphere as a receptor of GHGs are 
likely.
Incentives to free ride on climate protection have been analyzed exten-
sively and are well-understood (Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968; Stavins, 
2011). The literature suggests that in some cases, effective common 
property management of local open-access resources can limit or even 
eliminate overuse (Ostrom, 2001; Wiener, 2009). Effective common 
property management of the atmosphere would require applying such 
management at a global level, by allocating rights to emit and provid-
ing disincentives for overuse through sanctions or pricing emissions 
(Byrne and Glover, 2002; Wiener, 2009). 
Enhancing production of public goods may be achieved by internaliz-
ing external costs (i. e., those costs not incorporated into market prices) 
or through legal remedies. Economic instruments can incorporate 
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external costs and benefits into prices, providing incentives for private 
actors to more optimally reduce external costs and increase external 
benefits (Baumol and Oates, 1988; Nordhaus, 2006; Buchholz et  al., 
2012). Legal remedies may include seeking injunctive relief or com-
pensatory payments (IPCC, 2007, Chapter 13; Faure and Peeters, 2011; 
Haritz, 2011)
International cooperation is necessary to significantly mitigate climate 
change because of the global nature of the problem (WCED, 1987; 
Kaul et al., 1999, 2003; Byrne and Glover, 2002; Barrett, 2003; Stew-
art and Wiener, 2003; Sandler, 2004) Cooperation has the potential 
to address several challenges: multiple actors that are diverse in their 
perceptions of the costs and benefits of collective action; emissions 
sources that are unevenly distributed; heterogeneous climate impacts 
that are uncertain and distant in space and time; and mitigation costs 
that vary (IPCC, 2001, pp. 607 – 608).
In the absence of universal collective action, smaller groups of indi-
vidual actors may be able to organize schemes to supply public goods, 
particularly if actors know each other well, expect repeated interac-
tions, can exclude non-members, and can monitor and sanction non-
compliance in the form of either overconsumption or underproduction 
(Eckersley, 2012; McGee, 2011; Nairn, 2009; Ostrom, 1990, 2010a; 
b, 2011; Weischer et  al., 2012). Some authors are optimistic regard-
ing such ‘minilateralism’ (e. g., Keohane and Victor, 2011; on the term, 
see Eckersley, 2012) and others are more sceptical (e. g., Depledge and 
Yamin, 2009; Winkler and Beaumont, 2010) . Section  13.3 discusses 
the literature on coalitions in more detail.
Because there is no world government, each country must volun-
tarily consent to be bound by any international agreement. If these 
are to be effective, the agreements must be attractive enough to gain 
broad participation (Barrett, 2003, 2007; Stewart and Wiener, 2003; 
Schmalensee, 2010; Brousseau et al., 2012). Considering the relation-
ship between mitigation costs and climate benefits discussed above, 
there is insufficient incentive for actors at any level to reduce emissions 
significantly in the absence of international cooperation. Behavioural 
research, however, indicates that individuals are sometimes motivated 
to cooperate (and to punish those who do not) to a degree greater 
than strict rational choice models predict (Camerer, 2003; Andreoni 
and Samuelson, 2006). This may explain some of the observed policies 
being adopted to reduce GHG emissions at the national, subnational, 
firm, and individual level. Moreover, even under the assumption of 
rational action, some emission reductions can occur without coopera-
tion due to positive externalities of otherwise self-beneficial actions, 
or co-benefits, such as actions to reduce energy expenditures, enhance 
the security of energy supply, reduce local air pollution, improve land 
use, and protect biodiversity (Seto et al., 2012). Co-benefits of climate 
protection are receiving increasing attention in the literature (Rayner, 
2010; Dubash, 2009; UNEP, 2013b). However, policies designed to 
address climate change mitigation may also have adverse side-effects. 
See Section 4.8 and 6.6 for an overview of the discussion of co-bene-
fits and adverse side-effects throughout this report. 
13�2�1�2 Principles
Several principles have been advanced to shape international climate 
change policies. The IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR) (IPCC, 2001) 
discusses principles and mentions some criteria for evaluation of poli-
cies, whereas the AR4 (IPCC, 2007), clearly differentiates principles 
from criteria. Principles serve as guides to design climate policies, 
while criteria are specific standards by which to evaluate them. The 
roles and applications of principles and criteria are further elaborated 
in Chapter 3 of this report.
Sets of principles are enumerated and explained in multiple interna-
tional climate change fora, including the Rio Declaration on Environ-
ment and Development (UNEP, 1992) and the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (UNFCCC, 1992). In the 
latter, the principles listed explicitly include: ‘equity’ and ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ (CBDRRC) 
(Article 3(1)), relative needs, vulnerability, burdens in countries of dif-
fering wealth (Article 3(2)), precaution and ‘cost-effective[ness] so as 
to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost’ (Article 3(3)), 
‘sustainable development’ (Article 3(4)), and cooperation (Article 3(5)). 
Principles of climate change policy relevant for international coopera-
tion can be grouped into several broad categories. First, the principle 
of maximizing global net benefits makes the tradeoff between aggre-
gate compliance costs and aggregate performance benefits explicit. 
The principle also incorporates the notion of maximizing co-benefits 
of climate action (Stern, 2007; Nordhaus, 2008; Bosetti et  al., 2010; 
Rayner, 2010; Dubash, 2009) (see also Section 3.6.3). A related concept 
is that of cost-effectiveness, which allows for policies with the same 
level of performance in terms of aggregate benefits to be compared on 
the dimension of aggregate cost (IPCC, 2001, 2007, Chapter 13). See 
Section 6.6 for applied scenario studies.
Second, equity is a principle that emphasizes distributive justice across 
and within countries and across and within generations (Vanderheiden, 
2008; Baer et al., 2009; Okereke, 2010; Posner and Sunstein, 2010; Pos-
ner and Weisbach, 2010; Somanathan, 2010; Cao, 2010c). It includes 
evaluating the procedures used to reach an agreement as well as the 
achieved outcomes. This principle may also apply in a broader assess-
ment of well-being (Sen, 2009; Cao, 2010a). The principle of CBDRRC 
has been central in international climate negotiations (Rajamani, 2006, 
2011a; Gupta and Sanchez, 2013). The literature refers to the varied 
historic responsibility — and current capability and capacity — of coun-
tries with regard to impacts of and action to address climate change 
(Jacoby et al., 2010; Rajamani, 2006, 2012b; Höhne et al., 2008; Del-
link et al., 2009; den Elzen et al., 2013b). Some literature assesses how 
the principle might be applied to actors’ diverse needs (Jonas, 1984; 
Dellink et  al., 2009), including the specific needs and vulnerabilities 
of developing countries (Rong, 2010; Smith et al., 2011; Bukovansky 
et  al., 2012). Recent literature suggests that this principle’s applica-
tion may be more nuanced as patterns of development, emissions, 
and impacts evolve (Bukovansky et al., 2012; Deleuil, 2012; Müller and 
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Mahadev, 2013; Winkler and Rajamani, 2013). The literature describes 
competing views regarding the meaning of this principle in terms of its 
legal status, operational significance, and the obligations it may entail 
(Höhne et  al., 2006; Halvorssen, 2007; O’Brien, 2009; Winkler et  al., 
2009; Winkler, 2010; Hertel, 2011). The principle of CBDRRC is further 
analyzed in Sections 3.3 and 4.6. 
Third, the principle of precaution emphasizes anticipation and preven-
tion of future risks, even in the absence of full scientific certainty about 
the impacts of climate change (Bodansky, 2004; Wiener, 2007; Urueña, 
2008). Some see precaution as a strategy for effective action across 
diverse uncertain scenarios (Barrieu and Sinclair-Desgagné, 2006; World 
Bank, 2010), although the application of precaution varies across risks 
and countries (Hammitt, 2010). A key ongoing debate concerns whether 
or not this principle implies the need for stringent climate change poli-
cies as an insurance against potentially catastrophic outcomes, even 
if they may have very low probability (Weitzman, 2007, 2009, 2011; 
Pindyck, 2011; Nordhaus, 2011). The application of the precautionary 
principle to climate risk is further discussed in Section 2.5.5.
Fourth, the principle of sustainable development, broadly defined, 
emphasizes consideration of the socioeconomic needs of future gen-
erations in making decisions about current resource use (IPCC, 2007, 
Chapter 12; World Bank, 2010). For a detailed discussion of the litera-
ture on sustainable development, see Section 4.2.1.
13�2�2 Potential criteria for assessing means of 
international cooperation
The principles elaborated above can be translated into criteria to eval-
uate forms of international cooperation, thereby assisting in the design 
of a distribution of efforts intended to solve the collective action prob-
lem of climate protection. The AR4 put forth one set of criteria: environ-
mental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, distributional considerations, 
and institutional feasibility (IPCC, 2007, pp. 751 – 752). As ‘metrics of 
success’, these evaluation criteria can be applied in the context of 
both ex-post evaluations of actual performance and ex-ante assess-
ments of proposed cooperation (Hammitt, 1999; Fischer and Morgen-
stern, 2010). Below, this section describes four evaluation criteria that 
are applied in Section 13.13 to assess existing and proposed forms of 
international cooperation to address climate change mitigation. These 
criteria are subject to caveats, which are detailed in Section 13.13.
13�2�2�1 Environmental effectiveness
The environmental effectiveness of a climate change mitigation policy 
is the extent to which it achieves its objective to reduce the causes 
and impacts of climate change. Environmental effectiveness can be 
achieved by reducing anthropogenic sources of GHG emissions, remov-
ing GHGs from the atmosphere, or reducing the impacts of climate 
change directly through increased resilience. A primary objective of 
international cooperation has been to stabilize GHG concentrations 
at levels sufficient to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interfer-
ence with the climate system,” in the words of the UNFCCC Article 
2 (1992). This would require action within a time-frame sufficient to 
“allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that 
food production is not threatened and to enable economic develop-
ment to proceed in a sustainable manner” (UNFCCC, 1992), Article 2). 
The Kyoto Protocol established specific emission-reduction targets for 
developed countries, while the Copenhagen Accord and Cancún Agree-
ments expressed the environmental objective in terms of global aver-
age temperature increase. In addition to endorsing mitigation targets 
by developed countries and mitigation actions by developing countries, 
the Copenhagen and Cancún agreements recognized a goal of limiting 
increases in average global temperature to 2 °C above pre-industrial 
levels (UNFCCC, 2009a, 2010, 2011a).
13�2�2�2 Aggregate economic performance
Measuring the aggregate economic performance of a climate policy 
requires considering both its economic efficiency and its cost-effec-
tiveness. Economic efficiency refers to the maximization of net ben-
efits, the difference between total social benefits and total social costs 
(Stern, 2007; Nordhaus, 2008; Bosetti et al., 2010). 
Cost-effectiveness refers to the ability of a policy to attain a pre-
scribed level of environmental performance at least cost, taking 
into account impacts on dynamic efficiency, notably technological 
innovation (Jaffe and Stavins, 1995). Unlike net benefit assessment, 
cost-effectiveness analysis takes the environmental performance of a 
policy as given and seeks the least-cost strategy to attain it (Ham-
mitt, 1999). While analysis of a policy in terms of its cost-effectiveness 
still requires environmental performance of the policy to be quanti-
fied, it does not require environmental performance benefits to be 
monetized. Thus, analysis of a policy’s cost-effectiveness may be more 
feasible than analysis of a policy’s economic efficiency in the case of 
climate change, as some social benefits of climate-change mitigation 
are difficult to monetize.
13�2�2�3 Distributional and social impacts
Distributional equity and fairness may be considered important attri-
butes of climate policy because of their impact on measures of well-
being (Posner and Weisbach, 2010) and political feasibility (Jacoby 
et al., 2010; Gupta, 2012). Distributional equity relates to burden- and 
benefit-sharing across countries and across time. Section 4.2.2 puts for-
ward three justifications for considering distributional equity — legal, 
environmental effectiveness, and moral. The framing in Section 4.2 also 
identifies a relatively small set of core equity principles: responsibil-
ity, capacity, the right to sustainable development, and equality. These 
may be modelled with quantitative indicators, as discussed in Section 
6.3.6.6. The moral justification draws on ethical principles, which are 
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reflected in the principles of the Convention (see Section 13.2.1.2; and 
detailed treatment of the literature on ethics in Section 3.2).
Another dimension of distributional equity is the possibility for miti-
gation actions in one jurisdiction to have positive or negative conse-
quences in another jurisdiction. This phenomenon, sometimes referred 
to as ‘response measures’ or as ‘spillover effects’ (see WGIII AR4 Glos-
sary), can lead to an unequal distribution of the impacts of climate 
change mitigation actions themselves. A plausible example of a spill-
over effect is the impact of emissions reductions in developed countries 
lowering the demand for fossil fuels and thus decreasing their prices, 
leading to more use of such fuels and greater emissions in developing 
nations, partially off-setting the original cuts (Bauer et  al., 2013) This 
dynamic can also be important for countries with large endowments 
of conventional oil and gas that depend on export revenues. These 
countries may lose energy export revenue as a result of climate poli-
cies enacted in other countries (Kalkuhl and Brecha, 2013; Bauer et al., 
2013). Additionally, climate policies could also reduce international coal 
trading (Jewell et al., 2013). See also Sections 6.3.6, 14.4.2, and 15.5.2 
for further discussion of spillover effects. 
13�2�2�4 Institutional feasibility
The institutional feasibility of international climate policy may depend 
upon agreement among national governments and between govern-
ments and intergovernmental bodies (Wiener, 2009; Schmalensee, 
2010). Institutional feasibility is closely linked to domestic political 
feasibility, because domestic political conditions affect participation 
in, and compliance with, international climate policies. This has been 
addressed in the literature on ‘two-level’ games (Kroll and Shogren, 
2009; Hafner-Burton et al., 2012). Four sub-criteria of institutional fea-
sibility can also be considered: participation, compliance, legitimacy, 
and flexibility. 
First, participation in an international climate agreement might refer 
to the number of parties, geographical coverage, or the share of global 
GHG emissions covered. Participating parties might vary with regard 
to the nature and specificity of their commitments (e. g., actions ver-
sus quantitative emissions-reduction targets). Sovereign states are not 
bound by an international treaty or other arrangement unless they 
consent to participate. The literature has examined a broad array of 
incentives to promote breadth of participation in international agree-
ments (Barrett, 2003; Barrett and Stavins, 2003; Stewart and Wiener, 
2003; Hall et al., 2010; Victor, 2010; World Bank, 2010; Olmstead and 
Stavins, 2012). These incentives can be positive (e. g., financial sup-
port or technology transfers) or negative (e. g., trade sanctions). Some 
authors have suggested that participation limited to countries with the 
highest emissions enhances institutional feasibility (Leal-Arcas, 2011) 
and that incentive-based emissions-permit allocations, or rules requir-
ing participation of key players, may enable larger coalitions (Dellink 
et al., 2008; Dellink, 2011).
Second, institutional feasibility is also partly determined by the com-
pliance of participating countries with an agreement’s provisions. 
Mechanisms to ensure compliance, in turn, affect decisions to partici-
pate, as well as long-term performance (Barrett, 2003). Incentives for 
encouraging compliance can be built into flexible mechanisms, such 
as tradable permit systems (Wiener, 2009; Ismer and Neuhoff, 2009; 
Keohane and Raustiala, 2010). Compliance is fundamentally prob-
lematic in international agreements, as it is difficult to establish an 
authority that can legitimately and effectively impose sanctions upon 
sovereign national governments. Despite that, indirect negative con-
sequences of non-compliance can arise within the regime established 
by the agreement, or in other regimes, for example, adverse voting 
behaviour in international forums or reduction in foreign aid (Heitzig 
et al., 2011).
Third, legitimacy is a key component of institutional feasibility. Parties 
to a cooperative agreement must have reason to accept and imple-
ment decisions made under the agreement, meaning they must believe 
that the relevant regime represents them fairly. Legitimacy depends on 
the shared understanding both that the substantive rules (outputs) and 
decision-making procedures (inputs) are fair, equitable, and beneficial 
(Scharpf, 1999), and thus that other regime members will continue to 
cooperate (Ostrom, 1990, 2011). In practice, the legitimacy of substan-
tive rules is typically based on whether parties evaluate positively the 
results of an authority’s policies, while procedural legitimacy is typi-
cally based on the existence of proper input mechanisms of partici-
pation and consultation for the parties participating in an agreement 
(Stevenson and Dryzek, 2012). 
Finally, the institutional feasibility of international climate policy 
depends in part on whether the institutions relevant for a policy can 
develop flexibility mechanisms — which typically require that the 
institutions themselves are flexible or adjustable. It may be important 
to be able to adapt to new information or to changes in economic 
and political circumstances. The institutionalization of learning among 
actors, which is referred to as ‘social learning’ in the literature of envi-
ronmental governance (Pahl-Wostl et  al., 2007), is an important 
aspect of success, enabling adaptation to changing circumstances. 
While institutional arrangements that incorporate a purposive pro-
cess of experimentation, evaluation, learning, and revision may be 
costly, policies that do not incorporate these steps may be overly rigid 
in the face of change and therefore potentially even more costly 
(Greenstone, 2009; Libecap, 2011). Another area of current debate 
and research is the question of whether increased flexibility in design-
ing obligations for states helps them align their international obliga-
tions more readily with domestic political constraints (von Stein, 
2008; Hafner-Burton et al., 2012). This suggests that designing inter-
national climate policies involves a balance between the benefits of 
flexibility and the costs of regulatory uncertainty (Goldstein and Mar-
tin, 2000; Brunner et  al., 2012). Chapter 2, for example in Section 
2.6.5.1, goes into more depth on problems related to regulatory 
uncertainty.
Box 13�1 | International agreements and developing countries
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) is a statement of aspirations, principles, goals, and the 
means to meet commitments. The Kyoto Protocol of the UNFCCC 
included, for the first time, binding mitigation commitments — for 
nations listed in its Annex B. Other countries may assist Annex B 
Parties in meeting their mitigation commitments via the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), under the Protocol’s Article 12.
Annex I countries under the UNFCCC, which include all Annex 
B countries under the Kyoto Protocol, are largely the wealthi-
est countries and largest historical emitters of GHGs. However, 
Annex I countries’ share of historical cumulative GHG emissions 
in 2010 is close to the share of the non-Annex I countries (Section 
13.13.1.1). Thus, the Kyoto Protocol’s mitigation commitments 
were initially consistent with the UNFCCC principle of ‘common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ 
(CBDRRC). However, since the UNFCCC divided countries into two 
categories in 1992, both income patterns and the distribution of 
GHG emissions have changed significantly, even as variations in 
income and per capita responsibility for emissions remain sub-
stantial both within and between countries. Between Conference 
of Parties (COP)-13 (Bali) in 2007 and COP-16 (Cancún) in 2010, 
many developing countries put forward quantifiable mitigation 
actions (as contrasted with quantified, economy-wide emissions 
reductions targets assumed by Annex B parties under the Kyoto 
Protocol) and agreed to more frequent reporting and enhanced 
transparency of those actions. Further pledges of actions have 
been made since Cancún. (Section 13.13) 
For many developing countries, adaptation can have comparable 
priority to mitigation. This may be because countries are especially 
vulnerable to climate change damages or they lack confidence in 
progress with mitigation efforts. These countries are often the least 
able to finance adaptation, leaving cooperative agreements to 
attempt to identify sources of support. (See Chapter 16 for detail.) 
International collaboration regarding public climate finance under 
the UNFCCC dates back to 1991, when the Climate Change Pro-
gram of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) was established. The 
literature reflects mixed evidence on the scale and environmental 
effectiveness of such funding. Funding for reporting and mitigation 
flows through four primary vehicles: the GEF, which focuses on 
mitigation; the Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF) and Special 
Climate Change Fund (SCCF), created in 2001 for adaptation 
purposes and operated by the GEF; the Adaptation Fund set up in 
2008; and the Green Climate Fund (GCF), established in 2010 for 
mitigation and adaptation. (Section 13.11, see also Section 16.2) 
The Copenhagen Accord set a goal to jointly mobilize 100 billion 
USD / yr by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries. 
(Section 13.11) Article 4.5 of the UNFCCC also calls for technology 
transfer from developed to developing countries. The Technology 
Mechanism, with an Executive Committee and Climate Technology 
Centre and Network, is seeking to fulfil this goal. 
Research indicates that adaptation assistance, such as that pro-
vided by the Kyoto Protocol’s Adaptation Fund, can be crucial for 
inclusion of developing countries in international climate agree-
ments. Further research into the distribution of adaptation finance 
across countries from both UNFCCC and non-UNFCCC sources 
is required to assess the equity, efficiency, effectiveness, and 
environmental impacts of the Adaptation Fund and other funding 
mechanisms. Many developing countries have created institutions 
to coordinate adaptation finance from domestic and international 
funding sources. (Sections 13.3, 13.5)
The literature identifies several models for equitable burden 
sharing — among both developed and developing countries in 
international cooperation for climate change mitigation. The prin-
ciples on which burden sharing arrangements may be based are 
described in Section 4.6.2, and the implications of these arrange-
ments are discussed in Section 6.3.6.6. Distributional impacts from 
agreements will depend on the approach taken, criteria applied 
to operationalize equity, and the manner in which developing 
countries’ emissions plans are financed; studies suggest potential 
approaches (Section 13.4, UNFCCC Secretariat 2007b, 2008). A 
major distributional issue is how to account for emissions from 
goods produced in a developing country, but consumed in an 
industrialized country. Such emissions have increased rapidly since 
1990, as developed countries have typically been importers of 
embodied emissions, while many developing countries have large 
shares of emissions embodied in exports. (Sections 13.8, 14.3.4)
New and existing coalitions of countries have engaged in the 
UNFCCC negotiations, each presenting coordinated positions. 
Several distinct coalitions of developing countries have formed to 
negotiate their divergent priorities. Examples include the Group of 
77 (G-77) and China, which contains sub-groups such as the Afri-
can Group, the Least Developed Countries, and the Arab Group; 
the Alliance of Independent Latin American and Caribbean states; 
and a ‘like-minded developing country’ group that included China, 
India, and Saudi Arabia. Other coalitions organized to influence 
UNFCCC negotiations include the Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS); various groupings of industrialized countries, including 
the Umbrella Group; the Environmental Integrity Group; the BASIC 
countries (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China); the Coalition of 
Rainforest Nations; and other active coalitions not limited to the 
climate context, for example, the Comision Centroamericana de 
Ambiente y Desarollo and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas.
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Second, institutional feasibility is also partly determined by the com-
pliance of participating countries with an agreement’s provisions. 
Mechanisms to ensure compliance, in turn, affect decisions to partici-
pate, as well as long-term performance (Barrett, 2003). Incentives for 
encouraging compliance can be built into flexible mechanisms, such 
as tradable permit systems (Wiener, 2009; Ismer and Neuhoff, 2009; 
Keohane and Raustiala, 2010). Compliance is fundamentally prob-
lematic in international agreements, as it is difficult to establish an 
authority that can legitimately and effectively impose sanctions upon 
sovereign national governments. Despite that, indirect negative con-
sequences of non-compliance can arise within the regime established 
by the agreement, or in other regimes, for example, adverse voting 
behaviour in international forums or reduction in foreign aid (Heitzig 
et al., 2011).
Third, legitimacy is a key component of institutional feasibility. Parties 
to a cooperative agreement must have reason to accept and imple-
ment decisions made under the agreement, meaning they must believe 
that the relevant regime represents them fairly. Legitimacy depends on 
the shared understanding both that the substantive rules (outputs) and 
decision-making procedures (inputs) are fair, equitable, and beneficial 
(Scharpf, 1999), and thus that other regime members will continue to 
cooperate (Ostrom, 1990, 2011). In practice, the legitimacy of substan-
tive rules is typically based on whether parties evaluate positively the 
results of an authority’s policies, while procedural legitimacy is typi-
cally based on the existence of proper input mechanisms of partici-
pation and consultation for the parties participating in an agreement 
(Stevenson and Dryzek, 2012). 
Finally, the institutional feasibility of international climate policy 
depends in part on whether the institutions relevant for a policy can 
develop flexibility mechanisms — which typically require that the 
institutions themselves are flexible or adjustable. It may be important 
to be able to adapt to new information or to changes in economic 
and political circumstances. The institutionalization of learning among 
actors, which is referred to as ‘social learning’ in the literature of envi-
ronmental governance (Pahl-Wostl et  al., 2007), is an important 
aspect of success, enabling adaptation to changing circumstances. 
While institutional arrangements that incorporate a purposive pro-
cess of experimentation, evaluation, learning, and revision may be 
costly, policies that do not incorporate these steps may be overly rigid 
in the face of change and therefore potentially even more costly 
(Greenstone, 2009; Libecap, 2011). Another area of current debate 
and research is the question of whether increased flexibility in design-
ing obligations for states helps them align their international obliga-
tions more readily with domestic political constraints (von Stein, 
2008; Hafner-Burton et al., 2012). This suggests that designing inter-
national climate policies involves a balance between the benefits of 
flexibility and the costs of regulatory uncertainty (Goldstein and Mar-
tin, 2000; Brunner et  al., 2012). Chapter 2, for example in Section 
2.6.5.1, goes into more depth on problems related to regulatory 
uncertainty.
Box 13�1 | International agreements and developing countries
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) is a statement of aspirations, principles, goals, and the 
means to meet commitments. The Kyoto Protocol of the UNFCCC 
included, for the first time, binding mitigation commitments — for 
nations listed in its Annex B. Other countries may assist Annex B 
Parties in meeting their mitigation commitments via the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), under the Protocol’s Article 12.
Annex I countries under the UNFCCC, which include all Annex 
B countries under the Kyoto Protocol, are largely the wealthi-
est countries and largest historical emitters of GHGs. However, 
Annex I countries’ share of historical cumulative GHG emissions 
in 2010 is close to the share of the non-Annex I countries (Section 
13.13.1.1). Thus, the Kyoto Protocol’s mitigation commitments 
were initially consistent with the UNFCCC principle of ‘common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ 
(CBDRRC). However, since the UNFCCC divided countries into two 
categories in 1992, both income patterns and the distribution of 
GHG emissions have changed significantly, even as variations in 
income and per capita responsibility for emissions remain sub-
stantial both within and between countries. Between Conference 
of Parties (COP)-13 (Bali) in 2007 and COP-16 (Cancún) in 2010, 
many developing countries put forward quantifiable mitigation 
actions (as contrasted with quantified, economy-wide emissions 
reductions targets assumed by Annex B parties under the Kyoto 
Protocol) and agreed to more frequent reporting and enhanced 
transparency of those actions. Further pledges of actions have 
been made since Cancún. (Section 13.13) 
For many developing countries, adaptation can have comparable 
priority to mitigation. This may be because countries are especially 
vulnerable to climate change damages or they lack confidence in 
progress with mitigation efforts. These countries are often the least 
able to finance adaptation, leaving cooperative agreements to 
attempt to identify sources of support. (See Chapter 16 for detail.) 
International collaboration regarding public climate finance under 
the UNFCCC dates back to 1991, when the Climate Change Pro-
gram of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) was established. The 
literature reflects mixed evidence on the scale and environmental 
effectiveness of such funding. Funding for reporting and mitigation 
flows through four primary vehicles: the GEF, which focuses on 
mitigation; the Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF) and Special 
Climate Change Fund (SCCF), created in 2001 for adaptation 
purposes and operated by the GEF; the Adaptation Fund set up in 
2008; and the Green Climate Fund (GCF), established in 2010 for 
mitigation and adaptation. (Section 13.11, see also Section 16.2) 
The Copenhagen Accord set a goal to jointly mobilize 100 billion 
USD / yr by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries. 
(Section 13.11) Article 4.5 of the UNFCCC also calls for technology 
transfer from developed to developing countries. The Technology 
Mechanism, with an Executive Committee and Climate Technology 
Centre and Network, is seeking to fulfil this goal. 
Research indicates that adaptation assistance, such as that pro-
vided by the Kyoto Protocol’s Adaptation Fund, can be crucial for 
inclusion of developing countries in international climate agree-
ments. Further research into the distribution of adaptation finance 
across countries from both UNFCCC and non-UNFCCC sources 
is required to assess the equity, efficiency, effectiveness, and 
environmental impacts of the Adaptation Fund and other funding 
mechanisms. Many developing countries have created institutions 
to coordinate adaptation finance from domestic and international 
funding sources. (Sections 13.3, 13.5)
The literature identifies several models for equitable burden 
sharing — among both developed and developing countries in 
international cooperation for climate change mitigation. The prin-
ciples on which burden sharing arrangements may be based are 
described in Section 4.6.2, and the implications of these arrange-
ments are discussed in Section 6.3.6.6. Distributional impacts from 
agreements will depend on the approach taken, criteria applied 
to operationalize equity, and the manner in which developing 
countries’ emissions plans are financed; studies suggest potential 
approaches (Section 13.4, UNFCCC Secretariat 2007b, 2008). A 
major distributional issue is how to account for emissions from 
goods produced in a developing country, but consumed in an 
industrialized country. Such emissions have increased rapidly since 
1990, as developed countries have typically been importers of 
embodied emissions, while many developing countries have large 
shares of emissions embodied in exports. (Sections 13.8, 14.3.4)
New and existing coalitions of countries have engaged in the 
UNFCCC negotiations, each presenting coordinated positions. 
Several distinct coalitions of developing countries have formed to 
negotiate their divergent priorities. Examples include the Group of 
77 (G-77) and China, which contains sub-groups such as the Afri-
can Group, the Least Developed Countries, and the Arab Group; 
the Alliance of Independent Latin American and Caribbean states; 
and a ‘like-minded developing country’ group that included China, 
India, and Saudi Arabia. Other coalitions organized to influence 
UNFCCC negotiations include the Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS); various groupings of industrialized countries, including 
the Umbrella Group; the Environmental Integrity Group; the BASIC 
countries (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China); the Coalition of 
Rainforest Nations; and other active coalitions not limited to the 
climate context, for example, the Comision Centroamericana de 
Ambiente y Desarollo and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas.
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13�2�2�5 Conflicts and complementarities
Criteria may be mutually reinforcing (Cao, 2010a; c), but there may 
also be conflicts, forcing tradeoffs between and among them. For 
example, maximizing global net benefits or attaining cost-effective-
ness may lead to actions that decrease distributional equity (van Asselt 
and Gupta, 2009), which could lead to low participation. Posner and 
Weisbach (2010) and Baer (2009) argue that efficiency and distribution 
can be reconciled by either normatively adjusting the net benefit or 
cost calculations to account for changes in relative utility, or by adopt-
ing redistributive policy in addition to cost-effective climate policy. 
Different approaches to meet the same criteria (for example, equity) 
may also conflict with each other when operationalized (Fischer and 
Morgenstern, 2010) or lead to different results (Dellink et al., 2009). 
Simultaneously, there are relations among sub-criteria: excessive 
flexibility may undermine incentives to invest in long-term solutions, 
and may also increase the likelihood of participation. Compromises 
to enable institutional feasibility of an agreement may weaken per-
formance along other dimensions. The environmental performance of 
an international agreement depends largely on tradeoffs among the 
ambition of an agreement with regards to mitigation goals and par-
ticipation, and compliance (Barrett, 2003; Bodansky, 2011a; Rajamani, 
2012a). For further discussion of potential tradeoffs between participa-
tion and environmental effectiveness, see Section 13.3.3.
13.3 International agreements: 
Lessons for climate policy
Several lessons from research on existing international agreements, as 
well as game-theoretic models of such agreements, can be applied to 
climate change institutions. This section briefly summarizes some of 
the key lessons, which are addressed in more detail in subsequent sec-
tions of this chapter.
13�3�1 The landscape of climate agreements 
and institutions
Since the publication of IPCC AR4 in 2007, the landscape of interna-
tional institutions related to climate policy has become significantly 
more complex. Climate change is addressed in a growing number of 
fora and institutions and across a wider range of scales (Keohane and 
Victor, 2011; Bulkeley et al., 2012; Biermann et al., 2009, 2010; Barrett, 
2010; Abbott, 2011; Hoffmann, 2011; Zelli, 2011; Rayfuse and Scott, 
2012). 
Figure 13.1 illustrates the variety of international, transnational, regional, 
national, sub-national, and non-state agreements and other forms of 
cooperation, many of which have emerged since the mid-2000s. Some 
regimes that previously focused on other issues, e. g., trade (see Sec-
tion 13.8), energy (see Chapter 7), biodiversity, and human rights have 
begun to address climate change. For a more detailed discussion of 
these initiatives, see also Section 13.5.
Future efforts for international cooperation on climate policy will need 
to account for this wide variety of agreements and institutions. Careful 
design of linkages and cooperative arrangements will be needed to 
manage the increasingly fragmented regime complex to prevent con-
flicts among institutions (Biermann et  al., 2010; Keohane and Victor, 
2011; Zelli, 2011), avoid gaps or loopholes (Downs, 2007), and maxi-
mize potential institutional synergies (Hoffmann, 2011; Rayfuse and 
Scott, 2012). 
13�3�2 Insights from game theory for climate 
agreements
Game theory provides insights into international cooperation on cli-
mate policy, from research communities in environmental economics 
(Ward, 1993; Finus, 2001, 2003; Wagner, 2001; Barrett, 2003, 2007) 
and in the rationalist school of political science (Sjostedt, 1992; Downs 
et  al., 1996; Underdal, 1998; Koremenos et  al., 2001; Avenhaus and 
Zartman, 2007; Hafner-Burton et al., 2012). These researchers analyze 
the incentives and motivations of actors to join and comply with inter-
national environmental agreements (IEAs). 
The game-theoretic literature on climate change agreements has 
grown substantially in the last two decades (Barrett, 2007; Rubio 
and Ulph, 2007; Chambers, 2008; Froyn and Hovi, 2008; Bosetti et al., 
2009a; Asheim and Holtsmark, 2009; Dutta and Radner, 2009; Muñoz 
et al., 2009; Carbone et al., 2009; Weikard et al., 2010; Bréchet et al., 
2011; Wood, 2011; Heitzig et al., 2011; Dietz and Zhao, 2011; Bréchet 
and Eyckmans, 2012; Pittel and Rübbelke, 2012). It is important, how-
ever, to treat with caution any general conclusions from recent game 
theory literature on climate change agreements, as many have been 
criticized for their simplicity. In this section, we refrain from listing 
assumptions in detail, and restrict attention to the most general and 
policy-relevant discussions. See Finus (2001, 2003) for a more detailed 
review of the relevant game theory literature.
By and large, the game-theoretic literature assumes actors to be states 
that are maximizing the welfare of their citizens (Ward, 1993; Carraro 
and Siniscalco, 1998; Grundig, 2006). A central premise is that there 
is currently no supranational institution that can impose an IEA on 
governments and subsequently enforce it (see Section 13.2.1.1). Thus, 
IEAs must be self-enforcing to engage and maintain participation 
and compliance (Finus, 2001; Barrett, 2007; Dutta and Radner, 2009; 
Rubio and Casino, 2005; Heitzig et al., 2011). Nevertheless, in theory 
and practice, international institutions can help to promote, negotiate, 
and administer an IEA. They can do so by serving to coordinate and 
moderate negotiations and implementation, reducing transaction costs 
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UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol, Clean Development Mechanism, International Emissions Trading
Other UN Intergovernmental 
organizations
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, UN Development Programme, UN Environment Programme, UN Global Compact, International Civil Aviation 
Organization, International Maritime Organization, UN Fund for International Partnerships
Non-UN IOs World Bank, World Trade Organization
Other environmental treaties Montreal Protocol, UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, Environmental Modification Treaty, Convention on Biological Diversity
Other multilateral ‘clubs’ Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate, G20, REDD+ Partnerships
Bilateral arrangements e. g., US-India, Norway-Indonesia
Partnerships Global Methane Initiative, Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership, Climate Group
Offset certification systems e. g., Gold Standard, Voluntary Carbon Standard
Investor governance initiatives Carbon Disclosure Project, Investor Network on Climate Risk
Regional governance e. g., EU climate change policy
Subnational regional initiatives Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, California emissions-trading system
City networks US Mayors’ Agreement, Transition Towns
Transnational city networks C40, Cities for Climate Protection, Climate Alliance, Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network
NAMAs, NAPAs Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) of developing countries; National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs)
Figure 13�1 | The landscape of agreements and institutions on climate change. Lines connecting different types of agreements and institutions indicate different types of links. In 
some cases, lines represent a formal agreement of a division of labour (e. g. between the UNFCCC and ICAO concerning aviation emissions). In other cases, lines represent a more 
simple mutual recognition (e. g. the accreditation of C40 cities by the UNFCCC). In others still, lines represent a functional linkage without any formal relationship (e. g. the relation-
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of negotiations, and generating trust (Keohane, 1984, 1989; Finus and 
Rundshagen, 2006); changing the interests of actors by providing new 
information or building capacity (Haas et al., 1993); enlisting actors in 
domestic politics within and across states (Abbott and Snidal, 2010; 
Hafner-Burton et al., 2012); and inculcating norms (Bodansky, 2010a). 
Alternative perspectives on game theory weaken the assumption of 
rationality and emphasize the roles of legitimacy, norms, and accul-
turation in shaping behaviour under international law and institutions 
(Goodman and Jinks, 2004; March and Olsen, 2008; Brunnée and 
Toope, 2010; Bernauer et  al., 2010; Hafner-Burton et  al., 2012). See 
Chapter 2 for a discussion of behavioural approaches in the literature.
13�3�3 Participation in climate agreements
Greater participation in climate change agreements, all else equal, 
improves environmental effectiveness by covering a larger share of 
global emissions and reducing potential leakage to non-participating 
areas. Greater participation may also improve aggregate economic 
performance by enabling lower-cost emissions abatement and reduc-
ing leakage. An international climate agreement regime might achieve 
depth (ambition of emissions reduction) and breadth (of participation) 
in different sequence. Schmalensee (1998) argues for breadth of par-
ticipation first, with less emphasis on ambition. He argues that this 
approach allows time to develop correspondingly broad-based insti-
tutions that can potentially facilitate substantial aggregate emissions 
reductions over time (Schelling, 1992; Barrett, 2003). Conversely, pur-
suing an arrangement with depth before breadth can be motivated 
by the urgency of the climate-change problem. However, such an 
approach may make broadening participation more difficult later on 
(Schmalensee, 1998), and this type of agreement could induce emis-
sions leakage, undermining effectiveness (Babiker, 2005).
In the theoretical literature, the tradeoff between the level of abate-
ment by a sub-set of actors and participation in an IEA has been ana-
lyzed as a comparison between an ‘ambitious versus a modest treaty’ 
(Finus and Maus, 2008; Courtois and Haeringer, 2011) or between a 
focal (deep and narrow) versus a consensus (broad but shallow) treaty 
(Barrett, 2002; Hafner-Burton et  al., 2012). Scholars conclude that, 
overall, a consensus treaty may achieve more in terms of emission 
reductions and global welfare than a focal treaty. Further analysis has 
investigated the tradeoff between breadth and depth, and how broad 
participation can increase environmental effectiveness (by covering 
more emissions and reducing leakage), and reduce costs (by encom-
passing more low-cost abatement options in a larger market). Through 
these plausible mechanisms, greater breadth enables greater ambition 
(subject to the costs of attracting participants) (Battaglini and Harstad, 
2012).
While most existing IEAs feature open membership, some theoretical 
literature finds that exclusive membership can help to stabilize IEAs, 
prevent defection, and lead to better environmental outcomes, even 
in the context of a global public good such as climate protection (Car-
raro and Marchiori, 2003; Eyckmans and Finus, 2006; Finus, 2008a; 
Finus and Rundshagen, 2009). In practice, exclusive membership may 
reduce supply of a public good such as global emissions abatement, 
may increase emissions leakage (unless non-members are covered by 
their own coalition in a system of multiple agreements), and may con-
flict with norms of institutional legitimacy. Multiple agreements (i. e., 
multiple coalitions) may be a pragmatic, short- to mid-term strategy 
for achieving more effective cooperation if a universal treaty of all 
countries to limit emissions is not stable or attainable in the short-run 
(Finus and Rundshagen, 2003; Stewart and Wiener, 2003; Asheim et al., 
2006; Eyckmans and Finus, 2006; Bosetti et  al., 2009b; Bréchet and 
Eyckmans, 2012). Multiple coalition agreements involving all major 
emitters could potentially achieve better environmental effectiveness 
than a partial coalition acting while other countries do not act at all. 
However, for protecting a global public good, separate coalitions could 
forego some of the cost-effectiveness gains of a broader regime, and 
they could face questions of legitimacy (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and 
McGee, 2013). It remains unclear whether partial coalitions for climate 
policy will accelerate momentum for a more universal global agree-
ment in the future, or undermine such momentum (Brewster, 2010).
International transfers can also attract participation in climate agree-
ments, balancing the asymmetric gains from cooperation. These 
transfers can either be direct monetary transfers (e. g., contributions 
to a fund from which developing countries can draw), in-kind trans-
fers (e. g., technology transfer), or indirect transfers via market-based 
mechanisms (e. g., through the initial allocation of tradable emission 
permits) (Carraro et al., 2006; Barrett, 2007; Bosetti et al., 2009a; Fuen-
tes-Albero and Rubio, 2010; Bréchet and Eyckmans, 2012; Stewart and 
Wiener, 2003). Historically, transfers have been important for building 
participation in past international agreements (Hafner-Burton et  al., 
2012; Bernauer et al., 2013). The experience of the Montreal Protocol 
illustrates how transfers can engage participation by major develop-
ing countries through financial and technological assistance (Sandler, 
2010; Kaniaru, 2007; Zhao, 2005, 2002; Andersen et  al., 2007). The 
role of technology transfer in international cooperation is discussed in 
greater detail in Section 13.9, and the role of finance is discussed in 
Section 13.11. 
Linkages across issues may also help encourage participation. Many 
linkages exist between climate change and other issues, such as 
energy, water, agriculture, sustainable development, poverty allevia-
tion, public health, international trade, human rights, foreign direct 
investment, biodiversity, and national security (see Sections 3.4, 5.7, 
6.6, and Section 13.2.1.1). Such linkages may create opportunities, co-
benefits, or adverse side-effects, not all of which have been thoroughly 
examined. However, the advantages of issue linkage may diminish as 
the number of parties and issues increase, raising the transaction costs 
of negotiations (Weischer et al., 2012). 
A different instrument to encourage participation is trade sanctions 
against non-parties to an IEA. The threat of trade sanctions can moti-
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vate participation (Barrett, 2003; Victor, 2011), as exemplified by the 
Montreal Protocol. However, since participation in an international 
treaty is voluntary, sanctions for non-participation may be difficult to 
justify (see Section 13.3.4). Similar to trade sanctions are ‘offsetting 
border adjustment measures’ (BAMs) (see Section 13.8 for further dis-
cussion). 
Particularly vulnerable countries may be more likely to participate in 
agreements that address and fund adaptation activities (Huq et  al., 
2004; Mace, 2005; Ayers and Huq, 2009; Denton, 2010; Smith et al., 
2011). Benefits of adaptation are often local, and these local benefits 
may be more effective incentives for countries vulnerable to climate 
damages to participate in an IEA relative to the benefits of mitiga-
tion and support for technological development or deployment. Both 
of these alternative possible incentive mechanisms are less-excludable 
and are of potentially less value to lower-emitting countries, compared 
with adaptation benefits. Recent game theoretic analyses suggest 
that private co-benefits from mitigation actions may not substantially 
increase participation in international climate agreements (Pittel and 
Rübbelke, 2008; Finus and Rübbelke, 2012).
A final key issue related to participation is the role played by uncer-
tainty. Earlier research suggested that reducing uncertainty about 
the benefits and costs of mitigation can render IEAs less effective, 
showing that as parties learn of the actual costs and benefits of 
mitigation, their incentive to participate may shrink (Na and Shin, 
1998; Kolstad, 2005; Kolstad and Ulph, 2008). However, more recent 
work (Finus and Pintassilgo, 2012, 2013; Dellink and Finus, 2012) has 
qualified this conclusion by showing that removing uncertainty only 
has a negative impact on cooperation in certain cases. Recent experi-
mental evidence suggests that if there is uncertainty in the likelihood 
of tipping points of disastrous climate change impacts, this may 
reduce the success of cooperation (Dannenberg et  al., 2011); con-
versely, reducing uncertainty about the likelihood of tipping points 
can increase prospects for collective action (Barrett and Dannenberg, 
2012).
13�3�4 Compliance
As noted in Section 13.2.1.1, in the absence of a supranational author-
ity, compliance with international agreements must be verified by 
parties to the agreement or through a related collaborative body they 
perceive as legitimate. Barrett (2003) sees compliance as a dimension 
of participation, in the sense that incentives to comply are incentives 
to continue participating in the agreement. The reputational costs 
of being a non-compliant party may differ from those of withdraw-
ing altogether, but the magnitude of the difference is not clear. For 
example, there is only one case of withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, 
that of Canada in December 2011, but more than one case in which 
countries have not met their agreed emission targets (see Section 
13.13.1.1).
Compliance does not necessarily equate with success — because coun-
tries choose whether to become party to an agreement, compliance 
may only reflect what countries would have done without the agree-
ment (Downs et al., 1996). One measure of effectiveness is the extent 
to which the agreement changed countries’ behaviour, compared to 
what they would have done in the absence of the agreement (the 
counterfactual baseline scenario) (Hafner-Burton et al., 2012). Evaluat-
ing an agreement’s effectiveness is difficult because the counterfactual 
is not observed (Simmons and Hopkins, 2005; Mitchell, 2008; Hafner-
Burton et al., 2012).
A necessary condition for successful compliance strategies is an inde-
pendent and effective regime of ‘measurement (or monitoring), report-
ing, and verification’ (MRV) with a high frequency of reporting (as 
documented in the IPCC TAR; see also Section 2.6.4.3). Provisions for 
greater transparency in MRV are being developed with regard to (1) 
countries’ GHG emissions, and (2)  international financial flows from 
developed countries to developing countries for mitigation and adap-
tation measures (Winkler, 2008; Breidenich and Bodansky, 2009; Ellis 
and Larsen, 2008; Ellis and Moarif, 2009; Clapp et al., 2012). Lessons 
on MRV from other multilateral regimes — such as International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) consultations, Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development (OECD) economic policy reviews, World Trade 
Organization (WTO) trade policy reviews, and arms control agree-
ments — include attention to accuracy, evolution over time, combining 
self-reporting with third-party verification, including independent tech-
nical assessment as well as some form of political or peer review, the 
potential use of remote sensing or other technical means, and public 
domain outputs (Cecys, 2010; Pew Center, 2010; Bell et al., 2012).
Technical capabilities for monitoring emissions now include remote 
sensing from satellites  which themselves pose new issues about the 
availability, diffusion, and governance of MRV capabilities for greater 
transparency. Greater transparency about financial flows requires 
detailed analysis of donor government budgeting in their legislative 
and administrative processes (Clapp et al., 2012; Falconer et al., 2012; 
Brewer and Mehling, 2014). 
Measurement, reporting, and verification may be beneficially comple-
mented by enforcement strategies, which are comprised of positive 
inducements — such as international transfers, financing, capacity-
building, and technology transfer — and credible threats of sanctions 
for violating emissions commitments or reporting requirements. From 
a rationalist perspective, compliance will occur if the discounted net 
benefits from cooperation (including direct climate benefits, co-bene-
fits, reputation, transfers, and other elements) exceed the discounted 
net benefits of defection (including avoided mitigation costs, avoided 
adverse side-effects, and expected sanctions). The institutional and 
behavioural reality of ensuring compliance can be more complicated. 
Moreover, the theoretical literature has stressed the difficulty of 
designing credible sanctions that are renegotiation-proof (Finus, 2001, 
2003; Barrett, 2002; Asheim et al., 2006; Froyn and Hovi, 2008).
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Some research suggests that the Kyoto Protocol is unusual among 
IEAs in that it established an ‘elaborate and multifaceted’ compli-
ance system, which has been successful in assuring compliance with 
MRV requirements (Finus, 2008b; Oberthür and Lefeber, 2010; Brunnée 
et al., 2012), while many other IEAs rely on self-reporting of domes-
tic actions. Compliance with MRV requirements can in turn improve 
detection of other forms of noncompliance. Even if the Kyoto Protocol 
compliance regime has been imperfect, it can offer lessons for future 
regimes, in particular with regard to MRV. The design of sanction mech-
anisms currently in place under the Kyoto Protocol, however, has also 
been criticized for not being fully credible (Halvorssen and Hovi, 2006; 
Barrett, 2009; Vezirgiannidou, 2009), though possibilities for improve-
ment through modification have been identified (Finus, 2008b). For 
example, a sanction could take the form of a temporary suspension of 
monetary and technological transfers if recipient countries are found in 
non-compliance (Finus, 2008b). It has also been shown that a deposit 
system can be effective to enforce compliance: treaty members lodge 
a deposit into a fund from which they receive interest as long as they 
comply. In case of non-compliance, parts of the deposit are forfeited to 
compliant countries (Gerber and Wichardt, 2009, 2013). 
Trade sanctions, such as those employed under the Montreal Protocol, 
are frequently put forward as a possible compliance mechanism (Bar-
rett, 2003; Victor, 2011) (see Section 13.8 for institutional details and 
further discussion). A general reservation about trade sanctions is that 
they often not only affect the agreement-violator but also compliant 
countries, and hence this threat is not credible. Barrett (2009), Victor 
(2010), and others argue that trade sanctions are neither a feasible nor 
a desirable option for enforcing compliance with a climate agreement 
because trade sanctions may not be compatible with WTO rules. A WTO-
compatible design may be feasible in the case of border adjustments 
with obligations to buy allowances (Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007; Monjon 
and Quirion, 2011). Meanwhile, imposition of trade sanctions would 
pose some risks of reducing cooperation by undermining capacity for 
compliance in targeted countries and could be burdensome to low-
income populations in targeted countries (Murase, 2011). Especially 
if applied to embedded carbon (carbon from energy used to produce 
traded goods), the number of goods affected by the sanctions could 
be large, potentially fuelling a trade war that may negatively affect 
even those countries that intend to be the punishers (McKibbin and 
Wilcoxen, 2009) (see Sections 13.8 and 5.4.1 for further discussion). 
Finally, there is a considerable literature on the potential use of legal 
remedies (such as civil liability) to address climate damages (Penalver, 
1998; Grossman, 2003; Allen, 2003; Gillespie, 2004; Hancock, 2004; 
Burns, 2004; Verheyen, 2005; Jacobs, 2005; Smith and Shearman, 2006; 
Lord et  al., 2011; Farber, 2011; Faure and Peeters, 2011). There has 
been little suggestion that such liability remedies be formally incorpo-
rated into climate agreements as compliance mechanisms, and there 
would be significant obstacles to doing so (including the lack of a 
robust international civil liability system). Nonetheless, this is a poten-
tial avenue for encouraging compliance, perhaps indirectly. The IPCC 
AR4 (IPCC, 2007) reported on evidence from various legal actions and 
potential actions that have been considered in the theoretical litera-
ture. Haritz (2011) has argued, based on an analysis of the literature 
and court cases, that it is theoretically possible to link the IPCC scale 
of likelihood with a scale based on legal standards of proof required 
for various kinds of legal action. Liability for climate change damage 
at the supranational level (de Larragán, 2011; Gouritin, 2011; Peeters, 
2011), and at the national level in the United Kingdom (Kaminskaite-
Slaters, 2011), the United States (Kosolapova, 2011), and the Nether-
lands (van Dijk, 2011), has been explored. Climate litigation and legal 
liability may put additional pressure on corporations and govern-
ments to be more accountable (Smith and Shearman, 2006; Faure and 
Peeters, 2011). However, there are key analytical hurdles to establish-
ing important legal facts, such as causation and who is to be held liable 
(Gupta, 2014). While not framed in terms of liability or compensation, 
the UNFCCC negotiations in Doha decided to establish institutional 
arrangements associated with Loss and Damage (UNFCCC, 2013a).
13.4 Climate policy 
architectures
‘Policy architecture’ for global climate change refers to “the basic 
nature and structure of an international agreement or other mul-
tilateral (or bilateral) climate regime” (Aldy and Stavins, 2010a). 
The term includes the sense of durability, with regard to both policy 
structure and the institutions to implement and support that struc-
ture (Schmalensee, 1998, 2010), which is appropriate to the long-term 
nature of the climate-change problem.
13�4�1 Degrees of centralized authority
Absent the emergence of a global authority that has the capacity to 
impose an allocation of emissions rights on countries, as advocated 
by Tickell (2008), approaches to international cooperation all arise out 
of negotiated agreements among independent participants. However, 
they vary in the degree to which they confer authority on multilateral 
institutions to manage the rules and processes agreed to. On one end 
of the spectrum of possible approaches, referred to by some as ‘top-
down’ (Dubash and Rajamani, 2010), actors agree to a high degree of 
mutual coordination of their actions with, for example, fixed targets 
and a common set of rules for specific mechanisms, such as emissions 
trading. On the other end of the spectrum, sometimes known as ‘bot-
tom-up’ (Victor et al., 2005; Dubash and Rajamani, 2010), national pol-
icies are established that may or may not be linked with one another. 
Figure 13.2 illustrates how existing and proposed international agree-
ments can be placed on this spectrum (see IPCC, 2007, pp. 770 – 773 for 
a detailed list of many proposals that could be placed in this grid). The 
level of centralization refers to the authority an agreement confers on 
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an international institution, not the process of negotiating the agree-
ment. It shows that many proposals can be more or less centralized 
depending on the specific design. It also shows that the three idealized 
types discussed in the following sections have more blurred boundar-
ies than their titles suggest. The figure also divides them into agree-
ments focused on specific ends (emissions targets, for example) — and 
those that focus on means (specific policies, or technologies, for exam-
ple). Finally, it should be understood that these are idealized types, and 
in practice there will be considerable additional complexity in how the 
basic design of agreements connect the actions of the various actors 
that make them up. There are distinct limits to what can be gleaned 
from the ‘top-down vs bottom-up’ metaphor or the degrees-of-central-
ization notion employed here (Dai, 2010) as, for example, emphasized 
in Ostrom’s (2012) accounts of ‘polycentric governance’.
As one prominent example, the Cancún Agreements are a ‘hybrid’ of 
top-down and bottom-up. They include voluntary mitigation pledges 
from many (but not all) UNFCCC parties, together with additional or 
elaborated common goals and centralized UNFCCC functions (e. g., 
with regard to adaptation, see Part II of the Cancún Agreements 
(UNFCCC, 2010)). It is quite possible that the agreement mandated by 
the Durban Platform on Enhanced Action, to be completed by 2015, 
will also be such a hybrid.
Figure 13�2 | Alternative forms of international cooperation. The figure represents a compilation of existing and possible forms of international cooperation, based upon a survey 
of published research, but is not intended to be exhaustive of existing or potential policy architectures, nor is it intended to be prescriptive. Examples in orange are existing agree-
ments. Examples in blue are structures for agreements proposed in the literature. The width of individual boxes indicates the range of possible degrees of centralization for a particu-
lar agreement. The degree of centralization indicates the authority an agreement confers on an international institution, not the process of negotiating the agreement.
UNFCCC Objective
Other IO GHG Regulation
Linked Cap-and-Trade Systems
and Harmonized Carbon Taxes








































Loose coordination of policies: examples include transnational city networks and Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs); 
R&D technology cooperation: examples include the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF), Global Methane Initiative (GMI), 
or Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP); Other international organization (IO) GHG regulation: 
examples include the Montreal Protocol, International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Maritime Organization (IMO). 
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13�4�1�1 Centralized architectures and strong 
multilateralism
A centralized architecture, such as that generated by strong commit-
ments to multilateral processes and institutions, is an agreement that 
establishes goals, targets, or both which are generally binding, for par-
ticipating countries, within a specific time-frame, and establishes col-
lective processes for monitoring progress towards meeting those goals. 
The Kyoto Protocol adopted targets and timetables for participating 
Annex B countries, one realisation of strong multilateralism (Bodan-
sky, 2007). Other centralized approaches to international cooperation 
could expand on targets-and-timetables by also specifying the mecha-
nism for implementation of the goals and / or targets of the agreement. 
Such an approach could establish, for example, a global cap-and-trade 
system or global carbon tax.
In the literature, targets-and-timetables have been coupled with spe-
cific notions of fairness, prospective conditions for political acceptance, 
or both — to establish quantitative targets and timetables for all coun-
tries and all years in a potential international agreement (Agarwala, 
2010; Frankel, 2010; Höhne et al., 2008; Bosetti and Frankel, 2011; Cao, 
2010c; IPCC, 2007, Chapter 13).
13�4�1�2 Harmonized national policies
A less-centralized approach would be to structure international cooper-
ation around policies that would be harmonized, such as via collective 
monitoring, but where relatively little centralized authority is estab-
lished or employed. In this class of approaches, aspects of national 
policies are made similar or even equivalent to one another. Examples 
include the G20 and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) agree-
ment in 2009 to phase out fossil fuel subsidies that encourage waste-
ful consumption (Barbier, 2010); the EU’s use of private certification 
schemes for biofuels to link to its import policies for such fuels; efforts 
to harmonize private carbon-accounting systems, such as in the Carbon 
Disclosure Standards Board (Lovell and MacKenzie, 2011); hypothetical 
national carbon taxes that would be harmonized internationally (Coo-
per, 2010); adjusting design details of cap-and-trade schemes that are 
to be linked; and implementation of similar technology or performance 
standards. Many of these involve — or would involve — relatively lim-
ited numbers of actors, compared to UNFCCC agreements, reflecting 
the ‘minilateralism’ discussed in Section 13.2.1.1.
The so-called ‘pledge and review’ approach, exemplified to some 
degree by the Copenhagen Accord and the Cancún Agreements, is 
an architecture in which a participating nation or region voluntarily 
registers to abide by its stated domestic reduction targets or actions 
(pledges). The degree of centralization generated by this approach 
could vary considerably (see Figure 13.2), depending on the particular 
arrangement. If a pledge and review system, such as that represented 
by the Cancún Agreements, involved cooperation in forging an agree-
ment that provided some centralized administration or monitoring 
(in addition to the voluntary announcement of pledges by individual 
countries), it could be considered an example of strong multilateral-
ism, although perhaps with less centralized authority than the Kyoto 
Protocol or of coordinated national policies.
13�4�1�3 Decentralized approaches and coordinated 
policies
Finally, even more decentralized architectures may arise out of dif-
ferent regional, national, and sub-national policies, and subsequently 
vary in the extent to which they are connected internationally (Victor 
et al., 2005; Hoffmann, 2011). One form of decentralized architecture is 
linked regional, national, or sub-national tradable permit systems (Jaffe 
et al., 2009; Ranson and Stavins, 2012; Mehling and Haites, 2009). In 
such a system, smaller-scale tradable permit systems can be linked 
directly (e. g., through mutual recognition of the permits from other 
systems) or indirectly (e. g., through mutual recognition of an emission 
reduction credit system such as the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM). In practice, 
such a system of linkage is already emerging. However, there remains 
the challenge of harmonizing the design details of the various trading 
systems, as discussed above (e. g., emissions reductions requirements, 
proportions of target emissions that may be covered by offset credits, 
use of ceiling or floor prices, and accounting units (Jaffe et al., 2009; 
Bernstein et al., 2010).
Similarly, heterogeneous regional, national, or sub-national policies 
could be linked either directly or indirectly (e. g., cap and trade in one 
jurisdiction linked with a tax in another) (Metcalf and Weisbach, 2012). 
Linkage of heterogeneous policies can occur through trade mecha-
nisms (e. g., import allowance requirements or border adjustments) 
or via access to a common emission reduction credit system (e. g., the 
CDM, as with indirectly linked tradable permit systems).
13�4�1�4 Advantages and disadvantages of different 
degrees of centralization
Some authors conclude, particularly post-Copenhagen, that attempts 
to develop a comprehensive, integrated climate regime have failed, 
due to resistance to costly policies in both developed and developing 
countries and lack of political will (Michonski and Levi, 2010; Keo-
hane and Victor, 2011), or alternatively because of the complexity that 
characterizes the problem (Hoffmann, 2011). Other analyses empha-
size the legitimacy of the UN, particularly citing its universal member-
ship (Hare et al., 2010; Winkler and Beaumont, 2010; Müller, 2010; La 
Viña, 2010) and noting that fragmentation of the climate regime could 
create opportunities for forum shopping, a loss of transparency, and 
reduced ambition (Biermann et al., 2009; Hare et al., 2010; Biermann, 
2010). Other studies have examined (1) the evolution of multilateral-
ism (Bodansky and Diringer, 2010) and possible transitional arrange-
ments from fragmentation to a comprehensive agreement (Winkler 
and Vorster, 2007), and (2) how to manage fragmentation so that it 
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may become synergistic rather than prone to conflict (Biermann et al., 
2009; Oberthür, 2009).
13�4�2 Current features, issues, and elements of 
international cooperation
The policy architecture for climate change raises a number of specific 
questions about the structure of international cooperation. Four spe-
cific elements are of particular contemporary relevance: legal binding-
ness; goals, actions, and metrics; flexibility mechanisms; and participa-
tion, equity, and effort-sharing methods. These four elements deal with 
the key questions of how much an agreement insists on compliance 
with its obligations, what obligations it establishes, how flexible the 
implementation of the obligations may be, and how the obligations 
may vary across actors and situations. The discussion below focuses on 
mitigation of GHG emissions, but the four key elements apply as well 
to adaptation, financing, and other potential topics of international 
agreements on climate change. For example, UNFCCC Article 4(1)(b) 
(UNFCCC, 1992) calls on “all parties” to formulate and implement 
both “measures to mitigate climate change” by reducing net GHG 
emissions, and “measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate 
change.” Understanding what is meant by such obligations requires 
examining these four key elements. 
13�4�2�1 Legal bindingness
States choose whether to join an agreement, and can withdraw from 
an agreement, so international agreements exist by consent of the 
parties (Waltz, 1979; Thompson, 2006). Having said this, international 
agreements among states (national governments) may be more or less 
‘legally binding’ on their parties. The degree of ‘bindingness’ depends 
on both the legal form of the agreement and the costs to the state of 
noncompliance.
Among the indicators of legal bindingness in the agreement itself are 
(1) legal type (e. g., treaty, protocol to a treaty, decision of the UNFCCC 
Conference of the Parties, and political declaration); (2)  mandatory 
commitments, i. e., whether a commitment is ‘expressed in obliga-
tory language’ (e. g., ‘shall’ or ‘must,’ vs. ‘should’ or ‘aim’) (Werksman, 
2010)(Werksman, 2010)(Werksman, 2010); (3) specificity, i. e., “…
whether [commitments] are expressed in sufficient detail to accu-
rately assess compliance”; and (4) the type of enforcement procedures, 
mechanisms, and sanctions designed to implement an agreement by 
monitoring, reviewing, and encouraging compliance with commit-
ments (Werksman, 2010).
International agreements may be labelled ‘hard law’ (such as trea-
ties, their protocols, and contracts) that are legally binding on the 
Table 13�1 | Taxonomy of legal bindingness: examples of commitments in international agreements for climate change.
Legal character (noting 
relevance of indicators 1 – 4 
discussed in the text)
Description Example
Mandatory provision in a 
legally binding agreement with 
enforcement mechanisms. (1) – (4)
A legally binding commitment can be subject to a 
compliance regime, with authority to sanction non-
compliant parties. Enforcement can also come in the 
form of reciprocity for non-compliant actions.
The targets and timetables in the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1998) and the Marrakech Accords 
(UNFCCC, 2001), with specific quantitative emissions limits, a compliance system that sanctions non-
compliance, and flexibility mechanisms. (Outside the climate arena, the World Trade Organization is 
the most prominent example of this type.)
Mandatory provision in a legally 
binding agreement without 
enforcement mechanism. (1) and 
(2); possibly (3); but not (4)
‘Legally binding,’ but subject only to self-enforcement. Article 4.1 of the UNFCCC (1992), mandating, inter alia, national emissions inventories, measures to 
mitigate, and measures to facilitate adaptation.
Non-mandatory provision in a 
legally binding agreement. (1), but 
not (2) – (4)
Such a provision does not demand compliance, 
but carries somewhat more weight than a political 
agreement.
Article 4.2 (a) and (b) of the UNFCCC (1992) commit developed countries to adopt policies and 
measures to limit their net GHG emissions (a mandatory provision); 4.2(a) then ‘recognizes’ that 
returning these emissions to earlier levels by the year 2000 would be desirable, and 4.2(b) provides 
the ‘aim’ of returning to 1990 levels (both non-mandatory provisions).
Mandatory provision in a 
non-legally binding (‘political’) 
agreement. (2), possibly (3); but 
not (1) or (4)
Such a provision may induce the party to act, through 
norms, reputation, and reciprocity. 
The pledges on targets and actions submitted by states pursuant to the Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 
2009a) and Cancún Agreements (UNFCCC, 2010). (Outside the climate arena, the moratorium on high 
seas driftnet fishing is treated as binding by many states, even though United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) resolutions are not binding.)
Non-mandatory provision in a 
non-legally binding (‘political’) 
agreement.
None of (1) – (4)
An aim or aspiration, expressed in hortatory, non-
binding language. This type of provision typically 
includes one or more statements of principles or norms.
Targets set in the Noordwijk Declaration (1989), at a ministerial conference on climate change held 
prior to the 1992 Rio summit.
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parties, or ‘soft law’ (such as declarations, resolutions, and guide-
lines) that are not legally binding. But the reality is more complex 
(Baxter, 1980; Abbott et  al., 2000; Bodansky, 2010a; Guzman and 
Meyer, 2010). Across types of agreements, commitments may be 
more or less legally binding; for example, although treaties often 
contain mandatory commitments, a treaty may also contain horta-
tory provisions, such as aims and pledges, which are understood to 
be aspirational; while a political declaration may nonetheless con-
tain provisions that raise strong expectations and consequences for 
failure (Raustiala, 2005). Some commitments may be specific and 
subject to monitoring and accountability, while others are vague 
and difficult to verify (Abbott and Snidal, 2000). Further, across types 
of agreements, the enforcement mechanism may be weak or rigor-
ous, ranging from inaction to admonishments to trade sanctions to 
military force.
The bindingness of an agreement depends on the costs to a state of 
nonparticipation, noncompliance, or withdrawal — as well as to legal 
form. These costs include, as discussed above (see Section 13.3.4), 
not only the costs of sanctions imposed by the agreement’s enforce-
ment mechanism, but also the costs incurred from the state’s loss of 
reputation and from the loss of mutual cooperation by other states. 
Reputational costs and lost-cooperation costs can influence states to 
adhere to (initially informal) norms; hence strong norms with high 
costs of violation are sometimes called ‘binding’ (Hoffmann, 2005, 
2011; MacLeod, 2010). 
Table 13.1 provides a taxonomy of the bindingness of international 
agreements (Bodansky, 2003, 2009). The usage of ‘mandatory’ in the 
table refers to the specific wording of the commitment — not to a 
state’s choice of whether to participate or not. 
Research has not resolved whether or under what circumstances a 
more binding agreement elicits more effective national policy. In gen-
eral, a more legally binding commitment is more subject to monitoring 
and enforcement (both internationally and domestically), is more likely 
to require ratification by domestic institutions, and signals a greater 
seriousness by states (Bodansky, 2003; Rajamani, 2009). These factors 
increase the costs of violation (through enforcement and sanctions 
at international and domestic scales, the loss of mutual cooperation 
by others, and the loss of reputation and credibility in future negotia-
tions).
On the other hand, there may be situations where there is a tradeoff 
between legal bindingness and ambition (stringency of commitments). 
Because greater legal bindingness implies greater costs of violation, 
states may prefer more legally binding agreements to embody less 
ambitious commitments, and may be willing to accept more ambi-
tious commitments when they are less legally binding. (Rajamani, 
2009; Raustiala, 2005; Guzman and Meyer, 2010; Albin, 2001; Grasso 
and Sacchi, 2011; Bodansky, 1999; Bernstein, 2005; See also Sections 
13.2.2.5 and 13.3.3) 
13�4�2�2 Goals and targets
Most agreements that advance international cooperation to address 
climate change incorporate goals. ‘Goals’ are ‘long-term and systemic’ 
(as contrasted with absolute emissions-reduction ‘targets,’ which may 
flow logically from the goals but which are ‘near-term and specific’) 
(IPCC, 2007, Chapter 13). The goals of an international agreement 
might include, for example, stabilization levels (or a reduction in a 
previously agreed stabilization level) of atmospheric concentrations of 
GHGs — or reductions in impacts of climate change. 
Targets can be classified according to whether they require absolute 
GHG cuts relative to a historical baseline, or reductions relative to 
economic output, population growth, or business-as-usual projections 
(intensity targets). In recent literature on targets´ metrics, there has 
been a focus on whether or not intensity targets are superior to fixed 
ones when there is uncertainty about the future (Jotzo and Pezzey, 
2007; Marschinski and Edenhofer, 2010; Sue Wing et al., 2009; Conte 
Grand, 2013). There are tradeoffs between reduced uncertainty about 
the cost of abatement, associated with intensity targets, and reduced 
uncertainty about environmental effectiveness, associated with abso-
lute targets (Ellerman and Wing, 2003; Herzog, Timothy et al., 2006). 
In the UNFCCC climate negotiations, examples of fixed targets are 
Kyoto Annex B country-emission reductions by 2008 – 2012 with 
respect to 1990 levels, and Copenhagen pledges (Some of the devel-
oped countries propose emissions reductions by 2020 with respect to 
some base year — 1990, 2000, or 2005 — while some of the develop-
ing economies suggest reductions by 2020 with respect to their busi-
ness-as-usual trends). On the other hand, intensity targets have been 
proposed by China and India: their pledge is a reduction of carbon 
intensity (i. e., emissions / gross domestic product (GDP)) between 40 
and 45 % and 20 and 25 % respectively by 2020 with respect to 2005 
(Steckel et al., 2011; Zhang, 2011; Yuan et al., 2012; Cao, 2010b; Gov-
ernment of India, 2012). Another carbon target linked to GDP was the 
one planned by Argentina in 1999 (Barros and Conte Grand, 2002).
13�4�2�3 Flexible mechanisms
One focus of international negotiations has been enabling states to 
have flexibility in meeting obligations. In principle, there are numerous 
ways this could be achieved. For example, there could be provisions 
for renegotiating targets. The most often-cited benefit of flexibility 
is reduction in the costs associated with GHG-emissions reductions. 
However, Hafner-Burton et al. (2012) explore whether increased flex-
ibility in designing obligations for states helps them align their inter-
national obligations more readily with domestic political constraints. 
In existing interstate agreements, flexibility has been pursued princi-
pally through mechanisms that create markets. The rationale for these 
is to lower the cost of reducing emissions, relative to traditional regula-
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tory regimes, as they direct investments in emissions reductions toward 
lower-cost abatement opportunities available in various jurisdictions. 
Such flexible mechanisms can involve trading emissions allowances 
under a fixed overall cap, generating offset credits, or combinations of 
the two. Generally, offset credits can be generated through project-based 
mechanisms or crediting of policies and sectoral actions. The former have 
been developed since the mid-1990s, with the CDM as by far the larg-
est programme (Michaelowa and Buen, 2012); the literature assessing 
the CDM is reviewed in Section 13.13.1.1.) The latter are still being dis-
cussed with regards to post-2012 climate policies in the context of ‘new 
market mechanisms’ related to mitigation policies in developing coun-
tries (Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs)). Additionally, 
inter-temporal flexibility may be added to an allowance-trading regime 
through banking and borrowing of allowances, by which regulated enti-
ties may transfer current obligations to the future or vice versa. However, 
the environmental effectiveness and distributional impact of carbon mar-
kets have also raised concerns (Lohmann, 2008; Böhm and Dabhi, 2009).
The Kyoto Protocol provides three flexible mechanisms: Joint Imple-
mentation (JI), the CDM, and international emissions trading (IET) (in 
Articles 6, 12, and 17, respectively). Joint Implementation and CDM 
both generate offset credits from projects that reduce GHG emissions, 
and IET allows for government-to-government trading of Kyoto emis-
sions allowances. Most attention in the research on these mechanisms 
has focused on the CDM, in part because of the volume of trading 
compared to the others (on the relatively small volume in Kyoto emis-
sions trading, see Aldrich and Koerner, 2012).
The credits from JI and CDM may be used by Annex B countries to 
meet their emissions-reduction obligations. In practice, the key 
driver of investment in CDM projects has been the European Union 
(EU) Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), which allows regulated entities 
(companies or installations) to use credits from the CDM (referred to 
as ‘Certified Emission Reductions’ (CERs) and from JI (referred to as 
‘Emissions Reduction Units’ or ERUs) to meet a portion of their ETS 
obligations (see Sections 13.6.1 and 14.4.2.1 for details). The EU ETS 
has accounted for about 84 % of demand for CERs and ERUs from 
2008 – 2012. The next largest source of demand for CERs and ERUs 
comes from Japan, at 15 % of demand (Kossoy and Guigon, 2012).
Market-based flexibility mechanisms are evolving. Japan is pursu-
ing bilateral crediting approaches under its Joint Crediting Mecha-
nism / Bilateral Offset Crediting Mechanism (Ministry of the Envi-
ronment, Government of Japan, 2012). COP-17 in Durban in 2011 
mandated two approaches be pursued in the UNFCCC negotiations 
leading to a new international agreement in late 2015: (1) top-down, 
operating under authority of the COP (‘new market-based mecha-
nism’), which, as noted, focuses in large part on sectoral crediting; 
and (2) bottom-up, developed by countries ‘in accordance with their 
national circumstances’ (‘framework for various approaches’), which 
attempts to coordinate heterogeneous policies across countries. 
COP-18 in Doha, Qatar, in 2012 reiterated and developed further 
details regarding these two approaches (UNFCCC, 2013b).
13�4�2�4 Equitable methods for effort sharing 
While universal participation might be desirable in principle, actors 
participate in a context of heterogeneity in both economic capacity 
and emissions levels. Variations in both wealth and emissions have 
evolved over time; for example, many countries classified in the 1992 
UNFCCC as developing (non-Annex I) have since experienced increas-
ing incomes and increasing emissions (in some cases exceeding the 
incomes and / or emissions of some countries classified in 1992 as 
developed (Annex  I)). These variations and continued differences are 
discussed further in Section 4.1.2.2. As to participation in international 
agreements, in general, a country is less likely to participate in an inter-
national agreement the more the country perceives the agreement to 
be unfair to its own economic and environmental interests. Addressing 
climate change equitably can thus be central to pursuing broad partici-
pation in climate agreements.
There is disagreement, however, about how to put equity principles 
into practice in international agreements. The UNFCCC adopted the 
principle of CBDRRC of parties (Article 3.1) (UNFCCC, 1992). Several 
different approaches have been advanced for putting this principle into 
practice. Deleiul (2012) argues that CBDRRC initially facilitated agree-
ment and participation in the UNFCCC, but has become more conten-
tious as national variations in income and emissions have evolved over 
time (hence Deleiul sees promise in the Durban Platform, which calls 
for mitigation contributions from all parties in a new treaty concluded 
by 2015, to take effect by 2020).
Section 4.6.2 elaborates these different approaches in detail, and sug-
gests they can be broadly divided into those that start with the sta-
tus quo of emissions, that thus focus on the question of ‘effort-shar-
ing’ or ‘burden sharing,’ and those that start with a specific account 
of ‘rights’ to GHG emissions (such as equal per capita or equal per 
GDP emissions) and derive targets for countries from that formula 
(known as ‘resource-sharing’). Rao (2011) refers to these as burden 
sharing vs. resource-sharing equity principles. Burden sharing methods 
are reviewed in (Jotzo and Pezzey, 2007; den Elzen and Höhne, 2008, 
2010; Winkler et al., 2009; Chakravarty et al., 2009; Mearns and Nor-
ton, 2010; Frankel, 2010; Ekholm et al., 2010; Marschinski and Eden-
hofer, 2010; Cao, 2010c; Tavoni et al., 2013; den Elzen et al., 2013b; 
Höhne et  al., 2013). ‘Resource-sharing’ approaches are examined in 
(Höhne et al., 2006; Chakravarty et al., 2009; Baer et al., 2009; Kanitkar 
et al., 2010; Jayaraman et al., 2011; Rao, 2011; Kartha et al., 2012).
Section 6.3.6.6 elaborates a wide range of possible approaches and 
quantifies them in terms of levels of emissions reductions for various 
world regions. One recent example is Winkler et al. (2013), which eval-
uates several approaches for mitigation of and adaptation to climate 
change, and suggests that these call for more mitigation in wealth-
ier countries. Recent research is also comparing various measures of 
equity for climate policy within developing countries (Casillas and 
Kammen, 2012). Section 13.13 assesses existing and proposed agree-
ments in light of these criteria. 
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Table 13�2 | Description of recent proposals for climate change policy architectures.
Proposed Architecture (recent references) Description
Strong multilateralism
Indicator-linked national participation and commitments  
(Baer et al., 2009; Chakravarty et al., 2009; Frankel, 2010; Bosetti and 
Frankel, 2011; WBGU, 2009; Cao, 2010c; BASIC Project, 2007; Winkler 
et al., 2011)
All countries adopt emissions targets and timetables, with time of participation and / or target levels based on one or more 
indicators (per capita income, economic cost as percentage of national income, historical emissions). Targets can both be 
reductions in emissions growth rates as well as absolute reductions.
Per capita commitments  
(Agarwala, 2010)
Countries implement equal per capita emissions targets, resulting in significant emissions increases for many developing 
countries, and significant decreases for industrialized countries.
Top-down burden sharing  
(Baer et al., 2009; Kartha et al., 2012; Cao, 2010c; Kanitkar et al., 2010; 
Jayaraman et al., 2011)
Emissions targets based on equal per capita emissions, mitigation burden proportional to cumulative emissions and ability 
to pay, countries with similar economic circumstances have similar burdens, and poorest countries and individuals exempt 
from obligations. 
Sectoral approaches  
(Sawa, 2010; Schmidt et al., 2008; Barrett, 2010; den Elzen et al., 2008)
Countries develop national emissions targets by sector, and governments make international commitments to implement 
policies to achieve targets (Sawa, 2010) or based on staged sectoral approach (den Elzen et al., 2008); can be developed 
in a portfolio of treaties (Barrett, 2010). Alternatively, developing countries pledge to meet voluntary sectoral targets; 
reductions beyond targets can be sold to industrialized countries (Schmidt et al., 2008).
Portfolio system of treaties  
(Barrett, 2010; Stewart et al., 2012)
Separate international treaties concluded for different sectors, different GHGs. Treaty obligations apply globally, and 
developing countries offered financial assistance to aid compliance and induce participation. Trade restrictions used to 
enforce agreements in trade-sensitive sectors.
Harmonized national policies
Global emissions permit trading system (Ellerman, 2010) The EU ETS serves as prototype for a global emissions trading system. Design informed by EU ETS experience, which has a 
central coordinating institution (the European Commission), mechanisms to expand participation to new Member States, 
and effective financial flows resulting from trading. Distributional impacts addressed by specific design features.
International carbon tax  
(Cooper, 2010; Nordhaus, 2008; Metcalf and Weisbach, 2009)
A common charge levied on all global GHG emissions, most practically upstream (at oil refineries, gas pipelines, mine 
mouths, etc.). Each country collects and keeps its own revenues. Charges rise over time according to schedule to induce 
cost-effective technological change. Distributional impacts addressed by allocation of revenues.
Hybrid market-based approaches (Fell et al., 2012) A tradable emissions permit system includes a price ceiling, a price floor, or a combination of the two (a price collar). 
System functions like a hybrid of a tax and a tradable permit system. The price ceiling (often called a ‘safety valve’) can take 
the form of unlimited allowances sold at a fixed price or a limited allowance reserve.
Decentralized architectures and coordinated national policies
Linked domestic cap-and-trade systems 
(Jaffe and Stavins, 2010; Jaffe et al., 2009; Bernstein et al., 2010; Metcalf 
and Weisbach, 2012; Ranson and Stavins, 2013)
Domestic and international emissions trading and emissions reduction credit systems linked, directly or indirectly, to 
achieve cost savings. Direct linkages require more coordination, while indirect linkages (of cap-and-trade systems through 
a common credit system, for example) require less. Linkage achieved independently (as a bottom-up architecture), as a 
transition to a new top-down architecture, or as an element of a broader climate agreement.
Linked heterogeneous policy instruments 
(Metcalf and Weisbach, 2012)
Domestic and international emissions trading systems linked with carbon tax systems, allowing emissions permits from 
one country to be remitted as tax payments, and / or allowing payments in excess of the tax in one country to satisfy the 
requirement to own a permit in another. Alternatively, fixed emissions standards (or even technology standards) linked with 
taxes or tradable permit systems across countries or regions.
Technology-oriented agreements 
(Newell, 2009, 2010a; de Coninck et al., 2008)
International climate change agreements to cover issues such as knowledge sharing and coordination, joint research and 
development, technology transfer, and / or technology deployment mandates or incentives. Distributional impacts affected by 
intellectual property sharing rules.
13�4�3 Recent proposals for future climate 
change policy architecture
An extensive literature has examined what options could be pursued 
‘post-2012’, after the end of the first commitment period (CP1) of the 
Kyoto Protocol. The literature now contains several surveys of diverse 
proposals (see summaries of pre-2007 literature in Höhne et al., 2008; 
Moncel et al., 2011; Aldy and Stavins, 2010b; Rajamani, 2011b, 2012a; 
IPCC, 2007, Chapter 13). Table 13.2 describes recent proposals for cli-
mate policy architectures. Qualitative and quantitative performance 
assessments of these proposals, where available, are surveyed in Sec-
tion 13.13. 
13�4�4 The special case of international 
cooperation regarding carbon 
dioxide removal and solar radiation 
management
Since the publication of AR4, carbon dioxide removal (CDR) and solar 
radiation management (SRM) have received increasing attention as a 
means to address climate change, distinct from mitigation and adapta-
tion. These two approaches are often collectively referred to as ‘geoen-
gineering’ or ‘climate engineering’ (for more detail, see Working Group 
(WG) I contribution to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) Sec-
tion 6.9). Carbon dioxide removal refers to techniques to extract GHGs 
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directly from the atmosphere and store them in sinks, or to directly 
enhance such sinks. Solar radiation management aims to reduce the 
amount of solar radiation absorbed by the Earth’s surface. Proposed 
SRM projects can be atmospheric (e. g., cloud brightening or adding 
reflective sulphate particles to the lower stratosphere), terrestrial (e. g., 
enhancing the albedo of the ground, or painting pavements and roof 
materials white to reflect solar radiation) and space-based (e. g., plac-
ing mirrors in space). See WGI report, Section 7.7, for details of these.
Some SRM options (e. g., injecting sulphate particles into the lower 
stratosphere) may be inexpensive enough for individual states (Bar-
rett, 2008a) and even non-state actors, such as wealthy individuals, to 
undertake (Barrett, 2008a; Victor, 2008; Lin, 2009; Victor et al., 2009; 
Bodansky, 2011b). CDR and other SRM approaches might need to be 
implemented by numerous countries in order to be effective (Hum-
phreys, 2011). Some SRM options may also have specific regional 
impacts (e. g., regional temperature and precipitation effects, leaf 
albedo enhancement, or ocean circulation modification), providing 
direct and perhaps excludable benefits to actors undertaking them 
(Millard-Ball, 2012) and external costs to others (Ricke et  al., 2010, 
2013). See also WGII 19.5.4 for detailed discussion of the risks of SRM.
Smaller-scale actors that are particularly vulnerable to climate change 
impacts may perceive advantages to be first-movers with SRM, in 
order to ensure both global climate protection and a favourable dis-
tribution of regional impacts from their selected SRM projects (Ricke 
et  al., 2010; Millard-Ball, 2012). Hardly any cooperation might be 
needed for SRM’s development and deployment — indeed, countries 
facing severe impacts might rush to launch a preferred SRM project 
(Millard-Ball, 2012). If the benefits of such an SRM project outweigh 
the adverse side-effects, and its costs are indeed low, then such an 
SRM project might be desirable. But such unilateral action could also 
produce significant adverse side-effects and costs for other actors, if 
the SRM option chosen is one that secures climate benefits for one 
part of the world while creating climate or other damages in other 
parts (Lin, 2009). Solar radiation management may also be ineffective 
in mitigating some climate impacts, for example the acidification of 
oceans from absorption of excessive CO2 (Humphreys, 2011). Further, 
SRM does not reduce concentrations of atmospheric GHGs, and inter-
rupting SRM after concentrations have risen significantly could allow 
temperatures to rise rapidly (see also Smith and Rasch, 2012).
Solar radiation management poses the converse of the collective 
action and governance challenges arising from emissions-reduction 
efforts: rather than mobilizing hesitant action to limit emissions, SRM 
governance involves restraining hasty unilateral action (Victor, 2008; 
Victor et al., 2009; Virgoe, 2009; House of Commons Science and Tech-
nology Committee, 2010; Lloyd and Oppenheimer, 2014; Millard-Ball, 
2012; Bodansky, 2011b). One of the main issues for international 
cooperation will be to develop institutions and norms to address 
potential negative consequences of SRM in other social or environ-
mental fields, or for parts of the world either not protected or nega-
tively affected by the SRM option chosen. Thus, some analysts have 
recommended that international governance be organized for SRM 
research and testing, to learn about the benefits and side-effects of 
SRM options, to develop institutions to decide if and when to deploy 
SRM, to learn how to maintain SRM capabilities, and to monitor and 
evaluate this research and its use (Victor et al., 2009; Blackstock and 
Long, 2010; Lin, 2009; Solar Radiation Management Governance ini-
tiative, 2011). 
Some existing international agreements may be relevant to geoengi-
neering. The UNFCCC already includes a provision, Article 4.1(f), requir-
ing assessment of the adverse impacts of mitigation measures. The 
UN Convention on Law of the Sea contains important provisions on 
environmental protection (Redgwell, 2006), and may have increased 
significance with regards to the governance of marine-based carbon 
dioxide storage or geo-engineering options (Virgoe, 2009). Under the 
London Convention and Protocol, the International Maritime Organi-
zation (IMO) held that, given the uncertainty surrounding negative 
impacts, ocean fertilization other than ‘legitimate scientific research’ 
ought not be permitted (Reynolds, 2011; IMO resolution LC-LP.1, 2008 
and LC-LP.2, 2010). Several multilateral fora have recently taken up 
the issue of SRM. The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
adopted a decision calling for a moratorium on ‘geo-engineering 
activities that may affect biodiversity’ (Convention on Biological Diver-
sity, 2010; Tollefson, 2010). Other existing multilateral treaties and 
agreements that may relate to geo-engineering include: the 1977 UN 
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use 
of Environmental Modification Techniques (the ENMOD Convention) 
(though it restricts only ‘hostile’ actions); the convention on Environ-
mental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (UNECE, 1991); 
the 1959 Antarctic Treaty System (US Department of State, 2002); and 
ongoing developments in human rights law and in environmental law 
(Reynolds, 2011; Convention on Biological Diversity, 2012). Further, 
the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies (United Nations, 2002) may apply to the use of sun-
deflecting mirrors in space.
13.5 Multilateral and 
bilateral agreements 
and institutions across 
different scales
This section builds on the description of the climate policy landscape 
in Section 13.3.1 and plausible climate policy architectures in Section 
13.4. It considers the experience and evolution of international and 
transnational cooperation on climate change between states and non-
state actors since 2007 when the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
IPCC was published. 
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13�5�1 International cooperation among 
governments
13�5�1�1 Climate agreements under the UNFCCC
The UNFCCC’s universal membership provides it with a high degree 
of legitimacy among parties around the world (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen 
and McGee, 2013). Steps taken under the Convention and its Kyoto 
Protocol have led to more extensive action than under other forms of 
international cooperation on climate change.
Evolution of the multilateral climate regime since AR4 
At COP-13 in Bali in 2007, discussions on long-term cooperative action 
under the Convention turned into negotiations under the Bali Action 
Plan (UNFCCC, 2007a). Also in Bali, countries agreed to MRV of mitiga-
tion commitments or actions by developed countries and mitigation 
actions by developing countries and support for those. Under the 
Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009a) and Cancún Agreements 
(UNFCCC, 2010), Forty-two developed countries (including the 27 EU 
member states) submitted absolute reduction commitments against 
various base years in the form of quantified economy-wide emissions 
targets for 2020. Fifty-five developing countries and the African Union 
submitted information on NAMAs to the UNFCCC (as of May 2013), 
which are subject to domestic and international MRV. These 55 devel-
oping countries expressed their proposed goals in a variety of ways 
(e. g., relative emission reductions, deviation below business-as-usual, 
absolute reductions, and goals related to carbon neutrality); 16 pro-
posed economy-wide goals for mitigation of GHGs. Since 2010, no 
major economy has significantly changed its emission reduction pro-
posal under the UNFCCC, though some countries have clarified their 
assumptions and business-as-usual emission levels (UNEP, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013b; den Elzen et  al., 2013a; Sharma and Desgain, 2013; 
UNFCCC, 2013c). Figure 13.3 displays the different categories of 
actions and pledges taken by countries under the Cancún Agreements 
and the Kyoto Protocol as of September 2013.
Figure 13�3 | Global map showing the different categories of reduction proposals or commitments for 2020 under the Cancún Agreements and Kyoto Protocol, based on UNEP 
(2012, 2013b) with underlying data supported by UNFCCC (2011b, 2012d, 2013c).
Developing countries with Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions, termed as policy-, sectoral-, 
and project-level actions 
Countries with no pledges
Developed countries with Quantified Emission Limitation or Reduction Commitments (QELROs) 
under the Kyoto Protocol and Cancún agreements
Developed countries with Quantified Economy-Wide Emission Reduction Targets (QEERTs) 
under Cancún agreements
Developing countries with Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions stating their impact on greenhouse gas emissions 
(Reduction relative to BAU; Reduction in carbon intensity of GDP, compared to 2005 levels)
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COP-17 in Durban in 2011 produced the Durban Platform for 
Enhanced Action (UNFCCC, 2011a), in which the delegates agreed 
“to launch a process to develop a protocol, another legal instru-
ment or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention 
applicable to all Parties” (UNFCCC, 2011a) and “complete its work 
as early as possible but no later than 2015 in order to adopt this 
protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal 
force at the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties and 
for it to come into effect and be implemented from 2020” (UNFCCC, 
2011a).
Evolution of coalitions among UNFCCC parties 
New and existing coalitions of countries have engaged in the 
UNFCCC negotiations, each presenting coordinated positions. Several 
distinct coalitions of developing countries have formed to negotiate 
their divergent priorities. Examples include the G77 & China, which 
represents 131 developing countries operating in the UNFCCC and 
the UN system more broadly and which contains sub-groups such 
as the African Group, the Least Developed Countries, and the Arab 
Group; the Alliance of Independent Latin American and Caribbean 
states; and a ‘like-minded developing country’ group that included 
China, India, and Saudi Arabia (Grubb, 2013). Other coalitions orga-
nized to influence UNFCCC negotiations include the Alliance of Small 
Island States (AOSIS), which has played a significant role in UNFCCC 
negotiations since the early 1990s; various groupings of industrial-
ized countries, including the Umbrella Group; the Environmental 
Integrity Group, which was the first coalition to include both indus-
trialized and developing countries; the BASIC countries (Brazil, South 
Africa, India and China) (Olsson et  al., 2010; Rong, 2010; Nhamo, 
2010); the Coalition of Rainforest Nations, which has increased the 
salience of forests in climate negotiations; and other active coalitions 
not limited to the climate context, for example the Comision Cen-
troamericana de Ambiente y Desarollo and the Bolivarian Alliance for 
the Americas. 
Negotiations under the Kyoto Protocol
Negotiations on a second commitment period (CP2) of the Kyoto 
Protocol were launched in Montréal in 2005. These negotiations 
concluded in late 2012 at COP-18 in Doha, Qatar with a decision 
and amendment establishing the second commitment period of the 
Protocol for 2013 – 2020. However, a number of Annex  I countries 
(Belarus, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, the United States, 
and Ukraine) decided not to participate in the second commitment 
period. The other Annex I countries (Australia, the EU and its member 
states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, New Zealand, Norway, Swit-
zerland, and Ukraine) adopted quantified emission reduction com-
mitments (Figure 13.3), covering 13 % of global GHG emissions at 
2010 emission levels (UNFCCC, 2012d; JRC / PBL, 2013). At COP-18 
in Doha in 2012, parties also agreed upon rules for transferring sur-
plus Kyoto emissions allowances from the first to the second period. 
These rules are assessed in Section 13.13.1.1, and the evolution of 
market-based flexibility mechanisms in the UNFCCC negotiations is 
discussed in Section 13.4.2.3.
New institutions under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol
The UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol have brought about a number 
of new institutions focused on adaptation (funding and coordina-
tion), finance, and technology. The Adaptation Fund was established 
to provide direct access to financing for developing countries and is 
governed by a majority of developing countries. The Adaptation Com-
mittee was established to coordinate previously fragmented aspects 
of adaptation policy under the Convention, with modalities and link-
ages to other institutions to be defined (UNFCCC, 2011c) (see Section 
13.11.1.1). The GCF is accountable to the Conference of the Parties, 
and, when it is fully operational, may be a major channel for the provi-
sion of climate finance (Brown et al., 2011). The Standing Committee 
on Finance supports the parties in coordinating and providing account-
ability for the financial mechanism of the Convention. The Climate 
Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), together with the Technology 
Executive Committee (TEC), was established to exchange information 
regarding technology development and transfer for adaptation and 
mitigation (UNFCCC, 2011c). 
13�5�1�2 Other UN climate-related forums
Acting on climate change may require functions other than negotiation 
under the UNFCCC or other forms of high-level cooperation, such as 
analytical support and implementation assistance for mitigation and 
adaptation efforts. A diverse set of forums both within and outside the 
UN system has taken up the issue of climate change since AR4, pos-
sibly contributing to broader institutional learning and effectiveness 
(Depledge, 2006; Stewart et al., 2012).
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has had a natural 
concern with climate change for many years, given its mission, and it 
collaborates closely with the UNFCCC. Since AR4, UNEP has provided 
increasingly significant analytical support to the international process, 
in part through its emissions-gap reports (UNEP, 2010, 2012, 2013b; 
Höhne et al., 2012b; Hof et al., 2013), but also through a wide range of 
other analytical efforts and support for institution building.
United Nations forums beyond the UNFCCC are increasingly address-
ing funding for adaptation and mitigation. Fragmentation in the vari-
ous objectives, conditions, and eligibility requirements of the different 
funds may make it difficult for developing countries to identify and 
access appropriate funding (Czarnecki and Guilanpour, 2009). The lit-
erature examines the relationship between adaptation and develop-
ment finance, including concerns about measuring official develop-
ment assistance (ODA) and how much adaptation funding is ‘new and 
additional’ (Stadelmann et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2011). A number of 
developing countries have established “national funding entities to 
coordinate domestic and international funding for adaptation with 
development funding” (Smith et al., 2011). 
Other UN agencies have also addressed the connections of climate 
change with human development (UNDP, 2007; UNDESA, 2009), the 
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CO2 emissions gap (Convention on Biological Diversity, 2012; Höhne 
et  al., 2012b), finance (AGF, 2010), and human rights (see Section 
13.5.2.2).
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Stratospheric 
Ozone Layer (concluded in 1987 under UN auspices) — and the Pro-
tocol’s subsequent amendments, adjustments, and decisions — have 
also contributed to reductions in GHGs. One notable proposed amend-
ment would accelerate the phaseout of substitutes of ozone depleting 
substances that are also strong GHGs (Mauritius & Micronesia, 2009; 
Velders et al., 2012). 
13�5�1�3 Non-UN forums
Climate change is increasingly addressed in forums for international 
cooperation outside of the UN. The AR4 (IPCC, 2007, Chapter 13) 
assessed several partnerships focused on particular themes, technolo-
gies, or regions. 
Some international partnerships have defined themselves as comple-
ments to the UNFCCC rather than as alternatives. For example, the 
REDD+ Partnership helps coordinate measures for reducing emissions 
from deforestation and degradation (REDD) in the UNFCCC process. 
The Partnership focuses on conservation, sustainable forest man-
agement, and forest carbon stock enhancement. In 2010, more than 
50 countries signed a non-binding agreement to pledge more than 
4 billion USD to REDD+ (Bodansky and Diringer, 2010). Michaelowa 
(2012a) and Stewart el al. (2009) describe multiple avenues for cli-
mate change financing to assist transitions to low-carbon technolo-
gies, such as through the International Renewable Energy Agency 
(IRENA). Established in 2009, IRENA seeks to advance the develop-
ment and transfer of renewable energy technologies, with a focus on 
financing renewable energy in its 163 member and signatory states 
(plus the European Union) (Florini, 2011; International Renewable 
Energy Agency, 2013).
The MEF, organized by the United States, provides a forum for informal 
consultation. Its members — Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the Euro-
pean Union, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Repub-
lic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States — together account for about 70 % of global GHG 
emissions (JRC / PBL, 2013). Its meetings are intended to advance dis-
cussion of international climate change agreements (MEF, 2009), and 
it has generated a related Clean Energy Ministerial. MEF participants 
recognize the group as a venue for discussion rather than a forum for 
negotiating binding agreements. The MEF produces a chairs’ summary 
instead of formally agreed text (Leal-Arcas, 2011). The existence of the 
MEF may be evidence of an overall increase in the fragmentation of 
global environmental governance (Biermann and Pattberg, 2008; Bier-
mann, 2010). Some may also be concerned about a small set of large 
countries reaching even informal decisions that affect a much larger 
set, and some may not be comfortable with a process chaired by a 
single nation (Stavins, 2010).
The Group of Twenty (G20) finance ministers from industrialized 
and developing economies could have the capacity to address cli-
mate finance, building on its core mission to discuss economic and 
finance policy. The make-up of the G20 is similar to that of the MEF, 
with the addition of Argentina, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Houser 
(2010) finds that the G20 might help to accelerate the deployment of 
clean energy technology, help vulnerable countries adapt to climate 
change impacts, and help phase out inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies. 
At its meeting in Pittsburgh in 2009 (G20, 2009), the G20 gave con-
siderable attention to climate change policy issues, in particular to 
fossil-fuel subsidies. Likewise, since 2005, the smaller Group of Eight 
(G8) heads of state and government have held a series of meetings 
relating to climate change and recognized the broad scientific view 
that the increase in global average temperature above pre-industrial 
levels ought not exceed 2 °C (G8, 2009). Van de Graaf and Wsetphal 
(2011) explore both opportunities for and constraints on the G20 and 
G8 with regard to climate.
Two forums of growing importance, providing analytical support for 
international cooperation on climate change, are the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) and the OECD. While the IEA has limited its mem-
bership to industrialized oil-importing countries (Scott, 1994; Goldthau 
and Witte, 2011), the OECD has granted membership to advanced 
developing countries. Both institutions have received increasingly 
strong mandates by their members to provide analytical support for 
climate change mitigation decisions. The OECD has a unit for eco-
nomic analysis of climate policy and impacts, and already plays a role 
in building knowledge (OECD, 2009). The IEA could play a key role to 
reduce uncertainty about countries’ performance by collecting, analyz-
ing, and comparing energy and industry-related emissions data (Har-
vard Project on Climate Agreements, 2010). The IEA and OECD have 
formed and jointly manage the Climate Change Expert Group, whose 
explicit mission is to provide analytical support on technical issues to 
the international negotiations.
The Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action includes around 30 
industrialized and developing countries, which have met both dur-
ing and between formal sessions since 2009. The Dialogue is open to 
countries working toward an ambitious, comprehensive, and legally 
binding regime in the UNFCCC, and who are committed to domestic 
policy to reduce emissions. The aim of the Dialogue is to openly dis-
cuss positions, to increase understanding, and to explore areas where 
convergence and enhanced joint action could emerge (Oberthür, 
2011).
In February 2012, a group of seven partners (Bangladesh, Canada, 
Ghana, Mexico, Sweden, and the United States, together with the 
UNEP) launched a new ‘Climate and Clean Air Coalition’ as a forum 
for dialogue among state and non-state actors outside the UNFCCC 
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process. The goal of the Coalition is to reduce levels of black carbon, 
methane, and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) among its 34 state members 
(including the European Commission) in collaboration with nine inter-
national organizations and 29 non-state partners (as of September 
2013). The Coalition has received funding from a number of countries, 
including Canada, Japan, and the United States to implement projects 
(Blok et al., 2012; UNEP, 2013a). 
New initiatives on international cooperation for adaptation and its 
funding have also been created, such as the World Bank’s Pilot Pro-
gram on Climate Resilience, and the European Commission-established 
Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA), which pledges regional and 
country-specific finance. 
13�5�2 Non-state international cooperation
13�5�2�1 Transnational cooperation among sub-national 
public actors
A prominent development since AR4 is the emergence of a large 
number of international agreements between non-state entities (den 
Elzen et al., 2011a; Höhne et al., 2012b; Hare et al., 2012). These are 
most commonly referred to as ‘transnational climate governance ini-
tiatives’ (Biermann and Pattberg, 2008; Pattberg and Stripple, 2008; 
Andonova et  al., 2009; Bulkeley et  al., 2012). In the most compre-
hensive survey, (Bulkeley et  al., 2012) document 60 of these initia-
tives, which can be grouped into four principal types: public-private 
partnerships, private sector governance initiatives, non-governmental 
organization (NGO) transnational initiatives, and sub-national trans-
national initiatives. The first two, involving private actors, are dis-
cussed in Section 13.12. 
NGO transnational initiatives attempt to influence the activities of 
corporations directly through transnational partnerships, some of 
which involve collaboration with the private sector. They have set up 
certification schemes for carbon offset credits, such as the Gold Stan-
dard, which is limited to renewable energy and demand-side energy 
efficiency projects, and the Community Carbon and Biodiversity Asso-
ciation standard, which aims to increase the quality of forestry credits 
(Bayon et al., 2007; Bumpus and Liverman, 2008). Certified offset cred-
its have commanded a price premium above other (‘standard’) credits 
(Sterk and Wittneben, 2006; Ellis et al., 2007; Nussbaumer, 2009; New-
ell and Paterson, 2010). These certification schemes have been used 
for the Voluntary Carbon Market as well as for the CDM (Conte and 
Kotchen, 2010).
Sub-national transnational initiatives involve sub-national actors, 
such as city-level governments, collaborating at an international 
scale. One example of this form of cooperation is the International 
Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) — Local Govern-
ments for Sustainability network. This organization has taken action 
through its Cities for Climate Protection programme from 1993 and 
more recently through a partnership the C40 Cities Climate Leader-
ship Group (Kern and Bulkeley, 2009; Román, 2010; Bulkeley et al., 
2012). A World Mayors Summit in November 2010 had participation 
from 138 cities and agreed on a Global Cities Covenant on Climate, 
otherwise known as the Mexico City Pact. A related initiative, the 
‘carbonn’ Cities Climate Registry, is an effort of local governments to 
regularly measure, report, and verify cities’ actions on climate change 
mitigation and adaptation (Chavez and Ramaswami, 2011; Ibrahim 
et al., 2012; Otto-Zimmermann and Balbo, 2012; Richardson, 2012). 
Recognition of local governments as governmental stakeholders in 
paragraph I.7 of the Cancún Agreements is a reflection of the grow-
ing role of sub-national transnational cooperation in the UNFCCC 
processes. 
Larger sub-national units have developed transnational collaborative 
schemes. Most notable are the North American sub-federal cap-and-
trade schemes, including the Western Climate Initiative (WCI). The WCI 
was originally envisaged to link state and provincial cap-and-trade 
systems in seven western U. S. states and four Canadian provinces 
beginning in 2012. The original aim of the initiative was reducing 
GHG emissions by the member states and provinces to 15 % below 
2005 levels by 2020 (Rabe, 2007; WCI, 2007; Selin and VanDeveer, 
2009; Bernstein et al., 2010). While the U. S. state of California’s ETS 
began operating in January 2013, the launch of the WCI system has 
been delayed. The WCI currently includes only California and Québec, 
although Ontario, British Columbia, and Manitoba are considering 
accession. 
13�5�2�2 Cooperation around human rights and rights of 
nature
Human rights law could conceivably frame an approach to climate 
change (Bodansky, 2010b; Bell, 2013; Gupta, 2014). Some recent lit-
erature argues that a human rights framing helps ‘to counteract gross 
imbalances of power’ between states and individuals (Sinden, 2007; 
Bratspies, 2011; Akin, 2012). The human rights approach to climate 
change has been acknowledged by the UN Human Rights Council in 
its Resolution 7 / 23 and the Office of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Human Rights (UNHRC, 2008; Limon, 2009; OHCHR, 
2009). The literature discusses a variety of specific issues, including the 
implications for climate adaptation; the impacts of climate change on 
human rights to water, food, health, and development; obligations to 
undertake mitigation actions; and whether human rights law implies 
an obligation to receive climate refugees.
Refugees displaced from their homes due to climate change may strain 
the capacity of existing institutions (Biermann and Boas, 2008). How-
ever, policies to address climate refugees face legal hurdles, includ-
ing the issue of causality: who is to be held responsible, who is the 
rights-bearer, and the issue of standing (Limon, 2009). Proposals have 
been made in the literature for a new protocol to the UNFCCC, a new 
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convention, and funding mechanisms to address the issues associ-
ated with climate refugees (Biermann and Boas, 2008; Docherty and 
Giannini, 2009). Such efforts could build on the 1951 Geneva Conven-
tion Relating to the Status of Refugees. In the absence of coordinated 
efforts, the Special Procedures and the Universal Periodic Review of 
the Human Rights Council are advancing the human rights and climate 
change agenda (Cameron and Limon, 2012). 
In 2010, the government of Bolivia convened government and non-
government representatives in the World People’s Conference on 
Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, which culminated 
in a People’s Agreement (WPCCC and RME, 2010). The participation 
of social movements in international cooperation on climate change 
may enhance recognition of ‘radical climate justice’ (Roberts, 2011) 
and an approach to law that seeks to establish ‘rights of nature’ 
(Cullinan, 2002; Sandberg and Sandberg, 2010; Aguirre and Cooper, 
2010).
13�5�3 Advantages and disadvantages of 
different forums
The literature has considered the strengths and weaknesses of nego-
tiating climate policy across multiple forums and institutions. Some 
studies suggest that, in addition to its own action, the UNFCCC effect 
of catalyzing efforts by others and providing coherence to multiple ini-
tiatives may result in greater aggregate impact (Moncel and van Asselt, 
2012). Other literature suggests that ‘regime complexes’ may emerge 
from smaller ‘clubs’ and then expand (Keohane and Victor, 2011; Vic-
tor, 2011). Regimes need (external) incentives for participation and 
(internal) incentives for compliance (Aldy and Stavins, 2010c). A key 
advantage of smaller forums or ‘clubs’ may be greater efficiency in 
the negotiation process, as emphasized in the general political science 
literature on negotiations (for example, Oye, 1985). But the literature 
also reflects key disadvantages, including that such clubs lack univer-
sality and hence legitimacy (Moncel et al., 2011), and that the envi-
ronmental effectiveness of clubs may be undercut by leakage of emis-
sions sources to other countries outside the club (Babiker, 2005). Some 
have suggested clubs as a way forward outside the UNFCCC, while 
others suggest they could contribute to the UNFCCC, for example by 
assisting in catalyzing greater ambition (Weischer et  al., 2012). Sev-
eral smaller ‘clubs’ that cut across categories (e. g., public / private) and 
scales (from international to local) are assessed in Section 13.5.1.2. 
Flexibility is another advantage cited for smaller clubs. Climate change 
mitigation through ‘clubs’ is not necessarily superior (Keohane and Vic-
tor, 2011) and action through this form of cooperation has to date not 
brought about high levels of participation and action. Smaller clubs 
must address conflicts where the climate change regime intersects 
with other major policy regimes (Michonski and Levi, 2010). Analysis of 
existing clubs suggests they enable incremental change and suggests 
that a set of incentives (related to trade, investment, labour mobility, 
or access to finance) could turn these into ‘transformational clubs’ 
(Weischer et al., 2012).
In a fragmented world, linking multiple agreements into a coherent 
whole is a major challenge. The aggregate effectiveness (in terms of 
the criteria discussed in Section  13.2) of the landscape of climate 
agreements and related institutions (Figure 13.1) can be enhanced 
by coordinated linkages among multiple elements. The actual forms 
and effects of policy linkages, existing or future, must be evaluated in 
each context. Policy linkages across the landscape of agreements on 
climate change might take several forms, such as mandated action 
and reporting by subsidiary bodies, agreed links between institutions 
(e. g., memoranda of understanding), loose coordination, informa-
tion sharing, and delegation. The literature on transnational gover-
nance acknowledges a gap in that “interactions are understudied in 
all areas of transnational governance” (Weischer et al., 2012). Some 
characteristics of potential linkages may stimulate their formation, 
for example, competition among public and private governance 
regimes (Helfer and Austin, 2011), accountability (Bäckstrand, 2008; 
Ballesteros et  al., 2010), learning (Kolstad and Ulph, 2008), and 
experimentation. Related literatures suggest that other important 
characteristics of linkages across regime components may be reci-
procity (Saran, 2010), relationships of conflict or interpretation (ILC, 
2006), collaboration (Young, 2011), the catalytic role of the UNFCCC 
(UNFCCC, 2007a), NGOs as norm entrepreneurs (Finnemore and Sik-
kink, 1998), evaluation of policy approaches (Stewart and Wiener, 
2003; Greenstone, 2009), and delegation to other institutions (Green, 
2008). 
13.6 Linkages between 
international and 
regional cooperation
13�6�1 Linkages with the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme 
Due to the scale effects that occur when carbon markets are enlarged, 
market-based mechanisms may be an important means of regional 
policy integration. The largest carbon market is the EU ETS, which 
began operating in 2005, and now includes all 28 European Union 
member states and is linked with the Norwegian system. The EU ETS is 
described and evaluated in detail in Section 14.4.2.1.
The EU ETS interacts with international carbon markets through the 
project-based Kyoto mechanisms. Import of units through international 
emissions trading is not allowed, but companies covered by the EU 
ETS can import CDMs and JI credits. A relatively liberal import regime 
for the pilot phase was established in a ‘Linking Directive’ approved 
in 2004 (Flåm, 2009). Forestry credits were banned and additional 
criteria for large hydropower projects were set. For the EU ETS’s sec-
ond phrase, which corresponded to the Kyoto Protocol’s first com-
mitment period, 2008 – 2012, countries proposed import thresholds; 
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several proposals were adjusted downwards by the Commission. For 
the third phase, 2013 – 2020, imports were limited to credits from CDM 
projects registered before 2013 in the absence of an international cli-
mate change agreement. New (2013 inception or later) CDM projects 
can only be used in the EU ETS if located in least developed countries 
(LDCs) (Skjærseth, 2010; Skjærseth and Wettestad, 2010). However, 
CDM credits from new projects in non-LDCs can be accepted after 
2013 if the EU has concluded a bilateral agreement with the country in 
question regulating their level of use. 
The European Union could potentially link the EU ETS to other schemes, 
and legislation for the period until 2020 allows negotiation of such 
bilateral treaties. The EU and Australia have already agreed to a one-
way indirect link to commence on 1 July 2015, meaning that EU credits 
will be allowed for compliance under the Australia system (European 
Commission, 2012). This agreement will transition to a two-way direct 
link by no later than 1 July 2018, provided that the Australian system 
goes forward. 
13�6�2 Linkages with other regional policies
The Asia-Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate, 
which was time-limited and has now concluded, involved about 
50 % of the world population, GHG emissions, and world economic 
output (Kelly, 2007). The partnership included countries that had 
not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and while it was ‘soft’ in terms of 
legal bindingness, it may have had a modest impact on governance 
(Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and van Asselt, 2009; McGee and Taplin, 2009) 
and encouraged voluntary action (Heggelund and Buan, 2009). After 
the end of the Partnership, the Global Superior Energy Performance 
Partnership (GSEP) Clean Energy Ministerial took over some of the 
Partnership’s activities. 
In addition to coordination by international organizations, such as 
ICLEI — Local Governments for Sustainability, voluntary mitigation 
action of cities is taking a regional / global character (Kern and Bulke-
ley, 2009). In Europe, the Climate Alliance has about 1700 member 
cities from a number of countries. The Climate Alliance has supported 
rainforest conservation projects in the Amazon region (Climate Alli-
ance, 2013).
13.7 Linkages between 
international and 
national policies
As the landscape of multilateral and other international agreements 
on climate has become more complex, the interactions between inter-
national and national levels have become more varied. 
13�7�1 Influence of international climate 
policies on domestic action
International policy may trigger more ambitious national policies. Trea-
ties provide greater certainty that others will act, thus addressing key 
concerns that countries will free ride. International climate policy can 
shape domestic climate discourse, even if it may not be the main inspi-
ration for proactive action (Tompkins and Amundsen, 2008). 
National policies also affect the effectiveness of international poli-
cies. The implementation of international policy is affected by national 
political structure. Examples of studies on how varying domestic 
political structures affect the implementation of international policies 
include studies in: Italy (Massetti et al., 2007), France (Mathy, 2007), 
Canada (Harrison, 2008), China (Teng and Gu, 2007), the UK (Barry 
and Paterson, 2004; Compston and Bailey, 2008) and the Netherlands 
(Gupta et al., 2007). National and sub-national settings, where actions 
may be less risky or more politically feasible, may also provide useful 
‘laboratories’ to test policy instruments before implementation at the 
international level (Michaelowa et al., 2005; Moncel et al., 2011; Zelli, 
2011).
13�7�2 Linkages between the Kyoto 
mechanisms and national policies
Linking national policies with international policies may provide flex-
ibility by allowing a group of parties to meet obligations in the aggre-
gate. The Kyoto Protocol (Article 4) provides for such inter-regional 
flexibility, and the European Union has taken advantage of the Proto-
col’s provision through its internal burden sharing decision. This deci-
sion allowed the EU’s Kyoto commitment of an 8 % emissions reduc-
tion below 1990 for the 2008 – 2012 period to be redistributed among 
EU-15 member states; commitments of these states range from – 28 % 
(Luxembourg) to +27 % (Portugal) (Michaelowa and Betz, 2001; 
Hunter et al., 2011). 
Use of the CDM and JI Kyoto mechanisms has been driven by national 
mitigation policies to achieve developed countries’ emissions commit-
ments. While governments of some developed countries buy emissions 
credits directly, others introduce instruments with emissions commit-
ments for private companies, like the EU ETS; some countries, such as 
Denmark, have done both. These companies can then use emissions 
credits generated under the Kyoto Protocol to satisfy part of their com-
mitments (Michaelowa and Buen, 2012). Another example is Japan’s 
Industry Voluntary Action Plan that includes diverse sectors, each of 
which has its own target set either in absolute terms, in emissions´ 
intensity, or in terms of energy consumption (Mitsutsune, 2012).
Many industrialized countries limit imports of credits generated by the 
Kyoto mechanisms for various reasons; two have been posited in the 
literature: (1) to keep the domestic carbon price high to induce techno-
logical diffusion and possibly innovation; and (2) to avoid diminishing 
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environmental effectiveness by allowing required emissions-reduction 
to occur in other jurisdictions because of concerns about the quality 
of credits (‘additionality’). For example, the European Union has pro-
hibited the import of Assigned Amount Units (AAU) into the EU-ETS to 
prevent the use of surplus units from countries in transition, colloqui-
ally called ‘hot air’ (Michaelowa and Buen, 2012). Japanese companies 
have used AAUs from Green Investment Schemes for meeting their 
targets (Tuerk et al., 2010). In 2011, credits from certain CDM project 
types were banned for use in the EU-ETS from 2013 onwards (Schnei-
der, 2011). The ban includes CERs generated from projects involving 
destruction of trifluoromethane (HFC-23) and nitrous oxide (N2O) from 
adipic acid production.
The Kyoto mechanisms also interact with the national policies of coun-
tries in which projects are implemented. However, the CDM Execu-
tive Board decided that the effects of new policies implemented in 
host countries that reduce emissions should not be considered when 
assessing the additionality of new projects to avoid perverse incentives 
not to adopt mitigation policies (Winkler, 2004; Michaelowa, 2010). 
Instead, countries may subsidize renewable energy while generating 
CDM credits. There are indications that the availability of CDM credits 
has accelerated the introduction of feed-in tariffs in China (Schroeder, 
2009). Freeing emission units for sale under international emissions 
trading requires national mitigation policies unless there is a surplus 
of units in a business-as-usual situation, as in countries in transition 
(Böhringer et al., 2007). 
Investment law, defined through private international law and more 
than 3000 multilateral and bilateral investment treaties (UNCTAD, 
2013), applies to the CDM and emissions trading contracts. Proposed 
standardized contracts link the CDM to investment law by covering the 
choice of language and the process and forum for dispute resolution. 
These contracts could expose contractors to the costs associated with 
international arbitration (Gupta, 2008; Klijn et al., 2009). 
13�7�3 International linkage among regional, 
national, and sub-national policies
International linkages can be established among regional, national, or 
sub-national policies. These can be direct or indirect. Under direct 
linkage, the same units are valid throughout the linked systems. 
Under indirect linkage, a unit in a certified emission reduction credit 
system is accepted by multiple systems. Figure 13.4 shows sub-
national, national, and regional GHG cap-and-trade schemes and 
existing and planned linkages between them. The only formal direct 
linkage between two trading schemes is that arranged between the 
Australian ETS and the EU ETS, which was officially announced in 
August 2012. A strong indirect linkage between carbon markets 
exists through the CDM, whose credits are accepted under the EU-
ETS, the Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism, and the New Zealand 
ETS. Nazifi (2010) finds that EU demand has driven the price for CDM 
credits. 
Review of unilateral and bilateral direct linkages demonstrates that 
bilateral direct linkage reduces mitigation costs, increases credibility 
of the price signal, and expands market size and liquidity (Anger, 2008; 
Flachsland et al., 2009; Jaffe et al., 2009; Dellink et al., 2010; Cason 
and Gangadharan, 2011; Lanzi et  al., 2012). However, direct linkage 
also raises a variety of concerns (Jaffe et  al., 2009), including that 
linking can lead to a dilution of mitigation achieved through trading 
schemes, as linked systems are only as environmentally effective as the 
weakest among them (e. g., the one that allows imports of offsets with 
the lowest standards). Grubb (2009) also warns that countries may be 
unwilling to accept an increase of carbon prices that would result from 
linking with a more ambitious system.Tuerk et al. (2009) see the big-
gest challenges to linking in differential stringencies of targets in each 
system, varying degrees of enforcement, differences in eligible project-
based credits, and the existence of cost-containment measures, such as 
price ceilings. Haites and Mehling (2009) highlight that only bilateral 
links (or reciprocal unilateral links) yield the full benefits of linkage. 
Bilateral links often face lengthy adoption procedures as well as legal 
and procedural constraints, whereas reciprocal unilateral links, possibly 
framed by an informal agreement, are often easier to implement and 
provide more flexibility for almost the same benefits. 
Also attractive are indirect linkages among regional, national, or sub-
national cap-and-trade systems, an approach that maintains the ben-
efits of linkage without much of the downside. Such indirect linkages 
achieve cost savings and avoid risk diversification without the need 
for deliberative harmonization of emerging and existing cap-and-
trade systems. Indirect linkage is attractive because de facto linkages 
limit potential distributional concerns and preserve a high degree of 
national control over allowance markets (Jaffe et al., 2009).
In addition, both direct and indirect linkages can occur among het-
erogeneous regional, national, and sub-national policy instruments 
(Metcalf and Weisbach, 2012). Some such linking would be relatively 
straightforward, such as forming a link between a cap-and-trade sys-
tem and a carbon tax. Other links would be more challenging, such 
as between a cap-and-trade system and a quantity standard. Others 
would be even more difficult, such as between a cap-and-trade sys-
tem and a technology mandate, and some linkages between hetero-
geneous policy instruments would simply not be possible (Metcalf and 
Weisbach, 2012).
13.8 Interactions between 
climate change mitigation 
policy and trade
Research on interactions between climate change mitigation policy 
and trade indicates a diversity of compatibilities, synergies, conflicts, 
and cooperative arrangements (Brewer, 2003, 2004, 2010; Cosbey, 
Figure 13�4 | Cap-and-trade schemes with existing and planned linkages. Linkage through proposed acceptance of offsets and Joint Implementation projects not displayed. In 
some cases, countries otherwise eligible to host CDM projects must first establish a Designated National Authority. Accurate as of March 2014.
1031
International Cooperation: Agreements & Instruments
13
Chapter 13
2007; ICTSD, 2008; Cottier et al., 2009; Epps and Green, 2010; Rao, 
2012; Leal-Arcas, 2013). Consideration of these and other issues and 
options needs to take into account the context of the provisions of 
the principal existing multilateral climate change framework (Yamin 
and Depledge, 2004) and multilateral trade framework (Hoekman 
and Kostecki, 2009). Negotiators acknowledged the opportuni-
ties for international cooperation on interactions between climate 
change and trade in both the UNFCCC (1992) and in a Ministerial 
Decision at the time of the negotiations of the Marrakech Agreement 
establishing the WTO (1994). But there is also a potential for con-
flict between climate and trade issues. According to Article 3.5 of the 
UNFCCC, “Measures taken to combat climate change, including uni-
lateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifi-
able discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade”. 
The Kyoto Protocol notes in Article  2.3 that Annex  I Parties “shall 
strive to implement policies and measures under this Article in such 
a way as to minimize adverse effects, including … effects on inter-
national trade.”
Trade and climate policy interact at many levels (Copeland and Taylor, 
2005; Tamiotti et al., 2009; UNEP, 2009; UNCTAD, 2010; World Bank, 
2010). For instance, on the one hand, according to Peters and Hertwich 
(2008), “almost one-quarter of carbon dioxide released to the atmo-
sphere is emitted in the production of internationally traded goods 
and services” (see also Peters et al., 2011). Transportation associated 
with trade is another related issue (Conca, 2000). On the other hand, 
various climate change policies currently in place affect the relative 
prices of goods and services, which thereby affect trade flows and the 
total volume of traded goods (Whalley, 2011). Moreover, trade barri-
ers and obligations regarding intellectual property (IP) rights of ‘green 
technology’ as well as many other WTO obligations impinge on climate 
policy (Thomas, 2004; Khor, 2010a; Johnson and Brewster, 2013). Victor 
(1995) suggested that lessons from the trade regime could be used in 
the development of the climate regime, but comparative governance 
studies of the trade and climate regimes have not been thoroughly uti-
lized to gain insights into how the two regimes might address trade-
climate interactions (Bell et al., 2012 an exception).
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The production of internationally traded goods gives rise to a ‘label-
ling’ issue, a problem for accounting purposes and also for possible 
policy intervention. The issue arises because a proportion of a country’s 
GHG emissions resulting from the production of goods and services in 
one country may be ‘embedded’ in traded products that are consumed 
in other countries. At issue is whether to attribute the emissions to the 
producing (exporting) country or consuming (importing) country (Kai-
numa et al., 2000; Peters and Hertwich, 2008) (see also Sections 5.4.1 
and 14.3.4.2). There is an ethical and equity issue about how to define 
climate responsibility and allocate climate mitigation costs (discussed 
in detail in Sections 3.3, 4.1, and 4.2). There is also a political and 
economic issue whether climate policy instruments ought to address 
production- or consumption-induced GHGs (Droege, 2011a, b; see also 
Section 14.3.4). Finally, there is a technical issue as territorial measure-
ment is the current GHG accounting practice under the UNFCCC, and 
switching to consumption-induced measurement may be technically 
more difficult (Droege, 2011a; b; Peters et al., 2011; Caldeira and Davis, 
2011). 
There are significant differences among researchers and policymakers 
in their perspectives on the relationship between climate change and 
trade. These differences include fundamental empirical assumptions 
and policy preferences concerning the roles of markets and govern-
ments (Bhagwati, 2009), specifically concerning whether government 
measures are required to address market failures that produce cli-
mate change (Stern, 2007), or government regulations tend to create 
inefficiencies and distort trade (Krugman, 1979; Rodrik, 2011). Trade 
measures (e. g., trade sanctions, trade enticements, and trade-rele-
vant domestic product standards; see Section 13.8.1 below) could be 
used to address free-rider problems of international agreements, spe-
cifically participation and / or compliance problems (Victor, 2010), and 
some (e. g., Victor, 2011) suggest these may be useful in achieving an 
effective climate agreement. However, there are also some who con-
clude that trade measures are an inappropriate tool to pursue climate 
change policy objectives, pointing to the possibility of ‘green protec-
tionism’ (Khor, 2010a; Johnson and Brewster, 2013). The potential use 
of trade measures to enhance participation and / or compliance poses 
major institutional design questions (see Section 13.4).
13�8�1 WTO-related issues
A central issue for WTO members is whether policies are consistent 
with principles of non-discrimination. Most Favoured Nation Treatment 
prohibits favourable treatment of the goods, services, or corporations 
of any one member as compared with other members, while National 
Treatment prohibits less favourable treatment of foreign relative to 
domestic goods, services or corporations. Of the more than 60 WTO 
agreements that apply these principles, many are pertinent to climate 
change, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement 
on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), the Agreement on Trade Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs) and the Dispute Settlement Understand-
ing (DSU), as well as agreements on subsidies, government procure-
ment, and agriculture (Brewer, 2003, 2004, 2010; Cottier et al., 2009; 
Hufbauer et al., 2009; Epps and Green, 2010). Studies have suggested 
that ETSs can be designed to be compatible with WTO obligations 
(Werksman, 1999; Petsonk, 1999). 
Trade issues concerning CDM projects have received special attention 
(Werksman et  al., 2001; Rechsteiner et  al., 2009; Werksman, 2009). 
Although no trade or investment disputes have arisen yet in connec-
tion with CDM projects, there is the possibility that they will in the 
future as the number and economic significance of CDM projects con-
tinues to increase. Significant attention has also been given to product 
labelling and standards issues that can arise in relation to the WTO 
Agreement on TBT (Appleton, 2009), which could be pertinent to the 
use of labels concerning ‘food miles’ (ICTSD, 2007; World Bank, 2010). 
Although long-distance air transport of agricultural products itself is 
GHG-intensive, the agricultural practices of many exporting countries 
are less GHG-intensive than those of the importing countries, and 
determining the relative GHG emissions levels of imported versus 
domestic products thus requires complete lifecycle analyses of individ-
ual products and specific pairs of exporting-importing countries. 
Government procurement policies that entail buy-local practices con-
cerning climate-friendly goods and services have emerged as an issue 
under the principle of non-discrimination in the context of national 
economic stimulus programmes. The applicability of the WTO Agree-
ment on Government Procurement to such trade issues is limited 
because many countries have not agreed to it; among those that have, 
there are many government agencies whose programmes are not cov-
ered (van Asselt et al., 2006; Hoekman and Kostecki, 2009; Malumfashi, 
2009; van Calster, 2009).
Government subsidies for renewable energy and energy-efficiency 
goods and services have also become issues in relation to the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, as well as the 
TRIMs agreement. Such issues have prompted WTO dispute cases, 
including one involving subsidies for producers of wind turbines (WTO, 
2010) and another involving feed-in tariffs (WTO, 2011). The applica-
tion of WTO subsidy rules could slow the development and diffusion 
of climate-friendly technologies, but it is not yet clear whether this 
has or will have an effect (see Bigdeli, 2009; Howse and Eliason, 2009; 
Howse, 2010 on subsidy issues). 
There are WTO-related issues related to tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
resulting from climate change policy. In general, non-tariff barriers 
tend to be more important barriers than tariffs at the climate-trade 
interface, but tariffs are still high in some industries and countries 
(Steenblik, 2006; World Bank, 2008a). Countries may seek to limit 
competitive disadvantage introduced by domestic climate policy by 
raising tariffs and introducing non-tariff barriers that restrict imports, 
or by other BAMs. One example of a BAM would be a country that 
has imposed a domestic carbon tax also (1) imposing the carbon tax 
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on imported goods and services at a rate proportional to the emis-
sions associated with their production and (2) offering reimburse-
ment to domestic exporters who sell a good or service outside of 
the jurisdiction of the carbon tax (Wooders et al., 2009; Elliott et al., 
2010; Monjon and Quirion, 2011). Barriers to transfers of technolo-
gies identified by IPCC Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources 
and Climate Change Mitigation (IPCC, 2011) as potential contribu-
tors to climate change mitigation have been issues in the on-going 
WTO Doha Round negotiations (Tamiotti et al., 2009). Domestic sub-
sidies such as those for biofuels have also been at issue in the Doha 
Round.
Border adjustment measures to offset international differences in 
costs — and thus possible international leakage (see Section 5.4.1) 
arising from international differences in mitigation policy — have 
become one of the most contentious and researched points of inter-
action (Babiker, 2005; de Cendra, 2006; Cosbey and Tarasofsky, 2007; 
Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007; Genasci, 2008; Frankel, 2008; Tamiotti and 
Kulacoglu, 2009; O’Brien, 2009; van Asselt and Brewer, 2010; Tamiotti, 
2011; Zhang, 2012). This issue draws particular attention to differences 
between production-based and consumption-based emissions in both 
developed and developing countries (Figure 1.5 in Chapter 1). BAMs 
include policy options ranging from: (1) tariffs on imports or subsidies 
on exports based on the amount of GHGs released in their produc-
tion to (2) ‘compensatory measures,’ as for instance the free-allocation 
emission permits in the EU ETS or export rebates to energy-intensive 
sectors. Theoretical arguments in favour of BAMs can be grouped into 
three classes, each discussed below: the reduction of economic inef-
ficiencies in the context of an externality, the reduction of carbon leak-
age, and increasing participation and compliance in a climate agree-
ment.
The economic research on BAMs stresses that the inclusion of more 
countries in climate policy, e. g., by linking permit trading schemes and 
including more sectors and countries, reduces economic inefficiencies 
relative to unilateral BAMs. While, BAMs can enhance the competitive-
ness of GHG- and trade-intensive industries within a given climate 
regime (Kuik and Hofkes, 2010; Böhringer et al., 2012a; Balistreri and 
Rutherford, 2012; Lanzi et al., 2012), welfare effects may be negative 
for consumers and countries facing BAMs on their exports. Overall 
welfare effects accounting for externalities are mainly perceived to be 
positive at an abstract theoretical level (Gros and Egenhofer, 2011); 
the evidence is more blurred at an empirical level and is sensitive to 
assumptions (The Carbon Trust, 2010; Fischer and Fox, 2012; Lanzi 
et al., 2012). Export rebates, the exclusion of energy and CO2-intensive 
industries from regulation, or the free-allocation of permits to these 
industries are recognized as causing efficiency losses (Lanzi et  al., 
2012). Most empirical studies also do not confirm a need at the macro-
economic level for BAMs in the first place: they tend to find that cli-
mate policy is not a significant trade issue at the macro-economic level 
of national economies, though there are competitiveness and leakage 
issues for a few industries which are both GHG-intensive and trade-
intensive. They hold that the main channel of impact of climate policies 
is through world energy prices and not through manufactured goods 
(Grubb and Neuhoff, 2006; Houser et al., 2008; Aldy and Pizer, 2009; 
The Carbon Trust, 2010). 
The economic modelling literature on the effectiveness of BAMs to 
reduce carbon leakage finds that carbon leakage rates tend to decline 
by 2 – 12 % following the introduction of a border adjustment tax 
(Böhringer et al., 2012a). The political literature on the appropriateness 
of using BAMs to address carbon leakage, on the other hand, tends to 
be divided into two perspectives. Developed countries and / or countries 
with some form of mitigation policy either already in place or consider-
ing this for the future argue that BAMs are necessary to avoid carbon 
controls driving production abroad. Arguments along this line have 
emerged in the European Union and the United States for instance (see 
Veel, 2009; The Carbon Trust, 2010; Fischer and Fox, 2012). Developing 
countries tend to oppose BAMs, as many are concerned about nega-
tive welfare effects for their countries and what they see as a violation 
of the principle of CBDRRC as agreed under the UNFCCC (Khor, 2010a; 
Droege, 2011a; Scott and Rajamani, 2012). Nevertheless, the technical 
difficulties of measuring production-induced or consumption-induced 
GHG emissions are significant (Droege, 2011a), and addressing them 
may be associated with high administrative costs, possibly outweigh-
ing the potential benefits (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2009).
Participation and compliance in climate agreements might be 
enhanced by BAMs. However, conceptual thinking on the question 
does not reveal a consensus, and direct evidence on the point is insuf-
ficient to reach definitive conclusions (see Barrett, 2003, 2009, 2010; 
Victor, 2010, 2011). Because BAMs affect the distribution of abatment 
costs across countires, enacting a BAM could result in welfare loss, 
particularly for exporting developing countries, and even retaliatory 
countermeasures (de Cendra, 2006; Mattoo et  al., 2009; Böhringer 
et al., 2012b; Balistreri and Rutherford, 2012). For more discussion on 
the topic, see Section 13.3.3 on participation and Section 13.3.4 on 
compliance.
From the research on legal issues related to BAMs, four major con-
clusions emerge. First, BAMs may clash with WTO obligations, a point 
which is emphasized by many observers (Wooders et al., 2009; Con-
don, 2009; ICTSD, 2009; Holzer, 2010, 2011; Tamiotti, 2011; Du, 2011). 
Second, it is possible to design BAMs to be compatible with these obli-
gations, according to other observers (Condon, 2009; Droege, 2011a; 
b), particularly when BAMs are targeted to countries based on their 
production technology efficiency (Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007). Third, 
WTO obligations and their legal interpretation have evolved over time, 
allowing for the possibility to bring trade and climate policy goals 
more in line in the future (Kelemen, 2001; Neumayer, 2004). Finally, the 
use of BAMs for climate change purposes may be politically controver-
sial (Khor, 2010a). 
A final WTO-related issue concerns the distinction between prod-
ucts and ‘process and production methods’ (PPMs). The legal notion 
of PPMs, as applied in the WTO, can be based on several aspects of 
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production processes and can have a variety of effects on climate 
change-related policies. (For extensive discussions of the technical 
legal issues and their relevance to climate change issues see Cottier 
et al., 2009).
13�8�2 Other international venues
Two GHG-emitting industries that are centrally involved in interna-
tional trade as modes of transportation are covered by separate inter-
national agreements outside the WTO system (see also Chapter 8). 
International aviation issues are covered by the Chicago Convention 
and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), while inter-
national maritime shipping issues have been addressed by the IMO 
(see Section 13.13.1.4 for performance assessments of the ICAO and 
IMO).
There has been increasing interest in recent years in both ICAO and 
IMO in industry practices concerning GHG emissions, with some efforts 
at international cooperation to address them. However, there has been 
international conflict about the European Union’s inclusion of inter-
national aviation within the EU ETS. The Kyoto Protocol in Article 2.2 
recognized ICAO as the venue for negotiations on matters concerning 
international aviation emissions, but in the absence of what was seen 
in the EU as adequate progress in the ICAO, the EU decided to include 
aviation in the EU ETS. This unilateral decision prompted strong reac-
tions (Mueller, 2012; Scott and Rajamani, 2012), and flights in and out 
of the EU were temporarily exempted in April 2013 through the ICAO 
General Assembly scheduled for September-October 2013. Among 
the concerns expressed about the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS 
has been the assertion that it represents a violation of the principle 
of CBDRRC of the UNFCCC (Scott and Rajamani, 2012; Ireland, 2012), 
though this concern only applies to developing countries. There are also 
legal issues about the relationship of the EU ETS to the Chicago Con-
vention, which has traditionally been the international legal basis for 
aviation policies. Though studies indicate that the economic impacts of 
the EU ETS provisions are small relative to other airline expenses and 
ticket prices and that much of the cost can be passed on to consumers 
(Scheelhaase and Grimme, 2007; Anger and Köhler, 2010), political and 
legal issues have nevertheless made international cooperation difficult. 
The IMO (2009) concluded that a significant potential for CO2 reduc-
tion exists through technical and operational measures, many of which 
appear to be cost-effective; the IMO adopted an energy efficiency 
design index (International Maritime Organization (IMO), 2011). A link 
of carbon controls of aviation and shipping to the EU ETS and / or a pos-
sible U. S. ETS is suggested by Haites (2009) with the view that carbon 
offsets under the CDM could also be used.
There are other international institutional contexts within which cli-
mate change-trade interaction issues have been addressed, namely, 
the World Bank, G8, G20, IEA, MEF, and OECD (Section 13.5).
13�8�3 Implications for policy options
In terms of WTO and / or UNFCCC involvement, there are logically four 
possible sets of options for institutional architectures at the multi-
lateral level for addressing climate change-trade interactions: WTO-
based, UNFCCC-based, joint UNFCCC-WTO, and stand-alone. In addi-
tion, there could be hybrid arrangements involving combinations of 
these four types. For instance, proposals for Sustainable Energy Trade 
Agreements (SETAs) could be addressed in a variety of venues (ICTSD, 
2011). 
Of the four options, WTO-based architectures have received the most 
attention in the literature. Alternatives include making revisions in 
existing WTO arrangements or undertaking new arrangements (Epps 
and Green, 2010). Possible changes in existing WTO arrangements 
include a ‘peace clause’ (Hufbauer et al., 2009) or waiver agreement 
(Howse and Eliason, 2009; Howse, 2010), whereby WTO members 
would agree — within some limits — not to challenge on WTO grounds, 
respectively, climate policies in general or climate-related subsidies in 
particular. An extensive list of other possible changes to existing WTO 
arrangements has been discussed by Epps and Green (2010), whose 
suggestions include: change GATT Article XX (which allows exceptions 
to members’ obligations, including measures for the ‘conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources’) so that climate measures are explic-
itly identified as qualifying for exceptional treatment; add a similar 
provision to the Subsidies Agreement; change the burden of proof or 
standard of review for the scientific evidence presented in climate 
change cases to Dispute Settlement panels; change Dispute Appellate 
Body rules to take into account the scientific uncertainties in climate 
change cases; establish a notification process for members to inform 
other members of the adoption of climate policies with trade implica-
tions; and establish a Climate Change Committee, which could facili-
tate conflict resolution without resorting to the Dispute Resolution 
process. 
Many possibilities for a new Climate Change Agreement at the WTO 
have also been discussed by (Epps and Green, 2010). The elements of 
such an agreement could include: establishment of a Climate Change 
Committee (as above); establishment of a notification procedure for 
climate change measures (as above); establishment of climate change 
mitigation as a legitimate objective; development of a ‘non-aggression 
clause’ that would prohibit unilateral actions, such as BAMs; adoption 
of transparency requirements for national climate change policymaking 
processes to determine their legitimacy in relation to climate change 
concerns and protect against disguised trade protectionism; adoption 
of environmental rationales for subsidies; reviews of members’ trade-
related climate measures to insure that they are substantive responses 
to climate issues; and clarification of the potential application of PPMs 
questions to climate change disputes. Although these ideas have been 
mentioned in the literature, they have not been formulated as specific 
proposals to the WTO.
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UNFCCC-based options have been discussed in the literature (Werks-
man et al., 2009) relating to the possible creation of a ‘level’ playing 
field, such as through border charges on imports, or border rebates for 
exports, though views differ greatly, as indicated above in the discus-
sion of BAMs.
A potential joint UNFCCC-WTO agreement has not yet received much 
attention in the published literature (Epps and Green, 2010). However, 
there are already in effect arrangements whereby the UNFCCC sec-
retariat is an observer in meetings of the WTO Committee on Trade 
and Environment (CTE) and is invited on an ad hoc basis to meet-
ings of the Committee overseeing the specific trade and environment 
negotiations (CTESS) (Cossey and Marceau, 2009). In addition, WTO 
Secretariat staff members attend the annual UNFCCC COP meetings. 
Finally, a stand-alone arrangement could be developed (Epps and 
Green, 2010), a possibility that has not yet been analyzed in the pub-
lished literature. 
There are numerous and diverse unexplored opportunities for greater 
international cooperation in trade-climate policy interactions. While 
mutually destructive conflicts between the two systems have thus far 
been largely avoided, pre-emptive cooperation could protect against 
such developments in the future. Whether such cooperative arrange-
ments can be most effectively devised within the existing institutional 
architectures for trade and for climate change or through new archi-
tectures is an unsettled issue (Section 13.4).




Technology-related policies could conceivably play a significant role in 
an international climate regime (de Coninck et al., 2008). These poli-
cies have the potential to lower the cost of climate change mitigation 
and increase the likelihood that countries will commit to reducing 
their GHG emissions. By lowering the relative cost of more environ-
mentally sound technologies, technology policy can increase incen-
tives for countries to comply with international climate obligations 
and could therefore play an important role in increasing the robust-
ness of long-run international frameworks (Barrett, 2003). Such poli-
cies might generate incentives for participation in international cli-
mate agreements by facilitating access to climate-change-mitigating 
technologies or funding to cover the additional costs of such tech-
nologies. 
The role of international cooperation in facilitating technological 
change, including access to, facilitation of, and transfer of technol-
ogy, is explicitly recognized in Article 4(1)(c) and (h), 4(5), 4(7), 4(8), 
and 4(9) of the UNFCCC. Article 4.5 states that “The developed coun-
try Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II shall take 
all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, 
the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and 
know-how to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties….” 
The performance of international institutional arrangements and the 
adequacy of financing are subject to a variety of interpretations. (See 
Section 14.3.6.2 for a discussion of the UNFCCC CTCN, and see Section 
15.12 for a discussion of financial issues.) 
Although international technology transfer issues for climate change 
mitigation or adaptation have become concerns in numerous coun-
tries, these concerns have been especially acute in developing coun-
tries. Concerns over technology transfer in developing countries are 
frequently embedded in broader capacity building, sustainable devel-
opment, and other equity issues (for discussions of the broader issues 
of CBDRRC and equity, see respectively Sections 13.2.1.2 and 13.4.2.4, 
and also Chapter  3 and Sections 4.1 and 4.2) (Brewer, 2008; GEA, 
2012; Ockwell and Mallett, 2012).
Technology-oriented agreements could include activities across the 
technology life cycle for knowledge sharing, coordinated or joint 
research and development of climate-change-mitigating technolo-
gies, technology transfer, and technology deployment policies (such 
as technology or performance standards and incentives for technol-
ogy development or adoption). International technology policy may 
play an important role in improving the efficiency of existing research 
and development (R&D) activities by increasing the international 
exchange of scientific and technical knowledge and by reducing 
duplicated R&D effort that could be shared across nations. (Newell, 
2010a).
13�9�1 Modes of international incentive 
schemes to encourage technology-
investment flows
Absent additional market failures, underinvestment in innovative activ-
ity relative to socially optimal levels can occur due to several well-
understood general properties of innovation (see Section 15.6). At a 
global level, international carbon markets and the flexibility mecha-
nisms they may employ, such as international linkage of domestic 
emission programmes, offsets, and the CDM, may be used to finance 
emission reductions in developing countries and transferring technol-
ogy between nations and regions (see Section 13.13 and Haščič and 
Johnstone, 2011). Clear rules for these markets and their associated 
flexibility mechanisms may be established under international agree-
ments and domestic policies to aid the removal of unnecessary barriers 
to technology transfer and to facilitate investment flows. 
Because private-sector investments constitute more than 85 % of 
global financial flows (UNFCCC, 2007b), international trade and for-
eign direct investment are the primary means by which new knowl-
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edge and technology are transferred between countries (World Bank, 
2008b). While domestic actions can improve the conditions to enable 
technology transfer investments (e. g., through regulatory flexibility, 
transparency, and stability), international actions can also contribute. 
In particular, the literature has identified tariffs and non-tariff trade 
barriers as impediments to energy technology transfer (World Bank, 
2008b). An existing example is OECD regulation of export credits, with 
specific conditions to foster technology transfer for climate change 
mitigation (OECD, 2013).
In summary, national and supra-national policies that provide incen-
tives for climate change mitigation will likely play an essential role in 
stimulating public investment, financial incentives, and regulations to 
promote innovation in the necessary new technologies for mitigation 
goals. Reducing fossil-fuel subsidies may have a similar effect (UNEP, 
2008).
13�9�2 Intellectual property rights and 
technology development and transfer
The strength of IP right protection, together with other conditions 
related to the rule of law, regulatory transparency, and market open-
ness affect technology transfer rates (Newell, 2010a) (see also Sections 
3.11 and 16.8).
The goal of IP protection is to foster both the development of new 
technologies (innovation), and the diffusion of new technologies 
across countries (technology transfer) and within countries (tech-
nology adoption). In theory, such protection achieves these ends by 
increasing and / or maintaining the private economic incentive to create 
and transfer technology. At the same time, protection of IP also works 
to slow the diffusion of new technologies, because it raises their cost 
and potentially limits their availability. To the extent that IP protection 
raises the cost and limits the availability around the world of mitiga-
tion technologies, the potential for new technologies to reduce the 
cost of mitigation will be hampered. Concern by developing countries 
that IP protection for low-carbon technology will make climate action 
excessively costly has been a contentious issue in the climate negotia-
tions (Government of India, 2013). On the other hand, IP protection 
may encourage firms to innovate more than they otherwise would, 
thus potentially increasing the supply and reducing the cost of new 
technology. 
In order to balance the possible incentive effects of IP protection 
against the adverse impact of such protection on costs and availabil-
ity, it is important to assess the empirical significance of the incentive 
effects, both with respect to innovation and technology diffusion. The 
empirical evidence regarding the effect of IP policy on innovation is 
discussed in Section 15.6.2.1. 
Even if stronger IP protection does not foster creation and develop-
ment of new technologies, it may be beneficial for mitigation if it fos-
ters transfer of technologies from developed to less developed coun-
tries. Theoretically, strong IP protection in developing countries may 
be necessary to limit the risk for foreign firms that transfer of their 
technology will lead to imitation and resulting profit erosion. Look-
ing at technology transfer in general, empirical literature finds a role 
for strong IP protection in receiving countries in facilitating technol-
ogy transfer from advanced countries through exports, foreign direct 
investment (FDI), and licensing for transfers from the OECD (Maskus 
and Penubarti, 1995); FDI to 16 countries originating in the United 
States, Germany and Japan (Lee and Mansfield, 1996; Mansfield, 
2000); and transfers from the United State (Smith, 1999). Regard-
ing recipients, Awokuse and Yin (2010) find evidence for transfers to 
China, and Javorcik (2004) for FDI to 24 Eastern European transition 
economies. Branstetter et al. (2006) assessed FDI to 16 middle-income 
countries after those countries strengthened their IP protection and 
found indicators for United States technology transfer increasing sub-
sequently.
The empirical evidence suggests that the effects of IP strength on tech-
nology licensing parallel those for FDI. The Branstetter et  al. (2006) 
results discussed above included royalty payments among the mea-
sures of technology transfer that increased after IP strengthening. 
Smith (2001) finds that the association between strong IP and licenses 
is stronger than the relationship between IP and exports. In general, 
the evidence indicates a systematic impact of IP protection on technol-
ogy transfer through exports, FDI, and technology licensing for middle-
income countries for which the risk of imitation in the absence of such 
protection is relatively high. It is unclear whether or not these effects 
extend to the least developed countries whose absorptive capacity 
and ability to appropriate foreign technology in the absence of strong 
IP protections is less (Hall and Helmers, 2010). It is also important to 
note that IP rules are but one of many factors affecting FDI decisions. 
Others, particularly more general aspects of the legal and institutional 
environment that affect the riskiness of investments, may be more sig-
nificant (Fosfuri, 2004). 
Literature on the role of IP rights in the development of low-carbon 
technologies remains limited (Reichman et  al., 2008). For example, 
Barton (2007) analyzes existing solar, wind, and biofuel technologies, 
and Lewis (2007, 2011) and Pueuo et al. (2011) find that IP protection 
has induced innovation in wind technologies without compromising 
technology transfer. However, problems could arise if new, very broad 
patents were granted that impede the development of future, more 
efficient technologies (though even then, IP rights may provide flex-
ibility). Compulsory licensing has been proposed as a mechanism to 
encourage technology transfer. Such an action would compensate a 
patent holder while overcoming market power inhibitions on voluntary 
licensing (Reichman and Hasenzahl, 2003). Despite short-run technol-
ogy transfer benefits, compulsory licensing of mitigation technologies 
may not be desirable in the long-run, and current international law 
may limit the circumstances under which compulsory licensing can be 
used to achieve climate change mitigation objectives (Fair, 2009; Mai-
tra, 2010).
1037
International Cooperation: Agreements & Instruments
13
Chapter 13
In summary, there is inadequate evidence in the literature regarding 
the impact of IP policy on transfer of GHG-mitigating technologies to 
draw robust conclusions. If the experience from other technology sec-
tors is indicative, maintenance of effective protection of IP may be a 
factor in determining the transfer of mitigation technology to middle-
income countries, although other aspects of the legal and institutional 
environments are likely to be at least as important. There is little empir-
ical evidence that protection of IP rights is a major factor affecting 
technology transfer to the least developed countries.
13�9�3 International collaboration to encourage 
knowledge development
International cooperation on climate change mitigation has been linked 
to technology transfer policy, as transferring knowledge and equip-
ment internationally, and ensuring that technologies are deployed in 
appropriate national contexts, may require additional international 
action (Newell, 2010a). International cooperation on climate-relevant 
technology policy can include efforts to share technological knowl-
edge, collaborate or coordinate R&D, and directly facilitate and finance 
technology transfer.
13�9�3�1 Knowledge sharing, R&D coordination, and joint 
collaboration
International cooperation on knowledge-sharing and R&D coordina-
tion can include information exchange, coordinated or harmonized 
research agendas, measurement and technology standards, and coor-
dinated or cooperative R&D (IEA, 2008; de Coninck et al., 2008; GEA, 
2012). Examples of such existing forms of cooperation include the Car-
bon Sequestration Leadership Forum, the former Asia Pacific Partner-
ship on Clean Development and Climate, the U. S.-China Clean Energy 
Research Center, and the International Partnership for a Hydrogen 
Economy. Empirically, a higher degree of collaboration has been more 
frequently observed in research areas of more fundamental science 
without larger commercial interests (for example, the ITER fusion reac-
tor and the CERN supercollider) (de Coninck et al., 2008). In addition 
to enhancing the cross-border flow of scientific and technical informa-
tion, joint R&D can increase the cost-effectiveness of R&D through 
complementary expertise and reduced duplication of effort (Newell, 
2010a). 
The IEA has coordinated the development of more than 40 Imple-
menting Agreements. Under these agreements, IEA member countries 
may engage either in task-sharing programmes pursued within par-
ticipating countries and funded by individual country contributions, or 
in cost-sharing programmes funded by countries but performed by a 
single contractor. All existing Implementing Agreements incorporate 
some degree of task sharing while about half incorporate cost sharing 
(Newell, 2010a).
13�9�3�2 International cooperation on domestic climate 
technology R&D funding
Public sector investment in energy- and climate-related R&D has 
decreased since the early 1980s, although there has been a relative 
increase in recent years (Newell, 2010a, 2011). Newell (2010a), using 
the precedent of European Union cooperation on setting R&D spending 
goals, has proposed an international agreement that would increase 
domestic R&D funding for climate technologies (either in absolute 
terms, percentage increases from historic levels, or relative to GDP) in 
an analogous fashion to internationally agreed emission targets. Also, 
at a G8 meeting, in the context of a consideration of how to address 
climate change, there was agreement to seek to double public invest-
ment in R&D between 2009 and 2015 (G8, 2009).See Torvanger and 
Meadowcroft (2011) and Fischer et al. (2012) on issues in the design 
and support of climate friendly technologies. International coordina-
tion of R&D portfolios may reduce the duplication of R&D effort, cover 
a broader technological base, and enhance the exchange of informa-
tion gained through national-level R&D processes. This coordination 
could cover the allocation of effort by government scientists and engi-
neers, the targeting of extramural research funding to specific projects, 
and public-private partnerships. Engaging developing economies in 
developing and deploying new technologies may require further tech-
nology development to meet the needs of domestic institutions and 
norms.
Bringing newly developed technologies to full commercialization often 
presents challenges, and for some technologies, such as carbon dioxide 
capture and storage (CCS) (de Coninck et al., 2009), the private sector 
may not have sufficient incentives to commercialize new technologies 
in the absence of international cooperation. Since some of the eco-
nomic risk the private sector faces reflects uncertainty about the incen-
tives that future climate policies would create, governments may have 
a role in financing technology demonstration projects (Newell, 2007). 
The case for such demonstration projects may be stronger in develop-
ing and emerging economies, where incomplete capital markets may 
undermine investment in commercializing these technologies.
13.10 Capacity building
Several articles in the UNFCCC (4.1(i), 4.5, 6 and 9.2(d)) and the Kyoto 
Protocol (Article 10(e)) acknowledge the role of capacity building in 
promoting collective action on climate change. While the texts give 
special attention to building capacity in developing countries, they also 
recognize a general need for all countries to improve policy, planning, 
and education on climate issues. 
A variety of public, private, and NGO initiatives have undertaken 
capacity building efforts both within and outside of the UNFCCC, 
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focusing primarily on three issues: (1) adaptation policy and planning; 
(2) mitigation policy and planning; and (3) measurement, reporting, 
and verification of mitigation actions. Capacity building efforts with 
respect to technology transfer are addressed in Section 13.9. Section 
4.6.1 considers adaptive capacity and mitigative capacity jointly as 
dimensions of ‘response capacity’ and Section 15.10 considers capacity 
building in a national context.
Capacity building for adaptation includes (i) risk management 
approaches to address adverse effects of climate change, (ii) main-
tenance and revision of a database on local coping strategies, and 
(iii)  maintenance and revision of the adaptation practices interface 
(Yohe, 2001; UNFCCC, 2009b). The process of preparing the National 
Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) for and by LDCs identifies 
their most ‘urgent’ adaptation needs. However, capacity building for 
adaptation is likely insufficient because the costs in such regards are 
rarely estimated (Smith et al., 2011; see also WGII, 3.6.4). At the com-
munity level, adaptation projects require time and patience and can be 
successful if they raise awareness, develop and use partnerships, com-
bine reactive and anticipatory approaches, and are in line with local 
culture and context (Engels, 2008; Dumaru, 2010).
Capacity building for mitigation includes technical assistance and 
policy planning support. In CDM, capacity building has focused 
on the establishment of Designated National Authorities (DNAs), 
the training of private and public personnel, and project support 
(Michaelowa, 2005; Winkler et  al., 2007; Okubo and Michaelowa, 
2010). Efforts aimed at capacity building for NAMAs and REDD-plus 
are expected (Bosetti and Rose, 2011). NAMAs are a potentially 
important means of action by developing countries that emerged in 
the negotiations under the Bali Roadmap (UNFCCC, 2007); and have 
been assessed in the literature (Wang-Helmreich, et al., 2011; Upad-
hyaya,, 2012; Tyler et  al., 2013). NAMAs are discussed in detail in 
Section 15.2.
Monitoring and evaluation activities are important to ensure effective 
implementation of a capacity-building framework, helping to under-
stand gaps and needs in capacity building, share best practices, and 
promote resource efficiency (UNFCCC, 2009c). There are few empirical 
assessments of current capacity building approaches in relation to cli-
mate change (Virji et al., 2012).
13.11 Investment and finance
Since AR4, international cooperation on climate policy has increas-
ingly focused on mobilizing public and private investment and 
finance for mitigation and adaptation activities. Such coopera-
tion has included the setup of market mechanisms to generate 
private investment as well as public transfers through dedicated 
institutions (Michaelowa, 2012b). The Copenhagen Accord of 2009 
included a provision to jointly mobilize 100 billion USD per year by 
2020 to address the needs of developing countries, in the context of 
meaningful mitigation actions and transparency of implementation 
(UNFCCC, 2009a). In order to reach this goal, the High-level Advisory 
Group on Climate Change Financing (AGF) (AGF, 2010) identified four 
potential sources of finance: public sources (funds mobilized under 
the UNFCCC), development bank instruments, carbon market finance, 
and private capital. 
In the follow-up to the Copenhagen conference, the term ‘climate 
finance’ has been coined for financial flows to developing countries, 
but there exists no internationally agreed definition (Buchner et  al., 
2011). Stadelmann et al. (2011b) provide a discussion of what could 
be counted and how the baseline for international climate finance 
could be set to provide ‘new and additional’ funds. See Section 16.2.2 
for a description of the potential financing need and Section 16.5 for 
a description of possible public funding sources.
13�11�1 Public finance flows
13�11�1�1 Public funding vehicles under the UNFCCC
The largest share of UNFCCC-organized climate finance goes to miti-
gation: Abadie et al. (2013) provide reasons for this, such as the dif-
ferences between mitigation and adaptation regarding public good 
characteristics and the lack of information regarding context-specific 
climate impacts. The UNFCCC mobilizes financial flows to developing 
countries and countries in transition through four primary vehicles: (1) 
the GEF, which focuses on mitigation (GEF, 2011); (2) the LDCF and 
SCCF, which focus on adaptation; (3) the Adaptation Fund, which also 
focuses on adaptation; and (4) the GCF, which will focus on both miti-
gation and adaptation when it becomes operational. The GEF is the 
secretariat for all funds other than the GCF. This section reviews the 
literature on these four mechanisms (see also Section 16.5; UNFCCC, 
2012a).
The Adaptation Fund is financed through a 2 % in-kind levy on emis-
sions credits generated by CDM projects, though parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol have contributed additional funding (Liverman and Billett, 
2010; Horstmann, 2011; Ratajczak-Juszko, 2012). All other UNFCCC 
funding vehicles are based on voluntary government contributions 
that can be counted as official development assistance. Ayers and 
Huq (2009) maintain that the Adaptation Fund’s governance struc-
ture avoids many of the issues of ownership and accountability faced 
by other funds. Harmeling and Kaloga (2011) examine the influence 
of competing interests on funding decisions by the Adaptation Fund 
Board. Under the Fund, Multilateral Implementing Entities (MIEs) have 
had the most success in securing funding, followed by National Imple-
menting Entities (NIEs), but none by Regional Implementing Entities 
(RIEs). This disparity has led to calls for transparency in project assess-
ment (Harmeling and Kaloga, 2011). Grasso and Sacchi (2011) discuss 
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issues of justice in Adaptation Fund financing decisions to date. Further 
research into the distribution of adaptation finance across countries, 
sectors, and communities is required to assess the equity, efficiency, 
effectiveness, and environmental impacts of the operation of the Adap-
tation Fund (Persson, 2011).
The Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC has decision-making 
power regarding the representation of country groups on the govern-
ing boards of the UNFCCC’s funding vehicles, voting rules, the choice of 
secretariat and the choice of trustee (e. g., who oversees the finances 
and ensures funds go where they are supposed to go). Due to its com-
plex structure, the GEF faces challenges coordinating with UNFCCC 
decisions (COWI and IIED, 2009; Ayers and Huq, 2009). Recipient coun-
tries have a majority on the board of the Adaptation Fund, while the 
decision-making bodies for the other UNFCCC financing institutions 
have equal representation for developing and industrialized countries. 
The Adaptation Fund has allowed the possibility of ‘direct access’ by 
host country institutions, which has been used sparingly to date (Rata-
jczak-Juszko, 2012). The GEF is also starting to experiment with this 
approach (GEF, 2011).
Funding per country eligible under the Adaptation Fund is limited to 10 
million USD, essentially leading to a situation where each country gets 
financing for a single project. Stadelmann et al. (2013) show that this 
does not lead to projects ranking high on equity and efficiency criteria. 
The GEF operates funding floors and caps for each country (currently 2 
million USD and 11 % of the total volume available, respectively) (GEF, 
2010). Between these thresholds, a complex allocation formula is used 
whose variables consist of GDP, project portfolio performance, country 
environmental policy and institutional performance, GHG-emissions 
level, development of carbon intensity, forestry emissions, and changes 
in deforestation.
A step change with regards to the international coordination of pub-
lic finance flows was the collective commitment by industrialized 
countries in the Copenhagen Accord of 2009 to provide resources 
approaching 30 billion USD as ‘Fast Start Finance’ (FSF) during the 
period 2010 – 2012 for mitigation and adaptation in developing coun-
tries (UNFCCC, 2009a). Fast Start Finance was to provide ‘new and 
additional’ resources, flowing through existing multilateral, regional, 
and bilateral channels. Although few countries disclose details of their 
FSF, studies show that FSF ranges from small grants to large loans 
for infrastructure development (Fransen et  al., 2012; Nakhooda and 
Fransen, 2012; Kuramochi et al., 2012). While the FSF commitment for 
2010 – 2012 has been exceeded, transparency regarding allocation cri-
teria and actual disbursement is low (Ciplet et al., 2013). Official devel-
opment assistance (ODA) made up a large share of total funding (Ball-
esteros et al., 2010) and several studies argue that the use of ODA as 
a substitute for new climate finance mechanisms could divert funding 
away from other important imperatives (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 
2007; Ayers and Huq, 2009; Gupta and van der Grijp, 2010). See also 
Section 16.2.1.1.
13�11�1�2 Multilateral development banks
Multilateral development banks (MDBs) have played a significant role 
in mobilizing, coordinating, and overseeing the growth of climate-
related financial flows. The World Bank provides services as trustee or 
interim trustee for all the UNFCCC-related funds noted above. A group 
of MDBs manages and governs the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs), 
which were set up in 2008, are not supervised by the UNFCCC, and are 
financed through voluntary government contributions. The Clean Tech-
nology Fund supports investments in low-carbon technologies, and the 
Strategic Climate Fund is an umbrella for improving resilience against 
climate change, reducing deforestation and renewable energy support 
for low-income countries. 
Tirpak and Adams (2008) see increases in MDBs’ funding and shifts to 
low-GHG technologies being fragile owing to variability and low lev-
els of funding. Bowen (2011) proposes expansion of the capital base 
of multilateral financial institutions in order to increase concessional 
financing (finance made available at lower than market costs) of miti-
gation and adaptation activities.
Over the last two decades, recipients have gained more decision-
making power in the institutions under the UNFCCC, while multi-
lateral financial institutions have not followed this trend. Financing 
is typically not given directly to the project recipients but provided 
through implementing agencies, mostly multilateral financial institu-
tions or UN agencies that fulfil predefined fiduciary standards. Direct 
access, as implemented by the Adaptation Fund, is seen by some as 
the most appropriate model for climate finance (UNDP, 2011). How-
ever, peer-reviewed literature comparing the effectiveness of the 
two approaches is lacking. At the same time, national development 
banks (e. g., China Development Bank, Brazilian Development Bank 
(BNDES)), Bilateral Finance Institutions, and a planned multilateral 
fund of the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) coun-
tries have also provided or may provide substantial funding (Höhne 
et al., 2012a; Robles, 2012)
13�11�2 Mobilizing private investment and 
financial flows
Another emerging focus of international climate cooperation is on 
mobilizing private investment to finance mitigation and adaptation. 
As discussed in Sections 13.4.1.4 and 13.13.1.1, carbon credits from 
market mechanisms generate revenues for private sector players, thus 
leveraging potentially large investments in mitigation. Such leverage 
is seen as important by Urpelainen (2012), who presents a game-
theoretical model where capacity building leverages private mitiga-
tion investment. A number of international initiatives have supported 
capacity building for market mechanisms (Okubo and Michaelowa, 
2010). Also, the multilateral financing institutions discussed in Sec-
tion 13.11.1 will ‘leverage’ private finance to complement their public 
funding.
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The potential for leveraging to lead to double- and multiple-counting 
has led to suggestions that internationally agreed methodologies to 
account for leveraging are needed (Clapp et al., 2012), which would 
be of help in consistent reporting of finance against the goal agreed 
under the UNFCCC. Stadelmann et al. (2011a) find that the leverage 
factors, that is the ratio between mobilized private funding and mobi-
lized public finance, for the Climate Technology Fund under the CIFs 
and the GEF reach self-reported levels of 8.4 and 6.2, respectively. 
However, an analysis of over 200 CDM and close to 400 GEF projects, 
Stadelmann et al. (2011a) find a leverage ratio of just 3.0 – 4.5. More-
over, high-leverage factors may mean that the underlying project is not 
additional, i. e., not contributing to mitigation. Finally, instead of lever-
aging in the private sector through capacity building, the World Bank 
engagement in the Kyoto mechanisms has at least partially crowded 
out private sector activities, as shown empirically by Michaelowa and 
Michaelowa (2011).
Besides market mechanisms, other instruments such as grants, loans 
at concessional rates, provision of equity through financial institutions, 
or guarantees can mobilize private funds. This can happen directly on 
the company level or be channelled through national governments 
(Neuhoff et  al., 2010). While they can be implemented on any level 
of aggregation, the level of incentive provided could be coordinated 
internationally, e. g., by basing it on a previously agreed ‘social cost of 
carbon’ (Hourcade et al., 2012). The success of the Multilateral Invest-
ment Guarantee Agency shows that costs of guarantees are likely to be 
low if multilateral and bilateral financial institutions with strong finan-
cial ratings provide them (Brown et al., 2011; Buchner et al., 2011).
13.12 The role of public and 
private sectors and public-
private partnerships
International responses to climate change ultimately depend on pri-
vate sector action. Large multinational corporations produce about 
half of the global world product and global GHG emissions (Morgera, 
2004). Hence, private companies will need to generate investment and 
innovation necessary to pursue a low-carbon economy (Forsyth, 2005). 
Given that damages from climate change are a (negative) externality, 
a gap remains between the need for GHG reduction and the commit-
ments of the largest international companies (Knox-Hayes and Levy, 
2011). While some business sectors may have an interest advancing 
policy to mitigate climate change (Pulver, 2007; Falkner, 2008; Pinkse 
and Kolk, 2009; Meckling, 2011), in practice the public sector typically 
guides, supports, and motivates private sectors to contribute to a low-
carbon economy. These types of public sector interactions with the 
private sector can operate through government regulations (whether 
market-based or conventional), but may also be facilitated through 
public-private partnerships, the focus of this section.
13�12�1 Public-private partnerships
One channel for such guidance is through public-private partnerships 
focused on climate change, which have multiplied and grown in recent 
years (Bäckstrand, 2008; Pattberg, 2010; Andonova, 2010; Kolk et al., 
2010). Public-private partnerships involve governments, businesses, 
and sometimes NGOs. Examples include the Renewable Energy and 
Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP) (Parthan et al., 2010); the Meth-
ane to Markets initiative (now renamed the Global Methane Initia-
tive) (de Coninck et al., 2008); the former Asia Pacific Partnership on 
Climate and Energy (which was largely organized through sector-spe-
cific partnerships) (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and van Asselt, 2009; McGee 
and Taplin, 2009; Okazaki and Yamaguchi, 2011); the Global Superior 
Energy Performance Partnership (taking sector-specific activities from 
the regional scale to the global scale) (Fujiwara, 2012; Okazaki et al., 
2012; see also Section 14.3.3); the CDM (where some projects can 
take the character of public-private partnerships) (Streck, 2004; Green, 
2008; Newell, 2009); the World Bank Prototype Carbon Fund (Lecocq, 
2003; Andonova, 2010); the UN Fund for International Partnerships 
(39 % of whose environmental partnerships are in energy- or climate 
change-related projects) (Andonova, 2010); the UN Global Compact’s 
‘Caring for Climate’ initiative (Abbott, 2011); the Green Power Mar-
ket Development Group (Andonova, 2009); and the Munich Climate 
Insurance Initiative (Pinkse and Kolk, 2011). These partnerships can 
facilitate development and commercial deployment of low-carbon 
technologies as governments remove barriers to the entry and pro-
vide stakeholders with new business frameworks. Industries also dem-
onstrate leadership through active involvement with regards to their 
technologies, investments, and know-how (IEA, 2010).
Some international public-private partnerships concentrate on the 
development of specific technologies. Others focus on rural renew-
able energy or low-carbon energy development in general. Others 
center their attention on carbon market development. Few focus 
on adaptation, although the insurance sector is involved in such 
initiatives (Pinkse and Kolk, 2011). Effective partnerships are insti-
tutionalized with representatives of major stakeholders, a perma-
nent secretariat, resources and a dedicated mission (Pattberg et al., 
2012). Company willingness to engage in adaptation depends on 
their capacity, their past exposure to disasters, and the link between 
their business planning horizons and climate impact uncertainty 
(Agrawala et  al., 2011). Some also need to ensure that they are 
able to adapt to changing climatic circumstances (Linnenluecke and 
Griffiths, 2010; Vine, 2012).
13�12�2 Private sector-led governance initiatives
Private sector actors have also engaged in direct attempts to govern 
aspects of climate change transnationally. First, some institutional 
investors now ask companies to report on their GHG emissions, strate-
gies to reduce them, and more broadly on climate risk exposures (Kolk 
et al., 2008; Newell and Paterson, 2010; Harmes, 2011; MacLeod and 
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Park, 2011). The most important example of this is the Carbon Disclo-
sure Project, whose signatories controlled 70 trillion USD in assets in 
2011 (Carbon Disclosure Project, 2011). The private sector is playing a 
role in developing systems for carbon accounting (Lovell and MacKen-
zie, 2011).
Second, like NGOs (see Section 13.5.2), private-sector actors have 
developed initiatives to govern voluntary carbon markets, either 
through certification standards for offset markets or by developing 
trading exchanges, registries, and protocols for reporting GHGs (Green, 
2010, 2013; Hoffmann, 2011). Many of the certification schemes 
are either developed by private-sector actors (such as the Voluntary 
Carbon Standard, developed by the International Emissions Trading 
Association, the Climate Group, and the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development) or by such actors in collaboration with envi-
ronmental NGOs (such as the Social Carbon standard). 
13�12�3 Motivations for public-private sector 
collaboration and private sector 
governance
For private sector actors, partnerships with governments or NGOs on 
climate may create direct economic benefits through financial support, 
learning opportunities, risk sharing, or market access (Pinkse, 2007; 
Perusse et  al., 2009). Since direct regulation of firms at the interna-
tional level is unavailable, states have incentives to pursue partner-
ships to affect transnational private sector activities. International 
organizations pursue partnerships for similar reasons (Andonova, 
2010). Partnerships or private governance may create club goods for 
participants (Andonova, 2009). Sometimes, firms are motivated more 
by concerns for public relations (Pinkse and Kolk, 2009). Private sec-
tor finance can be stimulated by a five-step approach: strategic goal 
setting and policy alignment, an enabling process and incentives for 
low-carbon and climate-resilient (LCR) investment, financial policies 
and instruments, harnessing resources and building capacity for a LCR 
economy, and promoting green business and consumer behaviour 
(Corfee-Morlot et al., 2012).
13.13 Performance assessment 
on policies and 
institutions including 
market mechanisms
This section surveys and synthesizes quantitative and qualitative 
assessments of existing and proposed forms of international coop-
eration to address climate change mitigation that have appeared in 
the literature since AR4. Adaptation is not treated here, as there have 
been few international cooperative initiatives focused on adaptation, 
although these are now starting to emerge (Section 13.5.1.1).
Existing cooperation is considered in Section 13.13.1 with reference 
to the UNFCCC, its Kyoto Protocol, the CDM, agreements under the 
UNFCCC pertaining to the post-2012 period, and agreements and 
other forms of international cooperation outside of the UNFCCC. Sec-
tion 13.13.2 considers the literature that assesses various proposed 
forms of future international cooperation described in Section 13.4.3. 
Throughout, we synthesize assessments in terms of the four criteria 
discussed in Section 13.2: environmental effectiveness, aggregate eco-
nomic performance, distributional impacts, and institutional feasibility. 
Table 13.3 summarizes the key findings of this section’s performance 
assessment.
In applying the evaluation criteria to evaluate existing and proposed 
forms of international cooperation, five general caveats apply. First, 
an ex-ante evaluation of a policy may overestimate the costs and / or 
the benefits of that policy for several reasons, such as overestimating 
the extent of its implementation (Harrington et al., 2000; Harrington, 
2006), failing to account for over-reporting by regulated parties (Bai-
ley et al., 2002), and underestimating learning related to technologi-
cal development (Norman et al, 2008). Second, ex-ante evaluation may 
over- or under-estimate the effectiveness of proposed cooperation, 
because interactions between proposed policies and other existing 
policies may be difficult to predict. These interactions can be coun-
terproductive, inconsequential, or beneficial (Fankhauser et al., 2010; 
Goulder and Stavins, 2011; Levinson, 2012). Third, while evaluation 
of proposed policies can be informed by lessons learned from regime 
complexes in other contexts (see Section 13.5), such lessons may come 
with extrapolation bias, since it may not be appropriate to generalize 
to climate change findings from other contexts. Fourth, in comparing 
existing policies using these criteria, it can be helpful to keep in mind 
that as institutions evolve, the performance of particular policies may 
also change. Fifth and finally, the overall performance of the inter-
national regime depends also on national and regional policies (see 
Chapters 14 and 15, in particular Sections 14.4.2 and 15.5). 
13�13�1 Performance assessment of existing 
cooperation
13�13�1�1 Assessment of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, 
and its flexible mechanisms
The UNFCCC established a framework and a set of principles and goals 
for the international response to climate change. Under Article 2, the 
parties agreed to the objective of “prevent[ing] dangerous anthropo-
genic interference with the climate system,” an objective which was 
not quantified and was subject to several caveats. Under Article 4(2)
(a), the Annex I parties committed to adopt measures (which could be 
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Table 13�3 | Summary of performance assessments of existing cooperation of proposed cooperation on climate change.











UNFCCC Aggregate GHG emissions in 
Annex I countries declined by 
6.0 to 9.2 % below 1990 levels 
by 2000, a larger reduction 
than the apparent ‘aim’ of 
returning to 1990 levels by 
2000.
Authorized joint fulfilment 
of commitments, multi-gas 
approach, sources and sinks, 
and domestic policy choice. 
Cost and benefit estimates 
depend on baseline, discount 
rate, participation, leakage, co-
benefits, adverse side-effects, 
and other factors.
Commitments distinguish 
between Annex I (developed) 
and non-Annex I countries. 
Principle of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibility.’ 
Commitment to ‘equitable and 
appropriate contributions by 
each [party].’
Ratified (or equivalent) by 195 
countries and regional organi-
zations. Compliance depends 
on national communications.
The Kyoto Protocol (KP) Aggregate GHG emissions in 
Annex I countries were reduced 
by 8.5 to 13.6 % below 1990 
levels by 2011, more than the 
first commitment period (CP1) 
collective reduction target of 
5.2 %. Reductions occurred 
mainly in EITs; emissions 
increased in some others. 
Incomplete participation in CP1 
(even lower in CP2).
Cost-effectiveness improved 
by flexible mechanisms (Joint 
Implementation (JI), CDM, 
International Emissions 
Trading (IET)) and domestic 
policy choice. Cost and benefit 
estimates depend on baseline, 
discount rate, participation, 
leakage, co-benefits, adverse 
side-effects, and other factors.
Commitments distinguish 
between developed and devel-
oping countries, but dichoto-
mous distinction correlates 
only partly (and decreasingly) 
with historical emissions trends 
and with changing economic 
circumstances. Intertemporal 
equity affected by short-term 
actions.
Ratified (or equivalent) by 
192 countries and regional 
organizations, but took 7 
years to enter into force. 
Compliance depends on 
national communications, plus 
KP compliance system. Later 
added approaches to enhance 
measurement, reporting, and 
verification (MRV).
The Kyoto Mechanisms About 1.4 billion tCO2eq credits 
under the CDM, 0.8 billion 
under JI, and 0.2 billion under 
IET (through October 2013). 
Additionality of CDM projects 
remains an issue but regulatory 
reform underway.
CDM mobilized low-cost 
options, particularly industrial 
gases, reducing costs. Under-
performance of some project 
types. Some evidence that 
technology is transferred to 
non-Annex I countries.
Limited direct investment from 
Annex I countries. Domestic 
investment dominates, leading 
to concentration of CDM 
projects in few countries. 
Limited contributions to local 
sustainable development.
Helped enable political 
feasibility of Kyoto Protocol. 
Has multi-layered governance. 
Largest carbon markets to date. 
Has built institutional capacity 
in developing countries.
Further Agreements under the 
UNFCCC
Pledges to limit GHG emissions 
made by all major emitters 
under Cancún Agreements. 
Unlikely sufficient to limit 
temperature change to 2°C 
cost-effectively. Depends on 
treatment of measures beyond 
current pledges for mitigation 
and finance. Durban Platform 
calls for new agreement by 
2015, to take effect in 2020, 
engaging all parties.
Efficiency not assessed. 
Cost-effectiveness might be 
improved by market-based 
policy instruments, inclusion of 
forestry sector, commitments 
by more nations than Annex I 
countries (as envisioned in 
Durban Platform).
Depends on sources of financ-
ing, particularly for actions of 
developing countries.
Cancún Conference of the 
Parties (COP) decision; 97 
countries made pledges of 











G8 and MEF have recom-
mended GHG emissions 
reductions by all major emitters. 
G20 may spur GHG emissions 
reductions by phasing out of 
fossil fuel subsidies.
Action by all major emitters 
may reduce leakage and 
improve cost-effectiveness, 
if implemented using flex-
ible mechanisms. Potential 
efficiency gains through 
subsidy removal. Too early to 
assess economic performance 
empirically.
Has not mobilized climate 
finance. Removing fuel 
subsidies would be progressive 
but have negative effects on 
oil-exporting countries and on 
those with very low incomes 
unless other help for the poor-
est is provided.
Lower participation of countries 
than UNFCCC, yet covers 70 % 
of global emissions. Opens 
possibility for forum-shopping, 







Spurred GHG emissions reduc-
tions through ODS phaseouts 
approximately 5 times the mag-
nitude of Kyoto CP1 targets. 
Contribution may be negated 
by high-GWP substitutes, 
though efforts to phase out 
HFCs are growing.
Cost-effectiveness supported 
by multi-gas approach. Some 
countries used market-based 
mechanisms to implement 
domestically.
Later compliance period for 
phaseouts by developing coun-
tries. Montreal Protocol Fund 
provided finance to developing 
countries.
Universal participation. but the 
timing of required actions vary 





Covers 0.13 billion tCO2eq, but 
certification remains an issue.
Credit prices are heteroge-
neous, indicating market 
inefficiencies.
[No literature cited.] Fragmented and non-transpar-
ent market.
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implemented jointly) to limit net emissions (covering both sources and 
sinks of all GHGs not controlled by the Montreal Protocol), “recogniz-
ing that the return by the end of the present decade [the year 2000] 
to earlier levels” would contribute to modifying long-term trends con-
sistent with the treaty’s objective. Under Article 4(2)(b), Annex I parties 
committed to periodically communicate information on their emissions, 
“with the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels.” 
According to UN data, aggregate GHG emissions in Annex  I coun-
tries declined by 9.2 % from 1990 – 2000 (if land use and forestry are 
included; or by 6.0 % if they are not; the base year for some coun-
tries is in the mid- or late 1980s) (UNFCCC, 2013c, Profile for Annex I 
Parties). This is a larger reduction than the apparent two-step ‘aim’ 
implied in Article 4(2)(a) and (b) of the UNFCCC to return emissions 
to 1990 levels by the year 2000. Much of this reduction, however, 
was due to factors other than measures adopted under the UNFCCC, 
such as the economic downturn in Annex I ‘economies in transition’ 
(EITs) — Russia, former Soviet Republics, and Eastern Europe — during 
the 1990s.
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol adopted the first binding, quantitative miti-
gation commitments for developed countries. The 38 countries listed 
in its Annex B (industrialized countries, EITs, and the European Union 
separately from its member states) made aggregate commitments to 
collectively reduce their GHG emissions by 4.2 % relative to 1990 lev-
els (5.2 % relative to the country-specific base years used for establish-
ing national committments) by the Protocol’s first commitment period, 
2008 – 2012 (UNFCCC, 1998, 2012b). Other parties to the Kyoto Proto-
col are not constrained (but can participate in other ways; in particular, 
see discussion of CDM in Section 13.13.1.2). The Protocol also con-
tained a number of new mechanisms, including IET, JI, and the CDM, 
that aimed to help reduce GHG emissions cost-effectively. 
The aggregate emissions by Annex  I countries have been reduced 
below the Kyoto Protocol’s collective 5.2 % reduction target, but, as 
with the UNFCCC, much of the reduction was due to factors other than 
Kyoto Protocol. (The list of countries in the Protocol’s Annex B is nearly 
identical to the list of countries in the Convention’s Annex I during the 
historical periods referenced in this section, and the difference in aggre-
gate emissions between the two does not affect the analysis here.) 
According to UNFCCC GHG inventories, aggregate GHG emissions 
from all Annex  I countries were reduced by 13.6 % from 1990 – 2011 
(if land use and forestry-sector changes are taken into account, and 
8.5 % if they are not). Not counting the United States — because it was 
not a party to the Kyoto Protocol — the reduction from 1990 – 2011 in 
the remaining Annex  I aggregate GHG emissions was 22.9 % if land 
use and forestry sectors changes are taken into account and 16.6 % if 
they are not. Not counting the EITs, the remaining Annex I countries’ 
aggregate GHG emissions increased by 2.1 % and 3.2 % from 1990 to 
2011 (with and without land use and forestry, respectively) (UNFCCC, 
2012b).
Although emissions have decreased among Annex B parties, the envi-
ronmental effectiveness of the Protocol’s first commitment period has 
been less than it could have been, for several reasons. First, not all 
Annex B parties have participated. The United States, until recently 
the country with the largest share of global emissions (Gregg et al., 
2008), did not ratify the Protocol (see also Section 13.3.1). Therefore, 
its target emissions reduction of 7 %, which would have amounted 
to over 40 % of the difference in total Annex B committed emissions 
commitments and base year emissions levels (UNFCCC, 2012b), 
was not binding. In addition, Canada withdrew from the Protocol in 
December 2011 (effective December 2012). Russia, Japan, and New 
Zealand opted not to participate in the second commitment period 
(2013 – 2020).















Tradeoff between ambition 
(deep) and participation 
(broad).
More cost-effective with 




impacts into negotiations and 
may apply equity-based criteria 
as outlined in Ch. 4





Depends on net aggregate 
change in ambition across 
countries resulting from 
harmonization.
More cost-effective with 
greater reliance on market 
mechanisms.
Depends on specific national 
policies.
Depends on similarity of 
national policies; more similar 
may support harmonization but 







Effectiveness depends on 
quality of standards and credits 
across countries.
Often (though not necessarily) 
refers to linkage of national 
cap-and-trade systems, in 
which case cost-effective.
Depends on specific national 
policies.
Depends on similarity of 
national policies. National 
enforcement.
Effort (burden) sharing 
arrangements
Refer to Sections 4.6.2 for discussion of the principles on which effort (burden) sharing arrangements may be based, and Section 6.3.6.6 
for quantitative evaluation.
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Second, the Annex B EITs were credited for emissions reductions that 
would have occurred without the Protocol due to their significant 
economic contraction during the 1990s. These loose targets may 
have been necessary to engage them as parties (Stewart and Wie-
ner, 2003). In principle, these countries were allowed to sell resultant 
surplus emissions-reduction credits to other Annex B parties, which 
might have further reduced environmental effectiveness. However, 
in practice, other parties bought few AAUs relative to the stock 
available from EITs during the first commitment period (perhaps 
because the United States decision not to ratify reduced demand 
for such allowances), and thus environmental effectiveness was 
not affected as much as it could have been (Brandt and Svendsen, 
2002; Böhringer, 2003; IPCC, 2007, p.  778; Crowley, 2007; Aldrich 
and Koerner, 2012). 
Current model projections imply that emission reductions achieved by 
Annex B parties during the first and second commitment periods of 
the Kyoto Protocol are not likely to be sufficient to achieve environ-
mental performance that limits global average temperature increases 
to 2 °C above pre-industrial levels (Rogelj et al., 2011; Höhne et al., 
2012b) (see also Section 6.4 for a discussion of scenarios that relate 
short-term environmental performance to long-term GHG stabiliza-
tion and tempterature change goals). A key reason is that, since 1990, 
the Annex B countries’ share of global GHG emissions has declined 
significantly, from approximately 56 % of global emissions in 1990 
to approximately 39 % in 2010. Simultaneously, overall global GHG 
emissions have risen significantly; global emissions in 2010 were 
approximately 31 % higher than in 1990 (JRC / PBL, 2013) (see Section 
5.2). 
The criterion of economic performance encompasses both efficiency 
and cost-effectiveness (see Sections 3.7.1 and 13.2.) Assessments of 
the efficiency of the Kyoto Protocol depend on respective estimates 
of the costs and benefits of mitigation and assumptions regarding 
the appropriate discount rate (see Sections 2.4.3.2 and 3.6.2 on dis-
counting). Contrasting assumptions regarding these values are the key 
determinants in explaining the differences between assessments that 
have found the Protocol inefficient (e. g., Nordhaus, 2007), and those 
that find it cost-effective, but insufficient (e. g., Stern, 2007; Weitzman, 
2007). These latter researchers also tend to emphasize the non-zero 
probability of catastrophic climate outcomes. The Kyoto Protocol also 
fostered monitoring and reporting of emissions, and capacity build-
ing in developing countries, which may facilitate further cost-effective 
action in the future (Hare et al., 2010).
With respect to cost-effectiveness, the Kyoto Protocol’s three market-
based instruments (the CDM, JI, and IET) intended to lower the cost 
of the global regime (see Section 13.4.2.3 for a description of these 
mechanisms). Most research on the Kyoto mechanisms has focused on 
the CDM, primarily because transaction volumes of CDM credits have 
been so much greater than JI credits or AAUs. Performance assessment 
of the CDM is discussed separately in Section 13.13.1.2.
International Emissions Trading could, in theory, reduce abate-
ment costs by as much as 50 % if trades took place among Annex 
B countries (Blanford et al., 2010; Bosetti et al., 2010; Jacoby et al., 
2010). However, in practice, trading under this mechanism has been 
limited, partly due to the surplus problem discussed above (Aldrich 
and Koerner, 2012) and the absence of the United States. As of July 
2013, 0.2 billion tCO2eq have been traded through IET (Point Carbon, 
2013). The few trades that were made generally required reinvest-
ment of the revenues into projects that reduce GHG emissions, under 
so-called ‘Green Investment Schemes.’ The economic performance of 
IET also depends on what type of actor is doing the trading. Early 
expectations were that the main traders would be states (national 
governments), and that states would not operate as efficient trad-
ers, because they are not cost-minimizers (e. g., Hahn and Stavins, 
1999). In practice, increasing shares of trades have been made by 
private sector firms, which may increase cost-effectiveness (Aldrich 
and Koerner, 2012). 
Joint Implementation also has the potential to improve the cost-effec-
tiveness of Annex B countries’ activities under the Protocol (Böhringer, 
2003; Vlachou and Konstantinidis, 2010). A large majority of JI projects 
have been in the transition economies, especially Russia and Ukraine, 
given the low cost of emissions reductions there relative to other 
Annex B countries (Korppoo and Moe, 2008). From 2008 through July 
2013, JI had led to the issuance of over 0.8 billion emission reduction 
unit (ERU) credits (UNFCCC, 2013d), each equivalent to one tCO2eq of 
reported emission abatement. Over half of this volume was issued by 
Ukraine and Russia, especially in 2012 in response to the limitation 
on carrying over surplus AAUs to the second commitment period. The 
actual distribution of JI projects is not consistent with the theoretical 
potential, as some countries, such as Ukraine, proactively supported JI, 
while in others, including Russia, JI lacked political support, and effi-
cient frameworks took several years to establish. In Western Europe, 
a number of companies in the chemical industry generated emission 
credits for their own use in the EU ETS, demonstrating the cost-reduc-
tion potential (Shishlov et  al., 2012). Countries without a surplus of 
emission units usually applied strict rules to capture part of the emis-
sion reductions achieved by JI projects (Michaelowa and O’brien, 2006; 
Shishlov et al., 2012).
In addition to the three Kyoto flexibility mechanisms, the Protocol 
provides flexibility with regard to how Annex B parties may achieve 
their targets; they may employ domestic or regional policies of their 
own choice. One result has been the development of domestic emis-
sions trading programmes in several countries and regions (Paterson 
et  al., 2014). Regional and national emissions trading programmes 
include those in the EU (the EU ETS), Australia, and New Zealand, 
as well as subnational trading programmes in the United States 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and California / WCI) 
and in China (seven regional pilot programmes launched in 2013). 
See Figure 13.4 above and Sections 14.4.2 and 15.5; (Convery and 
Redmond, 2007; Ellerman and Buchner, 2007; Ellerman and Joskow, 
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2008; Ellerman, 2010; Ellerman et  al., 2010; Olmstead and Stavins, 
2012; Newell et al., 2013).
Distributional impacts of the Kyoto Protocol have been examined 
both cross-sectionally (mainly geographically) and temporally. Income 
patterns and trends as well as distribution of GHG emissions have 
changed significantly since the 1990s, when the UNFCCC and Kyoto 
Protocol listed Annex  I / Annex B countries; some countries outside 
these lists have become wealthier and larger emitters than some 
countries on these lists (U. S. Department of Energy, 2012; WRI, 2012; 
Aldy and Stavins, 2012). For example, in 1990, China’s total CO2 emis-
sions were about half of United States emissions, but by 2010, China 
emitted more than 50 % more CO2 than the United States. Over this 
same time period, China’s per capita CO2 emissions experienced an 
almost three-fold increase, rising to nearly equal the level in the EU, 
but still about 36 % of the United States level (IEA, 2012; PBL, 2012, 
see Annex II.9; Olivier et al., 2012; JRC / PBL, 2013). Non-Annex I coun-
tries as a group have a share in the cumulative global greenhouse 
emissions for the period 1850 to 2010 close to 50 %, a share that is 
increasing (den Elzen et al., 2013b) (see Section 5.2.1 for more detail 
on historical emissions).
Meanwhile, income inequality and variations in capacity remain sub-
stantial both within and across countries. While GDP per capita in 
some non-Annex I countries has increased and some have joined the 
OECD, incomes of G8 countries remain higher than those of major 
emerging economies such as the BASIC countries (World Bank, 2013). 
Poverty is much more extensive and income at lower absolute levels 
in the latter, compared to the former (Milanovic, 2012). Inequality in 
income remains related to inequalities in emissions (Padilla and Ser-
rano, 2006; Chakravarty et al., 2009). 
More broadly, although the Kyoto Protocol’s quantitative mitigation 
requirements are limited to Annex B countries, the economic impacts of 
these requirements may spill over to non-Annex B countries (Böhringer 
and Rutherford, 2004). In terms of intertemporal distributional equity, 
some have noted that climate change mitigation that requires emis-
sions reductions in the short term for uncertain long-term benefits, 
also involves inter-generational distributional impacts (Schelling, 1997; 
Leach, 2009).
Among Annex B countries, the Kyoto Protocol’s emissions-target allo-
cation is generally progressive, one common measure of distributional 
equity, exhibiting positive correlation between gross domestic prod-
uct per capita and the degree of targeted emissions reduction below 
business-as-usual levels. For a 10 % increase in per capita GDP, Annex 
B countries’ emissions reduction targets are, on average, about 1.4 % 
more stringent (Frankel, 1999, 2005).
In terms of institutional feasibility, it is notable that the Kyoto Proto-
col has been ratified (or the equivalent) by 191 countries (plus the EU 
separately) (Falkner et al., 2010). As noted above, participation among 
Annex I countries in emissions-reduction commitments dropped signif-
icantly from the first (2008 – 2012) to the second (2013 – 2020) commit-
ment periods, though the stringency of the emission-reduction com-
mitments of those countries still participating increased for the second 
period. More broadly, the high rate of ratification is likely due in part 
to the lack of emissions-reduction commitments asked of non-Annex B 
countries (Lutter, 2000).
Allowing Annex B countries the flexibility to choose policies to meet 
their national emissions commitments may have contributed to insti-
tutional feasibility. However, compromises made during the negotia-
tion of the Protocol that enabled its institutional and political viability 
may have reduced its environmental effectiveness (Victor, 2004; Helm, 
2010; Falkner et al., 2010). This serves as an example of the tradeoff 
across ambition, participation, and compliance discussed in Section 
13.2.2.5.
Additionally, obstacles for enforcement have hurt the Protocol’s insti-
tutional feasibility. Despite the Kyoto Protocol’s compliance system 
(Oberthür and Ott, 1999; Hare et  al., 2010; Brunnée et  al., 2012), it 
is difficult in practice to enforce the Kyoto Protocol’s targets because 
of the lack of a legal authority with enforcement powers, and the 
weakness of possible sanctions relative to the costs of compliance. 
This is, of course, true of most international agreements (van Kooten, 
2003; Böhringer, 2003; Barrett, 2008b) (see also Sections 13.3.2 and 
13.4.2.1.).
13�13�1�2 Assessment of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean 
Development Mechanism
The CDM aims to reduce mitigation costs for Annex B countries and 
contribute to sustainable development in non-Annex B countries 
(UNFCCC, 1998) (Article 12). This mechanism led to the issuance of 
nearly 1.4 billion emission credits from over 7300 registered projects 
by October 2013 (see Section 13.7.2; UNFCCC, 2014). This performance 
was surprising, given that the CDM suffered from many disadvantages 
relative to the other flexibility mechanisms (Woerdman, 2000).
The environmental effectiveness of the CDM depends on three key 
factors: whether a credited project actually reduces more emissions 
than would have been reduced in its absence (which may depend 
on whether the project developers are indeed motivated primarily by 
expected revenue from the sale of the emission credits) (‘additional-
ity’); the validity of the baseline from which emission reductions are 
calculated; and indirect emissions impacts (‘leakage’) caused by the 
projects. 
The issue of additionality (IPCC, 2007, pp. 779 – 780) continues to gen-
erate controversy, despite an increasing elaboration of additionality 
tests by CDM regulators (Michaelowa et al., 2009). On the one hand, 
(Schneider, 2009) found that key assumptions regarding additionality 
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were often not substantiated with credible, documented evidence, in 
a sample of 93 projects. On the other hand, (Lewis, 2010) finds a clear 
contribution of the CDM to the rapid upswing of the renewable energy 
sector in China.
Clean Development Mechanism projects in energy efficiency, trans-
port and buildings have faced challenges in baseline determination, 
monitoring, and transaction costs (Sirohi and Michaelowa, 2008; 
Michaelowa et  al., 2009; Millard-Ball and Ortolano, 2010). Kollmuss 
et al. (2010) suggest that it may be possible to prevent baseline gam-
ing through a clear regulatory framework. Heeding this advice, CDM 
regulators have increased the conservativeness of approved method-
ologies, after rejecting a significant share of baseline methodology 
proposals (Michaelowa et al., 2009; Millard-Ball and Ortolano, 2010). 
Recent attempts by CDM regulators to standardize baselines have trig-
gered a debate regarding their impacts on environmental effectiveness 
and transaction costs. Making the choice between standardized and 
project-specific baselines voluntary (Spalding-Fecher and Michaelowa, 
2013), as well as “simple, highly aggregated performance standards” 
(Hayashi and Michaelowa, 2013) could reduce environmental effec-
tiveness. 
With regard to leakage, (Vöhringer et al., 2006) argue that emission 
leakage due to market price effects is unavoidable (as it is for mitiga-
tion within Annex B countries), while Kallbekken et  al. (2007) stress 
that regardless of the baseline used, the CDM will reduce carbon 
leakage through the reduction in the difference in marginal mitiga-
tion costs between countries. Schneider (2011) shows that for HFC-23 
reduction projects, baseline gaming enabled production of the under-
lying commodity to shift from industrialized to developing countries 
(Wara, 2008).
With regard to cost-effectiveness, the CDM offers the potential for cost 
savings where abatement costs are lower in developing countries. The 
large volume of credits and projects in the CDM indicates its cost-sav-
ing potential. Still, Castro (2012) found that many low-cost opportuni-
ties had not been taken up by CDM projects. 
The long-term contribution of the CDM to cost-effectiveness depends 
in part on its ability to promote technological change in develop-
ing countries either through technology transfer from industrialized 
to developing countries (see Section 16.8 for an overview of the 
technology transfer component of CDM), or by stimulating innova-
tion within developing countries (Reichman et  al. 2008). Roughly 
a third of CDM projects involve technology transfer (Haites et  al., 
2006). Dechezleprêtre et al. (2008) find that the likelihood of technol-
ogy transfer is higher for CDM projects operated by subsidiaries of 
companies from industrialized countries. Seres et al. (2009) find that 
36 % of 3296 registered and proposed projects accounting for 59 % 
of the annual emission reductions claim to involve technology trans-
fer, confirming Dechezleprêtre et al.’s (2008) results. But all of these 
technology transfer studies limit themselves to assessment of project 
documents, which are not subject to rigorous and independent verifi-
cation. Project developers have an incentive to overstate technology 
transfer. Wang (2010) is an exception, and underpins his analyses of 
many project documents with background interviews and assesses 
government policies. He finds that in all but one of the industrial gas 
projects in China, technology transfer occurred, but only in about a 
quarter of wind and coal mine methane projects. Okazaki and Yama-
guchi (2011) fear that transactions costs, imposed by additionality cri-
teria and Executive Board delays, can discourage technology transfer 
through the CDM.
Distributional impacts of the CDM relate to contributions to sustain-
able development, as well as the distribution of rents generated by 
the sale of emission credits. Olsen (2007) provides a summary of the 
early literature that did not find significant support for sustainable 
development induced by CDM projects. Several researchers (Sutter 
and Parreño, 2007; Gupta et  al., 2008; Headon, 2009; Boyd et  al., 
2009; Alexeew et al., 2010) see the process of host country respon-
sibility for sustainable development and competition between host 
countries for CDM investment as a reason for the lack of sustain-
ability benefits of CDM projects in some countries, as Designated 
National Authorities (national CDM-management bodies) may not 
adequately scrutinize the environmental or social benefits of proj-
ects. Parnphhumeesup and Kerr (2011) find that experts and the local 
population weight sustainability criteria differently in the context of 
biopower projects in Thailand. Ellis et  al. (2007) found wide varia-
tion in the contribution to local sustainable development by project 
type, with greater contributions in small-scale renewable energy and 
energy efficiency than in large-scale industrial CDM projects. Using 
a sample of 39 projects, Nussbaumer (2009) finds that CDM projects 
certified by ‘The Gold Standard’ — referring both to the organization 
and the certification scheme by that name — slightly outperform 
other CDM projects with respect to sustainable-development ben-
efits. A similar result is found by Drupp (2011) for a sample of 18 
Gold Standard projects compared with 30 projects certified through 
other means. Torvanger et al. (2013) propose dividing the CDM into 
two tracks, one for GHG offsets and one for sustainable develop-
ment (though investors in the second track would need some new 
incentive). 
The distribution of CDM projects has been concentrated in a rela-
tively small number of developing countries (Yamada and Fujimori, 
2012; see also Section 14.3.6.4). Given that companies in developing 
countries finance CDM projects out of their own resources and even-
tually sell the credits as a new export product, with the CDM consul-
tant receiving a share (Michaelowa, 2007), a substantial amount of 
the rents remain in the host country. At the same time, the demand 
for CERs is evidence that it reduces costs compared to domestic 
reductions by developed countries. The fear, even if unfounded, of 
losing this export revenue may be a deterrent against taking up 
national emissions commitments (Castro, 2012), although in practice 
many such countries are developing policies aimed at emissions limi-
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tations. Therefore, it has been proposed to discount CDM credits to 
provide an incentive for taking up stricter national targets (Schneider, 
2009).
In terms of institutional feasibility, baselines, additionality, and emis-
sions-reductions are subject to third-party audit. However, due to the 
inadequate quality of many audits, regulators have been forced to 
introduce multi-layered procedures that have led to high transaction 
costs. Flues et  al. (2010) show econometrically that regulatory deci-
sions about project registration and baseline methodology approval 
have been influenced by political economy considerations.
There is ongoing debate in the literature about the efficacy of CDM 
governance (Green, 2008; Lund, 2010; Michaelowa, 2011; Okazaki and 
Yamaguchi, 2011; Böhm and Dhabi, 2011; Newell, 2012). The UNFCCC 
commissioned an evaluation of the CDM in the CDM Policy Dialogue, 
which issued a report in September 2012 recommending several 
reforms of CDM governance (CDM Policy Dialogue, 2012). Michaelowa 
(2009) and Schneider (2009) propose a shift from the current 1:1 off-
setting system to a system that only credits part of the reductions. 
This would improve additionality on the aggregate level and provide 
an incentive for advanced developing countries to accept their own 
emission reduction commitments. Giving preferential treatment in pro-
cedures and methodology to certain project categories, certain sectors, 
notably forestry (Thomas et al., 2010; CDM Policy Dialogue, 2012), or 
certain regions (Nguyen et al., 2010; Bakker et al., 2011) might expand 
the reach of CDM. 
The price of CDM credits has declined, due largely to decreased 
demand from the EU ETS and others, following the 2008 recession, as 
well as changes in EU ETS rules regarding the use of CDM credits (see 
Section 13.6.1). In response, the CDM Policy Dialogue (2012) proposed 
creation of a central bank for carbon markets to bolster credit prices, 
as well as further standardization of baseline and additionality deter-
mination to reduce transaction costs. The benefits of these two recom-
mendations are disputed in the literature (Hayashi and Michaelowa, 
2013; Spalding-Fecher and Michaelowa, 2013).
13�13�1�3 Assessment of further agreements under the 
UNFCCC
As discussed in 13.5.1.1, since AR4, negotiations under the UNFCCC 
have produced the system of pledges in the Copenhagen Accord and 
the Cancún Agreements, as well as the development of the GCF and 
an agreement to negotiate a new agreement by 2015. In terms of 
Figure 13�5 | Blue box plots show historic global GHG emissions and emissions in 2020 from business-as-usual projections and projections including Cancún pledges. Four cases 
are considered which combine assumptions about pledges (unconditional or conditional) and rules for complying with pledges (lenient or strict)*. The ranges of 2020 emissions 
(20th percentile, median, and 80th percentile) are taken directly from the UNEP Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2012) and represent findings from various modelling groups consider-
ing scenarios that begin mitigation immediately. The arrows indicate the difference between the median emissions projection in each case and the median emission level projected 
to maintain temperature change below 2 °C with a greater than 66 % probability. The ranges (20th to 80th percentiles) of 2020 emissions that maintain temperature change below 
2 °C can be compared to those from cost-effective immediate mitigation scenarios from the WGIII AR5 Scenario Database: greater than 66 % probability: 36 – 47 GtCO2eq / yr; 
50 – 66 % probability: 43 – 47 GtCO2eq / yr (see Chapter 6 and Annex II.10 for details, including MAGICC calculations). Differences in these ranges depend, for example, on assump-
tions about the availability of negative emissions technologies (see, e.g, Figure 6.31). Note that the analysis reconciles pledges for all countries against a business-as-usual counter-
factual based on what has been described in the literature, even though developed country pledges for 2020 are absolute (against a historical base year) and developing country 
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environmental performance, these agreements acknowledged that 
deep reductions in GHG emissions would be required to limit global 
average temperature increases to 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, and 
recognized the possibility strengthening this target to 1.5 °C (UNFCCC, 
2010). Different goals will imply different reductions in climate change 
impacts (see WGII AR5) and different mitigation costs (see Section 6.3).
There is broad agreement in the literature that global emissions 
reductions through 2020 implied by the Cancún pledges are incon-
sistent with cost-effective mitigation scenarios, which are based on 
the immediate onset of mitigation that maintain temperature change 
below 2 °C with a greater than 50 % probability (see Section 6.4 for 
detail on these scenarios). The difference between the emissions in 
2020 in immediate mitigation scenarios and the Cancún pledges has 
been referred to as the ‘2oC emissions gap’ (Rogelj et al., 2010; Dellink 
et  al., 2011; den Elzen et  al., 2011b; Höhne et  al., 2012b). However, 
there are a number of delayed mitigation scenarios that delay mitiga-
tion and still meet this temperature goal and have emissions in the 
range of the Cancún pledges in 2020 (see Section 6.4). Analyses that 
have quantified the Cancún pledges exhibit substantial differences in 
results, owing in part to uncertainties in current and projected emis-
sions estimates and interpretations of reduction proposals, and in part 
to different methodologies (UNEP, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013b; Höhne 
et al., 2012b) (Figure 13.5). For example, one source of differences in 
analyses is due to changing rules: At COP-17 in Durban in 2011, parties 
agreed to new rules for using land use credits for the Kyoto Protocol’s 
Second Commitment Period (UNFCCC, 2012c; Grassi et al., 2012), and 
at COP-18 in Doha in 2012, for surplus Kyoto allowances (Chen et al., 
2013; UNFCCC, 2012d).
Studies suggest that the emissions gap between current Cancún 
pledges and a an immediate mitigation trajectory consistent with 
maintaining temperature change below 2oC with a 50 % or greater 
chance could be narrowed by implementing more stringent pledges, 
applying stricter accounting rules for credits from forests (Grassi et al., 
2012) and surplus emission units (den Elzen et  al., 2012), avoiding 
double-counting of offsets for both developed-country commitments 
and developing countries’ Cancún pledges (UNEP, 2013b), increas-
ing support for action in developing countries (Winkler et al., 2009), 
and implementing measures beyond current pledges (den Elzen et al., 
2011b; Blok et al., 2012; Weischer et al., 2012; UNEP, 2013b).
In terms of aggregate economic performance, some analyses have esti-
mated the direct costs of the Cancún pledges (den Elzen et al., 2011a), 
as well as broader economic effects (Mckibbin et  al., 2011; Dellink 
et al., 2011; Peterson et al., 2011). For example, Dellink et al. (2011) 
estimate costs of action at around 0.3 % of GDP for both Annex I and 
non-Annex I countries and 0.5 – 0.6 % of global real income. However, 
there have been no published comparisons of the benefits and costs 
of the Cancún pledges, and thus no quantitative assessments of eco-
nomic efficiency. 
In terms of cost-effectiveness, the Cancún Agreements endorsed an 
on-going role for domestic and international market-based mecha-
nisms, among various approaches, to improve cost-effectiveness. They 
also made a potential step forward on the cost-effectiveness criterion 
by emphasizing the role of mitigation actions in the forestry sector 
(UNFCCC, 2010; Grassi et al., 2012), which could be integrated with 
other actions through market mechanisms. Including forestry in mar-
ket mechanisms could reduce global mitigation costs by taking advan-
tage of low-cost mitigation opportunities in that sector (Eliasch, 2008; 
Busch et al., 2009; Bosetti et al., 2011; UNEP, 2013b) (see also Section 
13.5.1.1).
Assessing distributional impacts accurately depends both on the 
mitigation costs for developing-country emission reductions and the 
sources of financing for such reductions. The distributional equity 
of recent emission-reduction pledges could be increased through 
financing of reductions in non-Annex I countries. By one study’s esti-
mate, between 2.1 – 3.3 GtCO2eq could be reduced in non-Annex  I 
countries with 50 billion USD in financing, half of the financing 
agreed to under the Copenhagen Accord (Carraro and Massetti, 
2012). Studies of the climate change mitigation ‘financing gap’ have 
suggested potential approaches to providing financial resources 
(Ballesteros et al., 2010; AGF, 2010; Haites, 2011) (see also Sections 
16.2 and 13.11). 
Assessments of climate agreements following the Copenhagen, Can-
cún, and Durban UN climate conferences reflect differing interpreta-
tions of recent negotiations with regard to institutional feasibility 
(Dubash, 2009; Rajamani, 2010, 2012a; Werksman and Herbertson, 
2010; Müller, 2010). Copenhagen (2009) was assessed as a failure 
by those who expected a new climate treaty and a second commit-
ment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Others saw the political agreement 
reached among a small group of world leaders (eventually espoused 
by more than fifty) as a major step forward, even though not legally 
binding, especially because it moved toward a future agreement on 
emissions reductions by all major emitting countries, rather than 
continuing to divide developed from developing countries (Ladislaw, 
2010). Others noted more specific effects, such as the change in the 
organization of carbon markets (Bernstein et al., 2010). The literature 
suggests that views diverge on the Cancún Agreements: some see 
them as a step forward in the multilateral process (Grubb, 2011) 
potentially towards a subsequent legal agreement (Bodansky and Dir-
inger, 2010), while others suggest that the move to a voluntary pledge 
system has weakened the multilateral climate regime (Khor, 2010b). 
The participation of 97 countries in the form of emission reduction 
pledges (42 countries) or mitigation actions (55 countries) speaks to 
the institutional feasibility of the Cancún Agreements (see Section 
13.5.1.1). The Durban Platform in 2011 further de-emphasized the 
distinction between developing and developed countries, with regard 
to mitigation commitments, and mandated a new treaty by 2015, to 
take effect by 2020, mobilizing emissions reductions by all countries 
(UNFCCC, 2011a). 
1049
International Cooperation: Agreements & Instruments
13
Chapter 13
13�13�1�4 Assessment of envisioned international 
cooperation outside of the UNFCCC
A wide variety of international institutions outside of the UNFCCC 
have some role in international climate change policy. These are 
described in Section 13.5 and depicted graphically in Figure 13.1, 
above. They include activities at the international, regional, national, 
subnational, and local scales, and they include public, private and civil 
society actors. Here, we discuss those institutions for which there exist 
published assessments of performance for at least one of the criteria 
from Section 13.2.2. 
The breadth of group membership poses a potential tradeoff between 
global participation and other aspects of institutional feasibility (see 
Sections 13.2.2.4, 13.3.3, and 13.5.1). To the extent that a group’s 
membership includes only a subset of countries, this may facilitate 
negotiations and implementation, thereby improvinginstitutional 
feasibility (Houser, 2010), but this may reduce environmental and 
economic performance due to incomplete global coverage — omit-
ting others’ emissions, yielding leakage, and forgoing low-cost oppor-
tunities for abatement (Wiener, 1999; see also Sections 13.13.1 and 
13.5.1.2). Moreover, bringing climate discussions into smaller interna-
tional forums has been criticized by some as attempts to circumvent 
the UNFCCC and reduce its legitimacy (Hurrell and Sengupta, 2012). 
Because the UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol provides for emissions com-
mitments only by Annex B countries (which account for a declining 
share of global emissions, with increased risk of leakage), some of the 
smaller groups discussed in this subsection have tried to engage major 
developing countries as well, to reduce leakage and increase environ-
mental effectiveness.
The G8
The G8 includes eight major industrialized countries (United States, 
United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia), 
plus the European Union. At the 2007 G8 summit, member countries 
agreed (though without a binding commitment) to set a goal of a 50 % 
reduction in GHG emissions below 1990 levels by 2050, conditional 
on major developing countries making significant reductions. A com-
parison of four models of global emission pathways (including the G8 
plus China, India, and other major developing countries, a group which 
resembles the MEF or G20 more than the G8), to achieve concentra-
tion levels of 550, 450, or 400 ppm by 2100, found that aggregate 
global costs through 2100 would be below 0.8 % of global GDP to 
achieve 550 ppm and about 2.5 % for 400 ppm (but highly sensitive to 
the availability of CCS and biofuels) (Edenhofer et al., 2010); see also 
Section 6.3.2.1.
Analysts have examined the economic impacts of achieving reduc-
tions approximating the G8 pledge on individual countries, such as the 
United Kingdom (Dagoumas and Barker, 2010) and the United States 
(Paltsev et  al., 2008).The former finds no simple tradeoff between 
emission reductions and economic growth in the United Kingdom. Of 
the more aggressive reductions modelled for the United States, Palt-
sev et  al. (2008) finds carbon prices rising to between 120 and 210 
USD by 2050, a level of cost that “would not seriously affect US GDP 
growth but would imply large-scale changes in its energy system.” 
Paltsev et  al. (2009) found somewhat higher costs, noting moreover 
that the details of policy design and incomplete sectoral coverage 
could raise these costs further. Meanwhile, actions by the G8 countries 
alone (excluding major developing countries) would address a declin-
ing share of global emissions and would be subject to leakage to non-
G8 members. 
The Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate
The MEF, described in Section 13.5.1.3, is a forum for the discussion of 
policy options and international collaboration with regard to climate 
and energy, not a forum for negotiation. There are no published assess-
ments of the MEF’s effectiveness. Massetti (2011) considers a scheme 
that achieves the MEF’s informal, aspirational objective of “reducing 
global emissions by 50 % in 2050” (similar to the G8 goal, described 
above) through hypothetical 80 % reductions by high-income MEF 
countries and 25 – 30 % reductions by low-income countries, and finds 
costs would exceed 1.5 % of GDP.
The G20
The G20, described in Section 13.5.1.3, came to a political agree-
ment at its 2009 Pittsburgh meeting to “phase out and rationalize 
over the medium term inefficient fossil fuel subsidies while providing 
targeted support for the poorest” (G20, 2009). This was not followed 
by a legally binding agreement. In terms of environmental effective-
ness, this effort could significantly affect GHG emissions, if countries 
in fact implemented it; by one modelled estimate, complete phaseout 
of such subsidies by 2020, could reduce CO2 emissions by 4.7 % (IEA, 
2011). Analysis suggests that, of the economies identified by the IEA 
as having fossil-fuel consumption subsidies, almost half had either 
implemented fossil-fuel subsidy reforms or announced related plans by 
2011 (IEA et al., 2011). However, other analysts suggest that progress 
towards this goal can be attributed to changes in reporting and sub-
sidy estimation, and that no fossil fuel subsidies have been eliminated 
under this pledge (Koplow, 2012). 
Studies have confirmed that countries reforming fossil fuel consumer 
subsidies would realize positive economic benefits (IEA et  al., 2011). 
However, “these economic benefits would be offset by trade impacts 
if other countries also removed their subsidies and thus reduced their 
demand for fossil-fuel imports” (IEA et al., 2011). The G20 initiative on 
fossil fuel subsidies could have positive distributional impacts within 
some countries, however. Since fossil fuel subsidies tend to benefit high-
income households more than the poor in developing countries, their 
removal would be progressive in such nations (World Bank, 2008c). 
Some note that the creation of the G20 and its elevation to a pre-
mier global international economic forum during the financial crisis in 
2008 (Houser, 2010) has led to more open and dynamic negotiations 
between industrialized and developing countries (Hurrell and Sen-
gupta, 2012), suggesting a potentially positive route forward. 
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The Montreal Protocol is one agreement outside of the UNFCCC 
that has achieved nearly universal participation and has made a sig-
nificant contribution to reducing GHG emissions (Molina et al., 2009; 
Velders et  al., 2007). (The UNFCCC does not address GHGs already 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol.) In its effort to reduce emissions 
of ozone-depleting substances (ODS), the Montreal Protocol initially 
phased down chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), which harm the ozone 
layer and also have very high global warming potential (GWP), and in 
2007 decided to accelerate the phase-down schedule for HCFCs — an 
interim replacement for CFCs with a somewhat lower, but still very 
significant, GWP. The latter decision was affected by climate consid-
erations (Bodansky, 2011a). Even before the HCFC decision, one esti-
mate suggested that the Montreal Protocol’s overall net contribution 
to climate change mitigation had been approximately 5 times what 
the Kyoto Protocol would achieve under its first commitment period 
(Velders et al., 2007, 2012). However, this comparison may be unfair 
because the progress in reducing ozone depleting gases relative to 
GHGs may be due to the major ozone depleting gases being less cen-
tral to economic activities than the major GHGs. In addition, the time-
periods in which the two agreements have been operating makes 
comparison difficult. 
Hydrofluorocarbons are being widely adopted as a longer-term substi-
tute for CFCs. Many of these have extremely high GWP, and their use 
will partially negate climate gains otherwise achieved by the Montreal 
Protocol (Moncel and van Asselt, 2012). Zaelke et al. (2012) suggest 
that a combination of reductions of HFCs and significant cuts in CO2, 
the largest contributor to climate change, can significantly increase the 
chances of remaining below the 2 °C limit. Proposals have been made 
in the Montreal Protocol process to phase down HFCs (even though 
these gases are not ozone-depleting substances), but as of mid-2013, 
parties to the Montreal Protocol had not agreed to an HFC phasedown. 
However, in June 2013 the presidents of the United States and China 
announced a joint initiative to phase down HFCs.
In terms of distributional equity, unlike the Kyoto Protocol, which 
placed no restrictions on developing country emissions, the Mon-
treal Protocol applied equally-stringent emission requirements on 
all countries. However, the Montreal Protocol allowed for a 10-year 
‘grace period’ for countries with low per capita CFC consumption to 
meet their implementation requirements, consistent with the principle 
of CBDRRC. The Montreal Protocol also established mechanisms for 
financing and provided technical support to assist developing coun-
tries in reducing their ODS emissions; the most notable mechanism is 
the Multilateral Fund, which has transferred more than 3 billion USD to 
assist developing country ODS mitigation (Molina et al., 2009). 
The International Maritime Organisation and the International 
Civil Aviation Organisation
Under the Kyoto Protocol’s Article 2.2, Annex I parties agreed to pursue 
GHG limitations from maritime and air transport through the IMO and 
ICAO. 
Approximately 3.3 % of global CO2 emissions in 2007 were attribut-
able to shipping (IMO, 2009). In 2011, the IMO adopted the first man-
datory standards for a sector relating to GHG emissions, instituting a 
performance-based energy-efficiency regulation for large ships “for 
which the building contract is placed on or after January 1, 2013” 
(Bodansky, 2011c). This regulation applies uniformly to all countries, 
extending participation in GHG emissions regulation. These standards 
were adopted by majority vote (over some objections), and include a 
provision to promote technical cooperation and assistance, especially 
for developing countries (Bodansky, 2011c), to address equity con-
cerns, enhancing institutional feasibility.
The ICAO adopted a resolution on climate change in 2010. In contrast to 
the IMO, the ICAO’s climate change goals are ‘voluntary and aspirational.’ 
Perceived inadequate progress by the ICAO toward aviation emissions 
reduction goals may have prompted the inclusion of aviation emissions 
in the EU-ETS in January 2012 (Bodansky, 2011c) (see Section 13.8.2). 
Agreements among non-state actors and agreements among 
sub-national actors
It is unclear whether agreements among non-state (NGOs, private 
sector) or sub-national actors (transnational city networks) have been 
effective in reducing emissions. Partly this is because of their nov-
elty and partly because the units of measurement for such effective-
ness are considerably more complex than for interstate agreements 
(Pinkse and Kolk, 2009). For subnational efforts, the question of attri-
bution requires better disaggregation, to understand whether reduc-
tions are additional to national effort, or only contribute to delivering 
national pledges. While these sub-national efforts may make a small 
contribution to climate action, they may be valuable in influencing 
nation states or helping them meet commitments (Osofsky, 2012). 
Other measures of impacts do exist. In private sector initiatives, the 
Carbon Disclosure Project has high rates of reporting, with about 91 % 
of Global 500 companies surveyed in 2011 disclosing GHG emissions 
(Carbon Disclosure Project, 2011). There is little evidence of substan-
tial changes in investor behaviour, with disagreement as to the poten-
tial for such changes in the future (Kolk et  al., 2008; Harmes, 2011; 
MacLeod and Park, 2011). Some assessments have focused on how 
transnational city initiatives promote technology uptake within cities 
(Hoffmann, 2011) or on how they create a combination of competition 
and learning among member cities.
The voluntary carbon market (VCM) (see Section 13.5.2) had grown to 
131 million tCO2eq (about one-tenth of the size of the CDM), with a 
value of 424 million USD, by 2010 (Peters-Stanley et al., 2011). In 2004, 
virtually no VCM projects underwent third-party verified certification, 
but by 2010, this figure had reached 90 % and the VCM has created a 
varied landscape of emission-offset providers, registries, and standards 
(Peters-Stanley et al., 2011).
For some, the VCM is complementary to the CDM, and provides for 
learning about new ways of developing emissions reduction projects 
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(Benessaiah, 2012). However, Dhanda and Hartman (2011) find that 
the voluntary market is not transparent and suffers from large swings 
of demand for specific project types. Offset prices for the same project 
type differs by up to two orders of magnitude. As noted, competing 
registries and standard providers proliferate, and additionality of a sig-
nificant share of projects is doubtful. Some regard voluntary certifica-
tion systems as primarily public relations exercises (Bumpus and Liver-
man, 2008). An earlier assessment by Corbera et al. (2009) concluded 
that the voluntary market does not perform better than the CDM. How-
ever, performance in the VCM seems to improve with the increased use 
of third-party certification systems (Hamilton et al., 2008; Capoor and 
Ambrosi, 2009; Newell and Paterson, 2010). 
There is evidence that the importance of partnerships between the 
private sector and government depends on their relationship to more 
traditional state-led governance. Partnerships may work once govern-
ment regulations send strong signals to investors (Pfeifer and Sullivan, 
2008). Rules developed in private sector agreements may then become 
incorporated in government regulations (Knox-Hayes and Levy, 2011), 
and private carbon market offset standards may be introduced into 
regulated carbon markets (Hoffmann, 2011).
13�13�2 Performance assessment of proposed 
international climate policy 
architectures
This section describes proposed global climate policy architectures (sur-
veyed in Section 13.4), focusing on those that have been described for 
the first time since AR4, and older proposals for which new research on 
anticipated performance is available. Earlier proposals are listed in Table 
13.2 of Gupta et al. (2007). The performance assessment of proposed 
architectures is difficult because it depends on both the architecture 
and the specific design elements of its regulatory targets and mecha-
nisms. 
For analytical purposes, this chapter classifies proposals using the 
taxonomy developed in Section 13.4.3 and Table 13.2: (a) strong mul-
tilateralism, (b) harmonized national policies, and (c) decentralized 
architectures and coordinated national policies. Combinations of these 
categories have also been proposed and assessed. For example, strong 
multilateralism can be advanced by ‘clubs’ of selected ambitious coun-
tries (Weischer et al., 2012)or by non-state actors (Blok et al., 2012).
13�13�2�1 Strong multilateralism
The anticipated performance of various proposals for strong multi-
lateralism has been assessed in the literature. In addition, another 
body of research has examined the ends (but not the policy architec-
ture) associated with various aggregate goals in terms of country- 
or region-level emission targets based on specific notions of distri-
butional equity, so-called ‘burden sharing approaches’ (see Section 
13.2, as well as Sections 4.6.2 and 6.3.6.6 for quantitative assess-
ments). 
Comprehensive proposals for strong multilateralism have in some 
cases been closely related to the targets-and-timetables approach of 
the Kyoto Protocol. This approach aims to be based on the UNFCCC 
principle of CBDRRC while introducing a more nuanced differentia-
tion and broader base of participation, along with some details of the 
means of implementation. This is well reflected in the literature on 
reduction proposals with national emission targets and emissions trad-
ing (see Table 13.2 in Gupta et al. (2007) for literature prior to AR4). 
Since AR4, this literature has studied gradually-increasing emission-
reduction commitments linked to indicators such as per capita income 
(Cao, 2010a; Frankel, 2010; Bosetti and Frankel, 2011), differentiating 
groups of countries (den Elzen et al., 2007; Rajamani, 2013), common 
but differentiated convergence (Luderer et  al., 2012), and per capita 
targets (Agarwala, 2010).
Distributional impacts vary significantly with underlying criteria for 
effort sharing. For example, proposals that use ‘responsibility and 
capability’ as a criterion for allocating effort would result in relatively 
more stringent implied actions for ‘early’ emitters, assigning them 
lower allocations. Proposals based on the criterion of ‘mitigation 
potential’ would be less stringent for ‘early’ emitters, capturing the 
mitigation potential in developing countries, assumed to be relatively 
low-cost (Höhne et  al., 2013). Especially for low-stabilization levels, 
the approaches differ in the extent to which they rely on contributions 
from all countries, from emissions reductions within their borders, and 
on international assistance between countries. Section 4.6.2 details 
many more possible criteria for effort sharing, and Section 6.3.6.6 
quantifies the implications of these various effort sharing criteria in 
terms of regional emission allocations and costs. 
Sectoral approaches are generally not anticipated to perform optimally 
in terms of environmental effectiveness or economic performance 
when compared with economy-wide approaches; therefore, sectoral 
approaches can be thought of as second-best policies (Bradley et al., 
2007; Schmidt et al., 2008; den Elzen et al., 2008; Meckling and Chung, 
2009). Sectors that are homogenous and already globally integrated, 
such as aviation, may lend themselves better to international coopera-
tion than those that are heterogeneous. Omitting some sectors makes 
it more difficult to achieve emissions or stabilization goals and also 
reduces cost-effectiveness, relative to economy-wide approaches, as 
required emissions reductions must be made within-sector, failing to 
take advantage of the lower of heterogeneous marginal abatement 
costs across sectors. Transaction costs may also be higher with sectoral 
approaches, including, for example, greater challenges to negotiation 
(Bradley et al., 2007).
However, these approaches could potentially help mitigate leak-
age within particular industries (Bradley et al., 2007; Sawa, 2010). In 
terms of institutional feasibility, sectoral approaches may encourage 
the participation of a wider range of countries than economy-wide 
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approaches, because sectoral agreements can be more politically 
manageable in domestic policy processes (Bradley et al., 2007; Sawa, 
2010). Developing countries may also be more likely to participate 
meaningfully in sectoral processes than economy-wide agreements 
limiting emissions (Meckling and Chung, 2009). 
Several researchers have suggested that a ‘regime complex’ is emerg-
ing (see Sections 13.3 and 13.5), with the strong implication that com-
ponent regimes may display a range of architectures — from strong 
multilateralism through more decentralized systems (Carraro et  al., 
2007; Biermann et al., 2009; Barrett, 2010; Keohane and Victor, 2011). 
The portfolio of treaties approach is similar in some ways to the sec-
toral approaches described above. However, the approach described in 
(Barrett, 2010) includes much more significant enforcement possibili-
ties, potentially increasing environmental effectiveness, while poten-
tially reducing institutional feasibility. 
13�13�2�2 Harmonized national policies
In principle, a wide variety of national climate policies can be harmo-
nized across countries. This holds for cap-and-trade systems (e. g., a 
global emissions permit trading system (Ellerman, 2010)), as we dis-
cuss in the context of linkage below, as well as for national carbon or 
other GHG taxes. The most-studied approach in terms of performance 
assessments has been harmonized carbon taxes. Their environmental 
performance would depend upon the level of the tax, but relative to 
non-market-based approaches, this approach would be cost-effective. 
The impact of a carbon tax on economic efficiency will depend, in part, 
on how tax revenues are used (Bovenberg and de Mooij, 1994; Parry, 
1995; Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996; Cooper, 2010). 
Estimates in the recent literature of the environmental effectiveness 
and economic performance of proposed carbon taxes vary dramati-
cally depending upon assumptions (Edmonds et al., 2008; Clarke et al., 
2009; van Vuuren et al., 2009; Bosetti et al., 2010; Luderer et al., 2012). 
The distributional impacts of a carbon tax include negative impacts 
on the fossil fuel industry as a whole, with stronger impacts for fuels 
with higher carbon emissions per unit of energy. For example, impacts 
on coal would be much greater than on natural gas (Cooper, 2010). 
Impacts of national carbon taxes on consumers would likely be some-
what regressive in high-income countries but progressive in low-
income countries (see Section 15.5 for detail). Tax revenues could be 
used by individual countries to address these domestic distributional 
concerns (See e. g.,Winkler and Marquard, 2011; Alton et al., 2012).
Under a harmonized national carbon tax regime, fossil-fuel-exporting 
countries might experience negative impacts, and net importers could 
experience decreasing prices due to reduced demand, while some 
regions could experience increased bio-energy exports (Persson et  al., 
2006; OECD, 2008; Cooper, 2010; Leimbach et al., 2010). International 
transfers drawing on revenues of such a tax could, in theory, be used 
to address these concerns or to encourage participation by developing 
countries (Nordhaus, 2006). As with emissions trading (Frankel, 2010), 
the extent of developing country participation in an international carbon 
tax scheme could be based upon income thresholds (Nordhaus, 2006).
The institutional feasibility of a global carbon tax has not been thor-
oughly considered in the literature. The relatively large number of stud-
ies on a global carbon tax is at least partly due to the fact that eco-
nomic modellers often model a global carbon tax as a proxy for other 
mitigation policy instruments that would impose shadow prices on the 
carbon content of fossil fuels and / or CO2 emissions.
Many hybrid market-based approaches to mitigation, combining trad-
able emissions permits with some characteristics of a carbon tax, have 
been proposed and examined in the recent literature (Pizer, 2002; 
Murray et al., 2009; FELL et al., 2010; Webster et al., 2010; Grüll and 
Taschini, 2011). In principle, these hybrid approaches can provide bet-
ter aggregate economic performance, lowering compliance costs and 
reducing price volatility, at the potential expense of environmental 
effectiveness in the form of uncertain changes in aggregate emissions 
(Grüll and Taschini, 2011). However, recent research suggests that ‘soft’ 
price collars, which provide a modest reserve of additional emission 
allowances at the price ceiling, may achieve most of the expected com-
pliance cost savings provided by ‘hard’ collars (unlimited supplies of 
additional allowances), while maintaining a more predictable cap on 
emissions (Fell et  al., 2012). In terms of distributional equity, hybrid 
systems may reduce expected compliance costs for regulated firms, 
though they may increase regulatory costs (Grüll and Taschini, 2011). 
This characteristic may also increase political feasibility.
13�13�2�3 Decentralized architectures and coordinated 
national policies
In principle, many types of national climate policies could be linked to 
each other. In the literature to date, most discussion is of linked carbon 
markets. The recent literature on these suggests that economic perfor-
mance of existing GHG allowance trading systems could be enhanced 
through linkage, which would reduce abatement costs and improve 
market liquidity (Haites and Mehling, 2009; Mehling and Haites, 2009; 
Sterk and Kruger, 2009; Anger et al., 2009; Jaffe et al., 2009; Jaffe and 
Stavins, 2010; Grüll and Taschini, 2011; Metcalf and Weisbach, 2012; 
Ranson and Stavins, 2013).
In terms of environmental performance, linkage can increase or reduce 
emissions leakage, depending on the stringency of caps, and the qual-
ity of offset credits within linked systems. 
Linkages among cap-and-trade systems as well as linkages with and 
among emission-reduction-credit systems would create winners and 
losers, generating distributional impacts relative to un-linked systems, 
depending upon impacts on allowance prices and whether partici-
pating entities are net buyers or net sellers of emissions (Jaffe and 
Stavins, 2010). While it does preserve the ability of countries to meet 
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their commitments through means of their own choice, consistent 
with the Kyoto Protocol, linkage also poses some challenges for insti-
tutional feasibility, since it reduces domestic control over prices, emis-
sions, and other aspects of policy design and impact (Buchner and 
Carraro, 2007; Jaffe et al., 2009; Jaffe and Stavins, 2010; Ranson and 
Stavins, 2013). Linking may not benefit all participating countries due 
to potential market distortions and the rebalancing of production and 
consumption patterns in multiple markets (i. e., general equilibrium 
effects) (Marschinski et al., 2012). In one analysis that modelled the 
heterogeneous costs and benefits of participation in a climate coali-
tion using a game-theoretic framework, incentives to deviate from 
cooperation could not be compensated by transfers (Bosetti et  al., 
2013).
Institutional-feasibility challenges may be more significant for linked 
heterogeneous policy instruments (such as taxes and emissions permit 
systems, or taxes and technology standards) relative to linked regimes 
that use similar instruments (Metcalf and Weisbach, 2012). For exam-
ple, unrestricted linkage would effectively turn a permit trading system 
into a tax, pegging the permit price to the other country’s tax rate, and 
allowing aggregate emissions above the permit system’s established 
cap (Metcalf and Weisbach, 2012).
Climate policy architectures that can be characterized as technology-
oriented agreements may seek to share and coordinate knowledge and 
enhance technology research, development, demonstration, and transfer. 
Some literature suggests that such agreements may increase the effi-
ciency and environmental effectiveness of international climate coopera-
tion, but will have limited environmental effectiveness operating alone 
(de Coninck et al., 2008). Though technology-oriented policies can pro-
mote the development of new technologies, environmental effectiveness 
hinges on the need for other policies to provide incentives for adoption 
(Fischer, 2008; Newell, 2010b). For example, (Bosetti et al., 2009b) show 
that R&D alone is insufficient to stabilize CO2 levels without an accom-
panying carbon tax or functionally equivalent policy instrument. See Sec-
tion 13.9.3 for details of international cooperation on technology.
13.14 Gaps in  knowledge 
and data
Current understanding of agreements and instruments for interna-
tional cooperation continues to evolve. At the time of this publication, 
there are a number of gaps in the scholarly literature of international 
cooperation for climate change mitigation, as identified below: 
•	 There exist few comparisons of proposals in terms of any or all 
of the four criteria used in this report. Research that would be 
particularly useful would be comparisons of aggregate cost, or 
disaggregated regional- or country-level costs per year, with incor-
poration of uncertainty.
•	 There exist few assessments of the emerging range of new inter-
governmental and transnational arrangements, including ‘hybrid’ 
approaches and approaches that interact across the landscape of 
climate agreements, which might enable better assessment of the 
sum of efforts.
•	 Current understanding of the complementarities and tradeoffs 
between policies affecting mitigation and adaptation is incomplete.
•	 Current understanding of how international cooperation on cli-
mate change can help achieve co-benefits and development goals 
of countries and what policies and practices work and do not work 
in capacity building projects is incomplete.
•	 Current understanding of the factors that affect national decisions 
to join and form international agreements and how international 
cooperation can directly influence achievement of various perfor-
mance criteria is incomplete.
13.15 Frequently Asked 
Questions
FAQ 13�1 Given that GHG emissions abatement 
must ultimately be carried out by 
individuals and firms within countries, 
why is international cooperation 
necessary?
International cooperation is important to achieve significant emis-
sions reductions for a number of reasons. First, climate protection is a 
public good that requires collective action, because firms and individ-
uals will not otherwise bear the private costs needed to achieve the 
global benefits of abatement (see Section 13.2.1.1). Second, because 
GHGs mix globally in the atmosphere, anthropogenic climate change 
is a global commons problem. Third, international cooperation helps 
to give every country an opportunity to ascertain how responsibilities 
are to be divided among them, based on principles adopted in inter-
national agreements (see Section 13.3). This is important because 
individual countries are the entities with jurisdiction over individuals 
and firms, whose actions ultimately determine if emissions are abated. 
Fourth, international cooperation allows for linkages across policies 
at different scale, notably through harmonizing national and regional 
policies, as well as linkages across issues, and through enhanced 
cooperation may reduce mitigation costs, create opportunities for 
sharing the benefits of adaptation, increase credibility of price signals, 
and expand market size and liquidity. Fifth, international cooperation 
may help bring together international science and knowledge, which 
may improve the performance of cooperatively-developed policy 
instruments. 
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FAQ 13�2 What are the advantages and 
disadvantages of including all countries 
in international cooperation on climate 
change (an ‘inclusive’ approach) and 
limiting participation (an ‘exclusive’ 
approach)?
The literature suggests that there are tradeoffs between ‘inclusive’ 
approaches to negotiation and agreement (i. e., approaches with 
broad participation, as in the UNFCCC) and ‘exclusive’ approaches 
(i. e., limiting participation according to chosen criteria — for exam-
ple, including only the largest emitters, or groups focused on specific 
issues). Regarding an ‘inclusive’ approach, the universal membership 
of the UNFCCC is an indicator of its high degree of legitimacy among 
states as a central institution to develop international climate policy. 
However, the scholarly literature offers differing views over whether 
or not the outcomes of recent negotiations strengthen or weaken the 
multilateral climate regime (Section 13.13.1.3). A number of other 
multilateral forums have emerged as potentially valuable in advanc-
ing the international process through an ‘exclusive’ approach. These 
smaller groups can advance the overall process through informal con-
sultations, technical analysis and information sharing, and implemen-
tation of UNFCCC decisions or guidance (e. g., with regard to climate 
finance). They might also be more effective in advancing agreement 
among the largest emitters, but so far have not been able to do so. 
Examples include the MEF, the G20 and G8, and the city-level C-40 
Climate Leadership Group. Section 13.5 goes into more detail, and Fig-
ure 13.1 illustrates the overall landscape of climate change-relevant 
agreements and institutions.
FAQ 13�3 What are the options for designing 
policies to make progress on 
international cooperation on climate 
change mitigation? 
There are a number of potential structures for formalized international 
cooperation on climate change mitigation, referred to in the text as pol-
icy ‘architectures’ (see Section 13.4). Architectures vary by the degree 
to which their authority is centralized and can be roughly categorized 
into three groups: strong multilateralism, harmonized national policies, 
and decentralized architectures (see Section 13.4.1). An example of 
strong multilateralism is a targets-and-timetables approach, which sets 
aggregate quantitative emissions-reduction targets over a fixed period 
of time and allocates responsibility for this reduction among countries, 
based on principles jointly accepted. The UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol is 
an example of a strong multilateral approach. The second architecture 
is harmonized national policies. An example in principle (though not 
put into practice) might be multilaterally harmonized domestic carbon 
taxes. An example of the third architecture, decentralized approaches 
and coordinated national policies, would be linkage among domestic 
cap-and-trade systems, driven not through a multilateral agreement 
but largely by bilateral arrangements. The literature suggests that each 
of the various proposed policy architectures for global climate change 
has advantages and disadvantages with regard to four evaluation cri-
teria: environmental effectiveness, aggregate economic performance, 
distributional equity, and institutional feasibility. Section 13.4.1.4 goes 
into more detail.
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Regional cooperation already is a powerful force in the global 
economy (medium evidence, high agreement). This is reflected in 
numerous agreements related to trade and technology cooperation, 
as well as trans-boundary agreements related to water, energy, trans-
port, etc. As a result, there is growing interest in regional cooperation 
as a means to achieving mitigation objectives. A regional perspective 
(where regions are defined primarily geographically, with further dif-
ferentiation related to economic proximity) recognizes differences in 
the opportunities and barriers for mitigation, opportunities for joint 
action on mitigation and common vulnerabilities, and assesses what 
regional cooperation can and has already achieved in terms of mitiga-
tion. Regional cooperation can provide a linkage between global and 
national / subnational action on climate change and can also comple-
ment national and global action. [Section 14.1.2, 14.4.1]
Regions can be defined in many different ways depending upon 
the context� Mitigation challenges are often differentiated by region, 
based on their levels of development. For the analysis of greenhouse 
gas (GHG) projections, as well as of climate change impacts, regions 
are typically defined in geographical terms. Regions can also be defined 
at a supra-national or sub-national level. This chapter defines regions 
as supra-national regions (sub-national regions are examined in Chap-
ter 15). Ten regions are defined based on a combination of proximity 
in terms of geography and levels of economic and human develop-
ment: East Asia (China, Korea, Mongolia) (EAS); Economies in Transi-
tion (Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union) (EIT); Latin America and 
Caribbean (LAM); Middle East and North Africa (MNA); North America 
(USA, Canada) (NAM); Pacific Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development 1990 (Japan, Australia, New Zealand) (POECD); 
South-East Asia and Pacific (PAS); South Asia (SAS); sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA); Western Europe (WEU). Where appropriate, we also examine the 
category of least-developed countries (LDC), which combines 33 coun-
tries in SSA, 5 in SAS, 9 in PAS, and one each in LAM and the MNA, and 
which are classified as such by the United Nations based on their low 
incomes, low human assets, and high economic vulnerabilities. We also 
examine regional cooperation initiatives through actual examples that 
bear upon mitigation objectives, which do not typically conform to the 
above listed world regions. [14.1.2]
There is considerable heterogeneity across and within regions 
in terms of opportunities, capacity, and financing of climate 
action, which has implications for the potential of different 
regions to pursue low-carbon development (high confidence). 
Several multi-model exercises have explored regional approaches to 
mitigation. In general, these regional studies find that the costs of cli-
mate stabilization for an individual region will depend on the baseline 
development of regional emission and energy-use and energy-pricing 
policies, the mitigation requirement, the emissions reduction potential 
of the region, and terms of trade effects of climate policy, particularly 
in energy markets. [14.1.3, 14.2]
At the same time, there is a mismatch between opportunities 
and capacities to undertake mitigation (medium confidence). The 
regions with the greatest potential to leapfrog to low-carbon develop-
ment trajectories are the poorest developing regions where there are 
few lock-in effects in terms of modern energy systems and urbaniza-
tion patterns. However, these regions also have the lowest financial, 
technological, and human capacities to embark on such low-carbon 
development paths and their cost of waiting is high due to unmet 
energy and development needs. Emerging economies already have 
more lock-in effects but their rapid build-up of modern energy systems 
and urban settlements still offers substantial opportunities for low-car-
bon development. Their capacity to reorient themselves to low-carbon 
development strategies is higher, but also faces constraints in terms of 
finance, technology, and the high cost of delaying the installation of 
new energy capacity. Lastly, industrialized economies have the larg-
est lock-in effects, but the highest capacities to reorient their energy, 
transport, and urbanizations systems towards low-carbon develop-
ment. [14.1.3, 14.3.2] 
Heterogeneity across and within regions is also visible at a more 
disaggregated level in the energy sector (high confidence). Access 
to energy varies widely across regions, with LDC and SSA being the 
most energy-deprived regions. These regions emit less CO2, but offer 
mitigation opportunities from future sustainable energy use. Regional 
cooperation on energy takes different forms and depends on the degree 
of political cohesion in a region, the energy resources available, the 
strength of economic ties between participating countries, their insti-
tutional and technical capacity, political will and the available financial 
resources. Regional cooperation on energy offers a variety of mitiga-
tion and adaptation options, through instruments such as harmonized 
legalization and regulation, energy resources and infrastructure shar-
ing (e. g., through power pools), joint development of energy resources 
(e. g., hydropower in a common river basin), and know-how transfer. As 
regional energy cooperation instruments interact with other policies, 
notably those specifically addressing climate change, they may affect 
their ability to stimulate investment in low-carbon technologies and 
energy efficiency. Therefore, there is a need for coordination between 
these energy cooperation and regional / national climate policy instru-
ments. In this context, it is also important to consider spillovers on 
energy that may appear due to trade. While mitigation policy would 
likely lead to lower import dependence for energy importers, it can also 
devalue endowments of fossil fuel exporting countries (with differ-
ences between regions and fuels). While the effect on coal exporters is 
expected to be negative in the short- and long-term, as policies could 
reduce the benefits of using coal, gas exporters could benefit in the 
medium-term as coal is replaced by gas. The overall impact on oil is 
more uncertain. [14.3.2, 14.4.2]
The impact of urbanization on carbon emissions also differs 
remarkably across regions (high confidence). This is due to the 
regional variations in the relationship between urbanization, economic 
growth, and industrialization. Developing regions and their cities have 
significantly higher energy intensity than developed regions, partly 
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due to different patterns and forms of urban settlements. Therefore, 
regional cooperation to promote environmentally friendly technology, 
and to follow sustainably socioeconomic development pathways, can 
induce great opportunities and contribute to the emergence of low-
carbon societies. [14.3.3]
In terms of consumption and production of GHG emissions, 
there is great heterogeneity in regional GHG emissions in rela-
tion to the population, sources of emissions and gross domes-
tic product (GDP) (high confidence). In 2010, NAM, POECD, EIT, 
and WEU, taken together, had 20.5 % of the world’s population, but 
accounted for 58.3 % of global GHG emissions, while other regions 
with 79.5 % of population accounted for 41.7 % of global emissions. If 
we consider consumption-based emissions, the disparity is even larger 
with NAM, POECD, EIT, and WEU generating around 65 % of global 
consumption-based emissions. In view of emissions per GDP (inten-
sity), NAM, POECD and WEU have the lowest GHG emission intensities, 
while SSA and PAS have high emission intensities and also the highest 
share of forestry-related emissions. This shows that a significant part 
of GHG-reduction potential might exist in the forest sector in these 
developing regions. [14.3.4]
Regional prospects of mitigation action and low-carbon devel-
opment from agriculture and land-use change are mediated 
by their development level and current pattern of emissions 
(medium evidence, high agreement). Emissions from agriculture, for-
estry, and other land use (AFOLU) are larger in ASIA (SAS, EAS, and PAS 
combined) and LAM than in other regions, and in many LDC regions, 
emissions from AFOLU are greater than from fossil fuels. Emissions 
were predominantly due to deforestation for expansion of agricul-
ture, and agricultural production (crops and livestock), with net sinks 
in some regions due to afforestation. Region-specific strategies are 
needed to allow for flexibility in the face of changing demographics, 
climate change and other factors. There is potential for the creation of 
synergies with development policies that enhance adaptive capacity. 
[14.3.5]
In addition, regions use different strategies to facilitate tech-
nology transfer, low-carbon development, and to make use of 
opportunities for leapfrogging (robust evidence, medium agree-
ment). Leapfrogging suggests that developing countries might be able 
to follow more sustainable, low-carbon development pathways and 
avoid the more emissions-intensive stages of development that were 
previously experienced by industrialized nations. Time and absorptive 
capacity, i. e., the ability to adopt, manage, and develop new technolo-
gies, have been shown to be a core condition for successful leapfrog-
ging. The appropriateness of different low-carbon pathways depends 
on the nature of different technologies and the region, the institutional 
architecture and related barriers and incentives, as well as the needs of 
different parts of society. [14.3.6, 14.4.3]
In terms of investment and finance, regional participation in 
different climate policy instruments varies strongly (high confi-
dence). For example, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has 
developed a distinct pattern of regional clustering of projects and buy-
ers of emission credits, with projects mainly concentrated in Asia and 
Latin America, while Africa and the Middle East are lagging behind. 
The regional distribution of the climate change projects of the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) is much more balanced than that of the 
CDM. [14.3.7]
Regional cooperation for mitigation can take place via climate-
specific cooperation mechanisms or existing cooperation mech-
anisms that are (or can be) climate-relevant� Climate-specific 
regional initiatives are forms of cooperation at the regional level that 
are designed to address mitigation challenges. Climate-relevant initia-
tives were launched with other objectives, but have potential implica-
tions for mitigation at the regional level. [14.4.1]
Our assessment is that regional cooperation has, to date, only 
had a limited (positive) impact on mitigation (medium evidence, 
high agreement). Nonetheless, regional cooperation could play an 
enhanced role in promoting mitigation in the future, particularly if it 
explicitly incorporates mitigation objectives in trade, infrastructure, 
and energy policies, and promotes direct mitigation action at the 
regional level. [14.4.2, 14.5]
Most literature suggests that climate-specific regional coopera-
tion agreements in areas of policy have not played an impor-
tant role in addressing mitigation challenges to date (medium 
confidence). This is largely related to the low level of regional inte-
gration and associated willingness to transfer sovereignty to supra-
national regional bodies to enforce binding agreements on mitigation. 
[14.4.2, 14.4.3] 
Even in areas with deep regional integration, economic mecha-
nisms to promote mitigation (including the European Union (EU) 
Emission Trading Scheme (ETS)) have not been as successful as 
anticipated in achieving intended mitigation objectives (high 
confidence). While the EU-ETS has demonstrated that a cross-border 
cap-and-trade system can work, the persistently low carbon price in 
recent years has not provided sufficient incentives to motivate addi-
tional mitigation action. The low price is related to a number of fac-
tors, including the unexpected depth and duration of the economic 
recession, uncertainty about the long-term emission-reduction targets, 
import of credits from the CDM, and the interaction with other policy 
instruments, particularly related to the expansion of renewable energy 
as well as regulation on energy efficiency. As of the time of this assess-
ment in late 2013, it has proven to be politically difficult to address 
this problem by removing emission permits temporarily, tightening the 
cap, or providing a long-term mitigation goal. [14.4.2]
Climate-specific regional cooperation using binding regulation-
based approaches in areas of deep integration, such as EU direc-
tives on energy efficiency, renewable energy, and biofuels, have 
had some impact on mitigation objectives (medium confidence). 
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Nonetheless, theoretical models and past experience suggest that 
there is substantial potential to increase the role of climate-specific 
regional cooperation agreements and associated instruments, includ-
ing economic instruments and regulatory instruments. In this context, 
it is important to consider carbon leakage of such regional initiatives 
and ways to address it. [14.4.2, 14.4.1]
In addition, non-climate-related modes of regional coopera-
tion could have significant implications for mitigation, even if 
mitigation objectives are not a component (medium confidence). 
Regional cooperation with non-climate-related objectives but possible 
mitigation implications, such as trade agreements, cooperation on 
technology, and cooperation on infrastructure and energy, has to date 
also had negligible impacts on mitigation. Modest impacts have been 
found on the level of emissions of members of regional preferential 
trade areas if these agreements are accompanied with environmental 
agreements. Creating synergies between adaptation and mitigation 
can increase the cost-effectiveness of climate change actions. Linking 
electricity and gas grids at the regional level has also had a modest 
impact on mitigation as it facilitated greater use of low-carbon and 
renewable technologies; there is substantial further mitigation poten-
tial in such arrangements. [14.4.2]
Despite a plethora of agreements on technology, the impact on 
mitigation has been negligible to date (medium confidence). A 
primary focus of regional agreements surrounds the research, devel-
opment, and demonstration of low-carbon technologies, as well as 
the development of policy frameworks to promote the deployment of 
such technologies within different national contexts. In some cases, 
geographical regions exhibit similar challenges in mitigating climate 
change, which can serve as a unifying force for regional technology 
agreements or cooperation on a particular technology. Other regional 
agreements may be motivated by a desire to transfer technological 
experience across regions. [14.4.3]
Regional development banks play a key role in mitigation 
financing (medium confidence). The regional development banks, 
the World Bank, the United Nations system, other multilateral institu-
tions, and the reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation 
(REDD)+ partnership will be crucial in scaling up national appropriate 
climate actions, e. g., via regional and thematic windows in the con-
text of the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, such as a possible Africa 
Green Fund. [14.4.4]
Going forward, regional mechanisms have considerably greater 
potential to contribute to mitigation goals than have been real-
ized so far (medium confidence). In particular, these mechanisms have 
provided different models of cooperation between countries on mitiga-
tion, they can help realize joint opportunities in the field of trade, infra-
structure, technology, and energy, and they can serve as a platform 
for developing, implementing, and financing climate-specific regional 
initiatives for mitigation, possibly also as part of global arrangements 
on mitigation. [14.5]
14.1 Introduction
14�1�1 Overview of issues 
This chapter provides an assessment of knowledge and practice on 
regional development and cooperation to achieve climate change 
mitigation. It will examine the regional trends and dimensions of the 
mitigation challenge. It will also analyze what role regional initiatives, 
both with a focus on climate change and in other domains such as 
trade, can play in addressing these mitigation challenges.
The regional dimension of mitigation was not explicitly addressed in 
the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4). Its discussion of policies, 
instruments, and cooperative agreements (Working Group III AR4, 
Chapter 13) was focused primarily on the global and national level. 
However, mitigation challenges and opportunities differ significantly 
by region. This is particularly the case for the interaction between 
development / growth opportunities and mitigation policies, which are 
closely linked to resource endowments, the level of economic develop-
ment, patterns of urbanization and industrialization, access to finance 
and technology, and — more broadly — the capacity to develop and 
implement various mitigation options. There are also modes of regional 
cooperation, ranging from regional initiatives focused specifically on 
climate change (such as the emissions trading scheme (ETS) of the 
European Union (EU)) to other forms of cooperation in the areas of 
trade, energy, or infrastructure, that could potentially provide a plat-
form for delivering and implementing mitigation policies. These dimen-
sions will be examined in this chapter.
Specifically, this chapter will address the following questions:
•	 Why is the regional level important for analyzing and achieving 
mitigation objectives?
•	 What are the trends, challenges, and policy options for mitigation 
in different regions?
•	 To what extent are there promising opportunities, existing exam-
ples, and barriers for leapfrogging in technologies and develop-
ment strategies to low-carbon development paths for different 
regions?
•	 What are the interlinkages between mitigation and adaptation at 
the regional level?
•	 To what extent can regional initiatives and regional integration 
and cooperation promote an agenda of low-carbon climate-resil-
ient development? What has been the record of such initiatives, 
and what are the barriers? Can they serve as a platform for further 
mitigation activities?
The chapter is organized as follows: after discussing the definition 
and importance of supra-national regions, sustainable development at 
the regional level, and the regional differences in mitigation capaci-
ties, Section 14.2 will provide an overview of opportunities and bar-
riers for low-carbon development. Section 14.3 will examine current 
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development patterns and goals and their emission implications at the 
regional level. In this context, this section will discuss issues surround-
ing energy and development, urbanization and development, and 
consumption and production patterns. Section 14.3 will also examine 
opportunities and barriers for low-carbon development by examining 
policies and mechanisms for such development-indifferent regions 
and sectors. Moreover, it will analyze issues surrounding technology 
transfer, investment, and finance. Section 14.4 will evaluate exist-
ing regional arrangements and their impact on mitigation, including 
climate-specific as well as climate-relevant regional initiatives. In this 
context, links between mitigation, adaptation and development will 
be discussed. Also, the experiences of technology transfer and leap-
frogging will be evaluated. Section 14.5 will formulate policy options. 
Lastly, Section 14.6 will outline gaps in knowledge and data related to 
the issues discussed in this chapter.
The chapter will draw on Chapter 5 on emission trends and drivers, 
Chapter 6 on transformation pathways, the sectoral Chapters 7 – 12, 
and Chapter 16 on investment and finance, by analyzing the region-
specific information in these chapters. In terms of policy options, it dif-
fers from Chapters 13 and 15 by explicitly focusing on regions as the 
main entities and actors in the policy arena. 
We should note from the outset that there are serious gaps in the peer-
reviewed literature on several of the topics covered in this chapter, as 
the regional dimension of mitigation has not received enough atten-
tion or the issues covered are too recent to have been properly ana-
lyzed in peer-reviewed literature. We will therefore sometimes draw on 
grey literature or state the research gaps. 
14�1�2 Why regions matter
This chapter only examines supra-national regions (i. e., regions in 
between the national and global level). Sub-national regions are 
addressed in Chapter 15. Thinking about mitigation at the regional 
level matters mainly for three reasons:
First, regions manifest vastly different patterns in their level, growth, 
and composition of GHG emissions, underscoring significant differ-
ences in socio-economic contexts, energy endowments, consump-
tion patterns, development pathways, and other underlying driv-
ers that influence GHG emissions and therefore mitigation options 
and pathways (Section 14.3). For example, low-income countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa, whose contribution to consumption-based GHG 
emissions is currently very low, face the challenge to promote eco-
nomic development (including broader access to modern energy and 
transport) while encouraging industrialization. Their mitigation chal-
lenge relates to choosing among development paths with different 
mitigation potentials. Due to their tight resource situation and severe 
capacity constraints, their ability to choose low-carbon development 
paths and their opportunities to wait for more mitigation-friendly 
technologies is severely constrained (Collier and Venables, 2012a). 
Moreover, these development paths may be costly. Nonetheless, with 
sufficient access to finance, technologies, and the appropriate institu-
tional environment, these countries might be able to leapfrog to low-
carbon development paths that would promote their economic devel-
opment and contribute to mitigating climate change in the medium 
to long run. Emerging economies, on the other hand, which are fur-
ther along the way of carbon-intensive development, are better able 
to adopt various mitigation options, but their gains from leapfrogging 
may be relatively smaller. For more rapidly growing economies, the 
opportunities to follow different mitigation paths are greater, as they 
are able to quickly install new energy production capacities and build 
up transport and urban infrastructure. However, once decisions have 
been made, lock-in effects will make it costly for them to readjust 
paths. In industrialized countries, the opportunities to leapfrog are 
small and the main challenge will be to drastically re-orient existing 
development paths and technologies towards lower-carbon intensity 
of production and consumption. We call this the ‘regional heteroge-
neity’ issue. 
Second, regional cooperation is a powerful force in global econom-
ics and politics — as manifest in numerous agreements related to 
trade, technology cooperation, trans-boundary agreements relating 
to water, energy, transport, and so on. From loose free-trade areas in 
many developing countries to deep integration involving monetary 
union in the EU, regional integration has built up platforms of coop-
eration among countries that could become the central institutional 
forces to undertake regionally coordinated mitigation activities. Some 
regions, most notably the EU, already cooperate on mitigation, using a 
carbon-trading scheme and binding regulations on emissions. Others 
have focused on trade integration, which might have repercussions on 
the mitigation challenge. It is critical to examine to what extent these 
forms of cooperation have already had an impact on mitigation and to 
what extent they could play a role in achieving mitigation objectives 
(Section 14.3). We call this the ‘regional cooperation and integration 
issue’.
Third, efforts at the regional level complement local, domestic efforts 
on the one hand and global efforts on the other hand. They offer the 
potential of achieving critical mass in the size of markets required 
to make policies, for example, on border tax adjustment, in exploit-
ing opportunities in the energy sector or infrastructure, or in creating 
regional smart grids required to distribute and balance renewable 
energy. 
Given the policy focus of this chapter and the need to distinguish 
regions by their levels of economic development, this chapter adopts 
regional definitions that are based on a combination of economic and 
geographic considerations. In particular, the chapter considers the fol-
lowing 10 regions: East Asia (China, Korea, Mongolia) (EAS); Econo-
mies in Transition (Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union) (EIT); Latin 
America and Caribbean (LAM); Middle East and North Africa (MNA); 
North America (USA, Canada) (NAM); Pacific Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD)-1990 members (Japan, 
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Australia, New Zealand) (POECD); South East Asia and Pacific (PAS); 
South Asia (SAS); sub-Saharan Africa (SSA); Western Europe (WEU). 
These regions can, with very minor deviations, readily be aggregated 
to regions used in scenarios and integrated models. They are also con-
sistent with commonly used World Bank regional classifications, and 
can be aggregated into the geographic regions used by WGII. However, 
if dictated by the reviewed literature, in some cases other regional 
classifications are used. Regional cooperation initiatives define regions 
by membership of these ventures. The least-developed countries (LDC) 
region is orthogonal to the above regional definitions and includes 
countries from SSA, SAS, PAS, and LAM.
14�1�3 Sustainable development and mitigation 
capacity at the regional level
Sustainable development refers to the aspirations of regions to attain 
a high level of well-being without compromising the opportunities of 
future generations. Climate change relates to sustainable development 
because there might be tradeoffs between development aspirations 
and mitigation. Moreover, limited economic resources, low levels of 
technology, poor information and skills, poor infrastructure, unstable 
or weak institutions, and inequitable empowerment and access to 
resources compromise the capacity to mitigate climate change. They 
will also pose greater challenges to adapt to climate change and lead 
to higher vulnerability (IPCC, 2001).
Figure 14.1 shows that regions differ greatly in development outcomes 
such as education, human development, unemployment, and poverty. 
In particular, those regions with the lowest level of per capita emis-
sions also tend to have the worst human development outcomes. 
Generally, levels of adult education (Figure 14.1b), life expectancy 
(Figure 14.1c), poverty, and the Human Development Index (Figure 
14.1d) are particularly low in SSA, and also in LDCs in general. Unem-
ployment (Figure 14.1a) is high in SSA, MNA, and EIT, also in LDCs, 
making employment-intensive economic growth a high priority there 
(Fankhauser et al., 2008).
The regions with the poorest average development indicators also 
tend to have the largest disparities in human development dimensions 
(Grimm et al., 2008; Harttgen and Klasen, 2011). In terms of income, 
LAM faces particularly high levels of inequality (Figure 14.1f). Gen-
der gaps in education, health, and employment are particularly large 
in SAS and MNA, with large educational gender gaps also persisting 
in SSA. Such inequalities will raise distributional questions regarding 
costs and benefits of mitigation policies. 
When thinking about inter-generational inequality (Figure 14.2b), 
adjusted net savings (i. e., gross domestic savings minus deprecia-
tion of physical and natural assets plus investments in education and 
minus damage associated with CO2 emissions) is one way to measure 
whether societies transfer enough resources to next generations. As 
shown in Figure 14.2b, there is great variation in these savings rates. 
In several regions, including SSA, MNA, LAM, as well as LDCs, there 
are a number of countries where adjusted net savings are negative. 
Matters would look even worse if one considered that — due to sub-
stantial population growth — future generations are larger in some 
regions, considered a broader range of assets in the calculation of 
depreciation, or considered that only imperfect substitution is possible 
between financial savings and the loss of some natural assets. For 
these countries, maintenance of their (often low) living standards is 
already under threat. Damage from climate change might pose further 
challenges and thereby limit the ability to engage in costly mitigation 
activities. 
14�1�3�1 The ability to adopt new technologies
Developing and adopting low-carbon technologies might be one way 
to address the mitigation challenge. However, the capacity to adopt 
new technologies, often referred to as absorptive capacity, as well as 
to develop new technologies, is mainly located in four regions: NAM, 
EAS, WEU, and POECD. This is also shown in Figure 14.2a, which plots 
high-technology exports as share of total manufactured exports. High-
technology exports refer to products with high research and devel-
opment intensity, such as in aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, 
scientific instruments, and electrical machinery. As visible in the fig-
ure, these exports are very low in most other regions, suggesting low 
capacity to develop and competitively market new technologies. Since 
most technological innovation happens in developed regions, techno-
logical spillovers could significantly increase the mitigation potential in 
developing regions. 
While Section 13.9 discusses inter-regional technology transfer 
mechanisms, which could help foster this process, there is an emerg-
ing literature that looks at the determinants and precursors of suc-
cessful technology absorption. Some studies have found that for 
energy technologies, the more technologically developed a country 
is, the more likely it is to be able to receive innovations (Verdolini 
and Galeotti, 2011; Dechezleprêtre et  al., 2013). However, more 
recent work looking at a wider range of mitigation technologies finds 
that domestic technological development tends to crowd out foreign 
innovations (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2013). But the determinants of the 
receptivity of a host country or region go beyond the technological 
development of the receiving countries. Some of these aspects are 
relatively harder (or impossible) to influence with policy interven-
tions such as the geographical distance from innovating countries 
(Verdolini and Galeotti, 2011) and linkages with countries with CO2-
efficient economies (Perkins and Neumayer, 2009). However, other 
aspects can be influenced such as institutional capacity (Perkins and 
Neumayer, 2012), and in particular the strength of intellectual prop-
erty laws to protect incoming technologies (Dechezleprêtre et  al., 
2013).
Two further challenges for promoting mitigation in different regions are 
the costs of capital, which circumscribe the ability to invest in new low-
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Figure 14�1 | Social provisions enabling regional capacities to embrace mitigation policies. Statistics refer to the year 2010 or the most recent year available. The red bar refers to 
Least Developed Countries (LDC). Source: UNDP (2010), World Bank (2011).
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carbon technologies, and differences in governance. Figure 14.2 pres-
ents the lending interest rate (Figure 14.2c) to firms by region as well as 
the World Bank Governance index (Figure 14.2d). It shows that poorer 
regions face higher interest rates and struggle more with governance 
issues, both reducing the ability to effectively invest in a low-carbon 
development strategy. 
Conversely, there are different regional opportunities to promote miti-
gation activities. As discussed by Collier and Venables (2012a), Africa 
has substantial advantages in the development of solar energy and 
hydropower. However, as these investments are costly in human and 
financial capital and depend on effective states and policies, these 
advantages may not be realized unless the financing and governance 
challenges discussed above are addressed.
In sum, differences in the level of economic development among 
countries and regions affect their level of vulnerability to climate 
change as well as their ability to adapt or mitigate (Beg et al., 2002). 
Given these regional differences, the structure of multi-national or 
multi-regional environmental agreements affects their chance of suc-
cess (Karp and Zhao, 2010). By taking these differences into account, 
regional cooperation on climate change can help to foster mitigation 
Figure 14�2 | Economic and governance indicators affecting regional capacities to embrace mitigation policies. Statistics refer to the year 2010 or the most recent year available. 
The red bar refers to Least Developed Countries (LDC). Source: UNDP (2010), World Bank (2011). Note: The lending interest rate refers to the average interest rate charged by banks 
to private sector clients for short- to medium-term financing needs. The governance index is a composite measure of governance indicators compiled from various sources, rescaled 
to a scale of 0 to 1, with 0 representing weakest governance and 1 representing strongest governance.
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that considers distributional aspects, and can help addressing climate-
change impacts (Asheim et  al., 2006). At the same time, disparities 
between and within regions diminish the opportunities that countries 
have to undertake effective mitigation policies (Victor, 2006).
14.2 Low-carbon development 
at the regional level: 
opportunities and barriers
There are great differences in the mitigation potential of regions. One 
way to assess these heterogeneities is through integrated models on 
the regional distribution of costs of mitigation pathways as well as 
regional modelling exercises that compare integrated model results 
for particular regions. The region-specific results are discussed in detail 
in Chapter 6 using a higher level of regional aggregation than adopted 
here (Section 6.3.6.4). They show that in an idealized scenario with a 
universal carbon price, where mitigation costs are distributed in the 
most cost-effective manner across regions, the macroeconomic costs 
of mitigation differ considerably by region. In particular, in OECD 
countries (including the regions WEU, NAM, and POECD), these costs 
would be substantially lower, in LAM they would be average, and in 
other regions they would be higher (Clarke et al., 2009; Tavoni et al., 
2014). These differences are largely due to the following: First, energy 
and carbon intensities are higher in non-OECD regions, leading to 
more opportunities for mitigation, but also to higher macroeconomic 
costs. Second, some developing regions face particularly attractive 
mitigation options (e. g., hydropower or afforestation) that would 
shift mitigation there. Third, some developing regions, and in particu-
lar countries exporting fossil energy (which are concentrated in MNA, 
but include countries in other regions as well), would suffer nega-
tive terms of trade effects as a result of aggressive global mitigation 
policies, thus increasing the macroeconomic impact of mitigation (see 
also Section 14.4.2). The distribution of these costs could be adjusted 
through transfer payments and other burden sharing regimes. The dis-
tribution of costs would shift towards OECD countries, if there was 
limited participation among developing and emerging economies (de 
Cian et al., 2013).
One should point out, however, that these integrated model results 
gloss over many of the issues highlighted in this chapter, including 
the regional differences in financial, technological, institutional, and 
human resource capacities that will make the implementation of such 
scenarios very difficult. 
As many of the region-specific opportunities and barriers for low-
carbon development are sector-specific, we will discuss them in the 
relevant sectoral sub-sections in Section 14.2.
14.3 Development trends and 
their emission implications 
at the regional level
14�3�1 Overview of trends in GHG emissions 
and their drivers by region
Global GHG emissions have increased rapidly over the last two decades 
(Le Quéré et al., 2009, 2012). Despite the international financial and 
economic crisis, global GHG emissions grew faster between 2000 and 
2010 than in the previous three decades (Peters et al., 2012b). Emis-
sions tracked at the upper end of baseline projections (see Sections 1.3 
and 6.3) and reached around 49 – 50 GtCO2eq in 2010 (JRC / PBL, 2013; 
IEA, 2012a; Peters et al., 2013). In 1990, EIT was the world’s highest 
emitter of GHG emissions at 19 % of global total of 37 GtCO2eq, fol-
lowed by NAM at 18 %, WEU at 12 %, and EAS at 12 %, with the rest 
of the world emitting less than 40 %. By 2010, the distribution had 
changed remarkably. The EAS became the major emitter with 24 % 
of the global total of 48 GtCO2eq (excluding international transport) 
(JRC / PBL, 2013; IEA, 2012a). The rapid increase in emissions in devel-
oping Asia was due to the region’s dramatic economic growth and its 
high population level.
Figure 14.3 shows the change in GHG emissions in the 10 regions 
(and additionally reporting for LDC including countries from several 
regions) over the period from 1990 to 2010, broken down along 
three drivers: Emissions intensity (emissions per unit of gross domes-
tic product (GDP)), GDP per capita, and population. As shown in the 
figure, the most influential driving force for the emission growth 
has been the increase of per capita income. Population growth also 
affected the emission growth but decreases of GHG emission intensi-
ties per GDP contributed to lowering the growth rate of GHG emis-
sions. These tendencies are similar across regions, but with notable 
differences. First, the magnitude of economic growth differed greatly 
by region with EAS showing by far the highest growth in GDP per cap-
ita, leading to the highest growth in emissions in the past 20 years; 
stagnating incomes in POECD contributed to low growth in emissions. 
Second, falling population levels in EIT contributed to lower emissions 
there. Third, improvements in the emission intensity were quantita-
tively larger than the increases in emissions due to income growth 
in all richer regions (WEU, POECD, NAM, and EIT), while the picture 
is more mixed in developing and emerging regions. Note also that 
in LDCs emissions were basically flat with improvements in emission 
intensity making up for increases in GDP and population.
Other ways to look at heterogeneity of regional GHG emissions are 
relative to the size of the total population, the size of the overall 
economy and in terms of sources of these emissions. These perspec-
tives are shown in the two panels of Figure 14.4. In 2010, NAM, EIT, 
POECD, and WEU, taken together, had 20 % of the world’s population, 
but accounted for 39 % of global GHG emissions, while other regions 
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with 80 % of population accounted for 61 % of global emissions (Fig-
ure 14.4). The contrast between the region with the highest per cap-
ita GHG emissions (NAM) and the lowest (SAS) is more pronounced: 
5.0 % of the world’s population (NAM) emits 15 %, while 23 % (SAS) 
emits 6.8 %. One of the important observations from Figure 14.4 (top 
panel) is that some regions such as SSA and PAS have the lowest lev-
els of per capita emissions of CO2 from non-forestry sources, but they 
have GHG emissions per capita that are comparable to other regions 
due to large emissions from land-use change and other non-CO2 GHG 
emissions.
The cumulative distribution of emissions per GDP (emission intensity) 
shows a strikingly different picture (Figure 14.4 bottom panel). The 
four regions with highest per capita emissions, NAM, EIT, POECD, and 
WEU, have the lowest GHG emission intensities (emission per GDP), 
except EIT. Some regions with low per capita emissions, such as SSA 
and PAS, have high emission intensities and also highest share of 
forestry-related emissions. This shows that a significant part of GHG-
reduction potential might exist in the forest sector in these developing 
regions (see Chapter 11).
14�3�2 Energy and development 
14�3�2�1 Energy as a driver of regional emissions
Final energy consumption is growing rapidly in many developing coun-
tries. Consequently, energy-related CO2 emissions in developing coun-
try regions such as EAS, MNA, and PAS in 2010 were more than double 
the level of 1990, while the CO2 emission in EIT decreased by around 
30 % (Figure 14.5). The composition of energy consumption also varies 
by region. Oil dominates the final energy consumption in many regions 
such as NAM, POECD, WEU, LAM, and MNA, while coal has the highest 
share in EAS. The share of electricity in final energy consumption has 
tended to grow in all regions.
When looking at trends in CO2 emissions by source (see Figure 14.5), 
the largest growth in total CO2 emissions between 1990 and 2010 has 
come from coal, followed by gas and oil. In this period, CO2 emissions 
from coal grew by 4.4 GtCO2 in EAS, which is equivalent to roughly half 
of the global net increase of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion. 
These observations are in line with findings in the literature emphasiz-
ing the transformation of energy use patterns over the course of eco-
Figure 14�3 | Decomposition of drivers for changes in total annual GHG emissions (excluding international transport) in different world regions from 1990 – 2010 (Logarithmic 
Mean Divisia Index (LMDI) method according to Ang, 2004). The white dots indicate net changes of GHG emissions from 1990 to 2010, and the bars, which are divided by three 
colours, show the impacts on GHG emission changes resulting from changes in population, GDP per capita, and GHG emission per GDP. For example, the white dot for EAS shows 
its emission increased by 7.4 Gt CO2eq, and the influence of the three driving factors are 1.2, 11, and – 5.1 GtCO2eq, which are indicated by red, yellow, and blue bars, respectively. 
Data sources: GHG emission data (in CO2eq using 100-year GWP values) from JRC / PBL (2013) and IEA (2012a), see Annex II.9; GDP (PPP) [Int$2005] from World Bank (2013a); 
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Figure 14�5 | CO2 emissions by sources and regions. Data source: IEA (2012a).
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Figure 14�4 | Distribution of regional GHG emissions (excluding international transport) in relation to population and GDP: cumulative distribution of GHG emissions per capita 
(top panel) and GDP (bottom panel). The percentages in the bars indicate a region’s share in global GHG emissions. Data sources: GHG emission data (in CO2eq using 100-year 
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nomic development from traditional biomass to coal and liquid fuel 
and finally natural gas and nuclear energy (Smil, 2000; Marcotullio and 
Schulz, 2007; Krausmann et al., 2008). Similar transitions in energy use 
are also observed for the primary energy carriers employed for electric-
ity production (Burke, 2010) and in household energy use (Leach, 1992; 
Barnes and Floor, 1996).
Due to its role in global emissions growth since 1990, it is worthwhile 
to look a little deeper into the underlying drivers for emissions in 
EAS, which have been increased by nearly 8 GtCO2eq between 1990 
and 2010. The major part of the increase has been witnessed in the 
years after 2002 (Minx et al., 2011). Efficiency gains and technological 
progress particularly in energy-intensive sectors that had a decreas-
ing effect on emissions (Ma and Stern, 2008; Guan et al., 2009; Zhao 
et al., 2010) were overcompensated by increasing effects of structural 
changes of the Chinese economy after 2002 (Liao et al., 2007; Ma and 
Stern, 2008; Guan et  al., 2009; Zhao et  al., 2010; Minx et  al., 2011; 
Liu et al., 2012a). Looking at changes from 2002 to 2005, Guan et al. 
(2009) find manufacturing, particularly for exports (50 %) as well as 
capital formation (35 %) to be the most important drivers from the 
demand side. Along with an increasing energy intensity of GDP, Steckel 
et  al. (2011) identify a rising carbon intensity of energy, particularly 
driven by an increased use of coal to have contributed to rapid increase 
in emissions in the 2000s. 
Figure 14.6 shows the relationship between GHG emissions and per 
capita income levels. Individual regions have different starting levels, 
directions, and magnitudes of changes. Developed regions (NAM, WEU, 
POECD) appear to have grown with stable per capita emissions in the 
last two decades, with NAM having much higher levels of per capita 
emissions throughout (Figure 14.6 top panel). Carbon intensities of 
GDP tended to decrease constantly for most regions as well as for the 
globe (Figure 14.6 bottom panel).
Despite rising incomes and rising energy use, lack of access to modern 
energy services remains a major constraint to economic development 
in many regions (Uddin et al., 2006; Johnson and Lambe, 2009; IEA, 
2013). The energy access situation is acute in LDCs (Chaurey et  al., 
2012) but likely to improve there and in other parts of the world in 
coming decades (Bazilian et al., 2012a). Of the world’s ‘energy poor’1, 
95 % live in Asia and SSA (Rehman et al., 2012). 
About 1.2 – 1.5 billion people — about 20 % of the global popula-
tion — lacked access to electricity in 2010 (IEA, 2010a, 2012b; World 
Bank, 2012; Pachauri et al., 2012, 2013; Sovacool et al., 2012; Sustain-
able Energy for All, 2013) and nearly 2.5 – 3.0 billion — about 40 % of 
the global population — lack access to modern cooking energy options 
(Zerriffi, 2011; IEA, 2012b; Pachauri et al., 2012; Sovacool et al., 2012; 
1 ‘Energy poor’ population is defined as population without electricity access and / or 
without access to modern cooking technologies (Rehman et al., 2012).
Rehman et al., 2012; Sustainable Energy for All, 2013). There is con-
siderable regional variation as shown in Table 14.1, with electricity 
access being particularly low in SSA, followed by SAS.
The lack of access to electricity is much more severe in rural areas 
of LDCs (85 %) and SSA (79 %) (IEA, 2010b; Kaygusuz, 2012). In 
developing countries, 41 % of the rural population does not have 
electricity access, compared to 10 % of the urban population (UNDP, 
2009). This low access to electricity is compounded by the fact that 
people rely on highly polluting and unhealthy traditional solid fuels 
for household cooking and heating, which results in indoor air pollu-
tion and up to 3.5 million premature deaths in 2010 — mostly women 
and children; another half-million premature deaths are attributed to 
household cooking fuel’s contribution to outdoor air pollution (Sath-
aye et al., 2011; Agbemabiese et al., 2012) (Lim et al., 2012); see Sec-
tion 9.7.3.1 and WGII Section 11.9.1.3). Issues that hinder access to 
energy include effective institutions (Sovacool, 2012b), good business 
models (e. g., ownership of energy service delivery organizations and 
finance; Zerriffi, 2011), transparent governance (e. g., institutional 
diversity; Sovacool, 2012a) and appropriate legal and regulatory 
frameworks (Bazilian et  al., 2012b; Sovacool, 2013). Despite these 
factors, universal access to energy services by 2030 is taking shape 
(Hailu, 2012).







Latin America and Caribbean 93.4 30
North America 100.0 0
East Asia 97.8 29
Western Europe 100.0 0
POECD 100.0 0
Sub-Saharan Africa 32.4 487
Middle East and North Africa 93.7 23
South Asia 62.2 607
Economies in Transition 100.0 0
South East Asia and Pacific 74.3 149
Total 79�5 1330
Note: Information missing for several small islands, Mexico, Puerto Rico, Suriname, Hong 
Kong SAR (China), North Korea, Macao SAR (China), Burundi, Cape Verde, Central Afri-
can Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Swaziland, Djibouti, 
Malta, Turkey, West Bank and Gaza, Bhutan. For OECD and EIT, no data are listed but 
presumed to be 100 % access; these are recorded in italics. Source: World Bank (2012).
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Figure 14�6 | Relationship between GHG emissions per capita and GDP per capita (top panel), and GHG emissions per GDP and GDP and per capita (bottom panel) (1990 – 2010). 
Data sources: GHG emission data (in CO2eq using 100-year GWP values) from JRC / PBL (2013) and IEA (2012a), see Annex II.9; GDP (PPP) from World Bank (2013a); and popula-
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14�3�2�2 Opportunities and barriers at the regional level 
for low-carbon development in the energy 
sector
The regional differences in opportunities and challenges for low-
carbon development in the energy sector described above arise due 
to patters of energy production and use, the local costs and capital 
investment needs of particular energy technologies, as well as their 
implications for regulatory capacity (Collier and Venables, 2012b).The 
choice of present and future energy technologies depends on the local 
costs of technologies. Local prices indicate the opportunity cost of dif-
ferent inputs. While in some regions diverting resources from other 
productive uses to climate change mitigation has a high opportunity 
cost, in others the cost is lower. 
Local costs mainly depend on two factors. First, they depend on the 
natural advantage of the region. An abundant endowment will tend to 
reduce the local price of resources to the extent that they are not freely 
traded internationally. Trade restrictions may be due to high transport 
costs or variability of the resource price, which reduces the return to 
exports and thereby the opportunity cost of using the resource domesti-
cally.
Second, local costs depend on the capital endowment of the region. 
Capital includes the accumulated stocks of physical capital and the 
financial capital needed to fund investment, the levels of human capi-
tal and skills, and the institutional and governance capacity required to 
implement and regulate economic activity. As shown in Section 14.1.3, 
developing regions are, to varying degrees, scarce in all of these types 
of capital. Borrowing costs for developing countries are high, educa-
tion and skill levels are a serious constraint, and lack of government 
regulatory capacity creates barriers (a high shadow price) on running 
large-scale or network investments. 
A number of features of energy production interact with local costs 
and thereby determine the extent of uptake of particular technolo-
gies in different regions. In general, the high capital intensity of many 
renewable technologies (IEA, 2010c) makes them relatively more 
expensive in many capital and skill-scarce developing economies 
(Strietska-Ilina, 2011). Different energy generation technologies also 
use different feedstock, the price of which depends upon their local 
availability and tradability; for example, coal-based electricity genera-
tion is relatively cheap in countries with large coal resources (Hepton-
stall, 2007). 
Many power generation technologies, in particular nuclear and coal, 
but also large hydropower, create heavy demands on regulatory 
capacity because they have significant-scale economies and are long-
lived projects. This has several implications. The first is that projects 
of this scale may be natural monopolies, and so need to be under-
taken directly by the state or by private utilities that are regulated. 
Large-scale electricity systems have been ineffective in regions that 
are scarce in regulatory capacity, resulting in under-investment, lack 
of maintenance, and severe and persistent power shortages (Eberhard 
et al., 2011). The second implication of scale is that a grid has to be 
installed and maintained. As well as creating a heavy demand for capi-
tal, this also creates complex regulatory and management issues. This 
problem can be less severe in the cases where off-grid electrification 
or small-scale energy local energy systems (such as mini-hydro) are 
feasible and economically advantageous; but even in such cases, local 
institutional, financial, and regulatory capacity to build and maintain 
such facilities are a challenge in places where such capacity is low (see 
Chapter 7). 
Third, if scale economies are very large, there are cross-border issues. 
For example, smaller economies may have difficulty agreeing on 
and / or funding cross-border power arrangements with their neighbors 
(see Section 14.4). Several studies have examined the use of road-
maps to identify options for low-carbon development (Amer and Daim, 
2010), with some taking a regional focus. For example, a study by Doig 
and Adow (2011) examines options for low-carbon energy develop-
ment across six SSA countries. More common are studies examining 
low-development roadmaps with a national focus, such as a recent 
study that explores four possible low-carbon development pathways 
for China (Wang and Watson, 2008).
Regional modelling exercises have also examined different mitigation 
pathways in the energy sector in different regions. For example, the 
Stanford Energy Modeling Forum (EMF)28, which focuses on mitiga-
tion pathways for Europe suggests that transformation pathways will 
involve a greater focus on a switch to bioenergy for the whole energy 
system and a considerable increase of wind energy in the power sys-
tem until 2050 that catches up with nuclear, while solar PV is only 
of limited importance (Knopf et  al., 2013). By contrast, in the Asian 
Modeling Exercise (AME) for Asia it will involve a greater switch to 
natural gas with carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) and solar 
(van Ruijven et al., 2012).
Studies that examine potentials for low-carbon development within 
different locations frequently focus on specific technologies and their 
opportunities in a specific context. For example, there are several stud-
ies on low-carbon technology potential in SSA that focus on biomass 
(Marrison and Larson, 1996; Hiemstra-van der Horst and Hovorka, 
2009; Dasappa, 2011) and solar energy technologies (Wamukonya, 
2007; Munzhedzi and Sebitosi, 2009; Zawilska and Brooks, 2011). 
However, other technologies have perhaps less clear regional advan-
tages, including biofuels, which have been widely studied not just for 
use in Brazil or in Latin America (Goldemberg, 1998; Dantas, 2011; 
Lopes de Souza and Hasenclever, 2011) but also in South East Asia 
(focusing on Malaysia) (Lim and Teong, 2010) and in OECD countries 
(Mathews, 2007). Wind energy also has a wider geographic focus, 
with studies ranging from East and South Asia (Lema and Ruby, 2007; 
Lewis, 2007, 2011) to South America (Pueyo et  al., 2011), and the 
Middle East (Gökçek and Genç, 2009; Keyhani et al., 2010; Ilkılıç et al., 
2011). Examinations of geothermal energy and hydropower potential 
are likewise geographically diverse (Hepbasli and Ozgener, 2004; Alam 
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Zaigham et al., 2009; Kusre et al., 2010; Guzović et al., 2010; Kosnik, 
2010; Fang and Deng, 2011).
Many developing regions are latecomers to large-scale energy produc-
tion. While developed regions have sunk capital in irreversible invest-
ments in power supply, transport networks, and urban structures, 
many developing countries still need to do so. This creates a latecomer 
advantage, as developing countries will be able to use the new and 
more-efficient technologies that will be available when they make 
these investments. However, being a latecomer also implies that there 
are current energy shortages, a high shadow price on power, and an 
urgent need to expand capacity. Further delay in anticipation of future 
technical progress is particularly expensive (Collier and Venables, 
2012b).
While the opportunities for switching to low-carbon development in 
different regions are circumscribed by capacity in poorer countries or 
lock-in effects in richer countries, there are low-cost options for reduc-
ing the carbon-intensity of the economies through the removal of 
energy subsidies and the introduction of energy taxes. Energy subsidy 
levels vary substantially by region (IEA, 2012; OECD, 2012; IMF, 2013). 
Pre-tax consumption subsidies compare the consumer price to a world 
price for the energy carrier, which may be due to direct price subsidies, 
subsidies to producers leading to lower prices, or low production costs 
for energy producers, relative to world market prices. Note that pre-
tax figures therefore do not correspond to the actual fiscal outlays of 
countries to subsidize energy. In particular, for energy exporters, the 
domestic costs of production might be lower than the world market 
price and therefore a lower domestic price represents a lower fiscal 
outlay compared to an energy importer who pays world market prices 
(IEA, OECD, OPEC, and World Bank, 2010). Nevertheless, pre-tax figures 
represent the opportunity costs to these energy exporters (IEA, OPEC, 
OECD; and World Bank, 2011). An IMF policy paper (2013), reports that 
in MNA as well as EIT, pre-tax energy subsidies are very high as a share 
of GDP. Also in SAS, energy subsidies are substantial, and there are also 
some subsidies in LAM and SSA where they are concentrated among 
fuel exporters (IMF, 2013). Similar data on pre-tax subsidies is available 
from the International Energy Agency (IEA) for a reduced set of coun-
tries. These data confirm the regional distribution of pre-tax energy 
subsidies, particularly their high level in MNA and EIT (IEA, 2012c).
The OECD (2012) provides an inventory of various direct budgetary 
transfers and reported tax expenditures that support fossil fuel pro-
duction or use in OECD countries. The OECD report finds that between 
2005 and 2011, these incentives tended to benefit crude oil and other 
petroleum products (70 % in 2011) more than coal (12 %) and natural 
gas (18 %) in absolute terms (OECD, 2012). 
Reducing energy subsidies would reduce the carbon-intensity of 
growth and save fiscal resources. A report prepared for the Group 
of Twenty Finance Ministers (G20) (IEA, OECD, OPEC, and World 
Bank, 2011) not only reports data on fossil fuel and other energy-
support measures, but also draws some lessons on subsidy reform. 
It concludes that three of the specific challenges facing developing 
countries are strengthening social safety nets and improving target-
ing mechanisms for subsidies; informing the public and implement-
ing social policy or compensatory measures; and implementing the 
reform in the context of broader energy sector reform (IEA, OECD, 
OPEC, and World Bank, 2011).This issue, as well as the political econ-
omy of fuel subsidies and fuel taxation, is discussed in more detail in 
Section 15.5.
14�3�3 Urbanization and development
14�3�3�1 Urbanization as a driver of regional emissions
Urbanization has been one of the most profound socioeconomic and 
demographic trends during the past decades, particularly in less-urban-
ized developed regions (UNDESA, 2010), see Section  12.2. Accom-
panying the changes in industrial structure and economic develop-
ment, urbanization tends to increase fossil fuel consumption and CO2 
emissions at the global level (Jones, 1991; York et al., 2003; Cole and 
Neumayer, 2004; York, 2007; Liddle and Lung, 2010). Studies of the 
net impact of urbanization on energy consumption based on histori-
cal data suggest that — after controlling for industrialization, income 
growth and population density — a 1 % of increase in urbanization 
increases energy consumption per unit of GDP by 0.25 % (Parikh and 
Shukla, 1995) to 0.47 % (Jones, 1991), and increases carbon emissions 
per unit of energy use by 0.6 % to 0.75 % (Cole and Neumayer, 2004). 
However, the impact of urbanization on energy use and carbon emis-
sions differs remarkably across regions and development level (Pou-
manyvong and Kaneko, 2010; Martínez-Zarzoso and Maruotti, 2011; 
Poumanyvong et al., 2012). For instance, LAM has a similar urbanization 
level as NAM and WEU, but substantially lower per capita CO2 emis-
sions because of its lower-income level (World Bank, 2013b). In SSA, 
the per capita carbon emissions remained unchanged in the past four 
decades (JRC / PBL, 2013; IEA, 2012a), while the urbanization level of the 
region almost doubled (UNDESA, 2011). This is because in SSA the rapid 
urbanization was not accompanied by significant industrialization and 
economic growth, the so-called ‘urbanization without growth’ (Easterly, 
1999; Haddad et al., 1999; Fay and Opal, 2000; Ravallion, 2002).
On the one hand, per capita energy use of developing countries is sig-
nificantly lower than in developed countries (Figure 14.7 left panel). On 
the other hand, per capita energy use of cities in developing regions 
is usually higher than the national average, while the relationship is 
reversed in developed regions (Kennedy et  al., 2009; Grübler et  al., 
2012). This is because in developing countries industrialization often 
happens through manufacturing in cities, while developed regions have 
mostly completed the industrialization process. Moreover, urban resi-
dents of developing regions usually have higher-income and energy-
consumption levels than their rural counterparts (see Section 12.3.2 
for a more-detailed discussion). This is particularly true in developing 
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Asia. In contrast, many cities in SSA and LAM have lower than national 
average per capita energy use because of the so-called ‘urbanization 
of poverty’ (Easterly, 1999; Haddad et al., 1999; Fay and Opal, 2000; 
Ravallion, 2002). Other studies reveal an inverted-U shape between 
urbanization and CO2 emissions among countries of different economic 
development levels. One study suggests that the carbon emissions 
elasticity of urbanization is larger than 1 for the low-income group, 
0.72 for the middle-income group, and negative (or zero) for the upper-
income group of countries (Martínez-Zarzoso and Maruotti, 2011).
Per capita energy consumption in cities of developing countries is 
shown to be generally lower (Figure 14.7 left panel). At the same time, 
studies reveal that cities in developing regions have significantly 
higher energy intensity than cities in developed regions (Figure 14.7 
right panel). Still, the majority of cities in both developed and develop-
ing countries (two-thirds in developed region and more than 60 % in 
developing regions) have lower than national average energy inten-
sity. Important factors that contribute to the varying energy intensities 
across cities are the different patterns and forms of urban settlements 
(Glaeser and Kahn, 2010; Grübler and Fisk, 2012; see Section 12.3.2 for 
a detailed discussion). Comparative analyses indicate that United 
States cities consume 3.5 times more per capita energy in transporta-
tion than their European counterparts (Steemers, 2003) because the 
latter are five times as dense as the former and have significantly 
higher car ownership and average distance driven (Kahn, 2000). Sub-
urbanization in the United States may also contribute to increasing 
residential fuel consumption and land-use change (Bento et al., 2005). 
See Section 12.4 for a more-detailed discussion on urban form as a 
driver for emissions. 
14�3�3�2 Opportunities and barriers at the regional level 
for low-carbon development in urbanization
Urbanization has important implications for global and regional miti-
gation challenges and opportunities. Many developing regions are pro-
jected to become more urbanized, and future global population growth 
will almost entirely occur in cities of developing regions (IIASA, 2009; 
UNDESA, 2011) (see Section 12.1). Due to their early stage of urban-
ization and industrialization, many SSA and Asian countries will inevi-
tably increase energy consumption and carbon emissions, which may 
become a barrier for these regions to achieve mitigation goals. Assum-
ing that the historical effect of urbanization on energy use and carbon 
emissions remains unchanged, the doubling of current urbanization 
levels by 2050 in many low-urbanized developing countries (such as 
India) implies 10 – 20 % more energy consumption and 20 – 25 % more 
Figure 14�7 | Per capita energy use (left panel), and energy intensity in cities compared with the national average by regions (right panel), in the year 2000. The per capita energy 
use of cities, represented by a dot above the green line, is higher than the national average; otherwise, is lower than the national average. Data sources: (1) city energy data is from 
Grübler et al. (2012); (2) national energy data is from IEA energy balances (IEA, 2010d).
0 30252015
National Energy Intensity in the Year 2000 [MJ/GDP (PPP) Int$2005]
1050 400300








































































Regional Development and Cooperation
14
Chapter 14
CO2 emissions (Jones, 1991). On the other hand, because they are still 
at an early stage of urbanization and face large uncertainty in future 
urban development trends (O’Neill et  al., 2012), these regions have 
great opportunities to develop energy-saving and resource-efficient 
urban settlements. For instance, if the African and Asian population 
increasingly grow into compact cities, rather than sprawl suburban 
areas, these regions have great potential to reduce energy intensity 
while proceeding urbanization.
An integrated and dynamic analysis reveals that if the world follows 
different socioeconomic, demographic, and technological pathways, 
urbanization may result in very different emission levels (O’Neill 
et al., 2010). The study compares the net contributions of urbaniza-
tion to total emissions under the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) Special Report on Emissions Scenarios SRES A2 and B2 
scenarios (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000). Under the A2 scenario, the 
world is assumed to be heterogeneous, with fast population growth, 
slow technological changes and economic growth. If all regions fol-
low the urbanization trends projected by the United Nations (UN) 
Urbanization Prospects (UNDESA, 2006), extrapolated up to 2100 by 
Grübler et  al. (2007), the global total carbon emissions in 2100 
increase by 3.7 GtC per year due to the impacts of urbanization 
growth (Figure 14.8). In a B2 world, which assumes local solutions to 
economic, social, and environmental sustainability issues, with con-
tinuous population growth and intermediate economic development, 
and faster improvement in environmentally friendly technology, the 
same urbanization trend generates a much smaller impact (1.1 GtC 
per year in 2100) on global total carbon emissions. Considering the 
differences in total emissions under different scenarios, the relative 
change in emissions due to urbanization under B2 scenarios (12 %) is 
also significantly lower than under A2 scenarios (15 %). Comparing 
the impacts in different regions, the 1.1 GtC per year more global 
total emissions due to urbanization under the B2 scenario is mostly 
due to East Asia, SAS and other less urbanized developing regions. 
Moreover, the relative changes in regional emissions due to urbaniza-
tion are also very significant in EAS (27 %), SAS (24 %), and SSA, 
MNA, and PAS (15 %), considerably higher than in other regions 
(<  10 %). Therefore, a growing urban population in developing 
regions will inevitably pose significant challenges to global mitiga-
tion. Moreover, it also has important implications for adaption. How-
ever, urban climate change mitigation policies and strategies can 
have important co-benefits by reducing the urban heat island effect 
(see Section 12.8.4). 
14�3�4 Consumption and production patterns in 
the context of development
As discussed in Section 5.4, the difference between production and 
consumption accounting methods are that the former identifies the 
place where emissions occur and the latter investigates emissions dis-
charged for the goods and services consumed within a certain geo-
graphic area. 
14�3�4�1 Consumption as a driver of regional emissions 
growth
Researchers have argued that the consumption-based accounting 
method (Peters, 2008) provides a better understanding of the common 
but differentiated responsibility between regions in different economic 
development stages (Peters and Hertwich, 2008; Davis and Caldeira, 
2010; Peters et al., 2011; Steinberger et al., 2012; Lenzen et al., 2012). 
Consequently, much research effort has been focused on estimating 
(1) country-level CO2 emissions from both production and consumption 
perspectives (Kondo et al., 1998; Lenzen, 1998; Peters and Hertwich, 
2006; Weber and Matthews, 2007; Peters et  al., 2007; Nansai et  al., 
2008; Weber et al., 2008; Guan et al., 2009; Baiocchi and Minx, 2010); 
and (2) the magnitude and importance of international trade in trans-
ferring emissions between regions (Davis and Caldeira, 2010; Peters 
et al., 2012b; Wiebe et al., 2012). Reviews of modelling international 
emission transfers are provided by Wiedmann et al. (2007), Wiedmann 
(2009), Peters et al. (2012a), and Tukker and Dietzenbacher (2013). 
During the period 1990 – 2008, the consumption emissions of EAS and 
SAS grew by almost 5 – 6 % annually from 2.5 to 6.5 GtCO2 and from 
0.8 to 2.0 GtCO2, respectively. The other developing regions observed 
a steadier growth rate in consumption emissions of 1 – 2.5 % per year. 
This growth is largely driven by flourishing global trade, especially 
trade between developing countries. The transfer of emissions via 
traded products between developing countries grew at 21.5 % annu-
ally during 1990 – 2008 (Peters et al., 2011).
While per capita consumption emissions in developed regions are 
far larger than the average level of developing countries, many high-
income households in large developing countries (e. g., China and 
India) are similar to those in developed regions (Feng et  al., 2009; 
Figure 14�8 | Impact of urbanization on carbon emissions in 2100 for the world under 
SRES A2 and B2 scenarios and by regions only under SRES B2 scenario. This figure is 
based on O’Neill et al. (2010), data for NAM from the United States, POECD from Japan, 
EIT from Russia, LAM from Mexico and Brazil, EAS from China, SAS from India, and other 
from Indonesia. The urbanization scenario follows UN Urbanization Prospects (UNDESA, 
2006), extrapolated up to 2100 by Grübler et al. (2007). The effect of urbanization on 
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Hubacek et  al., 2009). Along with the rapid economic developments 
and lifestyle changes in Asia, average consumption emissions have 
increased 72 %, 74 %, and 120 % in PAS, SAS, and EAS, respectively, 
and the growth is projected to be further accelerating (Hubacek et al., 
2007; Guan et  al., 2008). Per capita consumption emissions in LDCs 
have changed relatively little, due to minimal improvements in lifestyle. 
In fact, per capita consumption emission in SSA has slightly decreased 
from 0.63 tCO2 to 0.57 tCO2 (Peters et al., 2011).
Methodologies, datasets, and modelling techniques vary between 
studies, producing uncertainties of estimates of consumption-based 
emissions and measures of emissions embodied in trade. These issues 
and associated uncertainties in the estimates are addressed in detail in 
Section 5.2.3.6.
14�3�4�2 Embodied emission transfers between world 
regions
Figure 14.9 illustrates the net CO2 emission transfer between 10 world 
regions in 2007 using the Multi-Regional Input-Output Analysis (MRIO) 
method and economic and emissions (from fossil fuel combustion) 
data derived from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) Version 8. 
Focusing on production-related emissions, the left-hand side of Figure 
14.9 explains the magnitudes and regional final consumption destina-
tions of production emissions embodied in exports. Percentage values 
represent total exported production emissions as a share of total pro-
duction emissions for each regional economy. Now, focusing on con-
sumption-related emissions, the right-hand side of Figure 14.9 illus-
trates the magnitudes and origins of production emissions embodied 
Figure 14�9 | Net transfer of CO2 emissions (from fossil fuel combustion only) between world regions in 2007 using the multi-regional input-output (MRIO) method. Flow widths 
represent the magnitude of emissions (in MtCO2) released by left-hand side regions that have become embodied (along global supply chains) in the goods and services consumed 
by the regions listed on the right-hand side. Figures for total exported production emissions and total imported consumption emissions are given, and the difference between 
these two measures is shown as either a net export or net import emissions transfer. Percentages on the left-hand side indicate the total exported emissions as percentage of total 
industry production emissions, while the percentage figures on the right-hand side indicate total imported emissions as percentage of the total industry consumption emissions. 
Data reports global CO2 emissions of 26.5 GtCO2 in 2007 (22.8 Gt from industry and a further 3.7 Gt from residential sources). The analysis is performed using the MRIO model and 
emissions data derived from GTAP Version 8 database, as explained and presented by Andrew and Peters (2013) .
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in regional final consumption imports. The associated percentages rep-
resent total imported consumption emissions as a share of total con-
sumption emissions. The difference between exported production 
emissions and imported consumption emissions are highlighted to rep-
resent the net emission transfer between regions.
For example, EAS was the largest net emission exporter (1102 MtCO2) 
in 2007, with total exported production emissions (1520 MtCO2) 
accounting for 27 % of total production emissions (5692 MtCO2), while 
imported consumption emissions (418 MtCO2) accounted for less than 
10 % of total consumption emissions (4590 MtCO2). OECD countries 
are the major destinations of export products in EAS. For example, 
NAM and WEU account for 34 % and 29 % of EAS’s total exported 
production emissions, respectively. In China, the largest economy in 
EAS, the share of embodied emissions in exports to total annual emis-
sions have increased from 12 % in 1987 to 21 % in 2002, further to 
33 % in 2005 (Weber et al., 2008), and settled around 30 % in 2007 
(Minx et  al., 2011). Producing exports have driven half of emissions 
growth in China during 2002 – 2005 (Guan et  al., 2009). Over 60 % 
of embodied emissions in Chinese exports in 2005, mainly formed by 
electronics, metal products, textiles, and chemical products, are trans-
ferred to developed countries (Weber et al., 2008). Based on the 2002 
dataset, Dietzenbacher et  al. (2012) argue that the embodied emis-
sions in China may be over-estimated by more than 60 % if the distinc-
tion between processing exports and normal exports is not made. In 
contrast, WEU was the largest net emissions importer (870 MtCO2) in 
2007, with total exported production emissions (457 MtCO2) account-
ing for 16 % of total production emissions, while imported consump-
tion emissions (1327 MtCO2) accounted for 36 % of total consumption 
emissions.
Figure 14�10 | Growth in bilateral traded CO2 emissions between world regions from 1990 to 2008: Flow widths represent the growth in bilateral traded emissions (in MtCO2) 
between 1990 and 2008, exported from left-hand side region and imported by right-hand side region. Flows representing a growth greater than 30 MtCO2 are shown individually. 
Less significant flows have been combined and dropped to the background. Figures for the sum of all export / import connections of each region exhibiting positive growth are pro-
vided. Bracketed figures show the net growth in exported / imported emissions for each region after trade connections exhibiting negative growth (not shown in diagram) have been 
accounted for. Trade connections exhibiting significant negative growth include EIT to WEU (– 267 MtCO2), to EAS (– 121 MtCO2), to POECD (– 80 MtCO2), and to other regions (– 15 
MtCO2). Total growth in inter-region traded emissions between 1990 and 2008 is found to be 2.5 GtCO2 (this does not include intra-region traded emissions, e. g., between the 
United States and Canada). The analysis uses the emissions embodied in the bilateral trade (EEBT) approach.The input-output dataset, trade statistics, and emissions data derived 
from Peters et al. (2011).
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Figure 14.10 demonstrates (using the emissions embodied in the bilat-
eral trade (EEBT) method) that the embodied CO2 emissions in inter-
national bilateral trade between the 10 world regions have grown by 
2.5 Gt during 1990 – 2008. Considering exports, half of global growth is 
accounted for by exports from EAS (1226 MtCO2), followed by exports 
from MNA and SAS with 20 % (510 MtCO2) and 12 % (290 MtCO2) of 
global growth, respectively. The NAM region has increased imports 
by 621  MtCO2, with the three Asian regions providing 75 % of the 
increase. Although WEU observed positive import flows increase by 
610  MtCO2, it also saw a decrease of 268  MtCO2 in some bilateral 
trade connections, primarily from EIT (257 MtCO2). 
Many developing country regions have also observed considerable 
increases in imported emissions during 1990 – 2008. The total growth 
in developing countries accounts for 48 % of the global total. For 
example, EAS, PAS, and LAM have increased their imported emissions 
by 260 MtCO2, 242 MtCO2, and 212 MtCO2, respectively. Over half of 
the growth in EAS and LAM has been facilitated via trade with other 
developing country regions. While trade with other developing country 
regions has contributed over 90 % of increase in imported emissions 
to PAS and SAS. These results are indicative of further growth of emis-
sions transfers within the Global South.
Recent research efforts have investigated the embodied emissions 
at the sectoral level (Liu et al., 2012a; b; Lindner et al., 2013; Vetőné 
Mózner, 2013) and emission transfers between industrial sectors 
within or across country borders (Sinden et  al., 2011; Homma et  al., 
2012). Skelton et al. (2011) calculate total industrial sector production 
and consumption attributions to map the embodied emissions deliv-
ered from production to consumption end through the global produc-
tion systems. They find that Western Europe tends to be a net importer 
of emissions in all sectors but particularly so in the primary and sec-
ondary sectors.
14�3�4�3 Opportunities and barriers at the regional level 
for low-carbon development in consumption 
patterns
The growing discrepancy between production- and consumption-based 
emissions discussed above, is most likely related to changing struc-
tures of international trade, although carbon leakage associated with 
efforts to curb emissions in industrialized countries can play a role here 
as well. It is also related to the fact that demand for emission-intensive 
goods has not been reduced by as much as the production of emission-
intensive goods in industrialized countries. However, as identical goods 
can be produced with different carbon content in different countries, 
substitution processes need to be taken into account to assess how 
global emissions would change in reaction to a change of imported 
emissions (Jakob and Marschinski, 2013).
Climate change analysis and policies pay increasing attention to 
consumption (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000; Michaelis, 2003). Analy-
sis of household survey data from different regions shows that with 
improving income levels, households spend an increasing proportion 
of their income on energy-intensive goods (Figure 14.11) (O’Neill 
et  al., 2010). Households in SSA and PAS have much lower income 
levels than more-developed regions, and spend a much larger share 
of their smaller income on food and other basic needs. Households in 
the more-developed PAS and NAM, on the other hand, spend a larger 
share of their income on transportation, recreation, etc. With economic 
growth, households in less-developed regions are expected to ‘west-
ernize’ their lifestyles, which will substantially increase per capita and 
global total carbon emissions (Stern, 2006). Thus changing lifestyles 
and consumption patterns (using taxes, subsidies, regulation, informa-
tion, and other tools) can be an important policy option for reducing 
the emission-intensity of consumption patterns (Barrett et al., 2013). To 
the extent that carbon leakage (see Section 5.4.1) contributes to this 
increasing discrepancy between production and consumption-based 
emissions, border-tax adjustments or other trade measures (Ismer and 
Neuhoff, 2007) can be an option in the absence of a global agreement 
on mitigation. This is discussed in more detail below. 
14�3�5 Agriculture, forestry, and other land-use 
options for mitigation
Emission of GHGs in the Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land-Use 
(AFOLU) options sector increased by 20 % from 9.3 GtCO2eq / yr in 
1970 to 11.2 GtCO2eq / yr (Figure 5.18) in 2010, and contributed about 
22 % to the global total in 2010 (JRC / PBL, 2013; IEA, 2012a). Over 



































































































Figure 14�11 | Expenditure share of households and per capita income, 2001. House-
hold expenditure is based on Zigova et al. (2009) and O’Neill et al. (2010). Per capita 
GDP is from World Bank Development Indicators (World Bank, 2011).
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4.2 GtCO2eq / yr to 5.7 GtCO2eq / yr, and in the Forestry and Other Land 
Use (FOLU) sub-sector it rose from 5.1 GtCO2eq / yr to 5.5 GtCO2eq / yr 
(Section  5.3.5.4; see also Sections  11.2 and 11.3 for more-detailed 
sector-specific values). The AFOLU emissions have been relatively 
more significant in non-OECD-1990 regions, dominating, for example, 
total GHG emissions from Middle East and Africa (MAF) and LAM 
regions2 (see Section 5.3.5.4 and Figure 5.6, Sections 11.2 and 11.4, 
Figures 11.5 and 11.7). In the LDCs, more than 90 % of the GHG emis-
sions from 1970 – 2010 were generated by AFOLU (Figure 5.20), and 
emissions grew by 0.6 % per year over the past four decades (Box 5.3). 
As outlined in Section 11.2.3, global FOLU CO2 flux estimates are 
based on a wide range of data sources, and include different pro-
cesses, definitions, and different approaches to calculating emissions; 
this leads to a large range across global FOLU flux estimates (Figures 
11.6 and 11.7). For the period 1750 – 2011, cumulative CO2 fluxes have 
been estimated at 660 (± 293) GtCO2 based on the model approach of 
Houghton (2003, updated in Houghton, 2012), while annual emissions 
averaged 3.8 ± 2.9 GtCO2 / yr in 2000 to 2009 (see Table 11.1). In Chap-
ter 11 of this assessment, Figure 11.7 shows the regional distribution 
of FOLU CO2 over the last four decades from a range of estimates. For 
2000 to 2009, FOLU emissions were greatest in ASIA (1.1 GtCO2 / yr) 
and LAM (1.2  GtCO2 / yr) compared to MAF (0.56  GtCO2 / yr), OECD 
(0.21  GtCO2 / yr), and EIT (0.12  GtCO2 / yr) (Houghton, 2003; Pongratz 
et al., 2009; Hurtt et al., 2011; Pan et al., 2011; Lawrence et al., 2012); 
these are means across seven estimates, noting that in OECD and EIT 
some estimates indicate net emissions, while others indicate a net sink 
of CO2 due to FOLU. Emissions were predominantly due to defores-
tation for expansion of agriculture, and agricultural production (crops 
and livestock), with net sinks in some regions due to afforestation. 
There have been decreases in FOLU-related emissions in most regions 
since the 1980s, particular ASIA and LAM where rates of deforestation 
have decreased (FAOSTAT, 2013; Klein Goldewijk et  al., 2011; Hurtt 
et al., 2011). 
In the agriculture sub-sector 60 % of GHG emissions in 2010 were 
methane, dominated by enteric fermentation and rice cultivation (see 
Sections 5.3.5.4, 11.2.2, Figure 11.2). Nitrous oxide contributed 38 % 
to agricultural GHG emissions, mainly from application of fertilizer and 
manure. Between 1970 and 2010 emissions of methane increased by 
18 % whereas emission of nitrous oxide increased by 73 %. The ASIA 
region contributed most to global GHG emissions from agriculture, 
particularly for rice cultivation, while the EIT region contributed least 
(see Figure 11.5). Due to the projected increases in food production 
by 2030, which drive short-term land conversion, the contribution of 
developing countries to future GHG emissions is expected to be very 
significant (Box 11.6).
2 These belong to the so called five RC5 regions, which include ASIA, OECD-1990, 
LAM, MAF, and Economies in Transition (EIT) (see Annex II.2). The ten RC10 
regions (see also Annex II.2) used in this chapter further disaggregate OECD-1990 
(WEU, NAM, POECD), MAF (MNA and SSA), and ASIA (EAS, SAS, PAS).
Trajectories from 2006 to 2100 of the four Representative Concentra-
tion Pathways (RCPs) (see Table 6.2 in Section 6.3.2.1; Meinshausen 
et al., 2011) show different combinations of land cover change (crop-
land and grazing land) and wood harvest as developed by four inte-
grated assessment models and harmonized in the Hurtt et al. (2011) 
dataset. These results in regional emissions as illustrated by Figure 
14.12 show the results from one Earth System Model (Lawrence et al., 
2012). However, even using a common land cover change dataset, 
resulting forest cover, net CO2 flux, and climate change vary substan-
tially across different Earth System Models (Brovkin et al., 2013). Fur-
thermore, as shown by Popp et  al. (2013) projections regarding 
regional land cover changes and related emissions can vary substan-
tially across different integrated models for the same concentration 
scenario (see Figure 11.19).
Mitigation options in the AFOLU sector mainly focus on reducing 






























































Figure 14�12 | Cumulative regional emissions of CO2 from AFOLU. The four RCPs 
developed for this Assessment Report explore the implications of a broad range of 
future GHG concentration trajectories, resulting in a range of radiative forcing values 
in the year 2100: 2.6, 4.5, 6.0, and 8.5 Watts per square meter (see Table 6.2 in Sec-
tion 6.3.2.1; Meinshausen et al., 2011). Past and future land cover change and wood 
harvest data was from Hurtt et al. (2011). The historical period is from 1850 to 2005, 
the RCPs cover the period from 2005 to 2100. This figure shows results running the 
scenarios in the Community Climate System Model (CCSM4) (Lawrence et al., 2012) as 
illustrative of one of several Earth System Model results presented in the IPCC Working 
Group I Report.
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generate energy to displace fossil fuels (Table 11.2). As such, poten-
tial activities involve reducing deforestation, increasing forest cover, 
agroforestry, agriculture, and livestock management, and the produc-
tion of sustainable renewable biomass energy (Sathaye et al., 2005; 
Smith et  al., 2013) (see Box 11.6). Since development conditions 
affect the possibilities for mitigation and leapfrogging, in business-
as-usual conditions, the current level of emission patterns is to persist 
and intensify (Reilly et al., 2001; Parry et al., 2004; Lobell et al., 2008; 
Iglesias et al., 2011a). This poses challenges in terms of these regions’ 
vulnerability to climate change, their prospects of mitigation actions 
and low-carbon development from agriculture and land-use changes. 
The WGII report shows that without adaptation, increases in local 
temperature of more than 1 °C above pre-industrial are projected to 
have negative effects on yields for the major crops (wheat, rice, and 
maize) in both tropical and temperate regions, although individual 
locations may benefit (see WGII 7.4). However, the quantification of 
adaptation co-benefits and risks associated with specific mitigation 
options is still in an emerging state (see Section 6.3.3 and 6.6) and, 
as referred to in Section 11.5.5, subject to technological but also soci-
etal constraints.
Moreover, linking land productivity to an increase in water irrigation 
demand in the 2080s to maintain similar current food production, 
offers a scenario of a high-risk from climate change, especially for 
regions such as South East Asia and Africa. These regions could benefit 
from more technology and investment, especially at the farm level, in 
the means of access to irrigation for food production to decrease the 
impacts of climate change (Iglesias et al., 2011b). ‘Bottom-up’ regional 
strategies to merge market forces, domestic policies, and finance have 
been recommended for LAM (Nepstad et  al., 2013). Region-specific 
strategies are needed to allow for flexibility in the face of impacts and 
to create synergies with development policies that enhance adaptive 
lower levels of risk. This is the case for NAM, Western and Eastern 
Europe, and POECD, but also South East Asia, Central America, and 
Central Africa (Iglesias et al., 2011a). 
Studies reveal large differences in the regional mitigation potential as 
well as clear differences in the ranking of the most-effective options 
(see Section 11.6.3). For a range of different mitigation scenarios across 
the RC5 regions and all AFOLU measures, ASIA shows the largest eco-
nomic mitigation potential, both in forestry and agriculture, followed 
by LAM, OECD-1990, MAF, and EIT. Reduced deforestation dominates 
the forestry mitigation potential in LAM and MAF, but shows very lit-
tle potential in OECD-1990 and EIT. Forest management, followed by 
afforestation, dominate in OECD-1990, EIT, and ASIA (see Figure 11.19). 
Among agricultural measures, almost all of the global potential in rice 
management practices is in ASIA, and the large potential for restoration 
of organic soils also in ASIA (due to cultivated South East Asian peats), 
and OECD-1990 (due to cultivated Northern peatlands). 
Although climate and non-climate policies have been key to foster 
opportunities for adaptation and mitigation regarding forestry and 
agriculture, the above-mentioned scenarios imply very different abili-
ties to reduce emissions from land-use change and forestry in dif-
ferent regions, with the RCP 4.5 implying the most ambitious reduc-
tions. Reducing the gap between technical potential and realized 
mitigation requires, in addition to market-based trading schemes, 
the elimination of barriers to implementation, including climate and 
non-climate policy, and institutional, social, educational, and eco-
nomic constraints (Smith et  al., 2008). Opportunities for coopera-
tion schemes arise at the regional level as, for instance, combining 
reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD)+ 
and market transformation, which could potentially mitigate climate 
change impacts by linking biodiversity, regional development and 
cooperation favouring conservation (Nepstad et  al., 2013), or river 
basin management planning (Cooper et  al., 2008; González-Zeas 
et al., 2012).
14�3�6 Technology transfer, low-carbon 
 development, and opportunities for 
leapfrogging
The notion of ‘leapfrogging’ has particular resonance in climate 
change mitigation. It suggests that developing countries might be 
able to follow more sustainable, low-carbon development path-
ways and avoid the more emissions-intensive stages of develop-
ment that were previously experienced by industrialized nations 
(Goldemberg, 1998; Davison et al., 2000; Lee and Kim, 2001; Perkins, 
2003; Gallagher, 2006; Ockwell et al., 2008; Walz, 2010; Watson and 
Sauter, 2011; Doig and Adow, 2011). Other forms of technological 
change that are more gradual than leapfrogging include the adop-
tion of incrementally cleaner or more energy-efficient technologies 
that are commercially available (Gallagher, 2006).The evidence for 
whether such low-carbon technology transitions can or have already 
occurred, as well as specific models for low-carbon development, 
have been increasingly addressed in the literature reviewed in this 
section. 
Most of the energy-leapfrogging literature deals with how latecomer 
countries can catch up with the energy-producing or consuming tech-
nologies of industrialized countries (Goldemberg, 1998; Perkins, 2003; 
Unruh and Carrillo-Hermosilla, 2006; Watson and Sauter, 2011; Lewis, 
2012). Case studies of successful leapfrogging have shown that 
both the build-up of internal knowledge within a country or indus-
try and the access to external knowledge are crucial (Lee and Kim, 
2001; Lewis, 2007, 2011; Watson and Sauter, 2011). The increasing 
specialization in global markets can make it increasingly difficult for 
developing countries to gain access to external knowledge (Watson 
and Sauter, 2011). Other studies have identified clear limits to leap-
frogging, for example, due to barriers in introducing advanced energy 
technologies in developing countries where technological capabilities 
to produce or integrate the technologies may be deficient (Gallagher, 
2006). 
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14�3�6�1 Examining low-carbon leapfrogging across and 
within regions
The strategies used by countries to leapfrog exhibit clear regional dif-
ferences. Many cases of technological leapfrogging have been docu-
mented in emerging Asia, including the Korean steel (D’Costa, 1994) 
and automobile industries (Lee, 2005; Yoon, 2009), and the wind 
power industries in China and India (Lema and Ruby, 2007; Lewis, 
2007, 2011, 2012; Ru et al., 2012). Within Latin America, much atten-
tion has been focused on leapfrogging in transportation fuels, and 
specifically the Brazilian ethanol program (Goldemberg, 1998; Dantas, 
2011; Souza and Hasenclever, 2011). 
Absorptive capacity, i. e., the ability to adopt, manage, and develop 
new technologies, has been identified in the literature as a core condi-
tion for successful leapfrogging (Katz, 1987; Lall, 1987, 1998; Kim, 
1998; Lee and Kim, 2001; Watson and Sauter, 2011). While difficult to 
measure, absorptive capacity includes technological capabilities, 
knowledge, and skills. It is therefore useful to examine regional differ-
ences across such technological capabilities, using metrics such as the 
number of researchers within a country, and total research and devel-
opment (R&D) invested. These metrics are investigated on a national 
and regional basis in Figure 14.13 along with total CO2 emissions from 
energy use. 
14�3�6�2 Regional approaches to promote technologies 
for low-carbon development
The appropriateness of different low-carbon development pathways 
relies on factors that may vary substantially by region, including the 
nature of technologies and their appropriateness within different 
regions, the institutional architectures and related barriers and incen-
tives, and the needs of different parts of society within and across 
Figure 14�13 | Emissions contribution and innovative capacity: regional comparison. Source: Data on researchers and R&D expenditures as percentage of GDP from the OECD 
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regions. As a result, an appropriate low-carbon development pathway 
for a rapidly emerging economy in EAS may not be appropriate for 
countries in PAS or SSA (Ockwell et  al., 2008). Low-carbon develop-
ment pathways could also be influenced by climatic or ecological 
considerations, as well as renewable resource endowments (Gan and 
Smith, 2011). 
Regional institutions for low-carbon development
Many studies propose that regions could be a basis for establishing 
low-carbon technology innovation and diffusion centres (Carbon Trust, 
2008). Such centres could “enhance local and regional engagement 
with global technological developments” and “catalyze domestic 
capacity to develop, adapt and diffuse beneficial innovations” (Carbon 
Figure 14�14 | Options for regionally coordinated climate technology networks. Upper map illustrates a network of climate technology research, development, and demonstration 
(RD&D) centers (large circles) with a small secretariat (small circle); lower map illustrates a network of climate technology RD&D centers with national hubs (red dots) and regional 
centers (yellow shapes). Source: Cochran et al. (2010).
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Trust, 2008). In a report prepared for the United Nations Environment 
Program (UNEP) by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) 
and the Energy Research Center of the Netherlands (ECN), several 
options for structuring climate technology centres and networks were 
presented that focus on establishing regionally based, linked networks, 
as illustrated in Figure 14.14 (Cochran et  al., 2010). A Climate Tech-
nology Center and Network (CTCN) was formally established by the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
at the Conference of Parties (COP)  17 as part of the Cancun Agree-
ments. The CTCN, confirmed during COP 18 in Doha, is jointly managed 
by UNEP and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO), an advisory board, and 11 regionally based technology insti-
tutes serving as the CTCN consortium (UNEP Risoe Centre, 2013). The 
structure of the CTCN is therefore similar to the one illustrated in the 
left map in Figure 14.14.
14�3�7 Investment and finance, including the 
role of public and private sectors and 
public private partnerships 
Since the signature of the UNFCCC in 1992, public finance streams 
have been allocated for climate change mitigation and adaptation in 
developing countries, e. g., through the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF) and the Climate Investment Funds of the World Bank, but also 
through bilateral flows (for a discussion of existing and proposed pub-
lic climate finance instruments, see Chapter 16). Moreover, since the 
setup of the pilot phase for Activities Implemented Jointly in 1995 and 
the operationalization of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
and Joint Implementation (JI) from 2001 onwards, private finance 
has flown into mitigation projects abroad (for an assessment of these 
mechanisms, see Section 13.13.1). In this section, regional differences 
are assessed in use of public finance instruments and private finance 
triggered by market mechanisms.
14�3�7�1 Participation in climate-specific policy 
instruments related to financing
The CDM has developed a distinct pattern of regional clustering of 
projects and buyers of emission credits. Projects are concentrated in 
EAS, SAS, and LAM. PAS has a lower level of participation, while EIT, 
MNA, and SSA are lagging behind. Credit buyers are concentrated in 
WEU (see Figure 14.15 for project volumes). This pattern has been rela-
tively stable since 2006, although in 2011 and 2012 the distribution 
has become more balanced in terms of volumes.
The reasons for the skewed regional concentration of CDM projects have 
been thoroughly researched. Jung (2006) assesses host country attrac-
tiveness through a cluster analysis, by looking at mitigation potential, 
institutional CDM capacity, and general investment climate. Jung’s pre-
diction that China, India, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, and Thailand would 
dominate was fully vindicated, and only Argentina and South Africa did 
not perform as well as expected. Oleschak and Springer (2007) evaluate 
host country risk according to the Kyoto-related institutional environ-
ment, the general regulatory environment, and the economic environ-
ment, and derive similar conclusions. Castro and Michaelowa (2010) 
assess grey literature on host country attractiveness and find that even 
discounting of CDM credits from advanced developing countries would 
not be sufficient to bring more projects to low-income countries. Okubo 
and Michaelowa (2010) find that capacity building is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for successful implementation of CDM projects. 
Van der Gaast el al. (2009) discusses how technology transfer could 
contribute to a more equitable distribution of projects.
For CDM programmes of activities that allow bundling an unlimited 
number of projects, the distribution differs markedly. According to the 
UNEP Riso Centre (2013), the SSA’s share is 10 times higher than for 
ordinary CDM projects, while EAS and SAS’s share are one-third lower.
LAM region’s share remains the same. The reason for this more-bal-
anced distribution is the higher attractiveness of small-scale projects 
in a low-income context (Hayashi et  al., 2010). However, high fixed-
transaction costs of the CDM project cycle are a significant barrier for 
small-scale projects (Michaelowa and Jotzo, 2005).
The distribution of JI projects, of which 90 % are implemented in the 
EIT region, was not predicted by Oleschak and Springer (2007)’s list of 
most-attractive JI countries. The shares have not shifted substantially 
over time.
Figure 14.15 shows the regional distribution of pre-2013 credit vol-
umes for annual CDM project cohorts. It confirms the regionally skewed 
distribution of CDM projects. In contrast, the 880 climate change proj-
ects of the GEF (a total of 3.1 billion current USD spent since the early 
1990s) do not show a significant regional imbalance when assessed 
in terms of numbers. Once volumes are assessed, they are somewhat 
skewed towards EAS and SAS. Academic literature has evaluated the 
regional distribution of GEF projects only to a very limited extent. Mee 
et al. (2008) note that there is a correlation between national emis-
sions level and the number of GEF mitigation projects, which would 
Figure 14�15 | Regional distribution of pre-2013 credit volumes for annual CDM 
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lead to a concentration of projects in the same countries that have a 
high share in CDM projects. Dixon et al. (2010) describe the regional 
distribution of the energy efficiency, renewable energy, and transport 
project portfolio, but do not discuss what drives this distribution.
While the general direction of bilateral climate finance flows from 
the North to the South is clear, regional specificities have only par-
tially been addressed by the literature. Atteridge et al. (2009) assess 
the 2008 climate finance flows from France, Germany, and Japan as 
well as the European Investment Bank and find that 64 % of mitigation 
finance went to Asia and Oceania, 9 % to SSA, 8 % to MNA, and 5 % 
to LAM. With 11 %, EIT had a surprisingly high share. Climate Funds 
Update (2013) provides data on pledges, deposits, and recipients of 
the fast-start finance committed in the Copenhagen Accord. Of the 
31.4 billion USD funds pledged by September 2011, 53 % came from 
Asia, 37 % from Europe, 9 % from North America, and 1 % from Aus-
tralasia. Of 3.1 billion USD allocated to approved projects, 44 % was to 
be spent in Asia, 37 % in Africa, 13 % in Latin America, 13 % in North 
America and 6 % in Europe. There is no recent peer-reviewed literature 
discussing flows from Multilateral Development Banks.
As of 2009, a total of 79 REDD readiness activities and 100 REDD dem-
onstration activities were reported (Cerbu et  al., 2011). REDD readi-
ness activities were evenly distributed among regions (21 in Amazon 
Region of South America, 19 in East Asia and the Pacific, 13 in Central 
America and the Caribbean, and 22 in Africa). In contrast, East Asia 
and the Pacific hold major REDD demonstration projects (40), followed 
by 31 in Amazon, 18 in Africa, and 2 in South Asia (Cerbu et al., 2011).
Thirty-six countries, mainly in Latin America (15), Africa (15), and Asia-
Pacific (8) participate in the global initiative Forest Carbon Partnership 
Facilities (Nguon and Kulakowski, 2013).
Other global and regional REDD+ initiatives include the UN-REDD 
Program, which aims to support REDD+ readiness in 46 partner coun-
tries in Africa, Asia-Pacific, and Latin America; the REDD+ Partnership, 
which serves as an interim platform for its partner countries to scale 
up actions and finance for REDD+ initiatives in developing countries; 
and the Forest Investment Program, which supports developing coun-
tries’ efforts to REDD and promotes sustainable forest management 
(den Besten et al., 2013) (see also Section 11.10). 
14.4 Regional cooperation and 
mitigation: opportunities 
and barriers
14�4�1 Regional mechanisms: conceptual
As a global environmental challenge, mitigation of climate change 
would ideally require a global solution (see Chapter 13). However, 
when global agreement is difficult to achieve, regional cooperation 
may be useful to accomplish global mitigation objectives, at least 
partially. The literature on international environmental governance 
emphasizes the advantages of common objectives, common historical 
and cultural backgrounds, geographical proximity, and a smaller num-
ber of negotiating parties, which make it easier to come to agreement 
and to coordinate mitigation efforts. As a caveat, regional fragmen-
tation might hamper the achievement of global objectives (Biermann 
et al., 2009; Zelli, 2011; Balsiger and VanDeveer, 2012). However, game-
theoretic models using the endogenous coalition formation framework 
suggest that several regional agreements are better than one global 
agreement with limited participation (Asheim et al., 2006; Osmani and 
Tol, 2010). The underlying reason is that endogenous participation in a 
global environmental agreement is very small since free-riders profit 
more from the agreement than its signatories unless the number of 
signatories is very small. 
The discussion in this section distinguishes between climate-specific 
and climate-relevant initiatives. Climate-specific regional initiatives 
address mitigation challenges directly. Climate-relevant initiatives 
were launched with other objectives, but have potential implications 
for mitigation at the regional level, e. g. regional trade agreements and 
regional cooperation on energy. This section will also address tradeoffs 
and synergies between adaptation, mitigation, and development at 
the regional level. Questions addressed in this chapter are in regard 
to what extent the existing schemes have had an impact on mitigation 
and to what extent they can be adjusted to have a greater mitiga-
tion potential in future. Since this section focuses on the mitigation 
potential of regional cooperation, well-being, equity, intra- and inter-
generational justice will not be considered (see Sections 3.3 and 3.4 
for a discussion on these issues).
An important aspect of regional mechanisms is related to efficiency 
and consistency. As GHGs are global pollutants and their effect on 
global warming is largely independent of the geographical location of 
the emission source, all emitters of GHGs should be charged the same 
implicit or explicit price. If this ‘law of one price’ is violated, mitigation 
efforts will be inefficient. This would imply that regions should strive 
for internal and external consistency of prices for GHGs. The law of one 
price should apply within and across regions. As regards internal con-
sistency, regional markets for GHG emission permits, such as the EU 
ETS, have the potential to achieve this goal at least in theory (Mont-
gomery, 1972). However, since existing trading schemes cover only a 
part of GHG emissions, the law of one price is violated and mitigation 
efforts tend to be inefficiently allocated. 
External consistency is linked to the problem of GHG leakage. Specifi-
cally, regional climate regimes can lead to both carbon leakage (dis-
cussed in Section 5.4.1) and a decrease in competitiveness for partici-
pating countries (discussed in Section 13.8.1). Thus, the specific policies 
addressing these concerns, particularly the latter, have a large impact 
on an agreement’s regional and national acceptability. One of the 
most widely discussed policies to correct for climate-related cost differ-
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ences between countries is border tax adjustments (BTAs), which are 
similar to the (non-climate) value-added tax in the EU (Lockwood and 
Whalley, 2010). There is agreement that BTAs can enhance competi-
tiveness of GHG- and trade-intensive industries within a given climate 
regime (Alexeeva-Talebi et al., 2008; Kuik and Hofkes, 2010; Böhringer 
et al., 2012; Balistreri and Rutherford, 2012; Lanzi et al., 2012). How-
ever, while BTAs ensure the competitiveness of acting countries, they 
lead to severe welfare losses for non-acting ones (Winchester et  al., 
2011; Böhringer et  al., 2012; Ghosh et  al., 2012; Lanzi et  al., 2012), 
particularly developing countries and the global South (Curran, 2009; 
Brandi, 2013). Other solutions to the problem of carbon leakage 
include incorporating more countries into regional agreements (Peters 
and Hertwich, 2008, p.  1406), and linking regional emission trading 
systems. Tuerk et al. (2009) and Flachsland et al. (2009) show that link-
ing regional emission trading systems does not necessarily benefit all 
parties, even though it is welfare-enhancing at a global level (see also 
Section 13.7).
14�4�2 Existing regional cooperation processes 
and their mitigation impacts
While there is ongoing discussion in the literature on the contin-
ued feasibility of negotiating and implementing global environ-
mental agreements (see Chapter 13), a distinct set of studies has 
emerged that examines international coordination through gov-
ernance arrangements that aim at regional rather than universal 
participation(Balsiger and VanDeveer, 2010, 2012; Balsiger and Debar-
bieux, 2011; Elliott and Breslin, 2011). Much of the literature adopts a 
regional focus (Kato, 2004; Selin and Vandeveer, 2005; Komori, 2010; 
van Deveer, 2011) or focuses on a particular environmental issue (Sch-
reurs, 2011; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2012). Since 60 % of the international 
environmental agreements are regional (UNEP, 2001; Balsiger et al., 
2012), this broader set of regional environmental agreements can 
provide insights on designing regional climate initiatives, although 
further research is needed. In addition, several regional environmen-
tal agreements have climate change components, such as the Alpine 
Convention’s Action Plan on Climate Change in the Alps in March 
2009 (Alpine Convention, 2009).
This section examines a variety of regional initiatives with climate 
implications. Figure 14.16 illustrates three major areas in which 
regional climate change coordination can be classified: climate-spe-
cific agreements, technology-focused agreements, and trade-related 
agreements. Most, but not all, regionally coordinated initiatives fit 
into one of these three categories, though some span multiple cate-
gories. In addition, some of the programs within each category have 
been implemented within a single geographic region, while others are 
intra-regional. The following sections examine regional initiatives with 
climate-specific objectives, trade agreements with climate implications, 
regional cooperation on energy, and regional cooperation schemes 
where mitigation and adaptation are important.
14�4�2�1 Climate specific regional initiatives
To date, specific regional climate policy initiatives have been rare, 
and they need to be distinguished from transnational initiatives that 
abound (Andonova et al., 2009). Grunewald et al. (2013) survey exist-
ing regional cooperation agreements on mitigation (except the agree-
ments in the European Union for which a large literature exists). Of the 
15 agreements surveyed, they find that most are built on existing trade 
or regional integration agreements or are related to efforts by donors 
and international agencies. Most relate to technology (see discussion 
below), some to finance, and some to trade. Few of them have been 
rigorously evaluated and the likely impact of most of these activities 
appears to be limited, given their informal and mostly voluntary nature. 
The technology-focused agreements are discussed in more detail 
below. The EU has been an exception to this pattern of rather loose and 
voluntary agreements, where deep integration has generated binding 
and compulsory market-based as well as regulation-based initiatives. 
Therefore, the discussion of impacts of the EU experience offers lessons 
of the promise and challenges to use regional cooperation mechanisms 
to further a mitigation agenda also for other regions.
Of the wide array of mitigation policy instruments (see Chapter  15 
for a discussion of such instruments), only emission trading systems 
have been applied on a regional scale: the EU ETS covering the EU’s 
27 member states, Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein; and the West-
ern Climate Initiative (WCI), which initially included several states in 
the United States and provinces in Canada, and now includes just Cali-
fornia and Quebec (see Section 13.7.1.2 for a detailed review). 
While the EU has tried over many years to introduce a common CO2 
tax, these efforts have failed and only a minimum level of energy 
taxes to apply across the EU could be defined. Most other supra-
national climate policy initiatives specialize on certain technologies. 
These include the Methane to Markets Initiative, the Climate Technol-
ogy Initiative, the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum, and the 
International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy, which are open 
for global membership (see Bäckstrand, (2008) for a summary of 
these initiatives). In selected cases regional initiatives have emerged, 
such as the Asia-Pacific Partnership for Climate Change, and the addi-
tion of regional collaboration in the framework of the UNFCCC (e. g., 
the Central Group 11 (CG 11) of Eastern European countries in transi-
tion or the African Group). An evaluation of these initiatives follows.
The EU ETS 
The EU ETS is a mandatory policy, which has evolved over a decade in 
strong interaction between the EU Commission, the European Parlia-
ment, member state governments, and industry lobbies (for an over-
view of the role of the different interests, see Skjærseth (2010). It has 
gone through three phases, and shifted from a highly decentralized to 
a centralized system. 
The EU ETS is by far the largest emission trading system in the world, 
covering over 12,000 installations belonging to over 4,000 companies 
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and initially over 2 Gt of annual CO2 emissions. It has thus been thor-
oughly researched (see Convery, (2009a), for a review of the literature, 
and Lohmann, (2011), for a general critique). 
How was institutional, political, and administrative feasibility achieved 
in the case of the EU ETS? According to Skjærseth and Wettestad 
(2009), from being an opponent of market mechanisms in climate 
policy as late as 1997, the EU became a supporter of a large-scale 
emissions trading system since 2000 due to a rare window of oppor-
tunity. The Kyoto Protocol had increased the salience of climate policy, 
and according to EU rules, trading could be agreed through a quali-
fied majority, whereas a carbon tax required unanimity. Industry was 
brought on board through grandfathering (Convery, 2009b) and the 
lure of windfall profits generated by passing through the opportunity 
cost of allowances into prices of electricity and other products not 
exposed to international competition. 
Environmental effectiveness of the EU ETS has essentially been deter-
mined by the stringency of allowance allocation. Initially, a decentral-
ized allocation system was put in place, which has been criticized by 
researchers as leading to a ‘race to the bottom’ by member states 
(Betz and Sato, 2006). Nevertheless, allowance prices reached levels 
of almost 40.5  USD2010 (30 EUR2008), which was unexpected by ana-
lysts, and in the 2005 – 2007 pilot phase triggered emission reductions 
estimated from 85  MtCO2 (Ellerman and Buchner, 2008) up to over 
170 MtCO2 (Anderson and Di Maria, 2011). The wide range is due to 
the difficulty to assess baseline emissions. Hintermann (2010) sees 
the initial price spike not as sign of a shortfall of allowances but as 
market inefficiency due to a bubble, exercise of market power or com-
panies hedging against uncertain future emissions levels. This is cor-
roborated by the fact that the release of the 2005 emissions data in 
April – May 2006 showed an allowance surplus and led to a price crash, 
as allowances could not be banked into the second period starting 
 
Figure 14�16 | Typology of regional agreements with mitigation implications. Figure includes selected regional agreements only, and is not comprehensive. While not all agree-
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2008 (see Alberola and Chevallier, (2009) for an econometric analysis 
of the crash). A clampdown of the EU Commission on member states’ 
allocation plan proposals for 2008 – 2012 reduced allocation by 10 % 
(230 million  tCO2 per year for the period 2008 – 2012) and bolstered 
price levels, the crash of industrial production due to the financial and 
economic crisis of 2008 led to an emissions decrease by 450 MtCO2 
and an allowance surplus for the entire 2008 – 2012 period. As a result, 
prices fell by two-thirds but did not reach zero because allowances 
could be banked beyond 2012, and the Commission acted swiftly to set 
a stringent centralized emissions cap for the period 2013 – 2020 (see 
Skjærseth, 2010, and Skjærseth and Wettestad, 2010, for the details of 
the new rules and how interest groups and member states negotiated 
them). This stabilized prices until late 2011. But again, the unexpected 
persistence of industrial production decreases led to a situation of gen-
eral over-allocation and pressure on allowance prices. The European 
Parliament and member states decided in late 2013 to stop auctioning 
allowances between 2013 and 2015 to temporarily take up to 900 mil-
lion allowances out of the market (‘backloading’). 
While there is a literature investigating short-term spot carbon price 
fluctuations, which attributes price volatility to shifts in relative coal, 
gas, and oil prices, weather, or business cycles (Alberola et al., 2008; Hin-
termann, 2010), the unexpected low prices in the EU ETS are more likely 
to be driven by structural factors. Four structural factors discussed in the 
literature are (1) the financial and economic crises (Neuhoff et al., 2012; 
Aldy and Stavins, 2012); (2) the change of offset regulations (Neuhoff 
et al., 2012); (3) the interaction with other policies (Fankhauser et al., 
2010; Van den Bergh et al., 2013); and (4) regulatory uncertainty and 
lack of long-term credibility (Blyth and Bunn, 2011; Brunner et al., 2012; 
Clò et al., 2013; Lecuyer and Quirion, 2013). There is no analysis avail-
able that quantitatively attributes a relative share of these explanatory 
factors in the overall European Union Allowances (EUA) price develop-
ment, but all four factors seemed to have played a role in the sense that 
the absence of any of them would have led to a higher carbon price. The 
following paragraphs briefly review each of the four price drivers. 
Financial and economic crises — the crash of industrial production 
due to the financial and economic crisis of 2008 led to an emissions 
decrease by 450  MtCO2 and an allowance surplus for the entire 
2008 – 2012 period. This has led to a decrease in EUA prices (Aldy et al., 
2003; Neuhoff et al., 2012) prices fell by two thirds but did not reach 
zero because allowances could be banked beyond 2012, and the Com-
mission acted swiftly to set a stringent centralized emissions cap for 
the period 2013 – 2020 (see Skjærseth (2010) and Skjærseth and Wet-
testad (2010) for the details of the new rules and how interest groups 
and member states negotiated them). This action stabilized prices until 
late 2011. Nonetheless, since then the price has again dropped and 
the surplus has reached approximately 2 billion tCO2 (European Com-
mission, 2013a). Schopp and Neuhoff (2013) argue that when the sur-
plus of permits in the market exceeds the hedging needs of market 
participants — which they find to be the case in the period from 2008 
to at least 2020 — the remaining purchase of allowance is driven by 
speculators applying high discount rates. As a consequence, the EUA 
price remains below its long-term trend in the short-term until suffi-
cient scarcity is back in the market.
Import of offsets — The use of offsets should not have influenced the 
price, as market participants should consider the future scarcity of off-
set credits and there is a limit to the maximum cumulated use of off-
sets between 2008 and 2020. Most large companies covered by the 
EU ETS engaged in futures contracts for CER acquisition as early as 
2006. However, changes in offset regulations in 2009 and 2011 led to 
a pressure to rapidly import Certified Emission Reductions and Emis-
sion Reduction Units (CERs, ERUs). As due to rapidly rising issuance of 
CERs, imports approached the maximum level allowed for the period 
2008 – 2020, price pressure on CERs / ERUs increased, which in turn 
generated pressure on the price of EUAs (Neuhoff et al., 2012). 
Interaction with other policies — Interaction of the EU ETS with other 
mitigation policies and the resulting effects on economic efficiency has 
been discussed by del Río (2010) for renewable energy and energy-effi-
ciency policies, by Sorrell et al. (2009) for renewable energy certificates, 
by Frondel et  al. (2010) for renewable feed-in tariffs, and by Kautto 
et al. (2012) for biomass energy. These studies find that other mitiga-
tion policies can drive the allowance price down due to a decrease 
in the demand of allowances (Fankhauser et al. 2010; Van den Bergh 
et  al., 2013). However, there is no robust scientific assessment that 
identifies which share of the price decline is due to expansion of renew-
able energy and improvement of energy efficiency. Section 15.7.3 deals 
with this issue of policy interactions such as those of the EU ETS and 
EU policies on energy efficiency, renewable, and biofuels in more detail, 
including also a welfare analysis of such interactions. 
Regulatory uncertainty and lack of long-term credibility — Regulatory 
uncertainty (Clò et al., 2013; Lecuyer and Quirion, 2013) and the lack 
of long-term credibility (Brunner et  al., 2012) might also have influ-
enced the decline of the carbon price. The uncertainties surrounding 
2030 and 2040 targets, potential short-term interventions to address 
the low allowance price, the outcome of international climate nego-
tiations, as well as the inherent lack of credibility of long-term com-
mitment due to potential time inconsistency problems (Brunner et al., 
2012) probably increases the discount rate applied by market partici-
pants on future carbon prices. Indeed, it has been pointed out that the 
current linear reduction factor of 1.74 % per year is not in line with 
ambitious 2050 emission targets (achieving only around 50 % emis-
sions reduction compared to the EU’s 80 – 95 % target) (Neuhoff, 2011). 
However, while lack of credibility as a factor driving EU ETS prices has 
been discussed in some theoretical articles, no empirical evidence on 
the magnitude of this factor on EUA prices is available.
Economic effectiveness of the EU ETS has been discussed with respect 
to the mobilization of the cheapest mitigation options. While cheap 
options such as biomass co-firing for coal power plants have been 
exploited, it is contested whether price levels of allowances have been 
1114
Regional Development and Cooperation
14
Chapter 14
sufficiently high after the 2005 and 2009 crashes to drive emissions 
reduction. Literature suggests that they have not been high enough 
to drive renewable energy investment in the absence of feed-in tariffs 
(Blanco and Rodrigues, 2008). Engels et al. (2008) surveyed companies 
covered by the EU ETS and found widespread evidence of irrational 
behavior, i. e., companies not mitigating even if costs were substan-
tially below allowance prices. Engels (2009) even finds that many com-
panies did not know their abatement costs. A barrier to participation 
in trading could have been the highly scale-specific transaction costs, 
which were estimated to reach over 2 EUR / EUA for small companies 
in Ireland (Jaraitė et al., 2010). Given that 75 % of installations were 
responsible for just 5 % of emissions in 2005 – 2006 (Kettner et  al., 
2008), this is a relevant barrier to market participation. Another way of 
mobilizing cheap options is increasing the reach of the EU ETS, either 
through linking to other trading schemes or by allowing import of off-
set credits. Anger et al. (2009) find that linking can substantially reduce 
compliance cost, especially if the allocation is done in an efficient way 
that does not advantage energy-intensive industries. Linking to the 
states of the European Economic Area and Switzerland has not been 
researched to a large extent, with the exception of Schäfer (2009), who 
shows how opposition of domestic interest groups in Switzerland and 
lacking flexibility of the EU prevented linking. Access to credits from 
the project-based mechanisms was principally allowed by the ‘Link-
ing Directive’ agreed in 2004. In 2005 – 2007, companies covered by 
the EU ETS could import credits from the mechanisms without limit, 
but access to the mechanisms has been reduced over time, e. g., by 
national level limitations in the 2008 – 2012 period and a central lim-
itation for 2013 – 2020. The import option was crucial for the devel-
opment of the CDM market (Wettestad, 2009) and drove CER prices. 
Skjærseth and Wettestad (2008), Chevallier (2010) and Nazifi (2010) 
discuss the exchange between the member states and the EU Commis-
sion about import thresholds for the 2008 – 2012 period. 
Distributional and broader social impacts of the EU ETS have not been 
assessed by the literature to date except for impacts on specific indus-
trial sectors. While the majority of allowances for the electricity sector 
are now sold through auctions, other industries receive free allocations 
according to a system of 52 benchmarks. Competitiveness impacts 
of the EU ETS have been analyzed intensively. Demailly and Quirion 
(2008) find that auctioning of 50 % of allocations would only lead to 
a 3 % loss in profitability of the steel sector, while in their analysis for 
the cement sector Demailly and Quirion (2006) see a stronger expo-
sure with significant production losses at 50 % auctioning. Grubb and 
Neuhoff (2006) and Hepburn et  al. (2006) extended this analysis to 
other sectors and concluded that higher shares of auctioning are not 
jeopardizing competitiveness. 
Summing up the experiences from the EU ETS, institutional feasibility 
was achieved by a structurally lenient allocation, which puts into doubt 
its environmental effectiveness. There was a centralization of allocation 
over time, taking competences away from national governments. Sev-
eral factors have pushed the carbon prices down in the second phase of 
the EU ETS. This has created a situation in which the target set by Euro-
pean policy makers is achieved, but carbon prices are low; while there 
are efforts to stabilize the carbon price through backloading or an ambi-
tious emission target for 2030, at the time of this writing it has proven 
politically difficult to reach agreement on these matters. Future reform 
of the EU ETS will need to clarify the objectives of the scheme, i. e., a 
quantitative emissions target or a strong carbon price (e. g., to stimulate 
development of mitigation technologies). The link to the project-based 
mechanisms was important to achieve cost-effectiveness, but this has 
been eroded over time due to increasingly stringent import limits.
14�4�2�2 Regional cooperation on energy
Given the centrality of the energy sector for mitigation, regional coop-
eration in the energy sector could be of particular relevance. Regional 
cooperation on renewable energy sources (RES) and energy efficiency 
(EE) typically emerges from more general regional and / or interre-
gional agreements for cooperation at economic, policy, and legisla-
tive levels. It also arises through initiatives to share available energy 
resources and to develop cross-border infrastructure. Regional coop-
eration mechanisms on energy take different forms depending, among 
others, on the degree of political cohesion in the region, the energy 
resources available, the strength of economic ties between participat-
ing countries, their institutional and technical capacity, and the finan-
cial resources that can be devoted to cooperation efforts. 
In this context, it is also important to consider spillovers on energy that 
may appear due to trade. As discussed in Chapter 6 (Section 6.6.2.2), 
mitigating climate change would likely lead to lower import depen-
dence for energy importers (Shukla and Dhar, 2011; Criqui and Mima, 
2012). The flip side of this trend is that energy-exporting countries 
could lose out on significant energy-export revenues as the demand 
for and prices of fossil fuels drops.3 The effect on coal exporters is very 
likely to be negative in the short- and long-term as mitigation action 
would reduce the attractiveness of coal and reduce the coal wealth of 
exporters (Bauer et al., 2013a; b; Cherp et al., 2013; Jewell et al., 2013). 
Gas exporters could win out in the medium term as coal is replaced 
by gas. The impact on oil is more uncertain. The effect of climate poli-
cies on oil wealth and export revenues is found to be negative in most 
studies (IEA, 2009; Haurie and Vielle, 2011; Bauer et  al., 2013a; b; 
McCollum et al., 2014; Tavoni et al., 2014). However, some studies find 
that climate policies would increase oil export revenues of mainstream 
exporters by pricing carbon-intensive unconventionals out of the mar-
ket (Persson et  al., 2007; Johansson et  al., 2009; Nemet and Brandt, 
2012). See also Section 6.3.6.6. 
In the following section, some examples of regional cooperation will be 
briefly examined, namely the implementation of directives on renew-
able energy resources in the EU (European Commission, 2001, 2003, 
2009b) and in South East Europe under the Energy Community Treaty 
3 See also Section 13.4 on burden sharing regimes that could be used to offset the 
possible decrease in export revenue for fossil exporters.
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(Energy Community, 2005, 2008 and 2010), and energy resource sharing 
through regional power pools and regional cooperation on hydropower. 
Regional cooperation on renewable energy in the European 
Union
The legislative and regulatory framework for renewable energy in the 
EU has been set up through several directives of the European Com-
mission adopted by EU member states and the European parliament 
(European Commission, 2001, 2003, 2009b). These directives are an 
example of a regulatory instrument, in contrast to the cap-and-trade 
mechanism of the EU ETS described above. In the past, the European 
Community adopted two directives on the promotion of electricity 
from renewable sources and on the promotion of biofuels (European 
Commission, 2001, 2003). These two EU directives established indica-
tive targets for electricity from renewable sources and biofuels and 
other renewables in transport, respectively, for the year 2010. Further-
more, they started a process of legal and regulatory harmonization 
and required actions by EU member states to improve the develop-
ment of renewable energy (Haas et al., 2006, 2011; Harmelink et al., 
2006). There was progress toward the targets, but it did not occur at 
the required pace (Rowlands, 2005; Patlitzianas et al., 2005; European 
Commission, 2009a; Ragwitz et  al., 2012). Therefore, the European 
Commission proposed a comprehensive legislative and regulatory 
framework for renewable energy with binding targets.
This led to the introduction of the Directive 2009 / 28 / EC on the promo-
tion of RES (European Commission, 2009b). In this directive, EU Mem-
ber States agreed to meet binding targets for the share of RES in their 
gross final energy consumption by the year 2020. The overall target for 
the European Union is 20 % of EU gross final energy consumption to 
come from RES by the year 2020. The share of renewables in gross final 
energy consumption has indeed increased substantially after passage 
of the directive and stands at around 13 % in 2011. 
The RES Directive is part of the EU climate and energy package 
(European Commission, 2008). As such, it has interactions with the 
other two pillars, namely the EU ETS and the EE-related directives. 
On the basis of model analysis, the European Commission (European 
Commission, 2011b) estimates that the implementation of the EU 
RES directive could represent an emissions reduction of between 
600 and 900 MtCO2eq by the year 2020 in the EU-27 compared to 
a baseline scenario (Capros et al., 2010). The introduction of regula-
tory instruments targeted at RES and / or EE on top of the EU ETS 
appears justified on the grounds of the failure of the market to 
provide incentives for the uptake of these technologies (European 
Commission, 2013a). Still, the combined emission reductions result-
ing from RES deployment and EE measures leave the EU ETS with a 
reduced portion of the effort necessary to achieve the 20 % EU emis-
sion reduction target by 2020 (e. g., European Commission, 2013a). 
This, as discussed above, has contributed to a reduced carbon price 
in the EU ETS (Abrell and Weigt, 2008; OECD, 2011a), affecting its 
strength as a signal for innovation and investments in efficiency 
and low-carbon technologies (e. g., European Commission, 2013b). 
Therefore, coordination between RES and EE policies and the EU ETS 
is needed and could include introducing adjustment mechanisms 
into the EU ETS.
The implementation of the EU directives for renewable energy and the 
achievement of the national targets have required considerable efforts 
to surmount a number of barriers (Held et al., 2006; Haas et al., 2011; 
Patlitzianas and Karagounis, 2011; Arasto et al., 2012). One obstacle 
is the heterogeneity between EU member states regarding their insti-
tutional capacity, know-how, types of national policy instruments 
and degrees of policy implementation (e. g., European Commission, 
2013c). Still, the EU directives for renewable energy have contributed 
to advancing the introduction of RES in the member states (Cardoso 
Marques and Fuinhas, 2012). This regional cooperation has taken 
place in the framework of a well-developed EU integration at the 
political, legal, policy, economic, and industrial level. Only with these 
close integration ties has it been possible to implement EU directives 
on RES.
Power pools for energy resources sharing
Power pools have evolved as a form of regional cooperation in the 
electricity sector and are an example of an opportunity for mitigation 
that only arises for geographically close countries. Electricity intercon-
nections and common markets in a region primarily serve the purpose 
of sharing least-cost generation resources and enhancing the reliabil-
ity of supply. Getting regional electricity markets to operate effectively 
supports mitigation programs in the electricity sector. Cross-border 
transmission systems (interconnectors), regional markets and trade, 
and system-operating capability play a major role in both the econom-
ics and feasibility of intermittent renewables. In some cases, power 
pools provide opportunities for sharing renewable energy sources, 
notably hydropower and wind energy, facilitating fuel switching away 
from fossil fuels (ICA, 2011; Khennas, 2012). In this context, there is a 
correlation between the development of the power pool and the abil-
ity of a region to develop renewable electricity sources (Cochran et al., 
2012). A combination of electricity sector reform, allowing power utili-
ties to be properly run and sustainable, and regional wholesale market 
development, with the corresponding regional grid development, is 
necessary to tap their potential.
An example of a well-established power pool is the Nord Pool, the 
common market for electricity in Scandinavia, covering Denmark, Swe-
den, Norway, and Finland. The Nordic power system is a mixture of 
hydro, nuclear, wind, and thermal fossil power. With this mix, the pool 
possesses sizeable amounts of flexible regulating generation sources, 
specifically hydropower in Norway. These flexible hydropower plants 
and pump storage plants allow compensating the inflexibility of wind 
power generation (e. g., in Denmark), which cannot easily follow load 
changes. Through the wholesale market, the Nord Pool can absorb and 
make use of excess wind electricity generation originating in Denmark, 
through complementary generation sources. This allows the Nord 
Pool to integrate a larger share of wind energy (e. g., Kopsakangas-
Savolainen and Svento, 2013).
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In Africa there are five main power pools, namely the Southern Africa 
Power Pool (SAPP), the West African Power Pool (WAPP), the East 
African Power Pool (EAPP), the Central African Power Pool (CAPP), 
and the Comité Maghrébin de l’Electricité (COMELEC). The SAPP, for 
example, includes 12  countries: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, South 
Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Tanzania, Angola, 
Mozambique, and Democratic Republic of the Congo. Its generation 
mix is dominated by coal-based power plants from South Africa, which 
has vast coal resources and the largest generation capacity within 
SAPP. Other resources available in the SAPP are hydropower from the 
northern countries and, to a lower extent, nuclear power, and gas and 
oil plants (Economic Consulting Associates (ECA), 2009; ICA, 2011). 
Overall the scale of trade within these power pools is small, leading 
to continued inefficiencies in the distribution of electricity genera-
tion across the continent (Eberhard et al., 2011). One of the driving 
forces in SAPP is supplying rapid demand growth in South Africa with 
hydropower generated in the northern part of the SAPP region. This 
way, the power pool can contribute to switching from coal to hydro-
power (ICA, 2011; IRENA, 2013). African power pools and related 
generation and transmission projects are financed through different 
sources, including member contributions, levies raised on transactions 
in the pool and donations and grants (Economic Consulting Associ-
ates (ECA), 2009). To the extent that financial sources are grants or 
loans from donor countries or multi-lateral development banks, there 
exists the possibility to tie financing to carbon performance standards 
imposed on electricity generation and transmission infrastructure 
projects. 
Regional gas grids
Regional gas grids offer similar opportunities for mitigation (see 
Chapter 7). In particular, they allow the replacement of high-carbon 
coal-fired and diesel generation of electricity by gas-fired plants. Such 
gas grids are developing in East Asia linking China with gas exporting 
countries as well as in Eastern Europe, again linking gas exporters in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia with consumers in Western Europe 
with the EU taking a coordinating role (Victor, 2006).
Regional cooperation on hydropower
Regional cooperation on hydropower may enable opportunities for 
GHG-emissions reduction for geographically close countries by exploit-
ing hydropower power potential in one country and exporting electric-
ity to another, by joint development of a transboundary river system 
(van Edig et  al., 2001; Klaphake and Scheumann, 2006; Wyatt and 
Baird, 2007; Grumbine et al., 2012), or by technology cooperation and 
transfer to promote small hydropower (UNIDO, 2010; Kumar et  al., 
2011; Kaunda et  al., 2012). The development of hydropower poten-
tial, however, needs to comply with stringent environmental, social 
and economic sustainability criteria as it has important ramifications 
Box 14�1 | Regional cooperation on renewable energy in the Energy Community
The Energy Community extends the EU internal energy market 
to South East Europe and beyond, based on a legally binding 
framework. The Energy Community Treaty (EnCT) establishing 
the Energy Community entered into force on 1 July 2006 (Energy 
Community, 2005). The Parties to the Treaty are the European 
Union, and the Contracting Parties Albania, Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montene-
gro, Serbia, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK), Moldova and Ukraine. The Energy Community 
treaty extended the so-called ‘acquis communautaire’, the body 
of legislation, legal acts, and court decisions, which constitute 
European law, to the contracting parties. As a result, contracting 
parties are obliged to adopt and implement several EU direc-
tives in the areas of electricity, gas, environment, competition, 
renewable energies, and energy efficiency. In the field of renew-
able energy, the EU acquis established the adoption of the EU 
directives on electricity produced from renewable energy sources 
and on biofuels. As a further step, in 2012, the Energy Community 
adopted the EU RES Directive 2009 / 28 / EC (Energy Community, 
2012). This allows contracting parties to use the cooperation 
mechanisms (statistical transfers, joint projects, and joint support 
schemes) foreseen by the RES directive under the same conditions 
as the EU member states.
Analyses of the implementation of the acquis on renewables in the 
energy community (EIHP, 2007, p. 2007; Energy Community, 2008; 
IEA, 2008; IPA and EPU-NTUA, 2010) found that progress in imple-
menting the EU directives has been dissimilar across Contracting 
Parties, among others due to the heterogeneity between these 
countries in institutional capacity, know-how, and pace of imple-
mentation of policies and regulatory frameworks (Energy Com-
munity, 2010; Mihajlov, 2010; Karakosta et al., 2011; Tešić et al., 
2011; Lalic et al., 2011). Still, economic and political ties between 
South East Europe and the European Union and the prospect of 
contracting parties to become EU member states have contributed 
to the harmonization of legal, policy, and regulatory elements 
for RES (Renner, 2009, p. 20). Through the legally binding Energy 
Community Treaty, the European Union has exported its legislative 
frameworks on RES and EE to a neighboring region. Their further 
implementation, however, requires strengthening national and 
regional institutional capacity, developing regional energy markets 
and infrastructure, and securing financing of projects.
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for development and climate change in the affected regions (Kumar 
et  al., 2011). In addition, there are difficult economic, political, and 
social issues regarding water sharing, upstream and downstream 
impacts, and other development objectives. Given its vulnerability to 
droughts and other impacts of climate change, hydropower develop-
ment requires careful planning, including provisions for complemen-
tary electricity generation sources (Zarsky, 2010; Nyatichi Omambi 
et al., 2012)
Regional cooperation on energy efficiency standards and 
labelling
Standards and labels (S&L) for energy-efficient products are useful 
in accelerating market transformation towards more energy-efficient 
technologies. Energy-efficiency S&L programs help, for instance, reduc-
ing consumption of fossil fuels (e. g., diesel) for electricity generation. 
Also, when applied to biomass-based cook stoves, S&L help decreas-
ing the use of traditional biomass for cooking (Jetter et  al., 2012). 
Standards and labelling programs at a regional-scale provide critical 
mass for the creation of regional markets for energy efficiency and, 
therefore, incentives to equipment manufacturers. They are also use-
ful in reducing non-tariff barriers to trade (NAEWG, 2002). Examples 
of existing S&L regional programs are the European Energy Label-
ling directive, first published as Directive 92 / 75 / EEC by the European 
Commission in 1992 (European Commission, 1992) and subsequently 
revised (Directive 2010 / 30 / EU; European Commission, 2010), to har-
monize energy-efficiency S&L throughout EU member states and har-
monization efforts on energy-efficiency S&L between the U.S, Canada, 
and Mexico as a means to reduce barriers to trade within the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), (NAEWG, 2002; Wiel and 
McMahon, 2005; Geller, 2006). Currently, several regional S&L initia-
tives are being developed, such as the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) regional initiative on energy-efficiency stan-
dards and labelling (ECREEE, 2012a), and the Pacific Appliance Label-
ling and Standards (PALS) program in Pacific Island Countries (IIEC 
Asia, 2012).
14�4�2�3 Climate change cooperation under regional 
trade agreements
International trade regulation is particularly relevant as mitigation 
and adaptation policies often depend on trade policy (Cottier et al., 
2009; Hufbauer et  al., 2010; Aerni et  al., 2010). On the one hand, 
trade liberalization induces structural change, which can have a direct 
impact on emissions of pollutants such as GHGs. On the other hand, 
regional trade agreements (RTAs), while primarily pursuing economic 
goals, are suitable to create mechanisms for reducing emissions and 
establish platforms for regional cooperation on mitigation and adap-
tation to climate change. In parallel to provisions on elimination of 
tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, the new generation of RTAs con-
tains so called WTO-X provisions, which promote policy objectives 
that are not discussed at the multilateral trade negotiations (Horn 
et  al., 2010). In particular, they offer the potential to refine criteria 
for distinctions made on the basis of process and production methods 
(PPMs), which are of increasing importance in addressing the link-
age of trade and environment and of climate change mitigation in 
particular.
Regional trade agreements have flourished over the last two decades. 
As of December 2013, the World Trade Organization (WTO) acknowl-
edged 379 notifications of RTAs to be in force(WTO, 2013), half of 
which went into force only after 2000. This includes bilateral as well 
as multilateral agreements such as, e. g., the EU, the NAFTA, the South-
ern Common Market (MERCOSUR), the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and the Common Market of Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA). Regional trade agreements increasingly transgress 
regional relations and encompass transcontinental preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs). 
According to the economic theory of international trade, PTAs fos-
ter trade within regions and amongst member countries (trade cre-
ation) and they are detrimental to trade with third parties since trade 
with non-member countries is replaced by intraregional trade (trade 
diversion). Although the impacts of trade creation and trade diver-
sion have not been analyzed theoretically with respect to their envi-
ronmental impacts, conclusion by analogy implies that the effects on 
pollution-intensive and green industries can be positive or negative 
depending on the patterns of specialization. Most empirical studies 
look at NAFTA and find mixed evidence on the environmental conse-
quences of regional trade integration in North America (Kaufmann 
et al., 1993; Stern, 2007). The effects of NAFTA on Mexico turn out 
to be small. Akbostancı et al. (2008) look at the EU-Turkey free trade 
agreement and find weak evidence that the demand for dirty imports 
declined slightly. A study including 162 countries that were involved 
in RTAs supports the view that regional trade integration is good for 
the environment (Ghosh and Yamarik, 2006). Among empirical stud-
ies looking at the effects of trade liberalization in general, Antweiler 
et al. (2001), Frankel and Rose (2005), Kellenberg (2008) and Man-
agi et al. (2009) indicate that freer trade is slightly beneficial to the 
environment. As shown in Section 14.3.4, carbon embodied in trade 
is substantial and it has been increasing from 1990 to 2008 (Peters 
et al., 2011). 
Trade liberalization in major trade regions has fostered processes that 
are relevant to climate change mitigation via the development of coop-
eration on climate issues. (Dong and Whalley, 2010, 2011) look at envi-
ronmentally motivated trade agreements and find that their impacts, 
albeit positive, are very small. Many PTAs contain environmental chap-
ters or environmental side-agreements, covering the issues of environ-
mental cooperation and capacity building, commitments on enforce-
ment of national environmental laws, dispute settlement mechanisms 
regarding environmental commitments, etc. (OECD, 2007). In the case 
of NAFTA, the participating countries (Canada, Mexico, and the United 
States) created the North American Agreement on Environmental Coop-
eration (NAAEC). The NAAEC established an international organization, 
the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), to facilitate col-
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laboration and public participation to foster conservation, protection, 
and enhancement of the North American environment in the context 
of increasing economic, trade, and social links among the member 
countries. Several factors, such as the CEC’s small number of actors, 
the opportunities for issue linkage, and the linkage between national 
and global governance systems have led to beneficial initiatives; yet 
assessments stress its limitations and argue for greater interaction with 
other forms of climate governance in North America (Betsill, 2007). 
The Asia-Pacific Economic Forum (APEC) provides an example of how 
trade-policy measures can be used to promote trade and investment in 
environmental goods and services. In 2011, APEC leaders reaffirmed to 
reduce the applied tariff rate to 5 % or less on goods on the APEC list 
of environmental goods by the end of 2015 (APEC, 2011). Although the 
legal status of these political declarations is non-binding, this ‘soft law’ 
can help to define the standards of good behavior of a ‘well-governed 
state’ (Dupuy, 1990; Abbott and Snidal, 2000). 
Recent evidence suggests that environmental provisions in RTAs do 
affect CO2 emissions of member countries (Baghdadi et  al., 2013).
Member countries of RTAs that include environmental harmonization 
policies converge in CO2 emissions per capita, with the gap being 
18 % lower than in countries without an RTA. On the other hand, 
member countries of RTAs not containing such an environmental 
agreement tend to diverge in terms of CO2 emissions per capita. 
Moreover, the authors find that membership in an RTA per se does 
not affect average CO2 emissions significantly whereas environmen-
tal policy harmonization within an RTA has a very small (0.3 %) but 
significant effect on reducing emissions. Thus, regional agreements 
with environmental provisions lead to slightly lower average emis-
sions in the region and a strong tendency for convergence in those 
emissions. 
There is a potential to expand PTA environmental provisions to specifi-
cally cover climate policy concerns. One of the few existing examples of 
enhanced bilateral cooperation on climate change under PTAs relates 
to the promotion of capacity building to implement the CDM under 
the Kyoto Protocol provided for in Article 147 of the Japan-Mexico 
Agreement for the Strengthening of the Economic Partnership. Holmes 
et al. (2011) argue that PTAs can include provisions on establishment 
of ETSs with mutual recognition of emissions allowances (i. e., linking 
national ETSs in a region) and carbon-related standards. In promoting 
mitigation and adaptation goals, PTAs can go beyond climate policy 
cooperation provisions in environmental chapters and make climate 
protection a crosscutting issue. Obligations to provide know-how and 
transfer of technology, as well as concessions in other areas covered 
by a PTA can provide appropriate incentives for PTA parties to accept 
tariff distinctions based on PPMs (Cosbey, 2004). Although PTAs con-
stitute their own regulatory system of trade relations, the conclusion 
of PTAs, the required level of trade liberalization, and trade measures 
used under PTAs are subject to WTO rules (Cottier and Foltea, 2006). 
While trade measures linked to emissions is a contentious issue in 
the WTO (Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al., 2006; Holzer, 2010; Hufbauer 
et al., 2010; Conrad, 2011), the use of carbon-related trade measures 
under PTAs provides greater flexibility compared to their application 
in normal trade based on the most-favored nation (MFN) principle. 
Particularly, it reduces the risk of trade retaliations and the likelihood 
of challenge of a measure in the WTO dispute settlement (Holzer and 
Shariff, 2012).
While concerns are expressed in the literature about the coherence 
between regional and multilateral cooperation (Leal-Arcas, 2011), it 
is also recognized that PTAs could play a useful role in providing a 
supplementary forum for bringing together a number of key players 
(Lawrence, 2009) and fostering bilateral, regional, and trans-regional 
environmental cooperation (Carrapatoso, 2008; Leal-Arcas, 2013). 
With the current complexities of the UNFCCC negotiations, PTAs with 
their negotiation leverages and commercial and financial incentives 
can facilitate achievement of climate policy objectives. They can also 
form a platform for realization of mitigation and adaptation policies 
elaborated at a multilateral level (Fujiwara and Egenhofer, 2007). 
14�4�2�4 Regional examples of cooperation schemes 
where synergies between adaptation and 
mitigation are important
Referring to potential regional actions to integrate adaptation and 
mitigation, Burton et al. (2007) point out the need to incorporate adap-
tation in mitigation and development policies. An integrated approach 
to climate change policies was considered and large-scale mitigation 
opportunities at the national and regional level were identified, indi-
cating that scaling up could be realized through international initia-
tives (Kok and De Coninck, 2007).The UNFCCC Cancun agreements 
include mandates for multiple actions at the regional level, in particular 
related to adaptation and technology (UNFCCC, 2011). Some authors 
also underlined the importance of the linkage between adaptation 
and mitigation at the project level, in particular where the mitigative 
capacity is low and the need for adaptation is high. This linkage facili-
tates the integration of sustainable development priorities with climate 
policy, as well as the engagement of local policymakers in the mitiga-
tion agenda (Ayers and Huq, 2009). Section 4.6 underlines the large 
similarities and the complementarities between mitigative and adap-
tive capacities. 
Opportunities of synergies vary by sector (Klein et al., 2007). Promis-
ing options can be primarily identified in sectors that can play a major 
role in both mitigation and adaptation, notably land use and urban 
planning, agriculture and forestry, and water management (Swart and 
Raes, 2007). It has been stated that forest-related mitigation activi-
ties can significantly reduce emissions from sources and increase CO2 
removals from sinks at a low cost. It was also suggested that those 
activities can be designed promoting synergies with adaptation and 
sustainable development (IPCC, 2007). Adaptation measures in the for-
estry sector are essential to climate change mitigation, for maintaining 
the forest functioning status addressing the negative impacts of cli-
mate change (‘adaptation for forests’). They are also needed due to the 
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role that forests play in providing local ecosystem services that reduce 
vulnerability to climate change (‘adaptation for people’) (Vignola et al., 
2009; Locatelli et  al., 2011). Information and multiple examples on 
interactions between mitigation and adaptation that are mutually rein-
forcing in forests ecosystems and agriculture systems are provided in 
Section 11.5.
Examples where integration of mitigation and adaptation processes 
are necessary include REDD+ activities in the Congo Basin, a region 
where there are well-established cooperation institutions to deal with 
common forest matters, such as the Central Africa Forest Commis-
sion (COMIFAC) and the Congo Basin Forest Partnership (CBFP). Some 
authors consider that the focus is currently on mitigation, and adap-
tion is insufficiently integrated (Nkem et al., 2010). Other authors have 
suggested designing an overarching environmental road map or policy 
strategy. The policy approaches for implementing REDD+, adaptation, 
biodiversity conservation and poverty reductions may arise from them 
(Somorin et al., 2011).
The Great Green Wall of the Sahara, launched by the African Union, is 
another example to combine mitigation and adaptation approaches 
to address climate change. It is a priority action of the Africa-EU 
Partnership on Climate (European Union, 2011). The focus of the 
initiative is adaptation and mitigation to climate change through 
sustainable land management (SLM) practices. These practices are 
increasingly recognized as crucial to improving the resilience of land 
resources to the potentially devastating effects of climate change in 
Africa (and elsewhere). Thus, it will contribute to maintaining and 
enhancing productivity. SLM practices, which are referred in Sec-
tion 14.3.5 of this report, also contribute to mitigate climate change 
through the reduction of GHG emissions and carbon sequestration 
(Liniger et al., 2011). 
There may, however, also be significant differences across regions in 
terms of the scope of such opportunities and related regional coopera-
tive activities. At present there is not enough literature to assess these 
possible synergies and tradeoffs between mitigation and adaptation in 
sufficient depth for different regions.
14�4�3 Technology-focused agreements and 
cooperation within and across regions
A primary focus of regional climate agreements surrounds the research, 
development, and demonstration (RD&D) of low-carbon energy tech-
nologies, as well as the development of policy frameworks to promote 
the deployment of such technologies within different national contexts 
(Grunewald et  al., 2013). While knowledge-sharing and joint RD&D 
agreements related to climate change mitigation are possible in bilat-
eral, regional, and larger multilateral frameworks (de Coninck et  al., 
2008), regional cooperation mechanisms may evolve as geographical 
regions often exhibit similar challenges in mitigating climate change. 
In some cases these similarities serve as a unifying force for regional 
technology agreements or for cooperation on a particular regionally 
appropriate technology. 
Other regional agreements do not conform to traditional geographi-
cally defined regions, but rather may be motivated by a desire to 
transfer technological experience across regions. In the particular 
case of technology cooperation surrounding climate change mitiga-
tion, regional agreements are frequently comprised of countries that 
have experience in developing or deploying a particular technology, 
and countries that want to obtain such experience and deploy a simi-
lar technology. While many such agreements include countries from 
the North sharing such experience with countries from the South, it 
is increasingly common for agreements to also transfer technology 
experiences from North to North, or from South to South. Other forms 
of regional agreements on technology cooperation, including bilateral 
technology cooperation agreements, may serve political purposes such 
as to improve bilateral relations, or contribute to broader development 
assistance goals. Multilateral technology agreements, such as those 
facilitated under the UNFCCC, the Montreal Protocol, the IEA, and the 
GEF, are not included in the scope of this chapter as they are discussed 
in Chapter 13. 
While there has been limited assessment of the efficacy of regional 
agreements, when available such assessments are reviewed below. 
14�4�3�1 Regional technology-focused agreements
Few regional technology-focused agreements conform to traditional 
geographically defined regions. One exception is the Energy and Cli-
mate Partnership of the Americas (ECPA), which was initiated by the 
United States, and is a regional partnership among Western hemi-
sphere countries to jointly promote clean energy, low-carbon devel-
opment, and climate-resilient growth (ECPA, 2012). Argentina, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad, 
and Tobago, and the United States as well as the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank (IDB) and the Organization of American States (OAS) 
have announced initiatives and / or are involved in ECPA-supported 
projects. They focus on a range of topics, including advanced power 
sector integration and cross border trade in electricity, advancing 
renewable energy, and the establishment of an Energy Innovation Cen-
ter to serve as a regional incubator for implementation and financing 
of sustainable energy innovation (ECPA, 2012). The ECPA could provide 
a model for other neighboring countries to form regionally coordinated 
climate change partnerships focused on technologies and issues that 
are of common interest within the region.
While not explicitly focused on climate, the Regional Innovation and 
Technology Transfer Strategies and Infrastructures (RITTS) program 
provides an interesting example of a regionally coordinated technol-
ogy innovation and transfer agreement that could provide a model for 
regional technology cooperation. RITTS reportedly helped to develop 
the EU’s regional innovation systems, improve the efficiency of the 
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support infrastructure for innovation and technology transfer, enhance 
institutional capacity at the regional level, and promote the exchange 
of experiences with innovation policy (Charles et al., 2000). 
The ASEAN is a particularly active region in organizing initiatives 
focused on energy technology cooperation that may contribute to 
climate change mitigation. ASEAN has organized the Energy Security 
Forum in cooperation with China, Japan, and Korea (the ASEAN+3) 
that aims to promote greater emergency preparedness, wider use of 
energy efficiency and conservation measures, diversification of types 
and sources of energy, and development of indigenous petroleum (Phil-
ippine Department of Energy Portal, 2014). The Forum of the Heads of 
ASEAN Power Utilities / Authorities (HAPUA) includes working groups 
focused on electricity generation, transmission, and distribution; 
renewable energy and environment; electricity supply industry ser-
vices; resource development; power reliability and quality; and human 
resources (Philippine Department of Energy Portal, 2014). ASEAN’s Cen-
ter on Energy (ACE) (previously called the ASEAN-EC Energy Manage-
ment Training and Research Center) was founded in 1990 as an inter-
governmental organization to initiate, coordinate, and facilitate energy 
cooperation for the ASEAN region, though it lacks a mandate to imple-
ment actual projects (Kneeland et al., 2005; UNESCAP, 2008; Poocha-
roen and Sovacool, 2012). In addition, the European Commission part-
nered with the ASEAN countries in the COGEN 3 initiative, focused on 
promoting cogeneration demonstration projects using biomass, coal, 
and gas technologies (COGEN3, 2005). Regional energy cooperation 
in the ASEAN region has been mainly motivated by concerns about 
security of energy supply (Kuik et al., 2011) and energy access (Bazil-
ian et al., 2012a), an increasing energy demand, fast-rising fossil fuel 
imports, and rapidly growing emissions of GHGs and air pollutants 
(USAID, 2007; UNESCAP, 2008; Cabalu et al., 2010; IEA, 2010b; c). As 
a result, some policies have translated into action on the ground. For 
example, during the APAEC 2004 – 2009, the regional 10 % target to 
increase the installed renewable energy-based capacities for electric-
ity generation was met (Kneeland et al., 2005; Sovacool, 2009; ASEAN, 
2010; IEA, 2010c). 
The APEC also has an Energy Working Group (EWG) that was launched 
in 1990 to maximize the energy sector’s contribution to the region’s 
economic and social well-being, while mitigating the environmental 
effects of energy supply and use (APEC Secretariat, 2012). 
The ECOWAS regional energy program aims to strengthen regional 
integration and to boost growth through market development to 
fight poverty (ECOWAS, 2003, 2006). The ECOWAS Energy Protocol 
includes provisions for member states to establish energy-efficiency 
policies, legal and regulatory frameworks, and to develop renewable 
energy sources and cleaner fuels. It also encourages ECOWAS member 
states to assist each other in this process. The ECOWAS has recently 
expanded further energy access initiatives, which were launched 
by The Regional Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency 
(ECREEE, 2012a; b).
There are also examples of institutions that have been established 
to serve as regional hubs for international clean energy technology 
cooperation. For example, the Asia Energy Efficiency and Conservation 
Collaboration Center (AEEC), which is part of the Energy Conservation 
Center of Japan, promotes energy efficiency and conservation in Asian 
countries through international cooperation (ECCJ / AEEC, 2011). One 
of the longest-established institutions for promoting technology trans-
fer and capacity building in the South is the Asian and Pacific Center 
for Transfer of Technology (APCTT), based in New Delhi, India. Founded 
in 1977, APCTT operates under the auspices of the United Nations 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific to facilitate 
technology development and transfer in developing countries of the 
region, with special emphasis on technological growth in areas such 
as agriculture, bioengineering, mechanical engineering, construction, 
microelectronics, and alternative energy generation (Asia-Pacific Part-
nership on Clean Development and Climate, 2013).
14�4�3�2 Inter-regional technology-focused 
agreements
Some technology agreements have brought together non-traditional 
regions, or spanned multiple regions. For example, the Asia-Pacific 
Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) brought 
together Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, Korea, and the United 
States. These countries did not share a specific geography, but had 
common interests surrounding mitigation technologies, as well as a 
technology-oriented approach to climate change policy. The purpose 
of the APP was to build upon existing bilateral and multilateral initia-
tives, although it was perceived by some to be offered forth by the 
participating nations as an alternative to the Kyoto Protocol (Bäck-
strand, 2008; Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and Asselt, 2009; Lawrence, 2009; 
Taplin and McGee, 2010). The APP was a public-private partnership 
that included many active private sector partners in addition to gov-
ernmental participants that undertook a range of projects across eight 
task forces organized by sector. Initiated in 2006, the work of the APP 
was formally concluded in 2011, although some projects have since 
been transferred to the Global Superior Energy Performance Partner-
ship (GSEP) under the Clean Energy Ministerial. This includes projects 
from the sectoral task forces on power generation and transmission, 
cement, and steel (US Department of State, 2011; Clean Energy Minis-
terial, 2012). One study reviewing the implementation of the APP found 
that a majority of participants found the information and experiences 
exchanged within the program to be helpful, particularly on access to 
existing technologies and know-how (Okazaki and Yamaguchi, 2011; 
Fujiwara, 2012). The APP’s record on innovation and access to newer 
technologies was more mixed, with factors such as limited funding and 
a lack of capacity for data collection and management perceived as 
barriers (Fujiwara, 2012). As discussed in Section 13.6.3, it may also 
have had a modest impact on governance (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and 
Asselt, 2009; McGee and Taplin, 2009) and encouraged voluntary 
action (Heggelund and Buan, 2009). 
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Another technology agreement that brings together clean energy tech-
nology experience from different regions is the Clean Energy Ministerial 
(CEM). The CEM convenes ministers with responsibility for clean energy 
technologies from the world’s major economies and ministers from a 
select number of smaller countries that are leading in various areas 
of clean energy (Clean Energy Ministerial, 2012). The first CEM meet-
ing was held in Washington in 2010. The 23 governments participating 
in CEM initiatives are Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, the 
European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Mexico, Norway, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, the 
United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These 
participant governments account for 80 % of global GHG emissions and 
90 % of global clean energy investment (Clean Energy Ministerial, 2012). 
A smaller agreement that focused on a broad range of mitigation 
technologies, the Sustainable Energy Technology at Work (SETatWork) 
Program, was comprised of two years of activities that ran from 2008 
to 2010. SETatWork developed partnerships between organizations in 
the EU, Asia, and South America focused on implementing the EU ETS 
through identifying CDM project opportunities and transferring Euro-
pean technology and know-how to CDM host countries (European 
Commission, 2011a). 
Other inter-regional technology cooperation initiatives and agreements 
focus on specific technology areas. For example, multiple initiatives 
focus on the development or deployment of carbon dioxide capture 
and storage (CCS) technologies, including the Carbon Sequestration 
Leadership Forum (CSLF), the European CCS Demonstration Project 
Network, The Gulf Cooperation Council CCS Strategic Workshop, and 
the Global Carbon Capture and Storage Institute. 
14�4�3�3 South-South technology cooperation 
agreements
There are increasingly more examples of technology cooperation agree-
ments among and between developing countries, often in the context of 
broader capacity building programs or agreements to provide financial 
assistance. One example is the Caribbean Community Climate Change 
Centre; which coordinates the Caribbean region’s response to climate 
change and provides climate change-related policy advice and guide-
lines to the Caribbean Community (Caribbean Community Climate 
Change Center, 2012). Larger countries such as China and Brazil have 
taken an active role in promoting South-South cooperation. For example, 
China has served as a key donor to the UNDP Voluntary Trust Fund for 
the Promotion of South-South Cooperation, and United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is working with 
the China Science and Technology Exchange Centre, which is part of 
China’s Ministry of Science and Technology, to develop a network for 
South-South cooperation on science and technology to Address Cli-
mate Change (United Nations Development Programme: China, 2005; 
UNESCO Bejing, 2012). The Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation 
has established several programs to promote agricultural and biofuel 
cooperation with Africa, including the Africa-Brazil Agricultural Inno-
vation Marketplace, supported by Brazilian and international donors 
(Africa-Brazil Agricultural Innovation Marketplace, 2012). 
Other South-South programs of cooperation that do not focus on cli-
mate change explicitly still may encourage climate related technology 
cooperation. For example, the India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA) Trust 
Fund implements South-South cooperation for the benefit of LDCs, 
focusing on identifying replicable and scalable projects that can be 
jointly adapted and implemented in interested developing countries 
as examples of best practices in the fight against poverty and hunger. 
Projects have included solar energy programs for rural electrification 
and other projects with potential climate change mitigation benefits 
(UNDP IBSA Fund, 2014). 
14�4�3�4 Lessons learned from regional technology 
agreements
A review of regional climate technology agreements reveals a complex 
landscape of cooperation that includes diversity in structure, focus, and 
effectiveness. While all of the regional agreements discussed above 
vary in their achievements, the strength of the regional organization 
or of the relationships of the members of the partnership also vary 
substantially. This has a direct implication for the effectiveness of the 
cooperation, and for any emissions reductions that can be attributed to 
the program of cooperation. 
Well-coordinated, regionally based organizations, such as ASEAN, 
have served as an effective platform for cooperation on clean energy, 
because such programs build upon a strong, pre-existing regional plat-
form for cooperation. Since most regional organizations coordinate 
regional activity rather than govern it, most of these regional energy 
and climate technology agreements focus on sharing information 
and knowledge surrounding technologies, rather than implementing 
actual projects, though there are exceptions. Since many countries are 
involved in multiple regional agreements, often with a similar technical 
focus, it can be difficult to attribute technology achievements to any 
specific agreement or cooperation initiative.
Because of the large number of intra-regional climate technology agree-
ments with different types of membership structures and motivations, it 
is very difficult to draw general lessons from these types of initiatives. 
Since intra-regional technology agreements rarely build upon existing 
regional governance structures, their efficacy depends both on the com-
mitment of the members, as well as the resources committed. The promi-
nence of regionally coordinated agreements in other arenas, including 
environmental protection and trade, suggests that regions will play an 
increasingly important role in climate-related cooperation in the future. 
Experience with regional climate cooperation thus far suggests that 
building upon pre-existing regional groupings and networks, particularly 
those with strong economic or trade relationships, may provide the best 
platform for enhanced regional climate change cooperation.
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14�4�4 Regional mechanisms for investments 
and finance
14�4�4�1 Regional and sub-regional development banks 
and related mechanisms
Regional institutions, including the regional multilateral develop-
ment banks and the regional economic commissions of the United 
Nations, play an important role in stimulating action and funding 
for mitigation activities (see Section 16.5.1.2 for a discussion of spe-
cific regional institutions). Development finance institutions chan-
neled an estimated 76.8 billion USD2010 in 2010 / 2011 (Buchner et al., 
2011).
Appropriate governance arrangements at the national, regional, and 
international level are an essential pre-requisite for efficient, effec-
tive, and sustainable financing of mitigation measures (see Chapter 
16). The Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Advisory Group 
on Climate Change Financing recommended that the delivery of 
finance for adaptation and mitigation be scaled up through regional 
institutions, given their strong regional ownership. It also found that 
regional cooperation provides the greatest opportunity for analyzing 
and understanding the problems of, and designing strategies for cop-
ing with, the impact of climate change and variability (United Nations, 
2010).
There are few aggregated estimates of the split of finance by type 
of disbursement organization available (see Chapter 16). A regional 
breakdown of the recipients of Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) 
climate finance based on the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) 
database shows that recipients are primarily located in Asia (26 %), 
Latin America and the Caribbean (23 %) and Europe / Commonwealth 
of Independent States region (19 %) (Buchner et al., 2011).
14�4�4�2 South-South climate finance
There are limited data available to accurately quantify South-South 
climate finance flows, and many studies have pointed to a need for 
more accessible and consistent data (Buchner et  al., 2011). One 
study that tracked overall development assistance from countries 
that are not members of the OECD Development Assistance Com-
mittee (DAC) estimated flows of 9.66 billion to 12.88 billion USD2010 
(9  to 12 billion USD2006) and projected that these flows would sur-
pass 15 billion USD by 2010 (ECOSOC, 2008; Buchner et al., 2011). 
Brazil, India and China, the ‘emerging non-OECD donors’, are playing 
an increasingly important role in the overall aid landscape, and these 
countries also have programs to provide climate-related assistance 
to developing countries (Buchner et  al., 2011). The share of GEF 
contributions that come from developing countries was estimated 
to total 56.6 million USD2010 (52.8 million USD2006) (Ballesteros et al., 
2010). 
14.5 Taking stock and 
options for the future
A key finding from this chapter is that currently there is a wide gap 
between the potential of regional cooperation to contribute to a mitiga-
tion agenda and the reality of modest to negligible impacts to date. As 
shown in the discussion on climate-specific as well as climate-relevant 
regional cooperation, the ability to use existing regional cooperation for 
furthering a mitigation agenda, by pursuing a common and coordinated 
energy policy, embodying mitigation objectives in trade agreements in 
urbanization and infrastructure strategies, and developing and sharing 
technologies at the regional level, is substantial. In principle, in many 
regions the willingness to cooperate on such an agenda is substan-
tial. In the absence of an increasingly elusive global agreement, such 
regional cooperation may provide the best alternative to furthering an 
ambitious mitigation agenda. Also, if a global agreement emerges, such 
regional cooperation could prove vital for its implementation.
At the same time, the reality is one of very low mitigation impacts to 
date. Even in areas of deep integration where multiple instruments for 
mitigation have been put into place, progress on mitigation has been 
slower than anticipated. This is largely related to a political reluctance 
to pursue the multiple policy instruments with sufficient rigor. The chal-
lenge will be to drastically increase the ambition of existing instru-
ments while carefully considering the positive and negative interac-
tions between these different policies. For regions where deep regional 
integration is not present yet, the experience from the EU suggests 
that only after a substantial transfer of sovereignty to regional bodies 
can an ambitious mitigation be pursued. Such a transfer of sovereignty 
is unlikely in most regions where the regional cooperation processes 
are still in early stages of development. Alternatively, regional coop-
eration on mitigation can build on the substantial good-will within 
regions to develop voluntary cooperation schemes in the fields out-
lined in the chapter that also further other development goals, such 
as energy security, trade, infrastructure, or sustainable development. 
Whether such voluntary cooperation will be sufficient to implement 
ambitious mitigation measures to avoid the most serious impacts of 
climate change remains an open question. 
14.6 Gaps in  knowledge 
and data
While there is clear evidence from the theoretical and empirical litera-
ture that regional mechanisms have great potential to contribute to 
mitigation goals, there are large gaps in knowledge and data related 
to the issues covered in this chapter. In particular, there are gaps in the 
literature on:
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•	 The quantitative impact of regional cooperation schemes on miti-
gation, especially in terms of quantifying their impact and sig-
nificance. While some of the mechanisms, such as the EU-ETS are 
well-studied, many other cooperation mechanisms in the field of 
technology, labelling, and information sharing have hardly been 
analyzed at all. 
•	 The factors that lead to the success or failure of regional coopera-
tion mechanisms, including regional disparities and the mismatch 
between capacities and opportunities within and between regions. 
This research would be useful to determine which cooperation 
mechanisms are suitable for a particular region at a given stage 
of development, resource endowment, a given level of economic 
and political cooperation ties, institutional and technical national 
capacities and heterogeneity among the participating countries.
•	 Synergies and tradeoffs between mitigation and adaptation. In 
addition, it would be important to understand more about capacity 
barriers for low-carbon development at the regional level, includ-
ing on the costs of capital and credit constraints. There is also very 
little peer-reviewed literature assessing the mitigation potential 
and actual achievements of climate-relevant regional cooperation 
agreements (such as trade, energy, or infrastructure agreements). 
•	 The empirical interaction of different policy instruments. It is clear 
that regional policies interact with national and global initiatives, 
and often there are many regional policies that interact within the 
same regions. Not enough is known to what extent these many 
initiatives support or counteract each other.
14.7 Frequently Asked 
Questions
FAQ 14�1 How are regions defined in the AR5?
This chapter examines supra-national regions (i. e., regions in between 
the national and global level). Sub-national regions are addressed in 
Chapter  15. There are several possible ways to classify regions and 
different approaches are used throughout the IPCC Fifth Assessment 
Report (AR5). In most chapters, a five-region classification is used that 
is consistent with the integrated models: OECD-1990, Middle East 
and Africa, Economies in Transition, Asia, Latin America and the Carib-
bean. Given the policy focus of this chapter and the need to distinguish 
regions by their levels of economic development, this chapter adopts 
regional definitions that are based on a combination of economic and 
geographic considerations. In particular, this chapter considers the fol-
lowing 10 regions: East Asia (China, Korea, Mongolia) (EAS); Econo-
mies in Transition (Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union) (EIT); Latin 
America and Caribbean (LAM); Middle East and North Africa (MNA); 
North America (USA, Canada) (NAM); South-East Asia and Pacific 
(PAS); Pacific OECD-1990 members (Japan, Australia, New Zealand) 
(POECD); South Asia (SAS); sub-Saharan Africa (SSA); Western Europe 
(WEU). These regions can readily be aggregated to other regional clas-
sifications such as the regions used in scenarios and integrated assess-
ment models (e. g., the so-called Representative Concentration Path-
ways (RCP) regions), commonly used World Bank socio-geographic 
regional classifications, and geographic regions used by WGII. In some 
cases, special consideration will be given to the cross-regional group 
of Least Developed Countries (LDCs), as defined by the United Nations, 
which includes 33 countries in SSA, 5 in SAS, 8 in PAS, and one each 
in LAM and MNA, and which are characterized by low incomes, low 
human assets, and high economic vulnerability.
FAQ 14�2  Why is the regional level important 
for analyzing and achieving mitigation 
objectives?
Thinking about mitigation at the regional level matters for two rea-
sons. First, regions manifest vastly different patterns in their level, 
growth, and composition of GHG emissions, underscoring significant 
differences in socio-economic contexts, energy endowments, consump-
tion patterns, development pathways, and other underlying drivers 
that influence GHG emissions and therefore mitigation options and 
pathways [14.3]. We call this the ‘regional heterogeneity’ issue.
Second, regional cooperation, including the creation of regional insti-
tutions, is a powerful force in global economics and politics — as mani-
fest in numerous agreements related to trade, technology cooperation, 
transboundary agreements relating to water, energy, transport, and so 
on. It is critical to examine to what extent these forms of cooperation 
have already had an impact on mitigation and to what extent they 
could play a role in achieving mitigation objectives [14.4]. We call this 
the ‘regional cooperation and integration issue’. 
Third, efforts at the regional level complement local, domestic efforts 
on the one hand, and global efforts on the other hand. They offer the 
potential of achieving critical mass in the size of the markets required 
to make policies, for example, on border tax adjustment, work, in cre-
ating regional smart grids required to distribute and balance renew-
able energy. 
FAQ 14�3 How do opportunities and barriers for 
mitigation differ by region? 
Opportunities and barriers for mitigation differ greatly by region. On 
average, regions with the greatest opportunities to bypass more car-
bon-intensive development paths and leapfrog to low-carbon develop-
ment are regions with low lock-in, in terms of energy systems, urban-
ization, and transport patterns. Poorer developing regions such as 
sub-Saharan Africa, as well as most Least Developed Countries, fall into 
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this category. Also, many countries in these regions have particularly 
favorable endowments for renewable energy (such as hydropower or 
solar potential). At the same time, however, they are facing particularly 
strong institutional, technological, and financial constraints to under-
take the necessary investments. Often these countries also lack access 
to the required technologies or the ability to implement them effec-
tively. Given their urgent need to develop and improve energy access, 
their opportunities to engage in mitigation will also depend on sup-
port from the international community to overcome these barriers to 
invest in mitigation. Conversely, regions with the greatest technologi-
cal, financial, and capacity advantages face much-reduced opportuni-
ties for low-cost strategies to move towards low-carbon development, 
as they suffer from lock-in in terms of energy systems, urbanization, 
and transportation patterns. Particularly strong opportunities for low-
carbon development exist in developing and emerging regions where 
financial and institutional capacities are better developed, yet lock-in 
effects are low, also due to their rapid planned installation of new 
capacity in energy and transport systems. For these regions, which 
include particularly Latin America, much of Asia, and parts of the 
Middle East, a reorientation towards low-carbon development paths is 
particularly feasible. [14.1, 14.2, 14.3]
FAQ 14�4 What role can and does regional coope-
ration play to mitigate climate change? 
Apart from the European Union (with its Emissions Trading Scheme and 
binding regulations on energy and energy efficiency), regional coopera-
tion has, to date, not played an important role in furthering a mitiga-
tion agenda. While many regional groupings have developed initiatives 
to directly promote mitigation at the regional level — primarily through 
sharing of information, benchmarking, and cooperation on technology 
development and diffusion — the impact of these initiatives is very small 
to date. In addition, regional cooperation agreements in other areas (such 
as trade, energy, and infrastructure) can influence mitigation indirectly. 
The effect of these initiatives and policies on mitigation is currently also 
small, but there is some evidence that trade pacts that are accompanied 
by environmental agreements have had some impact on reducing emis-
sions within the trading bloc. Nonetheless, regional cooperation could 
play an enhanced role in promoting mitigation in the future, particularly 
if it explicitly incorporates mitigation objectives in trade, infrastructure, 
and energy policies and promotes direct mitigation action at the regional 
level. With this approach regional cooperation could potentially play an 
important role within the framework of implementing a global agree-
ment on mitigation, or could possibly promote regionally coordinated 
mitigation in the absence of such an agreement. [14.4]
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Since the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth 
Assessment Report (AR4), there has been a marked increase in national 
policies and legislation on climate change, however, these policies, 
taken together, have not yet achieved a substantial deviation in emis-
sions from the past trend. Many baseline scenarios (those without 
additional policies to reduce emissions) show GHG concentrations that 
exceed 1000 ppm CO2eq by 2100, which is far from a concentration 
with a likely probability of maintaining temperature increases below 
2 °C this century. Mitigation scenarios suggest that a wide range of 
environmentally effective policies could be enacted that would be 
consistent with such goals. This chapter assesses national and sub-
national policies and institutions to mitigate climate change in this 
context. It assesses the strengths and weaknesses of various mitiga-
tion policy instruments and policy packages and how they may interact 
either positively or negatively. Sector-specific policies are assessed in 
greater detail in the individual sector chapters (7 – 12). Major findings 
are summarized as follows. [Section 15.1]
The design of institutions affects the choice and feasibility of 
policy options as well as the sustainable financing of climate 
change mitigation measures (limited evidence, medium agreement). 
By shaping appropriate incentives, creating space for new stakeholders 
in decision making, and by transforming the understanding of policy 
choices, institutions designed to encourage participation by represen-
tatives of new industries and technologies can facilitate transitions to 
low-emission pathways, while institutions inherited unchanged from 
the past can perpetuate lock-in to high-carbon development paths. 
[15.2, 15.6]
There has been a considerable increase in national and sub-
national mitigation plans and strategies since AR4 (medium evi-
dence, high agreement). These plans and strategies are in their early 
stages of development and implementation in many countries, mak-
ing it difficult to assess whether and how they will result in appropri-
ate institutional and policy change, and thus, their impact on future 
emissions. However, to date these policies, taken together, have not 
yet achieved a substantial deviation in emissions from the past trend. 
Theories of institutional change suggest they might play a role in shap-
ing incentives, political contexts, and policy paradigms in a way that 
encourages emissions reductions in the future. [15.1, 15.2]  
Sector-specific policies have been more widely used than 
economy-wide, market-based policies (medium evidence, high 
agreement). Although economic theory suggests that economy-wide 
market-based policies for the singular objective of mitigation would 
generally be more cost-effective than sector-specific policies, political 
economy considerations often make economy-wide policies harder 
to design and implement than sector-specific policies. Sector-specific 
policies may also be needed to overcome sectoral market failures that 
price policies do not address. For example, building codes can require 
publicly funded energy efficient investments where private investments 
would otherwise not exist. Sector approaches also allow for packages 
of complementary policies, as, for example, in transport, where pricing 
policies that raise the cost of carbon-intensive forms of private trans-
port are more effective when backed by public investment in viable 
alternatives. [15.1, 15.2, 15.5, 15.8, 15.9]
Direct regulatory approaches and information measures are 
widely used, and are often environmentally effective, though 
debate remains on the extent of their environmental impacts 
and cost effectiveness (medium evidence, medium agreement). 
Examples of regulatory approaches include energy efficiency standards; 
examples of information programmes include labelling programmes 
that can help consumers make better-informed decisions. While such 
approaches often work at a net social benefit, the scientific literature 
is divided on whether such policies are implemented with negative pri-
vate costs to firms and individuals. Since AR4 there has been continued 
investigation into ‘rebound’ effects that arise when higher efficiency 
leads to lower energy prices and greater consumption. There is general 
agreement that such rebound effects exist, but there is low agreement 
in the literature on the magnitude. [3.9.5, 8.3, 9.7.2.4, 15.5.4, 15.5.5]
Fuel taxes are an example of a sector-specific policy and 
are often originally put in place for objectives such as rev-
enue — they are not necessarily designed for the purpose of 
climate change mitigation (high confidence). In Europe, where fuel 
taxes are highest, they have contributed to reductions in carbon emis-
sions from the transport sector of roughly 50 % for this group of coun-
tries. The short-run response to higher fuel prices is often small, but 
long-run price elasticities are quite high, or roughly – 0.6 to – 0.8. This 
means that in the long run, 10 % higher fuel prices correlate with 7 % 
reduction in fuel use and emissions. In the transport sector, taxes have 
the advantage of being progressive or neutral in most countries and 
strongly progressive in low-income countries. [15.5.2]
Reduction of subsidies to fossil energy can result in significant 
emission reductions at negative social cost (high confidence). 
[15.5.2] Although political economy barriers are substantial, many 
countries have reformed their tax and budget systems to reduce fuel 
subsidies that actually accrue to the relatively wealthy, and utilized 
lump-sum cash transfers or other mechanisms that are more targeted 
to the poor. [15.5.3]
Cap and trade systems for greenhouse gases are being estab-
lished in a growing number of countries and regions (limited evi-
dence, medium agreement). Their environmental effect has so far been 
limited because caps have either been loose or have not yet been bind-
ing. There appears to have been a tradeoff between the political feasi-
bility and environmental effectiveness of these programmes, as well as 
between political feasibility and distributional equity in the allocation 
of permits. Greater environmental effectiveness through a tighter cap 
may be combined with a price ceiling that makes for political feasibil-
ity. [15.5.3]
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Carbon taxes have been implemented in some countries 
and — alongside technology and other policies — have contrib-
uted to decoupling of emissions from gross domestic product 
(GDP) (high confidence). Differentiation by sector, which is quite com-
mon, reduces cost-effectiveness that arises from the changes in pro-
duction methods, consumption patterns, lifestyle shifts, and technology 
development, but it may increase political feasibility, or be preferred 
for reasons of competitiveness or distributional equity. In some coun-
tries, high carbon and fuel taxes have been made politically feasible 
by refunding revenues or by lowering other taxes in an environmental 
fiscal reform. [15.2, 15.5.2, 15.5.3]
Adding a mitigation policy to another may not necessarily 
enhance mitigation (high confidence). For instance, if a cap and 
trade system has a sufficiently stringent cap, then other policies such 
as renewable subsidies have no further impact on total emissions 
(although they may affect costs and possibly the viability of more 
stringent future targets). If the cap is loose relative to other policies, 
it becomes ineffective. This is an example of a negative interaction 
between policy instruments. Since other policies cannot be ‘added on’ 
to a cap-and-trade system, if it is to meet any particular target, a suf-
ficiently low cap is necessary. A carbon tax, on the other hand, can 
have an additive environmental effect to policies such as subsidies to 
renewables. [15.7]
There is a distinct role for technology policy as a complement to 
other mitigation policies (high confidence). Properly implemented 
technology policies reduce the cost of achieving a given environmental 
target. Technology policy will be most effective when technology-push 
policies (e. g., publicly funded research and development (R&D)) and 
demand-pull policies (e. g., governmental procurement programmes or 
performance regulations) are used in a complementary fashion (robust 
evidence, high agreement). [15.6] While technology-push and demand-
pull policies are necessary, they are unlikely to be sufficient without 
complementary framework conditions. Managing social challenges of 
technology policy change may require innovations in policy and insti-
tutional design, including building integrated policies that make com-
plementary use of market incentives, authority and norms (medium 
evidence, medium agreement). [15.6.5]. 
Since AR4, a large number of countries and sub-national jurisdictions 
have introduced support policies for renewable energy such as feed-
in tariffs (FIT) and renewable portfolio standards (RPS). These have 
promoted substantial diffusion and innovation of new energy tech-
nologies such as wind turbines and photovoltaic (PV) panels, but have 
raised questions about their economic efficiency, and introduced chal-
lenges for grid and market integration (7.12, 15.6).
Worldwide investment in research in support of climate change 
mitigation is small relative to overall public research spending 
(medium evidence, medium agreement). The effectiveness of research 
support will be greatest if it is increased slowly and steadily rather 
than dramatically or erratically. It is important that data collection for 
programme evaluation be built into technology policy programmes, 
because there is very little empirical evidence on the relative effective-
ness of different mechanisms for supporting the creation and diffusion 
of new technologies. [15.6.2, 15.6.5]
Public finance mechanisms reduce risks that deter climate 
investments (high confidence). The future value of carbon permits 
created by an economic instrument such as cap and trade may, for 
example, not be accepted as sufficiently secure by banks. Government 
public finance mechanisms to reduce risks include debt and equity 
mechanisms, carbon finance, and innovative grants. [15.12]
Government planning and provision can facilitate shifts to less 
energy and GHG-intensive infrastructure and lifestyles (high con-
fidence). This applies particularly when there are indivisibilities in the 
provision of infrastructure as in the energy sector (e. g., for electric-
ity transmission and distribution or district heating networks); in the 
transport sector (e. g., for non-motorized or public transport), and in 
urban planning. The provision of adequate infrastructure is important 
for behavioural change (medium evidence, high agreement) [15.5.6].
Successful voluntary agreements on mitigation between gov-
ernments and industries are characterized by a strong institu-
tional framework with capable industrial associations (medium 
evidence, medium agreement). The strengths of voluntary agreements 
are speed and flexibility in phasing measures, and facilitation of barrier 
removal activities for energy efficiency and low emission technologies. 
Regulatory threats, even though the threats are not always explicit, are 
also an important factor for firms to be motivated. There are few envi-
ronmental impacts without a proper institutional framework (medium 
evidence, medium agreement). [15.5.5]
Synergies and tradeoffs between mitigation and adaptation 
policies may exist in the land-use sector (medium evidence, 
medium agreement). For other sectors such as industry and power, the 
connections are not obvious. [15.11] 
The ability to undertake policy action requires information, 
knowledge, tools, and skills, and therefore capacity building 
is central both for mitigation and to the sustainable develop-
ment agenda (medium evidence, high agreement). The needs for 
capacity building include capacity to analyze the implications of cli-
mate change; capacity to formulate, implement, and evaluate policies; 
capacity to take advantage of external funding and flexible mecha-
nisms; and capacity to make informed choices of the various capacity 
building modalities. [15.10] 
Mainstreaming climate change into development planning has 
helped yield financing for various climate policy initiatives 
(medium evidence, medium agreement). Among developing and some 
least developed countries, an emerging trend is the establishment of 
national funding entities dedicated to climate change. While diverse in 
design and objectives, they tap and blend international and national 
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sources of finance, thereby helping to improve policy coherence and 
address aid fragmentation. Financing adaptation and mitigation in 
developing countries is crucial from the viewpoint of welfare and 
equity (medium evidence, high agreement). [15.12]
Gaps in knowledge: The fact that various jurisdictions produce vari-
ous policy instruments influenced by co-benefits and political economy 
and that they interact in complex manners makes it difficult to evalu-
ate the economic and environmental effectiveness of individual policy 
instrument as well as policy package of a nation. Most importantly, it 
is not known with certainty how much an emission reduction target 
may cost to the economy in the real world in comparison to the ‘first 
best’ optimal solution estimated by economic models in other chapters 
in this report. Costs may be under-stated or over-stated.
15.1 Introduction
This chapter assesses national and sub-national mitigation policies 
and their institutional settings. There has been a marked increase 
in national policies and legislation on climate change since the AR4 
with a diversity of approaches and a multiplicity of objectives (see 
Section 15.2). However, Figure 1.9 of Chapter 1 suggests that these 
policies, taken together, have not yet achieved a substantial devia-
tion in emissions from the past trend. Limiting concentrations to lev-
els that would be consistent with a likely probability of maintaining 
temperature increases below 2 °C this century (scenarios generally 
in the range of 430 – 480 ppmv CO2eq) would require that emissions 
break from these trends and be decreased substantially. In contrast, 
concentrations exceed 1000 ppmv CO2eq by 2100 in many baseline 
scenarios (that is, scenarios without additional efforts to reduce emis-
sions). 
The literature on mitigation scenarios provides a wide range of CO2 
shadow price levels consistent with these goals, with estimates of 
less than USD 50 / tCO2 in 2020 in many studies and exceeding USD 
100 / tCO2 in others, assuming a globally-efficient and immediate effort 
to reduce emissions. These shadow prices exhibit a strongly increasing 
trend thereafter. Policies and instruments are assessed in this light.
Section 15.2 assesses the role of institutions and governance. Section 
15.3 lays out the classification of policy instruments and packages, 
while 15.4 discusses the methodologies used to evaluate policies and 
institutions. The performance of various policy instruments and mea-
sures are individually assessed in Sections 15.5 and 15.6.  
The two main types of economic instruments are price instruments, 
that is, taxes and subsidies (including removal of subsidies on fossil 
fuels), and quantity instruments — emission-trading systems. These are 
assessed in Sections 15.5.2 and 15.5.3 respectively. An important fea-
ture of both these instruments is that they can be applied at a very 
broad, economy-wide scale. This is in contrast to the regulation and 
information policies and voluntary agreements which are usually sec-
tor-specific. These policies are assessed in Sections 15.5.4, 15.5.5, and 
15.5.7. Government provision and planning is discussed in 15.5.6. The 
next section, 15.6, provides a focused discussion on technology policy 
including research and development and the deployment and diffusion 
of clean energy technologies. In addition to technology policy, longer-
term effects of the policies assessed in Section 15.5 are addressed in 
Section 15.6.
Both these sections, 15.5 and 15.6, bring together lessons from poli-
cies and policy packages used at the sectoral level from Chapters 7 
(Energy), 8 (Transport), 9 (Buildings), 10 (Industry), 11 (Agriculture, For-
estry and Land Use) and Chapter 12 (Human Settlements, Infrastruc-
ture, and Spatial Planning). 
The following sections further assess the interaction among policy 
instruments, as they are not usually used in isolation, and the impacts 
of particular instruments depend on the entire package of policies and 
the institutional context. Section 15.7 reviews interactions, both ben-
eficial and harmful, that may not have been planned. The presence of 
such interactions is in part a consequence of the multi-jurisdictional 
nature of climate governance as well as the use of multiple policy 
instruments within a jurisdiction. Section 15.8 examines the deliberate 
linkage of policies across national and sub-national jurisdictions. 
Other key issues are further discussed in dedicated sections. They are: 
the role of stakeholders including non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) (15.9), capacity building (15.10), links between adaptation and 
mitigation policies (15.11), and investment and finance (15.12). Gaps 
in knowledge are collected in 15.13.  
15.2 Institutions and 
governance
15�2�1 Why institutions and governance matter
Institutions and processes of governance (see Annex 1: Glossary for 
definitions) shape and constrain policy-making and policy implementa-
tion in multiple ways relevant for a shift to a low carbon economy. First, 
institutions — understood as formal rules and informal norms — set the 
incentive structure for economic decision making (North, 1991), influ-
encing, for example, decisions about transportation investments, and 
behavioural decisions relevant to efficient energy use. Second, insti-
tutions shape the political context for decision making, empowering 
some interests and reducing the influence of others (Steinmo et  al., 
1992; Hall, 1993). Harrison (2012) illustrates this with respect to envi-
ronmental tax reform in Canada. Third, institutions can also shape pat-
terns of thinking and understanding of policy choices — through both 
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normative and cognitive effects (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). These 
effects can result in dominant policy paradigms — ideas, policy goals, 
and instruments — that favour some actions and exclude others from 
consideration (Radaelli and Schmidt, 2004). For example, existing 
energy systems are likely to remain in place without appropriate insti-
tutional change (Hughes, 1987) and changes in discourse, which would 
perpetuate existing technologies and policies and lock out new ones 
(Unruh, 2000; Walker, 2000). More generally, a mismatch between 
social-ecological context and institutional arrangements can lead to 
a lack of fit and exert a drag on policy and technological response 
(Young, 2002). 
15�2�2 Increase in government 
institutionalization of climate mitigation 
actions
There has been a definite increase since AR4 in formal governmental 
efforts to promote climate change mitigation. These efforts are diverse 
in their approach, scale, and emphasis, and take the form of legisla-
tion, strategies, policies, and coordination mechanisms. Many of these 
are relatively recent, and often in the design or early implementa-
tion stage. As a result, it is premature to evaluate their effectiveness 
and there is insufficient literature as yet that attempts to do so. Since 
global greenhouse gas emissions have continued to increase in recent 
years (Chapter 5 and Section 15.1), it will be important to closely 
monitor this trend to evaluate if policies and institutions created are 
sufficiently strong and effective to lead to the reductions required to 
stabilize global temperature, for instance, at the 2 °C target. This sec-
tion reviews national centralized governmental actions, while 15.2.3 
discusses sectoral actions and 15.2.5 examines the roles of other 
stakeholders including non-state actors.
A review of climate legislation and strategy in almost all United Nation 
(UN) Member States shows that there has been a substantial increase 
in these categories between 2007 and 2012 (Dubash et al., 2013) (See 
Figure 15.1). Dubash et al. (2013) define climate legislation as mitiga-
tion-focused legislation that goes beyond sectoral action alone, while 
climate strategy is defined as a non-legislative plan or framework 
aimed at mitigation that encompasses more than a small number of 
sectors, and that includes a coordinating body charged with implemen-
tation. International pledges are not included. By these definitions, 
39 % of countries, accounting for 73 % of population and 67 % of 
greenhouse gas emissions, were covered by climate law or strategies 
in 2012, an increase from 23 % of countries, 36 % of population, and 
45 % of emissions in 2007. There are also strong regional differences, 
Figure 15�1 | National climate legislation and strategies in 2007 and 2012.* Reproduced from Dubash et al., (2013). In this figure, climate legislation is defined as mitigation-
focused legislation that goes beyond sectoral action alone. Climate strategy is defined as a non-legislative plan or framework aimed at mitigation that encompasses more than a 
small number of sectors, and that includes a coordinating body charged with implementation. International pledges are not included, nor are sub-national plans and strategies. The 
panel shows proportion of GHG emissions covered.
* Number of countries and GHG emissions covered (NAI: Non Annex I countries (developing countries), AI: Annex I countries (developed countries), LAM: Latin America, MAF: 
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with Asia and Latin America recording the fastest rate of increase. 
Taken as a block, in 2012, 49 % of current emissions from the develop-
ing world regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America were under climate 
law and 77 % of emissions were under either law or strategy, while for 
the developed world regions of Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development 1990 Countries OECD-1990 and Economies in 
Transition (EIT) the equivalent numbers are 38 % and 56 %. Finally, 
while the number of countries with climate legislation increased mar-
ginally from 18 % to 22 % over this period, the number of countries 
with climate strategies increased from 5 % to 18 %, suggesting many 
more countries are adopting a strategy-led approach. (For regional 
aggregations see Annex II.2)
Climate legislation and strategies follow a wide diversity of approaches 
to operationalization and implementation. The imposition of carbon 
prices is one approach widely discussed in the literature (See Section 
15.5) but less frequently implemented in practice. Examples include 
the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) (See Section 
14.4.2) or setting of carbon taxes (see Section 15.5.2). One study of 
the 19 highest emitting countries finds that six have put in place some 
form of carbon price, while 14 have put in place both regulation and 
other economic incentives for greenhouse gas mitigation (Lachapelle 
and Paterson, 2013). Common explanations for this variation are in 
terms of the novelty of emissions trading (although emissions trad-
ing has been in practice implemented much more widely than carbon 
taxation), the legitimacy problems faced by emissions trading (Pater-
son, 2010), or political contestation over increased taxation (see for 
example Laurent (2010), on the French case, Jotzo (2012) for Austra-
lia or Jagers and Hammar (2009), for evidence that popular support 
for carbon taxes in Sweden depend on how it is framed in popular 
debate), and lobbying by fossil-fuel or energy-intense industry lobbies 
(Bailey et al., 2012; Sarasini, 2013).
More generally speaking, policy instruments have often been sec-
tor-specific. Economy-wide instruments, even when implemented, 
have had exemptions for some sectors, most commonly those most 
exposed to international trade. The exemptions have arisen because 
national policies have been developed under the strong influence of 
sectoral policy networks (Compston, 2009) and many stakeholders 
therein — including firms and NGOs — influence the policy to promote 
their interests (Helm, 2010). This phenomenon undermines the overall 
cost-effectiveness of climate policy (Anthoff and Hahn, 2010) although 
it may help further other objectives such as equity and energy security 
(see Section 15.7).
Another approach follows a model of national-level target backed by 
explicit creation of institutions to manage performance to that target. 
In China, for example, a ‘National Leading Group on Climate Change’ 
in June 2007, housed in the apex National Development and Reform 
Commission and chaired by the premier (Tsang and Kolk, 2010a) coor-
dinates the achievement of targets set in the subsequent National Cli-
mate Change Programme. The Chinese examples illustrate a broader 
point emerging from a cross-country study that implementation of cli-
mate legislation and plans are, in at least some cases, drawing power-
ful finance and planning departments into engagement with climate 
change (Held et al., 2013).
Another approach is to establish dedicated new climate change bodies 
that are substantially independent of the executive and that seek to 
coordinate existing government agencies through a variety of levers. 
The leading example of this approach is in the UK, where a dedicated 
Climate Change Committee analyzes departmental plans and monitors 
compliance with five-year carbon budgets (U. K., 2008; Stallworthy, 
2009). Instead of direct executive action, as in the Chinese case, this 
approach relies on analysis, public reporting, and advice to govern-
ment. Following the UK example, Australia has established an inde-
pendent Climate Change Authority to advise the government on emis-
sion targets and review effectiveness of its Carbon Pricing Mechanism 
(Keenan et al., 2012).
15�2�3 Climate change mitigation through 
sectoral action
While there is no systematic study of implementation of climate plans, 
case study evidence suggests that these plans are frequently opera-
tionalized through sectoral actions. There are a variety of ways through 
which national plans interface with sectoral approaches to mainstream 
climate change. In some cases, there is a formal allocation of emis-
sions across sectors. For example, in Germany, mitigation efforts were 
broken down by sectors for the period between 2008 and 2012, with 
the national ‘Allocation Act 2012’ specifying emissions budgets for 
sectors participating in the EU ETS as well as the remaining sectors 
(Dienes, 2007; Frenz, 2007). More typically, climate mainstreaming 
occurs through a sector by sector process led by relevant government 
departments, as in France (Mathy, 2007), India (Dubash, 2011; Atter-
idge et al., 2012), and Brazil (da Motta, 2011a; La Rovere et al., 2011).
In some cases, the sectoral process involves a role for stakehold-
ers in engagement with government departments. In France, sectoral 
approaches are devised at the central level through negotiation and 
consultation between multiple ministries, experts, business, and NGOs. 
According to at least one analysis, this approach risks a dilution of 
measures through the influence of lobbies that may lose from miti-
gation actions (Mathy, 2007). In Brazil, sector specific approaches are 
developed by sectoral ministries complemented by a multi-stakeholder 
forum to solicit views and forge consensus (Hochstetler and Viola, 
2012; Viola and Franchini, 2012; Held et al., 2013a).
In some cases, climate change considerations bring about changes in 
long-standing patterns of sector governance. In South Africa, for exam-
ple, the Copenhagen pledge led to a process of reconsidering South 
Africa’s integrated resource plan for electricity to include carbon reduc-
tion as one among multiple criteria (Republic of South Africa, 2011). In 
India, the establishment of national sectoral ‘missions’ had the effect 
of creating new institutional mechanisms in the case of the National 
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Solar Mission, or of raising the profile and importance of particular 
ministries or departments as in the example of the Bureau of Energy 
Efficiency (Dubash, 2011). In other cases, climate mainstreaming was 
facilitated by prior political shifts in governance of a sector. Brazil’s 
climate approach particularly emphasizes the forest sector (da Motta, 
2011b; La Rovere, 2011). Progress on the Brazilian plan was enabled 
by prior domestic political consensus around a far-reaching Forest 
Code (Hochstetler and Viola, 2012).
15�2�4 Co-Benefits as a driver of mitigation 
action
The importance of co-benefits — both development gains from climate 
policy and climate gains from development policy — emerge as a par-
ticularly strong rationale and basis for sectoral action. As Table 6.7 
shows, an inventory of sectoral action on climate change (drawn from 
Chapter 7 – 12) is linked to a wide range of co-benefits and adverse 
side-effects, encompassing economic, social, and environmental 
effects. Table 15.1 provides a roadmap for the co-benefits and adverse 
side-effects from sectoral mitigation measures most prominently dis-
cussed across Chapters 7 to 12. They are listed in three columns: eco-
nomic, social, and environmental. Each column shows the range of 
effects on objectives or concerns beyond mitigation discussed in Chap-
ters 7.12 for that category. For example, energy security is categorized 
in the column of ‘economic’ and addressed in Section 7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 
10.8, 11.13.6, and 12.8.
This perception is reinforced by comparative case studies and specific 
country studies. A comparative study finds that co-benefits is an impor-
tant driving force for mitigation policies across large, rapidly industrial-
izing countries (Bailey and Compston, 2012a), a finding that is sup-
ported by country level studies. India’s National Action Plan on Climate 
Change (NAPCC), for example, is explicitly oriented to pursuit of co-
benefits, with mitigation understood to be the secondary benefit emerg-
ing from development policies. The linkage between energy security and 
mitigation is particularly important to winning broader political support 
for action on mitigation (Dubash, 2011; Fisher, 2012). A similar trend is 
apparent in China (Oberheitmann, 2008), where provincial implementa-
tion of targets is enabled by linking action to local motivations, notably 
for energy efficiency (Teng and Gu, 2007; Richerzhagen and Scholz, 
2008a; Qi et al., 2008; Tsang and Kolk, 2010b; Kostka and Hobbs, 2012).
Tsang and Kolk (2010a) go so far as to say that Chinese leaders essen-
tially equate climate policy with energy conservation. Kostka and Hobbs 
(2012) identify three ways in which this alignment of global and local 
objectives happens: interest bundling, through which objectives of 
political institutions are tied to local economic interests; policy bun-
dling, to link climate change with issues of local political concern; and 
framing in ways that play to local constituencies. 
The concept of ‘nationally appropriate mitigation actions’ (NAMAs) 
has a conceptual connection to the idea of co-benefits. Nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions are intended to be mitigation actions 
that are ‘nationally appropriate’ in the sense that they contribute to 
development outcomes. Therefore, NAMAs provide a possible mech-
anism for connection of national policies and projects to the global 
climate regime, although the mechanisms through which this will be 
accomplished are yet to be fully articulated (see Box 15.1). Another, 
related mechanism is the explicit formulation in many countries of ‘low 
emissions development strategies’ that seek to integrate climate and 
development strategies (Clapp et al., 2010).
15�2�5 Sub-national climate action and 
interaction across levels of governance
In many countries, the formulation and implementation of national 
mitigation approaches are further delegated to sub-national levels, 
with differing levels of central coordination, depending on national 
contexts and institutions. Comparative analysis of cross-country cli-
mate action is insufficiently developed to allow generalization and 
explanation of different approaches to climate policy.
Table 15�1 | Roadmap for the assessment of potential co-benefits and adverse side-effects from mitigation measures for additional objectives in the sector chapters (7 – 12). For 
overview purposes, only those objectives and concerns are shown that are assessed in at least two sectors. For a broader synthesis of the literature assessed in this report, see Sec-
tion 6.6.
Effect of mitigation measures on additional objectives or concerns
Economic Social Environmental
Energy security (7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 10.8, 11.13.6, 12.8)
Employment impact (7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 10.8, 11.7, 11.13.6)
New business opportunity / economic activity (7.9, 11.7, 
11.13.6)
Productivity / competitiveness (8.7, 9.7, 10.9, 11.13.6)
Technological spillover / innovation (7.9, 8.7, 10.8, 11.3, 
11.13.6)
Health impact (e. g., via air quality and noise) (5.7, 7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 
10.8, 11.7, 11.13.6, 12.8)
Energy / mobility access (7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 11.13.6, 12.4)
(Fuel) Poverty alleviation (7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 11.7, 11.13.6)
Food security (7.9, 11.7, 11.13.6 / 7)
Impact on local conflicts (7.9, 10.8, 11.7, 11.13.6)
Safety / disaster resilience (7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 10.8, 12.8)
Gender impact (7.9, 9.7, 11.7, 11.13.6)
Ecosystem impact (e. g., via air pollution) (7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 10.8, 
11.7, 11.13.6 / 7, 12.8)
Land-use competition (7.9, 8.7, 10.8, 11.7, 11.13.6 / 7)
Water use / quality (7.9, 9.7, 10.8, 11.7, 11.13.6)
Biodiversity conservation (7.9, 9.7, 11.7, 11.13.6)
Urban heat island effect (9.7, 12.8)
Resource / material use impact (7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 10.8, 12.8)
Box 15�1 | Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs)
The Bali Action Plan (BAP), (1 / CP.13; UNFCCC, 2007) states that 
developing countries are called on to take NAMAs supported and 
enabled by technology and finance. For example, NAMAs could be 
articulated in terms of national emissions intensity or trajectories, 
sectoral emissions, or specific actions at sectoral or sub-sectoral 
levels. As of June 2013, 57 parties had submitted NAMAs to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) secretariat. 
The design of mechanisms to link NAMAs to global support lead 
to some complex tradeoffs. For example, large scale sectoral 
NAMAs provide the least scope for leakage (decreased emissions 
in one sector is undermined by increased emissions in another 
part of the economy) and the lowest measurement costs (Jung 
et al., 2010). However, designing NAMAs around transaction 
costs might run counter to designing them for targeted focus 
on national development priorities. Exploring the extent of this 
tradeoff and managing it carefully will be an important part of 
implementing NAMAs.
Much of the writing on NAMAs is focused on the challenges of 
linking national actions to the international climate framework. 
Conceptual challenges involved in linking NAMAs to the UNFCCC 
process include the legal nature of NAMAs (van Asselt et al., 
2010), financing of NAMAs, and associated concerns of avoid-
ing double counting (Cheng, 2010; Jung et al., 2010; van Asselt 
et al., 2010; Sovacool, 2011a) and measurement, reporting, and 
verification of NAMAs (Jung et al., 2010; Sterk, 2010; van Asselt 
et al., 2010).
While NAMAs pertain particularly to the developing world, co-
benefits based arguments are also used in developed countries. In 
the United States, Gore and Robinson (2009) argue that expansion 
of municipal scale action is articulated in the form of co-benefits, 
and is driven by network-based communication and citizen 
initiative. In Germany, several benefits in addition to climate 
change have been attributed to the policy for energy transition or 
‘Energiewende,’ including security of energy supply and industrial 
policy (Lehmann and Gawel, 2013).
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In some federal systems, national target setting by the central govern-
ment is followed by further allocation of targets to provinces, often 
through nationally specific formulae or processes. For example, in 
the case of Belgium, Kyoto targets were re-allocated to the regional 
level through a process of negotiation, followed by the preparation of 
regional climate plans to implement regional targets (Happaerts et al., 
2011). Ultimately, since agreement could not be reached on regional 
targets to meet the national Kyoto targets, the approach relied on off-
sets were explicitly internalized as part of the national approach to 
meeting Kyoto targets. In China, national action is defined and moni-
tored by the central government in consultation with provinces, and 
implementation is delegated to provinces. Targets set in the subse-
quent National Climate Change Programme as part of the 11th Five 
Year Plan were implemented through a mechanism of provincial com-
muniqués to track compliance with the target, and provincial leading 
groups to implement the target (Teng and Gu, 2007; Qi et al., 2008; 
Tsang and Kolk, 2010b; Held et al., 2011a; Kostka and Hobbs, 2012). A 
range of policy mechanisms were used to implement this target, such 
as differential energy prices based on energy efficiency performance, 
promotion of energy audits, and financial incentives for performance 
(Held et al., 2011b). Subsequent revised targets have been set for the 
12th Five Year Plan. 
Other countries represent intermediate cases between central control 
and decentralization. India has developed a mix of national policies 
through its National Action Plan on Climate Change, responsibility 
for which rests with central government ministries, and State Action 
Plans on Climate Change to be developed and implemented by states 
(Dubash et al., 2013). While they are predominantly focused on imple-
menting national level directives, there is also sufficient flexibility to 
pursue state-level concerns, and some states have created new mecha-
nisms, such as the establishment of a Climate Change department in 
the state of Gujarat, and the establishment of a green fund in Kerala 
(Atteridge et al., 2012). In France, the EU objectives were adopted as 
national goals, and through national legislation, all urban agglomera-
tions over 50,000 are required to prepare ‘Climate and Energy Territo-
rial Plans’ to meet these goals and, additionally, to address adaptation 
needs (Assemblée Nationale, 2010). Since all other planning processes 
related to issues such as transport, building, urban planning, and energy 
have to conform to and support these objectives, this approach pro-
vides a powerful mechanism to mainstream climate change into local 
public planning. These plans also form a framework around which pri-
vate voluntary action can be organized. In Germany, while the federal 
government initiates and leads climate action, the states or ‘Länder’ 
have a veto power against central initiatives through representation in 
the upper house of parliament (Weidner and Mez, 2008). In addition, 
however, the Länder may also take additional action in areas such as 
energy efficiency measures, renewable energy development on state 
property and even through state-wide targets (Biedermann, 2011).
In some cases, sub-national jurisdictions seem to be attempting to 
compensate for the lack of political momentum at the national level 
(Schreurs, 2008; Dubash, 2011). In the United States, for example, 
although progress at the federal level has been slow and halting, there 
have been multiple efforts at sub-national scales, through unilateral 
and coordinated action by states, judicial intervention, and municipal-
mitigation is particularly important to winning broader political support 
for action on mitigation (Dubash, 2011; Fisher, 2012). A similar trend is 
apparent in China (Oberheitmann, 2008), where provincial implementa-
tion of targets is enabled by linking action to local motivations, notably 
for energy efficiency (Teng and Gu, 2007; Richerzhagen and Scholz, 
2008a; Qi et al., 2008; Tsang and Kolk, 2010b; Kostka and Hobbs, 2012).
Tsang and Kolk (2010a) go so far as to say that Chinese leaders essen-
tially equate climate policy with energy conservation. Kostka and Hobbs 
(2012) identify three ways in which this alignment of global and local 
objectives happens: interest bundling, through which objectives of 
political institutions are tied to local economic interests; policy bun-
dling, to link climate change with issues of local political concern; and 
framing in ways that play to local constituencies. 
The concept of ‘nationally appropriate mitigation actions’ (NAMAs) 
has a conceptual connection to the idea of co-benefits. Nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions are intended to be mitigation actions 
that are ‘nationally appropriate’ in the sense that they contribute to 
development outcomes. Therefore, NAMAs provide a possible mech-
anism for connection of national policies and projects to the global 
climate regime, although the mechanisms through which this will be 
accomplished are yet to be fully articulated (see Box 15.1). Another, 
related mechanism is the explicit formulation in many countries of ‘low 
emissions development strategies’ that seek to integrate climate and 
development strategies (Clapp et al., 2010).
15�2�5 Sub-national climate action and 
interaction across levels of governance
In many countries, the formulation and implementation of national 
mitigation approaches are further delegated to sub-national levels, 
with differing levels of central coordination, depending on national 
contexts and institutions. Comparative analysis of cross-country cli-
mate action is insufficiently developed to allow generalization and 
explanation of different approaches to climate policy.
Box 15�1 | Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs)
The Bali Action Plan (BAP), (1 / CP.13; UNFCCC, 2007) states that 
developing countries are called on to take NAMAs supported and 
enabled by technology and finance. For example, NAMAs could be 
articulated in terms of national emissions intensity or trajectories, 
sectoral emissions, or specific actions at sectoral or sub-sectoral 
levels. As of June 2013, 57 parties had submitted NAMAs to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) secretariat. 
The design of mechanisms to link NAMAs to global support lead 
to some complex tradeoffs. For example, large scale sectoral 
NAMAs provide the least scope for leakage (decreased emissions 
in one sector is undermined by increased emissions in another 
part of the economy) and the lowest measurement costs (Jung 
et al., 2010). However, designing NAMAs around transaction 
costs might run counter to designing them for targeted focus 
on national development priorities. Exploring the extent of this 
tradeoff and managing it carefully will be an important part of 
implementing NAMAs.
Much of the writing on NAMAs is focused on the challenges of 
linking national actions to the international climate framework. 
Conceptual challenges involved in linking NAMAs to the UNFCCC 
process include the legal nature of NAMAs (van Asselt et al., 
2010), financing of NAMAs, and associated concerns of avoid-
ing double counting (Cheng, 2010; Jung et al., 2010; van Asselt 
et al., 2010; Sovacool, 2011a) and measurement, reporting, and 
verification of NAMAs (Jung et al., 2010; Sterk, 2010; van Asselt 
et al., 2010).
While NAMAs pertain particularly to the developing world, co-
benefits based arguments are also used in developed countries. In 
the United States, Gore and Robinson (2009) argue that expansion 
of municipal scale action is articulated in the form of co-benefits, 
and is driven by network-based communication and citizen 
initiative. In Germany, several benefits in addition to climate 
change have been attributed to the policy for energy transition or 
‘Energiewende,’ including security of energy supply and industrial 
policy (Lehmann and Gawel, 2013).
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scale action (Carlarne, 2008; Rabe, 2009, 2010; Posner, 2010). There 
are examples of states joining together in creating new institutional 
mechanisms, such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) 
among Northeastern states in the United States to institute an emis-
sions trading programme, and the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) 
between California and several Canadian provinces, although both 
these initiatives have also failed to live up to their original promise 
(Mehling and Frenkil, 2013). Climate policy in the state of California, 
with its new cap and trade programme, is particularly worth noting 
both because of the size of its economy and because California has a 
history as a pioneer of environmental innovation (Mazmanian et  al., 
2008; Farrell and Hanemann, 2009).
As detailed further in Section 15.8, cities are particularly vibrant sites 
of sub-national action in some countries, often operating in networks 
and involving a range of actors at multiple scales (Betsill and Bulkeley, 
2006; Gore and Robinson, 2009). For example, in the Netherlands, the 
central government has established a programme that provides subsi-
dies to municipalities to undertake various measures such as improve-
ments in municipal buildings and housing, improved traffic flow, sus-
tainable energy, and so on (Gupta et  al., 2007). In Brazil, important 
cities such as Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo have taken specific mea-
sures that go beyond national policies. For example, a 2009 São Paulo 
law (No. 13.798) commits the state to undertake mandatory economy-
wide GHG emission reduction targets of 20 % by 2020 from 2005 lev-
els (Lucon and Goldemberg, 2010). In the United States, over 1000 cit-
ies and municipalities have committed to reaching what would have 
been the US Kyoto target as part of the Conference of Mayors’ Climate 
Protection Agreement (Mehling and Frenkil, 2013).
Sub-national action on climate change is a mix of bottom-up experi-
mentation and the interaction of top-down guidance with local imple-
mentation action. In some cases, countries have set in place explicit 
mechanisms for coordination of national and sub-national action, such 
as in China and India, but there is insufficient evidence to assess the 
effectiveness of these mechanisms. More typical is relatively uncoor-
dinated action and experimentation at sub-national level, particularly 
focused on cities. These issues are discussed further in Section 15.8.
15�2�6 Drivers of national and sub-national 
climate action
National and sub-national actions are related to domestic political 
institutions, domestic politics, international influences, and ideational 
factors. Based on data from industrialized countries, a comparative 
political analysis suggests that proportional representation systems 
such as those in many EU nations are more likely than first past the 
post systems to give importance to minority interests on environmen-
tal outcomes; systems with multiple veto points, such as the US system, 
afford more opportunities for opponents to block political action; and 
in federal systems powerful provinces with high compliance costs can 
block action, as seems to have occurred in Canada (Harrison and Sund-
strom, 2010). Lachapelle and Paterson (2013) use quantitative analysis 
to substantiate the argument about proportional representation and 
systems with multiple veto points. They also show that presidential-
congressional systems find it systematically more difficult to develop 
climate policy than parliamentary systems. 
These are, however, only general tendencies: the specific details of 
country cases, as well as the possibility of multiple and interacting 
causal factors, suggests the need for caution in predicting outcomes 
based on these factors. 
In particular, national domestic political factors are also salient. Elec-
toral politics, operating through pressure for action from domestic 
constituents, is a determinant of action as is the cost of compliance 
(Harrison and Sundstrom, 2010). The role of climate change in elec-
toral strategies developed by political parties may also play a role 
in climate governance, although evidence for this effect is available 
only for developed countries (Carter, 2008; Fielding et al., 2012; Bai-
ley and Compston, 2012a). For example, the compliance costs of car-
bon pricing were the subject of direct electoral competition between 
Australia’s major political parties in the 2007 and 2010 general elec-
tions (Rootes, 2011; Bailey et  al., 2012). The presence of substantial 
co-benefits opportunities and re-framing policy around these oppor-
tunities can also influence domestic politics in favour of climate action 
(Held et al., 2013b); (Bailey and Compston, 2012a). Finally, the ‘type’ 
of state — liberal market, corporatist or developmental — can shape 
outcomes (Lachapelle and Paterson, 2013). For example, somewhat 
counter-intuitively corporatist states (e. g., Germany, South Korea) are 
more likely to have introduced carbon pricing than states with liberal 
market policy traditions (e. g., the United States, Canada). Conversely, 
liberal market economies are more likely, as are developmental states 
(e. g., China), to focus on R&D as a principal policy tool (on the United 
States, see notably Macneil (2012). These patterns reflect powerful 
institutional path dependencies and incentives facing actors promot-
ing climate policy in particular countries (Macneil, 2012).  
International pressures are also important in explaining state action. 
Diplomatic pressure, changes in public and private finance that empha-
size mainstreaming climate change, and a general trend toward higher 
fossil-fuel energy prices all are associated with increasing climate 
action (Held et al., 2013b).
Finally, based on comparative case studies, various ideational factors 
such as national norms around multilateralism, perceptions of equity 
in the global climate regime (Harrison and Sundstrom, 2010), and 
ideas put forward by scientists, international organizations and other 
voices of authority can also shift domestic politics (Held et al., 2013b).
15�2�7 Summary of institutions and governance
The evidence on institutional change and new patterns of climate gov-
ernance is limited, as many countries are in the process of establishing 
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new institutions and systems of governance. However, several trends 
are visible. First, there is a considerable increase in government led 
institutionalization of climate action through both legislation and pol-
icy since AR4. The factors driving these changes include international 
pressures, scope for co-benefits, and changing norms and ideas. The 
specifics of national political systems also affect country actions. Sec-
ond, evidence from national cases illustrates considerable diversity in 
the forms of action. While there are only a few cases of nationally led 
economy wide carbon price setting efforts, more common are sectoral 
approaches to climate change mitigation or delegated action to sub-
national levels, often embedded within national climate policy frame-
works. Third, the promise of ‘co-benefits’ is often an important stated 
reason for climate policies and their framing. Fourth, there is a profu-
sion of activity at sub-national levels, particularly urban areas, much 
of which is only loosely coordinated with national actions. Finally, the 
diversity of approaches appears to be strongly driven by local institu-
tional and political context, with legislative and policy measures tai-
lored to operate within the constraints of national political and insti-
tutional systems.
15.3 Characteristics and 
classification of policy 
instruments and packages 
This section presents a brief and non-exhaustive description of the 
main policy instruments and packages, using the common classifica-
tion set by Chapter 3.8. Most of these instruments will be assessed 
with the common evaluation criteria set by Chapter 3 (see Section 
15.5) in most of the remaining parts of this chapter. As indicated in 
Section 15.2, these instruments are introduced within an institutional 
context that obviously influences their design and implementation.    
15�3�1 Economic instruments
Economic instruments are sometimes termed ‘market-based’ approaches 
because prices are employed in environmental and climate policies. Eco-
nomic instruments for climate change mitigation include taxes (includ-
ing charges and border adjustments), subsidies and subsidy removal, 
and emissions trading schemes. Taxes and subsidies are known as price 
instruments since they do not directly target quantities, while emis-
sions trading schemes, especially cap-and-trade schemes (see below), 
are known as quantity instruments. This distinction can be important, as 
seen in Sections 15.5.3.8, 15.7.3.2, and 15.7.3.4.
Taxes and charges are ideally defined as a payment for each unit of 
GHG released into the atmosphere. In the climate context, they are 
usually unrelated to the provision of a service and are thus known as 
taxes rather than charges. They can be levied on different tax bases, 
whereas tax rates, given the global and uniform characteristics of the 
taxed emissions, usually do not show spatial variation (OECD, 2001). 
In the last years, many taxes on GHG or energy have devoted part of 
their revenues to the reduction of other distortionary taxes (green tax 
reforms), although other revenue uses are now playing an increasing 
role (Ekins and Speck, 2011).
Border tax adjustments are related instruments that intend to solve the 
dysfunctions of variable climate change regulations across the world. 
Although some authors highlight that they could alleviate the problem 
of leakage and a contribute to a wider application of mitigation policies 
(Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007), others emphasize that they do not consti-
tute optimal policy instruments and could even increase leakage (Jakob 
et al., 2013) or cause potential threats to fairness and to the function-
ing of the global trade system (e. g., Bhagwati and Mavroidis, 2007).
Subsidies to low GHG products or technologies have been applied by a 
number of countries but, contrary to the previous revenue-raising / neu-
tral economic instruments, they demand public funds. In some coun-
tries there are ‘perverse’ subsidies lowering the prices of fossil fuels 
or road transport, which bring about a higher use of energy and an 
increase of GHG emissions. Therefore, subsidy reduction or removal 
would have positive effects in climate change and public-revenue 
terms and is therefore treated as an instrument in its own right (OECD, 
2008).
In ‘cap-and-trade’ emissions trading systems regulators establish an 
overall target of emissions and issue an equivalent number of emis-
sions permits. Permits are subsequently allocated among polluters and 
trade leads to a market price. The allocation of emission permits can 
be done through free distribution (e. g., grandfathering) or through 
auctioning. In ‘baseline and credit’ emissions trading systems, polluters 
may create emission reduction credits (often project-based) by emit-
ting below a baseline level of emissions (Stavins, 2003).
15�3�2 Regulatory approaches
Regulations and standards were the core of the first environmental 
policies and are still very important in environmental and climate poli-
cies all around the world. They are conventional regulatory approaches 
that establish a rule and / or objective that must be fulfilled by the pol-
luters who would face a penalty in case of non-compliance with the 
norm. There are several categories of standards that are applicable to 
climate policies, mainly:
•	 Emission standards, which are the maximum allowable discharges 
of pollutants into the environment, and which can also be termed 
as performance standards; 
•	 Technology standards that mandate specific pollution abatement 
technologies or production methods (IPCC, 2007); and
•	 Product standards that define the characteristics of potentially pol-
luting products (Gabel, 2000).  
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A typical market failure in the environmental domain is the lack, or 
at least asymmetric nature, of relevant information among some 
firms and consumers. Good quality information is essential for rais-
ing public awareness and concern about climate change, identify-
ing environmental challenges, better designing and monitoring the 
impacts of environmental policies, and providing relevant informa-
tion to inform consumption and production decisions. Examples 
of information instruments include eco-labelling or certification 
schemes for products or technologies and collection and disclosure 
of data on GHG emissions by significant polluters (Krarup and Rus-
sell, 2005).
15�3�4 Government provision of public goods 
and services and procurement
A changing climate will typically be a ‘public bad’ and actions and 
programmes by governments to counteract or prevent climate 
change can thus be seen as ‘public goods’. There are many examples 
where public good provision may be an appropriate form of miti-
gation or adaptation. Examples include physical and infrastructure 
planning, provision of district heating or public transportation ser-
vices (Grazi and van den Bergh, 2008), and funding and provision 
of research activities (Metz, 2010). Moreover, the removal of insti-
tutional and legal barriers that promote GHG emissions (or preclude 
mitigation) should be included in this policy type. Afforestation pro-
grammes and conservation of state-owned forests are an important 
example.
15�3�5 Voluntary actions
Voluntary actions refer to actions taken by firms, NGOs, and other 
actors beyond regulatory requirement. Voluntary agreements repre-
sent an evolution from traditional mandatory approaches based on 
conventional or economic regulations and intend to provide further 
flexibility to polluters. They are based on the idea that, under certain 
conditions, polluters can decide collectively to commit themselves to 
abatement instead of, or beyond the requirements of regulation. Vol-
untary agreements, sometimes known as long-term agreements, can 
be developed in different ways; in most cases the voluntary commit-
ment is assumed as a consequence of an explicit negotiation process 
between the regulator and the pollutant. In other cases a spontane-
ous commitment may be viewed as a way to avoid future mandatory 
alternatives from the regulator (Metz, 2010). Finally, there are cases 
where the regulator promotes standard environmental agreements 
on the basis of estimation of costs and benefits to firms (Croci, 
2005). 
15.4 Approaches and tools 
used to evaluate policies 
and institutions
15�4�1 Evaluation criteria
Several criteria have been usually employed to assess the effects of cli-
mate change policies and these have been laid out in Section 3.7. The 
criteria that have been used are environmental effectiveness, economic 
effectiveness (cost-effectiveness and economic efficiency), distribu-
tional equity and broader social impacts, and institutional, political, 
and administrative feasibility and flexibility. Political and institutional 
feasibility are not only a separate criterion, but also need to be taken 
into account when judging other criteria such as economic effective-
ness. It would be misleading to show that a tax would have been more 
cost-effective than, for example, a regulation if it would never have 
been feasible to implement the tax at a sufficiently high level to have 
the same effect as that regulation.
15�4�2 Approaches to evaluation
One can evaluate the effect of policy instrument x on a set of vari-
ables y that matter for the evaluation criteria either through model-
ling or through ex-post empirical measurement. For any evaluation 
based solely on modelling, it will never be possible to know whether 
all important aspects of the relationship between x and the y’s are cap-
tured appropriately by the model. For this reason, it is highly desirable 
to have ex-post empirical analysis to evaluate a policy instrument. In 
order to measure the effect of a policy instrument, one must compare 
the observed y’s in the presence of x with the ‘but-for’ or ‘counterfac-
tual’ value of the y’s  defined as their estimated likely value but for the 
implementation of x.
Statistical methods can be used to attempt to control for the evolution 
of the world in the absence of the policy. The most reliable basis for 
estimating counterfactual developments is to build programme evalu-
ation into the design of programmes from their inception (Jaffe, 2002). 
If the planning of such evaluation is undertaken at the beginning of a 
programme, then data can be developed and maintained that greatly 
increase the power of statistical methods to quantify the true impact 
of a programme by controlling for but-for developments.
Statistical analyses capture only those policy effects that can be and have 
been measured quantitatively. Qualitative analyses and case studies 
complement statistical analyses by capturing the effects of policies and 
institutions on other aspects of the system, and the effect of institutional, 
social and political factors on policy success (e. g., Bailey et al., 2012).
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Of course, data for ex-post evaluation is not always available, and even 
where it is, it is very challenging to capture all aspects of the situation 
empirically. Therefore, there will always be a role for models to eluci-
date the structure of policy effects, and to estimate or put bounds on 
the magnitude of effects. Such models can be purely analytical / theo-
retical, or they can combine empirical estimates of certain parameters 
with a model structure, as in ‘bottom-up’ models where many small 
effects are estimated and cumulated, or in simulation models, which 
combine an analytical / theoretical structure with numerical estimates 
of parameters of the model. Many such models are ‘partial equilib-
rium,’ meaning they capture the particular context of interest but 
ignore impacts on and feedback from the larger system. There are also 
computable ‘general equilibrium’ (CGE) models that allow for interac-
tions between the context of the policy focus and the larger system, 
including overall macroeconomic impacts and feedbacks see for exam-
ple, Bohringer et al., (2006). 
‘Experimental economics’ uses a laboratory setting as a ‘model’ of a 
real-world process, and uses ‘experimental subjects’ responses in that 
setting as an indicator of likely real-world behaviour (Kotani et  al., 
2011). With any model, results are truly predictive of real-world results 
only to the extent that the model — be it theoretical, simulation or 
experimental — captures adequately the key aspects of the real world 
in the experiment.
15.5 Assessment of the 
performance of policies 
and measures, including 
their policy design, in 
developed and developing 
countries taking into 
account development 
level and capacity
15�5�1 Overview of policy implementation
In this section we assess the performance of a series of policy instru-
ments and measures, starting with economic instruments (taxes in 
15.5.2, emissions trading in 15.5.3), regulatory approaches (15.5.4), 
information programmes (15.5.5), government provision of public 
goods (15.5.6) and voluntary agreements (15.5.7). We assess aspects 
of these and other policies in Section 15.6 on technology and R&D pol-
icy, and in Section 15.7 that deals with interactions between policies.
Many policy instruments are in principle capable of covering the entire 
economy. However, as mentioned in Section 15.2, in practice the instru-
ments are often targeted to particular sectors or industries. This partly 
reflects the fact that certain barriers or market failures are specific to 
or more pronounced in certain sectors or industries. Furthermore, some 
policies may cover only part of the economy as a result of the ability 
of special interests to exempt some sectors or industries (Compston, 
2009), (Helm, 2010).
Broader coverage tends to promote greater cost-effectiveness. How-
ever, on fairness grounds there is an argument for partly or fully 
exempting certain industries in order to maintain international com-
petitiveness, particularly when the threat to competitiveness comes 
from other nations that have not introduced climate policy and would 
gain competitive advantage as a result.
Table 15.2 brings together policy instruments discussed in sector 
chapters (Chapters 7 to 12). Two broad themes emerge from this sur-
vey. First, while policies that target broad energy prices — taxes or 
tradable allowances are clearly applicable across all sectors — a wide 
range of other policy approaches are also prevalent, which enable 
policy design that addresses sector specific attributes. For example, 
in the buildings sector regulatory instruments are an important tool. 
In the absence of a building code enforcing enhanced efficiency, an 
energy price signal alone might be insufficient to induce a builder to 
invest in an energy efficient building that they plan to sell or rent. 
Building and product standards also increase investor certainty 
thereby reducing costs. Similarly, the transport sector relies not only 
on pricing policies but also on government provision of infrastructure 
and regulation that guides urban development and modal choices. 
The industry sector faces information and other barriers to investment 
in efficiency, which can be overcome by audits and other informa-
tion based programmes. In Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land Use 
(AFOLU), government regulation to protect forests and set the condi-
tions for REDD+ (Reducing Emissions From Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation) plays a substantial role, as do certification programmes 
for sustainable forestry.
Sector-specific policies often exist alongside broader ones. In energy 
supply, broad-based GHG emissions pricing has often been supple-
mented by specific price- and quantity-based mechanisms (such as 
feed-in-tariffs (FITs) and portfolio standards) and underpinned by 
sufficient regulatory stability (including non-discriminatory access to 
electricity and gas networks). In industry, relatively broad tax exemp-
tions may be combined with mandatory audits, with the former help-
ing ‘level the playing field’ and providing the impetus for action, and 
the latter addressing an information barrier; thus each instrument 
addresses a separate market failure or barrier. The implementation 
of multiple policy instruments within a single sector can promote 
cost-effectiveness when the two instruments address distinct market 
failures. On the other hand, multiple instruments can work against 
cost-effectiveness when the two instruments fail to address different 
market failures and thus are simply redundant. This issue is discussed 
further in Section 15.7 below. 
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Table 15�2 | Sector Policy Instruments.





Instruments — Taxes 
(Carbon taxes may be 
economy-wide)





•	Carbon and / or energy 
taxes (either sectoral 
or economy wide)
•	 Carbon tax or energy 
tax
•	Waste disposal taxes 
or charges
•	Fertilizer or Nitrogen 
taxes to reduce nitrous 
oxide
•	Sprawl taxes, impact 
fees, exactions, 
split-rate property 





Instruments — Tradable 
Allowances 
(May be economy-wide)
•	Emissions trading (e. g., 
EU ETS)
•	Emission credits under 





•	Fuel and vehicle 
standards
•	Tradable certificates 








•	Emission credits under 
CDM
•	Compliance schemes 













and insurance for 1st 
generation Carbon 






•	Subsidies or tax 
exemptions for 
investment in efficient 
buildings, retrofits and 
products
•	Subsidized loans
•	Subsidies (e. g., for 
energy audits)
•	Fiscal incentives (e. g., 
for fuel switching)













•	Equitable access to 
electricity grid








to encourage modal 
shifts (road to rail) 
•	Restriction on use 




•	Urban planning and 
zoning restrictions




•	Mandates for energy 
retailers to assist 



















•	Forest law to reduce 
deforestation
•	Air and water pollution 
control GHG precursors

























•	Brokerage for industrial 
cooperation
•	Certification schemes 
for sustainable forest 
practices
•	 Information policies 





National and Sub-national Policies and Institutions 
15
Chapter 15











heating / cooling or 
common carrier)
•	 Investment in transit 
and human powered 
transport
•	 Investment in 
alternative fuel 
infrastructure
•	Low emission vehicle 
procurement
•	Public procurement of 
efficient buildings and 
appliances
•	Training and education
•	Brokerage for industrial 
cooperation
•	Protection of national, 
state, and local forests.
•	 Investment in 
improvement and 
diffusion of innovative 
technologies in 
agriculture and forestry
•	Provision of utility 
infrastructure 
such as electricity 
distribution, district 











on energy targets or 








15�5�2 Taxes, charges, and subsidy removal 
15�5�2�1 Overview
Taxes on carbon (together with emissions trading systems) are eco-
nomic instruments. In the presence of rational consumers, firms, and 
complete markets, they achieve any given level of emissions reduc-
tion in the least costly way possible. Economic instruments like carbon 
taxes are attractive because of their simplicity and broad scope  cover-
ing all technologies and fuels (Section 3.8) and thus evoking the cost-
minimizing combination of changes to inputs in production and tech-
nologies to changing behaviour as manifested in consumption choices 
and lifestyles. This is the reason they have the potential to be more effi-
cient than directly regulating technology, products, or behaviour.1 To 
minimize administrative costs, a carbon tax can be levied ‘upstream’ 
(at the points of production or entry into the country). Finally, unlike an 
emissions trading system that requires new administrative machinery, 
a tax can piggyback off existing revenue collection systems. 
Despite these attractive properties, carbon taxes are not nearly as 
prevalent a policy instrument as one might expect. As yet, the Scandi-
navian countries, the Netherlands, the UK, and the Canadian province 
of British Columbia are the only large jurisdictions with significant and 
fairly general carbon taxes of at least USD 10 / tCO2.2 The reasons for 
this are not entirely clear. It may be that a carbon tax, unlike a nar-
rower sectoral regulation, attracts more hostile lobbying from fossil 
1 If psychological or institutional barriers to adoption or other market failures are 
the main factor impeding choice then regulations or other instruments may be 
an efficient complement or stand-alone instrument to deal with this (see Section 
15.4). 
2 Australia has a fixed fee hybrid system sometimes described as a tax that will be 
converted into an ETS.
fuel interests3 for whom the stakes it creates are high (Hunter and Nel-
son, 1989; Potters and Sloof, 1996; Goel and Nelson, 1999; Godal and 
Holtsmark, 2001; Skjærseth and Skodvin, 2001; Kolk and Levy, 2002; 
van den Hove et  al., 2002b; McCright and Dunlap, 2003; Markussen 
and Svendsen, 2005; Pearce, 2006; Beuermann and Santarius, 2006; 
Deroubaix and Lévèque, 2006; Pinkse and Kolk, 2007; Bridgman et al., 
2007; Bjertnæs and Fæhn, 2008; Blackman et  al., 2010; Sterner and 
Coria, 2012). Secondly, the payments required by a tax are transparent, 
unlike the less visible costs of regulations. The general public, not being 
aware of the above-mentioned efficiency properties of a tax, may be 
less likely to accept such an instrument (Brännlund and Persson, 2010). 
Third, policy may be driven by perceived risks to competitiveness and 
employment as well as the distribution of costs rather than on consid-
erations of pure efficiency (Decker and Wohar, 2007). Finally, a set of 
institutional path dependencies may have led to a favouring of emis-
sions trading systems over taxes, including a post-Kyoto preference 
for emissions trading in key bureaucracies, supported by creation of 
supportive industry and other associations (Skjærseth and Wettestad, 
2008; Paterson, 2012).
Countries that have sizeable general carbon taxes are fewer 
still — mainly a few Northern European countries. The carbon tax in 
Sweden is 1100 SEK or USD165 / tCO2, which is an order of magnitude 
higher than the price of permits on the EU emissions trading scheme 
(ETS) market or than the carbon taxes discussed in many other coun-
tries. Such high taxes typically have some exemptions motivated by 
the fact that other (competing) countries have no (or low) taxes. Swe-
den, for example, exempted the large energy users who participate in 
the EU ETS from also paying the carbon tax on the grounds that there 
would otherwise be a form of ‘double’ taxation (See 15.5.2.4 for a 
more thorough discussion). 
3 These can be either producers (for instance of fossil fuels) or users of energy, rang-
ing from energy intensive industries to truck drivers.
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Although general carbon taxes are so far uncommon, there are many 
policies that have similar effects but (for political reasons) avoid using 
the words ‘carbon’ and / or ‘tax’, (Rabe and Borick, 2012). Taxes on fuels, 
especially transport fuels are very common. While narrower in scope, 
they nevertheless cover a significant fraction of emissions in many 
countries. They can be interpreted as sectoral carbon taxes; in some 
countries this is clearly stated as an objective of fuel taxes, in others it 
is not. Fuel taxes may be politically easier to implement in some coun-
tries since (private) transport is hardly subject to international competi-
tion and hence leakage rates are low. A large share of all revenues 
from environmentally related taxes in fact come from fuel taxes, which 
were introduced in various countries, beginning with Europe and Japan, 
though they are also common in low income, oil-importing countries. 
One of their main stated purposes is to finance road building, although 
additional arguments include reducing expensive imports, government 
revenue raising, and reducing environmental impacts. Irrespective of 
the motivation, the effect of carbon taxes on fuel is to raise prices to 
consumers and restrict demand (see Section 15.5.2.2). Fuel taxes are 
important for climate change mitigation since the transport sector 
represents a large and increasing share of carbon emissions (27 % of 
global energy-related CO2 emissions in 2010 — see Section 8.1). Theory, 
simulation, and empirical studies all suggest strongly that taxing fuel is 
a lower cost method of reducing emissions compared to policies such 
as fuel efficiency mandates, driving restrictions, or subsidies to new 
technologies4 (Austin and Dinan, 2005). However, consumers who buy 
vehicles may be unable to correctly internalize the long-run savings of 
more fuel-efficient vehicles. This would be considered a ‘barrier’ and 
would provide motivation for having fuel efficiency standards in addi-
tion to fuel taxes (see Section 15.5.4). 
Variation in fuel prices is generated by subsidies as well as taxes. Fossil 
fuel subsidies are prevalent in many countries, being most common 
in oil and coal producing countries. According to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (2013), the Middle East and North Africa region 
accounts for around 50 % of global energy subsidies. In 2008, fossil 
fuel subsidies — for transport fuels, electricity, tax breaks for oil and 
gas production, and for research and development into coal genera-
tion, exceeded USD2010 489.1 billion globally (IEA / OECD, 2011). A more 
recent estimate by the IMF (2013) puts the figure at USD2010 469.5 bil-
lion or 0.7 % of global GDP in 2011. This is a pre-tax estimate and 
includes petroleum products, electricity, natural gas, and coal. A large 
share is in the fossil fuel exporting countries. After factoring in nega-
tive externalities, through corrective taxes, the IMF reports USD2010 
1.85 trillion in implicit subsidies. This figure assumes damages corre-
sponding to a USD 25 / t social cost on carbon, consistent with United 
States Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon (2010). 
‘Advanced economies’ make up 40 % of the global post-tax estimate. 
Reviewing six major studies that estimate fossil fuel subsidies, Ellis 
(2010) notes that removal of such subsidies would increase the aggre-
gate GDP in OECD and non-OECD countries in the “range from 0.1 per 
4 See also Section 15.12 on climate finance.
cent in total by 2010 to 0.7 per cent per year to 2050 (Ellis, 2010).” The 
studies reviewed include both modelling and empirical exercises.
15�5�2�2 Environmental effectiveness and efficiency
Assessing the environmental effectiveness of carbon taxation is not 
straightforward because multiple instruments and many other factors 
co-evolve in each country to produce policy mixes with different out-
comes in terms of emissions. For example, energy taxes varying by sec-
tor have been prominent in the Nordic countries since the 1970s with 
carbon taxes being added on in the early 1990s. Ex-post analyses have 
found varying reductions in CO2 emission from carbon taxes in Nor-
way, Sweden, Denmark, and Iceland, compared to business-as-usual 
(see Andersen (2004) for an extensive review of these studies and their 
estimation techniques).
The UK’s Climate Change Levy (CCL), introduced in 2001 on manufac-
turing plants and non-residential energy users (offices, supermarkets, 
public buildings, etc.), has had a strong impact on energy intensity 
(Martin et  al., 2011). Electricity use, taxed at a rate of about 10 %, 
declined by over 22 % at plants subject to the levy as compared to 
plants that were eligible to opt out by entering into a voluntary agree-
ment to reduce energy use. There was no evidence that the tax had any 
detrimental effect on economic performance or led plants to exit from 
the industry (Martin et al., 2011).
From 1990 to 2007, the CO2 equivalent emissions in Sweden were 
reduced by 9 % while the country experienced an economic growth of 
+51 %. In Sweden, with the highest carbon tax (albeit with exemptions 
for some industrial sectors), there was a very strong decoupling of car-
bon emissions and growth with reductions in carbon intensity of GDP 
of 40 % (Johansson, 2000; Hammar et al., 2013). Per capita emissions 
in Denmark were reduced by 15 % from 1990 to 2005; the experience 
in Scandinavia, the UK, and the Netherlands was similar (Enevoldsen, 
2005; Enevoldsen et al., 2007), (Bruvoll and Larsen, 2004), (Cambridge 
Econometrics, 2005), (Berkhout et al., 2004; Sumner et al., 2011; Lin 
and Li, 2011). Of course, many factors may be at play, and these dif-
ferences cannot be attributed solely to differences in taxation. Overall, 
the evidence does suggest that carbon taxes, as part of an environ-
mental tax reform, lead to abatement of GHG emissions, generate rev-
enue for the government, and allow reductions in income tax threaten-
ing employment. Theory strongly suggests that if a tax is implemented 
then it would also be cost effective, but it is for natural reasons hard to 
demonstrate this empirically at the macro level. 
There is much more evidence available on the environmental efficacy 
of fuel as compared to carbon taxation. In the short run, consumers 
may be locked into patterns of use by habit, culture, vehicle charac-
teristics, urban infrastructure, and architecture. The short-run response 
to higher fuel prices is indeed often small — price elasticity estimates 
range between – 0.1 to – 0.25 for the first year. However long-run price 
elasticities are quite high: approximately – 0.7 or a range of – 0.6 to 
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– 0.8. This range is the average found by surveys of hundreds of stud-
ies that use both market based variations in fuel price as well as pol-
icy induced variations and exploit both temporal and cross-sectional 
variations in the data; the individual study estimates range substan-
tially more depending on countries or regions covered, time period, 
method and other factors (Oum, 1989; Goodwin, 1992; Graham and 
Glaister, 2002; Goodwin et al., 2004). In the long run, therefore, 10 % 
higher fuel prices will ultimately lead to roughly a 7 % reduction in fuel 
use and emissions. Income elasticities are about 1, which means that 
5 % growth in income gives 5 % growth in emissions. If instead a 2 % 
reduction is desired there is a 7 % gap between the 5 % increase and 
the – 2 % desired and a 10 % increase in fuel price every year would be 
needed to achieve such a reduction in emissions with a 5 % growth in 
income. 
The long-run effects of transport fuel taxation have been large. Sterner 
(2007) shows that in Europe, where fuel taxes have been the high-
est, they have contributed to reductions in CO2 emissions from trans-
port by 50 % for this group of countries. The whole Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) would have had 
30 % higher fuel use had not the European Union and some other 
members imposed high fuel taxes (i. e., if all the OECD countries had 
instead chosen as low fuel taxes as in the United States). Similarly, the 
OECD could have decreased fuel use by more than 35 % if all member 
countries would have chosen as high taxes as the United Kingdom. 
The accumulated difference in emissions over the years leads to a dif-
ference in several ppm in CO2 concentration, presumably making fuel 
taxes the policy that has had the largest actual impact on the climate 
up till now (Sterner, 2007).   
The environmental effect of a fuel tax is illustrated in Figure 15.2, 
where the fitted curve is from a log-linear regression of the emission 
intensity of liquid fuels on the price of diesel. The cross-country varia-
tion in diesel prices is mostly due to variation in taxes (and in some 
cases, subsidies). Figure 15.2 suggests that the effect of a change in 
the price of a fuel on emissions is greater at low prices. This is intuitive, 
since fuel will be consumed wastefully when it is cheap, allowing for 
greater demand reductions when the price rises.
Though there are few clean experiments, the market continuously cre-
ates ‘quasi-experiments’ which are analogous to the introduction of 
policies. Increased fuel prices in the USA in 2008, for instance, led to 
a shift in the composition of vehicles sold, increasing fuel-efficiency, 
while also reducing miles travelled (Ramey and Vine, 2010; Aldy and 
Stavins, 2012).
Other price instruments that have been used in the transport sector are 
congestion charges, area pricing, parking fees, and tolls on roads or 
in cities. These have been used to reduce congestion; emission reduc-
tion is a co-benefit. The USD2010 15.4 congestion fee in London led to 
reductions in incoming private cars by 34 % when introduced. Over-
all congestion was also estimated to have been reduced by 30 %, and 
emissions fell (Leape, 2006). The smaller (USD2010 2.6) congestion fee in 
Stockholm reduced total road usage by 15 % (Johansson et al., 2009).
Reducing subsidies to fossil energy will have a significant impact on 
emissions. Removing them could reduce world GHG emissions by 10 % 
at negative social cost by 2050 (Burniaux and Chateau, 2011).The IMF 
calculates that the removal of these subsidies induce a 15 % reduction 
in global energy related carbon emissions or 5 billion tCO2 in absolute 
terms and concludes that the post-tax estimate of USD2010 1.85 tril-
lion in subsidies is ‘likely to underestimate’ energy subsidies due to the 
assumptions made, hence the impact on carbon emissions is likely to 
be higher. Ellis (2010) reports a range of effects from just a few percent 
to 18 % by 2050 depending on the size of the subsidy reduction. 
Recognizing the potential impact of a reduction in subsidies to fossil 
fuels, the G20 and APEC blocks agreed in 2009 to phase out inefficient 
fossil fuel subsidies in all countries (G20 Leaders, 2009).
In China, the energy saving policies adopted in 1991, the 1998 Law 
on Energy Conservation, and the 2004 Medium and Long Term Spe-
cific Schema on Energy Saving, led to higher energy prices and explain 
half the decline in energy intensity of Chinese industries between 1997 
and 1999, while R&D accounted for only 17 % of the decline (Fisher-
Vanden et al., 2006; Yuan et al., 2009).
15�5�2�3 Distributional incidence and feasibility
Although fuel taxes have often been criticized for being regressive 
(that is, for imposing a proportionally higher burden on the poor), 
this is not always the case. There are large variations in distributional 
impacts both within and between social groups  the effects range from 
regressive or progressive (Rausch et al., 2010, 2011); see also 6.3.5.2.
Studies of the distributional incidence of fuel taxes show that they 
may be neutral or weakly regressive (before revenue recycling) in rich 
countries, but they are generally progressive in poor countries. In many 
Figure 15�2 | The impact of average diesel prices across the world on the emissions 
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least developed and developing countries such as India, Indonesia, 
China, and many African countries, the progressivity of fuel taxes is 
in fact quite strong. In Europe they are approximately neutral (Sterner, 
2012). Carbon taxation can sometimes have regressive effects prior to 
recycling revenue, but recycling can make the poorest households bet-
ter off. Generally, the degree of progressivity can be selected depend-
ing on the method of recycling revenues. The environmental taxation 
gives rise to government income that can be allocated in ways that 
either benefit the poor or any other group giving a considerable range 
of options for how progressive or regressive the politicians want to 
make the overall package (Bureau, 2011). 
The distributional effects of other taxes vary significantly. Kerosene 
taxes in developing countries are regressive since kerosene is used 
predominantly by the poor (Younger et al., 1999; Gangopadhyay et al., 
2005; Datta, 2010). This regressivity may also apply to taxes on elec-
tricity or coal. The distributional effects of a more general carbon tax 
will depend on the mode of implementation with respect to different 
fuels and sectors and typically be more complex than for a single fuel, 
since the potential substitution possibilities are many. Results vary, but 
for instance, Hassett et al. (2009) finds a carbon tax to be regressive in 
the USA, showing that the cost is about 3.74 % for the poorest decile 
four times the effect on the highest decile. In India, on the other hand, 
a carbon tax would be progressive (Datta, 2010). The pro- or regressiv-
ity of carbon taxes will vary between countries but can also be affected 
by design, as shown for instance by Fullerton et al., (2012) or Sterner 
and Coria (2012).
The assertion that fuel taxes are regressive is often used as an argu-
ment and can make fuel taxes politically difficult to implement even if 
not true. Feasibility is however not tied in any simple way to income 
distribution effects. If a tax is progressive, this does not necessarily 
increase feasibility since this means that the interests of influential 
groups are affected, which may be a much bigger impediment to feasi-
bility (Datta, 2010). Fear of social unrest may hold up subsidy removal. 
Protests over reduced petrol subsidies are common; for example, 
recently riots erupted in Nigeria when President Jonathan Goodluck 
tried to eliminate very costly petrol subsidies with only partial success. 
Some countries such as Iran and Indonesia have recognized that fuel 
subsidies actually accrue to the relatively wealthy and managed to 
successfully reduce the subsidies without much unrest, by making sure 
that revenues saved are spent fairly — for instance through general 
lump-sum cash transfers (Coady et al., 2010; Atashbar, 2012; Sterner, 
2012; Aldy and Stavins, 2012).
15�5�2�4 Design issues: exemptions, revenue recycling, 
border adjustments
As mentioned above in 15.5.2.1, despite the attractive efficiency prop-
erties of a broad carbon tax, and even its progressivity in many cir-
cumstances, it may face political resistance. To have a big effect on 
emissions a tax must be high. Carbon and fuel taxes have often been 
initially resisted, but once introduced it seems the fee level has often 
been increased, (Sumner et al., 2011b). Another factor may be a path 
dependency since the taxes reduce the use of fossil fuel and lower fuel 
use means less opposition to fuel taxes, (Hammar et  al., 2004). This 
path dependency may be the rationale for raising the fuel or carbon 
taxes slowly and steadily as done by the Conservative government in 
the UK with the Fuel Price Escalator starting in 1993, a policy that was 
continued under the successor Labour government for several years. 
An emissions tax involves a transfer from economic agents to the 
state, namely the tax revenue from the residual emissions that are 
not abated. Private parties have to make this transfer in addition to 
bearing the cost of actually reducing emissions. There are a number 
of approaches to designing a tax (or fee) so that the transfer does not 
take place and resistance from incumbent polluters is reduced.
One approach is simply to exempt certain carbon-intensive indus-
tries — such as heavy industry in Sweden, as mentioned earlier. Such 
policies with incomplete coverage are less cost efficient than general 
policies (Montgomery, 1972 and Chapter 6.3.5.1). This lack of effi-
ciency applies not only to carbon emissions — it applies even more 
broadly to agriculture, forestry and to other climate gases such as 
methane or nitrous oxide (Bosetti et al., 2011). However, narrow sec-
toral policies may be politically more feasible due to concerns about 
international competitiveness, the structure of winners and losers, and 
consequent lobbying (Holland et al., 2011).
A related approach that tries to avoid the loss of coverage is to exempt 
some firms from taxes conditional on their undertaking emission 
reduction commitments. In Denmark, for example, companies signing 
an energy savings agreement with the government received a 25 % 
tax reduction (OECD, 2001; Agnolucci, 2009; Sumner et al., 2011; Ekins 
and Speck, 2011; Aldy and Stavins, 2012). Similarly, in the UK some 
firms may sign Climate Change Agreements (CCA) to reduce emissions 
that exempt them from the CCL. This experience offers a cautionary 
tale: on average the agreements did not require firms to reduce emis-
sions beyond what they would have done anyway (Martin et al., 2011). 
Conditional exemptions amount to unconditional ones if the condi-
tions are lax.
Yet another approach to avoiding a large transfer to the state is to 
recycle all or part of the tax revenue. In the Canadian province of Brit-
ish Columbia, revenue from the broad carbon tax of USD2010 29.1 / tCO2 
is fully rebated to the general population via income tax cuts and 
transfers to low-income people who do not pay income tax. British 
Columbia raised the tax gradually in increments of USD2010 4.8 / tCO2 
annually to its current level (Jaccard, 2012).
Sometimes revenues are recycled to firms in emission-intensive indus-
tries. Again, this relies on identifying the recipients, so it is usually con-
fined to a few sectors with the attendant disadvantages mentioned 
above. Refunded emission payments and other combinations of taxes 
and subsidies may be designed to be neutral so that, for example, the 
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industry pays the cost of abatement but does not pay a tax for the 
allowed or reference level of pollution (Fischer, 2011). One expression 
of this is fees, which are collected in environmental funds and sub-
sequently used in ways that benefit the polluters. An example from 
NOx emissions in Sweden is that a refunded emission payment may 
be politically more acceptable and thus environmentally more effective 
than simply a tax. Since the fee is refunded (in proportion to output), 
there is considerably less resistance to the fee and it can be set much 
higher than what would have been acceptable for a pure tax. Nor-
way has pioneered another instrument for NOx emissions — taxes are 
refunded to cover abatement expenses. This implies a combination of a 
tax on emissions with a subsidy on abatement. Experience shows that 
a lower fee can achieve the same result with this instrument design 
as a tax (Fischer, 2011). Norway is considering promoting similar solu-
tions for carbon emissions (Hagem et al., 2012). The drawback of such 
schemes for reducing carbon emissions is that their sectoral nature 
reduces coverage and raises costs. 
Abatement subsidies have also been financed out of general revenues. 
Abatement subsidies need to be financed through tax revenues. The 
taxes needed to finance the subsidies in general involve a marginal 
excess burden. This deadweight loss is an extra cost of subsidies rela-
tive to emissions taxes. Furthermore, there is an efficiency penalty due 
to their sectoral nature. If applied to firms, subsidies may create per-
verse incentives to enter or to fail to exit from, a polluting industry, and 
raise costs (Polinsky, 1979). Perhaps for such reasons, they are seen in 
residential and commercial sectors, for instance, tax breaks are pro-
vided for building insulation or refurbishing. There are also white certif-
icates and innovative financing schemes that allow loans to be repaid 
as part of electricity bills (See Section 9.10 for further discussion).
Another reason for tax exemptions is to avoid a loss of competitive-
ness in industries exposed to foreign competition that is not subject to 
taxation or equivalent policies. A pure tax (at a high level) may incen-
tivize industries to move to neighbouring countries. This is known as 
‘leakage’, since emissions `leak’ to jurisdictions not subject to taxa-
tion. It is generally hard to find decisive empirical evidence of carbon 
leakage, though this may be partly because high carbon taxes have 
not been tried in any significant way for trade-exposed sectors. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, some simulations suggest that there could be 
sizeable effects (Elliott et al., 2010). Though the overall effects of bor-
der tax adjustment on leakage are subject to debate (see Jakob et al., 
2013), a recent model comparison suggests that full border tax adjust-
ments would moderately decrease leakage rates from on average from 
on average 12 to 8 % (Bohringer et al., 2012). Border tax adjustments 
are taxes levied on imported goods that impose equivalent taxes on 
emissions `embedded’ in the goods. Aichele and Felbermayr (2011) 
find that sectoral carbon imports for a committed (i. e., taxed) coun-
try from an uncommitted exporter are approximately 8 % higher than 
if the country had no commitments and that the carbon intensity of 
those imports is about 3 % higher. When measurement of embedded 
emissions is uncertain, border tax adjustments can be criticized for 
introducing trade barriers in environmental guise (Holmes et al., 2011).
Leakage can also occur intertemporally. As shown by Sinn (2008, 
2012), a carbon tax might not only encourage demand in other areas. 
There may also be a perverse supply side reaction (referred to as the 
Green Paradox) increasing the current supply of fossil fuels in antici-
pation of rising carbon taxes. Subsequent research (Gerlagh, 2011; 
Hoel, 2012) has shown that, strictly speaking, this only applies to very 
simplified and special models with complete exhaustion of all fossil 
fuels (which would lead to very drastic climate change) and also only 
to models in which the carbon tax actually starts low and rises faster 
than the discount rate. A number of conclusions can be drawn from 
the debate: (1) generally, the supply side should not be neglected; (2) 
if a tax is used, there are arguments for making it high rather than low 
and fast-growing; and most importantly, (3) instruments used need to 
cover as many countries and sources as possible. It may be difficult to 
find a single optimal tax, and it may be necessary, rather to formulate 
a tax rule that will decide how the tax rate is to be updated (Kalkuhl 
and Edenhofer, 2013). 
15�5�3 Emissions trading
15�5�3�1 Overview of emissions trading schemes 
Over the past three decades, emissions trading, or cap and trade, has 
evolved from just a textbook idea (Dales, 1968) to its current role as a 
major policy instrument for pollution control. Earlier experiences with 
emissions trading include schemes such as the California RECLAIM 
Program and the US Acid Rain Program (Tietenberg, 2006; Ellerman 
et al., 2010). 
But since the start of the EU carbon trading system (See Section 
14.4.2), several countries and sub-national jurisdictions (e. g., New 
Zealand, Australia, California, northeastern United States, Quebec, 
South Korea, Tokyo, and five cities and seven provinces in China) have 
also put in place or proposed trading schemes to control their carbon 
emissions. This section provides a brief overview of the literature (see 
further Perdan and Azapagic, 2011; Aldy and Stavins, 2012) and draws 
lessons for the design of carbon trading programmes.
15�5�3�2 Has emissions trading worked?
We begin by assessing environmental effectiveness. There were three 
GHG cap-and-trade programmes that were operational5 by 2012 (New-
ell et al. 2013). The EU ETS, reviewed in 14.4.2, is by far the largest. 
Emissions are estimated to have fallen by 2 – 5 % relative to business-
as-usual in the first pilot phase from 2005 – 2007 (Ellerman, Convery, 
De Perthuis, et al., 2010). Similarly, Egenhofer et al., (2011) attribute 
5 California and Quebec started recently in 2013, as did Australia with its ‘fixed-
price’ or tax period; trading starts 2014 and S Korea starts even later. None of 
these can be evaluated empirically at present.
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reduction of emission intensity by 3.35 % per year in 2008 – 2009, in 
contrast to only 1 % in 2006 – 2007, to the EU ETS. Permit prices have 
fallen to around USD 10 – 15 in 2012 (Newell et  al., 2013). Section 
14.4.2 concludes that environmental effectiveness has been compro-
mised to a large extent by a structurally lenient allocation of permits 
that was driven by the necessity for institutional and political feasibil-
ity. 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), (see 15.5.3.3) has 
been ineffective since the cap has never been binding and is not 
expected to become so for several years (Aldy and Stavins, 2012). The 
third, much smaller, New Zealand ETS, appears to have had a small 
impact on emissions (Bullock, 2012). The last of the emissions trad-
ing schemes in GHGs, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), was 
an offset programme, not a cap-and-trade scheme. Section 13.13.1.2 
finds that there are many challenges when it comes to additionality, 
baseline definition and leakage but possibly some advantages from 
the viewpoint of generating income in developing countries.
This experience shows that it is has been very difficult to get a cap-
and-trade programme for GHGs enacted with a cap tight enough to 
have a significant environmental effect, at least initially. Other pro-
grammes (notably for the whole USA) that have been suggested have 
not made it through the political process. It is unclear to what extent 
this issue is peculiar to ETSs but there is a similar if not stronger oppo-
sition to the other major economic instrument, carbon taxation. One 
of the advantages claimed for an ETS is a greater option of allocat-
ing rights to appease opponents of a tax scheme. Hence there is a 
tradeoff between feasibility, distributional effects, and environmental 
effectiveness at least in the short run. Older non-GHG cap-and-trade 
programmes such as the SO2 and leaded petrol phase-out programmes 
in the United States have been environmentally effective (Tietenberg, 
2006; Schmalensee and Stavins, 2013).6 It may be that any policy 
instrument stringent enough to have a significant environmental effec-
tive programme may have faced opposition in the particular circum-
stances. One possible lesson for design may be to build a price ceiling 
into any proposed cap-and-trade programme. In that case, the concern 
that a tight cap would lead to very high costs, would be alleviated and 
may make it politically feasible to have a somewhat more ambitious 
cap (Aldy and Stavins, 2012). 
Cost-effectiveness is the main economic rationale for using emis-
sions trading as opposed to simpler regulation. The experience with 
regard to GHG programmes is too limited to draw any conclusions yet. 
As in many of the earlier markets, cost savings in the US Acid Rain 
Program — an allowance trading system established in 1995 to con-
trol SO2 emissions from coal-fired plants in the continental United 
States — were substantial (Carlson et al., 2000; Ellerman et al., 2000). 
6 Note that there is literature (e. g., Lohmann, 2008) much less enthusiastic about 
the concept of emissions trading for reasons of justice and environmental integ-
rity, among others, and more so after the current collapse of carbon prices in the 
EU-ETS (Lohmann, 2008).
Cost savings in this programme came not only from equalizing mar-
ginal costs across affected electric utility units on a period-by-period 
basis but also from equalizing (present value) marginal costs intertem-
porally as firms have saved current permits for future use in what is 
known as banking of permits. According to (Ellerman and Montero, 
2007), the use of banking has been substantial and remarkably close 
to what would be expected in a well-functioning market. Recently, the 
price has collapsed to zero also in this market as the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) has used other instruments to push for further 
reductions.
Banking has also been responsible for a large part of the significant 
cost savings in the US Lead Phasedown Program, a trading scheme 
established in 1982 to provide refineries with flexibility to gradually 
remove lead from gasoline. In addition to banking, cost savings in this 
program were driven by dynamic efficiencies, i. e., the faster adoption 
and / or development of more efficient refining technologies (Kerr and 
Newell, 2003). In contrast, dynamic efficiency has played a minor role 
in explaining cost savings in the US SO2 allowance program (e. g., Eller-
man et al., 2000; Fowlie, 2010; Kumar and Managi, 2010).
The introduction of a price on carbon through either a carbon tax 
or cap-and-trade can have substantial distributional consequences. 
Extensive analyses of these effects have been conducted in the US 
context. Burtraw et  al. (2009) illustrate in the context of a trading 
programme that the outcome for the average household will depend 
much more importantly on the use of the value associated with emis-
sions allowances than with the actual stringency of the regulation. For 
example, lump sum dividends or some kinds of tax reform can be pro-
gressive. Similarly Hassett et al. (2009) find that the degree of regres-
sivity is much reduced when a lifetime measure of income is used. 
Parry (2004) shows in an analytical framework that emissions trading 
can be regressive, especially if implemented with free allocation to 
incumbent emitters (grandfathering). Bovenberg et al. (2005) find that 
profits can be maintained throughout the economy by freely allocating 
less (sometimes considerably less) than 25 % of pollution permits, with 
the rest auctioned. These considerations are very similar for tax or cap-
and-trade systems. Granting greater than this quantity for free would 
lead to windfall profits. In simulation modelling of the US electricity 
market, Burtraw and Palmer (2008) find that it would be sufficient to 
allocate just 6 % of the allowances to the electricity industry to offset 
costs under a CO2 trading programme because a majority of costs are 
borne by consumers; greater allocation would again lead to windfall 
profits. Hassett et  al. (2009) examine regional effects and find them 
not to be very significant. Blonz et al. (2012) show that even if pro-
grammes are regressive, social safety nets, which adjust automatically 
to inflation, generally protect low-income groups in the United States, 
and middle income groups may be most vulnerable.  
It should be noted that the experience with emissions trading, whether 
for greenhouse gases or other, non-climate-related pollutants, has 
been wholly in high-income countries. Coria and Sterner (2010) 
describe some success for air pollution in a middle income country like 
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Chile but it is unclear to what extent these can be transferred to devel-
oping countries.
15�5�3�3 Sector coverage and scope of the cap
A key component in a trading scheme is establishing the pollutants 
(e. g., greenhouse gases) and entities that will be regulated. There are 
several factors that may affect this decision: (1) the quality and cost of 
emissions measurement and verification, (2) the ability to target sec-
tors with the greatest mitigation potential, (3) the ability to broaden 
the coverage to unlock low-cost mitigation opportunities, (4) the politi-
cal and institutional feasibility of including certain sectors, and (5) the 
interactive effects the cap may have with other policies.  
In most trading schemes, the affected sources are relatively large 
emitting sources whose emissions have been closely monitored 
(smaller sources are often regulated with alternative instruments). 
This applies to the earlier programmes (e. g., Acid Rain, RECLAIM, Lead 
Phasedown)7 but also in carbon markets. In other words, there are few 
cases in which the point of obligation has been upstream, i. e., different 
than the emitting point. The trading scheme in Australia, launched in 
2012, covered 373 entities comprising approximately 60 % of Austra-
lia’s GHG emissions. Electricity generation, industrial processes, fugi-
tive emissions, and non-legacy waste are under permit liability (Clean 
Energy Regulator, 2012). Small-scale stationary fossil fuel use (espe-
cially gas) is covered by upstream permit liability on fuel distributors. 
Liquid fuels used in aviation / shipping and synthetic GHGs are subject 
to an equivalent carbon price through changes to existing taxes. Agri-
culture and forestry can produce offset credits (Macintosh and Waugh, 
2012; Caripis et al., 2012).8
Coverage in the carbon-trading scheme in New Zealand, is the most 
comprehensive and covers all GHGs and all sectors. It has expanded 
in stages from the forestry sector (in January 2008) to fossil fuels and 
industrial emissions (in July 2010), and will cover the waste sector in 
May 2014. The agricultural sector must report emissions since Janu-
ary 2012 but a decision on when it will face surrender obligations has 
not yet been made. This is the only national emissions trading scheme 
to include forestry, and is intended to shift land-use change decisions 
towards greater carbon sequestration and less deforestation (Karpas 
and Kerr, 2011; Adams and Turner, 2012). Coverage is also scheduled 
to expand in stages in the recently launched carbon market in Cali-
fornia (Hanemann, 2009). In the first compliance period, which runs 
from 2013 – 2014, electricity generating and industrial facilities that 
7 An exception is the market for particulates established in Santiago-Chile in 1992 
for industrial sources (Montero et al., 2002). The trading commodity was not 
actual emissions, which were difficult to monitor on a daily basis, but a firm’s 
maximum capacity to emit.
8 For more see Section 7A of the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 
2007 (National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007, 2007). The carbon 
market in South Korea, to start in 2015, will cover around 450 large facilities and 
about 60 % of the country’s GHG emissions (Kim, 2011).
exceed 25,000 tonnes of CO2eq per year will be obligated to abide 
by the agreement; the second period (2015 – 2017) adds distributors 
of transportation, natural gas, and other fuels; and the third period 
(2018 – 2020) adds transportation fuels (CARB, 2011). All major sources 
will be covered over time, which will represent an equivalent of 85 % 
of California’s GHG emissions (CARB, 2011). Offset projects are fore-
seen in forestry management, urban forestry, dairy methane digesters, 
and the destruction of ozone-depleting substances. 
There are other carbon markets that are less ambitious in scope. The 
trading scheme in Tokyo, launched in April 2012, includes 300 indus-
trial facilities — which in total consume at least 1,500 kl of crude oil 
equivalent per annum — and a combined 1,000 commercial and insti-
tutional buildings. In aggregate, this is equivalent to only 20 % of 
Tokyo’s total CO2 emissions (Partnership for Market Readiness, 2012). 
Though the programme may be limited in scope, it is one of the first 
programmes in the world to address emissions from urban buildings, 
which can be quite significant (Nishida and Hua, 2011). The Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a cap-and-trade programme initi-
ated in 2009 and that covers nine Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states 
in the United States (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont), only 
regulates CO2 emissions from power plants. 
15�5�3�4 Setting the level of the cap
The cap defines the stringency of the trading scheme. Naturally, the 
permit prices also depend on many circumstances such as the eco-
nomic growth. In many of the trading programmes reviewed above, 
the caps appear however to have been set below what would lead 
to efficient levels of abatement — since the allowance prices (the mar-
ginal abatement costs) have ended up below most estimates of the 
marginal environmental benefits from abatement. The RECLAIM Pro-
gram which covers NOx and SO2 is an example as are the acid rain 
and lead phase-out programmes. It should be noted, however, that to 
varying extents, carbon trading programmes include mechanisms to 
tighten the cap gradually.
Caps in the carbon markets have slower reductions maybe because 
of higher short-term mitigation costs. In the Australian scheme, there 
is no cap on emissions during the initial so-called ‘fixed-price phase’ 
(2012 – 2014) but a price that rises from AUS 23.00 per tonne in 
2012 / 2013 to AUS 25.40 in 2014 / 2015. The fixed price scheme, has 
many of the characteristics of a tax and offered advantages in the 
specific political circumstances that failed to agree on an emissions 
target but not on a price (Jotzo et al., 2012) hence preferring implic-
itly uncertainty on emissions rather than on the price (Jotzo and Betz, 
2009; Jotzo and Hatfield-Dodds, 2011; Pearce, 2012). The fixed price 
period naturally established a price signal and provided time for 
important elements of the flexible price period to be implemented, 
such as an auction platform. Starting with the first flexible-price phase 
(2015 – 2018), the government will set annual caps for five-year peri-
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ods, extending the cap by one year every year. A default cap (associ-
ated to a GHG emissions reduction of 5 % from 2000 levels by 2020) 
will apply in the event the parliament cannot agree on a cap (CAUS, 
2012).
New Zealand, on the other hand, has operated within the Kyoto cap 
for 2008 – 2012 by requiring every unit of emission to be matched by 
a Kyoto unit at the end of the Protocol’s true-up period. For 2012 and 
forward, the government has proposed legislative amendments to 
introduce a domestic cap and remove the requirement to back domes-
tic emission with Kyoto units (NZME, 2013).
The cap in the California scheme is set in 2013 at about 2 % devi-
ating under the projected level for 2012, and then drops about 2 % 
in 2014 and about 3 % from 2015 to 2020 on an annual basis (4 % 
of allowances will be held in reserve to contain costs). The Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative has introduced a ‘soft’ fixed cap from 2009 
to 2014 to decline by 2.5 % per year. Economic growth and natural 
gas prices have been lower than expected, so it is unlikely that the cap 
becomes binding by 2020 (Aldy and Stavins, 2012).9
15�5�3�5 Allocations
Permits have been allocated either by auction, or have been given 
away for free. In the latter case, allocation has been proportional to 
past emissions or output (i. e., grandfathered) or proportional to cur-
rent output. Earlier programmes relied almost exclusively on grand-
fathering. The SO2 allowance programme allocated less than 3 % of 
the total cap, through revenue-neutral auctions; mainly to provide an 
earlier and more reliable price signal to participants (Ellerman, Conv-
ery, De Perthuis, et al., 2010). Some of the recent carbon markets also 
provide free allocations because of concerns about emissions-intensive 
trade-exposed industries. In fact, the programme in New Zealand con-
siders a very limited amount of auctioning (although increasing over 
time) unlike RGGI, which allocates the vast majority of permits through 
auctions (the softer cap in RGGI may explain the difference). Australia 
and California are somewhere in the middle in terms of auctioning, 
roughly 50 % and 80 % respectively.
The Californian and Australian schemes also make explicit output-based 
(free) allocation rules for energy-intensive, trade-exposed sectors, where 
recent production determines firm-level allocation. The Australian expe-
rience on this matter has also shown the influence that industry lobby 
groups can have in policy design (Garnaut, 2008; Pezzey et al., 2010) 
and how politically involved this can become (Macintosh et al., 2010). 
9 There is a proposal from the RGGI states, however, to reduce the cap in 45 % by 
2020 (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Inc., 2013).
15�5�3�6 Linking of schemes
Linking occurs when a trading scheme allows permits from another 
trading programme to be used to meet domestic targets. Such link-
ages can be mutually beneficial as they can improve market liquid-
ity and lower costs of compliance. However, these benefits need to be 
weighed against challenges like losing unilateral control over domestic 
design and being subject to international price movements. Linking, 
however, involves certain tradeoffs in terms of exposure to interna-
tional prices and loss of flexibility to unilaterally change features in 
the domestic design once links are established. International linkage 
of trading schemes might be simpler than harmonizing carbon taxes 
through international agreements (Karpas and Kerr, 2011). There is 
however, not general agreement on this point; to the contrary, agree-
ments on taxes might avoid the most contentious baseline issues see 
for instance Nordhaus (2007). 
The experience with linking is limited because carbon markets are 
relatively recent. One example of a linking process is the ongoing col-
laboration, since 2007, between California and the Canadian prov-
ince of Quebec, which will both place compliance obligations on large 
emitters under their trading schemes beginning in January 2013 and 
continue negotiations for a full linking of the two schemes later on in 
2013 (CARB, 2011). Another example is the announcement in 2013 
of an Australia-EU ETS link by 2018 preceded by a transition phase 
in which Australian installations can use EU-Allowances for compli-
ance from 2015 on. Interestingly, Australia is also exploring ways for 
establishing links with schemes in South Korea and California, which, 
de facto, would create links between all these trading schemes.10 We 
do not yet know if linking schemes without prior commitment on 
overall caps will facilitate or complicate future negotiations on the 
caps.
15�5�3�7 Other design issues: banking, offsets, leakage, 
price volatility and market power
There are additional, important, aspects of policy design on which 
we can only briefly touch here. Unlike borrowing, banking of per-
mits for future use is a feature used in many trading schemes with 
good results in terms of cost savings and environmental benefits (i. e., 
absence of emission spikes and acceleration of emission reductions). 
A well-documented example is the US SO2 allowance programme (Ell-
erman and Montero, 2007). A dramatic example of volatility is given 
by the RECLAIM programme where in the summer of 2000 permit 
prices that began under USD 5,000 per ton of NOx increased abruptly 
in price to almost USD 45,000, leading to a relaxation of the cap see 
Metcalf (2009). Offsets, the possibility of using emission credits out-
side the capped sectors either domestically or internationally (e. g., 
CDM or REDD), is another design feature common in most trading 
10 The firm intentions of New Zealand and Australia about linking their systems came 
to a sudden end after the latter announced it was linking its system to the EU ETS.
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schemes but of much concern because of the well-known tension 
between cost-effectiveness and additionality. One way to somewhat 
assuage this tension is to move away from a project-based crediting 
approaches (e. g., CDM) to scaled-up approaches — to the level of the 
sector, jurisdiction or country. Offset provisions, if well designed, can 
also help alleviate the ‘leakage’ problem of moving emissions from 
capped to uncapped sectors. An alternative design option to address 
leakage might be to use output-based allocation rules although this 
will raise concerns related to output subsidy. Another problem is mar-
ket power specific to permit trading which has been the subject of 
much research since the work of Hahn (1984). It seems, however, that 
market power is less of a problem than anticipated (Liski and Mon-
tero, 2011), also confirmed by findings from laboratory experiments 
(Sturm, 2008).
15�5�3�8 Choice between taxes and emissions trading
Regarding the choice between taxes and tradable permits, longstand-
ing economic theory (Weitzman, 1974; Hoel and Karp, 2001, 2002; 
Newell and Pizer, 2003) suggests that in the presence of uncertainty 
about the marginal cost of emission reduction, for a stock pollutant 
like CO2, a carbon tax is more economically efficient than a tradable 
permit system. According to the Weitzman intuition, a tax is preferred 
since the benefits curve is fairly flat for a stock pollutant (this result 
could be changed in the presence of a major threshold effect). The 
reason is essentially that when there is a negative shock to the cost 
of emission reduction, as has been the case in the EU following the 
economic slowdown that began in 2008, cost efficiency calls for doing 
more abatement, with less being done at other times when the abate-
ment cost is higher. This is achieved with a tax, but not with a cap that 
is fixed in each period. The slump in the carbon price in the EU ETS is 
thus suggestive of a loss of cost-effectiveness.
In the very long run there may be more uncertainty about the level 
of an optimal tax than about a quantity target and policymakers may 
then prefer to legislate a long-run abatement target in a cap-and-trade 
system. As seen above, this can entail short-run efficiency losses and it 
would be desirable to allow flexibility with regard to annual caps that 
would add up to the long run target, but concerns about credibility 
mean that such flexibility must be severely limited. As shown in Chap-
ter 2 (Section 2.6.5), there is a literature on regulatory uncertainty that 
shows extra costs deriving from the hesitancy by investors in the face 
of all regulatory uncertainty but in particular perhaps, when it comes 
to cap-and-trade systems.
To prevent a large loss of efficiency in a cap-and trade-system, and to 
avoid exceptionally high price volatility that deters investment, price 
floors and ceilings can be used, although care would be needed in 
design to avoid breaching the integrity of the cap. Banking and bor-
rowing of permits (see Section 15.5.3) are another means of providing 
intertemporal flexibility in abatement as are the availability of credit 
reserves or of offsets.
As explained in Section 15.7, a tax can be used in conjunction with 
other policy instruments while a cap-and-trade system either renders 
the other policies environmentally irrelevant or is itself rendered envi-
ronmentally irrelevant by them. This is a major concern when decision 
making takes place at several levels. 
As discussed in Section 15.5.2.4, the issues of intertemporal (and spa-
tial) leakage discussed in the green paradox literature would appear to 
give preference to cap and trade over taxes but this is partly a simpli-
fication. The green paradox mainly exists in oversimplified models and 
poorly designed tax schemes. There are however, lessons from this lit-
erature concerning design details. For example, one might prefer high 
taxes that grow slowly to low taxes that rise very fast, and one might 
be careful with too much flexibility, particularly borrowing in permit 
systems. Kalkuhl and Edenhofer (2013) compares four policies, (1) a 
conventional Pigouvian carbon tax, (2) a carbon tax rule (that adjusts 
the tax level dependent on GHG concentrations), a permit trade (3)
with or (4) without banking and borrowing) in the context of a (weak) 
green paradox setting with respect to three different criteria: the infor-
mational burden for the government, the commitment problem of the 
government, and the robustness of the policy with respect to devia-
tions in behaviour (discount rate) by agents in the economy. They find 
that a tax and a trading scheme without banking and borrowing have 
high informational requirements. The ETS with banking and borrow-
ing shifts the timing problem of carbon emissions to the private sector, 
but does not work well if these have different discount rates from the 
regulator. The flexible tax rule or an ETS with restricted banking and 
borrowing can lead to an optimal allocation even in this case, but then 
again the informational requirements for the regulator are daunting. 
One of the attractions of emissions trading schemes appears to have 
been that they may meet with less opposition from industry, which 
can be allocated permits for free. Taxation is often resisted by lobbies 
and sometimes for constitutional reasons. Taxation is also resisted by 
those who want a smaller government — in which case environmen-
tal fiscal reform (raising carbon taxes while lower other taxes) may 
be more acceptable. Another argument that has been made in favour 
of an ETS is that it may be easier to link permit schemes across bor-
ders than to agree on common taxes. Harmonization is advantageous, 
since it reduces costs (15.7). There is however, no general agreement 
on this. Some analysts believe the opposite, that it will be easier to 
link taxation systems within an international agreement (Helm, 2003; 
Nordhaus, 2007; Jaffe et al., 2009; Metcalf and Weisbach, 2011) and 
(15.8.1). Finally, linking cap-and-trade systems would automatically 
involve financial transfers between countries. These might be a ben-
efit for low-income countries if they can be carbon-efficient and maybe 
less controversial than negotiated side payments but this hinges on 
agreement concerning the various country targets.
Finally taxes, unlike an emission-trading scheme, do not require a new 
institutional infrastructure to keep track of ownership of emissions 
allowances. This consideration may be especially important in develop-
ing countries.
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15�5�4�1 Overview of the implementation of regulatory 
approaches 
As discussed in Section 15.2, economy-wide carbon pricing, though 
widely discussed in the literature, has been rarely implemented. Those 
policies that have been implemented have often been sector-specific, 
and have often fallen in the category of a regulatory approach. Regula-
tory approaches are used across sectors, usually alongside other poli-
cies, as can be seen in Table 15.2. For example, Renewable Portfolio 
Standards (RPS), and energy efficiency standards may be combined 
with fuel subsidy reduction in the energy sector (Chapter 7). In the 
transport sector, vehicle efficiency and fuel quality standards are used 
alongside government provision of mass transit, and fuel taxes (Chap-
ter 8). In the building sector, a number of complementary policies, such 
as appliance standards, labelling, and building codes are employed, 
along with tax exemptions for investment in energy-efficient build-
ings (9.9). In the industrial sector, energy audits for energy-intensive 
manufacturing firms are also regularly combined with voluntary or 
negotiated agreements and energy management schemes. Information 
programmes are the most prevalent approach for energy efficiency, 
followed by economic instruments, regulatory approaches and volun-
tary actions (10.11). 
Several of these regulatory approaches often contain market-like fea-
tures so that the distinction between regulatory approaches and eco-
nomic instruments is not always sharp. Renewable Portfolio Standards 
programmes often, for example, allow utilities to satisfy their obliga-
tions by purchasing renewable energy credits from other producers, 
while feed-in tariffs involve both regulations and subsidies for renew-
able energy. Low-carbon fuel standards also sometimes incorporate 
market-like features including trading among suppliers.
Regulatory approaches play the following roles in mitigation policy. 
First, they directly limit greenhouse gas emissions by specifying tech-
nologies or their performance. Second, in sectors such as AFOLU (see 
Chapter 11) and urban planning (see Chapters 8 and 12) in which 
much activity is strongly influenced by government planning and pro-
vision, regulations that take climate policy into account are clearly 
important. These are discussed in further in Section 15.5.6. Third, 
regulations such as RPS can promote the diffusion and innovation of 
emerging technologies, a role that is examined in Section 15.6. Fourth, 
regulations may remove barriers for energy efficiency improvement. 
These may arise when firms and consumers are hindered by the dif-
ficulty of acquiring and processing information about energy efficient 
investments, or have split incentives as in landlord-tenant relation-
ships. 
Regulatory approaches have been criticized, both for being environ-
mentally ineffective, and more strongly, for lack of cost-effectiveness, 
as the governments have limited information and may make govern-
mental failures in intervention (Helm, 2010; see also Section 3.8.2). 
Some are opposed to the regulations on libertarian philosophical 
grounds (Section 3.10.1.1). In what follows, we assess the environ-
mental and cost effectiveness of regulatory approaches, largely focus-
ing on short-run effects of energy efficiency policies that have been 
extensively studied. Long-run effects acting through technology devel-
opment are assessed in Section 15.6. There is insufficient literature on 
distributional incidence and feasibility to underpin an assessment of 
these dimensions.
15�5�4�2 Environmental effectiveness of energy efficiency 
regulations
Several prospective studies reviewed by Gillingham, Newell, and 
Palmer (2006) and one large ex-post study of US energy efficiency 
standards for appliances (Meyers et al., 2003) found substantial energy 
savings. Such savings have also been found in the building sector 
across countries (Section 9.10) in a study of best-practice building 
codes and other standards. Recently, econometric studies in the United 
States have also found energy reductions from building codes (Aroon-
ruengsawat, 2012; Jacobsen and Kotchen, 2013). These studies also 
reported significant energy savings and related CO2 reduction. Fuel 
economy standards for vehicles have also been successful in reducing 
fuel consumption in many countries (Anderson et al., 2011). Generally 
speaking, energy efficiency policies that address market failure can 
result in energy savings (7.10, 8.10, 9.10, Table 9.8, 10.10). Some case 
studies however, identified weak environmental effectiveness due to 
lack of implementation. Such examples were found for building codes 
and energy management systems.
Rebound effects need to be taken into account in interpreting these 
findings of environmental effectiveness of energy efficiency regula-
tions. The rebound effect refers to the increase in energy consumption 
induced by a fall in the cost of using energy services as a result of 
increased energy efficiency. For detailed general discussion on rebound 
effects, see Sections 3.9.5 and 5.6.2. For sector-specific studies of 
rebound effects, see Section 9.6.2.4 for building sector and Chapter 8 
for transport sector. With regard to appliance standards and fuel-econ-
omy regulations in the United States, environmental effects remain 
large even when taking the rebound effect into account (Gillingham 
et  al., 2006; Anderson et  al., 2011). More generally, direct rebound 
effects (within the regulated sector as a result of the fall in the cost of 
energy services) are commonly found to be in the range of 10 % – 30 % 
in various sectors in developed countries, and higher in developing 
countries (Sorrell et al., 2009; Gillingham et al., 2013). Indirect rebound 
effects, which result from increased economic growth resulting from 
the fall in the cost of energy services, can be much larger. Reviewing 
claims of rebound effects in excess of 100 %, Dimitropoulos (2007) 
concluded that although the evidence base and methodologies were 
weak, the possibility of significant rebound effects could not be dis-
missed. A recent review suggests that total rebound effects are unlikely 
to exceed 60 % (Gillingham et al., 2013). 
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While the scale of the rebound effect varies, its presence suggests that 
complementary policies that include carbon pricing are called for so 
that mitigation is not compromised. Some countries, such as the UK, 
have begun to account for a direct rebound effect in energy policies 
(Maxwell et al., 2011).
Regulations such as emissions standards have also been criticized 
on the ground that they are less flexible than incentive-based 
approaches and may even provide perverse incentives and increase 
emissions under certain conditions like treating new units more strin-
gently than old ones (Burtraw et al., 2010). Yet, recent modelling that 
incorporates institutional features of various policies in the United 
States, including the capacity to adjust the stringency of a regulation 
or a cap / tax, suggests that emissions standards may be more effec-
tive than cap and trade in reducing overall emissions (Burtraw and 
Woerman, 2013).
15�5�4�3 Cost effectiveness of energy efficiency 
regulations
Regulatory approaches are often implemented in contexts in which 
market failures or barriers to adoption of energy-efficient technologies 
exist. There is a considerable sectoral literature showing that energy 
efficiency regulations have been implemented at negative costs to 
firms and individuals, meaning that their value to consumers exceeded 
programme costs on average. In the transport sector, fuel economy 
standards have been shown to produce net cost savings over the life 
of the vehicle (Chapter 8.10). In the building sector, a range of energy 
efficiency policies including appliance standards and building codes 
have been found to have negative private costs (Table 9.8), (Gilling-
ham et  al., 2006, 2009a). In the industrial sector, a number of case 
studies on energy management systems and energy audit systems 
show that they have been cost effective (Chapter 10.10).
The cost effectiveness of such regulations has been the subject of 
heated debate. Economic theory points to the following circumstances 
in which regulations may be implemented with negative private costs. 
Buyers may have less information about the efficiency and cost of a 
device than sellers. They may not be able to assess the energy sav-
ings from an appliance even after using it. This can lead to a situation 
in which low-efficiency devices drive more expensive high-efficiency 
models out of the market. Efficiency standards in this setting can 
improve consumer welfare by reducing the informational asymmetry 
between buyers and sellers (Akerlof, 1970; Leland, 1979; Goulder and 
Parry, 2008). When competition is imperfect and sellers compete on 
both quality (efficiency) and price, then a minimum quality standard 
eliminates low-quality sellers from the market enhancing price com-
petition among high-quality goods. This can make all consumers better 
off (Ronnen, 1991). Split incentives, as in landlord-tenant relationships, 
can lead to economically inefficient devices persisting in the market, 
absent intervention. For more details, see Box 3.10.
Individuals working in small workplaces often find it difficult to 
acquire and analyze information on energy efficiency (see 2.6.5.3 
on human behaviour on energy efficiency). As a consequence, those 
individuals are prone to rely on intuition to make decisions. In many 
cases, analyzing the minimum cost actions given the price signal is 
too challenging, and thus cognitive costs may result in some consum-
ers simply not taking operating (energy) costs into account at all while 
making their purchase decisions (Section 3.10.1.1). (Allcott, 2011) 
exhibits this case in a recent survey of US car buyers, 40 % of whom 
were shown not to consider fuel costs in their purchasing decision. 
This kind of consumer decision making can lead sellers to offer — and 
consumers to buy — less energy efficient products than if consumers 
could more easily compute the operating costs. Section 9.8 indicates 
that such barriers to energy efficiency are significant in the building 
sector. Regulation and information measures can help overcome these 
barriers. 
Large firms have more resources than individuals to assess information 
on energy efficiency, and so may be more sensitive to carbon pricing. 
However, firms, especially small and medium enterprises, also face the 
barriers such as split incentive and lack of information. Governments 
may employ regulations (and information measures) to help correct 
this by implementing energy efficiency standards for equipment. See 
3.10.1.2 for more on behaviour of firms on energy efficiency.
Although both the theory and empirical evidence detailed above show 
that policy interventions to remove barriers can have negative costs 
to firms and individuals, it has been argued that unaccounted labour 
and opportunity costs borne by governments, firms, and individuals 
involved in policy design and implementation process, as well as loss 
of amenity (for example, fuel economy standards may undermine other 
functions of cars, such as speed, safety, quality of air conditioning, and 
audio sets), result in understatement of regulatory costs. Such unac-
counted costs are called ‘hidden costs’ (Box 3.10). 
On the other hand, an ex-post evaluation of expected and realized 
costs of environmental regulations in the United States found that esti-
mates of the unit cost of regulations by the regulator were overstated 
just as often as they were understated, while total costs were more 
frequently overstated (Harrington et  al., 2000). Furthermore, Gilling-
ham et al. (2006) note that in the United States, “even if unaccounted-
for costs of appliance standards were almost equal to those measured, 
and actual energy savings only roughly half of those estimated, appli-
ance standards still would yield positive net benefits on average” 
(Gillingham et al., 2006b). There may also be hidden benefits of regu-
lations, (Sorrell, 2009), such as improved amenities and ‘free drivers’ 
(which would occur if nonparticipants were induced to invest in energy 
efficiency because others in the programme made such investments) 
induced by regulation (Gillingham et  al., 2006). In conclusion, while 
it is clear that opportunities do exist to improve energy efficiency at 
negative private cost by regulations, the literature is divided as to what 
extent such negative private cost opportunities exist.
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It is the social rather than the private costs of regulations, however, 
that are more relevant for public policy. This means that externalities 
need to be taken into account and co-benefits of policies, such as local 
air pollution reduction, would ideally be valued and subtracted from 
costs. Such externalities can be large. Muller, Mendelsohn, and Nord-
haus (2011) found that the external costs of coal-fired utilities in the 
United States exceeded value-added in that sector. These and other 
costs and benefits have to be taken into account when evaluating poli-
cies.
15�5�5 Information measures
Information measures have been widely used in all sectors. To take 
typical examples, energy efficiency labelling for home electric appli-
ances and thermal insulation of buildings, as well as carbon footprint 
certificates and public awareness initiatives are implemented in the 
building sector (9.10). Energy management systems, as well as govern-
ment-assisted energy audits, either mandatory or voluntary, are used 
in the building, industry, and energy sectors (7.10, 9.10, 10.10). Man-
datory reporting of GHG emissions is common for firms in the power 
and industrial sectors (7.10, 10.10), while labelling of automobile fuel 
economy is used in the transport sector (8.10). Sustainability certificate 
programmes are used in the forestry sector (11.10). 
Regarding the environmental and economic effectiveness, a number of 
case studies in the building sector are shown for the energy efficiency 
labelling for home electric appliance, building label and certificates, 
energy audit programmes, and awareness raising campaign to stimu-
late behavioural change (see 9.10, Table 9.8). For energy efficiency, the 
role of information measures is the same with regulatory approaches, 
that is, to address market failure such as lack of information and split 
incentives. For details of the market failure and role of information 
measures, see Section 15.5.4. 
While some studies mentioned above reported high economic and 
environmental effectiveness, the results are mixed in general, reflecting 
the wide diversity of the information measures, and it is not appropri-
ate to draw a general conclusion. Note that some policy instruments, 
such as energy management systems and energy audit in the indus-
trial sector that may fall either in regulatory approach and informa-
tion measures, are also covered in the section on regulatory approach 
above. 
Since information programmes typically provide information and 
leave it to firms or consumers to take appropriate action, those 
actions will usually only be taken spontaneously, or if they are per-
ceived to have negative private costs economically. The discussion of 
hidden costs / benefits and rebound effects parallels that of regulatory 
approach, are covered in Section 15.5.4.
It should be noted that the role of information measure has been 
mostly supplementary to other policy instruments such as obligatory 
standards or much wider policy package as detailed in sector specific 
policy chapter (7.10, 8.10, 9.10, 10.10, 11.10). For example, energy 
efficiency labelling is often followed by energy efficiency standard as a 
single policy package. This also makes difficult to estimate the impacts 
of the information measure alone.
15�5�6 Government provision of public goods 
or services, and procurement
While formal assessment is difficult, it is clear that public provision and 
planning can and have played a prominent role in the mitigation of 
climate change at the national and sub-national levels, and in a wide 
range of industries including energy, transport, agriculture, forestry, 
and others. At the national level, government provision or funding is 
crucial for basic research into low and zero-emission technologies (see 
Section 15.7).
In the energy sector, the provision and planning of infrastructure, 
whether for electricity transmission and distribution or district heating 
networks, interconnectors, storage facilities, etc., is complementary to 
the development of renewable energy sources such as wind and solar 
energy (7.6.1.3). A modal shift from air to rail transport also requires 
public planning or provision by national and local governments as a 
part of the policy mix and in best-case scenarios could reduce associ-
ated emissions by 65 – 80 % (8.4.2). 
Urban planning that incorporates climate change mitigation can have 
a major impact on emissions (Chapter 12); therefore, municipal gov-
ernments have a very important role to play. Since mitigation poli-
cies have many co-benefits at the local level, including reduced local 
pollution and congestion, and improved quality of urban space, cities 
have an interest in mitigation policies in addition to the largely exter-
nal climate benefits they provide. Land-use and transport policies can 
considerably influence the share of non-motorized transport, public 
transport, and associated emissions (8.4.2.3). Buildings and associ-
ated energy supply infrastructure are very long-lasting (9.4.5) so public 
planning to encourage the rapid adoption of new low-carbon tech-
nologies and avoid lock-in to high-emission infrastructure assumes 
importance. Such planning would need to take into account transport 
pricing relative to land prices, building, parking, and other zoning 
regulation, city-wide district heating and cooling systems, and green 
areas (see Section 12.5, and Baeumler et al., 2012). Capacity building 
at the municipal level may be needed for incorporating climate change 
mitigation and its co-benefits into the planning process, especially in 
developing countries (see Section 15.10.3).
Government planning and infrastructure provision can complement a 
carbon or fuel tax, addressing additional market failures that increase 
the quantity response to the price instrument by making substitution 
towards less energy and carbon-intensive lifestyles easier to imple-
ment. Conversely, whether or not a public transit system will gener-
ate sufficient demand to be economical depends on whether private 
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transit (and its climate externalities) is suitably priced. By contrast, as 
noted below in Section 15.8, a tradable permit system for emissions 
would be a substitute, rather than a complement for emission reduc-
tion through public provision. In conjunction with a tradable permit 
system, local actions would affect the cost of reducing emissions, but 
not overall emissions themselves. This raises the possibility that local 
governments may be de-motivated to integrate mitigation in their 
planning if they are located in a national or international jurisdiction 
with a tradable permit system. In that case, their actions would not be 
‘additional’ in GHG emission reduction, rather they would reduce the 
cost of meeting the overall cap. Furthermore, the cost reduction would 
not be captured entirely by the residents of the local jurisdiction in 
which the actions took place.
Since most of the world’s forests are publicly owned, provision of 
sequestration services as part of forest conservation is largely in the 
public sector. Forest protected areas make up 13.5 % of the worlds’ 
forests, and 20.8 % for tropical lowland evergreen broadleaf forests 
(rainforests) (Schmitt et  al., 2009). During the period 2000 – 2005, 
strictly protected forest areas experienced 70 % less deforestation than 
all tropical forests (Campbell et  al., 2008), but impact studies must 
also control for ‘passive protection’ (protected areas being located in 
remote and inaccessible areas), and ‘leakage’ (more deforestation out-
side the protected area). The understanding of how protected areas 
can contribute to forest conservation, and thereby be a means of cli-
mate change mitigation, has advanced much since AR4, due to better 
spatial data and methods.
Andam et al. (2008) find substantial passive protection for protected 
areas in Costa Rica. While a simple comparison suggests that pro-
tected areas reduce deforestation by 65 %, the impact drops to 10 % 
after controlling for differences in location and other characteristics. 
Gaveau et  al. (2009) estimate the difference between deforestation 
rates in protected areas and wider areas in Sumatra, Indonesia dur-
ing the 1990s to be 58.6 %; this difference falls to 24 % after propen-
sity score matching which accounts for passive protection. In a global 
study, also using matching techniques, Joppa and Pfaff (2011) finds 
that for about 75 % of the countries, protected areas reduce forest con-
version, but that in 80 % of these controlling for land characteristics 
reduces the impact by 50 % or more. Thus, an emerging consensus is 
that protected areas reduce deforestation (Chomitz et al., 2007), even 
though protection is not perfect, and there is a medium to high degree 
of passive protection. Estimates of leakage are more challenging, as 
the channels of leakage are diverse and harder to quantify. 
Local governance of forests can be an effective way of reducing emis-
sions from deforestation and forest degradation, as at least some of 
the public goods provided by forest are included in the decision mak-
ing process. A meta-analysis of 69 cases of community forest manage-
ment finds that 58 % of these were successful in meeting ecological 
sustainability criteria, e. g., ‘improved forest condition’ (Pagdee et al., 
2006). Similarly, using data from 80 different forest management 
units in 10 countries, a study found positive correlation between 
greater devolved authority at the local level with higher levels of 
carbon sequestration (Chhatre and Agrawal, 2009). However, a study 
analyzing forest cover of central Himalaya in India that controls for 
confounders reports no statistically significant results (in forest cover) 
between village and state-managed forests, even though the costs per 
hectare are seven folds greater for the state-managed forests (Som-
anathan et al., 2009). 
Where property rights are insecure, strengthening land rights is often 
put forward as a way to contain deforestation, though the effects are 
ambiguous. It is argued that the lack of tenure rights can discourage 
investment in land and increase soil exhaustion. This would, in turn, 
lead to greater incentives to deforest to compensate for the lost pro-
ductivity due to degradation. Unclear tenure can also lead to unpro-
ductive and violent land conflicts (Alston et  al., 2000). However, by 
increasing the value of land clearing, policies that strengthen private 
property rights over land could increase deforestation (Angelsen, 
1999).
15�5�7 Voluntary actions
It has become quite common for major firms, either individually or in 
alliance with others, to commit to mitigation of climate change as part 
of their corporate social responsibility through emission cuts at their 
offices and facilities, technological research, development, and sales of 
climate friendly equipment (See IPCC, 2007). Non-government organi-
zations also initiate voluntary actions (See Section 15.9). 
This section focuses on voluntary agreements that are convened by 
industries in association with government. Voluntary agreements have 
been developed in very different ways in different nations, depending 
on their institutional and corporate culture background. In what fol-
lows the literature will be reviewed according to the three categories 
provided by Pinkse and Kolk (2009).
15�5�7�1 Government-sponsored voluntary programmes 
for firms
Government-sponsored programmes for firms, where participation is 
completely voluntary and there are no penalties for not participating in 
the agreement, have been implemented in several countries, including 
the United States and Australia. The United States EPA led voluntary 
programmes foster partnerships with industry and the private sector 
at large by providing technical support among other means (US EPA, 
2013).
Ex-post case studies on the environmental and economic effective-
ness have been scarce compared to the wide range of activities. Where 
available, they have been critical of this type of programme. Several 
studies say little reduction was achieved (see Brouhle et al. (2009) ana-
lyzing a voluntary programme in the US metal-finishing industry) or 
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the impacts were short lived, as was the case for the US Climate Wise 
Program (Morgenstern et al., 2007). See also Griffiths et al. (2007) and 
Lyon and Maxwell (2004) who conclude the US Climate Leaders pro-
gramme had little effect on firm behaviour. 
15�5�7�2 Voluntary agreements as a major complement to 
mandatory regulations
Voluntary agreements (VAs) often form a part of a larger climate policy 
approach that contains binding policies such as a carbon tax or a cap-
and-trade programme. Voluntary agreements conducted jointly with 
mandatory regulations have been widely implemented in Europe (Rez-
essy and Bertoldi, 2011).
This approach allows the regulated industries to use the voluntary 
agreement as a partial fulfilment of the mandatory regulation. For 
example, through participation in the CCA in the UK, energy intensive 
industrial sectors established targets to improve energy efficiency and 
the companies that met such targets received an 80 % discount from 
the CCL (Price et al., 2008). Likewise, the Dutch government ensured 
industries participating in Long-Term Agreements (LTA) were not sub-
ject to additional government policies regulating CO2 emission reduc-
tions or energy conservation and that the new energy tax would not be 
levied on the participating industries. In both cases participants estab-
lished a long term plan to save energy and reduce CO2, and imple-
mented energy management systems (Price et al., 2008; Stenqvist and 
Nilsson, 2012).
Some studies found that the voluntary agreements were environmen-
tally and economically effective. Bressers et al. (2009) found positive 
results in terms of ambition, compliance, goal attainment and behav-
ioural change. They also acknowledged the efficiency advantages of 
flexibility in phasing technical measures. Ekins and Etheridge (2006) 
analyzed the UK CCA and found that, while the targets were not very 
stringent and were generally achieved in advance of the set date, the 
CCAs appeared to have catalyzed energy savings by increasing aware-
ness. This allowed the net environmental benefits to exceed what 
would have been achieved by levying a flat tax without rebates and 
CCAs while also generating economic gains for the companies under 
the CCAs (Ekins and Etheridge, 2006).
Rezessy and Bertoldi (2011) assessed the effectiveness of voluntary 
agreements in nine EU member countries. In cases where there is 
cooperative culture between governmental entities and the private 
sector, VAs can have some beneficial effects compared to legislation. 
They include willingness by the industry, sharing of information, flex-
ibility in phasing measures, and fine-tuned solutions to individual 
industries. They emphasized that by engaging signatories in energy 
audits, consumption monitoring, energy management systems and 
energy efficiency project implementation, the voluntary agreements 
helped overcome the barrier for energy efficiency improvement in a 
systematic manner. Nevertheless, they also noted that the VAs had 
been criticized for lenient targets, deficiencies in monitoring, and 
difficulty in establishing the additionality. There are other critical 
studies. Bohringer and Frondel (2007) argued that they found little 
evidence that the commitment of the German cement industry was 
effective, due to weak monitoring. Martin et  al. (2011) concluded 
that the CCL had strong negative environmental impacts. Voluntary 
agreement between the European Commission and the car indus-
try which set a mid-term target of 25 % reduction on CO2 emissions 
from automobiles by 2008 completely failed (Newell and Paterson, 
2010).
15�5�7�3 Voluntary agreements as a policy instrument in 
governmental mitigation plan
Voluntary agreements may be used as a major policy instrument with 
wide coverage and political salience in a governmental mitigation 
plan. This type of voluntary agreement has been implemented in Japan 
and Taiwan, province of China. 
The Japanese Voluntary Action Plan (VAP) by Keidanren (Japan Busi-
ness Federation) was initiated in 1997. The plan, led by Keidanren 
and joined by 114 industrial associations, covered about 80 % of 
GHG emissions from Japan’s industrial and energy transformation 
sectors. The plan is embedded in the regulatory culture in which the 
government constantly consults with industrial associations. It was 
reviewed annually in governmental committees, and an independent 
third party committee was also established to monitor its implemen-
tation; the included industries were required to be accountable with 
their environmental performance constantly. Industrial groups and 
firms established energy and GHG management systems, exchanged 
information, being periodically reviewed and acted to improve 
energy efficiency and cut GHG emissions. Several industry sectors 
raised the ambition levels with stricter targets during the course of 
VAP, once they achieved original targets (Tanikawa, 2004; Akimoto, 
2012; Uchiyama et  al., 2012; Yamaguchi, 2012). An econometric 
analysis found that voluntary actions by the manufacturing sector 
led to significant energy efficiency investments (Sugino and Arimura, 
2011). 
Two successful case studies in VAP have been reported. In cutting 
stand-by power by electric appliances, three major industrial associa-
tions announced 2001 the target to limit stand-by power less than 1 
W for all electric appliances to be met by 2003. It was possible for 
them to commit to the ambitious targets — ambitious in terms of the 
level of target (1 W), wide coverage of appliances, and early timing of 
goal — exactly because it was voluntary, not mandatory. In contrast, 
other countries that took a regulatory approach have implemented 
much weaker targets at later dates, and the coverage of appliances 
had been small. By 2003, almost all appliances met the target on time 
in Japan. Also, semiconductor industrial associations committed to cut 
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Perfluorocarbons (PFC) emissions in 1998 and succeeded in reduction 
by 58 % by 2009 (Wakabayashi, 2013). 
Chen and Hu (2012) analyzed the voluntary GHG reduction agree-
ments of six different industrial sectors, as well as the fluorinated gases 
(F-gas) reduction agreement of the semiconductor and liquid crystal 
display (LCD) industries in Taiwan, province of China. They found that 
the plan launched in 2005 was largely successful. 
15�5�7�4 Synthesis
The voluntary agreements have been successful particularly in coun-
tries with traditions of close cooperation between government and 
industry (IPCC, 2007; Rezessy and Bertoldi, 2011; Akimoto, 2012; 
Yamaguchi, 2012).
Successful voluntary agreements are characterized by a proper institu-
tional framework. This framework consists of, first, capable and influ-
ential industrial associations that serve as an arena for information 
exchange and development of common expectation among industries. 
Second, governmental involvement in implementation review is cru-
cial. Third, accompanying measures such as technical assistance and 
subsidies for energy audits and equipment can also be instrumental. 
Finally, regulatory threats, even if they are not explicitly articulated, are 
an important motivating factor for firms to be active in the voluntary 
agreements.
The key benefits of voluntary agreements are: 1) quick planning and 
actions when technological solutions are largely known but still face 
uncertainties; 2) flexibility in phasing technical measures; 3) facilitating 
coordination and information exchange among key stakeholders that 
are crucial to removing barriers to energy efficiency and CO2 reduc-
tions; and 4) providing an opportunity for ‘learning by doing’ and shar-
ing experiences.
However, several voluntary agreements have been criticized for not 
bringing about significant environmental impacts due to their limited 
scope or lack of proper institutional framework to ensure the actions 
to be taken (see Sections 15.5.7.2 and 15.5.7.3).
As cross-national evaluations, Morgenstern and Pizer (2007) reviewed 
voluntary environmental programmes in the United States, Europe, and 
Japan and found average reductions in energy use and GHG emissions 
of approximately 5 % beyond baselines. Borck and Coglianese (2009) 
argued that, as an alternative to regulatory approaches, voluntary 
agreements may effectively achieve small environmental goals at com-
paratively low cost.
The major role of voluntary agreements is to facilitate cooperation 
among firms, industrial associations, and governments in order to find 
and implement low cost emissions reduction measures. Such a role is 
important because large mitigation potential exists, yet it is hampered 
by formidable barriers such as lack of information and coordination 
among actors. In such context the voluntary agreements can play an 
important role as part of a policy package. 
15�5�8 Summary 
This section has reviewed a range of policy instruments. Among the 
four policy evaluation criteria, literature is rich for economic and envi-
ronmental effectiveness. The distributional incidence of taxes has 
been studied quite extensively, much less is known about other policy 
instruments. Political and institutional feasibility was also discussed as 
a design issue of economic instruments. The reasons for which sector 
specific policy instruments such as regulations and information mea-
sures have higher political feasibility than economy-wide economic 
instruments were briefly discussed in Section 15.2, but there is a 
dearth of literature really analyzing this issue.
Basic economics suggests that one instrument — e. g., a price on car-
bon — would be most cost effective in dealing with the market failure 
associated with the release of greenhouse gases. The presence of other 
market failures, however, means that one instrument is insufficient for 
dealing comprehensively with issues related to the climate problem. 
We have seen in Section 15.5.4 that there are cognitive and institu-
tional factors that imply barriers to market response to carbon prices. 
Therefore, regulatory approaches, information programmes, voluntary 
agreements, and government provision may serve as a complement to 
pricing policy as a way to remove barriers, thereby saving the money 
of firms and individuals and reducing social costs. There are strong 
separate arguments for a technology policy to correct for the external-
ity implied by insufficient protection of property rights, as detailed in 
Section 15.6. Furthermore, because carbon-pricing policy is often lack-
ing or insufficient for political reasons in nations, various policy instru-
ments are playing substitutive role (see Section 8.10 for examples of 
the transport sector).
In several sectors such as transport, urban planning and buildings, 
energy, and forestry, government planning and provision of infra-
structure is important, even crucial, for achieving emission reduc-
tions in a cost-effective manner. Absent the appropriate infrastruc-
ture, the costs of achieving significant emission reduction might be 
prohibitive.
As discussed in Section 15.2 and this section, real-world politics tend 
to produce various policy instruments and differentiated carbon price 
across sectors owing to politics. Those policy instruments may posi-
tively interact as illustrated above, but may also negatively interact. 
Such interactions will be further detailed in Sections 15.7 and 15.8. 
Policymakers face the challenge to understand how the policy package 
is constructed in their nation and must harmonize various policy instru-
ments so that they interact synergistically.
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15.6 Technology policy 
and R&D policy
15�6�1 Overview of the role of technology 
policy and R&D policy
As discussed in Chapter 3.11, there are market failures associated with 
research, technology development, and technology diffusion that are 
distinct from and interact with the market failures associated with 
environmental harm of human activities such as anthropogenic climate 
change. There is therefore a distinct role for technology policy in cli-
mate change mitigation, which is complementary to the role of policies 
aimed directly at reducing current GHG emissions, which are discussed 
in Section 15.5 above.
Public policies and institutions affect the rate and direction of techno-
logical change at all points in the chain from the invention, to inno-
vation, to adoption and diffusion of the technology, and unaddressed 
market failures or barriers at any stage in the chain can limit policy 
effectiveness (Nemet, 2013). The innovation systems literature stresses 
that technology development and deployment are driven by both tech-
nology push (forces that drive the development of technologies and 
innovation such as R&D funding and tax breaks for R&D, patents), and 
demand pull forces that increase the market demand for technologies 
such as technology subsidies and standards (Gallagher et  al., 2012; 
Wilson et al., 2012).
Box 15�2 | National and sub-national policies specific to least developed countries (LDCs)
A number of developing countries have developed legislative and 
regulatory frameworks to measure and manage GHG emission 
(Box 15.1). These frameworks or strategies can be a part of larger 
development plans that aim to shift the economy to a low carbon 
and climate resilient trajectory. These plans can serve an important 
signaling function by aiding coordination of government agencies 
and stakeholders in addition to providing the government’s com-
mitment to a low-carbon policy framework (Clapp et al., 2010).
There are pre-requisites to develop these low carbon development 
strategies. Achieving this policy ‘readiness’ entails assembling the 
technical knowledge and analytical capacity, legal and institu-
tional capacity, and engagement of stakeholders in the process 
(Aasrud et al., 2010; van Tilburg et al., 2011). Capacity building 
is also a continuous process that aims to improve strategies over 
time to enhance low carbon outcomes. Readiness for market-
based instruments increases mitigative capacity in general and 
enables implementation and monitoring of mitigation policies 
(Partnership for Market Readiness, 2011). Due to tremendous 
variation in capacity across countries, sufficient flexibility to allow 
these strategies to evolve over time is needed (Clark et al., 2010; 
van Tilburg et al., 2011).
Evidence from CDM projects indicates that capacity building is 
necessary but not sufficient to allow countries to attract CDM 
projects. Targeted measures like support for Designated National 
Authorities have shown to be successful (Okubo and Michaelowa, 
2010). In addition, CDM projects have been an important mecha-
nism for creating awareness about climate change mitigation, and 
have served as an indirect link between cap-and-trade systems 
around the world (Michaelowa, 2013). Some developing country 
beneficiaries of CDM are also moving towards implementing 
longer-term national mitigation policies. For an assessment of 
the Clean Development Mechanism, please refer to Chapter 13 
(13.13.1.2) and Chapter 16 (16.8) for the technology component. 
Climate change mitigation has also been pursued through a co-
benefits approach (See Section 15.2). Increasing access to energy 
services is an important priority for policymakers in developing 
countries (Chapter 4). An estimated 1.3 billion of the world’s 
people have no access to electricity and roughly three billion rely 
on highly polluting and unhealthy traditional solid fuel for house-
hold heating and cooking (IEA, 2012; Pachauri et al., 2012, p. 19) 
(see Section 14.3.2.1). In the short term, policies may address use 
of climate-friendly technologies like solar lighting alternatives to 
kerosene lamps (Lam et al., 2012), and gasifier cook stoves (Grie-
shop et al., 2011), while longer term policies may address more 
comprehensive approaches such as universal grid connectivity. 
Chapter 6 (Section 6.6.2.3) and Chapter 16 (Box 16.3 in Section 
16.8) use global scenario results to conclude that universal basic 
energy access can be achieved without significantly increasing 
GHG emissions. 
One option particularly relevant for developing countries is a 
repeal of regressive subsidies given to fossil fuel based energy car-
riers, together with suitable compensating income transfers so as 
not to limit energy access or increase poverty (see Section 15.5.2). 
In some developing countries, subsidies to fossil fuels are slowing 
penetration of less expensive renewables. For example subsidies 
to natural gas result in an incremental levelized cost of wind 
power in Egypt of an estimated 88 % (Schmidt et al., 2012). Care 
must also be taken to ensure transparency and to clearly demon-
strate that the savings that accrue from the removal of subsidies 
will be used to benefit the poor.
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Technology systems may create path dependencies in the innovation 
process. The current dominance of the carbon-based system creates 
incentives to improve carbon technology rather than non-carbon. 
This has been observed in private (Aghion et  al., 2012) as well as 
public institutions (Unruh, 2000) exemplified by fossil fuel subsidies 
(OECD, 2013). Escaping carbon lock-in is essentially a problem of 
coordination (Rodrik, 2007; Kretschmer, 2008), which can be facili-
tated by public policy that addresses technology-push, demand-pull, 
and framework conditions in a complementary fashion (Nemet, 
2013). 
This section addresses the generic issues that arise in the implementa-
tion of policies intended specifically to foster the development and 
implementation of low-GHG technologies. It begins by discussing 
technology policy instruments in three overarching categories: 1) the 
patent system and other forms of intellectual property (IP); 2) public 
funding of research, tax subsidies for firms engaging in R&D; and 3) 
various policies designed to foster deployment of new technologies. 
It then moves on to discuss the impact of environmental policy on 
technological change in general, technological change in a broader 
social framework often termed an ‘enabling environment’ together 
with interactions across various elements of innovation systems, and 
finally the importance of incorporating programme evaluation into the 
design of technology policy. 
15�6�2 Experience with technology policy
15�6�2�1 Intellectual property
Public policy towards IP inherently involves a tradeoff between the 
desire to create incentives for knowledge creators and developers, 
and the desire to have new knowledge used as widely as possible 
once it is created (Hall, 2007). It is therefore crucial to analyze the 
extent to which IP protection such as patents, will foster climate 
change mitigation, by encouraging the creation and development of 
new GHG-reducing technologies, versus the extent to which it will 
hamper mitigation by raising the cost and limiting access to such 
new technologies as are developed. Intellectual Property policy will 
affect climate change mitigation both through its effects on the cre-
ation of new technology and on the international transfer of miti-
gation technology. The first of these mechanisms will be considered 
here; the effect of IP policy on technology transfer is discussed in 
Chapter 13.9.
In general, the empirical evidence that IP protection stimulates inno-
vation is limited to the chemical and pharmaceutical sectors, and to 
developed economies (Park and Ginarte, 1997). It is unclear to what 
extent IP protection is relevant to the development of the kind of tech-
nologies that would mitigate climate change in advanced and middle 
income countries, and it appears unlikely to be relevant to indigenous 
technology development in the poorest countries (Hall and Helmers, 
2010).11
The Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement gener-
ally commits all countries to create and enforce standard IP protections, 
but it does allow for the possibility of exceptions to standard patent 
regulations for public policy reasons (World Trade Organization, 1994). 
Hence a major policy issue related to climate change is the extent to 
which developing countries will be compelled within the TRIPS frame-
work to enforce strong IP protection relative to GHG-reducing technolo-
gies, or whether an exception or exceptions will develop for these tech-
nologies on public policy grounds (Derclaye, 2008; Rimmer, 2009).
Because the evidence that strong IP protection increases domestic 
innovation is almost entirely limited to specific sectors in the devel-
oped world, it is unclear whether maintenance of strong IP protection 
in less developed countries will increase those countries’ indigenous 
creation or adaptation of GHG-reducing technologies. As discussed in 
Chapter 13, however, the evidence does suggest that the presence of 
an effective IP regime is a factor in fostering technology transfer into 
a country.
15�6�2�2 Public funding of research and development
Public funding of research and development may address specific mar-
ket failures related to innovation (as discussed in Chapter 3.11), but 
may also help to compensate for barriers to private investment that may 
result from long lifetimes of incumbent technologies leading to lengthy 
transition times from one system / technology to another (Fouquet and 
Pearson, 2006; Fouquet, 2010), uncertainty about future levelized costs 
of capital or discount rates (Nemet, 2013), or the lack of guarantee on 
the success of an investment (Mazzucato, 2013; Nemet, 2013).
Public research expenditures that have the potential to foster the long-
run development of GHG-mitigating technology come under a number of 
different common public research expenditure categories, including envi-
ronment, agriculture, materials, and others. There are no widely accepted 
data that attempt to identify and sum up public expenditures across dif-
ferent categories that potentially relate to mitigation technologies. Much 
discussion about the potential for technological change to mitigate GHG 
emissions revolves around reducing and eliminating use of fossil fuels, 
and the largest single category of public research expenditure related to 
mitigation is energy research, discussed in Chapter 7.12.2.
Public energy-related research expenditures among the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) countries currently comprise about 5 % of total 
public R&D spending in those countries, less than half the share of 
11 There are however other relevant examples for instance of indigenous knowledge 
in developing countries being valuable when it comes to biodiversity and pharma-
ceuticals.
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such research in total public research spending in 1980. Gallagher et 
al. (2012) report an increase in public funding for energy-technologies 
among IEA member countries in the 2000s but also find a continued 
prominence of funding for nuclear and fossil fuel technologies. A simi-
lar trend has been noted for non-IEA members like Brazil, China India, 
Mexico, Russia, and South Africa (Gallagher et  al., 2012). A gradual 
but steady increase in this share is a major policy option for fostering 
the long-run development of GHG-reducing technologies (Jaffe, 2012).
The U. S. National Research Council (NRC) evaluated Federal Energy 
research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) investments in 
energy efficiency and fossil energy for the period 1978 – 2000. The NRC 
found that these investments “yielded significant benefits (economic, 
environmental, and national security-related), important technological 
options for potential application in a different (but possible) economic, 
political, and / or environmental setting, and important additions to the 
stock of engineering and scientific knowledge in a number of fields” 
(U. S. National Research Council, 2001). In terms of overall benefit-
cost evaluation, the NRC found that the energy efficiency programmes 
produced net realized economic benefits that ‘substantially exceeded’ 
the investment in the programmes. For the fossil energy programmes, 
the net realized economic benefits were less than the cost of the pro-
grammes for the period 1978 – 1986, but exceeded the cost of the pro-
grammes for 1986 – 2000 (U. S. National Research Council, 2001). Japa-
nese technology RD&D programmes for renewable energy and energy 
efficiency, known as Sunshine program and Moonlight program since 
1974, were also found to be both economically and environmentally 
effective (Kimura, 2010).
In the short run, the availability of appropriately trained scientists and 
engineers is a constraint on a country’s ability to increase its research 
output (Goolsbee, 1998) (See also Jensen and Thomson, 2013). This 
factor combines with short-run adjustment costs in laboratory facilities 
to make rapid ramp-up in research in a particular area likely to be cost-
ineffective, as found to occur, for example, as a result of the doubling 
of US health research (Cockburn et  al., 2011). Therefore, sustained 
gradual increases in research are likely to be more effective than short-
run rapid increases. In the long run, it is possible to expand the supply 
of scientific and technical labour available to perform energy-related 
research. This can occur through training that occurs when publicly 
funded research is carried out at universities and other combined 
research and teaching institutions, and / or via direct public funding of 
training. Success at increasing the technical workforce has been found 
to be a crucial factor in the long-run benefits of health-related research 
in the United States (Cockburn et al., 2011).
15�6�2�3 Policies to foster or accelerate deployment and 
diffusion of new technologies
In addition to fostering technology development through research, many 
policies seek to foster the deployment of GHG-mitigating technologies 
in households and firms. Such deployment policies could be thought 
of as a form of abatement policy, to the extent that they reduce emis-
sions relative to what would occur with the use of previous technologies. 
But the more fundamental reason for public policy to foster technology 
deployment is that deployment feeds back and enhances subsequent 
improvement of the technology over time (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994; Hen-
kel and Hippel, 2005; Jaffe, 2012). For example, publicly funded research 
certainly played a role in the digital revolution, but active government 
involvement as an early purchaser was also crucial (Mowery, 2011). Pur-
chases were made of products meeting stated technical specifications, 
and this approach has helped move products down the learning curve, 
eventually allowing civilian versions to be sold competitively.
Market failure in the deployment of new technologies is often illus-
trated via an image of a ‘Valley of Death’ between small scale or 
prototype developments and successful commercialization, in which 
the need for substantial increase in the scale of investment combines 
with uncertainty about technical reliability, market receptiveness and 
appropriability to stall or slow deployment (Grubb, 2004; Nemet, 2013, 
p. 112). A variety of demand-pull public policies can operate to carry 
technology deployment through the Valley of Death. 
As laid out in Table 15.2, economic instruments such as subsidies, reg-
ulatory approaches, information programmes, government provision of 
public goods and services, as well as voluntary actions are common 
across sectors. The targeted technologies include low-emission vehi-
cles such as hybrid cars in the transport sector (8.10), efficient electric 
appliances such as light-emitting diodes (LED) in the building sector 
(9.10), and advanced industrial equipment (11.10). Feed-in-tariffs are 
used for renewable in the power sector (7.10). Quantity requirement 
are also common, including RPSs in the power sector (7.10), biofuel 
mandates in the transport sector (8.10). Information programmes such 
as labelling of home electric appliance may be used to promote the 
sales of new, low emission technologies (9.10).
Since AR4, a large number of countries and sub-national jurisdictions 
have introduced support policies for renewable energy. These have 
promoted substantial diffusion and innovation of new energy tech-
nologies such as wind turbines and photovoltaic panels, though many 
renewable energy (RE) technologies still need policy support, if their 
market shares are to be increased (see 7.5.3, 7.6.1, 7.8.2, and Chap-
ter 11 Bioenergy Annex). 
Chapter 7 (citing the IPCC Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources 
and Climate Change Mitigation (SRREN)) argued that “...some feed in 
tariffs have been effective and efficient at promoting RE electricity, 
mainly due to the combination of long-term fixed price or premium 
payments, network connections, and guaranteed purchase of all RE 
electricity generated”. Feed-in-tariffs have been effective in promoting 
renewables in Germany and other nations (Couture and Gagnon, 2010; 
Ragwitz and Steinhilber, 2013). It is also argued that the flexibility of 
FITs can incorporate economic and technological changes (Klobasa 
et al., 2013) and encourage dynamic innovation (Mitchell et al., 2006). 
Proving dynamic efficiency in the narrow economic sense is more com-
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plicated, although Jaffe et al., (2005) have explored this in a somewhat 
positive light. 
There are different views on FITs, especially in relation to their cost-
effectiveness. Some criticize FIT of having ‘failed to harness market 
incentives’ because it is not statically cost effective (i. e., it supports 
photovoltaics in addition to wind energy, although the former is more 
expensive than the latter) (Frondel et al., 2008, 2010) . Schmalensee 
(2012), using a simple model, argues that while FITs shift risk away 
from investors in renewable energies, they may not reduce the risk to 
society as a whole. In a paper for the European Union, Canton and 
Linden (2010) argue that feed-in premiums are preferable to FITs if 
internal market distortions are to be avoided. 
With the increasing market shares of intermittent generation, new 
challenges have to be addressed in respect to grid and market integra-
tion such as capacity constraints, demand spikes, back up capacity, and 
transmission. A reform of market design, including flexible demand 
side pricing, is proposed to make the system more flexible so it can 
react to the new challenges (See 7.10 and SSREN Chapter 8 for details 
(Sims et al., 2012).
A theme that runs through many of the sectoral deployment policy 
discussions is the importance of information, and the relationship 
between incomplete information and risk. Uncertainty about the physi-
cal and economic performance of new technologies is a major factor 
limiting their diffusion, so policies that address information issues may 
be complementary with economic incentives or regulatory approaches. 
Many nations, including Germany, Spain, China, India, among others, 
have implemented ambitious deployment programmes for renewables 
consisting of capacity targets, FIT, and so forth (Jänicke, 2012), result-
ing in rapid capacity expansion and lower costs of technologies. Such 
progress may result in economic and environmental efficiency in the 
long run at the global scale (Kalkuhl et al., 2013). Ondraczek (2013) 
identifies awareness among consumers as a critical element in market 
development in Kenya and Tanzania and finds evidence for a ‘virtu-
ous cycle’ between dissemination and awareness. Friebe et al. (2013) 
emphasize the need for including pre and post-sales services to sustain 
the uptake of solar home systems. Glemarec (2012) highlights the role 
for public-private partnerships to deliver energy access but underlines 
the need for public investment in capacity and market development.
Many developing countries face a somewhat different set of choices 
in encouraging technology deployment because of the dominance 
of state-owned or other monopoly enterprises in the energy sector. 
Liu and Kokko (2010) evaluate the factors related to the significant 
growth of wind power in China, and conclude that administrative rules 
stipulating levels of wind usage have been more effective than incen-
tives operating through the pricing system. Pegels (2010) describes 
the introduction of a renewable FIT guaranteed for 20 years in South 
Africa, but notes that it is unclear what effect this will have on the 
investment decisions of the monopolist electricity supplier. 
15�6�3 The impact of environmental policy 
instruments on technological change
There is some empirical literature assessing the impact of generic 
environmental policy instruments (discussed in the previous section) 
on technological change. For surveys, see Newell (2010) and Popp 
et al. (2010b). Jaffe and Palmer (1997), looking across industries in the 
United States., found that more stringent regulation was associated 
with higher R&D expenditures (controlling for industry fixed effects), 
but did not find any impact on industry patents. Lanjouw and Moody 
(1996) did find that across the United States, Germany, and Japan, pat-
enting rates were correlated at the industry level with pollution control 
expenditures. 
A number of studies have looked at the impact of energy prices on 
energy-saving technological change. These effects can be seen as 
indicative of the possible consequences of GHG policies that increase 
the effective price of emitting GHG. Popp (2002) found that rising 
energy prices increased the rate of patenting with respect to alterna-
tive energy sources and energy efficiency, with more than one-half 
the effect coming within five years of energy price changes. Newell 
(1999) found that rising energy prices increased the efficiency of the 
menu of household appliances available for purchase in the United 
States. The Norwegian carbon tax appears to have triggered technol-
ogy innovation in the form of carbon dioxide storage in the Sleipner 
gas field (Sumner et al., 2011). Fuel taxes moved auto industry innova-
tion towards more efficient technologies (Aghion et al., 2012), and the 
EU ETS moved the firms most affected by its constraints towards low-
carbon innovation (Calel and Dechezleprêtre, 2012).
At a theoretical level, there are arguments why incentive-based policies 
such as carbon taxes or tradable permits are more conducive to inno-
vation than regulatory approaches (Popp, Newell, et al., 2010b). After 
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments in the United States implemented 
a tradable permit programme for sulphur dioxide, Popp (2003) found 
that the rate of patenting on techniques for sulphur removal increased, 
and Lange and Bellas (2005) found that both capital and operating 
expenditures for scrubbers were reduced. In a survey of research on 
the effects of tradable permit systems on technology innovation and 
diffusion, Bellas (2011) concluded “The general result is that tradable 
permit programs have improved the pollution control technology com-
pared to the previous regulation used.” Sterner and Turnheim (2009) 
find similarly that the very high fee on NOx in Sweden has led to a 
rapid process of both innovation and technology diffusion for abate-
ment technologies.
More recently, a few studies have explored the effect of renewable 
energy policies on energy innovation. Johnstone et  al. (2010) found 
that policy had a significant impact on patent applications for renew-
able technologies, with different policy instruments being effective for 
different technologies. Popp et al. (2010a) found that the link between 
greater patenting and investment in specific technologies is weak, but 
there does seem to be an association between policy and investment.
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15�6�4 The social context of technological 
transitions and its interaction with 
policy
The central insight from the empirical literature is that both technol-
ogy push and demand pull policies are required to be most effective 
(Nemet, 2009). A ‘virtuous cycle’ (IEA, 2003; Edenhofer et al., 2012) 
can occur, derived from learning from combined technology push and 
market pull whereby as ‘learning’ from market demand feeds back in 
to research and development, the improved product leads to more 
market demand and reduced costs. This virtuous technology and mar-
ket cycle has been extended to include a third cycle of policy learning 
(Jänicke, 2012) whereby as learning from a successful policy occurs 
across the innovation chain, it can also be fed back into the process.
A technology policy will be more effective if it addresses multiple 
aspects such as institutions, regulations and standards, political mod-
els, laws, social norms and preferences, individual behaviours, skills, 
and other characteristics. This idea was originally developed and 
encapsulated in the UNFCCC definition of an ‘enabling environment’ 
(UNFCCC, 2001).12 This general intention to match up specific technol-
ogy requirements with the system situation in which they develop has 
been called framework conditions (Grubb, 2004), enabling environ-
ment (Edenhofer et al., 2012; Johansson et al., 2012), enabling factors 
(Nemet, 2013), and complementary innovations (Grubb et al., 2014).
There is a literature base that explores technology transitions and the 
implications of multilevel interactions across social and technological 
elements (e. g., Geels, 2011; Meadowcroft, 2011; Foxon, 2011). Three 
social challenges are raised as especially salient to social management 
when attempting to alter the technological system: (1) the size and vis-
ibility of transfers and assets created; (2) the predictability of pressure 
to expand the focus of the policies to broaden the social benefits; and 
(3) the potential for market incentives and framings of environmen-
tal issues to undermine normative motivational systems (Parson and 
Kravitz, 2013). Managing these social challenges may require innova-
tions in policy and institutional design, including building integrated 
policies that make complementary use of market incentives, authority, 
and norms (Foxon, 2011; Gallagher et  al., 2012; Parson and Kravitz, 
2013). Doing so will reduce the risk of market incentives failing to 
achieve behavioural change and recognizes that incentives and norms 
have to be integrated to achieve sustainability transitions. 
12 Enabling environment is defined as: “the component of the framework [that] 
focuses on government actions such as fair trade policies, removal of technical, 
legal and administrative barriers to technical transfer, sound economic policy, 
regulatory frameworks and transparency, all of which create an environment 
conducive to private and public sector technology transfer” (UNFCCC, 2001). 
15�6�5 Building programme evaluation into 
government technology programmes
Evaluation of government programmes to foster new energy technolo-
gies has been hampered by a lack of complete and consistent evalu-
ation data at the programme level (U. S. National Research Council, 
2001). This problem is common to many government technology pro-
grammes. Proper evaluation requires that data on project selection and 
project performance be collected as programmes commence and main-
tained after they are completed (Jaffe, 2002). Wider use of such evalua-
tion methods would allow experience with relative effectiveness of dif-
ferent programmes to be used to improve outcomes over time. While 
the above argument applies to all governmental policy in general, it is 
particularly important for technology development programmes that 
may be vulnerable to governmental failure related to the picking and 
choosing of technologies under high uncertainty (Helm, 2010). 
15�6�6 Summary of technology policy and R&D 
policy
There is a distinct role for technology policy in climate change mitiga-
tion. This role is complementary to the role of policies aimed directly at 
reducing current GHG emissions (15.6.1).
The availability of new technologies is crucial for the ability to realis-
tically implement stringent carbon policies. Technology policy will be 
most effective when all aspects of the innovation / deployment chain 
are addressed in a complementary fashion (see Section 15.6.1). Invest-
ment depends on the willingness of a variety of actors to manage the 
balance between the risks and rewards in each step of the chain, and 
government decisions are crucial to this balance.
Evidence suggests that the presence of an effective IP regime increases 
domestic innovation. However, as evidence is almost entirely limited 
to specific sectors in the developed world, it is unclear whether strong 
IP protection in less developed countries will increase those coun-
tries’ indigenous creation or adaptation of mitigation technologies 
(15.6.2.1).
Worldwide investment in research in support of climate change miti-
gation is small relative to overall public research spending. The effec-
tiveness of research support will be greatest if it is increased steadily 
rather than dramatically or erratically (15.6.3). 
A wide range of policy approaches is prevalent across sectors, which 
enable policy design that addresses sector- and technology-specific 
attributes. These policies are often designed as complementary sets of 
policies, or policy packages (15.5.1 and 15.6.2.3).
Complementary framework conditions, or an enabling environment, 
may complement a package of technology-push and demand-pull poli-
cies (15.6.4). Managing social challenges of technology policy change 
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may require innovations in policy and institutional design, including 
building integrated policies that make complementary use of market 
incentives, authority and norms (15.6. 4). 
It is important that data collection for programme evaluation be built 
into technology policy programmes (15.6.5), because there is very little 
empirical evidence on the relative effectiveness of different mecha-
nisms for supporting the creation and diffusion of new technologies.
15.7 Synergies and  tradeoffs 
among policies
This section discusses interactions between policies with different 
main objectives as well as between differing climate policies with the 
same objective. Section 15.7.2 discusses relationships between poli-
cies with different principal objectives — for example, between climate 
policy and development policy. The next two sections consider inter-
actions between climate policies. Section 15.7.3 describes interactions 
between different climate policies at different levels of government, 
and 15.7.4 takes up interactions between climate policies enacted at 
the same level of government. The interactions in 15.7.3 and 15.7.4 
reflect the absence of policy coordination, and they affect the environ-
mental and economic outcomes. Deliberate linking of policies is dis-
cussed in Section 15.8. 
15�7�1 Relationship between policies with 
different objectives
Governments throughout the world have enacted various policies to 
support the mitigation of climate change, which is the central objec-
tive of climate policy. However, the implementation of mitigation poli-
cies and measures can have positive or negative effects on additional 
objectives — and vice versa. To the extent these side-effects are posi-
tive, they can be deemed ‘co-benefits’; if adverse and uncertain, they 
imply risks.13 The co-benefits of climate policy are primary benefits of 
policies with other main objectives. Social development is a primary 
benefit of development policy, since such development is the main 
objective. Similarly, enhanced energy security, technological develop-
ment, and reduced air pollution are primary benefits of energy security, 
technological development, and air-pollution policies, respectively. To 
the extent that these other policies (with other objectives) lead to miti-
gation, such mitigation is a co-benefit of these other policies. 
13 Co-benefits and adverse side-effects describe effects in non-monetary units 
without yet evaluating the net effect on overall social welfare. Please refer to the 
glossary in Annex I for definitions and to Chapters 3.6.3 and 4.8 for a discussion 
of how the concept of co-benefits relates to welfare and sustainable development, 
respectively.
Although there is growing interest in research on mitigation as a 
co-benefit (see Sections 1.2.1 and e. g., Kahn Ribeiro and de Abreu, 
2008), the great majority of the literature assessed in other chapters 
focuses on the co-effects of sectoral mitigation measures (Chapters 
7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 10.8, 11.7, 11.13.6, and 12.8) or transformation path-
ways (Section 6.6) on additional objectives. Table 15.1 in Section 
15.2.4 provides a roadmap for the assessment of those co-benefits 
and adverse side-effects on the many objectives examined in vari-
ous chapters of this report and highlights that the effects on energy 
security and air pollution as well as the associated reductions in 
health and ecosystem impacts are discussed in all sector chapters. 
For example, stringent mitigation results in reduced combustion of 
fossil fuels with major cuts in air pollutant emissions significantly 
below baseline scenarios (see 6.6.2.1 and, e. g., ApSimon et  al., 
2009) for a discussion of policy interaction in Europe); by increas-
ing the diversity of energy sources and reducing energy imports in 
most countries, mitigation often results in energy systems that are 
less vulnerable to price volatility and supply disruptions (see 6.6.2.2 
and, e. g., Lecuyer and Bibas, 2011) for a discussion of policy interac-
tion in Europe). 
According to recent scenario studies assessed in Chapter 6.6.2.7, strin-
gent climate policies would significantly reduce the costs of reaching 
energy security and / or air pollution objectives globally. Recent litera-
ture assessed in Chapters 6.6.2.3, 7.9.1 and 16.8 finds that increas-
ing access to modern energy services may not conflict with mitigation 
objectives — and vice versa.
There are two important advantages to coordinating separate policies 
and their various benefits. By coordinating policies, the various ben-
efits and costs can be considered in an integrated fashion, which offers 
information helpful to determining how to achieve the objectives at 
low cost (see 6.6.2.7). In addition, coordinating policies can improve 
political feasibility. The concept of ‘mainstreaming’ climate policy 
refers to the linking of climate policy with other policy efforts, particu-
larly policy efforts that have broad recognition. The prospects for suc-
cessful climate policy can be enhanced through such mainstreaming 
(Kok and de Coninck, 2007).
Development frameworks at international or national levels, or by sec-
tor, may include mainstreaming as a key element. For it to be effective, 
climate change mitigation needs to be mainstreamed in appropriate 
national and sector planning processes to widen development goals 
within national and sectoral contexts. For developing countries, such 
integration of mitigation into development planning can reduce prob-
lems of cooperation and coordination that may arise across different 
levels of government (Tyler, 2010).
Mitigation plans can be embedded in national policy-making processes 
to align economic and social development with mitigation actions. For 
example, in China, the National Leading Group on Climate Change is 
part of the National Development and Reform Commission, the princi-
pal national planning body (see Section 15.2.2.2).
1180
National and Sub-national Policies and Institutions 
15
Chapter 15
Limited institutional capacity in developing countries presents the 
most significant barrier to mainstreaming of mitigation policies. This 
includes a lack of knowledge and / or expertise in climate change 
issues, a lack of (or weak) oversight and / or enforcement. Developing 
countries aiming to mainstream and implement climate change miti-
gation policies must; 1) encourage awareness on the topic; 2) establish 
related training programmes; 3) ensure an adequate level of finance 
for enforcement; and 4) enhance coordination between ministries (Ellis 
et al., 2009).
15�7�2 Interactions between climate policies 
conducted at different jurisdictional 
levels
Climate policy has been conducted at various jurisdictional levels: 
international, national, regional (state or provincial), and local (munici-
pal). Important interactions can occur across jurisdictional levels. Some 
interactions are beneficial, reinforcing the intended effects; others are 
problematic, interfering with the planned objectives. Sound policymak-
ing requires attention to these interactions.
15�7�2�1 Beneficial interactions
Policies introduced by a local jurisdiction sometimes reinforce the 
goals of efforts undertaken at a higher jurisdictional level. In particu-
lar, a sub-national policy can enhance cost-effectiveness if it addresses 
market failures that are not confronted by a national climate policy. 
Thus, for example, as seen in Sections 15.5.4 and 15.5.6, an RPS in 
the electricity sector and an R&D subsidy could usefully complement a 
national emissions pricing policy. 
The connections between instruments that deal with climate change 
and those that deal with congestion or local pollution also present an 
opportunity to policymakers, but they are very different since the latter 
vary depending on the socioeconomic context, technology, fuel, and 
vehicle use (Parry et al., 2007; Oikonomou and Jepma, 2008; Vander-
schuren et al., 2010; Parry, 2013). For example, urban planning imple-
mented jointly with fuel or carbon taxes can help fast growing devel-
oping countries minimize resource waste by avoiding urban sprawl. 
Policies incentivizing more dense urban architecture combined with 
the appropriate infrastructure for modern public transport can be an 
important complement to energy taxation. Such policies can be sup-
ported (and possibly financed) by fuel taxes if the policymaker wants 
to discourage citizens from making private decisions that are incom-
patible with this broader vision; policy combinations for this sector are 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8. Conversely, subsidizing fuels 
and taking a hands-off urban planning approach can result in urban 
sprawl and a growth in private automobile use along with growth in 
resulting emissions.
Local-level action can also be a good source of information by allow-
ing experimentation. In the United States, environmental policies by 
the federal government have a history of evolving out of successful 
policy ‘experiments’ undertaken by states (Goulder and Stavins, 2011; 
Shobe and Burtraw, 2012). Thus, an appealing feature of local-level 
actions are their ability to try out policy options not currently in place 
at the higher jurisdictional level; the higher jurisdiction may have more 
confidence in introducing a policy subsequently if it already has a suc-
cessful track record at the more local level.
Finally, local policies can produce beneficial strategic interactions. If 
national policy is insufficiently stringent, a stringent state / province or 
even municipal policy may create pressure on the national government 
to increase its own policy’s stringency. Goulder and Stavins (2011) cite 
the example of California, which repeatedly increased the stringency 
of its local air pollution standards and was repeatedly followed by the 
federal government increasing Clean Air Act regulations’ stringency. 
Similarly, Lucon and Goldemberg (2010) note the importance of São 
Paulo’s GHG-reducing policies in influencing other local and even 
regional governments in Brazil.
15�7�2�2 Problematic interactions
Policies introduced at different levels sometimes interact in ways 
that compromise or weaken the intended environmental or economic 
impacts.
One particular difficulty that may arise is the problem of emissions 
leakage. This can occur, for example, when a climate policy introduced 
at a lower jurisdictional level is ‘nested’ within a cap-and-trade pro-
gramme implemented at a higher jurisdictional level. Consider the 
case where a cap-and-trade programme exists at the national level, 
and where a sub-national authority introduces a new policy intended 
to reduce its own (sub-national) emissions beyond what would result 
from the national programme alone. The sub-national jurisdiction’s 
efforts might indeed yield reductions within that jurisdiction, but facili-
ties in other sub-national jurisdictions covered by the cap-and-trade 
programme will now use these allowances leading to higher emissions 
in these jurisdictions completely compensating the abatement effort in 
the more stringent jurisdiction. Since overall emissions at the higher 
level are determined by the given national-level cap, the effort by the 
sub-national jurisdiction does not succeed in reducing nationwide: it 
just causes emissions leakage — offsetting increases in emissions else-
where in the nation. The national cap effectively prevents sub-national 
jurisdictions from achieving further emissions reductions (Goulder and 
Stavins, 2011; Shobe and Burtraw, 2012). 
The issue applies to the United Kingdom’s efforts to reduce emis-
sions through a carbon tax on the power sector (electricity genera-
tors). The generators are required to pay the tax on every unit of 
carbon emissions while also being subject to the EU ETS cap on over-
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all emissions. While the tax may lead to greater reduction in carbon 
emissions by the generators in the UK, the impact on overall emis-
sions in the EU might be negligible, since overall European emissions 
are largely determined by the Europe-wide cap under the EU ETS. On 
this, see (Böhringer et al., 2008; Sartor and Berghmans, 2011; Goul-
der, 2013)
This leakage problem can be avoided when the lower-level jurisdic-
tion’s programme is nested within a carbon tax programme, rather 
than emissions cap, at the higher level. In this case, the sub-national 
policies generally are not environmentally irrelevant. The reduced 
emissions in the sub-national jurisdiction do not lead to a fall in the 
emissions price (the carbon tax) at the national level; hence there 
are no offsetting increases in emissions in jurisdictions outside the 
jurisdiction introducing the more stringent policy (De Jonghe et al., 
2009; Fankhauser et al., 2010; Goulder and Stavins, 2011). This can 
be an important advantage of a carbon tax over a cap-and-trade sys-
tem.
15�7�3 Interactions between policies conducted 
at the same jurisdictional level
Interactions also can arise when different policy instruments are intro-
duced at the same jurisdictional level. These interactions can be ben-
eficial or problematic in terms of the cost-effectiveness of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
15�7�3�1 Beneficial interactions
The potential for cost-reducing interactions is greatest when the dif-
ferent instruments address different market failures. A fundamental 
principle of public policy is that the most cost-effective outcome results 
when there are as many policy instruments as the number of market 
failures involved, with each instrument focusing mainly on a different 
market failure (Tinbergen, 1970).
Climate policy is meant to address one market failure in particu-
lar — the climate-change-related externalities associated with GHGs. 
As seen in Section 15.6, another important market failure applies in 
the market for innovation: because new knowledge can spill over to 
third parties, innovators often cannot capture all of the social benefits 
from the new knowledge they create. Introducing two policy instru-
ments, for example, emissions pricing to address the emissions exter-
nality, and a subsidy to R&D to address the innovation market failure, 
can lower the costs of achieving given emissions reductions. In addi-
tion to helping reduce emissions by encouraging fuel-switching and 
a reduction in demand, emissions pricing can help spur innovation. 
Likewise, the R&D subsidy can promote invention of low-carbon tech-
nologies, thereby helping to curb emissions. Hence the interactions 
of the two policies are beneficial. Although each of the two policies 
might to some degree affect both of the market failures, emissions 
pricing is particularly well focused on the first, while the R&D policy 
sharply addresses the second. Using two instruments helps achieve 
emissions reductions at the lowest cost. In this connection, Fischer 
and Newell (2004) and Oikonomou et  al. (2010) find that a policy 
combination including a price on GHG emissions and renewable 
energy subsidies achieves emissions reductions at significantly lower 
cost than either of these policies alone. Schneider and Goulder (1997) 
obtain a similar result for the combination of carbon tax and R&D 
subsidy. 
As noted already in Section 15.5.4.1, several studies (Greene, 1998; 
Goulder and Parry, 2008; Gillingham et  al., 2009b) argue that there 
is a market failure associated with consumer purchases of durable 
energy-using equipment (automobiles, refrigerators, etc.), according to 
which consumers systematically underestimate their own future gains 
from purchasing more energy efficient durables. To the extent that this 
market failure is significant, the combination of emissions pricing and 
a second instrument (for example, an energy-efficiency standard for 
appliances) to address this additional market failure could lead to ben-
eficial interactions and promote cost-effectiveness. 
Some studies suggest a market failure associated with reliance on 
crude oil, claiming that reliance on oil produces an ‘economic vul-
nerability externality’, given the possibility of supply disruptions on 
the world oil market (Jones et al., 2004). Under these circumstances, 
the combination of emissions pricing (to address the climate change 
externality) and a tax on oil consumption (to address the vulnerability 
externality) can be a cost-effective way of dealing with both climate 
change and economic vulnerability. Several authors (e. g., Nordhaus, 
2009), emphasize that the vulnerability to world oil price changes is 
largely a function of the share of overall oil consumption in GDP, rather 
than the share of consumed oil that comes from imports. This suggests 
that the vulnerability externality is best addressed through a tax on oil 
consumption rather than a tax on imported oil.
15�7�3�2 Problematic interactions
Multiple policies at the same jurisdictional level also can yield prob-
lematic interactions. This can happen when multiple policies only 
address the same market failure. Consider the situation where a given 
jurisdiction attempts to reduce greenhouse gases through both emis-
sions pricing and another policy such as a performance standard (a 
limit on the ratio of emissions per unit of production). Economic theory 
claims that, absent market failures and other barriers, emissions pric-
ing tends to promote a highly cost-effective outcome by promoting 
equality in the marginal costs of emissions-abatement across all the 
facilities that face the given price of emissions (the carbon tax or the 
price of emissions allowances). If, in addition, facilities face a perfor-
mance standard, then this added policy approach either is redundant 
or it compromises cost-effectiveness.
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It is redundant if meeting the performance standard would involve 
marginal abatement costs lower than the emissions price. In this event, 
cost-minimizing firms would be induced to meet or exceed this stan-
dard by the emissions price alone: there is no need for the standard. 
On the other hand, if the performance standard entails a cost per unit 
of abatement that is significantly higher than the emissions price, then 
this requirement sacrifices cost-effectiveness. Relying on emissions 
pricing alone would have promoted emissions reductions by the facili-
ties that can achieve those reductions at the least cost. Thus it would 
likely have led to a situation where the more expensive technology 
approach was not employed. Hence in this case the combination of 
emissions pricing and the performance standard does not promote 
cost-effectiveness.
Emissions price policies interact with other policies differently 
depending on whether the emissions price policy involves a quantity 
limit (as is the case under cap and trade) or a stipulated emissions 
price (as is the case under an emissions tax). In the presence of a 
cap-and-trade programme, introducing an additional instrument 
such as a performance standard might yield no further reductions 
in overall emissions (Burtraw and Shobe, 2009; Fankhauser et  al., 
2010). The reason is that overall emissions are determined by the 
overall cap or number of allowances in circulation. The problem is 
formally very similar to the difficulty described in Section 15.7.3 
above, where in the presence of a national cap-and-trade pro-
gramme an effort by a sub-national jurisdiction to achieve further 
emissions reductions is likely to have difficulty achieving that goal. 
In contrast, introducing a performance standard in the presence of 
an emissions tax can in fact lead to a reduction in overall emissions. 
The price of emissions — the emissions tax — does not change when 
the performance standard causes a reduction in emissions. For this 
reason the reduction caused by the performance standard does not 
lead to a compensating increase in emissions elsewhere. Overall 
emissions fall. 
For similar reasons, the same difficulty arises when a carbon tax is 
introduced in the presence of a cap-and-trade programme at the same 
jurisdictional level (Fischer and Preonas, 2010).
Nevertheless, as suggested above, the combination of emissions 
pricing and some other policy could be justified in terms of cost-
effectiveness to the extent that the latter policy directly addresses a 
second market failure that emissions pricing does not directly con-
front. 
It is important to recognize that the notion of a ‘market failure’ per-
tains only to the criterion of economic efficiency. Another important 
public policy consideration is distributional equity. Concerns about dis-
tributional equity can justify supplementing a given policy instrument 
with another in order to bring about a more equitable outcome. This 
may be desirable even if the multiplicity of instruments reduces cost-
effectiveness.
15.8 National, state and 
local linkages 
15�8�1 Overview of linkages across jurisdictions 
In the last few years, an increasing number of sub-national administra-
tions across the world have been active in the design and application 
of climate policies. Section 15.2 has reported some of these experi-
ences, whereas Section 15.7 has dealt with some of the interactions 
that may arise with the simultaneous use of climate policy instruments 
by several jurisdictions. This section goes back a little and is basically 
interested in the allocation of climate policy responsibilities across 
the different levels of government that usually exist in most countries 
(central, provincial, and local administrations). Although such alloca-
tion involves the use the policy types described in Section 15.4, the 
emphasis here will not be on instrument use in itself, as this was 
already covered in Sections 15.5 to 15.7. The objective of this section 
is to examine the theoretical backing for such practical applications 
and to extract lessons that may be useful for future sub-national appli-
cations and even for the design and implementation of national and 
supra-national mitigation policies. When dealing with the reasons for 
and guidelines for the ‘vertical’ allocation of responsibilities among 
jurisdictions that co-exist in a country, the theory of fiscal federal-
ism (economic federalism) offers valuable insights. In short, that the 
responsibility for public decision making over a particular issue (e. g., 
allocation of public goods, economic stabilization, or distribution) 
should be given to the jurisdictional level that could better manage 
it. In this sense, fiscal federalism contends that the central govern-
ment should have the basic responsibility for functions whose national 
extension would render ineffective and inefficient a sub-national 
approximation, including ‘national’ public goods (Oates, 1999). 
15�8�2 Collective action problem of sub-
national actions
Given the global and public good nature of climate change, its juris-
dictional allocation should actually be at the highest possible level. 
A sub-global allocation, as observed in Chapter 13, would lead other 
jurisdictions that are not active in climate change mitigation to ben-
efit without paying the costs, i. e., in a free-riding fashion (Kousky and 
Schneider, 2003). Empirically, case studies found that climate policies 
tended to be less intrusive at sub-national level. While co-benefits with 
local development were pursued, policies that might incur costs to 
local economy were avoided in prefectures in Japan (Aoki, 2010). The 
costs for a sub-national administration may be actually beyond those 
of pure mitigation, as climate policies implemented by a jurisdiction 
might bring about leakage, (see the glossary in Annex  I for a defini-
tion) (Kruger, 2007; Engel, 2009). Moreover, the ‘reshuffling’ that may 
be associated to sub-national policies may reduce their environmental 
effectiveness (Bushnell et al., 2008). As a consequence, climate change 
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mitigation would be provided in a sub-optimal level with sub-national 
allocation of responsibilities. 
15�8�3 Benefits of sub-national actions
Yet, even if the central government has a major responsibility in this 
area, this does not preclude the allocation of mitigation responsibilities 
within a federation, as observed in citizen’s attitudes on this matter 
(Lachapelle et  al., 2012). But even within the theory of fiscal feder-
alism there are other reasons that may justify sub-national action in 
this field. First, as noted by Edenhofer et al. (2013), the exploitation of 
heterogeneous sub-national preferences for mitigation would lead to 
efficiency gains. This is actually one of the reasons for the decentraliza-
tion theorem, a centrepiece of fiscal federalism, which in fact justifies 
sub-national allocation of certain public goods.
Moreover, decentralization can contribute to policy innovation by 
providing an opportunity to experiment with different approxima-
tions. Indeed, there might be potential gains from learning by doing 
in policy terms without imposing large costs on an entire country or 
the world with untried options (Oates, 2002). Sub-national govern-
ments could also choose to be leaders in the development of climate 
policies to obtain potential economic gains that are associated to 
‘first movers’ (Jänicke and Jacob, 2004) and may provide guidance 
and incentives to other jurisdictions to follow them (Bulkeley and 
Castán Broto, 2012). Besides, as they tend to be smaller, sub-national 
governments may be able to adapt to new situations in a swifter 
manner and therefore may have a greater flexibility to modify exist-
ing climate policies or to define new ones (Puppim de Oliveira, 2009; 
Galarraga et al., 2011). 
Other general approaches to federalism, such as cooperative and dem-
ocratic federalism, may also provide reasons for sub-national involve-
ment in this area (Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997). On the one hand, 
cooperative federalism argues for allocating pure public goods to the 
local level, counting on the power of inter-jurisdictional bargaining to 
improve allocations. On the other hand, democratic federalism incorpo-
rates sub-national representation in central decision making on public 
goods. In any case, federal structures may be crucial for the transmis-
sion of mitigation policies because most sub-national governments are 
now responsible for matters that have huge effects on GHG emissions, 
namely: land use planning, building codes, waste management, traf-
fic infrastructure and management, and public transport (Collier and 
Löfstedt, 1997; Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005; Doremus and Hanemann, 
2008). But sub-national governments also have direct policies aimed 
at GHG mitigation, including: energy efficiency programmes, educa-
tional efforts, green procurement standards, partnership agreements 
with local businesses, or tree planting (Schreurs, 2008).
Yet another reason for a sub-national role in climate policies is beyond 
the standard collective action approach. By indicating that external-
ity-correcting regulations and global agreements are not the only 
pace to tackling climate change problems, Ostrom (2010) suggested 
a polycentric approach in which mitigation activities are undertaken 
by multiple (public and private) units at diverse scales. The prevalence 
of sub-national actions in the field, contentious to other approaches, 
may be actually a proof of polycentrism in the area (Byrne et al., 2007; 
Sovacool, 2011b). The polycentric approach could be seen as a reinter-
pretation of the findings of the federalism literature, as actions should 
involve many different agents in a reinforcing manner. 
Finally, further issues may explain sub-national allocation. Local 
authorities, for instance, may be more effective in reducing GHG emis-
sions from some sources such as waste and transport, as this may 
provide significant co-benefits to local citizens (Kousky and Schneider, 
2003). Moreover, sub-central administrations are usually closer to the 
places and citizens impacted by climate change. Even though climate 
change is a global phenomenon, the nature of its impacts and severity 
varies significantly across locations so some sub-national governments 
have reasons to be more protective than national or supranational 
administrations (Andreen, 2008). This is also the case of adaptation, 
where sub-national authorities can better manage challenges such 
as flood risk, water stress, or ‘climate proofing’ of urban infrastruc-
ture (Corfee-Morlot et al., 2009). In all the preceding situations, sub-
national governments may tailor actions and policies to people’s 
needs, with an easier identification of priorities and difficulties as they 
are closer to citizens than more centralized administrations (Lindseth, 
2004; Galarraga et al., 2011).
15�8�4 Summary
As in other environmental areas (Dalmazzone, 2006), there is theoreti-
cal backing for the allocation of climate-related policies to sub-national 
levels of government, although there are several limiting factors to a 
widespread reliance on these administrations. A federal structure that 
provides coordination and enables an easier transmission of climate 
policies throughout the agents of the economy is likely to increase the 
effectiveness of actions against climate change. Moreover, the lessons 
learned in the design and application of climate policies at different 
jurisdictional levels could be used in a global setting.
15.9 The role of stakeholders 
including NGOs
This section considers the role of stakeholders and civil society in 
developing and delivering concrete mitigation action and focuses on 
how stakeholders impact policy design and implementation. The range 
of stakeholders is immense given the extent and complexity of climate 
change. Devising policy in an inclusive manner may be lengthy and 
politically challenging (Irvin and Stansbury, 2004), however adopting 
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an inclusive approach to climate policy can bring advantages, notably 
through increasing the legitimacy of policy design, its durability and 
implementation (Lazo et al., 2000; Beierle, 2002; Dombrowski, 2010). 
15�9�1 Advocacy and accountability
Some of the major functions and roles of NGOs can include raising 
public awareness, which often involves translating scientific and tech-
nical knowledge into actionable forms, lobbying, influencing business 
investment decisions, and monitoring and implementing agreements 
(Gulbrandsen and Andresen, 2004; Guay et al., 2004; Betsill and Corell, 
2008; Newell, 2008; Dombrowski, 2010). Their domains of action also 
include engagement in sub-national and national policies and institu-
tions as well as international processes like UNFCCC (Wapner, 1995; 
Lisowski, 2005). It is in these diverse forms that NGOs play a role in 
“connecting knowledge with responsibility” (Szarka, 2013) and pro-
moting norms of accountability (Gough and Shackley, 2001; Newell, 
2008).
Stakeholders can also affect when and how evidence of climate change 
translates into policies via the domestic political system (Social Learn-
ing Group, 2001). The differing results of the same scientific evidence, 
for instance, the political polarization in the United States versus more 
proactive and consensual attempts to find solutions in Europe (Skjærs-
eth et al., 2013) demonstrate how stakeholder interests can filter sci-
entific evidence.
Evidence also indicates that that some fossil fuel companies went fur-
ther and promoted climate scepticism by providing financial resources 
to like-minded think-tanks and politicians (Antilla, 2005; Boykoff and 
Boykoff, 2007), although other fossil fuel companies adopted a more 
supportive position on climate science (van den Hove et  al., 2002a). 
Differences in the attitudes of oil companies towards climate change 
are explained in part by domestic institutional contexts and manage-
ment structures as well as the structure of assets or technologies of 
different energy companies (Rowlands, 2000; Kolk and Levy, 2002).
15�9�2 Policy design and implementation
Three factors have been considered important for lobbying success in 
policy design namely: how institutions shape the space for participa-
tion (Kohler-Koch and Finke, 2007), organizational resources (Eising, 
2007), and the policy environment (Mahoney, 2008; Coen and Rich-
ardson, 2009).
In the case of the EU ETS, Skodvin et al. (2010) find that interest groups 
are able to limit “spectrum of politically feasible policy options.” 
Instrument choice is a function of the extent of resources these interest 
groups control, the role of veto players in the political process, policy 
networks and entrepreneurs (Skjærseth and Wettestad, 2009; Skodvin 
et al., 2010; Braun, 2013; Skjærseth et al., 2013). 
The role of business interests in supporting emissions trading as 
opposed to taxation, in the UK, has also been recognized (Bailey and 
Rupp, 2006; Nye and Owens, 2008). The political opposition to Austra-
lia’s Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme has been explained largely by 
the opposition of fossil fuel interests (Crowley, 2010, 2013; Macintosh 
et al., 2010; Bailey et al., 2012). Similarly, in New Zealand, the agri-
culture sector has played a major role in obtaining a transition period 
for the sector, use of an intensity-based accounting system, and free 
credits (Bullock, 2012). This has led to questions regarding the environ-
mental effectiveness of the ETS (Bührs, 2008).
Stakeholders also affect policy durability, flexibility, and implementa-
tion. For example, European Climate Change Programme featured con-
sultation processes that ensured policy credibility by having the buy-
in of stakeholders. Similarly, the persistence of climate legislation in 
California has been explained by the stability of coalition groups sup-
porting the legislation due to path dependence despite the economic 
downturn in contrast to the emerging coalition at the national level 
which broke down after economic shocks (Knox-Hayes, 2012).
15�9�3 Summary of the role of stakeholders 
Early findings indicate the importance of institutions in creating spaces 
for stakeholder participation, the organizational resources of the 
stakeholders themselves, and the general policy environment as being 
critical factors that determine the effectiveness of stakeholder engage-
ment. However, the degree to which policy design and implementation 
to mitigate climate change is dependent on stakeholder engagement is 
as yet under-researched and it must be stressed that the evidence base 
is thin and that these results primarily derive from case studies. 
15.10 Capacity building
As national and sub-national governments around the globe confront 
the multifaceted challenge of climate change mitigation and adapta-
tion, capacity is essential. According to the Agenda 21, building a coun-
try’s capacity “encompasses the country’s human, scientific, techno-
logical, organizational, institutional, and resource capabilities” (United 
Nations, 1992).
The priority for capacity building is strongly reflected in the Johan-
nesburg Plan of Implementation (United Nations, 2002), where capac-
ity building, especially for developing countries and countries with 
economies in transition, features prominently. It is also stressed in the 
UNFCCC’s capacity building framework for developing countries (Deci-
sion 2 / CP.7; UNFCCC, 2001). The goal of capacity building under this 
framework is “to strengthen particularly developing country parties, to 
promote the widespread dissemination, application and development 
of environmentally sound technologies and know-how, and to enable 
1185
National and Sub-national Policies and Institutions 
15
Chapter 15
them to implement the provisions of the Convention. In addition, the 
COP under the UNFCCC requested the Subsidiary Body for Implemen-
tation to organize an annual in-session Durban Forum for in-depth 
discussion on capacity-building following COP-17” (Decision 2 / CP.17; 
UNFCCC, 2011). The Durban Forum provides an opportunity for rep-
resentatives from governments, UN organizations, intergovernmental 
and non-governmental organizations, academia, and the private sec-
tor to share ideas, experiences, and good practices on implementing 
capacity-building activities. 
15�10�1 Capacity to analyze the implications of 
climate change
Climate change is a severe and major problem that has the potential 
to seriously derail poverty alleviation in a number of low income coun-
tries (Dell et  al., 2009). Climate change will affect livelihood assets 
by impacting health, access to natural resources and infrastructure 
(Skoufias, 2012). It is also likely to erode agricultural productivity in 
tropical climates (Skoufias, 2012). Given that the implications of cli-
mate change differ so dramatically between countries, to inform cli-
mate negotiations and allow countries to realize the full extent of their 
adaptation needs, substantial capacity would be required to analyze 
the implications of climate change and to formulate country posi-
tions. So far, the academic capacity is geographically very skewed. For 
example, the International Social Science Council (ISSC) commissioned 
a bibliometric study on social science research on climate change and 
global environmental change in the period from 2000 until 2010. It 
found that OECD countries completely dominated this research and 
that the poorest countries, notably in Africa, hardly were visible at all 
in the statistics (Hackmann and St Clair, 2012).
15�10�2 Capacity to design, implement and 
evaluate policies
The design, implementation, and evaluation of national and sub-
national climate policies necessitate in-country human capital. 
National governments and civil society require that climate policies be 
adapted to local economic, cultural, and social conditions to ensure 
their effectiveness and public support. To be politically acceptable, such 
work generally needs to be done by citizens of the country in which 
the policies are to be implemented. Political feasibility is mainly deter-
mined by policy design to improve environmental and economic effec-
tiveness and distributional equity (Bailey and Compston, 2012b). A 
high level of scientific knowledge and analytical skills are required for 
such work. Capacity building allows the leadership to be sensitive to 
environmental constraints and encourages policymaking to meet the 
needs of the people within these parameters (United Nations, 1992).
Many studies analyze the technological options for achieving deep 
reductions in GHG emissions, however they do not necessarily reflect 
the need for capacity building. For example, while Pacala and Socolow 
(2004), through their ‘stabilization wedges’, increased the understand-
ing of the technological options that could be deployed to reach sta-
bilization targets, they did so without pointing out the capacity neces-
sary to reach such a potential. These do however need local adaptation. 
Through the collaborative dialogue under the Durban Forum, key areas 
for capacity building on mitigation have emerged, including: low-car-
bon development strategies; NAMAs; Monitoring, Reporting and Veri-
fication; Technology Needs Assessments (TNAs); and mitigation assess-
ments.
15�10�3 Capacity to take advantage of external 
funding and flexible mechanisms
Climate change, and the global policies to mitigate and adapt to it, 
also imply additional capacity challenges in order to take advantage of 
international funding and flexible mechanisms such as the CDM in the 
Kyoto Protocol, and REDD+. So far, the distribution of projects under 
flexible mechanisms has been very skewed towards countries with 
greater capacity. As an example, only 2.5 % of normal CDM projects 
have been hosted by African countries (Fenhann and Staun, 2010).
In the preparations for the UNFCCC Durban Forum on Capacity Build-
ing (UNFCCC, 2011) it was noted that capacity-building in develop-
ing countries should be improved by (1) ensuring consultations with 
stakeholders throughout the entire process of activities; (2) enhanc-
ing integration of climate change issues and capacity-building needs 
into national development strategies, plans and budgets; (3) increas-
ing country-driven coordination of capacity-building activities; and 
(4) strengthening networking and information sharing among devel-
oping countries, especially through South-South and triangular coop-
eration. 
15�10�4 Capacity building modalities
Capacity building is about equipping people, communities, and organi-
zations with the tools, skills, and knowledge to address the challenges 
of climate change. It can be delivered through education, outreach, 
and awareness, but it can also be facilitated through peer learning, 
knowledge platforms, information exchanges, and technical assistance 
(Mytelka et al., 2012). The need for capacity building is large. Hundreds 
of thousands of scientists of various disciplines need to be trained 
globally in the coming decades as well as policymakers, civil servants, 
businessmen, and civil society. These needs are not limited to develop-
ing countries, as it is needed at all levels of society and in all regions 
of the world.
There are many different modalities. Since the 15th Conference of 
the Parties (COP-15), partnerships have formed at the international, 
national, and sub-national level aimed at climate readiness activities. 
Capacity building in the private sector is also important. Studies indi-
cate that good management, trained workers, and clean manufacturing 
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increase energy efficiency while reducing CO2 emissions. Substantive 
carbon reductions can be achieved at zero or negative cost through 
improved workplace practices, optimized processes, and behavioural 
changes in production (Bloom et al., 2010). Even this requires human 
resources and capacity to be undertaken. 
Capacity building requires a long time horizon, and this is particularly 
evident in education-poor countries. Building in-country academic pro-
grammes that can graduate well-trained masters and PhD students can 
take decades. When students graduate from such programmes it takes 
an additional 5 – 10 years of post-doctoral and junior faculty positions 
to build the experience and skills to contribute at a high international 
level (Sterner et al., 2012). Capacity building initiatives are therefore 
fragile and require continued support and nurturing by both national 
governments and international organizations. This may be one addi-
tional and important area for climate finance.
15.11 Links to adaptation
This section discusses links between national and sub-national policies 
and institutions for mitigation and adaptation. Links between adapta-
tion and mitigation policies at the international level are discussed in 
Chapter 13, while adaptation in general is discussed in WGII. Adapta-
tion will be needed because some climate change is inevitable (Chap-
ter 5). Indeed, some governments have started to plan and implement 
policies aimed at tackling changes that are likely to take place or have 
taken place already (Aaheim et al., 2009). In the longer term, the level 
of adaptation needed will depend on the success of mitigation efforts 
and the resulting GHG concentrations, thus there is an obvious linkage 
between mitigation and adaptation. However, the level of adaptation 
needed will also depend on the climate response to any given GHG 
level, around which there is high uncertainty. Mitigation will help to 
reduce the uncertainty on future changes and is therefore helpful for 
planning adaptation.
It has been argued that mitigation and adaptation policies are related 
to each other (Smith and Olesen, 2010). This, however, is a controver-
sial issue (Hamin and Gurran, 2009). Any given mitigation policy at the 
national or sub-national level is unlikely to have a significant effect on 
the global climate, so that the climatic consequences of that policy for 
the purpose of planning adaptation can usually be ignored. The direct 
side-effects of a mitigation policy for adaptation are more relevant. 
Examples of such direct effects are mainly in land use (discussed in 
Section 15.11.3 below) where synergies and tradeoffs between mitiga-
tion and adaptation policies may arise.
It is, of course, true that mitigation policies can have effects on adap-
tation across sectors. For example, carbon pricing can make air-con-
ditioning more expensive, thus hindering adaptation to a warmer cli-
mate. However, this is simply one of many costs of a mitigation policy 
that will be taken into account while making policies. Conversely, 
adaptation to higher temperatures has led to increased electricity con-
sumption for cooling (Gupta, 2012) that has to be taken into account 
while planning mitigation, but so do all changes in demand arising for 
other reasons such as income growth.
On the national scale, the approach to mitigation and adaptation dif-
fers between high or upper-middle income countries and low or lower-
middle income countries due to the balance of responsibilities and the 
focus on mitigation versus adaptation. 
The early national policy focus in high or upper-middle income coun-
tries was largely on mitigation. These policies were largely developed 
without in-depth consideration of adaptation linkages. Those high or 
upper-middle income countries that are developing national adapta-
tion strategies and policies (e. g., see Bizikova et  al., 2008; Stewart 
et al., 2009; Bedsworth and Hanak, 2010; Biesbroek et al., 2010) have 
shown limited consideration of the effects of adaptation policies on 
greenhouse gas emissions to date. Neufeldt et al. (2010) investigated 
the reasons for this disconnect in Europe and found it was due to a 
strong sectoral separation: sectors that were major emitters have been 
mitigation focused, and have received little attention on adaptation, 
whereas climate sensitive sectors such as agricultural, although a 
potential contributor to emission reductions, have focused on adapta-
tion. They also report that adaptation policy and actions have lagged 
behind mitigation more generally, and the difference in timing also 
contributes to the separation of the two domains. This is now start-
ing to change: Bruin et  al. (2009) in the Netherlands considered the 
potential GHG emissions of adaptation measures as part of a national 
multi-criteria ranking of options.
To date, most of the national climate policy initiatives in low-income 
countries, especially in the LDCs, have focused on adaptation, notably 
through the National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPAs). How-
ever, more recently there has been a shift with a number of national 
policy initiatives that aim to develop climate resilient, low carbon 
economies (also known as low-emission development strategies or 
green growth). These include Ethiopia’s Climate Resilient Green Econ-
omy Vision (EPA Ethiopia, 2011) and Rwanda’s Green Growth and Cli-
mate Resilience National Strategy for Climate Change and Low Carbon 
Development (Government of Rwanda, 2011). Given the importance 
of climate change in these highly vulnerable countries, these initia-
tives look to build climate resilience, but also recognize the benefits in 
advancing low carbon development. Research on the linkages between 
emission reductions and adaptation is still at an early stage and most 
of the synergies between adaptation and mitigation are centred on the 
agricultural and forestry sectors.
Some local activities, such as those regarding land-use decisions, have 
important implications for both mitigation (e. g., by means of carbon 
sequestration) and adaptation (e. g., by means of increasing resil-
ience to climate change). Ravindranath (2007) explores the synergies 
between mitigation and adaptation in the forestry sector. As forests 
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are highly vulnerable to climate change, but provide opportunities 
for mitigation (e. g., through afforestation), efforts to enhance carbon 
sequestration need to embed adaptation elements so that exposure 
to climate impacts can be addressed. Mitigation efforts through for-
est management regimes such as conservation areas and sustainable 
forestry contribute to adaptation. Conversely, adaptation efforts such 
as urban forestry and measures to conserve soil and water also have 
mitigation effects (Ravindranath, 2007).
Similar issues have emerged for the agricultural sector, with the focus 
on climate-smart agriculture. This focus recognizes the high vulnerabil-
ity of agriculture as a climate-sensitive sector, but also addresses the 
fact that it is a major source of greenhouse gas emissions in develop-
ing economies. A number of options have been identified as potentially 
beneficial for mitigation and adaptation, including (McCarthy et  al., 
2011) soil and water conservation (including conservation agriculture, 
low or minimum tillage, vegetation strips, terraces, structures such as 
bunds contours, shade trees, tied ridges, small-scale water harvesting, 
compost production, cover crops, improved fallows, crop residues), 
agroforestry, and improved pasture and grazing management includ-
ing restoration. These options generally are based on sustainable agri-
cultural land management (SALM) practices. These practices reduce 
climate related risks in the form of rainfall variability and soil erosion, 
increase soil organic matter and soil fertility (thus increasing productiv-
ity), and reduce emissions by either reducing soil emissions or prevent-
ing other more emission intensive activities. More traditional measures 
to increase productivity, such as fertilizer use or increased irrigation, 
have the potential to increase greenhouse gas emissions because of 
the high energy intensity of fertilizer production and the energy use in 
water abstraction and pumping; however, they may still reduce land-
use emissions by increasing the productivity and yields per hectare, as 
well we reduce future land-use pressures that may lead to deforesta-
tion (Chapter 11). However, as highlighted by McCarthy et al. (2011), 
many of these climate-smart options involve important opportunity or 
policy costs, higher risks, or may involve benefits that arise over longer 
time periods (e. g., improved soil function), or involve wider environ-
mental benefits that are not immediately useful to farmers. They also 
frequently involve institutional, financial, and capacity barriers, and so 
may not happen autonomously. 
Both the forest and agricultural sectors also link through to issues 
of rural land-use change and land planning / management, which can 
have synergistic effects on mitigation and adaptation (Pimentel et al., 
2010), but which can also involve complex tradeoffs.
Overall, the emerging evidence suggests that while there may be a 
potential for synergistic mitigation and adaptation policy linkages 
in the agricultural and forest sectors, the translation of these poli-
cies through to implementation may well be challenging because of 
the different characteristics of mitigation and adaptation (e. g., the 
global public good nature of mitigation versus the local benefits from 
adaptation), because of the additional costs involved (e. g., involving 
higher capital costs or opportunity costs associated with synergistic 
options), because of institutional, technological or behavioural bar-
riers, and because different actors maybe involved in mitigation and 
adaptation decisions, including the need to address cross-sectoral 
aspects.
15.12 Investment and finance
15�12�1 National and sub-national institutions 
and policies
The justification for investment and finance and the description of 
the various financial agreements have been elaborated in Chapter 13. 
Chapter 16 assesses in more detail the range of institutional arrange-
ments for mitigation finance at the global, regional, national, and sub-
national levels. This section concentrates on institutional mechanisms 
which parties to the UNFCCC, developed and developing countries, 
have been using or introducing to facilitate, tap, channel, and catalyze 
climate change investment and finance. It also briefly touches on some 
of the major policy directions and trends affecting mitigation finance 
and investments. Earlier sections of this chapter presented the variety 
of policy instruments available and being used both in developed and 
developing countries. Public finance is needed for subsidies and public 
provision (Sections 15.5.2 and 15.5.6). In this section we track the con-
sequences with a view to the aggregate funding needed. 
Without dedicated financial policy, other policy instruments alone may 
be insufficient to mobilize the large-scale investments needed to move 
the world away from its current high-emission path. 
Recent case studies and some empirical evidence highlight the impor-
tance of targeted public finance to help catalyze and leverage private 
investment in some mitigation activities (CPI, 2012). For this purpose, 
governments have at their disposal a variety of mechanisms that 
include credit lines, bonds, guarantees, equity, venture capital, carbon 
finance, and grants (Maclean et al., 2008). These mechanisms exist and 
are effective mostly in developed and emerging economies (Kennedy 
and Corfee-Morlot, 2012).
In addition, a number of innovative mechanisms are being promoted 
in some developed countries with success. These include, ‘property 
assessed financing districts’ where residential and commercial prop-
erty owners are provided with loans for renewable energy and energy 
efficiency, ‘direct cash subsidies’ to promote the installation of energy 
efficiency measures and renewable energy systems, ‘power purchase 
agreements’, and ESCOs — Energy Service Companies to implement 
performance-based energy efficiency projects (Ellingson et al., 2010).
National development banks are increasingly playing a critical role in 
leveraging public and private resources in both developed and devel-
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oping countries. National development banks, which operate mainly 
domestically, have an advantage in accessing local financial markets 
and dealing with barriers that they understand better than others 
(Smallridge et al., 2013). 
International financing for mitigation and adaptation has impacted 
the domestic climate discourse and has created incentives for sus-
tainable development at national and local levels in developing 
countries (Metz and Kok, 2008). National and sub-national efforts 
to finance climate change often have an explicit link to international 
processes or support through the various mechanisms of the Con-
vention and Kyoto Protocol or those encouraged to facilitate fund-
ing for developing countries such as bilateral and multilateral chan-
nels. Some of these mechanisms have led to significant investment 
in developing countries. An estimated USD 215.4 billion had been 
invested in 4832 Clean Development Mechanism projects by June 
15, 2012 (UNFCCC, 2012). Similarly, the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF) estimates that since the start of its operations (1991 – 2013), it 
has leveraged over USD 27 billion for climate change projects (GEF, 
2013).
A new trend is the establishment by several developing countries of 
funds and national funding entities dedicated to climate change. Table 
16.2 lists some of these institutions, their objectives, governance, and 
sources of funding. The missions and objectives are diverse and their 
level of institutionalization varies from country to country. All are 
designed to tap and blend funding available from international and 
domestic sources — public and private — to catalyze climate invest-
ment in their country (Flynn, 2011).
National funding entities have the potential to help countries cope 
with the proliferation of funds and entities offering financial resources 
for mitigation activities (Glemarec, 2011; Smith et al., 2011). Increased 
fragmentation of international assistance has increased transaction 
costs for recipients while the multiplicity and competitive nature of 
sources has challenged national and sub-national capacities (Knack 
and Rahman, 2007; Anderson, 2012). Limited absorptive and human 
capacity resources do however present serious challenges. Evidence of 
the ability of national funding entities to ensure coherence between 
national institutions dedicated to climate change and cabinet entities 
such as the Ministry of Finance or the Office of the President relies 
on case studies and, currently, does not yet offer general conclusions 
(Thornton, 2010).
15�12�2 Policy change direction for finance and 
investments in developing countries
There have been some significant trends in recent years regarding cli-
mate finance and the actors involved. Three are particularly relevant 
for their impact on the way climate finance is being managed and who 
does the management. 
First, financing climate objectives by mainstreaming climate change 
into development planning has been gaining ground. This is particu-
larly the case of countries wanting to integrate adaptation strategies 
into their overall national strategy as a way to build resilience. It is 
also evident in some of the climate change action plans and strate-
gies of some countries that are clearly linked to poverty reduction and 
national development objectives (Garibaldi et al., 2013). However, the 
benefits and costs of integrating climate change considerations into 
development planning may be difficult to attain in practice. The OECD 
(OECD, 2005) warns of ‘mainstreaming overload’ as climate change 
competes with other issues like governance and gender to be main-
streamed into development planning. Barriers to integrating climate 
and development objectives include: lack of human and institutional 
capacity and lack of coordination among line ministries (Knack and 
Rahman, 2007; Kok et al., 2008).
Second, is the growing recognition that financing climate actions 
can have large co-benefits. Investments in clean energy, for example, 
may result in improvement in health indicators as air pollution lev-
els decrease. Similarly, investing in forest conservation may result in 
a reduction of GHG emissions from deforestation. Thus, the increas-
ing interest in the concept of co-benefits or climate and development 
as ‘win-win’ outcomes. Reducing emissions has been seen as a by-
product of reducing energy costs in the case of China (Richerzhagen 
and Scholz, 2008). Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation is seen as another major opportunity to deliver both emis-
sions reductions and livelihood benefits. However, Campbell (2009) 
and Adams and Hulme (2001) argue that the ability to define these 
win-win objectives is a major factor for success.
Third, the number of actors involved in climate finance and investment 
is growing. Climate change finance is no longer a monopoly of the 
public sector. There is now a multiplicity of actors from the private and 
business world whose level of financing exceeds that of the public sec-
tor several fold, particularly in the middle-income and emerging econ-
omies (Gomez-Echeverri, 2013). This development has the potential 
to address implementation gaps, generate greater participation from 
stakeholders, and encourage public-private partnerships that promote 
sustainable development (Pattberg, 2010). 
Two areas of need emerge from the literature (Cameron, 2011; Zin-
gel, 2011). First, attracting climate finance investments will require 
strengthening institutional and governance capacities at the national 
and sub-national levels in recipient countries. Specifically, the ability to 
formulate strategies and action plans, including policies and measures, 
formulate, assess and approve projects, demonstrate accountability 
and transparency to their own populations, as well as to the develop-
ment partners to raise levels of investment confidence will be needed. 
Second, robust mechanisms are needed to ensure accountability. This 
would involve greater transparency in both donor and recipient coun-
tries. The role of civil society organizations and the media could be 
strengthened for good governance and accountability. 
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15.13 Gaps in  knowledge 
and data
•	 Cross-country comparisons of institutional design options, particu-
larly mechanisms for coordinating and mainstreaming climate and 
other related sector policies, are limited. Wider use of evaluation 
methods would allow for the understanding of relative effective-
ness of different options and designs to be used to improve out-
comes over time. 
•	 Evaluating the economic and environmental effectiveness of indi-
vidual policy instruments and packages is difficult as various juris-
dictions produce policy instruments influenced by context-specific 
factors such as co-benefits and political economy considerations. 
As a result, the cost of committing to a target and the actions 
needed to meet it, are difficult to estimate. For example, fuel taxes 
in the transport sector are implemented for multiple purposes 
including energy security, congestion and pollution reduction, rev-
enue for road construction, mitigation of climate change, and so 
forth. It is difficult to gauge the contribution of fuel taxes to miti-
gation efforts.
•	 While the distributional incidence of taxes has been studied 
quite extensively, much less is known about the distributional 
incidence of other policy instruments and packages. Similarly, 
knowledge gaps remain uneven across policy instruments on 
other criteria such as institutional, political, and administrative 
feasibility.
•	 The asymmetry of methodologies regarding ‘negative cost’ policies 
regarding regulation and information measures with case studies 
arguing for negative private and social cost polices while critiques 
basing results on economic theory and models has meant that con-
clusive results are not yet available.
•	 Understanding of the relative balance between demand pull and 
supply push policies needed to accelerate technological innova-
tion remains an important gap. Data on global private invest-
ment in research and development is a major gap along in addi-
tion to public R&D figures in middle income and low-income 
countries. 
•	 The valuation of co-benefits from emission reduction has been 
studied comprehensively in the United States (Muller et al., 2011), 
but much less is known about other countries. This is important 
because taking these co-benefits into account could significantly 
lower the cost of emission reduction, and perhaps offer negative 
costs, in several sectors.
15.14 Frequently Asked 
Questions 
FAQ 15�1 What kind of evidence and analysis will 
help us design effective policies?
Economic theory can help with policy design at a conceptual level, 
while modelling can provide an ex-ante assessment of the potential 
impact of alternative mitigation policies. However, as theory and mod-
elling tend to be based on sets of simple assumptions, it is desirable 
that they are complemented by ex-post policy evaluations whenever 
feasible. For example, theory and bottom up modelling suggest that 
some energy efficiency policies can deliver CO2 emission reductions 
at negative cost, but we need ex-post policy evaluation to establish 
whether they really do and whether the measures are as effective as 
predicted by ex-ante assessments (Section 15.4). 
As climate policies are implemented, they can generate an empirical 
evidence base that allows policy evaluation to take place. If evaluation 
is built into the design of a programme or policy from its inception, the 
degree of success and scope for improvement can be identified. Poli-
cies implemented at the sub-national levels provide sites for experi-
mentation on climate policies. Lessons from these efforts can used to 
accelerate policy learning. 
Much of the evidence base consists of case studies. While this method is 
useful to gain context-specific insights into the effectiveness of climate 
policies, statistical studies based on large sample sizes allow analysts 
to control for various factors and yield generalizable results. However, 
quantitative methods do not capture institutional, political, and admin-
istrative factors and need to be complemented by qualitative studies. 
FAQ 15�2 What is the best climate change mitiga-
tion policy?
A range of policy instruments is available to mitigate climate change 
including carbon taxes, emissions trading, regulation, information mea-
sures, government provision of goods and services, and voluntary agree-
ments (Section 15.3). Appropriate criteria for assessing these instruments 
include: economic efficiency, cost effectiveness, distributional impact, 
and institutional, political, and administrative feasibility (Section 15.5).
Policy design depends on policy practices, institutional capacity 
and other national circumstances. As a result, there is no single best 
policy instrument and no single portfolio of instruments that is best 
across many nations. The notion of ‘best’ depends on which assess-
ment criteria we employ when comparing policy instruments and the 
relative weights attached to individual criteria. The literature provides 
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more evidence about some types of policies, and how well they score 
against the various criteria, than others. For example, the distributional 
impacts of a tax are relatively well known compared to the distribu-
tional impacts of regulation. Further research and policy evaluation is 
required to improve the evidence base in this respect (Section 15.12).
Different types of policy have been adopted in varying degrees in 
actual plans, strategies, and legislation. While economic theory pro-
vides a strong basis for assessing economy-wide economic instru-
ments, much mitigation action is being pursued at the sectoral level 
(Chapters 7 – 12). Sectoral policy packages often reflect co-benefits and 
wider political considerations. For example, fuel taxes are among a 
range of sectoral measures that can have a substantial effect on emis-
sions even though they are often implemented for other objectives. 
Interactions between different policies need to be considered. The 
absence of policy coordination can affect environmental and economic 
outcomes. When policies address distinct market failures such as the 
externalities associated with greenhouse gas emissions or the under-
supply of innovation, the use of multiple policy instruments has con-
siderable potential to reduce costs. In contrast, when multiple instru-
ments such a carbon tax and a performance standard are employed to 
address the same objective, policies can become redundant and under-
mine overall cost effectiveness (Section 15.8.4.2). 
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For the first time, an assessment report by the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) contains a chapter dedicated to investment 
and finance. These are the chapter’s key findings:
Scientific literature on investment and finance to address cli-
mate change is still very limited and knowledge gaps are sub-
stantial; there are no agreed definitions for climate investment 
and climate finance� Quantitative data are limited, relate to different 
concepts, and are incomplete. Accounting systems are highly imperfect. 
Estimates are available for current total climate finance, total climate 
finance provided to developing countries, public climate finance pro-
vided to developing countries, and climate finance under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), as well 
as future incremental investment and incremental cost for mitigation 
measures. Climate finance relates both to adaptation and mitigation, 
while under the scope of this chapter, estimates of future investment 
needs are presented only for mitigation. [Section 16.1]
Total climate finance for mitigation and adaptation is estimated 
at 343 to 385 billion USD (2010 / 11 / 12 USD) per year using a 
mix of 2010, 2011, and 2012 data, almost evenly being invested 
in developed and developing countries (medium confidence). The 
figures reflect the total financial flow for the underlying investments, 
not the incremental investment, i. e., the portion attributed to the emis-
sion reductions. Around 95 % of reported total climate finance is for 
mitigation (medium confidence). [16.2.1.1]
The total climate finance currently flowing to developing 
countries is estimated to be between 39  to  120 billion USD 
per year using a mix of 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 data 
(2009 / 2010 / 2011 / 2012 USD) (medium confidence). This range 
covers public and private flows for mitigation and adaptation. Public 
climate finance is estimated at 35 – 49 billion USD (2011 / 2012 USD) 
(medium confidence). Most public climate finance provided to devel-
oping countries flows through bilateral and multilateral institutions, 
usually as concessional loans and grants. Climate finance under the 
UNFCCC is funding provided to developing countries by Annex II Par-
ties. The climate finance reported by Annex II Parties averaged nearly 
10 billion USD per year from 2005 to 2010 (2005 – 2010 USD) (medium 
confidence). Between 2010 and 2012, the ‘fast-start finance’ (FSF) pro-
vided by some developed countries amounted to over 10 billion USD 
per year (2010 / 2011 / 2012 USD) (medium confidence). Estimates of 
international private climate finance flowing to developing countries 
range from 10 to 72 billion USD (2009 / 2010 USD) per year, including 
foreign direct investment as equity and loans in the range of 10 to 
37 billion USD (2010 USD and 2008 USD) per year over the period of 
2008 – 2011 (medium confidence). [16.2.1.1]
Emission patterns that limit temperature increase from pre-
industrial level to no more than 2 °C require considerably differ-
ent patterns of investment� A limited number of studies have exam-
ined the investment needs to transform the economy to limit warming 
to 2 °C. Information is largely restricted to energy use with global total 
annual investment in the energy sector at about 1200 billion USD. In 
the results for these scenarios, which are consistent to keeping carbon 
dioxide equivalent (CO2eq) concentration in the interval 430 – 530 ppm 
until 2100, annual investment in fossil-fired power plants without car-
bon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) would decline by 30 (median: 
– 20 % compared to 2010) (2  to  166) billion USD during the period 
2010 – 2029, compared to the reference scenarios (limited evidence, 
medium agreement). Investment in low-emissions generation tech-
nologies (renewable, nuclear, and electricity generation with CCS) 
would increase by 147 (median: +100 % compared to 2010) (31 to 
360) billion USD per year during the same period (limited evidence, 
medium agreement) in combination with an increase by 336 (1 to 641) 
billion USD in energy-efficiency investments in the building, trans-
port, and industry sector (limited evidence, medium agreement), fre-
quently involving modernization of existing equipment. Higher energy 
efficiency and the shift to low-emission energy sources contribute to 
a reduction in the demand for fossil fuels, thus causing a decline in 
investment in fossil fuel extraction, transformation, and transportation. 
Scenarios suggest that the average annual reduction of investment in 
fossil fuel extraction in 2010 – 2029 would be 116 (– 8 to 369) billion 
USD (limited evidence, medium agreement). Such ‘spillover’ effects 
could yield adverse effects on economies, especially of countries that 
rely heavily on exports of fossil fuels. Model results suggest that defor-
estation could be reduced against current deforestation trends by 50 % 
with an investment of 21 to 35 billion USD per year (low confidence). 
Information on investment needs in other sectors in addition to energy 
efficiency, e. g., to abate process or non-CO2 emissions is virtually 
unavailable. [16.2.2]
Resources to address climate change need to be scaled up con-
siderably over the next few decades both in developed and 
developing countries (medium evidence, high agreement). Increased 
financial support by developed countries for mitigation (and adapta-
tion) measures in developing countries will be needed to stimulate the 
increased investment. Developed countries have committed to a goal 
of jointly mobilizing 100 billion USD per year by 2020 in the context 
of meaningful mitigation action and transparency on implementation. 
The funding could come from a variety of sources — public and private, 
bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance. 
Studies of how 100 billion USD per year could be mobilized by 2020 
conclude that it is challenging but feasible. [16.2]
Public revenues can be raised by collecting carbon taxes and 
by auctioning carbon allowances (high confidence). Putting a 
price on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, through a carbon tax or 
emissions trading, alters the rate of return on high- and low-carbon 
investments. It makes low-emission technologies attract more invest-
ment and at the same time it raises a considerable amount of revenue 
that can be used for a variety of purposes, including climate finance. 
These carbon-related sources are already sizeable in some countries 
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[16.2.1.2]. The consideration of alternative sources of public revenue 
like taxes on international bunker fuels has the potential to generate 
significant funds but is still in its infancy. Reducing fossil fuel subsi-
dies would lower emissions and release public funds for other pur-
poses [16.2.3].
Within appropriate enabling environments, the private sec-
tor, along with the public sector, can play an important role in 
financing mitigation (medium evidence, high agreement). Its con-
tribution is estimated at 267 billion USD per year in 2010 and 2011 
(2010 / 2011 USD) and at 224 billion USD (2011 / 2012 USD) per year 
in 2011 and 2012 on average, which represents around 74 % and 
62 % of overall climate finance, respectively (limited evidence, medium 
agreement) [16.2.1]. In a range of countries, a large share of private 
sector climate investment relies on low-interest and long-term loans 
as well as risk guarantees provided by public sector institutions to 
cover the incremental costs and risks of many mitigation investments. 
In many countries, therefore, the role of the public sector is crucial in 
helping these private investments happen. The quality of a country’s 
enabling environment — including the effectiveness of its institutions, 
regulations and guidelines regarding the private sector, security of 
property rights, credibility of policies and other factors — has a sub-
stantial impact on whether private firms invest in new technologies 
and infrastructures. Those same broader factors will probably have a 
big impact on whether and where investment occurs in response to 
mitigation policies [16.3]. By the end of 2012, the 20 largest emitting 
developed and developing countries with lower risk country grades 
for private sector investments covered 70 % of global energy-related 
CO2 emissions (low confidence). This makes them attractive for inter-
national private sector investment in low-carbon technologies. In many 
other countries, including most least developed countries, low-carbon 
investment will often have to rely mainly on domestic sources or inter-
national public finance [16.4.2].
A main barrier to the deployment of low-carbon technolo-
gies is a low risk-adjusted rate of return on investment vis-
à-vis high-carbon alternatives often resulting in higher cost 
of capital (medium evidence, high agreement). This is true in both 
developed and developing countries. Dedicated financial instruments 
to address these barriers exist and include inter alia credit insurance 
to decrease risk, renewable energy premiums to increase return, and 
concessional finance to decrease the cost of capital. Governments can 
also alter the relative rates of return of low-carbon investments in 
different ways and help to provide an enabling environment. [16.3, 
16.4]
Appropriate governance and institutional arrangements at the 
national, regional, and international level need to be in place 
for efficient, effective, and sustainable financing of mitigation 
measures (high confidence). They are essential to ensure that financ-
ing to mitigate and adapt to climate change responds to national 
needs and priorities and that national and international activities are 
linked and do not contradict each other. An enabling environment at 
the national level ensures efficient implementation of funds and risk 
reduction using international resources, national funds, as well as 
national development and financial institutions. [16.5]
Important synergies and tradeoffs between financing mitiga-
tion and adaptation exist (medium confidence). Available estimates 
show that adaptation projects get only a minor fraction of interna-
tional climate finance. Current analyses do not provide conclusive 
results on the most efficient temporal distribution of funding on adap-
tation vis-à-vis mitigation. While the uncertainties about specific path-
ways and relationships remain, and although there are different con-
siderations on its optimal balance, there is a general agreement that 
funding for both mitigation and adaptation is needed. Moreover, there 
is an increasing interest in promoting integrated financing approaches, 
addressing both adaptation and mitigation activities in different sec-
tors and at different levels. [16.6]
Increasing access to modern energy services for meeting basic 
cooking and lighting needs could yield substantial improve-
ments in human welfare at relatively low cost (medium confi-
dence). Shifting the large populations that rely on traditional solid fuels 
(such as unprocessed biomass, charcoal, and coal) to modern energy 
systems and expanding electricity supply for basic human needs could 
yield substantial improvements in human welfare for a relatively low 
cost; 72 – 95 billion USD per year until 2030 to achieve nearly universal 
access. [16.8]
16.1 Introduction 
This is the first time an assessment report by the Intergovernmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) contains a chapter dedicated to 
investment and finance to address climate change. This reflects the 
growing awareness of the relevance of these issues for the design of 
efficient and effective climate policies. 
The assessment of this topic is complicated by the absence of agreed 
definitions, sparse data from disparate sources, and limited peer-
reviewed literature. Equity, burden sharing, and gender consider-
ations related to climate change are discussed in other chapters, inter 
alia Sections 3.3 and 4.6.2. This chapter does not include a separate 
discussion of these considerations in relation to climate finance.
There is no agreed definition of climate finance (Haites, 2011; Stadel-
mann et al., 2011b; Buchner et al., 2011; Forstater and Rank, 2012). 
The term ‘climate finance’ is applied both to the financial resources 
devoted to addressing climate change globally and to financial flows 
to developing countries to assist them in addressing climate change. 
The literature includes multiple concepts within each of these broad 
categories (Box 1.1). The specific mitigation and adaptation measures 
whose costs qualify as ‘climate finance’ also are not agreed. The mea-
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Box 16�1 | Different concepts, different numbers
Different concepts of climate finance are found in the literature. 
The corresponding values differ significantly. 
Financial resources devoted to addressing climate change 
globally:
Total climate finance includes all financial flows whose expected 
effect is to reduce net GHG emissions and / or to enhance resilience 
to the impacts of climate variability and the projected climate 
change. This covers private and public funds, domestic and inter-
national flows, expenditures for mitigation and adaptation to cur-
rent climate variability as well as future climate change. It covers 
the full value of the financial flow rather than the share associated 
with the climate change benefit; e. g., the entire investment in a 
wind turbine rather than the portion attributed to the emission 
reductions. The estimate by Buchner et al. (2012, 2013b) of current 
climate finance of 343 to 385 billion USD (2010 / 2011 / 2012 USD) 
per year using a mix of 2010, 2011, and 2012 data, corresponds 
roughly to this concept. 
The incremental investment is the extra capital required for 
the initial investment for a mitigation or adaptation project in 
comparison to a reference project. For example, the investment in 
wind turbines less the investment that would have been required 
for the coal or natural gas-generating unit displaced. Since the 
value depends on the unknown investment in a hypothetical 
alternative, the incremental investment is uncertain. Incremen-
tal investment for mitigation and adaptation measures is not 
regularly estimated and reported, but estimates are available 
from models. It can be positive or negative. Many agriculture and 
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
(REDD+) mitigation options that involve ongoing expenditures 
for labour and other operating costs rather than investments are 
excluded.
The incremental costs reflect the cost of capital of the incremental 
investment and the change of operating and maintenance costs 
for a mitigation or adaptation project in comparison to a reference 
project. It can be calculated as the difference of the net present 
values of the two projects. Many mitigation measures — such as 
energy efficiency, renewables, and nuclear — have a higher capi-
tal cost and lower operating costs than the measures displaced. 
Frequently the incremental costs are lower than the incremental 
investment. Values depend on the incremental investment as well 
as projected operating costs, including fossil fuel prices, and the 
discount rate. Models can estimate the incremental costs of energy 
supply and demand but data are not immediately available and 
aggregate estimates cannot be provided. Estimates are available 
for single-mitigation options (see, e. g., Chapter 7).
The macroeconomic costs of mitigation policy are the reductions 
of aggregate consumption or gross domestic product induced by 
the reallocation of investments and expenditures induced by cli-
mate policy. These costs do not account for the benefit of reduc-
ing anthropogenic climate change and should thus be assessed 
against the economic benefit of avoided climate change impacts. 
Models have traditionally provided estimates of the macroeco-
nomic costs of climate policy (see Chapter 6).
Financial flows to developing countries to assist them in 
addressing climate change:
The total climate finance flowing to developing countries is the 
amount of the total climate finance invested in developing coun-
tries that comes from developed countries. This covers private and 
public funds for mitigation and adaptation. Estimates from a few 
studies suggest the current flow is between 39 and 120 billion USD 
per year (2009 – 2012 USD).
Public climate finance provided to developing countries is the 
finance provided by developed countries’ governments and bilat-
eral institutions as well as multilateral institutions for mitigation 
and adaptation activities in developing countries. Most of the 
funds provided are concessional loans and grants. Estimates sug-
gest that public climate finance flows to developing countries were 
at 35 to 49 billion USD per year in 2011 and 2012 (2011 / 2012 
USD).
Private climate finance flowing to developing countries is finance 
and investment by private actors in / from developed countries 
for activities in developing countries whose expected effect is to 
reduce net GHG emissions and / or to enhance resilience to the 
impacts of climate variability and the projected climate change.
Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), climate finance is not well-defined. Annex  II 
Parties provide and mobilize funding for climate related activities 
in developing countries. Most of the funds provided are conces-
sional loans and grants. The climate finance provided to devel-
oping countries reported by Annex  II Parties averaged nearly 10 
billion USD per year from 2005 to 2010 (2005 – 2010 USD). In addi-
tion, some developed countries promised FSF amounting to over 
10 billion USD per year between 2010 and 2012 (2010 / 2011 / 2012 
USD).
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sures included vary across studies and often are determined by the 
data available1.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 16.2 reviews 
estimates of current climate finance corresponding to the different 
concepts in Box 1, projections of global incremental investment and 
incremental costs for energy-related mitigation measures to 2030, 
and options for raising public funds for climate finance. Enabling fac-
tors that influence the ability to efficiently generate and implement 
climate finance are discussed in Section 16.3. Section 16.4 considers 
opportunities and key drivers for low-carbon investments. Institutional 
arrangements for mitigation finance are addressed in Section 16.5. 
Synergies and tradeoffs between financing mitigation and adapta-
tion are discussed in Section 16.6. The chapter concludes with sections 
devoted to financing mitigation activities in developed (Section 16.7) 
and developing countries (Section  16.8) and a review of important 
gaps of knowledge (Section 16.9).
1 Most of the financial flow data in this chapter originate from 2010, 2011, and 2012 
and were published in USD. The exchange rates used by each source to convert 
other currencies to USD are not specified in the published sources. In these cases, 
the published USD figure has been maintained and the base year is similar to the 
year the commitment / investment / flow was announced / reported. If no base year is 
indicated, as for most monetary values in Section 16.2.2, the base year is 2010.
16.2 Scale of financing at 
national, regional, and 
international level in the 
short-, mid-, and long-term 
16�2�1 Current financial flows and sources
Figure 16.1 provides an overview of climate finance and the terms 
used in this chapter. The term ‘capital’ is used because most climate 
finance involves an investment, but it should be understood to include 
all relevant financial flows2. One or more capital managers mobilize 
the required capital and invest it in an adaptation or mitigation proj-
ect. Project owners or sponsors — governments, corporations, or 
households — implement a project using their own and other sources 
of capital. However, projects often obtain capital from multiple capital 
managers (Buchner et al., 2011, 2012; Jürgens et al., 2012). An instru-
ment defines the financial agreement between a project owner / spon-
sor and a manager of capital. A project that obtains capital from sev-
2 Terms that cover both capital and operating costs, such as ‘financial resources’ or 
‘funds’ are cumbersome (sources / managers of financial resources) or potentially 
confusing (‘funds’ can also be institutions).
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eral managers would use multiple instruments. The size of the boxes is 
not related to the magnitude of the financial flow.
Data on current climate finance, summarized below, indicate that most 
capital deployed is private — private corporations and households. That 
is not surprising since they dominate the economy in most countries.
Domestically, government funds are disbursed directly as financial 
incentives or tax credits, or through national financial institutions. 
Climate finance under the UNFCCC currently is provided mainly by 
the national governments of Annex  II Parties. Climate finance from 
the budgets of these government flows through bilateral institutions 
being a national public entity, such as Japan International Coopera-
tion Agency (JICA), Agence Française de Développement (AFD), Kredi-
tanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), or through multilateral institutions 
having several countries as shareholders, such as the World Bank, 
regional development banks, and multilateral climate funds.
There is no internationally agreed definition of mitigation and adapta-
tion projects; for example, whether a high-efficiency gas-fired gener-
ating unit is a mitigation project or which capacity building activities 
help to address climate change. The relevant projects, and hence the 
scale of climate finance, depend upon the definition of mitigation and 
adaptation projects adopted. In practice, the definition varies across 
studies and is often determined by the data available.
16�2�1�1 Estimates of current climate finance
This section reviews estimates of current global total climate finance, 
total climate finance flowing to developing countries, public climate 
finance provided to developing countries and climate finance under 
the UNFCCC.
There is no comprehensive system for tracking climate finance (Clapp 
et al., 2012; Tirpak et al., 2012), therefore, estimates must be compiled 
from disparate sources of variable quality and timeliness, sources that 
use different assumptions and methodologies and have gaps and 
may occasionally duplicate coverage. Available data typically relate to 
commitments rather than disbursements, so the amount reported may 
not equal the amount received by the project owner during a given 
year. Changes in exchange rates further complicate the picture. For 
these and other reasons, estimates of current climate finance exhibit 
considerable uncertainties.
Global total climate finance is estimated at 343 to 385 billion 
USD per year for 2010 / 11 (2010 / 11 USD) and 356 to 363 billion USD 
per year for 2011 / 12 (2011 / 12 USD), with mitigation accounting for 
approximately 95 % of this amount (350 billion USD and 337 billion 
USD, respectively) (Buchner et al., 2012, 2013b). This estimate includes 
a mix of instruments, e. g., grants, concessional loans, commercial 
loans and equity, as well as the full investment in mitigation measures 
such as renewable energy generation technologies that also produce 
other goods or services3. The figures reflect new commitments by capi-
tal managers using a mix of 2010 / 11 and 2011 / 12 data, respectively. 
Private finance dominates the total, but its share declined from 74 % 
(267 billion USD) on average in 2010 and 2011 to 62 % (224 billion 
USD) on average in 2011 and 2012 (2010 / 2011 USD and 2011 / 2012 
USD) (Buchner et  al., 2012, 2013b). Investment in renewable gen-
eration technologies dominates the mitigation investment (Frankfurt 
School-UNEP Centre and BNEF, 2012).
Reasonably robust estimates of total climate finance for individual 
countries are available for only a few cases, for instance, for Germany 
(Jürgens et al., 2012). However, some institutions report on their financ-
ing commitments for climate and environment. Data from 19 develop-
ment banks indicate that commitments of mitigation finance increased 
from 51 billion USD in 2011 to 65 billion USD in 2012 with commit-
ments of adaptation finance rising from 6 to 14 billion USD over the 
same period (2011 / 2012 USD). Concessional funding provided by pub-
lic development banks plays an important role in financing domestic 
climate projects, e. g., in Brazil, China, and Germany.
A growing number of developed and developing countries, including 
Bangladesh, Colombia, Indonesia, Nepal, Samoa, Tanzania, Uganda, 
and the United States as well as the European Commission, calculates 
the share of their annual budget devoted to climate change mitiga-
tion and adaptation often using a methodology known as a Climate 
Public Expenditure and Institutional Review (UNDP, 2013a). Country 
estimates range from 3 – 15 % of the national budget. 
A few estimates of total climate finance flowing to developing coun-
tries are available. Clapp et  al. (2012) estimate the total at 70 – 120 
billion USD per year based on 2009 – 2010 data (2009 / 2010 USD). Data 
from Buchner et al. (2013a) suggest a net flow to developing countries 
of the order of 40 to 60 billion USD for 2010 and 2011 (2010 / 2011 
USD).4 For 2011 and 2012, North-South flows are estimated at 39 
to 62 billion USD (2011 / 2012 USD) (Buchner et  al., 2013b). Clapp 
et  al. (2012) estimate the private investment at 37 – 72 billion USD 
(2009 / 2010 USD) per year based on 2009 – 2010 data and Stadelmann 
3 Methodology used by Buchner et al. (2012, 2013b): Finance flows are limited to 
‘climate-specific finance’, capital flows targeting low-carbon, and climate-resilient 
development with direct or indirect mitigation or adaptation objectives / outcomes. 
The focus is on current financial flows (upfront capital investment costs and grants 
expressed as commitments, so risk management instruments are excluded). Data 
are for total rather than incremental investment because incremental investment 
requires assumptions on the baseline on a project-by-project basis. The data are 
for ‘gross’ investment, the full value of the investment, and reflect commitments 
because disbursement data is not widely available. The data are a mix of 2010 
and 2011 data, and 2011 and 2012 data, respectively.
4 Buchner et al. (2013) estimate that developed countries mobilized 213 to 255 bil-
lion USD climate finance per year during 2010 and 2011 while 160 to 208 billion 
USD climate finance had been committed to climate change projects in developed 
countries. Developing countries mobilized 120 to 141 billion USD climate finance 
per year during 2010 and 2011 and 162 to 202 billion USD had been commit-
ted to climate change projects in developing countries. Those figures suggest a 
net flow to developing countries of the order of 40 to 60 billion USD per year 
(2010 / 2011 USD).
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et al. (2013) estimate foreign direct investment as equity and loans in 
the range of 10 to 37 billion USD per year based on 2008 – 2011 data 
(2010 USD and 2008 USD). 
The investment in registered Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) projects is estimated at over 400 billion USD over the period 
2004 to 2012 (2004 – 2012 USD) (UNEP Risø, 2013). Of that amount 
almost 80 billion USD was for projects registered during 2011 and 
195 billion USD for projects registered during 2012 (2011 USD and 
2012 USD). The majority of the investment in CDM projects is private. 
Renewable energy projects account for over 70 % of the total invest-
ment. The share of CDM renewable energy projects with some foreign 
investment has grown over time, representing almost 25 billion USD in 
2011 (2011 USD) (Kirkman et al., 2013).5 
Since 1999 almost 100 carbon funds with a capitalization of 14.2 
billion USD have been established (Alberola and Stephan, 2010).6 
Carbon funds are investment vehicles that raise capital to purchase 
carbon credits (52 %) and / or invest in emission reduction projects 
(23 %). A fund may have only private investors (48 %), only public 
investors (29 %) or a mix of both (23 %) (Alberola and Stephan, 2010). 
Investment may be restricted to a specific region or project type (e. g., 
REDD+). Financial data, especially for private funds, is often confiden-
tial so the amount of finance provided to developing countries via 
carbon funds is not available. Scaling up data from 29 funds on the 
amount invested in projects suggests a maximum cumulative invest-
ment of 18 billion USD (1999 – 2009 USD) (Kirkman et al., 2013). 
Public climate finance provided to developing countries was esti-
mated at 35 to 49 billion USD per year in 2011 and 2012 (2011 / 2012 
USD) (Buchner et al., 2013b).7 These public funds flow mainly through 
bilateral and multilateral institutions8. Most of the climate finance is 
implemented by development banks, frequently involving the blend-
ing of government resources with their own funds. There are two main 
reporting systems for public support in place that are not fully compa-
rable due to differences in respective methodologies.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) reports the amount of offi-
cial development assistance (ODA) committed bilaterally for projects 
5 CDM projects sell emission reduction credits, Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), 
to developed country buyers, which provide a return to developed country inves-
tors. 
6 United Nations Environment Program (UNDP) estimates that in addition up to 
6000 private equity funds have been established for the purpose of funding 
climate change-related activities (UNDP, 2011).
7 Buchner et al. (2013b) count climate finance provided by bilateral finance institu-
tions, multilateral finance institutions, government bodies, and climate funds as 
public flows. The difference between lower- and upper-bound results when taking 
the ownership structure of multilateral institutions into account and excluding all 
bilateral flows marked as having climate as ‘significant’ objective.
8 Ryan et al. (2012) estimate the annual average finance provided to developing 
countries for energy efficiency at 18.9 billion USD in 2010 from bilateral financial 
institutions and 4.9 billion USD from multilateral financial institutions over the 
period 2008 – 2011.
that have climate change mitigation or adaptation as a ‘principal’ or 
‘significant’ objective by its 23 member countries and the European 
Commission. The DAC defines ODA as those flows to countries on the 
DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral institutions provided 
by official agencies or by their executive agencies. Resources must be 
used to promote the economic development and welfare of develop-
ing countries as a main objective and they must be concessional in 
character, meaning as grants or as concessional loans including a grant 
element of at least 25 %, calculated at a rate of discount of 10 %. The 
amount is the total funding committed to each project, not the share 
of the project costs attributable to climate change (OECD, 2013a). 
Researchers have questioned the accuracy of the project classification 
(Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011; Junghans and Harmeling, 2013). 
Bilateral commitments averaged 20 billion USD per year in 2010 and 
2011 (2010 / 2011 USD) (OECD, 2013a) and were implemented by 
bilateral development banks or other bilateral agencies, provided to 
national government directly or to dedicated multilateral climate funds 
(Buchner et al., 2012, 2013b).
Seven multilateral development banks (MDBs)9 reported climate 
finance commitments of about 24.1 and 26.8 billion USD in 2011 and 
2012, respectively (2011 / 2012 USD). The reporting is activity-based 
allowing counting entire projects but also project components. Recipi-
ent countries include developing countries and 13 European Union 
(EU) member states. It covers grant, loan, guarantee, equity, and per-
formance-based instruments, not requiring a specific grant element. 
The volume covers MDBs’ own resources as well as external resources 
managed by the MDBs that are also reported to OECD DAC (such as 
contributions to the Global Environment Facility (GEF), Climate Invest-
ment Funds (CIFs), and Carbon Funds) (AfDB et al., 2012a; b, 2013).
Under the UNFCCC, climate finance is not well-defined. Annex  II 
Parties committed to provide new and additional financial resources 
to cover the “agreed full incremental costs” of agreed mitigation mea-
sures implemented by developing countries (Article 4.3), to “assist 
the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation” 
(Article 4.4) and to cover the agreed full costs incurred by developing 
countries for the preparation of their national communications (Article 
4.3) (UNFCCC, 1992). None of these terms are operationally defined 
(Machado-Filho, 2011). These commitments are reaffirmed by the Kyoto 
Protocol (UNFCCC, 1998, Art. 11). The Conference of Parties (COP) has 
agreed that funds provided to developing country Parties may come 
from a wide variety of sources, public, and private, bilateral and multi-
lateral, including alternative sources (UNFCCC, 2010, para. 99).
Annex II Parties report the financial resources they provide to develop-
ing countries through bilateral and multilateral channels for climate 
9 African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Euro-
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment 
Bank (EIB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank (WB) and 
the International Finance Corporation (IFC).
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change action to increase transparency about public flows of climate 
finance vis-à-vis expectations and needs. The latest summary of the 
Annex II reports on their provided climate finance indicates that they 
provided a total of 58.4 billion USD for the period 2005 through 
2010, an average of nearly 10 billion USD per year (2005 – 2010 USD) 
(UNFCCC, 2011a).10 Most of the funds provided are concessional loans 
and grants. In addition, a range of developed countries promised FSF 
of about 10 billion USD per year from 2010 to 2012 (2010 / 2011 / 2012 
USD) (see Section 16.2.1.3).11
Operating entities of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC deal 
with less than 10 % of the climate finance reported under the Conven-
tion, although that could change once the Green Climate Fund (GCF) 
becomes operational. Annex II Party contributions to the Trust Fund of 
the GEF, the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) and the Least Devel-
oped Countries Fund (LDCF) amounted to about 3.3  billion USD for 
2005 through 2010, an average of less than 0.6 billion USD per year 
(2005 – 2010 USD) (UNFCCC, 2011a). Most of the funds are used for 
mitigation. The Adaptation Fund derives most of its funds from the sale 
of its share of the CERs issued for CDM projects12.
16�2�1�2 Current sources of climate finance 
Climate finance comes from the sources of capital shown in Figure 
16.1 including capital markets, carbon markets, and government bud-
gets. Most government funding comes from general revenue but some 
governments also raise revenue from sources — carbon taxes and auc-
tioned GHG-emission allowances — that have mitigation benefits. Most 
corporate funding comes from corporate cash flow including corporate 
borrowing, often called balance-sheet finance (Frankfurt School-UNEP 
Centre, 2013).13 Household funding comes from household income from 
wages, investments, and other sources. Governments, corporations, and 
households can all access capital markets to mobilize additional funds. 
10 Although there is an agreed reporting format, the UNFCCC Secretariat notes 
that many data gaps and inconsistencies persist in the reporting approaches of 
Annex II Parties. The information is compiled by the UNFCCC Secretariat from 
Annex II national communications. The figures represent ‘as committed’ or ‘as 
spent’ currency over the 6 years. The procedures used by different countries and 
the Secretariat to convert currencies into USD are not known.
11 Although COP took note of the ´fast start finance’ (FSF) commitment in paragraph 
95 of Decision 1 / CP.16 (UNFCCC, 2010) and the funds committed have been 
reported annually to the UNFCCC, the FSF is not formally climate finance under 
the UNFCCC.
12 Currently the only international levy is the 2 % of the CERs issued for most CDM 
projects provided to the Adaptation Fund. The Fund sells the CERs and uses the 
proceeds for adaptation projects in developing countries. Sale of CERs gener-
ated revenue of over 90 million USD for FY 2010 (2010 / 2011 USD) and over 50 
million USD for FY 2011 (World Bank, 2012a). In December 2012 Parties agreed 
to extend the share of proceeds levy to the issuance of emission reduction unit 
(ERUs) and the first international transfers of AAUs (UNFCCC, 2012a, para. 21).
13 General revenue includes revenue collected from all taxes and charges imposed 
by a government. Balance sheet finance means that a new investment is financed 
by the firm rather than as a separate project. The firm may seek external funding 
(debt and / or equity) but that funding is secured by the operations of the firm 
rather than the new investment.
This section summarizes estimates of the revenue currently generated 
by carbon taxes and auctioned GHG-emission allowances. Fuel taxes, 
fossil fuel royalties, and electricity charges can be converted to CO2eq 
charges but they are excluded here because they are usually imple-
mented for different policy goals.
Carbon taxes generate about 7 billion USD in revenue annually 
mainly in European countries (2010 / 2011 USD).14 Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, Swit-
zerland, and the United Kingdom — generated about 6.8 billion USD in 
2010 (2010 USD) and 7.3 billion USD (2011 USD) in 2011. India15, Aus-
tralia, and Japan introduced carbon taxes in July 2010, July 2012, and 
October 2012, respectively. In some countries, part or all of the rev-
enue is dedicated to environmental purposes or reducing other taxes; 
none is earmarked for international climate finance.
Auctioned allowances, fixed price compliance options, and the interna-
tional sale of surplus Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) generate about 
2 billion USD per year for national governments (2010 / 2011 USD). 
Among the 30 countries participating in the EU emissions trading 
scheme, Austria, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, 
and the United Kingdom auctioned some emission allowances during 
the second (2008 – 2012) phase (European Commission, 2012). Buch-
ner et  al. (2011, 2012) estimate auction revenue at 1.4 and 1.6 bil-
lion USD for 2010 and 2011 (2010 / 2011 USD). Germany has so far 
earmarked a portion of its auction revenue for international climate 
finance (Germany Federal Ministry for the Environment Nature Con-
servation and Nuclear Safety, 2012). New Zealand collected 1.25 and 
1.42 million USD for 2010 (6 months) and 2011, respectively, from its 
fixed price compliance option of 10.8 USD per tonne of CO2 (15 NZD) 
(New Zealand Ministry for the Environment, 2012).
Several eastern European countries (Estonia, Czech Republic, Poland, 
and Russia) sell surplus AAUs to generate revenue. Others such as Bul-
garia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Ukraine, sell their surplus AAUs 
to fund Green Investment Schemes that support domestic emission 
reduction measures (Linacre et al., 2011).16 Revenue rose from 276 mil-
lion USD in 2008 (2008 USD) to 2 billion USD in 2009 (2009 USD) and 
then declined to less than 1.1 billion USD in 2010 (2010 USD) (Kossoy 
and Ambrosi, 2010; Linacre et al., 2011; Tuerk et al., 2013). Buchner at 
al. (2011, 2012) estimate the revenue at 580 and 240 million USD for 
2010 and 2011, respectively (2010 and 2011 USD).
14 Revenue from taxes explicitly named carbon taxes in the OECD database of 
environmentally related taxes, available at http: / / www2. oecd. org / ecoinst / 
queries / index.htm.
15 In India, the carbon tax is on coal only.
16 The Green Investment Schemes are a source of climate finance for these countries.
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Climate finance has been affected by the financial crisis of late 2008, 
the subsequent stimulus packages and the FSF commitment of 30 bil-
lion USD for 2010 – 2012 made by developed countries in December 
2009 for climate action in developing countries. 
The financial crisis in late 2008 reduced investment in renewable 
energy (Hamilton and Justice, 2009). In late 2008 and early 2009, 
investment in renewable generation fell disproportionately more than 
that in other types of generating capacity (IEA, 2009). Global invest-
ment in renewable energy fell 3 % during 2009 but rebounded strongly 
in 2010 and 2011. In developed countries, where the financial crisis hit 
hardest, investment dropped 14 % while renewable energy investment 
continued to grow in developing countries (Frankfurt School-UNEP 
Centre and BNEF, 2012).
In response to the financial crisis, Group of Twenty Finance Ministers 
(G20) governments implemented economic stimulus packages 
amounting to 2.6 trillion USD. Of that amount, 180 to 242 billion USD 
was low-carbon funding (2008 and 2009 USD) (IEA, 2009; REN21, 
2010). The stimulus spending supported the rapid recovery of renewable 
energy investment by compensating for reduced financing from banks. 
Some countries facing large public sector deficits scaled down green 
spending when the economy started recovering (Eyraud et al., 2011).
At the UNFCCC in Copenhagen in 2009, developed countries committed 
to provide new and additional resources approaching 30 billion USD of 
FSF to support mitigation and adaptation action in developing countries 
during 2010 – 2012 (UNFCCC, 2009a). The sum of the announced com-
mitments exceeds 33 billion USD (UNFCCC, 2011b, 2012b; c, 2013a)17. 
Japan, United States, United Kingdom, Norway, and Germany being the 
five biggest donors have reported commitments amounting to 27 billion 
USD (2010 / 2011 / 2012 USD). Nakooda et  al. (2013) finds that around 
45 % have been provided as grants and around 47 % in the form of 
loans, guarantees, and insurance. Approximately 61 % of the funds had 
been committed for mitigation, 10 % for REDD+, ,18 % for adaptation, 
9 % for multiple objectives and for 2 % of the funding the purpose is 
unknown. The funders reported commitments to recipient country gov-
ernments via bilateral channels (33 %), multilateral climate funds (20 %), 
recipient countries companies (12 %), and multilateral institutions (9 %). 
Data on actual disbursements is not available to date because of the 
multi-year time lag between commitment and disbursement.
The announced pledges triggered questions as to whether they were 
‘new and additional’ as promised (Fallasch and De Marez, 2010; BNEF, 
2011). Some countries explain the basis on which they consider their 
pledge to be ‘new and additional’. Criteria have been proposed that 
17 The information is compiled by the UNFCCC Secretariat from national reports 
on FSF. The figures represent ‘as committed’ currency over the three years. The 
procedures used by different countries and the Secretariat to convert currencies 
into USD are not known.
indicate, when applied to the pledges, that proportions ranging from 
virtually none to almost all are new and additional (Brown et al., 2010; 
Stadelmann et al., 2010, 2011b). For Germany, Japan, the United King-
dom, and the United States annual FSF contributions were significantly 
higher than the 2009 expenditure related to climate activities in devel-
oping countries (Nakooda et al., 2013).
16�2�2 Future low-carbon investment 
As noted in Chapter 6, the stabilization of GHG concentrations will ulti-
mately require dramatic changes in the world’s energy system, includ-
ing a dramatic expansion in the deployment of low-carbon energy 
sources. This change will require significant shifts in global investment 
in the energy, land use, transportation, and infrastructure sector. The 
future investment flows summarized in this section are based on sev-
eral large-scale analyses conducted over the past few years. For the 
most part these analyses explore scenarios to achieve specified tem-
perature or concentration goals. Hence, the estimates of investment 
flows drawn from these studies should not be interpreted as forecasts, 
but rather, as some probable future states of the world. 
Figure 16.2 presents estimates of baseline, i. e., current investment 
in energy supply sub-sectors as a reference for the following consid-
erations. It illustrates the very substantial nature of investments in 
today’s energy sector with global total annual investment at about 
USD2010 1200 billion and very strong roles for investments in fossil fuel 
extraction, transmission and distribution (T&D), and electricity genera-
tion.
16�2�2�1 Investment needs
While a large number of studies and many modelling comparison 
exercises have assessed technological transformation pathways and 
the macroeconomic costs of transforming the global economy, only a 
handful of studies estimate the associated investment needs. Section 
16.2.2.2 summarizes available estimates of investment needs under 
climate policy between 2010 – 2029 and 2030 – 2049, for the world as 
a whole and for non-OECD and OECD countries. Models and scenarios 
differ so the focus is on incremental investment, i. e., the differences in 
the estimated investment between the reference and mitigation sce-
narios.18 It must also be noted that the model estimates crucially rely 
on assumptions about the future costs of technologies and of subsi-
dies, on the possibility of nuclear phaseout in some countries, and on 
the mitigation policies already included in the reference scenarios.
Without climate policy, investments in the power sector would 
mainly be directed towards fossil fuels, especially in non-OECD coun-
tries that rely on low-cost coal power plants to supply their growing 
18 Adaptation costs and economic losses from future climate change are not consid-
ered in any of these estimates.
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demand for electricity. At the global level, fossil fuel-based power 
generation would require an average annual investment of 182 (95 
to 234) billion USD in 2010 – 2029 and 287 (158 to 364) billion USD 
in 2030 – 2049;19 the bulk of investments (roughly 80 %) goes to non-
OECD countries.20 There is greater uncertainty in models about the 
future of renewable and nuclear power without climate policy. Mod-
elled global investment in renewable power generation is expected 
to increase over time from 123 (31 to 180) billion USD per year in 
2010 – 2029 to 233 (131 to 336) billion USD over 2030 – 2049. Nuclear 
power generation would attract 55 (11 to 131) billion USD annually in 
2010 – 2029 and 90 (0 to 155) billion USD per year in 2030 – 2049.
The introduction of an emission reduction target in the models 
abruptly changes the investment pattern. Figures 16.3 and 16.4 report 
the investment change for major power generation technologies, 
fossil fuel extraction, and for end-use energy efficiency, for emission 
scenarios compatible with a long-term target of keeping mean global 
temperature increase below 2 °C in 2100.21 Although the policy targets 
19 The mean should not be considered as an expected value. It is not possible to 
attribute any probability distribution to models’ outcomes. Therefore policymakers 
face pure uncertainty in face of future investment needs. The range is presented to 
provide information on the degree of uncertainty in the literature.
20 See captions of Figures 16.3 and 16.4 for a list of the studies surveyed.
21 Also in this case, the mean and median are used as synthetic indicators having no 
predictive power.
are not identical, they are close enough to allow a broad comparison 
of results. The dispersion across estimated emission reductions over 
2010 – 2029 and 2010 – 2049 is mainly due to differences in reference 
scenario emissions and because models choose different optimal emis-
sion trajectories among the many compatible with the long-term cli-
mate goal.
The results of an analysis of investment estimates in Figures 16.3 and 
16.4 show that climate policy is expected to induce a major reallo-
cation of investments in the power sector. Investments in fossil-fired 
power plants (without CCS) were equal to about 137 billion USD per 
year in 2010. Investment would decline by 30 (2 to 166) billion USD 
per year (about – 20 % for the median) during the period 2010 – 2029, 
compared to the reference scenarios. Investment in low-emissions 
generation technologies (renewable, nuclear, and electricity genera-
tion with CCS) would increase by 147 (31 to 360) billion USD per year 
(about 100 % for the median) during the same period. 
Based on a limited number of studies (McKinsey, 2009; IEA, 2011; Riahi 
et  al., 2012), annual incremental investments until 2030 in energy-
efficiency investments in the building, transport, and industry sector 
increase by 336 (1 to 641) billion USD. The only three studies with sec-
toral detail in end-use technologies show an increase of investments 
of 153 (57 to 228) billion USD for the building sector, 198 (98 to 344) 




























































Figure 16�2 | Present level of investment in energy supply. Note: The bars indicate the minimum and maximum level of investments found in the literature. Ranges result from 
different sources of market information and differing definitions of the investment components to be included. Source: From McCollum et al. (2013) based on data from IEA World 
Energy Outlook 2011 (IEA, 2011) and GEA (Riahi et al., 2012).
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industry sector. Incremental investments in end-use technologies are 
particularly hard to estimate and the number of studies is limited 
(Riahi et al., 2012). Results should therefore be taken with caution.
While models tend to agree on the relative importance of investments 
in fossil and non-fossil power generation, they differ with respect to 
the mix of low-emission power generation technologies and the over-
all incremental investment. This is mainly due to different reference 
scenarios (e. g., population, economic growth, exogenous technologi-
cal progress), and assumptions about (1) the structure of the energy 
system and the costs of reducing the energy intensity of the economy 
versus reducing the carbon intensity of energy, (2) the investment costs 
of alternative technologies over time, and (3) technological or politi-
cal constraints on technologies. Limits to the deployment of some key 
technology options or the presence of policy constraints (e. g., delayed 
action, limited geographical participation) would increase investment 
needs (Riahi et al., 2012; McCollum et al., 2013).
Higher energy efficiency, technological innovation in transport, and 
the shift to low-emission generation technologies — all contribute to 
a drastic reduction in the demand for fossil fuels, thus causing a sharp 
decline in investment in fossil fuel extraction, transformation, and 
transportation. Scenarios from a limited number of models suggest 
that average annual investment reduction in 2010 – 2029 would be 
equal to 56 (– 8 to 369) billion USD. The contraction would be sharper 
in 2030 – 2049, in the order of 451 (332 to 1385) billion USD per year. 
Figure 16�3 | Change of average annual investment in mitigation scenarios (2010 – 2029). Investment changes are calculated by a limited number of model studies and model 
comparisons for mitigation scenarios that stabilize concentrations within the range of 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq by 2100 compared to respective average baseline investments. Note: 
The vertical bars indicate the range between minimum and maximum estimate of investment changes; the horizontal bar indicates the median of model results. Proximity to this 
median value does not imply higher likelihood because of the different degree of aggregation of model results, low number of studies available, and different assumptions in the 
different studies considered. The numbers in the bottom row show the total number of studies available in the literature. Sources: UNFCCC (2008). IEA (2011): 450 Scenario (450) 
relative to the Constant Policies Scenario (CPS). The CPS investment in CCS is also included under Coal and Gas (retrofitting); World investment in biofuels includes international 
bunkers; investment in solar photovoltaic (PV) in buildings is attributed to power plants in supply-side investment. Riahi et al. (2012): the Global Energy Assessment Mix scenario 
(GEA-Mix) relative to the GEA reference scenario. Carraro et al. (2012): 460 ppm CO2eq in 2100 (t460) relative to reference scenario. McCollum et al. (2013): the Low Climate 
Impact Scenarios and Implications of Required Tight Emission Control Strategies (LIMITS), RefPol-450 scenario (2.8 W / m2 in 2100) relative to the reference scenarios, mean of six 
models. McKinsey (2009): data obtained from Climate Desk, S2015 scenario with full technological potential, 100 % success rate, negative lever of costs, beginning of policy in 
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All models that provide data on investments for fossil fuel extraction 
show that overall investments in energy supply would decrease against 
the baseline trends in scenarios consistent with the 2 °C limit (IEA, 
2011; Carraro et al., 2012; Riahi et al., 2012; McCollum et al., 2013).
According to a range of models, climate policy would thus substan-
tially change the allocation of baseline energy investments rather than 
increase overall demand for energy investment. 
Models with a separate consideration of energy-efficiency measures fore-
see the need for significant incremental investment in energy efficiency 
in the building, transport, and industry sector in addition to  the realloca-
tion of investment from high-carbon to low-carbon power  supply. 
There is wide agreement among model results on the necessity to 
ramp up investments in research and development (R&D) to increase 
end-use energy efficiency and to improve low-emission generation 
energy carriers and energy transformation technologies. Estimates of 
the additional funding needed for energy-related R&D range from 
4.5 to 78 billion USD per year during 2010 – 2029 (UNFCCC, 2007; 
Carraro et  al., 2012; McCollum et  al., 2013) and from 115 to 126 
billion USD per year in 2030 – 2049 (Carraro et al., 2012; Marangoni 
and Tavoni, 2013; McCollum et al., 2013). Because of the need for 
new low-carbon alternatives, investments in R&D are higher in case 
of nuclear phaseout and other technological constraints (Bosetti 
et al., 2011).
Figure 16�4 | Change of average annual investment in mitigation scenarios (2030 – 2049). Investment changes are calculated by a limited number of model studies and model 
comparisons for mitigation scenarios that stabilize concentrations within the range of 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq by 2100 compared to respective average baseline investments. Note: 
The vertical bars indicate the range between minimum and maximum estimate of investment changes; the horizontal bar indicates the median of model results. Proximity to this 
median value does not imply higher likelihood because of the different degree of aggregation of model results, low number of studies available, and different assumptions in the 
different studies considered. The numbers in the bottom row show the total number of studies available in the literature. Sources: Riahi et al. (2012): the Global Energy Assessment 
Mix scenario (GEA-Mix) relative to the GEA reference scenario. Carraro et al. (2012): 460 ppm CO2eq in 2100 (t460) relative to reference scenario. McCollum et al. (2013): the Low 
Climate Impact Scenarios and Implications of Required Tight Emission Control Strategies (LIMITS), RefPol-450 scenario (2.8 W / m2 in 2100) relative to the reference scenarios, mean 
of six models. Regions: OECD, non-OECD, and World.
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Land-use is the second largest source of GHG emissions and within 
land use, tropical deforestation is by far the largest source (see Chap-
ters 5 and 11). Efforts to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of GHGs 
will require investments in land use change (LUC) as well as in the 
energy sector.
Kindermann et al. (2008) use three global forestry and land use models 
to examine the costs of reduced emissions through avoided deforesta-
tion over the 25 year period from 2005 – 2030.22 The models’ results 
suggest substantial emission reductions can be achieved. The mod-
els estimate that 1.6 to 4.3 GtCO2 per year could be reduced for 20 
USD tCO2 with the greatest reductions coming from Africa followed 
by Central and South America and Southeast Asia. They also use the 
models to estimate the costs to reduce deforestation by between 10 % 
and 50 % of the baseline. Deforestation could be reduced by 10 % 
(0.3 – 0.6 GtCO2 per year) over the 25-year period for an investment 
of 0.5 to 2.1 billion USD per year in forest preservation activities, and 
a 50 % reduction (1.5 – 2.7 GtCO2 per year) could be achieved for an 
investment of 21.2 to 34.9 billion USD per year. This is comparable to 
what has been found by UNFCCC (2008) and McCollum et al. (2013).
Investment needs in other sectors commonly relate to energy-effi-
ciency measures included above. Information on global or regional 
investment needs to abate process emissions or non-CO2 emissions in 
sectors like the waste, petroleum, gas, cement, or the chemical industry 
is virtually unavailable. For instance, McKinsey (2009) does not pro-
vide information that could be separated from energy-efficiency mea-
sures in the sectors. An indicative estimate for the waste sector can 
be derived from Pfaff-Simoneit (2012) suggesting investment needs of 
approximately 10 – 20 billon USD per year if access to a modern waste 
management system were to be provided for an additional 100 million 
people per year.
16�2�2�2 Incremental costs
Incremental costs can be calculated for an individual project, a pro-
gramme, a sector, a country, or the world as a whole. The incremental 
costs reflect the incremental investment and the change of operating 
and maintenance costs for a mitigation or adaptation project in com-
parison to a reference project. It can be calculated as the difference of 
the net present values of the two projects. Estimates of the incremen-
tal costs of mitigation measures for key sectors or the entire economy 
have been prepared for over 20 developing countries (Olbrisch et al., 
2011). When estimates of both the incremental costs and the incre-
mental investment are available, the former is generally lower because 
of the annualization of incremental investments for the calculation of 
incremental costs.
22 The models used are the Dynamic Integrated Model of Forestry and Alternative 
Land Use (DIMA) (Roktiyanskiy et al., 2007), the Generalized Comprehensive 
Mitigation Assessment Process Model (GCOMAP) (Sathaye et al., 2006), and the 
Global Timber Model (GTM) (Sohngen and Mendelsohn, 2003).
From an economic perspective, macroeconomic incremental costs can 
be defined as the lost gross domestic product (GDP). This measure 
provides an aggregate cost of the mitigation actions (estimates pro-
vided in Chapter 6), but it does not provide information on the specific 
micro-economic investments that must be made and costs incurred to 
meet the mitigation commitments. This distinction is important if inter-
national climate finance commitments will be implemented through 
institutions designed to provide financial support for specific invest-
ments and costs rather than macro-level compensation.
Other than on the project-level, investment needs are thus frequently 
only a fraction of incremental costs on the level of the macro-economy. 
This difference is largely due to reduced growth of carbon-constrained 
economies in many models. Adaptation costs and economic losses 
from future climate change, which are not considered in these esti-
mates, should be lower for climate policy scenarios than in the refer-
ence scenario. 
16�2�3 Raising public funding by developed 
countries for climate finance in 
developing countries
Comparison of the model estimates of future mitigation investment 
(Section 16.2.2) with the current level of global total climate finance 
(Section 16.2.1.1) indicates that global climate finance needs to be 
scaled up. Increased financial support by developed countries for 
mitigation (and adaptation) in developing countries will be needed 
to stimulate the increased investment. This section reviews possible 
sources of additional funds that could be implemented by developed 
country governments to finance mitigation in developing countries. 
In December 2009, developed countries committed to a goal of mobi-
lizing jointly 100 billion USD a year by 2020 to address the needs of 
developing countries in the context of meaningful mitigation actions 
and transparency on implementation. This funding will come from a 
wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, 
including alternative sources of finance (UNFCCC, 2009a).23 This goal 
has been recognized by the COP (UNFCCC, 2010, para. 98). This rec-
ognition does not change the commitments of Annex II Parties speci-
fied in Article 4 of the Convention to provide financial resources for 
climate-related costs incurred by developing countries.
Studies by the High-level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financ-
ing (AGF) (AGF, 2010) and the World Bank Group et al. (2011) at the 
request of G20 finance ministers have analyzed options for mobilizing 
100 billion USD per year by 2020. The AGF concluded that it is chal-
lenging but feasible to reach the goal of mobilizing 100 billion USD 
23 There is currently no definition of which ‘climate’ activities count toward the 100 
billion USD, what ‘mobilizing’ means, or even which countries are covered by this 
commitment (Caruso and Ellis, 2013).
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annually for climate actions in developing countries. Both reports con-
clude that a mix of sources is likely to be required to reach the goal.
Both reports estimate the revenue that could be mobilized in 2020 by 
various options to finance climate action in developing countries in the 
context of a carbon price of 25 USD per tonne of CO2eq in Annex  II 
countries. The feasibility of the options was not assessed. For some 
options, only a fraction of the revenue was assumed to be available for 
international climate finance. Their estimates of the international cli-
mate finance that could be generated by each option, together with 
other estimates, where available, are summarized in Table 16.1. Only 
options to mobilize public funds and that yield mitigation benefits are 
included in the table; options for increased borrowing by multilateral 
institutions and mobilizing more private finance are excluded.
Virtually all of the options put a price on GHG emissions thus providing 
a mitigation benefit in addition to generating revenue. The options are 
grouped into the following categories (Haites and Mwape, 2013): 
1. Options that contribute to developed countries national budgets, 
dependent on national decisions;
2. Options that contribute to national budgets, dependent on interna-
tional agreements; and
3. Funds collected internationally pursuant to an international agree-
ment. 
Funds mobilized by options in the first two categories flow into 
national budgets, so the amount allocated for international climate 
finance depends on national decisions. In contrast, funds mobilized by 
options in the third category go directly to an international fund.
The AGF and G20 reports assume for many options that only small 
fraction of the total revenue mobilized is dedicated to international 
climate finance. Hence, these options would mobilize revenue to meet 
the international climate finance goal and at the same time mobilize 
substantial revenue for domestic use by Annex  II governments. The 
domestic share of the revenue could be used by Annex II treasuries to 
reduce deficits and debt, or to reduce existing distortionary taxes and 
so help stimulate economic growth. 
Global modelling estimates
Using integrated models, it is possible to estimate the potential car-
bon revenues when all emissions are taxed or all permits are auc-
tioned. These estimates reflect a scenario in which all world regions 
commit to reduce GHG emissions using an efficient allocation of 
abatement effort, i. e., globally equal marginal abatement costs. 
Therefore, it should be used to gain insights rather than exact rev-
enue forecasts.
From the analysis of scenarios already presented in this chapter (Car-
raro et al., 2012; Calvin et al., 2012; McCollum et al., 2013) it is pos-
sible to derive the following messages:
Carbon revenues are potentially large, in the order of up to 200 billion 
USD each in China, the European Union and the United States in 2030. 
At the global level, they could top 1600 billion USD in 2030.
Table 16�1 | Summary of potential sources of public funds for climate finance in 2020.
Option Projected amount generated in 2020 (billion USD2010 / year) Share assumed to be dedicated to international climate finance
1) Options that contribute to developed country national budgets, dependent on national decisions
Domestic auctioned allowances AGF: 125 – 250b; G20: 250 AGF: 2 – 10 %; G20: 10 %
Domestic carbon taxc AGF: 250 AGF: 4 %
Phase out of fossil fuel subsidies AGF: 8; G20: 40 – 60 AGF: 100 %; G20: 15 – 25 %
Higher fossil fuel royalties AGF: 10 AGF: 100 %
Wires charge on electricity generation AGF: 5 AGF: 100 %
2) Options that contribute to national budgets, dependent on international agreements
Border carbon cost levelling Grubb 2011: 5*
Financial transactions tax AGF: 2 – 27 AGF: 25 – 50 %
3) Funds collected internationally pursuant to an international agreement
Extension of the ‘share of proceeds’ AGF: 38 – 50 AGF: 2 – 10 %
Auctioning a portion of AAUs AGF: 125 – 250 b AGF: 2 – 10 %
Carbon pricing for international aviation***,a UNFCCC: 10 – 25**; AGF: 6; G20: 13 AGF: 25 – 50 %; G20: 33 – 50 % 
Carbon pricing for international shipping***,a UNFCCC: 10 – 15**; AGF: 16 – 19; G20: 26 AGF: 25 – 50 %; G20: 33 – 50 %
Notes: AGF, G20, and UNFCCC refer to estimates from AGF (2010), World Bank Group et al. (2011) and UNFCCC (2007), respectively.* = Date not specified; ** = 2006 USD; *** 
Could fall into category 2 depending upon the method of implementation; a The AGF and G20 estimates for international aviation and international shipping assume that a substan-
tial fraction (30 to 50 %) of the global revenue is allocated to developing countries. b The AGF combines auctioned AAUs and auctioned domestic allowances, here half of the total is 
included in each category; c The AGF estimates revenue of 10 billion USD per 1 USD tax per tonne of CO2, that is equivalent to potential revenue of 250 billion USD and a 4 % share 
for international climate finance as reported here. Sources: Compiled from AGF (2010), World Bank Group et al. (2011), UNFCCC (2007), and Grubb (2011).
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Carbon revenues may peak in the mid-term and decline in the long-
term, as decreasing emissions (the tax base) more than offset the 
increase in the carbon price (Carraro et  al., 2012). In regions with 
lower marginal abatement costs, the tax base shrinks faster so carbon 
revenues fall faster. Fast-growing regions may see growing carbon rev-
enues for several decades more.
Scenarios and / or regions in which absorption of emissions — e. g., by 
means of bioenergy with CCS — plays an important role may exhibit 
net negative emissions. This implies net reduction of carbon revenues 
so governments must finance net negative emissions using either the 
general budget or international funding (Carraro et al., 2012).
16.3 Enabling environments
This section highlights the importance of a supportive enabling 
environment in facilitating low-carbon investments. The concept of 
enabling environment is not clearly defined, so it has many different 
interpretations. One is government policies that focus on “creating 
and maintaining an overall macroeconomic environment” (UNCTAD, 
1998).24 Another (Bolger, 2000), interprets an ‘enabling environment’ 
as the wider context within which development processes take place, 
i. e., the role of societal norms, rules, regulations, and systems. This 
environment may either be supportive (enabling) or constraining.
According to Stadelmann and Michaelowa (2011), capacity build-
ing and enabling environment are separate but interrelated con-
cepts. Capacity building targets knowledge and skills gaps, while the 
enabling environment for low-carbon business activities is “the overall 
environment including policies, regulations and institutions that drive 
the business sector to invest in and apply low-carbon technologies and 
services.” According to this definition, the enabling environment has 
three main components: (1) the core business environment, which is 
relevant for all types of businesses, e. g., tax regime, labour market, and 
ease of starting and operating a business; (2) the broader investment 
climate, including education, financial markets, and infrastructure, 
which is partially low-carbon related, e. g., via climate change educa-
tion or investments in electricity grids; and (3) targeted policies that 
encourage the business sector to invest in low-carbon technologies. 
Capacity building can also be seen as a subcomponent of an enabling 
environment (UNFCCC, 2009b) as it aims to improve the enabling envi-
ronment by overcoming market, human, and institutional capacity bar-
riers. Support for capacity building can increase the probability that the 
recipient country will succeed in implementing mitigation policies, and 
hence may reduce the total funding needed (Urpelainen, 2010).
24 For enabling environments for technology transfer see McKenzie Hedger et al. 
(2000).
Reliability and predictability are important elements of an enabling 
environment. While stable and predictable government policies reduce 
uncertainty about expected return on investment, frequent and unpre-
dictable changes to policies can undermine market efficiency (Blyth 
et  al., 2007; Brunner et  al., 2012). Predictability and stability require 
well-established legal institutions and rule of law. Institutional capac-
ity across sectors and at various levels is also important (Brinkerhoff, 
2004).
In their econometric examination, Eyraud et al. (2011) found that low-
ering the cost of capital is particularly effective in boosting investment 
in low-carbon activities. Hence, macro-economic factors and policy 
regulatory frameworks that are good for private investment as a whole 
are also important determinants of climate investment. Put differently, 
obstacles that impede private investment also hamper investment 
in low-carbon technologies. More elements related to the drivers of 
low-carbon investments, which are part of enabling environments, are 





Financing mitigation projects is, in principle, similar to financing any 
other investment. This section provides an overview of factors that 
attract private capital for low-carbon investments. First, different 
categories of capital managers and their key investment criteria are 
introduced. Next, challenges that hamper investors, such as investment 
risks and access to capital, are assessed. Finally, selected financial 
instruments used in low-carbon transactions are presented and dis-
cussed.
16�4�1 Capital managers and investment 
decisions
Mitigation measures often are financed through investments by sev-
eral different capital managers (see Figure 16.1). It is crucial to under-
stand the basic investment logic and the preferred financial instru-
ments of each type of capital manager.25 Box 16.2 characterizes some 
of the major types of capital managers.
Risk and return are crucial decision factors in any investment finance 
decision, including low-carbon activities. The higher the perceived risk, 
25 For the different types of financing typically used, i. e., required, in the different 
stages of renewable technologies, such as R&D, commercialization, manufactur-
ing, and sales, see Mitchell et al.(2011).
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the higher the cost of capital and required return needing to be gener-
ated to cover the costs (i. e., higher risk results in a higher discount rate 
for cash flow) (Romani, 2009). 
Equity and debt are basically the two basic types of finance. Both 
come at a certain cost, which is very sensitive to risk, i. e., risk premium 
or risk margin. The type of finance required depends on the type of 
activity, its development phase, and its application. 
Project finance is usually the preferred financing approach for infra-
structure or energy projects worth more than 21.4 million USD (UNEP, 
2005). In this financing structure, debt and equity are paid back 
exclusively from the cash flows generated by the project and there 
is no recourse to the balance sheet (also call non-recourse finance); 
as opposed to balance-sheet financing, where all ‘on-balance sheet’ 
assets can be used as collateral. In 2012, around 70 billion USD of 
project-level market rate debt went towards emission reduction (70 % 
provided by the public sector). Project-level equity was estimated at 
approximately 11 billion USD. However, the largest share of mitiga-
tion , 198 billion USD, consisted of balance-sheet financing (2012 USD) 
(Buchner et al., 2013b).
Risk profile, tenor (i. e., loan duration) and size are the primary crite-
ria to characterize the financing demand. The total financing demand 
can be split into tranches with varying risk profiles (e. g., debt vs. 
equity) and varying tenors that match the characteristics of existing 
financing instruments. For renewable energy projects, higher cost of 
capital will increase start-up costs, which are generally front-loaded 
and higher per unit of capacity than for fossil fuel-based projects even 
if financing conditions are identical (Brunnschweiler, 2010). Lenders 
require a higher equity share if a project is perceived as risky. A typi-
cal project finance structure in an industrialized country consists of 
10 – 30 % equity, whereas in developing countries this share tends to 
be higher (UNEP, 2007). However, equity tends to be scarce in many 
developing countries (see Section 16.4.2.2).
16�4�2 Challenges for low-carbon investment
Factors that reduce the relative attractiveness of implementing a low-
carbon technology shall be considered as a challenge. Many factors 
pertaining to the general investment environment can have an enabling 
character or can act as a challenge (see Section 16.3). However, there 
Box 16�2 | Types of capital managers relevant for investment and finance in low-carbon activities
Governments commit to mitigation measures to comply with 
international agreements and self-imposed targets. Their role as 
capital managers is limited to mitigation measures where they 
invest directly. In 2011 and 2012, the public sector provided on 
average 135 billion USD per year (2011 / 2012 USD) of public fund-
ing for climate finance, thereof 12 billion USD provided directly by 
government bodies1 (Buchner et al., 2013b).
Public financial institutions include national, bilateral, multi-
lateral, and regional finance institutions, as well as UN agencies 
and national cooperation agencies. These institutions invested 
121 billion USD in mitigation and adaptation measures in 2012 
(2012 USD), more than 50 % was provided as concessional loans 
(Buchner et al., 2013b).
Commercial financial institutions, such as banks, pension 
funds, life insurance companies, and other funds, manage 
over 71 trillion USD in assets. They can have long-time horizon 
investments diversified across asset classes with varying risk return 
profiles and investment tenors, sectors, and geographies (Inderst 
1 This estimate excludes financing by public financial institutions and by dedi-
cated climate fund, the latter providing approximately 1.6 billion USD (2012 
USD) in 2012 (Buchner et al., 2013b).
et al., 2012). The ability of institutional investors to invest in mitiga-
tion measures depends on their investment strategy, restrictions 
agreed upon with their clients, as well as the regulatory framework. 
Life insurance and pension funds are especially constrained by the 
latter (Glemarec, 2011). Their contribution was estimated at 22 bil-
lion USD in 2012 (2012 USD) (Buchner et al., 2013b).
Energy corporations including power and gas utilities, inde-
pendent power producers, energy companies, and independent 
project developers can design, commission, and operate renew-
able energy projects. They provided approximately 102 billion USD 
(2012 USD) for climate finance in 2012 (Buchner et al., 2013b).
Non-energy corporations invest in mitigation measures to 
reduce their energy bills, meet voluntary commitments or comply 
with emission trading schemes. Altogether, they provided around 
66 billion USD in 2012 for low-carbon investment (2012 USD) 
(Buchner et al., 2013b).
Households’ investments are funded by income and savings 
supplemented by loans. In 2012, households provided around 
33 billion USD for climate finance projects; 83 % of households’ 
contributions were in developed countries, especially in Germany, 
Japan, and Italy (Buchner et al., 2013b).
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are also low-carbon specific factors — especially in absence of a clear 
price signal for carbon emissions — that, if they remain, may keep the 
market penetration of these technologies to low percentages (Gilling-
ham and Sweeney, 2011). The latter will be assessed in this subsection.
Challenges vary significantly within the different investment catego-
ries, dependent upon the investor and the type of activity. For instance, 
each group is faced with some additional typical financial challenges. 
Energy-efficiency measures, for instance, often face misaligned incen-
tives between the asset owner, user, and lender. It is more complex for 
energy-efficiency projects to structure and share the underlying risks. 
In addition, energy savings are intangible as collateral (Hamilton and 
Justice, 2009; Ryan et al., 2012; Venugopal and Srivastava, 2012). 
Investment risks: Investments in low-carbon activities face partly the 
same risks as other investments in the same countries analogous to the 
core and broader investment climate. These risks can be broadly grouped 
into political risks (e. g., political instability, expropriation, transfer risk, 
breach of contract, etc.) and macro-economic risks (e. g., currency risk, 
financial risks, etc.). In some developing countries, political and macro-
economic risks represent a high barrier to investment (Ward et al., 2009; 
World Bank, 2011a; Venugopal and Srivastava, 2012).
There are also types of risks characteristic for low-carbon investments: 
Low-carbon policy risks are one type of these risks that concern the 
predictability, longevity, and reliability of policy, e. g., low-carbon regu-
lations might change or not be enforced (Ward et al., 2009; Venugopal 
and Srivastava, 2012; Frisari et al., 2013). Private capital will flow to 
those countries, or markets, where regulatory frameworks and policies 
provide confidence to investors over the time horizon of their invest-
ment (Carmody and Ritchie, 2007).
Mitigation activities also face specific technology and operational 
risk. For relatively new technologies, these are related to performance 
of the technology (i. e., initial production and long-term performance), 
delay in the construction, and the risk of not being able to access 
affordable capital (see Section  16.4.2.2). Some low-carbon activities 
also tend to depend on an expected future development, e. g., steep 
learning curves for certain technologies. Operational risks include the 
credit quality of the counterparties, off-take agreements, especially in 
a scenario where the mitigation technology has a higher costs of pro-
duction, supply chain scalability, unreliable support infrastructure, and 
maintenance costs (Jamison, 2010; Venugopal and Srivastava, 2012).
Moreover, risks may be overestimated due to limited information in 
markets that are undergoing a technological and structural transition 
(Sonntag-O’Brien and Usher, 2006) and the longer time frame used to 
assess the risk increases uncertainty. A lack of quantitative analytical 
methodologies for risk management may add to the perceived risk.
Return on investment: The basic challenge is to find a financing 
package that provides the debt and equity investors with a reason-
able return on their investment given the perceived risks. Debt finan-
ciers have a strong interest in seeing that their loans are paid back 
and hence provide funds to less risky, proven technologies and estab-
lished companies (Hamilton, 2010). It is estimated that in 2009 they 
required an average internal rate of return (IRR) of around 3 to 7 % 
above the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) reference interest 
rate, for renewable energy projects in industrialized countries. Ven-
ture capitalists, angel investors, and some foundations (through so-
called programme-related investments) are situated on the other side 
of the financing continuum. They typically invest in new companies 
and technologies, and are willing to take higher risks while expect-
ing commensurately larger returns. These investors may require an IRR 
of 50 % or higher because of the high chances that individual proj-
ects will fail. Private equity companies that invest in more established 
companies and technologies may still require an IRR of about 35 % 
(Hamilton and Justice, 2009). However, these typical IRRs have to be 
considered with care since they may vary according to the prevail-
ing basis interest rates (i. e., the current LIBOR rate), perceived risks of 
the investment category and the availability of alternative investment 
opportunities. Many renewable energy projects, especially in develop-
ing countries where additional risk margins are added, are struggling 
to reach returns of this level to satisfy the expectations of financiers 
of equity and debt.
Cost of capital and access to capital: In many countries, there are 
imperfections in the capital market restricting the access to affordable 
long-term capital (Maclean et  al., 2008). This is particularly the case 
in many developing countries where local banks are not able to lend 
for 15 – 25 years due to their own balance sheet constraints (Hamilton, 
2010), e. g., to match the maturity of assets and liabilities.
Attracting sufficient equity is often critical for low-carbon activi-
ties, especially for renewable energy projects in developing countries 
(Glemarec, 2011). The equity base of a company is used to attract 
(leverage) mezzanine or debt finance especially in project finance 
investments. Since equity is last in the risk order and can be recov-
ered only by means of sale of shares of the asset or its liquidation, 
return expectations are significantly higher than for debt or mezzanine 
finance. Often, equity is also the key limiting factor in the expansion of 
a low-carbon activity, e. g., through growth of a company, expansion 
into new markets, R&D, or multiplication of a project approach (UNEP, 
2005).
Market and project size: Since the pre-investment costs vary dis-
proportionally with the project size, smaller low-carbon projects incur 
much higher transaction costs than larger ones of conventional energy 
projects (Ward et  al., 2009). These costs include feasibility and due 
diligence work, legal and engineering fees, consultants, and permit-
ting costs. Hamilton (2010) finds that small low-carbon projects in 
developing countries seeking less than 10 million USD of debt are 
generally not attractive to an international commercial bank. Due to 
the higher transaction costs, small projects might also generate lower 
gross returns, even if the rate of return lies within the market stan-
dards (Sonntag-O’Brien and Usher, 2006).
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There is basically no secondary market to raise debt for low-carbon 
projects. Hence, institutional investors, whose major asset class is 
bonds, lack opportunities to invest in low-carbon energy projects 
because they do not issue bonds or the issuance size is too small (Ham-
ilton and Justice, 2009; Kaminker and Stewart, 2012). The minimum 
issuance size for investment grade bonds tends to be about 460 mil-
lion USD, so few projects can achieve this standard (Veys, 2010). Many 
renewable energy projects need investment in the range of 70 – 700 
million USD, with only a few big ones towards the upper end (Hamil-
ton and Justice, 2009). In 2011, clean energy bonds amounted to only 
about 0.2 % of the global bond market (Kaminker and Stewart, 2012).
Tenor-risk combination: Capital markets tend to prefer a combina-
tion of long tenor with low risk and are willing to finance high risk only 
in the short term. Due to higher political and macro-economic instabil-
ity in developing countries, investors are particularly reluctant to invest 
in projects with such a long investment horizon. Although pension 
funds and insurance companies are long-term investors, concerns 
about quality and reliability of cash flow projections, credit ratings of 
off-takers for power purchase agreements, short-term performance 
pressures, and financial market regulations often inhibit them from 
investing in long-term low-carbon assets (Kaminker and Stewart, 
2012). Industrial firms also face constraints with extended payback 
periods, since they typically operate with a short-term horizon that 
requires rapid positive returns on investment (Della Croce et al., 2011). 
A significant positive consideration, however, is that low-carbon proj-
ects like waste heat, geothermal, wind, and solar have zero or negligi-
ble fuel price volatility risk.
Human resources and institutional capacity: The lack of technical 
and business capabilities at the firm, financial intermediary and regula-
tory level are significant barriers to harness low-carbon technologies, 
especially in many developing economies (Ölz and Beerepoot, 2010). In 
countries where private sector actors do not only own the low-carbon 
technology but are also predominately responsible for the diffusion of 
technologies in the market, capacity building efforts need to focus on 
these actors’ ability to develop, fund, and deploy the respective tech-
nologies (Lall, 2002; Figueiredo, 2003; Mitchell et al., 2011). 
16�4�3 Financial instruments
Policy instruments to incentivize mitigation activities are assessed in 
depth in Chapters 13, 14, and 15. Evidently a missing price signal for 
carbon emissions is a major obstacle for low-carbon investments. But 
not only in absence of such a price signal, other important measures 
can be applied to reduce critical barriers for low-carbon investment. 
Basic financial instruments are illustrated in Figure 16.1 and introduced 
in Section 16.4.1. This subsection focuses on three types of financial 
instruments with the following purposes: reducing risk, reducing the 
cost of capital, and providing access to capital, as well as enhancing 
cash-flows. Figure 16.5 illustrates in a simplified manner how these 
instruments can enhance market competitiveness of low-carbon proj-
ects. There is a growing literature on how the public sector can use 
these instruments to mobilize additional private finance, and can help 
to improve the risk-return profile of investments for low-carbon activi-
ties.
16�4�3�1 Reducing investment risks
Risk mitigation can play an essential part in helping to ensure that a 
successful project financing structure is achieved by transferring risk 
away from borrowers, lenders, and equity investors. Various instru-
ments provided by private insurers, and by means of public mecha-
nisms, can help to partially or fully reduce the exposure of investors to 
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political risk, exchange rate fluctuations, business interruption, short-
falls in output, delays or damage during fabrication, construction, and 
operation of a product, project, and company (Marsh, 2006).
There is a wide portfolio of proven commercial- and government-sup-
ported risk mitigation products that can be instrumental in efficiently 
expanding low-carbon investment. Their allocation and application 
requires a substantial level of expertise, experience, and resources 
available in specialized insurance companies, export credit agencies, 
and selected commercial and development banks. Examples of such 
products are highlighted below. They signal the potential for expanded 
use of risk mitigation instruments to support low-carbon investment 
(Frisari et al., 2013).
Credit enhancements / guarantees, such as commercial credit insur-
ance and government guarantees, usually cover part of the loan and 
reduce the loss incurred by a lender if the borrower is unable to repay 
a loan. The lender must still evaluate the creditworthiness and condi-
tions of the loan, but these instruments can reduce the interest rate 
and improve the terms, thereby expanding the available credit or 
reducing the costs (Stadelmann et al., 2011a).
Trade credit insurance provides partial protection against certain 
commercial risks (e. g., counterparty default) and political risks (e. g., 
war and terrorism, expropriation, currency transfer, or conversion 
limitations) and other risks like non-honouring of sovereign financial 
obligations or breach of contract by sovereign actors (MIGA, 2012; 
OPIC, 2012). Such insurance is provided by commercial insurance 
companies and by governments to their manufacturers, exporters, or 
financiers. 
Production and savings guarantees are typically provided to their 
clients by energy service companies (ESCOs) and large energy per-
formance contracting (EPC) contractors. Only proven practices and 
technologies are eligible to receive these guarantees, covering both 
technical risk (from customer payment default due to non-performance 
attributable to the ESCO or EPC contractor), and comprehensive risk 
(defaults due to technical and financial creditworthiness of the cus-
tomer) (IDB, 2011).
Local currency finance can be used if currency fluctuations are par-
ticularly risky for a project or company because a major investment is 
made in foreign currency and revenues are in local currency. Loans in 
local currency or risk management swaps to hedge foreign currency 
liability back into respective local currency can be provided by develop-
ment finance institutions (IFC, 2013; TCX, 2013a). Structured funds like 
the Currency Exchange Fund (TCX) are dedicated to hedge these cross-
border currency and interest rate mismatches (TCX, 2013b).
By the end of 2012, the 20 largest emitting developed and develop-
ing countries with lower risk country grades for private sector invest-
ments were producing 70 % of global energy-related CO2 emissions 
(Harnisch and Enting, 2013). In investment-grade countries, risk miti-
gation instruments and access to long-term finance can be provided 
at reasonably low costs, and have the potential to mobilize substantial 
additional private sector mitigation investments. In other countries, 
low-carbon investment would have to rely mainly on domestic sources 
or international public finance. 
16�4�3�2 Reducing cost of and facilitating access to 
capital
In many situations, mitigation measures imply additional or incre-
mental investments. Independent of the specific role of equity or debt 
finance in these individual investments, and irrespective of potential 
future reductions of operating and maintenance costs, the level of 
these investments can be a severe barrier to the investment decisions 
of different investors (as outlined in Section 16.4.2).
Concessional or ‘soft’ loans are repayable funds provided at terms 
more favourable than those prevailing on the market including lower 
interest rates, longer tenor, longer grace period, and reduced level of 
collateral. Providers of concessional loans are typically development 
banks on behalf of governments. In international cooperation, conces-
sional loans of varying degree and type have been established as main 
financing instruments to support public sector entities and local banks 
by bilateral and multilateral development banks (Maclean et al., 2008; 
Birckenbach, 2010; UNEP, 2010, 2011, 2012). In 2011, bilateral finance 
institutions, for instance, disbursed 73 % of their mitigation finance 
as concessional loans (UNEP, 2012). National finance institutions pro-
vided around 87 % of their climate funding in 2010 / 2011 via soft loans 
(Buchner et al., 2012).
Grants are non-repayable funds provided to a recipient for a specific 
purpose by a government, public financial institution or charity. Grants 
can play an important role in reducing up-front capital investment 
costs, and meeting viability gaps for projects that are more expensive 
than business-as-usual (Buchner et al., 2012).
Rebates provide immediate price reductions for purchase of an eligible 
product. Rebates can be structured to decline over time, encouraging 
early adopters and reflecting anticipated technology cost reductions 
(de Jager and Rathmann, 2008). Rebates are typically administered 
by retailers of respective products, in cooperation with a government 
agency.
Tax deductions or tax credits increase the after-tax cash flow for a 
specific investment. Hence, they can have a similar effect as soft loans 
by reducing the net annual payments for the amortization of a capi-
tal investment. They can be useful in enticing profitable enterprises to 
enter the market for renewable energies to reduce their tax liabilities. 
However, they require to be embedded in a country’s tax system and 
a base in the tax code. Additionally, the specific level cannot be easily 
adapted to changed market conditions and will depend on the specific 
tax burden of the taxed entity (Wohlgemuth and Madlener, 2000).
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Equity plays a critical role in financing a project and it is potentially 
attractive for governments to provide equity to companies or projects 
to support desirable activities. At the same time, limited expertise of 
the public sector in allocating capital in risky operations and in man-
agement of companies, and problems arising from the relationships of 
owners and regulators, are frequently cited as reasons against a broad 
public engagement as equity investor. In support of emission mitiga-
tion activities, a number of approaches have been successfully dem-
onstrated. Because of the challenges discussed above, some public 
sector investors have decided to limit their equity investment to minor-
ity stakes and apply clear investment criteria to avoid crowding-out of 
private investors and to use defined exit strategies (IFC, 2009).
16�4�3�3 Enhancing cash flow
Nationally agreed feed-in tariffs (FITs) or third-party guaranteed 
renewable energy premiums for individual power purchase agree-
ments provide a secure long-term cash-flow to operators of renewable 
energy systems — based on technology, system size, and project loca-
tion. Debt and equity for a project can hence be secured due to the 
long duration, the guaranteed off-take of the electricity generated, and 
the grid access. Consequently, FITs do not only increase and stabilize 
the return, but also reduce the risks for developers, lenders, and inves-
tors. As a result, the cost of capital and required rate of return can 
be reduced as well (Cory et al., 2009; Kubert and Sinclair, 2011). The 
FITs for renewable energy have been implemented in a broad range 
of industrialized and developing countries (Fulton et  al., 2010). The 
level of the FIT for a specific technology, region and time determines 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the programme, but it is difficult to 
establish the appropriate level up front and to adapt it as the market 
evolves and the technology matures.
CO2 Offset-Mechanisms can also provide additional cash flow via 
the sales of credits to support the economics of a mitigation invest-
ment. Unlike renewable energy premiums, however, there is uncer-
tainty about the future level of this payment stream. This has made 
many financiers hesitant to provide debt finance for these projects. 
Some MDBs, like the ADB have a provision to buy credits upfront con-
tributing to investment capital and reducing uncertainty on the future 
cash-flows from the sale of carbon credits (ADB, 2011; Asian Develop-
ment Bank, 2012).
16.5 Institutional arrangements 
for mitigation financing
Institutions are essential to channel climate finance to mitigation 
and adaptation measures (Stadelmann, 2013) and to ensure that the 
actions funded respond to national needs and priorities in an efficient 
and effective way.26 Through institutions, knowledge is accumulated, 
codified, and passed on in a way that is easily transferable and used to 
build capacities, share knowledge, transfer technologies, help develop 
markets, and build enabling environments for effective climate invest-
ments. Without proper institutions, some actions and investments may 
remain simply as stand-alone projects with no lasting effects, or a one-
off capital equipment supply rather than a transaction with a transfer 
of skills, know-how, full knowledge of the technology, and a contri-
bution to a broader system of innovation and technological change 
(Ockwell et al., 2008).
16�5�1 International arrangements
Global arrangements for climate change mitigation finance are 
essential for several reasons. Most commonly cited is the fact that 
because the earth’s climate is a public good, investing within borders 
is often not seen as beneficial to a particular country unless doing so 
becomes a collective effort (Pfeiffer and Nowak, 2006). The UNFCCC, 
among others, was established to address this dilemma and turn the 
global effort on climate change into a collective action that would be 
seen by all as beneficial to the whole (Burleson, 2007). Trusted institu-
tions are needed to channel and implement the funding in an orderly 
and efficient process. 
Funds that are part of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC are 
subject to guidance from the COP. Until recently, these included only 
the GEF Trust Fund, the SCCF and the LDCF, all of which are adminis-
tered by the GEF (see Section 16.2.1.1) (UNFCCC, 2013b). In 2010, the 
COP decided to establish the GCF to be designated as a new operating 
entity of the Financial Mechanism (UNFCCC, 2010). The GCF, that is 
currently being operationalized, is expected to become the main global 
fund to support climate action in developing countries, but it has not 
yet been capitalized. In addition, the Adaptation Fund has been estab-
lished under the Kyoto Protocol. 
The UNFCCC recognizes that funding for mitigation may come from a 
variety of sources and through a variety of channels beyond the finan-
cial mechanism, such as multilateral and bilateral institutions engaged 
in official development assistance. There has been an expansion in 
the number of public and private climate funds in the last decade. The 
UNDP estimates that over the last decade some 50 international public 
funds, 45 carbon market funds, in addition to 6000 private equity funds 
(set up largely independent of international climate policy) have been 
established for the purpose of funding climate change-related activi-
ties (UNDP, 2011). Some of these, such as CIFs are multi-donor funds 
administered by the World Bank but with their own governance and 
26 The term ‘institution’ in this context is defined narrowly to mean an established 
organization dedicated to facilitate, manage, or promote mitigation finance, as 
opposed to the broader meaning of the term commonly used in the study of the 
social sciences and used to mean a structure or mechanism of social order and 
cooperation governing the behaviour of individuals in society, e. g., the institutions 
of marriage or religion. 
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organizational structure. The CIFs were designed as an interim measure 
to demonstrate how scaled-up support can be provided and include 
a sunset clause linked to progress on the financial architecture under 
UNFCCC. They consist of two trust funds: the Clean Technology Fund 
(CTF), which promotes scaled-up financing for demonstration, deploy-
ment, and transfer of low-carbon technologies with significant poten-
tial for long-term GHG emissions savings, and the Strategic Climate 
Fund (SCF), under which are three separate initiatives for piloting trans-
formational, scaled-up action on climate change (World Bank, 2011b; 
c). The pledges and contributions to the CIFs are recorded as ODA, and 
therefore constitute a multi-bilateral arrangement (World Bank, 2010). 
The CDM and carbon funds are directly linked to emission. Prior to the 
decline of certificate prices, they played a central role in attracting cli-
mate investments. The CDM is one of three trading mechanisms cre-
ated by the Kyoto Protocol that a developed country can use to help 
meet its national commitment. The CDM allows a developed country 
to use credits issued for emission reductions in developing countries. 
The other two mechanisms — Joint Implementation (JI) and Interna-
tional Emissions Trading (IET) — involve only developed countries with 
national commitments. The CDM is the largest of the mechanisms 
(UNFCCC, 2013c). Some of the carbon funds have been established by 
multilateral financial institutions. The World Bank established the first 
fund, the Prototype Carbon Fund, in 1999, and has since created sev-
eral additional funds (World Bank, 2013). 
There are several institutions promoting mitigation finance by private 
actors, which frequently combine financial power of up to several tril-
lions. However, their scope of work differs considerably. Some of the 
major private sector institutions include inter alia the World Business 
Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD) (WBCSD, 2013), the 
Climate Markets and Investment Association (CMIA) (CMIA, 2013), 
and the Global Investor Coalition on Climate Change (Global Investor 
Coalition on Climate Change, 2013). 
Regional arrangements play an important role in fostering regional 
cooperation and stimulating action and funding. These regional insti-
tutions include the regional multilateral development banks and the 
regional economic commissions of the United Nations on the multilat-
eral side.27 They are increasingly engaging in the promotion of mitiga-
tion and adaptation activities in their respective regions and establish-
ing and helping to manage regional financing arrangements (Sharan, 
2008). In the Asia and Pacific region, examples of regional financial 
arrangements to promote funding for mitigation activities include 
ADB´s Clean Energy Financing Partnership Facility, the Asia Pacific Car-
bon Fund, and the Future Carbon Fund. Other regional development 
banks have been equally active (Asian Development Bank, 2013a; b; c).
27 Economic Commission for Latin America, Inter American Development Bank 
(IDB), Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), African Development Bank (AfDB), 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), European Bank for Reconstruction, 
and Development (EBRD).
Regional groupings such as the Economic Community for West African 
States (ECOWAS), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
the Secretariat for Central American Economic Integration, Merco-
sur, Corporación Andina de Fomento, and the Andean Pact, to name 
just a few, have been actively promoting sub-regional integration of 
energy systems and cooperation in climate change activities in devel-
oping countries for some years. In the developed world, one of the best 
examples of these regional political groupings is the European Union, 
which has been very active in the area of climate change and in sup-
porting activities in developing countries.
Bilateral cooperation arrangements are widely used by donor 
countries to provide funding to partner country governments and their 
implementing organizations. They frequently involve development 
banks and agencies with a proven track record in international coop-
eration. The three principal means to channel climate change fund-
ing bilaterally are (1) bilateral programmes for funding international 
cooperation in the energy, water, transport, or forestry, (2) dedicated 
funding windows established to target climate change funding open 
to a wider range of implementing institutions, and (3) new funds 
implemented by bilateral development institutions with their own 
governance structure. The OECD has established a framework for the 
implementation and reporting modalities that can be applied to all 
climate-relevant ODA and partially for other official flows (see OECD, 
(2013b) for agreed principles on statistics, effectiveness, evaluation, 
and the like). Officially supported export credits provided by export 
credit agencies on behalf of national governments are also covered by 
a respective OECD arrangement (OECD, 2013c).
Triangular cooperation arrangements are defined by the OECD as 
those involving a traditional donor, most likely a member of DAC, an 
emerging donor in the south (providers of South-South Cooperation), 
and the beneficiary countries or recipients of development aid (Forde-
lone, 2011). Although they have grown in number in recent years, 
triangular arrangements, and particularly those for climate change 
financing, are a relatively recent mode of development cooperation 
(ECOSOC, 2008). These arrangements have attracted a number of coun-
tries particularly for technology cooperation across sectors or specified 
industries. The rise of triangular arrangements has been driven by the 
growing role of middle-income countries and their increasing presence 
in providing development co-operation in addition to receiving it, and 
by the desire to experiment with other types of cooperation where the 
experience of developing countries can be brought to bear.
16�5�2 National and sub-national arrangements 
The landscape of institutional arrangements for action on climate 
change is diverse. In many countries, actions on climate change are not 
clearly defined as such. Consequently, many of the national arrange-
ments that exist to promote programmes and activities that contribute 
to mitigation do not appear in the literature as institutions dedicated 
to support climate finance.
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In many countries, particularly in developed countries and in a few 
larger developing countries, finance for mitigation comes mainly from 
the private sector, often with public support through regulatory and 
policy frameworks and / or specialized finance mechanisms. Institu-
tional arrangements and mechanisms that are successful in mobilizing 
and leveraging private capital tend to be more cost-effective in climate 
change mitigation, but some projects with low private investments 
(e. g., projects reducing industrial GHGs or projects owned by state-
owned enterprises) are also among the most cost-effective (Stadel-
mann, 2013). The institutions and public finance mechanisms are 
diverse, but all aim to help commercial financial institutions to do this 
job effectively and efficiently. Many of the institutions support special-
ized public finance mechanisms such as dedicated credit lines, guaran-
tees to share the risks of investments and debt financing of projects, 
microfinance or incentive funds, and schemes to mobilize R&D and 
technical assistance funds to build capacities across the sectors, includ-
ing the private and commercial sectors (Maclean et al., 2008). National 
development banks play an important role in financing domestic cli-
mate projects in many countries especially by providing concessional 
funding (Smallridge et al., 2012; Höhne et al., 2012; IDFC, 2013).
Many developing countries, other than the larger ones, are trying to 
cope with the multiplicity of sources, agents and channels offering cli-
mate finance (Glemarec, 2011). These efforts take two forms. 
One form is coordination of national efforts to address climate change 
by relevant government institutions. Very few developing countries 
have an institution fully dedicated to climate finance (Gomez-Echeverri, 
2010). Rather, climate finance decisions involve multiple ministries 
and agencies often coordinated by the ministry of the environment. 
Involvement of ministries of foreign affairs and ministries of finance 
is becoming more common due to their engagement in international 
negotiations and the promise of increased resources under UNFCCC. 
The second form is the establishment of specialized national funding 
entities designed specifically to mainstream climate change activities 
in overall development strategies. These institutions blend interna-
tional climate funding with domestic public funds and private sector 
resources (Flynn, 2011). Table 16.2 lists examples of national funding 
entities. A common feature is the desire to allocate resources for activi-
ties that are fully mainstreamed to the national needs and priorities. To 
do this, the national funding entities seek to tap the numerous interna-
tional sources of climate finance and supplement them with domestic 
resources. They are also expected to develop the governance and 
capacity requirements for ‘direct access’ to funds from the Adaptation 
Fund and the GCF.28
28 Direct access means that an accredited institution in the recipient country may 
receive funds directly to implement a project. Currently, most international funding 
institutions insist that projects be implemented by a multilateral development 
bank or UN agency.
In many countries, sub-national arrangements are increasingly becom-
ing an effective vehicle for advancing energy and climate change 
goals. These arrangements and the institutions that support them are 
being established to advance regional collaboration in areas of com-
mon interest and to benefit from greater efficiency and effectiveness 
through actions with greater geographical coverage (Setzer, 2009). For 
example, because of their population densities and economic activi-
ties, cities are major contributors to global GHG emissions, and as such 
they are major potential contributors to worldwide mitigation efforts 
(Corfee-Morlot et al., 2009). In recent years, there has been an increase 
in the number of networks and initiatives specifically dedicated to 
enhance the role of cities in the fight against climate change. As a 
result, these initiatives are potentially big contributors to mitigation 
efforts, but because of the lack of clear processes linking these initia-
tives to national and international climate change policy, their impact 
in broader policy frameworks is less certain (UN-Habitat, 2011). One 
possible opportunity for enhancing this linkage is through the new 
National Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) being submitted by 
developing countries within the context of UNFCCC. The NAMA pro-
cess agreed to at Bali provides an opportunity to incorporate sectoral 
policies with relevance to their cities (Li, 2011).
16�5�3 Performance in a complex institutional 
landscape
The institutional landscape for climate finance is becoming increas-
ingly complex as interest of actors to enter the field of climate change 
finance and mitigation activities in developing countries increases. As 
in other international cooperation, there are discussions about effec-
tiveness of climate finance (see OECD (2008) for politically agreed prin-
ciples on aid effectiveness). Concerns have been raised about divert-
ing attention and resources from development aid, i. e., ODA, such 
as health and education, the additionality of expanded funding for 
mitigation and adaptation (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011), the 
difficulty of defining and measuring comparable results and achieving 
coherence with national priorities and development strategies, the lack 
of transparency, the fragmentation and duplication of efforts, and that 
the number of established funds may undermine the authority of the 
operating entities of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC (Poerter 
et al., 2008). The proliferation of climate funds (HBF and ODI, 2013) 
and funding channels with their own governance procedures can cre-
ate a substantial bureaucratic burden for recipients (Greene, 2004). 
Compounding these problems is the fragmentation of governance 
architectures that prevail in most developing countries (Biermann 
et al., 2009). Climate finance may be more effective if the operation 
of related institutions is streamlined and the capacity in developing 
countries to cope with the increasing number of these institutions 
is developed further. Evidence on the effectiveness of institutions to 
mainstream climate change mitigation and adaptation activities is cur-
rently lacking.
Table 16�2 | A sample of national funding entities in developing countries. Sources: Adapted from Gomez-Echeverri (2010), updated based on UNDP and World Bank (2012), 
Amazon Fund (2012), BCCRF (2012), CDMF (2012), ICCTF (2012), World Bank (2012b), UNDP (2013b).
Name, country, 
establishment
Description Source of fund and operations Governance
Amazon Fund, Brazil
(2010)
Established to combat deforestation and promote 
sustainable development in the Amazon. Focus: 
adaptation and mitigation
Designed to attract national and private investment 
for Amazon rainforest projects as well as donations 
and earnings from non-reimbursable investments 
made
Managed by the Brazilian Development Bank 
(BNDES), a Guidance Committee composed of 
federal and state governments and civil society, and 
a Technical Committee 
Bangladesh Climate 
Change Resilience Fund 
(BCCRF)
(2010)
Established to provide support for the 
implementation of Bangladesh’s Climate 
Change Strategy and Action Plan 2009 – 2018 
and particularly vulnerable communities. Focus: 
adaptation and mitigation
Designed to attract funds from UNFCCC finance 
mechanisms, and direct donor support
Managed by a board composed of Ministers of 
Environment, Finance, Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, 
and Women and Children Affairs and disaster 
management, as well as donors and civil society 
organizations
China CDM Fund (CDMF)
(2007)
Established jointly by Ministries of Finance, Foreign 
Affairs, Science and Technology, and National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). 
Focus: mitigation
Funded by revenues generated from CDM projects 
in China, as well as grants from domestic and 
international institutions
Governed by the Board of the China CDM Fund that 
comprises representatives of seven line ministries, 
and managed and operated by a management 
centre affiliated with the Ministry of Finance
Indonesia Climate 
Change Trust Fund 
(ICCTF)
(2010)
Established jointly by the National Development 
Planning Agency and Ministry of Finance to pool and 
coordinate funds from various sources to finance 
Indonesia’s climate change policies and programmes 
Currently funded by grants from development 
partners but designed for direct access to 
international climate funding and to attract private 
funding
The UNDP is an interim Trustee operating under 
a Steering Committee headed by the National 
Development Planning Agency that also includes 
donors and other line ministries
Guyana REDD Investment 
Fund (GRIF)
(2010)
Established to finance activities under the Low 
Carbon Development Strategy of Guyana and to 
create an innovative climate finance mechanism. 
Focus: mitigation and adaptation
Designed to attract donor support. Operates under 
a performance-based funding modality, based on an 
independent verification of Guyana’s deforestation 
and forest degradation rates and progress on REDD+ 
enabling activities
A Steering Committee with members of government 
and financial contributors chaired by the 
Government of Guyana, is the decision making 
and oversight body. The International Development 
Association (IDA) of the World Bank Group acts as 
Trustee and the partner entities provide operational 
services
Ethiopia
Climate Resilient Green 
Economy Facility
(2012)
Established to support country’s vision of attaining a 
middle-income economy with low-carbon growth by 
2020. Focus: mitigation and adaptation
Designed to mobilize, access, and blend both local 
and international public and private resources to 
support Ethiopia’s Climate Resilience Green Economy 
Strategy 
Governed by a Ministerial Steering Committee 
chaired by Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development with an advisory body composed of 
development partners, multilateral organizations, 
national non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
civil society, private sector, and academia
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16.6 Synergies and tradeoffs 
between financing 
mitigation and adaptation 
This section introduces a conceptual framework linking adaptation 
and mitigation in terms of financing and investment. Estimates of 
investments needed for mitigation are provided in Section 16.2.2, and 
for adaptation investments in the sectoral chapters of the Working 
Group II report. First, this section addresses the interactions of financ-
ing adaptation and mitigation in terms of their specific effectiveness 
and tradeoffs, as well as their competition for funding over time. Sec-
ond, it discusses examples of integrated financing approaches.
16�6�1 Optimal balance between mitigation 
and adaptation and time dimension
Both mitigation and adaptation measures are necessary to effectively 
avoid harmful climate impacts. However, an assessment on whether, 
where, and which types of adaptation and mitigation measures and 
policies are substitutes or complements requires theoretical analysis and 
empirical evidence (Section 13.3.3). Investing in mitigation may reduce 
the need to invest in adaptation, and vice versa. Several authors have 
recognized that optimal mitigation and adaptation strategies should be 
jointly determined (Schelling, 1992; Kane and Shogren, 2000; Dellink 
et  al., 2009; Bosello et  al., 2010), including from the perspective of a 
global decision maker. The optimal balance of mitigation and adaptation 
depends on their relative costs, for any given profile of climate change 
impacts. To avoid inefficiencies, the socially discounted rate of return on 
resources invested in mitigation and adaptation should be equal. There-
fore, mitigation and adaptation compete to attract investments. From 
the perspective of simple economic models, a reduction in the costs of 
mitigation should lead to more mitigation and less adaptation, and, 
according to this view, they are substitutes (Ingham et al., 2005).
From the perspective of development and climate studies (Tol, 2007; 
Ayers and Huq, 2009), climate change in most cases will impact the 
economy by reducing its production potential (part of the residual 
damage), and the level of impacts will depend on its efficiency, diver-
sity, and vulnerability, as well as on how institutions are able to adapt. 
In many countries, particularly in developed countries and in a few 
larger developing countries, finance for mitigation comes mainly from 
the private sector, often with public support through regulatory and 
policy frameworks and / or specialized finance mechanisms. Institu-
tional arrangements and mechanisms that are successful in mobilizing 
and leveraging private capital tend to be more cost-effective in climate 
change mitigation, but some projects with low private investments 
(e. g., projects reducing industrial GHGs or projects owned by state-
owned enterprises) are also among the most cost-effective (Stadel-
mann, 2013). The institutions and public finance mechanisms are 
diverse, but all aim to help commercial financial institutions to do this 
job effectively and efficiently. Many of the institutions support special-
ized public finance mechanisms such as dedicated credit lines, guaran-
tees to share the risks of investments and debt financing of projects, 
microfinance or incentive funds, and schemes to mobilize R&D and 
technical assistance funds to build capacities across the sectors, includ-
ing the private and commercial sectors (Maclean et al., 2008). National 
development banks play an important role in financing domestic cli-
mate projects in many countries especially by providing concessional 
funding (Smallridge et al., 2012; Höhne et al., 2012; IDFC, 2013).
Many developing countries, other than the larger ones, are trying to 
cope with the multiplicity of sources, agents and channels offering cli-
mate finance (Glemarec, 2011). These efforts take two forms. 
One form is coordination of national efforts to address climate change 
by relevant government institutions. Very few developing countries 
have an institution fully dedicated to climate finance (Gomez-Echeverri, 
2010). Rather, climate finance decisions involve multiple ministries 
and agencies often coordinated by the ministry of the environment. 
Involvement of ministries of foreign affairs and ministries of finance 
is becoming more common due to their engagement in international 
negotiations and the promise of increased resources under UNFCCC. 
The second form is the establishment of specialized national funding 
entities designed specifically to mainstream climate change activities 
in overall development strategies. These institutions blend interna-
tional climate funding with domestic public funds and private sector 
resources (Flynn, 2011). Table 16.2 lists examples of national funding 
entities. A common feature is the desire to allocate resources for activi-
ties that are fully mainstreamed to the national needs and priorities. To 
do this, the national funding entities seek to tap the numerous interna-
tional sources of climate finance and supplement them with domestic 
resources. They are also expected to develop the governance and 
capacity requirements for ‘direct access’ to funds from the Adaptation 
Fund and the GCF.28
28 Direct access means that an accredited institution in the recipient country may 
receive funds directly to implement a project. Currently, most international funding 
institutions insist that projects be implemented by a multilateral development 
bank or UN agency.
Table 16�2 | A sample of national funding entities in developing countries. Sources: Adapted from Gomez-Echeverri (2010), updated based on UNDP and World Bank (2012), 
Amazon Fund (2012), BCCRF (2012), CDMF (2012), ICCTF (2012), World Bank (2012b), UNDP (2013b).
Name, country, 
establishment
Description Source of fund and operations Governance
Amazon Fund, Brazil
(2010)
Established to combat deforestation and promote 
sustainable development in the Amazon. Focus: 
adaptation and mitigation
Designed to attract national and private investment 
for Amazon rainforest projects as well as donations 
and earnings from non-reimbursable investments 
made
Managed by the Brazilian Development Bank 
(BNDES), a Guidance Committee composed of 
federal and state governments and civil society, and 
a Technical Committee 
Bangladesh Climate 
Change Resilience Fund 
(BCCRF)
(2010)
Established to provide support for the 
implementation of Bangladesh’s Climate 
Change Strategy and Action Plan 2009 – 2018 
and particularly vulnerable communities. Focus: 
adaptation and mitigation
Designed to attract funds from UNFCCC finance 
mechanisms, and direct donor support
Managed by a board composed of Ministers of 
Environment, Finance, Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, 
and Women and Children Affairs and disaster 
management, as well as donors and civil society 
organizations
China CDM Fund (CDMF)
(2007)
Established jointly by Ministries of Finance, Foreign 
Affairs, Science and Technology, and National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). 
Focus: mitigation
Funded by revenues generated from CDM projects 
in China, as well as grants from domestic and 
international institutions
Governed by the Board of the China CDM Fund that 
comprises representatives of seven line ministries, 
and managed and operated by a management 
centre affiliated with the Ministry of Finance
Indonesia Climate 
Change Trust Fund 
(ICCTF)
(2010)
Established jointly by the National Development 
Planning Agency and Ministry of Finance to pool and 
coordinate funds from various sources to finance 
Indonesia’s climate change policies and programmes 
Currently funded by grants from development 
partners but designed for direct access to 
international climate funding and to attract private 
funding
The UNDP is an interim Trustee operating under 
a Steering Committee headed by the National 
Development Planning Agency that also includes 
donors and other line ministries
Guyana REDD Investment 
Fund (GRIF)
(2010)
Established to finance activities under the Low 
Carbon Development Strategy of Guyana and to 
create an innovative climate finance mechanism. 
Focus: mitigation and adaptation
Designed to attract donor support. Operates under 
a performance-based funding modality, based on an 
independent verification of Guyana’s deforestation 
and forest degradation rates and progress on REDD+ 
enabling activities
A Steering Committee with members of government 
and financial contributors chaired by the 
Government of Guyana, is the decision making 
and oversight body. The International Development 
Association (IDA) of the World Bank Group acts as 
Trustee and the partner entities provide operational 
services
Ethiopia
Climate Resilient Green 
Economy Facility
(2012)
Established to support country’s vision of attaining a 
middle-income economy with low-carbon growth by 
2020. Focus: mitigation and adaptation
Designed to mobilize, access, and blend both local 
and international public and private resources to 
support Ethiopia’s Climate Resilience Green Economy 
Strategy 
Governed by a Ministerial Steering Committee 
chaired by Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development with an advisory body composed of 
development partners, multilateral organizations, 
national non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
civil society, private sector, and academia
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On the other hand, policies to address mitigation and / or adaptation 
could promote the transfer of technologies and financial resources, and 
strengthen institutions and markets, which could lead to the enhance-
ment of a country’s productive capacity (Halsnæs and Verhagen, 2007).
Combined mitigation and adaptation strategies taking into account 
cost-effectiveness may involve economic tradeoffs. The optimal bal-
ance, including allocation of resources, should be determined taking 
into account possible co-benefits, which may be difficult to assess. 
Many actions that integrate mitigation and adaptation have enough 
co-benefits to make obvious sense of their immediate implementation 
(see Working Group II report), in spite of the fact that in many cases, 
assessment of their effective combination, cost-effectiveness, and trad-
eoffs requires improved information, improved capacities for analysis 
and action, and further policymaking (Wilbanks and Sathaye, 2007). 
Modelling of any direct interaction between adaptation and mitiga-
tion in terms of their specific effectiveness and tradeoffs would also be 
desirable (Wang and McCarl, 2011).
An analysis on the time composition (timing of mitigation and adap-
tation) of the optimal climate change strategy is also important to 
assess how to best allocate climate change funds. Emerging frame-
works for assessing the tradeoffs between adaptation and mitigation 
include those from the point of view of risks and costs. People invest 
resources to reduce the risk they confront or create (Ehrlich and Becker, 
1972; Lewis and Nickerson, 1989). Recent studies have used inte-
grated assessment models to numerically calculate the optimal alloca-
tion of investments between mitigation and adaptation. They confirm 
the analytical insights of Kane and Shogren (2000) and suggest that 
investments in mitigation should anticipate investments in adaptation 
(Lecocq and Shalizi, 2007; de Bruin et al., 2009; Bosello et al., 2010). 
The reason for this is because climate and economic systems have iner-
tia and delaying action increases the costs of achieving a given tem-
perature target. These studies suggest that the competition between 
mitigation and adaptation funds extends over time.
By arguing “uncertainty on the location of damages reduces the benefits 
of ‘targeted’ proactive adaptation with regard to mitigation and reactive 
adaptation”, some authors reinforce the idea that it is optimal to wait to 
invest in adaptation (Lecocq and Shalizi, 2007). For the above reasons, 
Carraro and Massetti (2011) suggest that the greatest share of the GCF 
should finance emissions reductions rather than adaptation in develop-
ing countries. Other authors propose a framework that could integrate 
into an optimization model not only mitigation and adaptation, but also 
climate change residual damages. In the light of the uncertain impacts of 
climate change, prioritizing mitigation measures is justified, on the basis 
of a precautionary approach. Adaptation actions “should be optimally 
designed, consistently with mitigation, as a residual strategy addressing 
the damage not accommodated by mitigation” (Bosello et al., 2010). 
Wang and McCarl (2011) recognizes that, in terms of an overall invest-
ment shared between mitigation and adaptation, mitigation tackles 
the long-run cause of climate change while adaptation tackles the 
short-run reduction of damages and is preferred when damage stocks 
are small. Contrary to Bosello et al. (2010), they advocate that, instead 
of taking adaptation as a ‘residual’ strategy, well-planned adaptation 
is an economically effective complement to mitigation since the begin-
ning and should occur in parallel. Thus, adaptation investment should 
be considered as an important current policy option due to the near-
term nature of given benefits. 
Moreover, the optimal balance of adaptation and mitigation measures 
and investments should be determined in function of the magnitude 
of climate change; “if mitigation can keep climate change to a moder-
ate level, then adaptation can handle a larger share of the resulting 
impact vulnerabilities” (Wilbanks et al., 2007). While the uncertainties 
about specific pathways remain, and although there are different con-
siderations on their optimal balance, there is a general agreement that 
funding for both mitigation and adaptation is needed.
16�6�2 Integrated financing approaches
Despite the lack of modelling of any direct interaction between adapta-
tion and mitigation in terms of financing, there is an increasing interest 
in promoting integrated financing approaches, addressing both adap-
tation and mitigation activities in different sectors and at different lev-
els. Although the GCF will have thematic funding windows for adapta-
tion and mitigation, an integrated approach will be used to allow for 
cross-cutting projects and programmes (UNFCCC, 2011c, para 37).
The theoretical literature reviewed in Section 16.1.1 provides only gen-
eral guidance on financing mitigation and adaptation measures. Analy-
sis of specific adaptation and mitigation options in different sectors 
reveals that adaptation and mitigation can positively and negatively 
influence the effectiveness of each other (see also Working Group II 
report). Particular opportunities for synergies exist in some sectors 
(Klein et al., 2007), including agriculture (Niggli et al., 2009), forestry 
(Ravindranath, 2007; Isenberg and Potvin, 2010), and buildings and 
urban infrastructure (Satterthwaite, 2007). 
Mitigation activities have global benefits while most adaptation 
activities benefit a smaller geographical area or population. Funding 
sources with a regional, national or sub-national perspective, therefore, 
will increasingly favour adaptation over mitigation measures (Dowla-
tabadi, 2007; Wilbanks and Sathaye, 2007). Thus the sources of climate 
finance available may yield a mix of mitigation and adaptation mea-
sures quite different from the global optimal mix. Additional studies 
“to understand the complex way in which local adaptation aggregates 
to the global level” are needed (Patt et al., 2009). Although the optimal 
mix cannot be determined precisely, the availability of international cli-
mate finance for both mitigation and adaptation is necessary to coun-
teract such tendencies.
Taking into account the strong regional nature of climate change 
impacts, a regional financing arrangement will be more responsive 
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and relevant than a global one, and may play an important role in 
adaptation (Sharan, 2008). Regional funding tools have made arrange-
ments for financing adaptation activities in complement to mitigation 
measures: e. g., the Poverty and Environment Fund (PEF) of the Asian 
Development Bank promotes the mainstreaming of environmental and 
climate change considerations into development strategies, plans, pro-
grammes, and projects of the bank (ADB, 2003).
The AfDB acts as manager and coordinator of new funding for the 
Congo Basin forest ecosystem conservation and sustainable manage-
ment (UNEP, 2008). According to the operational procedures by AfDB, 
to be eligible for financing under the Congo Basin Forest Fund (CBFF), 
project proposals and initiatives considered for funding should, among 
other things, aim at slowing the rate of deforestation, contribute to 
poverty alleviation, provide some contribution to climate stabiliza-
tion and GHG emissions reduction, and may show environment, eco-
nomic, and social risk assessment in addition to appropriate mitigation 
measures, as well as be supported by national strategies to combat 
deforestation while preserving biodiversity and promoting sustainable 
development (AfDB, 2009). See Section 14.3.2 for additional informa-
tion on regional examples of cooperation schemes identifying syner-
gies between mitigation and adaptation financing. 
Many ongoing bilateral and multilateral development activities address 
mitigation and adaptation at the same time. A recent survey by Illmann 
et al. (2013) discusses examples from agriculture (conversion of fallow 
systems into continuously cultivated area; the reuse of wastewater for 
irrigation), forestry (reforestation with drought-resistant varieties; man-
grove plantations), and from the energy sector (rural electrification with 
renewable energy, production of charcoal briquettes from agricultural 
waste). The study identifies significant potential to further mobilize 
these synergies within existing development cooperation programmes.
Another point of debate regarding synergies and tradeoffs between 
financing mitigation and adaptation relates to the conceptual frame-
work that suggests allocating responsibility for international financing 
of adaptation based on the historical contribution of countries to climate 
change in terms of GHG emissions and their capacity to pay for the costs 
of adaptation at international level (Dellink et al., 2009). The provision of 
international climate finance, of course, raises other issues of equity and 
burden sharing, which are beyond the scope of this chapter.
16.7 Financing developed 
countries’ mitigation 
activities
This and the next section consider the manner in which developed and 
developing countries may choose to finance the incremental invest-
ments and operating costs associated with GHG mitigation activities. 
It is fully recognized that a country’s individual circumstances will in 
large part determine how financing is accomplished, and further, that 
individual national circumstances vary widely among members of the 
developed and developing country groups.
The manner in which developed countries finance their mitigation 
activities depends largely on the policies chosen to limit GHG emis-
sions and the ownership of the sources of emissions. Policies and 
ownership also determine the distribution of the burdens posed by 
the financing needs, i. e., if it will be financed by households and firms 
through higher prices, taxes, or both.
In 2011 and 2012, on average, 177 billion USD of global climate 
finances were invested in developed countries (49 % of the global 
total climate finance) of which the vast majority (81 %) originated in 
the same country as the investment was undertaken (2011 / 2012 USD) 
(Buchner et al., 2013b). Due to the financial crisis investment in renew-
able energy in developed countries dropped 14 % in 2009 (Frankfurt 
School-UNEP Centre and BNEF, 2012), but saw a rapid recovery due 
to the green stimulus packages (IEA, 2009; REN21, 2010). The eight 
development banks of OECD countries that are members of the 
International Development Finance Club (IDFC) allocated 28 billion 
USD (2011 USD) and 33 billion USD (2012 USD) ‘green’29 finance to 
domestic projects in 2011 and 2012, respectively (Höhne et al., 2012; 
IDFC, 2013). Public climate finance was also directed to developing 
countries at a range of 35 – 49 billion USD per year for 2011 and 2012 
(2011 / 2012 USD) (Buchner et al., 2013b).
Without climate policy, an estimated 96 (70 – 126) billion USD per year 
of investment in fossil power generation will occur in developed coun-
tries from 2010 – 2029; from 2030 to 2049, this figure increases to 131 
(86 – 215) billion USD per year. In a climate policy scenario compatible 
with a 2 °C warming limit in 2100, OECD countries are expected to 
reduce investments in fossil power generation by 57 % (– 2 to – 89 %) 
during 2010 – 2029, but investments will drop by 90 % (– 80 to – 98 %) 
during 2030 – 2049. Investment in renewable power generation instead 
will increase by 86 % (58 to 116 %) during 2010 – 2029 and by 200 % 
(77 to 270 %) during 2030 – 2049 (based on IEA (2011), Carraro et al. 
(2012), Calvin et al. (2012) and McCollum et al. (2013), used in Sec-
tion 16.2.2).
To date, public sourcing for climate finance originates primarily from 
general tax revenues. However, under ambitious stabilization targets, 
financial sources that yield mitigation benefits have the potential to 
generate high revenues that could be used for climate finance. Carbon 
taxes and the auctioning of emissions allowances carry the highest 
potential, a phaseout of fossil fuel subsidies, and a levy or emission 
trading scheme for international aviation and shipping emissions are 
29 ‘Green’ finance as reported by IDFC includes projects with other environmental 
benefits. Approximately 93 % (80 %) of the ‘green’ finance by IDFC in 2011 
(2012) was climate finance (Höhne et al., 2012; IDFC, 2013).
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estimated to generate considerable revenues as well (UNFCCC, 2007; 
AGF, 2010; World Bank Group et al., 2011). 
Most developed countries offer a reasonably attractive core and 
broader enabling environment for climate investments. Developed 
countries, as do many emerging economies, combine substantial 
energy-related GHG emission reduction potential with low country 
risks. At the end of 2012, 29 out of 36 assessed developed countries 
fell into the group of lower risk country grade, producing 39 % of 
global fuel-related CO2 emissions (Harnisch and Enting, 2013). Pri-
vate finance can thus be the main source of low-carbon investment in 
these countries, however private actors are often dependent on public 
support through regulatory and policy frameworks and / or specialized 
finance mechanisms.
While macroeconomic and policy risk have been reasonably low in the 
past, low-carbon policy risks have affected investments in developed 
countries. In principle, risk-mitigation instruments and access to long-
term finance can be provided at reasonably low cost. Suitable insti-
tutions exist to implement specialized public finance mechanisms to 
provide dedicated credit lines, guarantees to share the risks of invest-
ments, debt financing of projects, microfinance or incentive funds, and 
schemes to mobilize R&D and technical assistance funds for build-
ing capacities across the sectors. The institutions and types of public 
finance mechanisms in existence across countries are diverse but share 
the common aim of helping commercial financial institutions to effec-
tively and efficiently perform this job (Maclean et al., 2008).
In 2012, the most widespread fiscal incentives were capital subsidies, 
grants, and rebates. They were in place in almost 90 % of high-income 
countries. In 70 % of the countries public funds were used to support 
renewable energy, e. g., public investment loans and grants. Feed-in 
tariffs were in place in 27 high-income countries at national or state 
level (75 % of all countries analyzed) (REN21, 2012).
16.8 Financing mitigation activ-
ities in and for develop-
ing countries including for 
technology development, 
transfer, and diffusion
Analogous to the previous section, this section outlines key assess-
ment results for mitigation finance in and for developing countries, i. e., 
embracing domestic flows as well as financing provided by developed 
countries.
An estimated 51 % of the total global climate finance in 2011 and 
2012, namely on average 182  billion USD per year, was invested in 
developing countries (2011 / 2012 USD). Thereof, 72 % was originating 
in the same country as it was invested) (Buchner et  al., 2013b). The 
total climate finance flowing from developed to developing countries 
is estimated to be between 39 and 120 billion USD per year in 2011 
and 2012 (2011 / 2012 USD). This range covers public and the more 
uncertain flows of private funding for mitigation and adaptation. Clapp 
et al. (2012) estimate the total at 70 – 120 billion USD per year based 
on 2009 – 2010 data. Data from Buchner et al. (2013a) suggest a net 
flow to developing countries for 2010 and 2011 of the order of 40 to 
60 billion USD. North-South flows are estimated at 39 to 62 billion USD 
per year for 2011 and 2012 (2011 / 2012 USD) (Buchner et al., 2013b).
Public climate finance provided by developed countries to developing 
countries was estimated at 35 to 49 billion USD per year in 2011 and 
2012 (2011 / 2012USD) (Buchner et al., 2013b). Multilateral and bilat-
eral institutions played an important role in delivering climate finance 
to developing countries. Seven MDBs30 reported climate finance com-
mitments of about 24.1 and 26.8 billion USD in 2011 and 2012, respec-
tively31 (2011 and 2012 USD) (AfDB et al., 2012a; b, 2013). These insti-
tutions manage a range of multi-donor trust climate funds, such as the 
Climate Investment Funds, and the funds of the financial mechanism of 
the Convention (GEF, SCCF, LDCF). The GCF is expected to become an 
additional international mechanism to support climate activities in 
developing countries. Bilateral climate-related ODA commitments were 
at an average of 20 billion USD per year in 2010 and 2011 (2010 / 2011 
USD) (OECD, 2013a)32 and were implemented by bilateral development 
banks or bilateral agencies, provided to national government directly 
or to dedicated multilateral climate funds (Buchner et al., 2012). How-
ever, bilateral and multilateral commitments are not fully comparable 
due to differences between methodologies.
Climate projects in developing countries showed a higher share of bal-
ance-sheet financing and concessional funding provided by national 
and international development finance institutions than developed 
countries (Buchner et al., 2012). Domestic public development banks 
played an important role in this regard. The 11 non-OECD development 
30 African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Euro-
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment 
Bank (EIB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank (WB), 
and the International Finance Corporation (IFC).
31 The reporting is activity-based allowing counting entire projects but also project 
components. Recipient countries include developing countries and 13 EU member 
states. It covers grant, loan, guarantee, equity, and performance-based instru-
ments, not requiring a specific grant element. The volume covers MDBs’ own 
resources as well as external resources managed by the MDBs that might also be 
reported to OECD DAC (such as contributions to the GEF, CIFs, and Carbon Funds).
32 It covers total funding committed to projects that have climate change mitigation 
or adaptation as a ‘principal’ or ‘significant’ objective. The ODA is defined as 
those flows to countries on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral 
institutions provided by official agencies or by their executive agencies. Resources 
must be used to promote the economic development and welfare of developing 
countries as a main objective and they must be concessional in character (OECD, 
2013a).
Box 16�3 | Least Developed Countries’ investment and finance for low-carbon activities
This box highlights key issues related to investment and 
finance for Least Developed Countries (LDCs), however some 
of these issues are certainly also relevant for other developing 
countries.
Climate change increased the challenges LDCs are facing regard-
ing food, water, and energy that exacerbate sustainable develop-
ment. Most LDCs are highly exposed to climate change effects 
as they are heavily reliant on climate-vulnerable sectors such as 
agriculture (Harmeling and Eckstein, 2012). Most of the LDCs, 
already overwhelmed by poverty, natural disasters, conflicts, and 
geophysical constraints, are now at risk of further devastating 
impacts of climate change. In turn, they contribute very little to 
carbon emissions (Baumert et al., 2005; Fisher, 2013). 
At the same time, LDCs are faced with a lack of access to energy 
services and with an expected increase in energy demand due to 
the population and GDP growth. Of the 1.2 billion people without 
electricity in 2010, around 85 % live in rural areas and 87 % in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia. For cooking, the access 
deficit amounts to 2.8 billion people who primarily rely on solid 
fuels. About 78 % of that population lives in rural areas, and 96 % 
are geographically concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern 
Asia, Southern Asia, and South-Eastern Asia (Sustainable Energy 
for All, 2013) (see Section 14.3.2.1 for other estimates provided by 
the literature). By investing in mitigation activities in the early and 
interim stages, access to clean and sustainable energy can be pro-
vided and environmentally harmful technologies can potentially 
be leapfrogged. Consequently, needs for finance and investment 
are pressing both for adaptation and mitigation. 
Regarding specific mitigation finance needs, there are no robust 
data for LDCs. It is estimated that shifting the large populations 
that rely on traditional solid fuels (such as unprocessed biomass, 
charcoal, and coal) to modern energy systems and expanding 
electricity supply for basic human needs could yield substantial 
improvements in human welfare for a relatively low cost (72 – 95 
billion USD per year until 2030 to achieve nearly universal access) 
(Pachauri et al., 2013). For instance, in Bangladesh, the costs 
to provide a minimum power from solar home system’s energy 
source to off-grid areas was around 285 USD per household 
(World Bank, 2012c). However, the very few country studies on 
mitigation needs and costs are not representative of the whole 
group of LDCs and are not comparable. Data on international and 
domestic private sector activities in LDCs are also lacking, as are 
data on domestic public flows. With respect to North-South flows, 
the OECD DAC reported that developed countries provided 730 
million USD in mitigation related ODA to LDCs in the year 2011. 
Bangladesh received the highest share with 117 million USD, 
followed by Uganda and Haiti with more than 70 million USD 
(OECD, 2012).
Most LDCs have very few CDM projects that are also an impor-
tant vehicle for mitigation (UNFCCC, 2012d; UNEP Risø, 2013). 
To improve the regional distribution of CDM projects, the CDM 
Executive Board has promoted the regulatory reform of CDM 
standards, procedures, and guidelines. Furthermore, stakeholder 
interaction has been enhanced and a CDM loan scheme has been 
established by UNFCCC to provide interest-free loans for CDM 
project preparation in LDCs (UNFCCC, 2012e).
Some LDCs are starting to allocate public funds to mitigation and 
adaptation activities, e. g., NAPAs or national climate funds (Khan 
et al., 2012). However, pressing financial needs to combat poverty 
favour other expenditures over climate-related activities. 
Most LDCs struggle to provide an enabling environment for pri-
vate business activities, a very common general development issue 
(Stadelmann and Michaelowa, 2011). It is noteworthy that among 
the 30 lowest-ranking countries in the World Bank’s Doing Busi-
ness Index, 23 countries are LDCs (World Bank, 2011a). Obstacles 
to general private business activities in turn hinder long-term 
private climate investments (Hamilton and Justice, 2009). Due to 
very high perceived risk in LDCs, risk premiums are very high. This 
is particularly problematic as low-carbon investments are very 
responsive to the cost of capital (Eyraud et al., 2011). In a chal-
lenging environment, it is difficult to implement targeted public 
policies and financial instruments to mobilize private mitigation 
finance. Moreover, the weakness of technological capabilities in 
LDCs presents a challenge for successful development and transfer 
of climate-relevant technologies (ICTSD, 2012).
To develop along a low-carbon growth path, LDCs rely on interna-
tional grant and concessional finance. It is especially important to 
ensure the predictability and sustainability of climate finance for 
LDCs, as these countries are inherently more vulnerable to eco-
nomic shocks due to their structural weaknesses (UNCTAD, 2010).
While all donors and development institutions provide mitigation 
finance to LDCs, there are some dedicated institutional arrange-
ments, such as the LDCF and the SCCF under the Convention. 
Some LDCs have also implemented national funding institutions, 
e. g., Benin, Senegal, and Rwanda in the framework of the Adapta-
tion Fund, or the Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund.
While knowledge and data gaps regarding mitigation finance are 
generally higher in developing than in developed countries, they 
are even more severe in LDCs.
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developing countries (2011 / 2012 USD). Thereof, 72 % was originating 
in the same country as it was invested) (Buchner et  al., 2013b). The 
total climate finance flowing from developed to developing countries 
is estimated to be between 39 and 120 billion USD per year in 2011 
and 2012 (2011 / 2012 USD). This range covers public and the more 
uncertain flows of private funding for mitigation and adaptation. Clapp 
et al. (2012) estimate the total at 70 – 120 billion USD per year based 
on 2009 – 2010 data. Data from Buchner et al. (2013a) suggest a net 
flow to developing countries for 2010 and 2011 of the order of 40 to 
60 billion USD. North-South flows are estimated at 39 to 62 billion USD 
per year for 2011 and 2012 (2011 / 2012 USD) (Buchner et al., 2013b).
Public climate finance provided by developed countries to developing 
countries was estimated at 35 to 49 billion USD per year in 2011 and 
2012 (2011 / 2012USD) (Buchner et al., 2013b). Multilateral and bilat-
eral institutions played an important role in delivering climate finance 
to developing countries. Seven MDBs30 reported climate finance com-
mitments of about 24.1 and 26.8 billion USD in 2011 and 2012, respec-
tively31 (2011 and 2012 USD) (AfDB et al., 2012a; b, 2013). These insti-
tutions manage a range of multi-donor trust climate funds, such as the 
Climate Investment Funds, and the funds of the financial mechanism of 
the Convention (GEF, SCCF, LDCF). The GCF is expected to become an 
additional international mechanism to support climate activities in 
developing countries. Bilateral climate-related ODA commitments were 
at an average of 20 billion USD per year in 2010 and 2011 (2010 / 2011 
USD) (OECD, 2013a)32 and were implemented by bilateral development 
banks or bilateral agencies, provided to national government directly 
or to dedicated multilateral climate funds (Buchner et al., 2012). How-
ever, bilateral and multilateral commitments are not fully comparable 
due to differences between methodologies.
Climate projects in developing countries showed a higher share of bal-
ance-sheet financing and concessional funding provided by national 
and international development finance institutions than developed 
countries (Buchner et al., 2012). Domestic public development banks 
played an important role in this regard. The 11 non-OECD development 
30 African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Euro-
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment 
Bank (EIB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank (WB), 
and the International Finance Corporation (IFC).
31 The reporting is activity-based allowing counting entire projects but also project 
components. Recipient countries include developing countries and 13 EU member 
states. It covers grant, loan, guarantee, equity, and performance-based instru-
ments, not requiring a specific grant element. The volume covers MDBs’ own 
resources as well as external resources managed by the MDBs that might also be 
reported to OECD DAC (such as contributions to the GEF, CIFs, and Carbon Funds).
32 It covers total funding committed to projects that have climate change mitigation 
or adaptation as a ‘principal’ or ‘significant’ objective. The ODA is defined as 
those flows to countries on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral 
institutions provided by official agencies or by their executive agencies. Resources 
must be used to promote the economic development and welfare of developing 
countries as a main objective and they must be concessional in character (OECD, 
2013a).
Box 16�3 | Least Developed Countries’ investment and finance for low-carbon activities
This box highlights key issues related to investment and 
finance for Least Developed Countries (LDCs), however some 
of these issues are certainly also relevant for other developing 
countries.
Climate change increased the challenges LDCs are facing regard-
ing food, water, and energy that exacerbate sustainable develop-
ment. Most LDCs are highly exposed to climate change effects 
as they are heavily reliant on climate-vulnerable sectors such as 
agriculture (Harmeling and Eckstein, 2012). Most of the LDCs, 
already overwhelmed by poverty, natural disasters, conflicts, and 
geophysical constraints, are now at risk of further devastating 
impacts of climate change. In turn, they contribute very little to 
carbon emissions (Baumert et al., 2005; Fisher, 2013). 
At the same time, LDCs are faced with a lack of access to energy 
services and with an expected increase in energy demand due to 
the population and GDP growth. Of the 1.2 billion people without 
electricity in 2010, around 85 % live in rural areas and 87 % in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia. For cooking, the access 
deficit amounts to 2.8 billion people who primarily rely on solid 
fuels. About 78 % of that population lives in rural areas, and 96 % 
are geographically concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern 
Asia, Southern Asia, and South-Eastern Asia (Sustainable Energy 
for All, 2013) (see Section 14.3.2.1 for other estimates provided by 
the literature). By investing in mitigation activities in the early and 
interim stages, access to clean and sustainable energy can be pro-
vided and environmentally harmful technologies can potentially 
be leapfrogged. Consequently, needs for finance and investment 
are pressing both for adaptation and mitigation. 
Regarding specific mitigation finance needs, there are no robust 
data for LDCs. It is estimated that shifting the large populations 
that rely on traditional solid fuels (such as unprocessed biomass, 
charcoal, and coal) to modern energy systems and expanding 
electricity supply for basic human needs could yield substantial 
improvements in human welfare for a relatively low cost (72 – 95 
billion USD per year until 2030 to achieve nearly universal access) 
(Pachauri et al., 2013). For instance, in Bangladesh, the costs 
to provide a minimum power from solar home system’s energy 
source to off-grid areas was around 285 USD per household 
(World Bank, 2012c). However, the very few country studies on 
mitigation needs and costs are not representative of the whole 
group of LDCs and are not comparable. Data on international and 
domestic private sector activities in LDCs are also lacking, as are 
data on domestic public flows. With respect to North-South flows, 
the OECD DAC reported that developed countries provided 730 
million USD in mitigation related ODA to LDCs in the year 2011. 
Bangladesh received the highest share with 117 million USD, 
followed by Uganda and Haiti with more than 70 million USD 
(OECD, 2012).
Most LDCs have very few CDM projects that are also an impor-
tant vehicle for mitigation (UNFCCC, 2012d; UNEP Risø, 2013). 
To improve the regional distribution of CDM projects, the CDM 
Executive Board has promoted the regulatory reform of CDM 
standards, procedures, and guidelines. Furthermore, stakeholder 
interaction has been enhanced and a CDM loan scheme has been 
established by UNFCCC to provide interest-free loans for CDM 
project preparation in LDCs (UNFCCC, 2012e).
Some LDCs are starting to allocate public funds to mitigation and 
adaptation activities, e. g., NAPAs or national climate funds (Khan 
et al., 2012). However, pressing financial needs to combat poverty 
favour other expenditures over climate-related activities. 
Most LDCs struggle to provide an enabling environment for pri-
vate business activities, a very common general development issue 
(Stadelmann and Michaelowa, 2011). It is noteworthy that among 
the 30 lowest-ranking countries in the World Bank’s Doing Busi-
ness Index, 23 countries are LDCs (World Bank, 2011a). Obstacles 
to general private business activities in turn hinder long-term 
private climate investments (Hamilton and Justice, 2009). Due to 
very high perceived risk in LDCs, risk premiums are very high. This 
is particularly problematic as low-carbon investments are very 
responsive to the cost of capital (Eyraud et al., 2011). In a chal-
lenging environment, it is difficult to implement targeted public 
policies and financial instruments to mobilize private mitigation 
finance. Moreover, the weakness of technological capabilities in 
LDCs presents a challenge for successful development and transfer 
of climate-relevant technologies (ICTSD, 2012).
To develop along a low-carbon growth path, LDCs rely on interna-
tional grant and concessional finance. It is especially important to 
ensure the predictability and sustainability of climate finance for 
LDCs, as these countries are inherently more vulnerable to eco-
nomic shocks due to their structural weaknesses (UNCTAD, 2010).
While all donors and development institutions provide mitigation 
finance to LDCs, there are some dedicated institutional arrange-
ments, such as the LDCF and the SCCF under the Convention. 
Some LDCs have also implemented national funding institutions, 
e. g., Benin, Senegal, and Rwanda in the framework of the Adapta-
tion Fund, or the Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund.
While knowledge and data gaps regarding mitigation finance are 
generally higher in developing than in developed countries, they 
are even more severe in LDCs.
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bank members of IDFC provided 44 billion USD of domestic ‘green’33 
finance in 2011 and 2012 (2011 and 2012 USD) (Höhne et al., 2012; 
IDFC, 2013). 
According to UNFCCC (2011a), Annex  II countries provided an aver-
age of almost 10 billion USD per year of climate finance to develop-
ing countries. In 2009, developed countries committed to provide new 
and additional resources approaching 30 billion USD of ‘FSF’ to sup-
port mitigation and adaptation action in developing countries during 
2010 – 2012. The sum of the announced commitments exceeds 33 bil-
lion USD (UNFCCC, 2011b, 2012b; c, 2013a). Data on the amount actu-
ally disbursed is not available. Some analyses question whether these 
funds were ‘new and additional’ (Brown et al., 2010; Stadelmann et al., 
2010, 2011b).
There is limited robust information on the current magnitude of private 
flows from developed to developing countries. Clapp et al. (2012) esti-
mate the private investment at 37 – 72 billion USD per year based on 
2009 – 2010 data (2008 / 2009 USD) and Stadelmann et al. (2013) esti-
mate foreign direct investment as equity and loans in the range of 10 
to 37 billion USD (2010 and 2008 USD) per year based on 2008 – 2011 
data. 
In reference scenarios as well as in policy scenarios compatible with a 
2 °C warming target in 2100, non-OECD countries absorb the greatest 
share of incremental investments in power generation technologies. 
Without climate policy, investments in the power sector are mainly 
directed towards fossil fuels. About 73 % (65 % to 80 %) of global 
investment in fossil power plants between 2010 – 2029, and 78 % 
(76 to 80 %) between 2030 – 2049, would flow into in the non-OECD 
because many developing countries rely on low-cost coal power plants 
to supply an ever-growing demand of electricity in the scenarios exam-
ined (based on IEA (2011), Carraro et al. (2012), Calvin et al. (2012), 
and McCollum et al. (2013) used in Section 16.2.2). In a climate policy 
scenario compatible with a 2 °C warming limit in 2100, non-OECD 
countries are expected to absorb 51 % (34 % to 66 %) of incremental 
average annual investment in renewables over 2010 – 2029, and 67 % 
(61 % to 73 %) over 2030 – 2049. 
In tackling climate change, developing countries face different types 
and magnitudes of constraints. Out of the 149 assessed develop-
ing countries, only 37 were assigned lower risk country grades. These 
countries, being attractive for international private sector investment 
in low-carbon technologies, represent 38 % of global CO2 emissions. 
However, the majority of developing countries currently exhibits higher 
country risk grades — reflecting less attractive international invest-
33 ‘Green’ finance as reported by IDFC includes projects with other environmental 
benefits. Approximately 93 % (80 %) of the ‘green’ finance by IDFC in 2011 
(2012) was climate finance (Höhne et al., 2012; IDFC, 2013). 
ment conditions — and finds it more difficult to attract foreign private 
investment (Harnisch and Enting, 2013). Moreover, the lack of techni-
cal capacity and training systems is a significant barrier for low-carbon 
investment in many developing economies (Ölz and Beerepoot, 2010). 
Between 2005 and 2009, developed countries provided 2.5 billion 
USD of ODA to support creation of general enabling environments in 
developing countries (2005 – 2009 USD) (Stadelmann and Michaelowa, 
2011).
Since investment risks for low-carbon projects in developing countries 
are typically perceived to be higher than in developed countries, the 
cost of capital and the return requirements of investors are respectively 
higher. The IRR for general infrastructure in developing countries, for 
instance, is a median of 20 % compared to about 12 % in developed 
countries (Ward et  al., 2009). Access to affordable long-term capital 
is limited in many developing countries (Maclean et al., 2008), where 
local banks are not able to lend for 15 – 25 years due to balance sheet 
constraints (Hamilton, 2010), such as the mismatch in the maturity of 
assets and liabilities. In addition, appropriate financing mechanism for 
end-users’ up-take are also often missing (Derrick, 1998). Moreover, 
equity finance is scarce in many developed countries, increasing the 
dependence on project finance. Especially in low-income countries, 
project sponsors frequently rely on external assistance to cover project 
development costs for many investments because of their high risks 
and non-commercial nature (World Bank, 2011d).
Many developing countries use a range of incentives for investments 
in renewable energies (REs), especially fiscal incentives (OECD, 2013d). 
Public financing instruments to stimulate RE, such as public invest-
ment, loans, or grants, were in place in 57 % of the countries analyzed 
and FITs were established in 39 developing countries in 2012 (REN21, 
2012). Carbon pricing has not yet widely been adopted by develop-
ing countries, apart from the non-perfect carbon price incentive via the 
CDM. However, currently new ETS are set up, planned, or under con-
sideration in some developing countries such as China (provinces and 
cities), Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Chile, Brazil, and South Korea, but it will 
take time until such ETS will be fully operational and provide enough 
investment certainty (Kossoy et al., 2013).
Regional groupings such as the ECOWAS, the ASEAN, and the Merco-
sur, have been actively promoting sub-regional integration of energy 
systems and cooperation in climate change activities.
On the national level, there is an on-going attempt to cope with 
the multiplicity of sources, agents, and channels offering financial 
resources for climate action (Glemarec, 2011). Most developing coun-
tries rely on relevant ministries and agencies chaired by the ministry 
of the environment or finance to coordinate climate change finance 
(Gomez-Echeverri, 2010). Some developing countries are establishing 
national implementing entities and funds that mainstream climate 
change activities into overall development strategies. Often these insti-
tutions are designed to blend international funding with domestic and 
private sector resources (Flynn, 2011).
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16.9 Gaps in  knowledge 
and data 
Scientific literature on investment and finance for low-carbon activities 
is still very limited and knowledge gaps are substantive. 
•	 Common definitions and data availability. To date there are no 
common definitions for central concepts related to climate finance 
or financial accounting rules. Neither are there complete or rea-
sonably accurate data on current climate finance and its compo-
nents, namely developed country sources or commitments, devel-
oping country sources or commitments, international flows, and 
private vs. public sources. The role of domestic and South-South 
flows and domestic investments in developing countries is also not 
adequately understood and documented. Frequently it is not pos-
sible to distinguish exactly between adaptation and development 
finance, since they are closely interconnected. Another difficult 
assessment is on the differences between funding under the ODA 
and ‘new and additional’ funds available. Important metrics like 
the high-carbon investment by sub-sector and region, the carbon 
intensity of new investments, downward deviations from reference 
emission pathways, or the cost-effectiveness of global mitigation 
investments are not tracked systematically. 
•	 Model outputs and approaches. Only very limited model results 
exist for additional investments and incremental costs to abate 
CO2 emissions in sectors other than energy supply, e. g., via energy 
efficiency in industry, buildings, and transport, as well as in other 
sectors like forestry, agriculture, and waste, or to mitigate process 
and non-CO2 emissions in the petroleum and gas, cement, and 
chemical industry, or from refrigeration and air conditioning. Very 
limited analysis has been published that takes a globally consis-
tent perspective of incremental investments and costs at the level 
of nation states and regions. This perspective could enrich the sci-
entific discussion because global and regional netting approaches 
among sectors and sub-sectors may fall short of the complexity of 
real political decision making processes.
•	 A comprehensive and transparent treatment of investment and 
technology risks in energy models is not available. The impact of 
fuel price volatility on low-carbon investments is generally not 
considered. Reasonably robust quantitative results of the need for 
additional R&D for low-carbon technologies and practices and on 
the timing of these needs (infrastructure and technology deploy-
ment roadmaps) are not available. While there is literature on miti-
gation technology diffusion and transfer in general, it is not clear 
whether specific financial requirements to this end are different 
from finance for other mitigation activities.
•	 For the energy sector, there is no convergence on the order of mag-
nitude of net incremental investment costs across its sub-sectors. 
Interactions of stringent climate policies with overall growth and 
investment of individual economies and the world economy as a 
whole are also not yet well understood.
•	 Effectiveness and efficiency of climate finance� Knowledge 
about enabling environments for effective deployment of climate 
finance in any country is insufficient. There is very limited empirical 
evidence to relate the concept of low-carbon activities to macro 
determinants from a cross-country perspective. More research is 
especially needed regarding determinants for mitigation invest-
ment in LDCs.
•	 There is only case-specific knowledge by practitioners on the selec-
tion and combination of instruments that are most effective at 
shifting (leveraging) private investment to mitigation and adapta-
tion. There is no general understanding of what are the efficient 
levers to mobilize private investment and its potential in any coun-
try (since they will differ by investment and country). 
•	 The effectiveness of different public climate finance channels in 
driving low-carbon development is insufficiently analyzed. Esti-
mates of the incremental cost value of public guarantees, export 
insurances, and non-concessional loans of development banks 
would provide valuable insights. Little is known on determinants 
for an economically efficient and effective allocation of public 
climate finance. A comprehensive assessment of the interrelation 
between private and public sector actors in sharing incremental 
costs and risks of mitigation investments, for example, via conces-
sional loans or guarantee instruments has not been undertaken 
yet. 
•	 There is no agreement yet which institutional arrangements are 
more effective at which level (international — national — local) and 
for what investment in which sector. However, an understanding of 
the key determinants of this efficiency and of the nature of a future 
international climate policy agreement is needed first.
•	 Balance between mitigation and adaptation finance and 
investment� The optimal balance, including its time dimension, 
is a difficult exercise given the lack of modelling of any direct 
interaction between adaptation and mitigation in terms of their 
specific effectiveness and tradeoffs. A better-informed assessment 
of the effective integration of mitigation and adaptation, includ-
ing tradeoffs and cost avoidance estimates, is needed. Moreover, 
there is limited research and literature to assess synergies and 
tradeoffs between and across sector-specific mitigation and adap-
tation measures from the specific financing and investment point 
of view.
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16.10 Frequently Asked 
Questions
FAQ 16�1 What is climate finance?
There is no agreed definition of climate finance. The term ‘climate 
finance’ is applied both to the financial resources devoted to address-
ing climate change globally and to financial flows to developing 
countries to assist them in addressing climate change. The literature 
includes multiple concepts within each of these broad categories. 
There are basically three types of metrics for financial resources 
devoted to addressing climate change globally� Total climate 
finance includes all financial flows whose expected effect is to reduce 
net greenhouse gas emissions and / or to enhance resilience to the 
impacts of climate variability and the projected climate change. This 
covers private and public funds, domestic and international flows, 
expenditures for mitigation and adaptation, and adaptation to current 
climate variability as well as future climate change. It covers the full 
value of the financial flow rather than the share associated with the 
climate change benefit; e. g., the entire investment in a wind turbine 
rather than the portion attributed to the emission reductions. The incre-
mental investment is the extra capital required for the initial invest-
ment to implement a mitigation or adaptation measure, for example, 
the investment in wind turbines less the investment that would have 
been required for a natural gas generating unit displaced. Since the 
value depends on a hypothetical alternative, the incremental invest-
ment is uncertain. The incremental costs reflect the cost of capital of 
the incremental investment and the change of operating and main-
tenance costs for a mitigation or adaptation project in comparison to 
a reference project. It can be calculated as the difference of the net 
present values of the two projects. Values depend on the incremental 
investment as well as projected operating costs, including fossil fuel 
prices, and the discount rate. 
Financial flows to assist developing countries in addressing cli-
mate change typically cover the following three concepts. The total 
climate finance flowing to developing countries is the amount of the 
total climate finance invested in developing countries that comes from 
developed countries. This covers private and public funds for mitiga-
tion and adaptation. Public climate finance provided to developing 
countries is the finance provided by developed countries’ governments 
and bilateral institutions as well as multilateral institutions for mitiga-
tion and adaptation activities in developing countries. Private climate 
finance flowing to developing countries is finance and investment by 
private actors in / from developed countries for activities in develop-
ing countries. Under the UNFCCC, climate finance is not well-defined. 
Annex II Parties provide and mobilize funding for climate related activ-
ities in developing countries. Most of the funds provided are conces-
sional loans and grants.
FAQ 16�2 How much investment and finance 
is currently directed to projects that 
contribute to mitigate climate change 
and how much extra flows will be 
required in the future to stay below the 
2 °C limit?
Current climate finance was estimated at around 359 billion USD per 
year of which 337 billion USD per year was invested in mitigation 
using a mix of 2011 and 2012 data (2011 / 2012 USD). This covers the 
full investment in mitigation measures, such as renewable energy gen-
eration technologies that also produce other goods or services. Climate 
finance invested in developed countries amounted to 177 billion USD 
and in developing countries 182 billion USD (2011 / 2012 USD). 
Climate policy is expected to induce a significant change in invest-
ment pattern in all scenarios compatible with a 2 °C limit. Based on 
data from a limited number of scenarios, there would need to hap-
pen a remarkable reallocation of investments in the power sector 
from fossil fuels to low-emissions generation technologies (renew-
able power generation, nuclear, and electricity generation with CCS). 
While annual investment in conventional fossil-fired power plants 
without CCS is estimated to decline by about 30 billion USD per year 
in 2010 – 2029 (i. e., by 20 % compared to 2010), annual investment 
in low-emission generation technologies is expected to increase by 
about 147 billion USD per year (i. e., by 100 % compared to 2010), 
over the same period.
Investment in energy efficiency in the building, transport, and industry 
sector would need to increase by several hundred billion USD per year 
from 2010 – 2029. Information on investment needs in other sectors, 
e. g., CO2 to abatement processes or non-CO2 emissions, is sparse. 
Model results suggest that deforestation could be reduced against cur-
rent deforestation trends by 50 % with an investment of 21 to 35 bil-
lion USD annually.
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Glossary
This glossary defines some specific terms as the Lead Authors 
intend them to be interpreted in the context of this report. Glos-
sary entries (highlighted in bold) are by preference subjects; a 
main entry can contain subentries, in bold and italic, for example, 
Primary Energy is defined under the entry Energy. Blue, itali-
cized words indicate that the term is defined in the Glossary. The 
glossary is followed by a list of acronyms and chemical symbols. 
Please refer to Annex II for standard units, prefixes, and unit con-
version (Section A.II.1) and for regions and country groupings 
(Section A.II.2).
Abrupt climate change: A large-scale change in the climate system 
that takes place over a few decades or less, persists (or is anticipated 
to persist) for at least a few decades, and causes substantial disrup-
tions in human and natural systems. See also Climate threshold.
Adaptability: See Adaptive capacity. 
Adaptation: The process of adjustment to actual or expected climate 
and its effects. In human systems, adaptation seeks to moderate or 
avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In some natural sys-
tems, human intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected cli-
mate and its effects.1 
Adaptation Fund: A Fund established under the Kyoto Protocol in 
2001 and officially launched in 2007. The Fund finances adaptation 
projects and programmes in developing countries that are Parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol. Financing comes mainly from sales of Certified 
Emissions Reductions (CERs) and a share of proceeds amounting to 
2 % of the value of CERs issued each year for Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) projects. The Adaptation Fund can also receive 
funds from government, private sector, and individuals.
Adaptive capacity: The ability of systems, institutions, humans, and 
other organisms to adjust to potential damage, to take advantage of 
opportunities, or to respond to consequences.2 
Additionality: Mitigation projects (e. g., under the Kyoto Mecha-
nisms), mitigation policies, or climate finance are additional if they go 
beyond a business-as-usual level, or baseline. Additionality is required 
to guarantee the environmental integrity of project-based offset mech-
anisms, but difficult to establish in practice due to the counterfactual 
nature of the baseline.
1 Reflecting progress in science, this glossary entry differs in breadth and focus from 
the entry used in the Fourth Assessment Report and other IPCC reports.
2 This glossary entry builds from definitions used in previous IPCC reports and the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA, 2005).
Adverse side-effects: The negative effects that a policy or measure 
aimed at one objective might have on other objectives, without yet 
evaluating the net effect on overall social welfare. Adverse side-effects 
are often subject to uncertainty and depend on, among others, local 
circumstances and implementation practices. See also Co-benefits, 
Risk, and Risk tradeoff.
Aerosol: A suspension of airborne solid or liquid particles, with a 
typical size between a few nanometres and 10 μm that reside in the 
atmosphere for at least several hours. For convenience the term aero-
sol, which includes both the particles and the suspending gas, is often 
used in this report in its plural form to mean aerosol particles. Aerosols 
may be of either natural or anthropogenic origin. Aerosols may influ-
ence climate in several ways: directly through scattering and absorbing 
radiation, and indirectly by acting as cloud condensation nuclei or ice 
nuclei, modifying the optical properties and lifetime of clouds. Atmo-
spheric aerosols, whether natural or anthropogenic, originate from two 
different pathways: emissions of primary particulate matter (PM), and 
formation of secondary PM from gaseous precursors. The bulk of aero-
sols are of natural origin. Some scientists use group labels that refer 
to the chemical composition, namely: sea salt, organic carbon, black 
carbon (BC), mineral species (mainly desert dust), sulphate, nitrate, and 
ammonium. These labels are, however, imperfect as aerosols combine 
particles to create complex mixtures. See also Short-lived climate pol-
lutants (SLCPs).
Afforestation: Planting of new forests on lands that historically have 
not contained forests. Afforestation projects are eligible under a num-
ber of schemes including, among others, Joint Implementation (JI) and 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol 
for which particular criteria apply (e. g., proof must be given that the 
land was not forested for at least 50 years or converted to alternative 
uses before 31 December 1989).
For a discussion of the term forest and related terms such as afforesta-
tion, reforestation and deforestation, see the IPCC Special Report on 
Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (IPCC, 2000). See also the 
report on Definitions and Methodological Options to Inventory Emis-
sions from Direct Human-induced Degradation of Forests and Deveg-
etation of Other Vegetation Types (IPCC, 2003).
Agreement: In this report, the degree of agreement is the level of con-
currence in the literature on a particular finding as assessed by the 
authors. See also Evidence, Confidence, Likelihood, and Uncertainty.
Agricultural emissions: See Emissions.
Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU): Agriculture, 
Forestry and Other Land Use plays a central role for food security and 
sustainable development (SD). The main mitigation options within 
AFOLU involve one or more of three strategies: prevention of emis-
sions to the atmosphere by conserving existing carbon pools in soils 
or vegetation or by reducing emissions of methane (CH4) and nitrous 
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oxide (N2O); sequestration — increasing the size of existing carbon 
pools, and thereby extracting carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmo-
sphere; and substitution — substituting biological products for fossil 
fuels or energy-intensive products, thereby reducing CO2 emissions. 
Demand-side measures (e. g., by reducing losses and wastes of food, 
changes in human diet, or changes in wood consumption) may also 
play a role. FOLU (Forestry and Other Land Use) — also referred to as 
LULUCF (Land use, land-use change, and forestry) — is the subset of 
AFOLU emissions and removals of greenhouse gases (GHGs) result-
ing from direct human-induced land use, land-use change and forestry 
activities excluding agricultural emissions.
Albedo: The fraction of solar radiation reflected by a surface or object, 
often expressed as a percentage. Snow-covered surfaces have a high 
albedo, the albedo of soils ranges from high to low, and vegetation-
covered surfaces and oceans have a low albedo. The earth’s planetary 
albedo varies mainly through varying cloudiness, snow, ice, leaf area 
and land cover changes. 
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS): The Alliance of Small Island 
States (AOSIS) is a coalition of small islands and low-lying coastal 
countries with a membership of 44 states and observers that share 
and are active in global debates and negotiations on the environment, 
especially those related to their vulnerability to the adverse effects of 
climate change. Established in 1990, AOSIS acts as an ad-hoc lobby and 
negotiating voice for small island development states (SIDS) within the 
United Nations including the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) climate change negotiations.
Ancillary benefits: See Co-benefits. 
Annex I Parties / countries: The group of countries listed in Annex 
I to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). Under Articles 4.2 (a) and 4.2 (b) of the UNFCCC, Annex 
I Parties were committed to adopting national policies and measures 
with the non-legally binding aim to return their greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. The group is largely similar to the 
Annex B Parties to the Kyoto Protocol that also adopted emissions 
reduction targets for 2008 – 2012. By default, the other countries are 
referred to as Non-Annex I Parties.
Annex II Parties / countries: The group of countries listed in Annex 
II to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). Under Article 4 of the UNFCCC, these countries have a spe-
cial obligation to provide financial resources to meet the agreed full 
incremental costs of implementing measures mentioned under Article 
12, paragraph 1. They are also obliged to provide financial resources, 
including for the transfer of technology, to meet the agreed incremen-
tal costs of implementing measures covered by Article 12, paragraph 
1 and agreed between developing country Parties and international 
entities referred to in Article 11 of the UNFCCC. This group of coun-
tries shall also assist countries that are particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change. 
Annex B Parties / countries: The subset of Annex I Parties that have 
accepted greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction targets for the 
period 2008 – 2012 under Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol. By default, 
the other countries are referred to as Non-Annex I Parties. 
Anthropogenic emissions: See Emissions.
Assigned Amount (AA): Under the Kyoto Protocol, the AA is the 
quantity of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that an Annex B country 
has agreed to as its cap on its emissions in the first five-year commit-
ment period (2008 – 2012). The AA is the country’s total GHG emissions 
in 1990 multiplied by five (for the five-year commitment period) and by 
the percentage it agreed to as listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol 
(e. g., 92 % for the EU). See also Assigned Amount Unit (AAU).
Assigned Amount Unit (AAU): An AAU equals 1 tonne (metric ton) of 
CO2-equivalent emissions calculated using the Global Warming Poten-
tial (GWP). See also Assigned Amount (AA).
Atmosphere: The gaseous envelope surrounding the earth, divided 
into five layers — the troposphere which contains half of the earth’s 
atmosphere, the stratosphere, the mesosphere, the thermosphere, 
and the exosphere, which is the outer limit of the atmosphere. The 
dry atmosphere consists almost entirely of nitrogen (78.1 % volume 
mixing ratio) and oxygen (20.9 % volume mixing ratio), together 
with a number of trace gases, such as argon (0.93 % volume mixing 
ratio), helium and radiatively active greenhouse gases (GHGs) such 
as carbon dioxide (CO2) (0.035 % volume mixing ratio) and ozone 
(O3). In addition, the atmosphere contains the GHG water vapour 
(H2O), whose amounts are highly variable but typically around 1 % 
volume mixing ratio. The atmosphere also contains clouds and aero-
sols.
Backstop technology: Models estimating mitigation often use an 
arbitrary carbon-free technology (often for power generation) that 
might become available in the future in unlimited supply over the hori-
zon of the model. This allows modellers to explore the consequences 
and importance of a generic solution technology without becoming 
enmeshed in picking the actual technology. This ‘backstop’ technology 
might be a nuclear technology, fossil technology with Carbon Dioxide 
Capture and Storage (CCS), solar energy, or something as yet unimag-
ined. The backstop technology is typically assumed either not to cur-
rently exist, or to exist only at higher costs relative to conventional 
alternatives.
Banking (of Assigned Amount Units) : Any transfer of Assigned 
Amount Units (AAUs) from an existing period into a future commit-
ment period. According to the Kyoto Protocol [Article 3 (13)], Parties 
included in Annex I to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) may save excess AAUs from the first com-
mitment period for compliance with their respective cap in subsequent 
commitment periods (post-2012).
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Baseline / reference: The state against which change is measured. 
In the context of transformation pathways, the term ‘baseline sce-
narios’ refers to scenarios that are based on the assumption that no 
mitigation policies or measures will be implemented beyond those that 
are already in force and / or are legislated or planned to be adopted. 
Baseline scenarios are not intended to be predictions of the future, 
but rather counterfactual constructions that can serve to highlight 
the level of emissions that would occur without further policy effort. 
Typically, baseline scenarios are then compared to mitigation scenar-
ios that are constructed to meet different goals for greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions, atmospheric concentrations, or temperature change. 
The term ‘baseline scenario’ is used interchangeably with ‘reference 
scenario’ and ‘no policy scenario’. In much of the literature the term 
is also synonymous with the term ‘business-as-usual (BAU) scenario,’ 
although the term ‘BAU’ has fallen out of favour because the idea of 
‘business-as-usual’ in century-long socioeconomic projections is hard 
to fathom. See also Climate scenario, Emission scenario, Representa-
tive concentration pathways (RCPs), Shared socio-economic pathways, 
Socio-economic scenarios, SRES scenarios, and Stabilization.
Behaviour: In this report, behaviour refers to human decisions and 
actions (and the perceptions and judgments on which they are based) 
that directly or indirectly influence mitigation or the effects of poten-
tial climate change impacts (adaptation). Human decisions and actions 
are relevant at different levels, from international, national, and sub-
national actors, to NGO, tribe, or firm-level decision makers, to com-
munities, households, and individual citizens and consumers. See also 
Behavioural change and Drivers of behaviour.
Behavioural change: In this report, behavioural change refers to 
alteration of human decisions and actions in ways that mitigate cli-
mate change and / or reduce negative consequences of climate change 
impacts. See also Drivers of behaviour.
Biochar: Biomass stabilization can be an alternative or enhancement 
to bioenergy in a land-based mitigation strategy. Heating biomass 
with exclusion of air produces a stable carbon-rich co-product (char). 
When added to soil a system, char creates a system that has greater 
abatement potential than typical bioenergy. The relative benefit of bio-
char systems is increased if changes in crop yield and soil emissions of 
methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) are taken into account. 
Biochemical oxygen demand (BOD): The amount of dissolved oxy-
gen consumed by micro-organisms (bacteria) in the bio-chemical oxi-
dation of organic and inorganic matter in wastewater. See also Chemi-
cal oxygen demand (COD).
Biodiversity: The variability among living organisms from terrestrial, 
marine, and other ecosystems. Biodiversity includes variability at the 
genetic, species, and ecosystem levels.3
3 This glossary entry builds from definitions used in the Global Biodiversity Assess-
ment (Heywood, 1995) and the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA, 2005).
Bioenergy: Energy derived from any form of biomass such as recently 
living organisms or their metabolic by-products.
Bioenergy and Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (BECCS): 
The application of Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (CCS) technol-
ogy to bioenergy conversion processes. Depending on the total life-
cycle emissions, including total marginal consequential effects (from 
indirect land use change (iLUC) and other processes), BECCS has the 
potential for net carbon dioxide (CO2) removal from the atmosphere. 
See also Sequestration.
Bioethanol: Ethanol produced from biomass (e. g., sugar cane or 
corn). See also Biofuel.
Biofuel: A fuel, generally in liquid form, produced from organic mat-
ter or combustible oils produced by living or recently living plants. 
Examples of biofuel include alcohol (bioethanol), black liquor from the 
paper-manufacturing process, and soybean oil.
First-generation manufactured biofuel: First-generation manu-
factured biofuel is derived from grains, oilseeds, animal fats, and 
waste vegetable oils with mature conversion technologies.
Second-generation biofuel: Second-generation biofuel uses 
non-traditional biochemical and thermochemical conversion pro-
cesses and feedstock mostly derived from the lignocellulosic frac-
tions of, for example, agricultural and forestry residues, municipal 
solid waste, etc.
Third-generation biofuel: Third-generation biofuel would 
be derived from feedstocks such as algae and energy crops by 
advanced processes still under development. 
These second- and third-generation biofuels produced through new 
processes are also referred to as next-generation or advanced biofuels, 
or advanced biofuel technologies.
Biomass: The total mass of living organisms in a given area or volume; 
dead plant material can be included as dead biomass. In the context of 
this report, biomass includes products, by-products, and waste of bio-
logical origin (plants or animal matter), excluding material embedded 
in geological formations and transformed to fossil fuels or peat. 
Traditional biomass: Traditional biomass refers to the bio-
mass — fuelwood, charcoal, agricultural residues, and animal 
dung — used with the so-called traditional technologies such as 
open fires for cooking, rustic kilns and ovens for small industries. 
Widely used in developing countries, where about 2.6 billion peo-
ple cook with open wood fires, and hundreds of thousands small-
industries. The use of these rustic technologies leads to high pol-
lution levels and, in specific circumstances, to forest degradation 
and deforestation. There are many successful initiatives around 
the world to make traditional biomass burned more efficiently 
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and cleanly using efficient cookstoves and kilns. This last use of 
traditional biomass is sustainable and provides large health and 
economic benefits to local populations in developing countries, 
particularly in rural and peri-urban areas. 
Modern biomass: All biomass used in high efficiency conversion 
systems.
Biomass burning: Biomass burning is the burning of living and dead 
vegetation. 
Biosphere (terrestrial and marine): The part of the earth system 
comprising all ecosystems and living organisms, in the atmosphere, on 
land (terrestrial biosphere) or in the oceans (marine biosphere), includ-
ing derived dead organic matter, such as litter, soil organic matter and 
oceanic detritus.
Black carbon (BC): Operationally defined aerosol species based on 
measurement of light absorption and chemical reactivity and / or ther-
mal stability. It is sometimes referred to as soot. BC is mostly formed 
by the incomplete combustion of fossil fuels, biofuels, and biomass 
but it also occurs naturally. It stays in the atmosphere only for days or 
weeks. It is the most strongly light-absorbing component of particu-
late matter (PM) and has a warming effect by absorbing heat into the 
atmosphere and reducing the albedo when deposited on ice or snow.
Burden sharing (also referred to as Effort sharing): In the context 
of mitigation, burden sharing refers to sharing the effort of reducing 
the sources or enhancing the sinks of greenhouse gases (GHGs) from 
historical or projected levels, usually allocated by some criteria, as well 
as sharing the cost burden across countries.  
Business-as-usual (BAU): See Baseline / reference.
Cancún Agreements: A set of decisions adopted at the 16th Session 
of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), including the follow-
ing, among others: the newly established Green Climate Fund (GCF), 
a newly established technology mechanism, a process for advancing 
discussions on adaptation, a formal process for reporting mitigation 
commitments, a goal of limiting global mean surface temperature 
increase to 2 °C, and an agreement on MRV — Measuring, Reporting 
and Verifying for those countries that receive international support for 
their mitigation efforts.
Cancún Pledges: During 2010, many countries submitted their exist-
ing plans for controlling greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to the Cli-
mate Change Secretariat and these proposals have now been formally 
acknowledged under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). Developed countries presented their plans 
in the shape of economy-wide targets to reduce emissions, mainly 
up to 2020, while developing countries proposed ways to limit their 
growth of emissions in the shape of plans of action.
Cap, on emissions: Mandated restraint as an upper limit on emis-
sions within a given period. For example, the Kyoto Protocol mandates 
emissions caps in a scheduled timeframe on the anthropogenic green-
house gas (GHG) emissions released by Annex B countries. 
Carbon budget: The area under a greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
trajectory that satisfies assumptions about limits on cumulative emis-
sions estimated to avoid a certain level of global mean surface temper-
ature rise. Carbon budgets may be defined at the global level, national, 
or sub-national levels.
Carbon credit: See Emission allowance.
Carbon cycle: The term used to describe the flow of carbon (in various 
forms, e. g., as carbon dioxide) through the atmosphere, ocean, terres-
trial and marine biosphere and lithosphere. In this report, the reference 
unit for the global carbon cycle is GtC or GtCO2 (1 GtC corresponds 
to 3.667 GtCO2). Carbon is the major chemical constituent of most 
organic matter and is stored in the following major reservoirs: organic 
molecules in the biosphere, carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere, 
organic matter in the soils, in the lithosphere, and in the oceans.
Carbon dioxide (CO2): A naturally occurring gas, also a by-product 
of burning fossil fuels from fossil carbon deposits, such as oil, gas and 
coal, of burning biomass, of land use changes (LUC) and of industrial 
processes (e. g., cement production). It is the principal anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas (GHG) that affects the earth’s radiative balance. It is 
the reference gas against which other GHGs are measured and there-
fore has a Global Warming Potential (GWP) of 1. See Annex II.9.1 for 
GWP values for other GHGs.
Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (CCS): A process in which 
a relatively pure stream of carbon dioxide (CO2) from industrial and 
energy-related sources is separated (captured), conditioned, com-
pressed, and transported to a storage location for long-term isolation 
from the atmosphere. See also Bioenergy and carbon capture and stor-
age (BECCS), CCS-ready, and Sequestration.
Carbon dioxide fertilization: The enhancement of the growth of 
plants as a result of increased atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) con-
centration.
Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR): Carbon Dioxide Removal methods 
refer to a set of techniques that aim to remove carbon dioxide (CO2) 
directly from the atmosphere by either (1) increasing natural sinks for 
carbon or (2) using chemical engineering to remove the CO2, with the 
intent of reducing the atmospheric CO2 concentration. CDR methods 
involve the ocean, land, and technical systems, including such meth-
ods as iron fertilization, large-scale afforestation, and direct capture 
of CO2 from the atmosphere using engineered chemical means. Some 
CDR methods fall under the category of geoengineering, though this 
may not be the case for others, with the distinction being based on 
the magnitude, scale, and impact of the particular CDR activities. The 
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boundary between CDR and mitigation is not clear and there could be 
some overlap between the two given current definitions (IPCC, 2012, 
p. 2). See also Solar Radiation Management (SRM).
Carbon footprint: Measure of the exclusive total amount of emis-
sions of carbon dioxide (CO2) that is directly and indirectly caused by 
an activity or is accumulated over the life stages of a product (Wied-
mann and Minx, 2008).
Carbon intensity: The amount of emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) 
released per unit of another variable such as gross domestic product 
(GDP), output energy use, or transport. 
Carbon leakage: See Leakage.
Carbon pool: See Reservoir.
Carbon price: The price for avoided or released carbon dioxide (CO2) 
or CO2-equivalent emissions. This may refer to the rate of a carbon 
tax, or the price of emission permits. In many models that are used to 
assess the economic costs of mitigation, carbon prices are used as a 
proxy to represent the level of effort in mitigation policies.
Carbon sequestration: See Sequestration.
Carbon tax: A levy on the carbon content of fossil fuels. Because vir-
tually all of the carbon in fossil fuels is ultimately emitted as carbon 
dioxide (CO2), a carbon tax is equivalent to an emission tax on CO2 
emissions.
CCS-ready: New large-scale, stationary carbon dioxide (CO2) point 
sources intended to be retrofitted with Carbon Dioxide Capture and 
Storage (CCS) could be designed and located to be ‘CCS-ready’ by 
reserving space for the capture installation, designing the unit for opti-
mal performance when capture is added, and siting the plant to enable 
access to storage locations. See also Bioenergy and Carbon Dioxide 
Capture and Storage (BECCS).
Certified Emission Reduction Unit (CER): Equal to one metric 
tonne of CO2-equivalent emissions reduced or of carbon dioxide (CO2) 
removed from the atmosphere through the Clean Development Mech-
anism (CDM) (defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol) project, cal-
culated using Global Warming Potentials (GWP). See also Emissions 
Reduction Units (ERU) and Emissions trading.
Chemical oxygen demand (COD): The quantity of oxygen required 
for the complete oxidation of organic chemical compounds in water; 
used as a measure of the level of organic pollutants in natural and 
waste waters. See also Biochemical oxygen demand (BOD).
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs): A chlorofluorocarbon is an organic 
compound that contains chlorine, carbon, hydrogen, and fluorine and 
is used for refrigeration, air conditioning, packaging, plastic foam, 
insulation, solvents, or aerosol propellants. Because they are not 
destroyed in the lower atmosphere, CFCs drift into the upper atmo-
sphere where, given suitable conditions, they break down ozone (O3). 
It is one of the greenhouse gases (GHGs) covered under the 1987 
Montreal Protocol as a result of which manufacturing of these gases 
has been phased out and they are being replaced by other compounds, 
including hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) which are GHGs covered under 
the Kyoto Protocol.
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM): A mechanism defined 
under Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol through which investors (gov-
ernments or companies) from developed (Annex B) countries may 
finance greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction or removal projects 
in developing (Non-Annex B) countries, and receive Certified Emission 
Reduction Units (CERs) for doing so. The CERs can be credited towards 
the commitments of the respective developed countries. The CDM is 
intended to facilitate the two objectives of promoting sustainable 
development (SD) in developing countries and of helping industrial-
ized countries to reach their emissions commitments in a cost-effective 
way. See also Kyoto Mechanisms.
Climate: Climate in a narrow sense is usually defined as the average 
weather, or more rigorously, as the statistical description in terms of 
the mean and variability of relevant quantities over a period of time 
ranging from months to thousands or millions of years. The classical 
period for averaging these variables is 30 years, as defined by the 
World Meteorological Organization. The relevant quantities are most 
often surface variables such as temperature, precipitation and wind. 
Climate in a wider sense is the state, including a statistical description, 
of the climate system.
Climate change: Climate change refers to a change in the state of 
the climate that can be identified (e. g., by using statistical tests) by 
changes in the mean and / or the variability of its properties, and that 
persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer. Climate 
change may be due to natural internal processes or external forcings 
such as modulations of the solar cycles, volcanic eruptions and persis-
tent anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmosphere or 
in land use. Note that the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), in its Article 1, defines climate change as: 
‘a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human 
activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which 
is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable 
time periods’. The UNFCCC thus makes a distinction between climate 
change attributable to human activities altering the atmospheric com-
position, and climate variability attributable to natural causes. See also 
Climate change commitment.
Climate change commitment: Due to the thermal inertia of the 
ocean and slow processes in the cryosphere and land surfaces, the cli-
mate would continue to change even if the atmospheric composition 
were held fixed at today’s values. Past change in atmospheric com-
position leads to a committed climate change, which continues for 
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as long as a radiative imbalance persists and until all components of 
the climate system have adjusted to a new state. The further change 
in temperature after the composition of the atmosphere is held con-
stant is referred to as the constant composition temperature commit-
ment or simply committed warming or warming commitment. Climate 
change commitment includes other future changes, for example in 
the hydrological cycle, in extreme weather events, in extreme climate 
events, and in sea level change. The constant emission commitment is 
the committed climate change that would result from keeping anthro-
pogenic emissions constant and the zero emission commitment is the 
climate change commitment when emissions are set to zero. See also 
Climate change.
Climate (change) feedback: An interaction in which a perturbation 
in one climate quantity causes a change in a second, and the change 
in the second quantity ultimately leads to an additional change in 
the first. A negative feedback is one in which the initial perturbation 
is weakened by the changes it causes; a positive feedback is one in 
which the initial perturbation is enhanced. In this Assessment Report, a 
somewhat narrower definition is often used in which the climate quan-
tity that is perturbed is the global mean surface temperature, which in 
turn causes changes in the global radiation budget. In either case, the 
initial perturbation can either be externally forced or arise as part of 
internal variability.
Climate engineering: See Geoengineering.
Climate finance: There is no agreed definition of climate finance. 
The term ‘climate finance’ is applied both to the financial resources 
devoted to addressing climate change globally and to financial flows 
to developing countries to assist them in addressing climate change. 
The literature includes several concepts in these categories, among 
which the most commonly used include:
Incremental costs: The cost of capital of the incremental invest-
ment and the change of operating and maintenance costs for a 
mitigation or adaptation project in comparison to a reference proj-
ect. It can be calculated as the difference of the net present values 
of the two projects. See also Additionality.
Incremental investment: The extra capital required for the initial 
investment for a mitigation or adaptation project in comparison to 
a reference project. See also Additionality.
Total climate finance: All financial flows whose expected effect is 
to reduce net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and / or to enhance 
resilience to the impacts of climate variability and the projected 
climate change. This covers private and public funds, domestic and 
international flows, expenditures for mitigation and adaptation to 
current climate variability as well as future climate change.
Total climate finance flowing to developing countries:The 
amount of the total climate finance invested in developing coun-
tries that comes from developed countries. This covers private and 
public funds. 
Private climate finance flowing to developing countries: 
Finance and investment by private actors in / from developed coun-
tries for mitigation and adaptation activities in developing coun-
tries.
Public climate finance flowing to developing countries: 
Finance provided by developed countries’ governments and bilat-
eral institutions as well as by multilateral institutions for mitiga-
tion and adaptation activities in developing countries. Most of the 
funds provided are concessional loans and grants.
Climate model (spectrum or hierarchy): A numerical representa-
tion of the climate system based on the physical, chemical and biologi-
cal properties of its components, their interactions and feedback pro-
cesses, and accounting for some of its known properties. The climate 
system can be represented by models of varying complexity, that is, 
for any one component or combination of components a spectrum or 
hierarchy of models can be identified, differing in such aspects as the 
number of spatial dimensions, the extent to which physical, chemical 
or biological processes are explicitly represented, or the level at which 
empirical parametrizations are involved. Coupled Atmosphere-Ocean 
General Circulation Models (AOGCMs) provide a representation of the 
climate system that is near or at the most comprehensive end of the 
spectrum currently available. There is an evolution towards more com-
plex models with interactive chemistry and biology. Climate models 
are applied as a research tool to study and simulate the climate, and 
for operational purposes, including monthly, seasonal and interannual 
climate predictions. 
Climate prediction: A climate prediction or climate forecast is the 
result of an attempt to produce (starting from a particular state of the 
climate system) an estimate of the actual evolution of the climate in 
the future, for example, at seasonal, interannual, or decadal time scales. 
Because the future evolution of the climate system may be highly sen-
sitive to initial conditions, such predictions are usually probabilistic in 
nature. See also Climate projection, and Climate scenario.
Climate projection: A climate projection is the simulated response of 
the climate system to a scenario of future emission or concentration of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) and aerosols, generally derived using climate 
models. Climate projections are distinguished from climate predictions 
by their dependence on the emission / concentration / radiative forcing 
scenario used, which is in turn based on assumptions concerning, for 
example, future socioeconomic and technological developments that 
may or may not be realized. See also Climate scenario.
Climate scenario: A plausible and often simplified representation 
of the future climate, based on an internally consistent set of clima-
tological relationships that has been constructed for explicit use in 
investigating the potential consequences of anthropogenic climate 
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change, often serving as input to impact models. Climate projections 
often serve as the raw material for constructing climate scenarios, 
but climate scenarios usually require additional information such as 
the observed current climate. See also Baseline / reference, Emission 
scenario, Mitigation scenario, Representative concentration pathways 
(RCPs), Scenario, Shared socio-economic pathways, Socio-economic 
scenario, SRES scenarios, Stabilization, and Transformation pathway. 
Climate sensitivity: In IPCC reports, equilibrium climate sensitivity 
(units: °C) refers to the equilibrium (steady state) change in the annual 
global mean surface temperature following a doubling of the atmo-
spheric CO2-equivalent concentration. Owing to computational con-
straints, the equilibrium climate sensitivity in a climate model is some-
times estimated by running an atmospheric general circulation model 
(GCM) coupled to a mixed-layer ocean model, because equilibrium 
climate sensitivity is largely determined by atmospheric processes. 
Efficient models can be run to equilibrium with a dynamic ocean. The 
climate sensitivity parameter (units: °C (W m – 2) – 1) refers to the equilib-
rium change in the annual global mean surface temperature following 
a unit change in radiative forcing.
The effective climate sensitivity (units: °C) is an estimate of the global 
mean surface temperature response to doubled carbon dioxide (CO2) 
concentration that is evaluated from model output or observations for 
evolving non-equilibrium conditions. It is a measure of the strengths of 
the climate feedbacks at a particular time and may vary with forcing 
history and climate state, and therefore may differ from equilibrium 
climate sensitivity.
The transient climate response (units: °C) is the change in the global 
mean surface temperature, averaged over a 20-year period, centred at 
the time of atmospheric CO2 doubling, in a climate model simulation 
in which CO2 increases at 1 % yr – 1. It is a measure of the strength and 
rapidity of the surface temperature response to greenhouse gas (GHG) 
forcing.
Climate system: The climate system is the highly complex system 
consisting of five major components: the atmosphere, the hydrosphere, 
the cryosphere, the lithosphere and the biosphere, and the interactions 
between them. The climate system evolves in time under the influence 
of its own internal dynamics and because of external forcings such as 
volcanic eruptions, solar variations and anthropogenic forcings such 
as the changing composition of the atmosphere and land use change 
(LUC).
Climate threshold: A limit within the climate system that, when 
crossed, induces a non-linear response to a given forcing. See also 
Abrupt climate change.
Climate variability: Climate variability refers to variations in the 
mean state and other statistics (such as standard deviations, the occur-
rence of extremes, etc.) of the climate on all spatial and temporal 
scales beyond that of individual weather events. Variability may be due 
to natural internal processes within the climate system (internal vari-
ability), or to variations in natural or anthropogenic external forcing 
(external variability). See also Climate change.
CO2-equivalent concentration: The concentration of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) that would cause the same radiative forcing as a given mixture 
of CO2 and other forcing components. Those values may consider only 
greenhouse gases (GHGs), or a combination of GHGs, aerosols, and 
surface albedo changes. CO2-equivalent concentration is a metric for 
comparing radiative forcing of a mix of different forcing components 
at a particular time but does not imply equivalence of the correspond-
ing climate change responses nor future forcing. There is generally 
no connection between CO2-equivalent emissions and resulting CO2-
equivalent concentrations.
CO2-equivalent emission: The amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) emis-
sion that would cause the same integrated radiative forcing, over a 
given time horizon, as an emitted amount of a greenhouse gas (GHG) 
or a mixture of GHGs. The CO2-equivalent emission is obtained by mul-
tiplying the emission of a GHG by its Global Warming Potential (GWP) 
for the given time horizon (see Annex II.9.1 and WGI AR5 Table 8.A.1 
for GWP values of the different GHGs). For a mix of GHGs it is obtained 
by summing the CO2-equivalent emissions of each gas. CO2-equivalent 
emission is a common scale for comparing emissions of different GHGs 
but does not imply equivalence of the corresponding climate change 
responses. See also CO2-equivalent concentration.
Co-benefits: The positive effects that a policy or measure aimed at 
one objective might have on other objectives, without yet evaluating 
the net effect on overall social welfare. Co-benefits are often subject 
to uncertainty and depend on, among others, local circumstances and 
implementation practices. Co-benefits are often referred to as ancil-
lary benefits. See also Adverse side-effect, Risk, and Risk tradeoff.
Cogeneration: Cogeneration (also referred to as combined heat and 
power, or CHP) is the simultaneous generation and useful application 
of electricity and useful heat.
Combined-cycle gas turbine: A power plant that combines two pro-
cesses for generating electricity. First, fuel combustion drives a gas tur-
bine. Second, exhaust gases from the turbine are used to heat water to 
drive a steam turbine. 
Combined heat and power (CHP): See Cogeneration.
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model: See Models.
Conference of the Parties (COP): The supreme body of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), com-
prising countries with a right to vote that have ratified or acceded to 
the convention. See also Meeting of the Parties (CMP).
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Confidence: The validity of a finding based on the type, amount, 
quality, and consistency of evidence (e. g., mechanistic understanding, 
theory, data, models, expert judgment) and on the degree of agree-
ment. In this report, confidence is expressed qualitatively (Mastran-
drea et al., 2010). See WGI AR5 Figure 1.11 for the levels of confidence 
and WGI AR5 Table 1.2 for the list of likelihood qualifiers. See also 
Uncertainty.
Consumption-based accounting: Consumption-based accounting 
provides a measure of emissions released to the atmosphere in order 
to generate the goods and services consumed by a certain entity (e. g., 
person, firm, country, or region). See also Production-based account-
ing.
Contingent valuation method: An approach to quantitatively 
assess values assigned by people in monetary (willingness to pay) 
and non-monetary (willingness to contribute with time, resources 
etc.) terms. It is a direct method to estimate economic values for 
ecosystem and environmental services. In a survey, people are asked 
their willingness to pay / contribute for access to, or their willingness 
to accept compensation for removal of, a specific environmental ser-
vice, based on a hypothetical scenario and description of the environ-
mental service. 
Conventional fuels: See Fossil fuels.
Copenhagen Accord: The political (as opposed to legal) agreement 
that emerged at the 15th Session of the Conference of the Parties 
(COP) at which delegates ‘agreed to take note’ due to a lack of con-
sensus that an agreement would require. Some of the key elements 
include: recognition of the importance of the scientific view on the 
need to limit the increase in global mean surface temperature to 2° 
C; commitment by Annex I Parties to implement economy-wide emis-
sions targets by 2020 and non-Annex I Parties to implement mitiga-
tion actions; agreement to have emission targets of Annex I Parties 
and their delivery of finance for developing countries subject to Mea-
surement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) and actions by developing 
countries to be subject to domestic MRV; calls for scaled up financing 
including a fast track financing of USD 30 billion and USD 100 billion 
by 2020; the establishment of a new Green Climate Fund (GCF); and 
the establishment of a new technology mechanism. Some of these ele-
ments were later adopted in the Cancún Agreements.
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA): Monetary measurement of all negative 
and positive impacts associated with a given action. Costs and benefits 
are compared in terms of their difference and / or ratio as an indicator 
of how a given investment or other policy effort pays off seen from the 
society’s point of view.
Cost of conserved energy (CCE): See Levelized cost of conserved 
energy (LCCE).
Cost-effectiveness: A policy is more cost-effective if it achieves a 
goal, such as a given pollution abatement level, at lower cost. A criti-
cal condition for cost-effectiveness is that marginal abatement costs 
be equal among obliged parties. Integrated models approximate cost-
effective solutions, unless they are specifically constrained to behave 
otherwise. Cost-effective mitigation scenarios are those based on a 
stylized implementation approach in which a single price on carbon 
dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) is applied across the 
globe in every sector of every country and that rises over time in a way 
that achieves lowest global discounted costs.
Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA): A tool based on constrained 
optimization for comparing policies designed to meet a prespecified 
target.
Crediting period, Clean Development Mechanism (CDM): The 
time during which a project activity is able to generate Certified Emis-
sion Reduction Units (CERs). Under certain conditions, the crediting 
period can be renewed up to two times.
Cropland management: The system of practices on land on which 
agricultural crops are grown and on land that is set aside or temporar-
ily not being used for crop production (UNFCCC, 2002).
Decarbonization: The process by which countries or other entities 
aim to achieve a low-carbon economy, or by which individuals aim to 
reduce their carbon consumption.
Decomposition approach: Decomposition methods disaggregate the 
total amount of historical changes of a policy variable into contribu-
tions made by its various determinants.
Deforestation: Conversion of forest to non-forest is one of the major 
sources of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Under Article 3.3 of the 
Kyoto Protocol, “the net changes in greenhouse gas emissions by 
sources and removals by sinks resulting from direct human-induced 
land-use change and forestry activities, limited to afforestation, 
reforestation and deforestation since 1990, measured as verifiable 
changes in carbon stocks in each commitment period, shall be sued 
to meet the commitments under this Article of each Party included in 
Annex  I”. Reducing emissions from deforestation is not eligible for 
Joint Implementation (JI) or Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
projects but has been introduced in the program of work under REDD 
(Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) 
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). 
For a discussion of the term forest and related terms such as afforesta-
tion, reforestation, and deforestation see the IPCC Special Report on 
Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (IPCC, 2000). See also the 
report on Definitions and Methodological Options to Inventory Emis-
sions from Direct Human-induced Degradation of Forests and Deveg-
etation of Other Vegetation Types (IPCC, 2003).
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Dematerialization: The ambition to reduce the total material inputs 
required to deliver a final service.
Descriptive analysis: Descriptive (also termed positive) approaches to 
analysis focus on how the world works or actors behave, not how they 
should behave in some idealized world. See also Normative analysis.
Desertification: Land degradation in arid, semi-arid, and dry sub-
humid areas resulting from various factors, including climatic varia-
tions and human activities. Land degradation in arid, semi-arid, and 
dry sub-humid areas is a reduction or loss of the biological or eco-
nomic productivity and complexity of rainfed cropland, irrigated crop-
land, or range, pasture, forest, and woodlands resulting from land uses 
or from a process or combination of processes, including processes 
arising from human activities and habitation patterns, such as (1) soil 
erosion caused by wind and / or water; (2) deterioration of the physical, 
chemical, biological, or economic properties of soil; and (3) long-term 
loss of natural vegetation (UNCCD, 1994).
Designated national authority (DNA): A designated national 
authority is a national institution that authorizes and approves Clean 
Development Mechansim (CDM) projects in that country. In CDM host 
countries, the DNA assesses whether proposed projects assist the host 
country in achieving its sustainable development (SD) goals, certifica-
tion of which is a prerequisite for registration of the project by the 
CDM Executive Board. 
Developed / developing countries: See Industrialized / developing 
countries.
Development pathway: An evolution based on an array of techno-
logical, economic, social, institutional, cultural, and biophysical charac-
teristics that determine the interactions between human and natural 
systems, including consumption and production patterns in all coun-
tries, over time at a particular scale.
Direct Air Capture (DAC): Chemical process by which a pure carbon 
dioxide (CO2) stream is produced by capturing CO2 from the ambient 
air.
Direct emissions: See Emissions.
Discounting: A mathematical operation making monetary (or other) 
amounts received or expended at different times (years) comparable 
across time. The discounter uses a fixed or possibly time-varying dis-
count rate (> 0) from year to year that makes future value worth less 
today. See also Present value.
Double dividend: The extent to which revenue-generating instru-
ments, such as carbon taxes or auctioned (tradable) emission permits 
can (1) contribute to mitigation and (2) offset at least part of the 
potential welfare losses of climate policies through recycling the rev-
enue in the economy to reduce other taxes likely to cause distortions. 
Drivers of behaviour: Determinants of human decisions and actions, 
including peoples’ values and goals and the factors that constrain 
action, including economic factors and incentives, information access, 
regulatory and technological constraints, cognitive and emotional 
processing capacity, and social norms. See also Behaviour and Behav-
ioural change.
Drivers of emissions: Drivers of emissions refer to the processes, 
mechanisms and properties that influence emissions through factors. 
Factors comprise the terms in a decomposition of emissions. Factors 
and drivers may in return affect policies, measures and other drivers.
Economic efficiency: Economic efficiency refers to an economy’s allo-
cation of resources (goods, services, inputs, productive activities). An 
allocation is efficient if it is not possible to reallocate resources so as 
to make at least one person better off without making someone else 
worse off. An allocation is inefficient if such a reallocation is possible. 
This is also known as the Pareto Criterion for efficiency. See also Pareto 
optimum.
Economies in Transition (EITs): Countries with their economies 
changing from a planned economic system to a market economy. See 
Annex II.2.1.
Ecosystem: A functional unit consisting of living organisms, their non-
living environment, and the interactions within and between them. The 
components included in a given ecosystem and its spatial boundaries 
depend on the purpose for which the ecosystem is defined: in some 
cases they are relatively sharp, while in others they are diffuse. Ecosys-
tem boundaries can change over time. Ecosystems are nested within 
other ecosystems, and their scale can range from very small to the 
entire biosphere. In the current era, most ecosystems either contain 
people as key organisms, or are influenced by the effects of human 
activities in their environment.
Ecosystem services: Ecological processes or functions having mon-
etary or non-monetary value to individuals or society at large. These 
are frequently classified as (1) supporting services such as productiv-
ity or biodiversity maintenance, (2) provisioning services such as food, 
fiber, or fish, (3) regulating services such as climate regulation or car-
bon sequestration, and (4) cultural services such as tourism or spiritual 
and aesthetic appreciation.
Embodied emissions: See Emissions.
Embodied energy: See Energy.
Emission allowance: See Emission permit.
Emission factor / Emissions intensity: The emissions released per 
unit of activity. See also Carbon intensity.
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Emission permit: An entitlement allocated by a government to a 
legal entity (company or other emitter) to emit a specified amount of a 
substance. Emission permits are often used as part of emissions trad-
ing schemes. 
Emission quota: The portion of total allowable emissions assigned to 
a country or group of countries within a framework of maximum total 
emissions.
Emission scenario: A plausible representation of the future devel-
opment of emissions of substances that are potentially radiatively 
active (e. g., greenhouse gases, aerosols) based on a coherent and 
internally consistent set of assumptions about driving forces (such 
as demographic and socioeconomic development, technological 
change, energy and land use) and their key relationships. Concentra-
tion scenarios, derived from emission scenarios, are used as input to 
a climate model to compute climate projections. In IPCC (1992) a set 
of emission scenarios was presented which were used as a basis for 
the climate projections in IPCC (1996). These emission scenarios are 
referred to as the IS92 scenarios. In the IPCC Special Report on Emis-
sion Scenarios (Nakićenović and Swart, 2000) emission scenarios, 
the so-called SRES scenarios, were published, some of which were 
used, among others, as a basis for the climate projections presented 
in Chapters 9 to 11 of IPCC (2001) and Chapters 10 and 11 of IPCC 
(2007). New emission scenarios for climate change, the four Repre-
sentative Concentration Pathways (RCPs), were developed for, but 
independently of, the present IPCC assessment. See also Baseline / ref-
erence, Climate scenario, Mitigation scenario, Shared socio-economic 
pathways, Scenario, Socio-economic scenario, Stabilization, and 
Transformation pathway.
Emission trajectories: A projected development in time of the emis-
sion of a greenhouse gas (GHG) or group of GHGs, aerosols, and GHG 
precursors. 
Emissions: 
Agricultural emissions: Emissions associated with agricultural 
systems — predominantly methane (CH4) or nitrous oxide (N2O). 
These include emissions from enteric fermentation in domestic 
livestock, manure management, rice cultivation, prescribed burn-
ing of savannas and grassland, and from soils (IPCC, 2006). 
Anthropogenic emissions: Emissions of greenhouse gases 
(GHGs), aerosols, and precursors of a GHG or aerosol caused by 
human activities. These activities include the burning of fossil fuels, 
deforestation, land use changes (LUC), livestock production, fertil-
ization, waste management, and industrial processes.
Direct emissions: Emissions that physically arise from activities 
within well-defined boundaries of, for instance, a region, an eco-
nomic sector, a company, or a process.
Embodied emissions: Emissions that arise from the production 
and delivery of a good or service or the build-up of infrastructure. 
Depending on the chosen system boundaries, upstream emissions 
are often included (e. g., emissions resulting from the extraction of 
raw materials). See also Lifecycle assessment (LCA).
Indirect emissions: Emissions that are a consequence of the 
activities within well-defined boundaries of, for instance, a region, 
an economic sector, a company or process, but which occur outside 
the specified boundaries. For example, emissions are described as 
indirect if they relate to the use of heat but physically arise out-
side the boundaries of the heat user, or to electricity production 
but physically arise outside of the boundaries of the power supply 
sector.
Scope 1, Scope 2, and Scope 3 emissions: Emissions respon-
sibility as defined by the GHG Protocol, a private sector initiative. 
‘Scope 1’ indicates direct greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that are 
from sources owned or controlled by the reporting entity. ‘Scope 
2’ indicates indirect GHG emissions associated with the produc-
tion of electricity, heat, or steam purchased by the reporting entity. 
‘Scope 3’ indicates all other indirect emissions, i. e., emissions asso-
ciated with the extraction and production of purchased materials, 
fuels, and services, including transport in vehicles not owned or 
controlled by the reporting entity, outsourced activities, waste dis-
posal, etc. (WBCSD and WRI, 2004).
Territorial emissions: Emissions that take place within the ter-
ritories of a particular jurisdiction.
Emissions Reduction Unit (ERU): Equal to one metric tonne of CO2-
equivalent emissions reduced or of carbon dioxide (CO2) removed from 
the atmosphere through a Joint Implementation (JI) (defined in Arti-
cle 6 of the Kyoto Protocol) project, calculated using Global Warming 
Potentials (GWPs). See also Certified Emission Reduction Unit (CER) 
and Emissions trading.
Emission standard: An emission level that, by law or by voluntary 
agreement, may not be exceeded. Many standards use emission fac-
tors in their prescription and therefore do not impose absolute limits 
on the emissions.
Emissions trading: A market-based instrument used to limit emis-
sions. The environmental objective or sum of total allowed emissions is 
expressed as an emissions cap. The cap is divided in tradable emission 
permits that are allocated — either by auctioning or handing out for 
free (grandfathering) — to entities within the jurisdiction of the trad-
ing scheme. Entities need to surrender emission permits equal to the 
amount of their emissions (e. g., tonnes of carbon dioxide). An entity 
may sell excess permits. Trading schemes may occur at the intra-com-
pany, domestic, or international level and may apply to carbon dioxide 
(CO2), other greenhouse gases (GHGs), or other substances. Emissions 
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trading is also one of the mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol. See 
also Kyoto Mechanisms.
Energy: The power of ‘doing work’ possessed at any instant by a 
body or system of bodies. Energy is classified in a variety of types and 
becomes available to human ends when it flows from one place to 
another or is converted from one type into another. 
Embodied energy: The energy used to produce a material sub-
stance or product (such as processed metals or building materi-
als), taking into account energy used at the manufacturing facility, 
energy used in producing the materials that are used in the manu-
facturing facility, and so on.
Final energy: See Primary energy.
Primary energy: Primary energy (also referred to as energy 
sources) is the energy stored in natural resources (e. g., coal, crude 
oil, natural gas, uranium, and renewable sources). It is defined in 
several alternative ways. The International Energy Agency (IEA) 
utilizes the physical energy content method, which defines pri-
mary energy as energy that has not undergone any anthropogenic 
conversion. The method used in this report is the direct equiva-
lent method (see Annex II.4), which counts one unit of secondary 
energy provided from non-combustible sources as one unit of pri-
mary energy, but treats combustion energy as the energy poten-
tial contained in fuels prior to treatment or combustion. Primary 
energy is transformed into secondary energy by cleaning (natural 
gas), refining (crude oil to oil products) or by conversion into elec-
tricity or heat. When the secondary energy is delivered at the end-
use facilities it is called final energy (e. g., electricity at the wall 
outlet), where it becomes usable energy in supplying energy ser-
vices (e. g., light).
Renewable energy (RE): Any form of energy from solar, geophys-
ical, or biological sources that is replenished by natural processes 
at a rate that equals or exceeds its rate of use. For a more detailed 
description see Bioenergy, Solar energy, Hydropower, Ocean, Geo-
thermal, and Wind energy.
Secondary energy: See Primary energy.
Energy access: Access to clean, reliable and affordable energy ser-
vices for cooking and heating, lighting, communications, and produc-
tive uses (AGECC, 2010).
Energy carrier: A substance for delivering mechanical work or trans-
fer of heat. Examples of energy carriers include: solid, liquid, or gas-
eous fuels (e. g., biomass, coal, oil, natural gas, hydrogen); pressur-
ized / heated / cooled fluids (air, water, steam); and electric current.
Energy density: The ratio of stored energy to the volume or mass of 
a fuel or battery.
Energy efficiency (EE): The ratio of useful energy output of a system, 
conversion process, or activity to its energy input. In economics, the 
term may describe the ratio of economic output to energy input. See 
also Energy intensity.
Energy intensity: The ratio of energy use to economic or physical out-
put. 
Energy poverty: A lack of access to modern energy services. See also 
Energy access.
Energy security: The goal of a given country, or the global community 
as a whole, to maintain an adequate, stable, and predictable energy 
supply. Measures encompass safeguarding the sufficiency of energy 
resources to meet national energy demand at competitive and stable 
prices and the resilience of the energy supply; enabling development 
and deployment of technologies; building sufficient infrastructure to 
generate, store and transmit energy supplies; and ensuring enforceable 
contracts of delivery.
Energy services: An energy service is the benefit received as a result 
of energy use.
Energy system: The energy system comprises all components related 
to the production, conversion, delivery, and use of energy. 
Environmental effectiveness: A policy is environmentally effective 
to the extent by which it achieves its expected environmental target 
(e. g., greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction).
Environmental input-output analysis: An analytical method used 
to allocate environmental impacts arising in production to categories 
of final consumption, by means of the Leontief inverse of a country’s 
economic input-output tables. See also Annex II.6.2.
Environmental Kuznets Curve: The hypothesis that various environ-
mental impacts first increase and then eventually decrease as income 
per capita increases.
Evidence: Information indicating the degree to which a belief or prop-
osition is true or valid. In this report, the degree of evidence reflects 
the amount, quality, and consistency of scientific / technical information 
on which the Lead Authors are basing their findings. See also Agree-
ment, Confidence, Likelihood and Uncertainty.
Externality / external cost / external benefit: Externalities arise from 
a human activity when agents responsible for the activity do not take 
full account of the activity’s impacts on others’ production and con-
sumption possibilities, and no compensation exists for such impacts. 
When the impacts are negative, they are external costs. When the 
impacts are positive, they are external benefits. See also Social costs.
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Feed-in tariff (FIT): The price per unit of electricity (heat) that a utility 
or power (heat) supplier has to pay for distributed or renewable elec-
tricity (heat) fed into the power grid (heat supply system) by non-utility 
generators. A public authority regulates the tariff. 
Final energy: See Primary energy.
Flaring: Open air burning of waste gases and volatile liquids, through 
a chimney, at oil wells or rigs, in refineries or chemical plants, and at 
landfills. 
Flexibility Mechanisms: See Kyoto Mechanisms.
Food security: A state that prevails when people have secure access 
to sufficient amounts of safe and nutritious food for normal growth, 
development, and an active and healthy life.4 
Forest: A vegetation type dominated by trees. Many definitions of the 
term forest are in use throughout the world, reflecting wide differences 
in biogeophysical conditions, social structure and economics. According 
to the 2005 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) definition a forest is an area of land of at least 0.05 – 1 hect-
are, of which more than 10 – 30 % is covered by tree canopy. Trees must 
have a potential to reach a minimum of 25 meters at maturity in situ. 
Parties to the Convention can choose to define a forest from within 
those ranges. Currently, the definition does not recognize different 
biomes, nor do they distinguish natural forests from plantations, an 
anomaly being pointed out by many as in need of rectification. 
For a discussion of the term forest and related terms such as afforesta-
tion, reforestation and deforestation see the IPCC Report on Land Use, 
Land-Use Change and Forestry (IPCC, 2000). See also the Report on 
Definitions and Methodological Options to Inventory Emissions from 
Direct Human-induced Degradation of Forests and Devegetation of 
Other Vegetation Types (IPCC, 2003).
Forest management: A system of practices for stewardship and use 
of forest land aimed at fulfilling relevant ecological (including biologi-
cal diversity), economic and social functions of the forest in a sustain-
able manner (UNFCCC, 2002).
Forestry and Other Land Use (FOLU): See Agriculture, Forestry and 
Other Land Use (AFOLU).
Fossil fuels: Carbon-based fuels from fossil hydrocarbon deposits, 
including coal, peat, oil, and natural gas.
Free Rider: One who benefits from a common good without contrib-
uting to its creation or preservation.
4 This glossary entry builds on definitions used in FAO (2000) and previous IPCC 
reports.
Fuel cell: A fuel cell generates electricity in a direct and continu-
ous way from the controlled electrochemical reaction of hydrogen or 
another fuel and oxygen. With hydrogen as fuel the cell emits only 
water and heat (no carbon dioxide) and the heat can be utilized (see 
also Cogeneration).
Fuel poverty: A condition in which a household is unable to guaran-
tee a certain level of consumption of domestic energy services (espe-
cially heating) or suffers disproportionate expenditure burdens to meet 
these needs.
Fuel switching: In general, fuel switching refers to substituting fuel A 
for fuel B. In the context of mitigation it is implicit that fuel A has lower 
carbon content than fuel B, e. g., switching from natural gas to coal.
General circulation (climate) model (GCM): See Climate model.
General equilibrium analysis: General equilibrium analysis consid-
ers simultaneously all the markets and feedback effects among these 
markets in an economy leading to market clearance. (Computable) 
general equilibrium (CGE) models are the operational tools used to 
perform this type of analysis.
Geoengineering: Geoengineering refers to a broad set of methods 
and technologies that aim to deliberately alter the climate system 
in order to alleviate the impacts of climate change. Most, but not 
all, methods seek to either (1) reduce the amount of absorbed solar 
energy in the climate system (Solar Radiation Management) or (2) 
increase net carbon sinks from the atmosphere at a scale sufficiently 
large to alter climate (Carbon Dioxide Removal). Scale and intent 
are of central importance. Two key characteristics of geoengineer-
ing methods of particular concern are that they use or affect the cli-
mate system (e. g., atmosphere, land or ocean) globally or regionally 
and / or could have substantive unintended effects that cross national 
boundaries. Geoengineering is different from weather modification 
and ecological engineering, but the boundary can be fuzzy (IPCC, 
2012, p. 2).
Geothermal energy: Accessible thermal energy stored in the earth’s 
interior.
Global Environment Facility (GEF): The Global Environment Facil-
ity, established in 1991, helps developing countries fund projects and 
programmes that protect the global environment. GEF grants support 
projects related to biodiversity, climate change, international waters, 
land degradation, the ozone (O3) layer, and persistent organic pollut-
ants.
Global mean surface temperature: An estimate of the global mean 
surface air temperature. However, for changes over time, only anoma-
lies, as departures from a climatology, are used, most commonly based 
on the area-weighted global average of the sea surface temperature 
anomaly and land surface air temperature anomaly. 
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Global warming: Global warming refers to the gradual increase, 
observed or projected, in global surface temperature, as one of the 
consequences of radiative forcing caused by anthropogenic emissions.
Global Warming Potential (GWP): An index, based on radiative 
properties of greenhouse gases (GHGs), measuring the radiative forc-
ing following a pulse emission of a unit mass of a given GHG in the 
present-day atmosphere integrated over a chosen time horizon, rela-
tive to that of carbon dioxide (CO2). The GWP represents the combined 
effect of the differing times these gases remain in the atmosphere and 
their relative effectiveness in causing radiative forcing. The Kyoto Pro-
tocol is based on GWPs from pulse emissions over a 100-year time 
frame. Unless stated otherwise, this report uses GWP values calculated 
with a 100-year time horizon which are often derived from the IPCC 
Second Assessment Report (see Annex II.9.1 for the GWP values of the 
different GHGs).
Governance: A comprehensive and inclusive concept of the full range 
of means for deciding, managing, and implementing policies and mea-
sures. Whereas government is defined strictly in terms of the nation-
state, the more inclusive concept of governance recognizes the contri-
butions of various levels of government (global, international, regional, 
local) and the contributing roles of the private sector, of nongovern-
mental actors, and of civil society to addressing the many types of 
issues facing the global community.
Grazing land management: The system of practices on land used for 
livestock production aimed at manipulating the amount and type of 
vegetation and livestock produced (UNFCCC, 2002).
Green Climate Fund (GCF): The Green Climate Fund was established 
by the 16th Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) in 2010 as 
an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in accordance 
with Article 11 of the Convention, to support projects, programmes 
and policies and other activities in developing country Parties. The 
Fund is governed by a Board and will receive guidance of the COP. The 
Fund is headquartered in Songdo, Republic of Korea.
Greenhouse effect: The infrared radiative effect of all infrared-
absorbing constituents in the atmosphere. Greenhouse gases (GHGs), 
clouds, and (to a small extent) aerosols absorb terrestrial radiation 
emitted by the earth’s surface and elsewhere in the atmosphere. These 
substances emit infrared radiation in all directions, but, everything else 
being equal, the net amount emitted to space is normally less than 
would have been emitted in the absence of these absorbers because 
of the decline of temperature with altitude in the troposphere and the 
consequent weakening of emission. An increase in the concentration 
of GHGs increases the magnitude of this effect; the difference is some-
times called the enhanced greenhouse effect. The change in a GHG 
concentration because of anthropogenic emissions contributes to an 
instantaneous radiative forcing. Surface temperature and troposphere 
warm in response to this forcing, gradually restoring the radiative bal-
ance at the top of the atmosphere.
Greenhouse gas (GHG): Greenhouse gases are those gaseous con-
stituents of the atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic, that 
absorb and emit radiation at specific wavelengths within the spectrum 
of terrestrial radiation emitted by the earth’s surface, the atmosphere 
itself, and by clouds. This property causes the greenhouse effect. Water 
vapour (H2O), carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrous oxide (N2O), methane 
(CH4) and ozone (O3) are the primary GHGs in the earth’s atmosphere. 
Moreover, there are a number of entirely human-made GHGs in the 
atmosphere, such as the halocarbons and other chlorine- and bromine-
containing substances, dealt with under the Montreal Protocol. Beside 
CO2, N2O and CH4, the Kyoto Protocol deals with the GHGs sulphur 
hexafluoride (SF6), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and perfluorocarbons 
(PFCs). For a list of well-mixed GHGs, see WGI AR5 Table 2.A.1.
Gross domestic product (GDP): The sum of gross value added, at 
purchasers’ prices, by all resident and non-resident producers in the 
economy, plus any taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the 
value of the products in a country or a geographic region for a given 
period, normally one year. GDP is calculated without deducting for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natu-
ral resources.
Gross national expenditure (GNE): The total amount of public and 
private consumption and capital expenditures of a nation. In general, 
national account is balanced such that gross domestic product (GDP) + 
import = GNE + export.
Gross national product: The value added from domestic and foreign 
sources claimed by residents. GNP comprises gross domestic product 
(GDP) plus net receipts of primary income from non-resident income.
Gross world product: An aggregation of the individual country’s 
gross domestic products (GDP) to obtain the world or global GDP.
Heat island: The relative warmth of a city compared with surrounding 
rural areas, associated with changes in runoff, effects on heat reten-
tion, and changes in surface albedo.
Human Development Index (HDI): The Human Development Index 
allows the assessment of countries’ progress regarding social and eco-
nomic development as a composite index of three indicators: (1) health 
measured by life expectancy at birth; (2) knowledge as measured by 
a combination of the adult literacy rate and the combined primary, 
secondary and tertiary school enrolment ratio; and (3) standard of liv-
ing as gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (in purchasing power 
parity). The HDI sets a minimum and a maximum for each dimension, 
called goalposts, and then shows where each country stands in rela-
tion to these goalposts, expressed as a value between 0 and 1. The 
HDI only acts as a broad proxy for some of the key issues of human 
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development; for instance, it does not reflect issues such as political 
participation or gender inequalities.
Hybrid vehicle: Any vehicle that employs two sources of propulsion, 
particularly a vehicle that combines an internal combustion engine 
with an electric motor.
Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs): One of the six types of greenhouse 
gases (GHGs) or groups of GHGs to be mitigated under the Kyoto Pro-
tocol. They are produced commercially as a substitute for chlorofluo-
rocarbons (CFCs). HFCs largely are used in refrigeration and semicon-
ductor manufacturing. See also Global Warming Potential (GWP) and 
Annex II.9.1 for GWP values.
Hydropower: Power harnessed from the flow of water.
Incremental costs: See Climate finance.
Incremental investment: See Climate finance.
Indigenous peoples: Indigenous peoples and nations are those that, 
having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial soci-
eties that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct 
from other sectors of the societies now prevailing on those territories, 
or parts of them. They form at present principally non-dominant sectors 
of society and are often determined to preserve, develop, and transmit 
to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic iden-
tity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance 
with their own cultural patterns, social institutions, and common law 
system.5
Indirect emissions: See Emissions.
Indirect land use change (iLUC): See Land use.
Industrial Revolution: A period of rapid industrial growth with far-
reaching social and economic consequences, beginning in Britain dur-
ing the second half of the 18th century and spreading to Europe and 
later to other countries including the United States. The invention of 
the steam engine was an important trigger of this development. The 
industrial revolution marks the beginning of a strong increase in the 
use of fossil fuels and emission of, in particular, fossil carbon dioxide. 
In this report the terms pre-industrial and industrial refer, somewhat 
arbitrarily, to the periods before and after 1750, respectively.
Industrialized countries / developing countries: There are a diver-
sity of approaches for categorizing countries on the basis of their level 
of development, and for defining terms such as industrialized, devel-
oped, or developing. Several categorizations are used in this report. (1) 
5 This glossary entry builds on the definitions used in Cobo (1987) and previous 
IPCC reports.
In the United Nations system, there is no established convention for 
designating of developed and developing countries or areas. (2) The 
United Nations Statistics Division specifies developed and developing 
regions based on common practice. In addition, specific countries are 
designated as Least Developed Countries (LCD), landlocked develop-
ing countries, small island developing states, and transition economies. 
Many countries appear in more than one of these categories. (3) The 
World Bank uses income as the main criterion for classifying countries 
as low, lower middle, upper middle, and high income. (4) The UNDP 
aggregates indicators for life expectancy, educational attainment, and 
income into a single composite Human Development Index (HDI) to 
classify countries as low, medium, high, or very high human develop-
ment. See WGII AR5 Box 1 – 2.
Input-output analysis: See Environmental input-output analysis.
Institution: Institutions are rules and norms held in common by social 
actors that guide, constrain and shape human interaction. Institu-
tions can be formal, such as laws and policies, or informal, such as 
norms and conventions. Organizations — such as parliaments, regula-
tory agencies, private firms, and community bodies — develop and act 
in response to institutional frameworks and the incentives they frame. 
Institutions can guide, constrain and shape human interaction through 
direct control, through incentives, and through processes of socializa-
tion.
Institutional feasibility: Institutional feasibility has two key parts: (1) 
the extent of administrative workload, both for public authorities and 
for regulated entities, and (2) the extent to which the policy is viewed 
as legitimate, gains acceptance, is adopted, and is implemented.
Integrated assessment: A method of analysis that combines results 
and models from the physical, biological, economic, and social sciences, 
and the interactions among these components in a consistent frame-
work to evaluate the status and the consequences of environmental 
change and the policy responses to it. See also Integrated Models.
Integrated models: See Models.
IPAT identity: IPAT is the lettering of a formula put forward to describe 
the impact of human activity on the environment. Impact (I) is viewed 
as the product of population size (P), affluence (A=GDP / person) and 
technology (T= impact per GDP unit). In this conceptualization, popu-
lation growth by definition leads to greater environmental impact if A 
and T are constant, and likewise higher income leads to more impact 
(Ehrlich and Holdren, 1971).
Iron fertilization: Deliberate introduction of iron to the upper ocean 
intended to enhance biological productivity which can sequester addi-
tional atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) into the oceans. See also Geo-
engineering and Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR).
Jevon’s paradox: See Rebound effect.
1265
Glossary, Acronyms and Chemical SymbolsAnnex I
AI
Joint Implementation (JI): A mechanism defined in Article 6 of the 
Kyoto Protocol, through which investors (governments or companies) 
from developed (Annex B) countries may implement projects jointly 
that limit or reduce emissions or enhance sinks, and to share the Emis-
sions Reduction Units (ERU). See also Kyoto Mechanisms.
Kaya identity: In this identity global emissions are equal to the popu-
lation size, multiplied by per capita output (gross world product), mul-
tiplied by the energy intensity of production, multiplied by the carbon 
intensity of energy.
Kyoto Mechanisms (also referred to as Flexibility Mechanisms): 
Market-based mechanisms that Parties to the Kyoto Protocol can use in 
an attempt to lessen the potential economic impacts of their commit-
ment to limit or reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. They include 
Joint Implementation (JI) (Article 6), Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) (Article 12), and Emissions trading (Article 17).
Kyoto Protocol: The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted in 1997 in 
Kyoto, Japan, at the Third Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) 
to the UNFCCC. It contains legally binding commitments, in addition to 
those included in the UNFCCC. Countries included in Annex B of the 
Protocol (most Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment countries and countries with economies in transition) agreed to 
reduce their anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (carbon 
dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons 
(HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6)) by at 
least 5 % below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 – 2012. 
The Kyoto Protocol entered into force on 16 February 2005.
Land use (change, direct and indirect): Land use refers to the total 
of arrangements, activities and inputs undertaken in a certain land 
cover type (a set of human actions). The term land use is also used 
in the sense of the social and economic purposes for which land is 
managed (e. g., grazing, timber extraction and conservation). In urban 
settlements it is related to land uses within cities and their hinterlands. 
Urban land use has implications on city management, structure, and 
form and thus on energy demand, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, 
and mobility, among other aspects.
Land use change (LUC): Land use change refers to a change in 
the use or management of land by humans, which may lead to a 
change in land cover. Land cover and LUC may have an impact on 
the surface albedo, evapotranspiration, sources and sinks of GHGs, 
or other properties of the climate system and may thus give rise to 
radiative forcing and / or other impacts on climate, locally or glob-
ally. See also the IPCC Report on Land Use, Land-Use Change, and 
Forestry (IPCC, 2000).
Indirect land use change (iLUC): Indirect land use change refers 
to shifts in land use induced by a change in the production level of 
an agricultural product elsewhere, often mediated by markets or 
driven by policies. For example, if agricultural land is diverted to 
fuel production, forest clearance may occur elsewhere to replace 
the former agricultural production. See also Afforestation, Defores-
tation and Reforestation.
Land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF): A greenhouse 
gas (GHG) inventory sector that covers emissions and removals of 
GHGs resulting from direct human-induced land use, land use change 
and forestry activities excluding agricultural emissions. See also Agri-
culture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU).
Land value capture: A financing mechanism usually based around 
transit systems, or other infrastructure and services, that captures the 
increased value of land due to improved accessibility.
Leakage: Phenomena whereby the reduction in emissions (relative to 
a baseline) in a jurisdiction / sector associated with the implementation 
of mitigation policy is offset to some degree by an increase outside 
the jurisdiction / sector through induced changes in consumption, pro-
duction, prices, land use and / or trade across the jurisdictions / sectors. 
Leakage can occur at a number of levels, be it a project, state, province, 
nation, or world region. See also Rebound effect. 
In the context of Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (CCS), ‘CO2 leak-
age’ refers to the escape of injected carbon dioxide (CO2) from the 
storage location and eventual release to the atmosphere. In the con-
text of other substances, the term is used more generically, such as 
for ‘methane (CH4) leakage’ (e. g., from fossil fuel extraction activities), 
and ‘hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) leakage’ (e. g., from refrigeration and 
air-conditioning systems).
Learning curve / rate: Decreasing cost-prices of technologies shown 
as a function of increasing (total or yearly) supplies. The learning rate is 
the percent decrease of the cost-price for every doubling of the cumu-
lative supplies (also called progress ratio).
Least Developed Countries (LDCs): A list of countries designated 
by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC) 
as meeting three criteria: (1) a low income criterion below a certain 
threshold of gross national income per capita of between USD 750 
and USD 900, (2) a human resource weakness based on indicators 
of health, education, adult literacy, and (3) an economic vulnerability 
weakness based on indicators on instability of agricultural production, 
instability of export of goods and services, economic importance of 
non-traditional activities, merchandise export concentration, and the 
handicap of economic smallness. Countries in this category are eligible 
for a number of programmes focused on assisting countries most in 
need. These privileges include certain benefits under the articles of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
See also Industrialized / developing countries. 
Levelized cost of conserved carbon (LCCC): See Annex II.3.1.3 for 
concepts and definition.
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Levelized cost of conserved energy (LCCE): See Annex II.3.1.2 for 
concepts and definition.
Levelized cost of energy (LCOE): See Annex II.3.1.1 for concepts 
and definition.
Lifecycle assessment (LCA): A widely used technique defined by ISO 
14040 as a “compilation and evaluation of the inputs, outputs and the 
potential environmental impacts of a product system throughout its 
life cycle”. The results of LCA studies are strongly dependent on the 
system boundaries within which they are conducted. The technique is 
intended for relative comparison of two similar means to complete a 
product. See also Annex II.6.3.
Likelihood: The chance of a specific outcome occurring, where this 
might be estimated probabilistically. This is expressed in this report 
using a standard terminology (Mastrandrea et al., 2010): virtually cer-
tain 99 – 100 % probability, very likely 90 – 100 %, likely 66 – 100 %, 
about as likely as not 33 – 66 %, unlikely 0 – 33 %, very unlikely 0 – 10 
%, exceptionally unlikely 0 – 1 %. Additional terms (more likely than 
not > 50 – 100 %, and more unlikely than likely 0 – < 50 %) may also be 
used when appropriate. Assessed likelihood is typeset in italics, e. g., 
very likely. See also Agreement, Confidence, Evidence and Uncertainty.
Lock-in: Lock-in occurs when a market is stuck with a standard even 
though participants would be better off with an alternative.
Marginal abatement cost (MAC): The cost of one unit of additional 
mitigation.
Market barriers: In the context of climate change mitigation, market 
barriers are conditions that prevent or impede the diffusion of cost-
effective technologies or practices that would mitigate greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions.
Market-based mechanisms, GHG emissions: Regulatory approaches 
using price mechanisms (e. g., taxes and auctioned emission permits), 
among other instruments, to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks 
of greenhouse gases (GHGs).
Market exchange rate (MER): The rate at which foreign currencies 
are exchanged. Most economies post such rates daily and they vary 
little across all the exchanges. For some developing economies, offi-
cial rates and black-market rates may differ significantly and the MER 
is difficult to pin down. See also Purchasing power parity (PPP) and 
Annex II.1.3 for the monetary conversion process applied throughout 
this report.
Market failure: When private decisions are based on market prices 
that do not reflect the real scarcity of goods and services but rather 
reflect market distortions, they do not generate an efficient allocation 
of resources but cause welfare losses. A market distortion is any event 
in which a market reaches a market clearing price that is substantially 
different from the price that a market would achieve while operating 
under conditions of perfect competition and state enforcement of legal 
contracts and the ownership of private property. Examples of factors 
causing market prices to deviate from real economic scarcity are envi-
ronmental externalities, public goods, monopoly power, information 
asymmetry, transaction costs, and non-rational behaviour. See also 
Economic efficiency.
Material flow analysis (MFA): A systematic assessment of the flows 
and stocks of materials within a system defined in space and time 
(Brunner and Rechberger, 2004). See also Annex II.6.1.
Measures: In climate policy, measures are technologies, processes or 
practices that contribute to mitigation, for example renewable energy 
(RE) technologies, waste minimization processes, public transport com-
muting practices. 
Meeting of the Parties (CMP): The Conference of the Parties (COP) 
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) serves as the CMP, the supreme body of the Kyoto Protocol, 
since the latter entered into force on 16 February 2005. Only Parties 
to the Kyoto Protocol may participate in deliberations and make deci-
sions.
Methane (CH4): One of the six greenhouse gases (GHGs) to be miti-
gated under the Kyoto Protocol and is the major component of natural 
gas and associated with all hydrocarbon fuels. Significant emissions 
occur as a result of animal husbandry and agriculture and their man-
agement represents a major mitigation option. See also Global Warm-
ing Potential (GWP) and Annex II.9.1 for GWP values.
Methane recovery: Any process by which methane (CH4) emissions 
(e. g., from oil or gas wells, coal beds, peat bogs, gas transmission pipe-
lines, landfills, or anaerobic digesters) are captured and used as a fuel 
or for some other economic purpose (e. g., chemical feedstock).
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): A set of eight time-bound 
and measurable goals for combating poverty, hunger, disease, illit-
eracy, discrimination against women and environmental degradation. 
These goals were agreed to at the UN Millennium Summit in 2000 
together with an action plan to reach the goals.
Mitigation (of climate change): A human intervention to reduce the 
sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases (GHGs). This report 
also assesses human interventions to reduce the sources of other 
substances which may contribute directly or indirectly to limiting cli-
mate change, including, for example, the reduction of particulate mat-
ter (PM) emissions that can directly alter the radiation balance (e. g., 
black carbon) or measures that control emissions of carbon monoxide, 
nitrogen oxides (NOx), Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) and other 
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pollutants that can alter the concentration of tropospheric ozone (O3) 
which has an indirect effect on the climate.
Mitigation capacity: A country’s ability to reduce anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions or to enhance natural sinks, where 
ability refers to skills, competencies, fitness, and proficiencies that a 
country has attained and depends on technology, institutions, wealth, 
equity, infrastructure, and information. Mitigative capacity is rooted in 
a country’s sustainable development (SD) path.
Mitigation scenario: A plausible description of the future that 
describes how the (studied) system responds to the implementation 
of mitigation policies and measures. See also Baseline / reference, 
Climate scenario, Emission scenario, Representative Concentration 
Pathways (RCPs), Scenario, Shared socio-economic pathways, Socio-
economic scenarios, SRES scenarios, Stabilization, and Transformation 
pathways.
Models: Structured imitations of a system’s attributes and mecha-
nisms to mimic appearance or functioning of systems, for example, the 
climate, the economy of a country, or a crop. Mathematical models 
assemble (many) variables and relations (often in a computer code) to 
simulate system functioning and performance for variations in param-
eters and inputs.
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model: A class of 
economic models that use actual economic data (i. e., input / out-
put data), simplify the characterization of economic behaviour, 
and solve the whole system numerically. CGE models specify all 
economic relationships in mathematical terms and predict the 
changes in variables such as prices, output and economic welfare 
resulting from a change in economic policies, given information 
about technologies and consumer preferences (Hertel, 1997). See 
also General equilibrium analysis.
Integrated Model: Integrated models explore the interactions 
between multiple sectors of the economy or components of par-
ticular systems, such as the energy system. In the context of trans-
formation pathways, they refer to models that, at a minimum, 
include full and disaggregated representations of the energy 
system and its linkage to the overall economy that will allow for 
consideration of interactions among different elements of that 
system. Integrated models may also include representations of the 
full economy, land use and land use change (LUC), and the climate 
system. See also Integrated assessment.
Sectoral Model: In the context of this report, sectoral models 
address only one of the core sectors that are discussed in this 
report, such as buildings, industry, transport, energy supply, and 
Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU).
Montreal Protocol: The Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer was adopted in Montreal in 1987, and subse-
quently adjusted and amended in London (1990), Copenhagen (1992), 
Vienna (1995), Montreal (1997) and Beijing (1999). It controls the con-
sumption and production of chlorine- and bromine- containing chemi-
cals that destroy stratospheric ozone (O3), such as chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs), methyl chloroform, carbon tetrachloride and many others.
Multi-criteria analysis (MCA): Integrates different decision param-
eters and values without assigning monetary values to all parameters. 
Multi-criteria analysis can combine quantitative and qualitative infor-
mation. Also referred to as multi-attribute analysis.
Multi-attribute analysis: See Multi-criteria analysis (MCA).
Multi-gas: Next to carbon dioxide (CO2), there are other forcing com-
ponents taken into account in, e. g., achieving reduction for a basket of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (CO2, methane (CH4), nitrous oxide 
(N2O), and fluorinated gases) or stabilization of CO2-equivalent con-
centrations (multi-gas stabilization, including GHGs and aerosols).
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action (NAMA): Nationally 
Appropriate Mitigation Actions are a concept for recognizing and 
financing emission reductions by developing countries in a post-2012 
climate regime achieved through action considered appropriate in a 
given national context. The concept was first introduced in the Bali 
Action Plan in 2007 and is contained in the Cancún Agreements.
Nitrogen oxides (NOX): Any of several oxides of nitrogen.
Nitrous oxide (N2O): One of the six greenhouse gases (GHGs) to be 
mitigated under the Kyoto Protocol. The main anthropogenic source 
of N2O is agriculture (soil and animal manure management), but 
important contributions also come from sewage treatment, fossil fuel 
combustion, and chemical industrial processes. N2O is also produced 
naturally from a wide variety of biological sources in soil and water, 
particularly microbial action in wet tropical forests. See also Global 
Warming Potential (GWP) and Annex II.9.1 for GWP values.
Non-Annex I Parties / countries: Non-Annex I Parties are mostly 
developing countries. Certain groups of developing countries are 
recognized by the Convention as being especially vulnerable to the 
adverse impacts of climate change, including countries with low-lying 
coastal areas and those prone to desertification and drought. Others, 
such as countries that rely heavily on income from fossil fuel produc-
tion and commerce, feel more vulnerable to the potential economic 
impacts of climate change response measures. The Convention empha-
sizes activities that promise to answer the special needs and concerns 
of these vulnerable countries, such as investment, insurance, and tech-
nology transfer. See also Annex I Parties / countries.
Normative analysis: Analysis in which judgments about the desirabil-
ity of various policies are made. The conclusions rest on value judg-
ments as well as on facts and theories. See also Descriptive analysis.
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Ocean energy: Energy obtained from the ocean via waves, tidal 
ranges, tidal and ocean currents, and thermal and saline gradients.
Offset (in climate policy): A unit of CO2-equivalent emissions that is 
reduced, avoided, or sequestered to compensate for emissions occur-
ring elsewhere.
Oil sands and oil shale: Unconsolidated porous sands, sandstone 
rock, and shales containing bituminous material that can be mined 
and converted to a liquid fuel. See also Unconventional fuels.
Overshoot pathways: Emissions, concentration, or temperature 
pathways in which the metric of interest temporarily exceeds, or ‘over-
shoots’, the long-term goal.
Ozone (O3): Ozone, the triatomic form of oxygen (O3), is a gaseous 
atmospheric constituent. In the troposphere, it is created both naturally 
and by photochemical reactions involving gases resulting from human 
activities (smog). Tropospheric O3 acts as a greenhouse gas (GHG). In 
the stratosphere, it is created by the interaction between solar ultra-
violet radiation and molecular oxygen (O2). Stratospheric O3 plays a 
dominant role in the stratospheric radiative balance. Its concentration 
is highest in the O3 layer.
Paratransit: Denotes flexible passenger transportation, often but not 
only in areas with low population density, that does not follow fixed 
routes or schedules. Options include minibuses (matatus, marshrutka), 
shared taxis and jitneys. Sometimes paratransit is also called commu-
nity transit.
Pareto optimum: A state in which no one’s welfare can be increased 
without reducing someone else’s welfare. See also Economic efficiency.
Particulate matter (PM): Very small solid particles emitted during 
the combustion of biomass and fossil fuels. PM may consist of a wide 
variety of substances. Of greatest concern for health are particulates of 
diameter less than or equal to 10 nanometers, usually designated as 
PM10. See also Aerosol.
Passive design: The word ‘passive’ in this context implies the ideal 
target that the only energy required to use the designed product or 
service comes from renewable sources. 
Path dependence: The generic situation where decisions, events, or 
outcomes at one point in time constrain adaptation, mitigation, or 
other actions or options at a later point in time.
Payback period: Mostly used in investment appraisal as financial 
payback, which is the time needed to repay the initial investment by 
the returns of a project. A payback gap exists when, for example, pri-
vate investors and micro-financing schemes require higher profitability 
rates from renewable energy (RE) projects than from fossil-fired proj-
ects. Energy payback is the time an energy project needs to deliver as 
much energy as had been used for setting the project online. Carbon 
payback is the time a renewable energy (RE) project needs to deliver 
as much net greenhouse gas (GHG) savings (with respect to the fossil 
reference energy system) as its realization has caused GHG emissions 
from a perspective of lifecycle assessment (LCA) (including land use 
changes (LUC) and loss of terrestrial carbon stocks).
Perfluorocarbons (PFCs): One of the six types of greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) or groups of GHGs to be mitigated under the Kyoto Protocol. 
PFCs are by-products of aluminium smelting and uranium enrichment. 
They also replace chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in manufacturing semi-
conductors. See also Global Warming Potential (GWP) and Annex II.9.1 
for GWP values.
Photovoltaic cells (PV): Electronic devices that generate electricity 
from light energy. See also Solar energy.
Policies (for mitigation of or adaptation to climate change): Poli-
cies are a course of action taken and / or mandated by a government, 
e. g., to enhance mitigation and adaptation. Examples of policies aimed 
at mitigation are support mechanisms for renewable energy (RE) sup-
plies, carbon or energy taxes, fuel efficiency standards for automobiles. 
See also Measures.
Polluter pays principle (PPP): The party causing the pollution is 
responsible for paying for remediation or for compensating the damage.
Positive analysis: See Descriptive analysis.
Potential: The possibility of something happening, or of someone 
doing something in the future. Different metrics are used throughout 
this report for the quantification of different types of potentials, includ-
ing the following:
Technical potential: Technical potential is the amount by which 
it is possible to pursue a specific objective through an increase in 
deployment of technologies or implementation of processes and 
practices that were not previously used or implemented. Quanti-
fication of technical potentials may take into account other than 
technical considerations, including social, economic and / or envi-
ronmental considerations.
Precautionary principle: A provision under Article 3 of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), stipu-
lating that the Parties should take precautionary measures to antici-
pate, prevent, or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate 
its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason 
to postpone such measures, taking into account that policies and mea-
sures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective in order to 
ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.
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Precursors: Atmospheric compounds that are not greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) or aerosols, but that have an effect on GHG or aerosol con-
centrations by taking part in physical or chemical processes regulating 
their production or destruction rates.
Pre-industrial: See Industrial Revolution.
Present value: Amounts of money available at different dates in the 
future are discounted back to a present value, and summed to get the 
present value of a series of future cash flows. See also Discounting.
Primary production: All forms of production accomplished by plants, 
also called primary producers.
Primary energy: See Energy.
Private costs: Private costs are carried by individuals, companies or 
other private entities that undertake an action, whereas social costs 
include additionally the external costs on the environment and on soci-
ety as a whole. Quantitative estimates of both private and social costs 
may be incomplete, because of difficulties in measuring all relevant 
effects.
Production-based accounting: Production-based accounting pro-
vides a measure of emissions released to the atmosphere for the pro-
duction of goods and services by a certain entity (e. g., person, firm, 
country, or region). See also Consumption-based accounting.
Public good: Public goods are non-rivalrous (goods whose consump-
tion by one consumer does not prevent simultaneous consumption by 
other consumers) and non-excludable (goods for which it is not pos-
sible to prevent people who have not paid for it from having access 
to it). 
Purchasing power parity (PPP): The purchasing power of a currency 
is expressed using a basket of goods and services that can be bought 
with a given amount in the home country. International comparison 
of, for example, gross domestic products (GDP) of countries can be 
based on the purchasing power of currencies rather than on current 
exchange rates. PPP estimates tend to lower per capita GDP in indus-
trialized countries and raise per capita GDP in developing countries. 
(PPP is also an acronym for polluter pays principle). See also Market 
exchange rate (MER) and Annex II.1.3 for the monetary conversion 
process applied throughout this report.
Radiation management: See Solar Radiation Management.
Radiative forcing: Radiative forcing is the change in the net, down-
ward minus upward, radiative flux (expressed in W m – 2) at the tropo-
pause or top of atmosphere due to a change in an external driver of 
climate change, such as, for example, a change in the concentration of 
carbon dioxide (CO2) or the output of the sun. For the purposes of this 
report, radiative forcing is further defined as the change relative to the 
year 1750 and refers to a global and annual average value.
Rebound effect: Phenomena whereby the reduction in energy con-
sumption or emissions (relative to a baseline) associated with the 
implementation of mitigation measures in a jurisdiction is offset to 
some degree through induced changes in consumption, production, 
and prices within the same jurisdiction. The rebound effect is most typ-
ically ascribed to technological energy efficiency (EE) improvements. 
See also Leakage.
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degrada-
tion (REDD): An effort to create financial value for the carbon stored 
in forests, offering incentives for developing countries to reduce 
emissions from forested lands and invest in low-carbon paths to sus-
tainable development (SD). It is therefore a mechanism for mitiga-
tion that results from avoiding deforestation. REDD+ goes beyond 
reforestation and forest degradation, and includes the role of con-
servation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of 
forest carbon stocks. The concept was first introduced in 2005 in the 
11th Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) in Montreal and 
later given greater recognition in the 13th Session of the COP in 2007 
at Bali and inclusion in the Bali Action Plan which called for “pol-
icy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reduc-
ing emissions to deforestation and forest degradation in developing 
countries (REDD) and the role of conservation, sustainable manage-
ment of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stock in develop-
ing countries”. Since then, support for REDD has increased and has 
slowly become a framework for action supported by a number of 
countries.
Reference scenario: See Baseline / reference.
Reforestation: Planting of forests on lands that have previously 
sustained forests but that have been converted to some other use. 
Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol, reforestation is the direct human-
induced conversion of non-forested land to forested land through 
planting, seeding, and / or human-induced promotion of natural seed 
sources, on land that was previously forested but converted to non-
forested land. For the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, 
reforestation activities will be limited to reforestation occurring on 
those lands that did not contain forest on 31 December 1989. 
For a discussion of the term forest and related terms such as afforesta-
tion, reforestation and deforestation, see the IPCC Report on Land Use, 
Land-Use Change and Forestry (IPCC, 2000). See also the Report on 
Definitions and Methodological Options to Inventory Emissions from 
Direct Human-induced Degradation of Forests and Devegetation of 
Other Vegetation Types (IPCC, 2003). 
Renewable energy (RE): See Energy.
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Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs): Scenarios that 
include time series of emissions and concentrations of the full suite of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) and aerosols and chemically active gases, as 
well as land use / land cover (Moss et al., 2008). The word representa-
tive signifies that each RCP provides only one of many possible scenar-
ios that would lead to the specific radiative forcing characteristics. The 
term pathway emphasizes that not only the long-term concentration 
levels are of interest, but also the trajectory taken over time to reach 
that outcome (Moss et al., 2010).
RCPs usually refer to the portion of the concentration pathway extend-
ing up to 2100, for which Integrated Assessment Models produced 
corresponding emission scenarios. Extended Concentration Pathways 
(ECPs) describe extensions of the RCPs from 2100 to 2500 that were 
calculated using simple rules generated by stakeholder consultations, 
and do not represent fully consistent scenarios.
Four RCPs produced from Integrated Assessment Models were selected 
from the published literature and are used in the present IPCC Assess-
ment as a basis for the climate predictions and projections presented 
in WGI AR5 Chapters 11 to 14:
RCP2.6 One pathway where radiative forcing peaks at approxi-
mately 3 W m – 2 before 2100 and then declines (the corresponding 
ECP assuming constant emissions after 2100);
RCP4.5 and RCP6.0 Two intermediate stabilization pathways in 
which radiative forcing is stabilized at approximately 4.5 W m – 2 
and 6.0 W m – 2 after 2100 (the corresponding ECPs assuming con-
stant concentrations after 2150);
RCP8.5 One high pathway for which radiative forcing reaches 
greater than 8.5 W m – 2 by 2100 and continues to rise for some 
amount of time (the corresponding ECP assuming constant emis-
sions after 2100 and constant concentrations after 2250).
For further description of future scenarios, see WGI AR5 Box 1.1. See 
also Baseline / reference, Climate prediction, Climate projection, Cli-
mate scenario, Shared socio-economic pathways, Socio-economic sce-
nario, SRES scenarios, and Transformation pathway.
Reservoir: A component of the climate system, other than the atmo-
sphere, which has the capacity to store, accumulate or release a sub-
stance of concern, for example, carbon, a greenhouse gas (GHG) or a 
precursor. Oceans, soils and forests are examples of reservoirs of car-
bon. Pool is an equivalent term (note that the definition of pool often 
includes the atmosphere). The absolute quantity of the substance of 
concern held within a reservoir at a specified time is called the stock. 
In the context of Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (CCS), this term 
is sometimes used to refer to a geological carbon dioxide (CO2) stor-
age location. See also Sequestration.
Resilience: The capacity of social, economic, and environmental sys-
tems to cope with a hazardous event or trend or disturbance, respond-
ing or reorganizing in ways that maintain their essential function, iden-
tity, and structure, while also maintaining the capacity for adaptation, 
learning, and transformation (Arctic Council, 2013).
Revegetation: A direct human-induced activity to increase carbon 
stocks on sites through the establishment of vegetation that covers a 
minimum area of 0.05 hectares and does not meet the definitions of 
afforestation and reforestation contained here (UNFCCC, 2002).
Risk: In this report, the term risk is often used to refer to the poten-
tial, when the outcome is uncertain, for adverse consequences on lives, 
livelihoods, health, ecosystems and species, economic, social and cul-
tural assets, services (including environmental services), and infrastruc-
ture.
Risk assessment: The qualitative and / or quantitative scientific 
estimation of risks.
Risk management: The plans, actions, or policies to reduce the 
likelihood and / or consequences of a given risk.
Risk perception: The subjective judgment that people make 
about the characteristics and severity of a risk.
Risk tradeoff: The change in the portfolio of risks that occurs 
when a countervailing risk is generated (knowingly or inadver-
tently) by an intervention to reduce the target risk (Wiener and 
Graham, 2009). See also Adverse side-effect, and Co-benefit.
Risk transfer: The practice of formally or informally shifting the 
risk of financial consequences for particular negative events from 
one party to another.
Scenario: A plausible description of how the future may develop 
based on a coherent and internally consistent set of assumptions about 
key driving forces (e. g., rate of technological change (TC), prices) and 
relationships. Note that scenarios are neither predictions nor forecasts, 
but are useful to provide a view of the implications of developments 
and actions. See also Baseline / reference, Climate scenario, Emission 
scenario, Mitigation scenario, Representative Concentration Pathways 
(RCPs), Shared socio-economic pathways, Socioeconomic scenarios, 
SRES scenarios, Stabilization, and Transformation pathway.
Scope 1, Scope 2, and Scope 3 emissions: See Emissions.
Secondary energy: See Primary energy.
Sectoral Models: See Models.
Sensitivity analysis: Sensitivity analysis with respect to quantitative 
analysis assesses how changing assumptions alters the outcomes. For 
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example, one chooses different values for specific parameters and re-
runs a given model to assess the impact of these changes on model 
output.
Sequestration: The uptake (i. e., the addition of a substance of con-
cern to a reservoir) of carbon containing substances, in particular car-
bon dioxide (CO2), in terrestrial or marine reservoirs. Biological seques-
tration includes direct removal of CO2 from the atmosphere through 
land-use change (LUC), afforestation, reforestation, revegetation, car-
bon storage in landfills, and practices that enhance soil carbon in agri-
culture (cropland management, grazing land management). In parts of 
the literature, but not in this report, (carbon) sequestration is used to 
refer to Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (CCS). 
Shadow pricing: Setting prices of goods and services that are not, or 
are incompletely, priced by market forces or by administrative regula-
tion, at the height of their social marginal value. This technique is used 
in cost-benefit analysis (CBA).
Shared socio-economic pathways (SSPs): Currently, the idea of 
SSPs is developed as a basis for new emissions and socio-economic 
scenarios. An SSP is one of a collection of pathways that describe 
alternative futures of socio-economic development in the absence of 
climate policy intervention. The combination of SSP-based socio-eco-
nomic scenarios and Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP)-
based climate projections should provide a useful integrative frame 
for climate impact and policy analysis. See also Baseline / reference, Cli-
mate scenario, Emission scenario, Mitigation scenario, Scenario, SRES 
scenarios, Stabilization, and Transformation pathway.
Short-lived climate pollutant (SLCP): Pollutant emissions that have 
a warming influence on climate and have a relatively short lifetime in 
the atmosphere (a few days to a few decades). The main SLCPs are 
black carbon (BC) (‘soot’), methane (CH4) and some hydroflurorcar-
bons (HFCs) some of which are regulated under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Some pollutants of this type, including CH4, are also precursors to the 
formation of tropospheric ozone (O3), a strong warming agent. These 
pollutants are of interest for at least two reasons. First, because they 
are short-lived, efforts to control them will have prompt effects on 
global warming — unlike long-lived pollutants that build up in the 
atmosphere and respond to changes in emissions at a more sluggish 
pace. Second, many of these pollutants also have adverse local impacts 
such as on human health. 
Sink: Any process, activity or mechanism that removes a greenhouse 
gas (GHG), an aerosol, or a precursor of a GHG or aerosol from the 
atmosphere.
Smart grids: A smart grid uses information and communications tech-
nology to gather data on the behaviours of suppliers and consumers in 
the production, distribution, and use of electricity. Through automated 
responses or the provision of price signals, this information can then 
be used to improve the efficiency, reliability, economics, and sustain-
ability of the electricity network.
Smart meter: A meter that communicates consumption of electricity 
or gas back to the utility provider.
Social cost of carbon (SCC): The net present value of climate dam-
ages (with harmful damages expressed as a positive number) from one 
more tonne of carbon in the form of carbon dioxide (CO2), conditional 
on a global emissions trajectory over time.
Social costs: See Private costs.
Socio-economic scenario: A scenario that describes a possible future 
in terms of population, gross domestic product (GDP), and other socio-
economic factors relevant to understanding the implications of climate 
change. See also Baseline / reference, Climate scenario, Emission sce-
nario, Mitigation scenario, Representative Concentration Pathways 
(RCPs), Scenario, Shared socio-economic pathways, SRES scenarios, 
Stabilization, and Transformation pathway.
Solar energy: Energy from the sun. Often the phrase is used to mean 
energy that is captured from solar radiation either as heat, as light that 
is converted into chemical energy by natural or artificial photosynthe-
sis, or by photovoltaic panels and converted directly into electricity.
Solar Radiation Management (SRM): Solar Radiation Manage-
ment refers to the intentional modification of the earth’s shortwave 
radiative budget with the aim to reduce climate change according to a 
given metric (e. g., surface temperature, precipitation, regional impacts, 
etc.). Artificial injection of stratospheric aerosols and cloud brightening 
are two examples of SRM techniques. Methods to modify some fast-
responding elements of the longwave radiative budget (such as cirrus 
clouds), although not strictly speaking SRM, can be related to SRM. 
SRM techniques do not fall within the usual definitions of mitigation 
and adaptation (IPCC, 2012, p. 2). See also Carbon Dioxide Removal 
(CDR) and Geoengineering.
Source: Any process, activity or mechanism that releases a green-
house gas (GHG), an aerosol or a precursor of a GHG or aerosol into 
the atmosphere. Source can also refer to, e. g., an energy source.
Spill-over effect: The effects of domestic or sector mitigation mea-
sures on other countries or sectors. Spill-over effects can be positive 
or negative and include effects on trade, (carbon) leakage, transfer of 
innovations, and diffusion of environmentally sound technology and 
other issues.
SRES scenarios: SRES scenarios are emission scenarios developed by 
Nakićenović and Swart (2000) and used, among others, as a basis for 
some of the climate projections shown in Chapters 9 to 11 of IPCC 
(2001) and Chapters 10 and 11 of IPCC (2007) as well as WGI AR5. The 
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following terms are relevant for a better understanding of the structure 
and use of the set of SRES scenarios:
Scenario family: Scenarios that have a similar demographic, soci-
etal, economic and technical change storyline. Four scenario fami-
lies comprise the SRES scenario set: A1, A2, B1, and B2.
Illustrative Scenario: A scenario that is illustrative for each of the 
six scenario groups reflected in the Summary for Policymakers of 
Nakićenović and Swart (2000). They include four revised marker 
scenarios for the scenario groups A1B, A2, B1, B2, and two addi-
tional scenarios for the A1FI and A1T groups. All scenario groups 
are equally sound.
Marker Scenario: A scenario that was originally posted in draft 
form on the SRES website to represent a given scenario family. The 
choice of markers was based on which of the initial quantifications 
best reflected the storyline, and the features of specific models. 
Markers are no more likely than other scenarios, but are consid-
ered by the SRES writing team as illustrative of a particular sto-
ryline. They are included in revised form in Nakićenović and Swart 
(2000). These scenarios received the closest scrutiny of the entire 
writing team and via the SRES open process. Scenarios were also 
selected to illustrate the other two scenario groups.
Storyline: A narrative description of a scenario (or family of scenar-
ios), highlighting the main scenario characteristics, relationships 
between key driving forces and the dynamics of their evolution.
See also Baseline / reference, Climate scenario, Emission scenario, 
Mitigation scenario, Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs), 
Shared socio-economic pathways, Socio-economic scenario, Stabiliza-
tion, and Transformation pathway.
Stabilization (of GHG or CO2-equivalent concentration): A state 
in which the atmospheric concentrations of one greenhouse gas (GHG) 
(e. g., carbon dioxide) or of a CO2-equivalent basket of GHGs (or a com-
bination of GHGs and aerosols) remains constant over time. 
Standards: Set of rules or codes mandating or defining product per-
formance (e. g., grades, dimensions, characteristics, test methods, and 
rules for use). Product, technology or performance standards establish 
minimum requirements for affected products or technologies. Stan-
dards impose reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions associ-
ated with the manufacture or use of the products and / or application 
of the technology. 
Stratosphere: The highly stratified region of the atmosphere above the 
troposphere extending from about 10 km (ranging from 9 km at high 
latitudes to 16 km in the tropics on average) to about 50 km altitude. 
Structural change: Changes, for example, in the relative share of 
gross domestic product (GDP) produced by the industrial, agricultural, 
or services sectors of an economy, or more generally, systems transfor-
mations whereby some components are either replaced or potentially 
substituted by other components.
Subsidiarity: The principle that decisions of government (other things 
being equal) are best made and implemented, if possible, at the lowest 
most decentralized level, that is, closest to the citizen. Subsidiarity is 
designed to strengthen accountability and reduce the dangers of mak-
ing decisions in places remote from their point of application. The prin-
ciple does not necessarily limit or constrain the action of higher orders 
of government, but merely counsels against the unnecessary assump-
tion of responsibilities at a higher level.
Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6): One of the six types of greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) to be mitigated under the Kyoto Protocol. SF6 is largely used 
in heavy industry to insulate high-voltage equipment and to assist in 
the manufacturing of cable-cooling systems and semi-conductors. See 
Global Warming Potential (GWP) and Annex II.9.1 for GWP values.
Sustainability: A dynamic process that guarantees the persistence of 
natural and human systems in an equitable manner.
Sustainable development (SD): Development that meets the needs 
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs (WCED, 1987).
Technical potential: See Potential.
Technological change (TC): Economic models distinguish autono-
mous (exogenous), endogenous, and induced TC. 
Autonomous (exogenous) technological change: Autonomous 
(exogenous) technological change is imposed from outside the 
model (i. e., as a parameter), usually in the form of a time trend 
affecting factor and / or energy productivity and therefore energy 
demand and / or economic growth.
Endogenous technological change: Endogenous technologi-
cal change is the outcome of economic activity within the model 
(i. e., as a variable) so that factor productivity or the choice of tech-
nologies is included within the model and affects energy demand 
and / or economic growth.
Induced technological change: Induced technological change 
implies endogenous technological change but adds further 
changes induced by policies and measures, such as carbon taxes 
triggering research and development efforts.
Technological learning: See Learning curve / rate.
Technological / knowledge spillovers: Any positive externality that 
results from purposeful investment in technological innovation or 
development (Weyant and Olavson, 1999).
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Territorial emissions: See Emissions.
Trace gas: A minor constituent of the atmosphere, next to nitrogen 
and oxygen that together make up 99 % of all volume. The most impor-
tant trace gases contributing to the greenhouse effect are carbon 
dioxide (CO2), ozone (O3), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), per-
fluorocarbons (PFCs), chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), hydrofluorocarbons 
(HFCs), sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) and water vapour (H2O).
Tradable (green) certificates scheme: A market-based mechanism 
to achieve an environmentally desirable outcome (renewable energy 
(RE) generation, energy efficiency (EE) requirements) in a cost-effective 
way by allowing purchase and sale of certificates representing under 
and over-compliance respectively with a quota.
Tradable (emission) permit: See Emission permit.
Tradable quota system: See Emissions trading.
Transaction costs: The costs that arise from initiating and completing 
transactions, such as finding partners, holding negotiations, consulting 
with lawyers or other experts, monitoring agreements, or opportunity 
costs, such as lost time or resources (Michaelowa et al., 2003).
Transformation pathway: The trajectory taken over time to meet 
different goals for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, atmospheric con-
centrations, or global mean surface temperature change that implies 
a set of economic, technological, and behavioural changes. This can 
encompass changes in the way energy and infrastructure is used and 
produced, natural resources are managed, institutions are set up, 
and in the pace and direction of technological change (TC). See also 
Baseline / reference, Climate scenario, Emission scenario, Mitigation 
scenario, Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs), Scenario, 
Shared socio-economic pathways, Socio-economic scenarios, SRES sce-
narios, and Stabilization.
Transient climate response: See Climate sensitivity.
Transit oriented development (TOD): Urban development within 
walking distance of a transit station, usually dense and mixed with the 
character of a walkable environment.
Troposphere: The lowest part of the atmosphere, from the surface 
to about 10 km in altitude at mid-latitudes (ranging from 9 km at 
high latitudes to 16 km in the tropics on average), where clouds and 
weather phenomena occur. In the troposphere, temperatures generally 
decrease with height. See also Stratosphere.
Uncertainty: A cognitive state of incomplete knowledge that can 
result from a lack of information or from disagreement about what 
is known or even knowable. It may have many types of sources, from 
imprecision in the data to ambiguously defined concepts or terminol-
ogy, or uncertain projections of human behaviour. Uncertainty can 
therefore be represented by quantitative measures (e. g., a probability 
density function) or by qualitative statements (e. g., reflecting the judg-
ment of a team of experts) (see Moss and Schneider, 2000; Manning 
et al., 2004; Mastrandrea et al., 2010). See also Agreement, Evidence, 
Confidence and Likelihood.
Unconventional resources: A loose term to describe fossil fuel 
reserves that cannot be extracted by the well-established drilling 
and mining processes that dominated extraction of coal, gas, and oil 
throughout the 20th century. The boundary between conventional and 
unconventional resources is not clearly defined. Unconventional oils 
include oil shales, tar sands / bitumen, heavy and extra heavy crude oils, 
and deep-sea oil occurrences. Unconventional natural gas includes gas 
in Devonian shales, tight sandstone formations, geopressured aquifers, 
coal-bed gas, and methane (CH4) in clathrate structures (gas hydrates) 
(Rogner, 1997).
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC): The Convention was adopted on 9 May 1992 in New York 
and signed at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro by more than 
150 countries and the European Community. Its ultimate objective is 
the ‘stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere 
at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system’. It contains commitments for all Parties under 
the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’. Under the 
Convention, Parties included in Annex I aimed to return greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions not controlled by the Montreal Protocol to 1990 
levels by the year 2000. The convention entered in force in March 
1994. In 1997, the UNFCCC adopted the Kyoto Protocol. 
Urban heat island: See Heat island.
Verified Emissions Reductions: Emission reductions that are verified 
by an independent third party outside the framework of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its 
Kyoto Protocol. Also called ‘Voluntary Emission Reductions’.
Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs): Important class of organic 
chemical air pollutants that are volatile at ambient air conditions. 
Other terms used to represent VOCs are hydrocarbons (HCs), reactive 
organic gases (ROGs) and non-methane volatile organic compounds 
(NMVOCs). NMVOCs are major contributors — together with nitrogen 
oxides (NOX), and carbon monoxide (CO) — to the formation of photo-
chemical oxidants such as ozone (O3).
Voluntary action: Informal programmes, self-commitments, and dec-
larations, where the parties (individual companies or groups of compa-
nies) entering into the action set their own targets and often do their 
own monitoring and reporting.
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Voluntary agreement (VA): An agreement between a government 
authority and one or more private parties to achieve environmental 
objectives or to improve environmental performance beyond compli-
ance with regulated obligations. Not all voluntary agreements are truly 
voluntary; some include rewards and / or penalties associated with join-
ing or achieving commitments.
Voluntary Emission Reductions: See Verified Emissions Reductions.
Watts per square meter (W m-2): See Radiative forcing.
Wind energy: Kinetic energy from air currents arising from uneven 
heating of the earth’s surface. A wind turbine is a rotating machine for 
converting the kinetic energy of the wind to mechanical shaft energy 
to generate electricity. A windmill has oblique vanes or sails and the 
mechanical power obtained is mostly used directly, for example, for 
water pumping. A wind farm, wind project, or wind power plant is a 
group of wind turbines interconnected to a common utility system 
through a system of transformers, distribution lines, and (usually) one 
substation.
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Acronyms and chemical symbols
AAU Assigned Amount Unit
ADB Asian Development Bank
AfDB African Development Bank
AFOLU Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use
AME Asian Modeling Exercise
AMPERE Assessment of Climate Change Mitigation Pathways 
and Evaluation of the Robustness of Mitigation Cost 
Estimates
AOSIS Alliance of Small Island States
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
AR4 IPCC Fourth Assessment Report 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
ASIA Non-OECD Asia
BAMs Border adjustment measures
BAT Best available technology
BAU Business-as-usual 
BC Black carbon
BECCS Bioenergy with carbon dioxide capture and storage
BEVs Battery electric vehicles 
BNDES Brazilian Development Bank
BOD Biochemical Oxygen Demand
BRT Bus rapid transit 
C Carbon
C40 C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group
CBA Cost-benefit analysis 
CBD Convention on Biological Diversity 
CBD Central business district
CCA Climate Change Agreement 
CCE Cost of conserved energy 
CCL Climate Change Levy 
CCS Carbon dioxide capture and storage 
CDM Clean Development Mechanism 
CDR Carbon dioxide removal 
CEA Cost-effectiveness analysis 
CERs Certified Emissions Reductions 
CFCs Chlorofluorocarbons
CGE Computable general equilibrium 
CH4 Methane
CHP Combined heat and power
CIFs Climate Investment Funds
CMIP Coupled Model Intercomparison Project
CNG Compressed natural gas
CO Carbon monoxide
CO2 Carbon dioxide
CO2eq Carbon dioxide-equivalent, CO2-equivalent
COD Chemical oxygen demand 
COP Conference of the Parties 
CRF Capital recovery factor
CSP Concentrated solar power
CTCN Climate Technology Centre and Network
DAC Direct air capture 
DAC Development Assistance Committee 
DALYs Disability-adjusted life years
DANN Designated National Authority
DCs Developing countries
DRI Direct reduced iron 
DSM Demand-side management
EAF Electric arc furnace
EAS East Asia
ECA Economic Commission for Africa
ECN Energy Research Center of the Netherlands
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EDGAR Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research 
EE Energy efficiency 
EIA U. S. Energy Information Administration
EITs Economies in Transition 
EMF Energy Modeling Forum 
EPA U. S. Environmental Protection Agency 
EPC Energy performance contracting 
ERU Emissions reduction unit
ESCOs Energy service companies 
ETS Emissions Trading System
EU European Union
EU ETS European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
EVs Electric vehicles
F-gases Fluorinated gases 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations 
FAQ Frequently asked questions
FAR IPCC First Assessment Report 
FCVs Fuel cell vehicles
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
FE Final energy
FEEM Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
FF&I Fossil fuel and industrial 
FIT  Feed-in tariff
FOLU Forestry and Other Land Use
FSF Fast-start Finance
G20 Group of Twenty Finance Ministers
G8 Group of Eight Finance Ministers
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCAM Global Change Assessment Model
GCF Green Climate Fund
GCM General Circulation Model
GDP Gross domestic product 
GEA Global Energy Assessment
GEF Global Environment Facility
GHG Greenhouse gas 
GNE Gross national expenditure
GSEP Global Superior Energy Performance Partnership
GTM Global Timber Model 
GTP Global Temperature Change Potential 
GWP Global Warming Potential 
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HDI Human Development Index 




HHV Higher heating value 
HIC High-income countries 
HVAC Heating, ventilation and air conditioning
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IAMC Integrated Assessment Modelling Consortium 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
ICE Internal combustion engine
ICLEI International Council for Local Environmental Initia-
tives
ICT Information and communication technology 
IDB Inter-American Development Bank 
IDP Integrated Design Process
IEA International Energy Agency 
IET International Emissions Trading
IGCC Integrated gasification combined cycle
IIASA International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
iLUC Indirect land-use change
IMF International Monetary Fund
IMO International Maritime Organization
INT TRA International transport
IO International organization
IP Intellectual property 
IPAT Income-Population-Affluence-Technology
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
IRENA International Renewable Energy Agency
IRR Internal rate of return
ISO International Organization for Standardization
JI Joint Implementation 
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
KfW Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
LAM Latin America 
LCA Lifecycle Assessment 
LCCC Levelized costs of conserved carbon 
LCD Liquid crystal display
LCCE Levelized cost of conserved energy 
LCOE Levelized costs of energy
LDCs Least Developed Countries
LDCF Least Developed Countries Fund
LDVs Light-duty vehicles
LED Light-emitting diode
LHV Lower heating value
LIC Low-income countries 
LIMITS Low Climate Impact Scenarios and Implications of 
Required Tight Emission Control Strategies
LMC Lower-middle income countries 
LNG Liquefied natural gas
LPG Liquefied petroleum gas 
LUC Land-use change
LULUCF Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry 
MAC Marginal abatement cost
MAF Middle East and Africa 
MAGICC Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse Gas Induced 
Climate Change
MCA Multi-criteria analysis 
MDB Multilateral Development Bank 
MDGs Millennium Development Goals 
MEF Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate
MER Market exchange rate
MFA Material flow analysis 
MNA Middle East and North Africa
MRIO Multi-Regional Input-Output Analysis
MRV Measurement, reporting, and verification 




NAMA Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action
NAPA National Adaptation Programmes of Action
NAS U. S. National Academy of Science
NF3 Nitrogen trifluoride




NPV Net present value
NRC U. S. National Research Council
NREL U. S. National Renewable Energy Laboratory 
NZEB Net zero energy buildings
O3 Ozone
O&M Operation and maintenance
OC Organic carbon
ODA Official development assistance
ODS Ozone-depleting substances 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment 
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
PACE Property Assessed Clean Energy 
PAS South-East Asia and Pacific
PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency
PC Pulverized Coal
PDF Probability density function
PEVs Plug-in electric vehicles 
PFC Perfluorocarbons 
PHEVs Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles 
PIK Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research 
PM Particulate Matter 
PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratories 
POEDC Pacific OECD 1990 members (Japan, Aus, NZ)
PPP Polluter pays principle
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PPP Purchasing power parity
PV Photovoltaic
R&D Research and development 
RCPs Representative Concentration Pathways
RD&D Research, Development and Demonstration 
RE Renewable energy 
RECIPE Report on Energy and Climate Policy in Europe
REDD Reducing Emissions From Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation
REEEP Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership 
RES Renewable energy sources
RGGI Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
RoSE Roadmaps towards Sustainable Energy futures
ROW Rest of the World
RPS Renewable portfolio standards
SAR IPCC Second Assessment Report 
SAS South Asia 
SCC Social cost of carbon 
SCCF Special Climate Change Fund
SCP Sustainable consumption and production
SD Sustainable development 
SF6 Sulphur hexafluoride
SLCP Short-lived climate pollutant
SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises 
SO2 Sulphur dioxide
SPM Summary for Policymakers
SRES IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios 
SREX IPCC Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme 
Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change 
Adaptation
SRM Solar radiation management 
SRREN IPCC Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and 
Climate Change Mitigation 
SRCSS IPCC Special Report on Carbon dioxide Capture and 
Storage
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa
SUVs Sport Utility Vehicles
SWF Social welfare function
TAR IPCC Third Assessment Report 
TC Technological change 
TCR Transient climate response
Th Thorium
TNAs Technology Needs Assessments 
TOD Transit-oriented development 
TPES Total primary energy supply
TRIPs Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights 
TT Technology transfer 
U Uranium
UHI Urban heat island 
UMC Upper-middle income countries 
UN United Nations
UN DESA United Nations Department for Economic and Social 
Affairs
UNCCD United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
UNCSD United Nations Conference on Sustainable Develop-
ment 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change 
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
USD U. S. Dollars
VAs Voluntary agreements 
VOCs Volatile Organic Compounds 
VKT Vehicle kilometers travelled
WACC Weighted costs of capital
WBCSD World Business Council on Sustainable Development
WCED World Commission on Environment and Development
WCI Western Climate Initiative 
WEU Western Europe
WGI IPCC Working Group I
WGII IPCC Working Group II
WGIII IPCC Working Group III
WHO World Health Organization
WTP Willingness to pay
WWTP Wastewater plant
WTO World Trade Organization
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Part I:  Units and definitions � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1284
A�II�1 Standard units and unit conversion � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1284
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1284
Metrics & Methodology Annex II
AII
This annex on methods and metrics provides background information 
on material used in the Working Group III Contribution to the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report 
(WGIII AR5). The material presented in this annex documents metrics, 
methods, and common data sets that are typically used across multiple 
chapters of the report. The annex is composed of three parts: Part I 
introduces standards metrics and common definitions adopted in the 
report; Part II presents methods to derive or calculate certain quanti-
ties used in the report; and Part III provides more detailed background 
information about common data sources that go beyond what can be 
included in the chapters. While this structure may help readers to navi-
gate through the annex, it is not possible in all cases to unambiguously 
assign a certain topic to one of these parts, naturally leading to some 
overlap between the parts.
Part I: Units and definitions
A.II.1 Standard units and 
unit conversion
The following section, A.II.1.1, introduces standard units of measure-
ment that are used throughout this report. This includes Système Inter-
national (SI) units, SI-derived units, and other non-SI units as well the 
standard prefixes for basic physical units. It builds upon similar mate-
rial from previous IPCC reports (IPCC, 2001; Moomaw et al., 2011). 
In addition to establishing a consistent set of units for reporting 
throughout the report, harmonized conventions for converting units 
as reported in the scientific literature have been established and are 
summarized in Section A.II.1.2 (physical unit conversion) and Section 
A.II.1.3 (monetary unit conversion).
A�II�1�1 Standard units
Table A�II�1 | Système International (SI) units.
Physical Quantity  Unit  Symbol  
 Length  meter   m  
 Mass  kilogram   kg  
 Time  second   s  
 Thermodynamic temperature kelvin  K  
 Amount of Substance  mole   mol  
Table A�II�2 | Special names and symbols for certain SI-derived units.
Physical Quantity  Unit  Symbol  Definition  
 Force Newton  N  kg m s^2  
 Pressure  Pascal   Pa   kg m^ – 1 s^ – 2 (= N m^ – 2)  
 Energy  Joule   J   kg m^2 s^ – 2  
 Power  Watt   W   kg m^2 s^ – 3 (= J s^ – 1)  
 Frequency  Hertz   Hz   s^ – 1 (cycles per second)  
 Ionizing Radiation Dose sievert Sv J kg^-1
Table A�II�3 | Non-SI standard units.
Monetary units Unit Symbol
Currency (Market 
Exchange Rate, MER)
constant US Dollar 2010 USD2010
Currency (Purchasing 
Power Parity, PPP)




Emissions Metric tonnes t
CO2 Emissions Metric tonnes CO2 tCO2
CO2-equivalent Emissions Metric tonnes CO2-equivalent* tCO2eq
Abatement Costs and 
Emissions Prices / Taxes
constant US Dollar 2010 
per metric tonne
USD2010 / t
CO2 concentration or Mixing 
Ratio (μmol mol – 1)
Parts per million (10^6) ppm
CH4 concentration or Mixing 
Ratio (μmol mol – 1)
Parts per billion (10^9) ppb
N2O concentration or Mixing 
Ratio (μmol mol – 1)
Parts per billion (10^9) ppb
Radiative forcing Watts per square meter W / m2
Energy-related units Unit Symbol
Energy Joule J
Electricity and Heat generation Watt Hours Wh
Power (Peak Capacity) Watt (Watt thermal, Watt electric) W (Wth, We)
Capacity Factor Percent %
Technical and Economic Lifetime Years yr
Specific Energy Investment Costs US Dollar 2010 per kW 
(peak capacity)
USD2010 / kW
Energy Costs (e. g., LCOE) and Prices constant US Dollar 2010 per GJ or 
US Cents 2010 per kWh




Land-related units Unit Symbol
Area Hectare ha
Note:
* CO2-equivalent emissions in this report are — if not stated otherwise — aggregated 
using global warming potentials (GWPs) over a 100-year time horizon, often 
derived from the IPCC Second Assessment Report (IPCC, 1995a). A discussion 
about different GHG metrics can be found in Sections 1.2.5 and 3.9.6 (see 
Annex II.9.1 for the GWP values of the different GHGs).
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Table A�II�4 | Prefixes for basic physical units.
Multiple Prefix Symbol Fraction Prefix Symbol 
1E+21 zeta Z 1E-01 deci d 
1E+18 exa E 1E-02 centi c 
1E+15 peta P 1E-03 milli m 
1E+12 tera T 1E-06 micro μ 
1E+09 giga G 1E-09 nano n 
1E+06 mega M 1E-12 pico p 
1E+03 kilo k 1E-15 femto f 
1E+02 hecto h 1E-18 atto a
1E+01 deca da 1E-21 zepto z
A�II�1�2 Physical unit conversion
Table A�II�5 | Conversion table for common mass units (IPCC, 2001).
To: kg t lt St lb
From: multiply by:
kilogram kg 1 1.00E-03 9.84E-04 1.10E-03 2.20E+00
tonne t 1.00E+03 1 9.84E-01 1.10E+00 2.20E+03
long ton lt 1.02E+03 1.02E+00 1 1.12E+00 2.24E+03
short ton st 9.07E+02 9.07E-01 8.93E-01 1 2.00E+03
Pound lb 4.54E-01 4.54E-04 4.46E-04 5.00E-04 1
A�II�1�3 Monetary unit conversion
To achieve comparability across cost und price information from dif-
ferent regions, where possible all monetary quantities reported in the 
WGIII AR5 have been converted to constant US Dollars 2010 (USD2010). 
This only applies to monetary quantities reported in market exchange 
rates (MER), and not to those reported in purchasing power parity 
(PPP, unit: Int$). 
To facilitate a consistent monetary unit conversion process, a simple 
and transparent procedure to convert different monetary units from 
the literature to USD2010 was established which is described below.
It is important to note that there is no single agreed upon method 
of dealing with monetary unit conversion, and thus data availability, 
transparency, and — for practical reasons — simplicity, were the most 
important criteria for choosing a method to be used throughout this 
report. 
To convert from year X local currency unit (LCUX) to 2010 US Dollars 
(USD2010) two steps are necessary:
1. in- / deflating from year X to 2010, and
2. converting from LCU to USD. 
Table A�II�6 | Conversion table for common volumetric units (IPCC, 2001).
To: gal US gal UK bbl ft3 l m3
From: multiply by:
US Gallon gal US 1 8.33E-01 2.38E-02 1.34E-01 3.79E+00 3.80E-03
UK / Imperial Gallon gal UK 1.20E+00 1 2.86E-02 1.61E-01 4.55E+00 4.50E-03
Barrel bbl 4.20E+01 3.50E+01 1 5.62E+00 1.59E+02 1.59E-01
Cubic foot ft3 7.48E+00 6.23E+00 1.78E-01 1 2.83E+01 2.83E-02
Liter l 2.64E-01 2.20E-01 6.30E-03 3.53E-02 1 1.00E-03
Cubic meter m3 2.64E+02 2.20E+02 6.29E+00 3.53E+01 1.00E+03 1
Table A�II�7 | Conversion table for common energy units (NAS, 2007; IEA, 2012a).
To: TJ Gcal Mtoe Mtce MBtu GWh
From: multiply by:
Tera Joule TJ 1 2.39E+02 2.39E-05 3.41E-05 9.48E+02 2.78E-01
Giga Calorie Gcal 4.19E-03 1 1.00E-07 1.43E-07 3.97E+00 1.16E-03
Mega Tonne Oil Equivalent Mtoe 4.19E+04 1.00E+07 1 1.43E+00 3.97E+07 1.16E+04
Mega Tonne Coal Equivalent Mtce 2.93E+04 7.00E+06 7.00E-01 1 2.78E+07 8.14E+03
Million British Thermal Units MBtu 1.06E-03 2.52E-01 2.52E-08 3.60E-08 1 2.93E-04
Giga Watt Hours GWh 3.60E+00 8.60E+02 8.60E-05 0.000123 3.41E+03 1
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In practice, the order of applying these two steps will lead to different 
results. In this report, the conversion route LCUX -> LCU2010 -> USD2010 
is adopted, i. e., national / regional deflators are used to measure coun-
try- or region-specific inflation between year X and 2010 in local cur-
rency and current (2010) exchange rates are then used to convert to 
USD2010.
To reflect the change in prices of all goods and services that an econ-
omy produces, and to keep the procedure simple, the economy’s GDP 
deflator is chosen to convert to a common base year. Finally, when 
converting from LCU2010 to USD2010, official 2010 exchange rates, which 
are readily available, but on the downside often fluctuate significantly 
in the short term, are adopted for currency conversion in the report.
Consistent with the choice of the World Bank databases as the primary 
source for gross domestic product (GDP) (see Section A.II.9) and other 
financial data throughout the report, deflators and exchange rates 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database 
(World Bank, 2013) is used. 
To summarize, the following procedure has been adopted to convert 
monetary quantities reported in LCUX to USD2010:
1. Use the country- / region-specific deflator and multiply with 
the deflator value to convert from LCUX to LCU2010. In case 
national / regional data are reported in non-LCU units (e. g., USDX 
or EuroX), which is often the case in multi-national or global stud-
ies, apply the corresponding currency deflator to convert to 2010 
currency (i. e., the US deflator and the Eurozone deflator in the 
examples above). 
2. Use the appropriate 2010 exchange rate to convert from LCU2010 
to USD2010.
A.II.2 Region definitions
In this report a number of different sets of regions are used to present 
results of analysis. These region sets are referred to as RC5, RC10 
(Region Categorization 5 and 10, respectively), see Table A.II.8, and 
ECON4 (income-based economic categorization), see Table A.II.9. RC10 
is a breakdown of RC5 and can be aggregated to RC5 as shown in 
Table A.II.8. Note that for some exceptional cases in this report there 
are minor deviations from the RC5 and RC10 definitions given here. In 
addition to these three standard aggregations some chapters feature 
an 11 region aggregation (GEA R11) used in the Global Energy Assess-
ment (GEA, 2012) and other studies.
A�II�2�1 RC10
NAM (North America): Canada, Guam, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, 
United States 
WEU (Western Europe): Aland Islands, Andorra, Austria, Belgium, 
Channel Islands, Denmark, Faroe Islands, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Gibraltar, Greece, Greenland, Guernsey, Holy See (Vatican 
City State), Iceland, Ireland, Isle of Man, Italy, Jersey, Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, 
Spain, Svalbard and Jan Mayen, Sweden, Switzerland, United King-
dom, Turkey 
POECD (Pacific OECD): Australia, Japan, New Zealand 
EIT (Economies in Transition): Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Russian Federation, Slovakia, 
Table A�II�8 | Description of regions in the RC5 and RC10 region sets.
RC5 RC10
OECD-1990 OECD Countries in 1990 NAM North America
WEU Western Europe
POECD Pacific OECD (Japan, Australia, New Zealand)
EIT Economies in Transition (sometimes referred to as Reforming Economies) EIT Economies in Transition 
(Eastern Europe and  
part of former Soviet Union)
LAM Latin America and Caribbean LAM Latin America and Caribbean
MAF Middle East and Africa SSA Sub-Saharan Africa
MNA Middle East and North Africa
ASIA Non-OECD Asia EAS East Asia
SAS South Asia
PAS South-East Asia and Pacific
INT TRA International transport INT TRA International transport
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Slovenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova (Repub-
lic of), Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Romania, Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro, Turkmenistan 
Table A�II�9 | ECON4 income-based economic country aggregations.
HIC High-income countries
UMC Upper-middle income countries
LMC Lower-middle income countries
LIC Low income countries
INT-TRA International transport
LAM (Latin America and Caribbean): Anguilla, Antarctica, Antigua 
and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Bouvet Island, 
British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Chile, Curacao, Falkland Islands 
(Malvinas), French Guiana, French Southern Territories, Guadeloupe, 
Martinique, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, Saint Kitts 
and Nevis, Sint Maarten, South Georgia and the South Sandwich 
Islands, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, Uruguay, US 
Virgin Islands, Haiti, Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Hondu-
ras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Grenada, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Panama, Peru, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Suriname, Venezuela
SSA (Sub Saharan Africa): Equatorial Guinea, Mayotte, Reunion, 
Saint Helena, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Repub-
lic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (The Democratic Republic of the), Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tan-
zania, Togo, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Ghana, Lesotho, Mauritania, Nigeria, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Senegal, Swaziland, Zambia, Angola, Botswana, Gabon, Mau-
ritius, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa
MNA (Middle East and North Africa): Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Morocco, Palestine, 
South Sudan, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Western Sahara, Yemen, 
Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Tunisia 
EAS (East Asia): South Korea, Korea (Democratic People’s Republic 
of), Mongolia, China 
SAS (South Asia): British Indian Ocean Territory, Afghanistan, Bangla-
desh, Nepal, Bhutan, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives 
PAS (South-East Asia and Pacific): Brunei Darussalam, Christmas 
Island, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, French Polynesia, Heard Island and 
McDonald Islands, New Caledonia, Norfolk Island, Northern Mariana 
Islands, Pitcairn, Singapore, Tokelau, US Minor Outlying Islands, Wal-
lis and Futuna, Cambodia, Myanmar, Indonesia, Kiribati, Laos (People’s 
Democratic Republic), Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, Papua 
New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Vanu-
atu, Viet Nam, Niue, American Samoa, Cook Islands, Fiji, Malaysia, Mar-
shall Islands, Palau, Thailand, Tonga, Tuvalu 
INT TRA (International transport): International Aviation, Interna-
tional Shipping
A�II�2�2 RC5
For country mapping to each of the RC5 regions see RC10 mappings 
(Section A.II.2.1) and their aggregation to RC5 regions in Table A.II.8. 
It should be noted that this region set was also used in the so-called 
Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs, see Section 6.3.2) and 
therefore has been adopted as a standard in integrated modelling sce-
narios (Section A.II.10).
A�II�2�3 ECON4
High Income (HIC): Aland Islands, Andorra, Anguilla, Antarctica, Anti-
gua and Barbuda, Aruba, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barba-
dos, Belgium, Bermuda, Bouvet Island, British Indian Ocean Territory, 
British Virgin Islands, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Cayman Islands, 
Channel Islands, Chile, Christmas Island, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Croa-
tia, Curacao, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Equatorial Guinea, 
Estonia, Falkland Islands (Malvinas), Faroe Islands, Finland, France, 
French Guiana, French Polynesia, French Southern Territories, Germany, 
Gibraltar, Greece, Greenland, Guadeloupe, Guam, Guernsey, Heard 
Island and McDonald Islands, Holy See (Vatican City State), Iceland, 
Ireland, Isle of Man, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jersey, Kuwait, Latvia, Liech-
tenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Martinique, Mayotte, Monaco, 
Montserrat, Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, New 
Zealand, Norfolk Island, Northern Mariana Islands, Norway, Oman, 
Pitcairn, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Reunion, Russian Fed-
eration, Saint Helena, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, 
San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sint Maarten, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, South Korea, Spain, 
Svalbard and Jan Mayen, Sweden, Switzerland, Tokelau, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, United Arab Emirates, United King-
dom, United States, Uruguay, US Minor Outlying Islands, US Virgin 
Islands, Wallis and Futuna
Upper Middle Income (UMC): Albania, Algeria, American Samoa, 
Angola, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belize, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Cook Islands, 
Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Fiji, Gabon, 
Grenada, Hungary, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, 
Libya, Macedonia, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Montenegro, Namibia, Niue, Palau, Panama, Peru, Romania, 
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Serbia, Serbia and Mon-
tenegro, Seychelles, South Africa, Suriname, Thailand, Tonga, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Venezuela 
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Lower Middle Income (LMC): Armenia, Bhutan, Bolivia, Cameroon, 
Cape Verde, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, El Salvador, Georgia, 
Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kiribati, Laos 
(People’s Democratic Republic), Lesotho, Mauritania, Micronesia (Fed-
erated States of), Moldova (Republic of), Mongolia, Morocco, Nauru, 
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, 
Philippines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Solomon Islands, 
South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Timor-
Leste, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Western Sahara, Yemen, 
Zambia
Low Income (LIC): Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo 
(The Democratic Republic of the), Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kenya, Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of), 
Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Myan-
mar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tajikistan, Tanzania, 
Togo, Uganda, Zimbabwe
INT TRA (International transport): International Aviation, Interna-
tional Shipping
A�II�2�4 GEA R11
The 11 regions of GEA R11 are similar to the above RC10 and consist 
of North America (NAM), Western Europe (WEU), Pacific OECD (POECD 
[PAO]), Central and Eastern Europe (EEU), Former Soviet Union (FSU), 
Centrally Planned Asia and China (CPA), South Asia (SAS), Other Pacific 
Asia (PAS), Middle East and North Africa (MNA [MEA]), Latin America 
and the Caribbean (LAM [LAC]) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA [AFR]). 
The differences to RC10 are the following:
•	 RC10 EIT is split in GEA R11 FSU and EEU. To FSU belong Arme-
nia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Republic 
of Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine 
and Uzbekistan and to EEU belong Albania, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Macedonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, 
Slovak Republic and Slovenia.
•	 GEA R11 NAM matches RC10 NAM plus Puerto Rico and the Brit-
ish Virgin Islands.
•	 GEA R11 LAM matches RC10 LAM without Puerto Rico and the 
British Virgin Islands.
•	 GEA R11 CPA matches RC10 EAS plus Cambodia, Laos (People’s 
Democratic Republic), Viet Nam, without South Korea. 
•	 GEA R11 PAS matches RC10 PAS plus South Korea and Taiwan, 




Across this report, a number of different metrics to characterize cost of 
climate change mitigation are employed. These cost metrics reflect the 
different levels of detail and system boundaries at which mitigation 
analysis is conducted. For example, in response to mitigation policies, 
different technologies are deployed across different sectors. To facili-
tate a meaningful comparison of economics across diverse options at 
the technology level, the metric of ‘levelized costs’ is used throughout 
several chapters (7, 8, 9, 10, and 11) of this report in various forms 
(Section A.II.3.1). In holistic approaches to mitigation, such as the ones 
used in Chapter 6 on transformation pathways, different mitigation 
cost metrics are used, the differences among which are discussed in 
Section A.II.3.2.
A�II�3�1 Levelized costs
Levelizing costs means to express all lifetime expenditures of a stream 
of relatively homogeneous outputs that occur over time as cost per 
unit of output. Most commonly, the concept is applied to electricity as 
an output. It is also being applied to express costs of other streams of 
outputs such as energy savings and greenhouse gas (GHG) emission 
savings. Each of these metrics provides a benchmark for comparing 
different technologies or practices of providing the respective output. 
Each also comes with a set of context-specific caveats that need to be 
taken into account for correct interpretation. Various literature sources 
caution against drawing too strong conclusions from these metrics. The 
levelized cost of energy (LCOE), the levelized cost of conserved energy 
(LCCE), and the levelized cost of conserved carbon (LCCC) are used 
throughout the WGIII AR5 to provide output-specific benchmarks for 
comparison. They are explained and discussed below in the mentioned 
order.1
A�II�3�1�1 Levelized cost of energy
Background
In order to compare energy supply technologies from an economic 
point of view, the concept of ‘levelized cost of energy’ (LCOE, also 
called levelized unit cost or levelized generation cost) frequently is 
applied (IEA and NEA, 2005; IEA, 2010a; Fischedick et al., 2011; Lar-
1 This section, however, does not take into account the implications for additional 
objectives beyond energy supply (LCOE), energy savings (LCCE) or mitigation 
(LCCC) — often referred to as co-benefits and adverse side-effects (see Glossary 
in Annex I). In particular, external costs are not taken into account if they are not 
internalized (e. g., via carbon pricing). 
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son et  al., 2012; Turkenburg et  al., 2012; UNEP, 2012; IRENA, 2013). 
Simply put, ‘levelized’ cost of energy is a measure that can be loosely 
defined as the long-run ‘average’ cost of a unit of energy provided by 
the considered technology (albeit, calculated correctly in an economic 
sense by taking into account the time value of money). Strictly speak-
ing, the levelized cost of energy is “the cost per unit of energy that, if 
held constant through the analysis period, would provide the same net 
present revenue value as the net present value cost of the system.” 
(Short et al., 1995, p. 93). The calculation of the respective ‘average’ 
cost (expressed, for instance in US cent / kWh or USD / GJ) palpably facil-
itates the comparison of projects, which differ in terms of plant size 
and / or plant lifetime.
General formula and simplifications
According to the definition given above, “the levelized cost is the 
unique break-even cost price where discounted revenues (price x 
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 (Equation A.II.1)
where LCOE are the levelized cost of energy, Et is the energy delivered 
in year t (which might vary from year to year), Expensest cover all (net) 
expenses in the year t, i is the discount rate and n the lifetime of the 
project. 
After solving for LCOE this gives: 
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  (Equation A.II.2)
Note that while it appears as if energy amounts were discounted in 
Equation A.II.2, this is just an arithmetic result of rearranging Equation 
A.II.1 (Branker et al., 2011). In fact, originally, revenues are discounted 
and not energy amounts per se (see Equation A.II.1). 
Considering energy conversion technologies, the lifetime expenses 
comprise investment costs I, operation and maintenance cost O&M 
(including waste management costs), fuel costs F, carbon costs C, and 
decommissioning costs D. In this case, levelized cost can be deter-
mined by (IEA, 2010a): 
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 (Equation A.II.3)
In simple cases, where the energy E provided annually is constant dur-
ing the lifetime of the project, this translates to:
LCOE  :=  
CRF · NPV (Lifetime Expenses)
   ________ 
E
 =  
Annuity (Lifetime Expenses)




where CRF: =  i ___ 1 − (1 + i ) −n is the capital recovery factor and NPV the net 
present value of all lifetime expenditures (Suerkemper et al., 2011). For 
the simplified case, where the annual costs are also assumed constant 
over time, this can be further simplified to (O&M costs and fuel costs 
F constants):
LCOE =   CRF · I + O&M + F  _____
 E   
 (Equation A.II.5)
Where I is the upfront investment, O&M are the annual operation and 
maintenance costs, F are the annual fuel costs, and E is the annual 
energy provision. The investment I should be interpreted (here and also 
in Equations A.II.7 and A.II.9) as the sum of all capital expenditures 
needed to make the investment fully operational discounted to t = 0. 
These might include discounted payments for retrofit payments dur-
ing the lifetime and discounted decommissioning costs at the end of 
the lifetime. Where applicable, annual O&M costs have to take into 
account revenues for by-products and existing carbon costs must be 
added or treated as part of the annual fuel costs.
Discussion of LCOE
The LCOE of a technology is only one indicator for its economic com-
petitiveness, but there are more dimensions to it. Integration costs, 
time dependent revenue opportunities (especially in the case of inter-
mittent renewables), and relative environmental impacts (e. g., exter-
nal costs) play an important role as well (Heptonstall, 2007; Fischedick 
et al., 2011; Joskow, 2011a; Borenstein, 2012; Mills and Wiser, 2012; 
Edenhofer et  al., 2013a; Hirth, 2013). Joskow (2011b) for instance, 
pointed out that LCOE comparisons of intermittent generating tech-
nologies (such as solar energy converters and wind turbines) with dis-
patchable power plants (e. g., coal or gas power plants) may be mis-
leading as these comparisons fail to take into account the different 
production schedule and the associated differences in the market value 
of the electricity that is provided. An extended criticism of the concept 
of LCOE as applied to renewable energies is provided by (Edenhofer 
et al., 2013b). 
Taking these shortcomings into account, there seems to be a clear 
understanding that LCOE are not intended to be a definitive guide 
to actual electricity generation investment decisions (IEA and NEA, 
2005; DTI, 2006). Some studies suggest that the role of levelized 
costs is to give a ‘first order assessment’ (EERE, 2004) of project 
viability. 
In order to capture the existing uncertainty, sensitivity analyses, which 
are sometimes based on Monte Carlo methods, are frequently carried 
out in numerical studies. Darling et  al. (2011), for instance, suggest 
that transparency could be improved by calculating LCOE as a distri-
bution, constructed using input parameter distributions, rather than a 
single number. Studies based on empirical data, in contrast, may suffer 
from using samples that do not cover all cases. Summarizing country 
studies in an effort to provide a global assessment, for instance, might 
have a bias as data for developing countries often are not available 
(IEA, 2010a).
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As Section 7.8.2 shows, typical LCOE ranges are broad as values vary 
across the globe depending on the site-specific renewable energy 
resource base, on local fuel and feedstock prices as well as on coun-
try specific projected costs of investment, and operation and main-
tenance. While noting that system and installation costs vary widely, 
Branker et  al. (2011) document significant variations in the underly-
ing assumptions that go into calculating LCOE for photovoltaic (PV), 
with many analysts not taking into account recent cost reductions or 
the associated technological advancements. In summary, a compari-
son between different technologies should not be based on LCOE data 
solely; instead, site-, project- and investor specific conditions should be 
considered (Fischedick et al., 2011). 
A�II�3�1�2 Levelized cost of conserved energy
Background
The concept of ‘levelized cost of conserved energy’ (LCCE), or more 
frequently referred to as ‘cost of conserved energy (CCE)’, is very 
similar to the LCOE concept, primarily intended to be used for com-
paring the cost of a unit of energy saved to the purchasing cost 
per unit of energy. In essence the concept, similarly to LCOE, also 
annualizes the investment and operation and maintenance cost dif-
ferences between a baseline technology and the energy-efficiency 
alternative, and divides this quantity by the annual energy savings 
(Brown et al., 2008). Similarly to LCOE, it also bridges the time lag 
between the initial additional investment and the future energy sav-
ings through the application of the capital recovery factor (Meier, 
1983).
General formula and simplifications
The conceptual formula for LCCE is essentially the same as Equation 
A.II.4 above, with ΔE meaning in this context the amount of energy 
saved annually (Suerkemper et al., 2011):
LCCE  :=  
CRF · NPV(ΔLifetime  Expenses)
   ________ 
ΔE
 =  
Annuity (ΔLifetime Expenses)




In the case of assumed annually constant O&M costs over the lifetime, 
this simplifies to (equivalent to Equation A.II.5) (Hansen, 2012):
LCCE =   CRF · ΔI + ΔO&M  _____
ΔE
 (Equation A.II.7)
Where ΔI is the difference in investment costs of an energy saving 
measure (e. g., in USD) as compared to a baseline investment; ΔO&M 
is the difference in annual operation and maintenance costs of an 
energy saving measure (e. g., in USD) as compared to the baseline in 
which the energy saving measure is not implemented; ΔE is the annual 
energy conserved by the measure (e. g., in kWh) as compared to the 
usage of the baseline technology; and CRF is the capital recovery fac-
tor depending on the discount rate i and the lifetime of the measure 
n in years as defined above. It should be stressed once more that this 
equation is only valid if ΔO&M and ΔE are constant over the lifetime. 
As LCCE are designed to be compared with complementary levelized 
cost of energy supply, they do not include the annual fuel cost differ-
ence. Any additional monetary benefits that are associated with the 
energy saving measure must be taken into account as part of the O&M 
difference. 
Discussion of LCCE
The main strength of the LCCE concept is that it provides a metric of 
energy saving investments that are independent of the energy price, 
and can thus be compared to different energy purchasing cost values 
for determining the profitability of the investment (Suerkemper et al., 
2011). 
The key difference in the concept with LCOE is the usage of a refer-
ence / baseline technology. LCCE can only be interpreted in context of 
a reference, and is thus very sensitive to how this reference is cho-
sen (see Section 9.3 and 9.6). For instance, the replacement of a very 
inefficient refrigerator can be very cost-effective, but if we consider an 
already relatively efficient product as the reference technology, the 
LCCE value can be many times higher. This is one of the main chal-
lenges in interpreting LCCE. 
Another challenge in the calculation of LCCE should be pinpointed. The 
lifetimes of the efficient and the reference technology may be different. 
In this case the investment cost difference needs to be used that incurs 
throughout the lifetime of the longer-living technology. For instance, 
a compact fluorescent lamp (CFL) lasts as much as 10 times as long 
as an incandescent lamp. Thus, in the calculation of the LCCE for a 
CFL replacing an incandescent lamp the saved investments in multi-
ple incandescent lamps should be taken into account (Ürge-Vorsatz, 
1996). In such a case, as in some other cases, too, the difference in 
annualized investment cost can be negative resulting in negative LCCE 
values. Negative LCCE values mean that the investment is already prof-
itable at the investment level, without the need for the energy savings 
to recover the extra investment costs. 
Taking into account incremental operation and maintenance cost 
can be important for applications where those are significant, for 
instance, the lamp replacement on streetlamps, bridges. In such 
cases a longer-lifetime product, as it typically applies to efficient 
lighting technologies, is already associated with negative costs at 
the investment level (less frequent needs for labour to replace the 
lamps), and thus can result in significantly negative LCCEs or cost 
savings (Ürge-Vorsatz, 1996). In case of such negative incremental 
investment cost, some peculiarities may occur. For instance, as can 
be seen from Equation A.II.7, LCCE decrease (become more nega-
tive) with increasing CRF, e. g., as a result of an increase in discount 
rates. 
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A�II�3�1�3 Levelized cost of conserved carbon
Background
Many find it useful to have a simple metric for identifying the costs of 
GHG emission mitigation. The metric can be used for comparing miti-
gation costs per unit of avoided emissions, and comparing these spe-
cific emission reduction costs for different options, within a company, 
within a sector, or even between sectors. This metric is often referred 
to as levelized cost of conserved carbon (LCCC) or specific GHG mitiga-
tion costs. There are several caveats, which will be discussed below, 
after the general approach is introduced.
General formula and simplification
For calculation of specific mitigation costs, the following, equation 
holds, where ΔC is the annual reduction in GHG emissions achieved 
through the implementation of an option. The equation is equivalent to 
Equations A.II.4 and A.II.6. 
LCCC  :=  
CRF · NPV(ΔLifetime Expenses)
   ________ 
ΔC
 =  
Annuity(ΔLifetimeExpenses)




Also this equation can be simplified under the assumption of annual 
GHG emission reduction, annual O&M costs and annual benefits ΔB 
being constant over the lifetime of the option.
LCCC =   CRF · ΔI + ΔO&M − ΔB  _______
ΔC
 (Equation A.II.9)
Where ΔI is the difference in investment costs of a mitigation measure 
(e. g., in USD) as compared to a baseline investment; ΔO&M is the dif-
ference in annual operation and maintenance costs (e. g., in USD) and 
ΔB denotes the annual benefits, all compared to a baseline for which 
the option is not implemented. Note that annual benefits include 
reduced expenditures for fuels, if the investment project reduces GHG 
emissions via a reduction in fuel use. As such LCCC depend on energy 
prices.
An important characteristic of this equation is that LCCC can become 
negative if ΔB is bigger than the sum of the other two terms in the 
numerator. 
Discussion of LCCC
Several issues need to be taken into account when using LCCC. First of 
all, the calculation of LCCC for one specific option does not take into 
account the fact that each option is implemented in a system, and the 
value of the LCCC of one option will depend on whether other options 
will be implemented or not (e. g., because the latter might influence 
the specific emissions of the background system). To solve this issue, 
analysts use integrated models, in which ideally these interactions are 
taken into account (see Chapter 6). Second, energy prices and other 
benefits are highly variable from region to region, rarely constant over 
time, and often difficult to predict. This issue is relevant for any analysis 
on mitigation, but it is always important to be aware of the fact that 
even if one single LCCC number is reported, there will be substantial 
uncertainty in that number. Uncertainty tends to increase from LCOE 
to LCCE, for example, due to additional uncertainty with regard to 
the choice of the baseline, and even further for LCCC, since not only 
a baseline needs to be defined, but furthermore the monetary benefit 
from energy savings needs to be taken into account (if the mitigation 
measure affects energy consumption). Moving from LCOE to LCCC in 
the field of energy supply technologies, for instance, results in compar-
ing LCOE differences to the differences of the specific emissions of the 
mitigation technology compared to the reference plant (Rubin, 2012). 
As Sections 7.8.1 and 7.8.2 have shown, LCOE and specific emissions 
exhibit large uncertainties in their own, which result in an even exag-
gerated uncertainty once combined to yield the LCCC. Third, options 
with negative costs can occur, for example, in cases where incremental 
investment cost are taken to be negative. Finally, there is also a debate 
whether options with negative costs can occur at all, as it apparently 
suggests a situation of non-optimized behaviour. For further discussion 
of negative costs, see Box 3.10 in Chapter 3 of this report.
Levelized costs of conserved carbon are used to determine abatement 
cost curves, which are frequently applied in climate change decision 
making. The merits and shortcoming of abatement cost curves are 
discussed in the IPCC Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources 
and Climate Change Mitigation (SRREN) (Fischedick et  al., 2011) 
and in Chapter 3 (Section 3.9.3) of the AR5. In order to avoid some 
of the shortcomings of abatement cost curves, the AR5 opted to use 
integrated modelling scenarios in order to evaluate the economic 
potential of specific mitigation options in a consistent way. Integrated 
models are able to determine the economic potential of single mitiga-
tion options within the context of (other) competing supply-side and 
demand-side options by taking their interaction and potential endog-
enous learning effects into account. The results obtained in this way 
are discussed in Chapter 6.
A�II�3�2 Mitigation cost metrics
There is no single metric for reporting the costs of mitigation, and the 
metrics that are available are not directly comparable (see Section 
3.9.3 for a more general discussion; see Section 6.3.6 for an overview 
of costs used in model analysis). In economic theory the most direct 
cost measure is a change in welfare due to changes in the amount 
and composition of consumption of goods and services by individu-
als. Important measures of welfare change include ‘equivalent varia-
tion’ and ‘compensating variation’, which attempt to discern how 
much individual income would need to change to keep consumers just 
as well off after the imposition of a policy as before. However, these 
are quite difficult to calculate, so a more common welfare measure-
ment is change in consumption, which captures the total amount of 
money consumers are able to spend on goods and services. Another 
common metric is the change in gross domestic product (GDP). How-
ever, GDP is a less satisfactory measure of overall mitigation cost than 
those focused on individual income and consumption, because it is an 
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output-related measure that in addition to consumption also includes 
investment, imports and exports, and government spending. Aggre-
gate consumption and GDP losses are only available from an analysis 
of the policy impact on the full economy. Common cost measures used 
in studies of the policy impact on specific economic sectors, such as the 
energy sector, are the reduction in consumer and producer surplus and 
the ‘area under the marginal abatement cost function’.
From a practical perspective, different modelling frameworks applied 
in mitigation analysis are capable of producing different cost estimates 
(Section 6.2). Therefore, when comparing cost estimates across mitiga-
tion scenarios from different models, some degree of incomparability 
must necessarily result. In representing costs across transformation 
pathways in this report and more specifically Chapter 6, consumption 
losses are used preferentially when available from general equilibrium 
models, and costs represented by the area under the marginal abate-
ment cost function or the reduction of consumer and producer surplus 
are used for partial equilibrium models. Costs are generally measured 
relative to a baseline scenario without mitigation policy. Consumption 
losses can be expressed in terms of, inter alia, the reduction of baseline 
consumption in a given year or the annual average reduction of con-
sumption growth in the baseline over a given time period.
One popular measure used in different studies to evaluate the eco-
nomic implications of mitigation actions is the emissions price, often 
presented in per tonne of CO2 or per tonne of CO2-equivalent (CO2eq). 
However, it is important to emphasize that emissions prices are not 
cost measures. There are two important reasons why emissions prices 
are not a meaningful representation of costs. First, emissions prices 
measure marginal cost, i. e., the cost of an incremental reduction of 
emissions by one unit. In contrast, total costs represent the costs of all 
mitigation that took place at lower cost than the emissions price. With-
out explicitly accounting for these ‘inframarginal’ costs, it is impossible 
to know how the carbon price relates to total mitigation costs. Sec-
ond, emissions prices can interact with other existing or new policies 
and measures, such as regulatory policies that aim at reducing GHG 
emissions (e. g., feed-in tariffs, subsidies to low-carbon technologies, 
renewable portfolio standards) or other taxes on energy, labour, or 
capital. If mitigation is achieved partly by these other measures, the 
emissions price will not take into account the full costs of an additional 
unit of emissions reductions, and will indicate a lower marginal cost 
than is actually warranted.
It is important to calculate the total cost of mitigation over the entire 
lifetime of a policy. The application of discounting is common practice 
in economics when comparing costs over time. In Chapter 3, Section 
3.6.2 provides some theoretical background on the choice of discount 
rates in the context of cost-benefit analysis (CBA), where discounting 
is crucial, because potential climate damages, and thus benefits from 
their avoidance, will occur far in the future, are highly uncertain, and 
are often in the form of non-market goods. In Chapter 6, mitigation 
costs are assessed primarily in the context of cost-effectiveness analy-
sis, in which a target for the long-term climate outcome is specified 
and models are used to estimate the cost of reaching it, under a variety 
of constraints and assumptions (Section 6.3.2). These scenarios do not 
involve the valuation of damages and the difficulties arising from their 
aggregation. Nonetheless, the models surveyed in Chapter 6 consider 
transformation pathways over long time horizons, so they must specify 
how decision makers view intertemporal tradeoffs.
The standard approach is to use a discount rate that approximates 
the interest rate, that is, the marginal productivity of capital. Empiri-
cal estimates of the long-run average return to a diversified portfolio 
are typically in the 4 % – 6 % range. In scenarios where the long-term 
target is set, the discounting approach will have an effect only on the 
speed and shape of the mitigation schedule, not on the overall level of 
stringency (note that this is in sharp contrast to cost-benefit analysis, 
where the discounting approach is a strong determinant of the level of 
stringency). Although a systematic comparison of alternative discount-
ing approaches in a cost-effectiveness setting does not exist in the 
literature, we can make the qualitative inference that when a policy-
maker places more (less) weight on the future, mitigation effort will be 
shifted sooner (later) in time. Because of long-lived capital dynamics 
in the energy system, and also because of expected technical change, 
mitigation effort in a cost-effectiveness analysis typically begins gradu-
ally and increases over time, leading to a rising cost profile. Thus, an 
analogous inference can be made that when a policy-maker places 
more (less) weight on the future, mitigation costs will be higher (lower) 
earlier and lower (higher) later.
Estimates of the macroeconomic cost of mitigation usually represent 
direct mitigation costs and do not take into account co-benefits or 
adverse side-effects of mitigation actions (see red arrows in Figure 
A.II.1). Further, these costs are only those of mitigation; they do not 
capture the benefits of reducing CO2eq concentrations and limiting cli-
mate change. 
Two further concepts are introduced in Chapter 6 to classify cost 
estimates (Section 6.3.6). The first is an idealized implementation 
approach in which a ubiquitous price on carbon and other GHGs is 
applied across the globe in every sector of every country and which 
rises over time at a rate that reflects the increase in the cost of the 
next available unit of emissions reduction. The second is an idealized 
implementation environment of efficient global markets in which there 
are no pre-existing distortions or interactions with other, non-climate 
market failures. An idealized implementation approach minimizes miti-
gation costs in an idealized implementation environment. This is not 
necessarily the case in non-idealized environments in which climate 
policies interact with existing distortions in labour, energy, capital, and 
land markets. If those market distortions persist or are aggravated by 
climate policy, mitigation costs tend to be higher. In turn, if climate 
policy is brought to bear on reducing such distortions, mitigation costs 
can be lowered by what has been frequently called a double dividend 
of climate policy (see blue arrows in Figure A.II.1). Whether or not such 
a double dividend is available will depend on assumptions about the 
policy environment and available climate policies. 
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A.II.4 Primary energy accounting
Following the standard set by the SRREN, this report adopts the direct-
equivalent accounting method for the reporting of primary energy 
from non-combustible energy sources. The following section largely 
reproduces Annex A.II.4 of the SRREN (Moomaw et  al., 2011) with 
some updates and further clarifications added.
Different energy analyses use a variety of accounting methods that 
lead to different quantitative outcomes for both reporting of current 
primary energy use and primary energy use in scenarios that explore 
future energy transitions. Multiple definitions, methodologies, and 
metrics are applied. Energy accounting systems are utilized in the liter-
ature often without a clear statement as to which system is being used 
(Lightfoot, 2007; Martinot et al., 2007). An overview of differences in 
primary energy accounting from different statistics has been described 
by Macknick (2011) and the implications of applying different account-
ing systems in long-term scenario analysis were illustrated by Naki-
cenovic et al., (1998), Moomaw et al. (2011) and Grubler et al. (2012).
Three alternative methods are predominantly used to report primary 
energy. While the accounting of combustible sources, including all fos-
sil energy forms and biomass, is identical across the different methods, 
they feature different conventions on how to calculate primary energy 
supplied by non-combustible energy sources, i. e., nuclear energy and 
all renewable energy sources except biomass. These methods are:
•	 the physical energy content method adopted, for example, by 
the OECD, the International Energy Agency (IEA) and Eurostat 
(IEA / OECD / Eurostat, 2005);
•	 the substitution method, which is used in slightly different variants 
by BP (2012) and the U. S. Energy Information Administration (EIA, 
2012a, b, Table A6), both of which publish international energy sta-
tistics; and
Figure A�II�1 | Modelled policy costs in a broader context. The plotted range summarizes costs expressed as percentage loss relative to baseline across models for cost-effective 
scenarios reaching 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq. Scenarios were sorted by total NPV costs for each available metric (loss in GDP, loss in consumption, area under marginal abatement cost 
curve as a fraction of GDP). The lower boundary of the plotted range reflects the minimum across metrics of the 25th percentile, while the upper boundary reflects the maximum 
across metrics of the 75th percentile. A comprehensive treatment of costs and cost metrics, including the effects of non-idealized scenario assumptions, is provided in Section 6.3.6. 
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•	 the direct equivalent method that is used by UN Statistics (2010) 
and in multiple IPCC reports that deal with long-term energy and 
emission scenarios (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000; Morita et  al., 
2001; Fisher et al., 2007; Fischedick et al., 2011). 
For non-combustible energy sources, the physical energy content 
method adopts the principle that the primary energy form should be 
the first energy form used down-stream in the production process for 
which multiple energy uses are practical (IEA / OECD / Eurostat, 2005). 
This leads to the choice of the following primary energy forms:
•	 heat for nuclear, geothermal, and solar thermal, and
•	 electricity for hydro, wind, tide / wave / ocean, and solar PV.
Using this method, the primary energy equivalent of hydro energy and 
solar PV, for example, assumes a 100 % conversion efficiency to ‘pri-
mary electricity’, so that the gross energy input for the source is 3.6 MJ 
of primary energy = 1 kWh of electricity. Nuclear energy is calculated 
from the gross generation by assuming a 33 % thermal conversion effi-
ciency2, i. e., 1 kWh = (3.6 ÷ 0.33) = 10.9 MJ. For geothermal, if no 
country-specific information is available, the primary energy equivalent 
is calculated using 10 % conversion efficiency for geothermal electric-
ity (so 1 kWh = (3.6 ÷ 0.1) = 36 MJ), and 50 % for geothermal heat.
The substitution method reports primary energy from non-combustible 
sources in such a way as if they had been substituted for combusti-
ble energy. Note, however, that different variants of the substitution 
method use somewhat different conversion factors. For example, BP 
2 As the amount of heat produced in nuclear reactors is not always known, the IEA 
estimates the primary energy equivalent from the electricity generation by assum-
ing an efficiency of 33 %, which is the average of nuclear power plants in Europe 
(IEA, 2012b).
applies 38 % conversion efficiency to electricity generated from nuclear 
and hydro whereas the World Energy Council used 38.6 % for nuclear 
and non-combustible renewables (WEC, 1993; Grübler et  al., 1996; 
Nakicenovic et  al., 1998), and the U. S. Energy Information Adminis-
tration (EIA) uses still different values. For useful heat generated from 
non-combustible energy sources, other conversion efficiencies are 
used. Macknick (2011) provides a more complete overview.
The direct equivalent method counts one unit of secondary energy pro-
vided from non-combustible sources as one unit of primary energy, i. e., 
1 kWh of electricity or heat is accounted for as 1 kWh = 3.6 MJ of 
primary energy. This method is mostly used in the long-term scenarios 
literature, including multiple IPCC reports (IPCC, 1995b; Nakicenovic 
and Swart, 2000; Morita et  al., 2001; Fisher et  al., 2007; Fischedick 
et al., 2011), because it deals with fundamental transitions of energy 
systems that rely to a large extent on low-carbon, non-combustible 
energy sources.
The accounting of combustible sources, including all fossil energy 
forms and biomass, includes some ambiguities related to the defi-
nition of the heating value of combustible fuels. The higher heating 
value (HHV), also known as gross calorific value (GCV) or higher calo-
rific value (HCV), includes the latent heat of vaporization of the water 
produced during combustion of the fuel. In contrast, the lower heat-
ing value (LHV) (also: net calorific value (NCV) or lower calorific value 
(LCV)) excludes this latent heat of vaporization. For coal and oil, the 
LHV is about 5 % smaller than the HHV, for natural gas and derived 
gases the difference is roughly 9 – 10 %, while the concept does not 
apply to non-combustible energy carriers such as electricity and heat 
for which LHV and HHV are therefore identical (IEA, 2012a). 
In the WGIII AR5, IEA data are utilized, but energy supply is reported 
using the direct equivalent method. In addition, the reporting of com-
Table A�II�10 | Comparison of global total primary energy supply in 2010 using different primary energy accounting methods (data from IEA 2012b).
Physical content method Direct equivalent method Substitution method*
EJ % EJ % EJ %
Fossil fuels 432.99 81.32 432.99 84.88 432.99 78.83
Nuclear 30.10 5.65 9.95 1.95 26.14 4.76
Renewables 69.28 13.01 67.12 13.16 90.08 16.40
Bioenergy 52.21 9.81 52.21 10.24 52.21 9.51
Solar 0.75 0.14 0.73 0.14 1.03 0.19
Geothermal 2.71 0.51 0.57 0.11 1.02 0.19
Hydro 12.38 2.32 12.38 2.43 32.57 5.93
Ocean 0.002 0.0004 0.002 0.0004 0.005 0.001
Wind 1.23 0.23 1.23 0.24 3.24 0.59
Other 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.01
Total 532.44 100.00 510.13 100.00 549.29 100.00
* For the substitution method, conversion efficiencies of 38 % for electricity and 85 % for heat from non-combustible sources were used. The value of 38 % is used by BP for 
electricity generated from hydro and nuclear. BP does not report solar, wind, and geothermal in its statistics for which, here, also 38 % is used for electricity and 85 % for 
heat.
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bustible energy quantities, including primary energy, should use the 
LHV which is consistent with the IEA energy balances (IEA, 2012a; b). 
Table A.II.10 compares the amounts of global primary energy by source 
and percentages using the physical energy content, the direct equiva-
lent and a variant of the substitution method for the year 2010 based 
on IEA data (IEA, 2012b). In current statistical energy data, the main 
differences in absolute terms appear when comparing nuclear and 
hydro power. As they both produced comparable amounts of electricity 
in 2010, under both direct equivalent and substitution methods, their 
share of meeting total final consumption is similar, whereas under the 
physical energy content method, nuclear is reported at about three 
times the primary energy of hydro.
The alternative methods outlined above emphasize different aspects 
of primary energy supply. Therefore, depending on the application, 
one method may be more appropriate than another. However, none 
of them is superior to the others in all facets. In addition, it is impor-
tant to realize that total primary energy supply does not fully describe 
an energy system, but is merely one indicator amongst many. Energy 
balances as published by IEA (2012a; b) offer a much wider set of 
indicators which allows tracing the flow of energy from the resource 
to final energy use. For instance, complementing total primary energy 
consumption by other indicators, such as total final energy consump-
tion and secondary energy production (e. g., of electricity, heat), using 
different sources helps link the conversion processes with the final use 
of energy.
A.II.5 Indirect primary energy 
use and CO2 emissions
Energy statistics in most countries of the world and at the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) display energy use and carbon dioxide (CO2) emis-
sions from fuel combustion directly in the energy sectors. As a result, 
the energy sector is the major source of reported energy use and CO2 
emissions, with the electricity and heat industries representing the 
largest shares. 
However, the main driver for these energy sector emissions is the con-
sumption of electricity and heat in the end use sectors (industry, build-
ings, transport, and agriculture). Electricity and heat mitigation oppor-
tunities in these end use sectors reduce the need for producing these 
energy carriers upstream and therefore reduce energy and emissions in 
the energy sector.
In order to account for the impact of mitigation activities in the end 
use sectors, a methodology has been developed to reallocate the 
energy consumption and related CO2 emissions from electricity and 
heat produced and delivered to the end use sectors (de Ia Rue du Can 
and Price, 2008).
Using IEA data, the methodology calculates a series of primary energy 
factors and CO2 emissions factors for electricity and heat production 
at the country level. These factors are then used to re-estimate energy 
and emissions from electricity and heat produced and delivered to the 
end use sectors proportionally to their use in each end-use sectors. The 
calculated results are referred to as primary energy3 and indirect CO2 
emissions. 
The purpose of allocating primary energy consumption and indirect 
CO2 emissions to the sectoral level is to relate the energy used and the 
emissions produced along the entire supply chain to provide energy 
services in each sector (consumption-based approach). For example, 
the consumption of one kWh of electricity is not equivalent to the con-
sumption of one kWh of coal or natural gas, because of the energy 
required and the emissions produced in the generation of one kWh of 
electricity. 
Figure A.II.2 shows the resulting reallocation of CO2 emissions from 
electricity and heat production from the energy sector to the industrial, 
buildings, transport, and agriculture sectors at the global level based 
on the methodology outlined in de la Rue du Can and Price (2008) and 
described further below.
A�II�5�1 Primary electricity and heat factors
Primary electricity and heat factors have been derived as the ratio of 
fuel inputs of power plants relative to the electricity and heat deliv-
ered. These factors reflect the efficiency of these transformations. 
3 Note that final energy and primary energy consumption are different concepts 
(Section A.II.3.4). Final energy consumption (sometimes called site energy 
consumption) represents the amount of energy consumed in end use applications 
whereas primary energy consumption (sometimes called source energy consump-
tion) in addition includes the energy required to generate, transmit and distribute 
electricity and heat.
Figure A�II�2 | Energy sector electricity and heat CO2 emissions calculated for the end-
use sectors in 2010. Note that industry sector CO2 emissions do not include process 
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Primary Electricity Factor:
PEF =   
 ∑  e,p 
 
 EI
  ______  
 ∑  p 
 
EO − E OU − E DL
Where 
•	 EI is the total energy (e) inputs for producing Electricity in TJ
•	 EO is the total Electricity Output produced in TJ
•	 E OU is the energy use for own use for Electricity production
•	 E DL is the distribution losses needed to deliver electricity to the 
end use sectors
Primary Heat Factor:  
PHF =   
 ∑  e,p 
 
 HI
  _______  
 ∑  p 
 
HO − H OU − H DL
Where 
•	 HI is the total energy (e) inputs for producing Heat in TJ
•	 HO is the total Heat Output produced in TJ
•	 H OU is the energy use for own use for Heat production
•	 H DL is the distribution losses needed to deliver heat to the end 
use sectors
p represents the 6 plant types in the IEA statistics (Main Activity Elec-
tricity Plant, Autoproducer Electricity Plant, Main Activity CHP plant, 
Autoproducer CHP plant, Main Activity Heat Plant and Autoproducer 
Heat Plant)
e represents the energy products
It is important to note that two accounting conventions were used 
to calculate these factors. The first involves estimating the portion of 
fuel input that produces electricity in combined heat and power plants 
(CHP) and the second involves accounting for the primary energy value 
of non-combustible fuel energy used as inputs for the production of 
electricity and heat. The source of historical data for these calculations 
is the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2012c; d).
For the CHP calculation, fuel inputs for electricity production were 
separated from inputs for heat production according to the fixed-heat-
efficiency approach used by the IEA (IEA, 2012c). This approach fixes 
the efficiency for heat production equal to 90 %, which is the typical 
efficiency of a heat boiler (except when the total CHP efficiency was 
greater than 90 %, in which case the observed efficiency is used). 
The estimated input for heat production based on this efficiency was 
then subtracted from the total CHP fuel inputs, and the remaining fuel 
inputs to CHP were attributed to the production of electricity. As noted 
by the IEA, this approach may overstate the actual heat efficiency in 
certain circumstances (IEA, 2012c; d).
As described in Section A.II.4 in more detail, different accounting meth-
ods to report primary energy use of electricity and heat production 
from non-combustible energy sources, including non-biomass renew-
able energy and nuclear energy, exist. The direct equivalent accounting 
method is used here for this calculation. 
Global average primary and electricity factors and their historical 
trends are presented in Figure A.II.3. Average factors for fossil power 
and heat plants are in the range of 2.5 and 3 and factors for non-bio-
mass renewable energy and nuclear energy are by convention a little 
above one, depending on heat and electricity own use consumption 
and distribution losses.
A�II�5�2 Carbon dioxide emission factors
Carbon dioxide emission factors for electricity and heat have been 
derived as the ratio of CO2 emissions from fuel inputs of power plants 
relative to the electricity and heat delivered. The method is equivalent 
to the one described above for primary factors. The fuel inputs have 
in addition been multiplied by their CO2 emission factors of each fuel 
type as defined in IPCC (2006). The calculation of electricity and heat 
related CO2 emission factors are conducted at the country level. Indi-
rect carbon emissions related to electricity and heat consumption are 
then derived by simply multiplying the amount of electricity and heat 
consumed with the derived electricity and heat CO2 emission factors at 
the sectoral level.
When the results of the methodology described above to estimate 
end-use CO2 emissions from electricity and heat production are 
compared with the reported IEA direct emissions from the heat and 
electricity sectors there is an average difference of + 1.36 % over the 
years 1970 to 2010, indicating a slight overestimation of global CO2 
emissions. This difference varies by year, with the largest negative dif-

















Metrics & MethodologyAnnex II
AII
ference in 1976 (-2.99 %) and the largest positive difference in 1990 
(3.23 %).
The cross-sectoral annual total indirect carbon emissions were then 
normalized to the direct emission from electricity and heat production 
on the global level.
Figure A.II.4 shows the historical electricity CO2 emission factors. The 
factors reflect both the fuel mix and conversion efficiencies in elec-
tricity generation and the distribution losses. Regions with high shares 
of non-fossil electricity generation have low emissions coefficients. For 
example, Latin America has a high share of hydro power and therefore 
a low CO2 emission factor in electricity generation. 
Primary heat and heat carbon factors were also calculated however, 
due to irregularity in data availability over the years at the global level, 
only data from 1990 are shown in the figures. 
The emission factor for natural gas, 56.1 tCO2 per PJ combusted, is 
shown in the graph for comparison. 
A.II.6 Material flow analysis, 
input-output analysis, 
and lifecycle assessment
In the WGIII AR5, findings from material flow analysis, input-output 
analysis, and lifecycle assessment are used in Chapters 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 
9, 11, and 12. The following section briefly sketches the intellectual 
background of these methods and discusses their usefulness for miti-
gation research, and discusses some relevant assumptions, limitations, 
and methodological issues. 
The anthropogenic contributions to climate change, caused by fossil 
fuel combustion, land conversion for agriculture, commercial forestry 
and infrastructure, and numerous agricultural and industrial processes, 
result from the use of natural resources, i. e., the manipulation of mate-
rial and energy flows by humans for human purposes. Mitigation 
research has a long tradition of addressing the energy flows and associ-
ated emissions, however, the sectors involved in energy supply and use 
are coupled with each other through material stocks and flows, which 
leads to feedbacks and delays. These linkages between energy and 
material stocks and flows have, despite their considerable relevance for 
GHG emissions, so far gained little attention in climate change mitiga-
tion (and adaptation). The research agendas of industrial ecology and 
ecological economics with their focus on the socioeconomic metabo-
lism (Wolman, 1965; Baccini and Brunner, 1991; Ayres and Simonis, 
1994; Fischer-Kowalski and Haberl, 1997) also known as the biophysical 
economy (Cleveland et al., 1984), can complement energy assessments 
in important manners and support the development of a broader fram-
ing of mitigation research as part of sustainability science. The socio-
economic metabolism consists of the physical stocks and flows with 
which a society maintains and reproduces itself (Fischer-Kowalski and 
Haberl, 2007). These research traditions are relevant for sustainability 
because they comprehensively account for resource flows and hence 
can be used to address the dynamics, efficiency, and emissions of pro-
duction systems that convert or utilize resources to provide goods and 
services to final consumers. Central to the socio-metabolic research 
methods are material and energy balance principles applied at vari-
ous scales ranging from individual production processes to companies, 
regions, value chains, economic sectors, and nations.
An important application of these methods is carbon footprinting, i. e., 
the determination of lifecycle GHG emissions of products, organiza-
tions, households, municipalities, or nations. The carbon footprint of 
products usually determined using lifecycle assessment, while the car-
bon footprint of households, regional entities, or nations is commonly 
modeled using input-output analysis.
A�II�6�1 Material flow analysis
Material flow analysis (MFA) — including substance flow analysis 
(SFA) — is a method for describing, modelling (using socio-economic 
and technological drivers), simulating (scenario development), and 
visualizing the socioeconomic stocks and flows of matter and energy 
in systems defined in space and time to inform policies on resource 
and waste management and pollution control. Mass- and energy bal-
ance consistency is enforced at the level of goods and / or individual 
substances. As a result of the application of consistency criteria they 
are useful to analyze feedbacks within complex systems, e. g., the 
interrelations between diets, food production in cropland and livestock 
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systems, and availability of area for bioenergy production (e. g., Erb 
et al. (2012), see Section 11.4).
The concept of socioeconomic metabolism (Ayres and Kneese, 1969; 
Boulding, 1972; Martinez-Alier, 1987; Baccini and Brunner, 1991; Ayres 
and Simonis, 1994; Fischer-Kowalski and Haberl, 1997) has been devel-
oped as an approach to study the extraction of materials or energy 
from the environment, their conversion in production and consumption 
processes, and the resulting outputs to the environment. Accordingly, 
the unit of analysis is the socioeconomic system (or some of its com-
ponents), treated as a systemic entity, in analogy to an organism or a 
sophisticated machine that requires material and energy inputs from 
the natural environment in order to carry out certain defined functions 
and that results in outputs such as wastes and emissions. 
Some MFAs trace the stocks and flows of aggregated groups of mate-
rials (fossil fuels, biomass, ores and industrial minerals, construction 
materials) through societies and can be performed on the global scale 
(Krausmann et al., 2009), for national economies and groups of coun-
tries (Weisz et  al., 2006), urban systems (Wolman, 1965; Kennedy 
et  al., 2007) or other socioeconomic subsystems. Similarly compre-
hensive methods that apply the same system boundaries have been 
developed to account for energy flows (Haberl, 2001a; b; Haberl et al., 
2006), carbon flows (Erb et al., 2008) and biomass flows (Krausmann 
et al., 2008) and are often subsumed in the Material and Energy Flow 
Accounting (MEFA) framework (Haberl et al., 2004). Other MFAs have 
been conducted for analyzing the cycles of individual substances (e. g., 
carbon, nitrogen, or phosphorus cycles; Erb et al., 2008) or metals (e. g., 
copper, iron, or cadmium cycles; Graedel and Cao, 2010) within socio-
economic systems. A third group of MFAs have a focus on individual 
processes with an aim to balance a wide variety of goods and sub-
stances (e. g., waste incineration, a shredder plant, or a city).
The MFA approach has also been extended towards the analysis of 
socio-ecological systems, i. e., coupled human-environment systems. 
One example for this research strand is the ‘human appropriation of 
net primary production’ or HANPP which assesses human-induced 
changes in biomass flows in terrestrial ecosystems (Vitousek et  al., 
1986; Wright, 1990; Imhoff et al., 2004; Haberl et al., 2007). The socio-
ecological metabolism approach is particularly useful for assessing 
feedbacks in the global land system, e. g., interrelations between 
production and consumption of food, agricultural intensity, livestock 
feeding efficiency, and bioenergy potentials, both residue potentials 
and area availability for energy crops (Haberl et al., 2011; Erb et al., 
2012).
Anthropogenic stocks (built environment) play a crucial role in socio-
metabolic systems: (1) they provide services to the inhabitants, (2) 
their operation often requires energy and releases emissions, (3) any 
increase or renewal / maintenance of these stocks requires materials, 
and (4) the stocks embody materials (often accumulated over the past 
decades or centuries) that may be recovered at the end of the stocks’ 
service lives (‘urban mining’) and, when recycled or reused, substitute 
primary resources and save energy and emissions in materials produc-
tion (Müller et al., 2006). In contrast to flow variables, which tend to 
fluctuate much more, stock variables usually behave more robustly 
and are therefore often suitable as drivers for developing long-term 
scenarios (Müller, 2006). The exploration of built environment stocks 
(secondary resources), including their composition, performance, and 
dynamics, is therefore a crucial pre-requisite for examining long-term 
transformation pathways (Liu et al., 2012). Anthropogenic stocks have 
therefore been described as the engines of socio-metabolic systems. 
Moreover, socioeconomic stocks sequester carbon (Lauk et al., 2012); 
hence policies to increase the carbon content of long-lived infrastruc-
tures may contribute to climate-change mitigation (Gustavsson et al., 
2006).
So far, MFAs have been used mainly to inform policies for resource and 
waste management. Studies with an explicit focus on climate change 
mitigation are less frequent, but rapidly growing. Examples involve the 
exploration of long-term mitigation pathways for the iron / steel indus-
try (Milford et al., 2013; Pauliuk et al., 2013a), the aluminium industry 
(Liu et al., 2011, 2012), the vehicle stock (Pauliuk et al., 2011; Melaina 
and Webster, 2011), or the building stock (Pauliuk et al., 2013b).
A�II�6�2 Input-output analysis
Input-output (IO) analysis is an approach to trace the production pro-
cess of products by economic sectors, and their use as intermediate 
demand by producing sectors (industries) and final demand includ-
ing that by households and the public sector (Miller and Blair, 1985). 
Input-output tables describe the structure of the economy, i. e., the 
interdependence of different producing sectors and their role in final 
demand. Input-output tables are produced as part of national eco-
nomic accounts (Leontief, 1936). Through the assumption of fixed 
input coefficients, input-output models can be formed, determining, 
e. g., the economic activity in all sectors required to produce a unit of 
final demand. The mathematics of input-output analysis can be used 
with flows denoted in physical or monetary units and has been applied 
also outside economics, e. g., to describe energy and nutrient flows in 
ecosystems (Hannon et al., 1986).
Environmental applications of input-output analysis include analyzing 
the economic role of abatement sectors (Leontief, 1971), quantifying 
embodied energy (Bullard and Herendeen, 1975) and the employment 
benefits of energy efficiency measures (Hannon et al., 1978), describing 
the benefits of pre-consumer scrap recycling (Nakamura and Kondo, 
2001), tracing the material composition of vehicles (Nakamura et al., 
2007), and identifying an environmentally desirable global division 
of labour (Stromman et al., 2009). Important for mitigation research, 
input-output analysis has been used to estimate the GHG emissions 
associated with the production and delivery of goods for final con-
sumption, the ‘carbon footprint’ (Wiedmann and Minx, 2008). This type 
of analysis basically redistributes the emissions occurring in producing 
sectors to final consumption. It can be used to quantify GHG emissions 
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associated with import and export (Wyckoff and Roop, 1994), with 
national consumption (Hertwich and Peters, 2009), or the consump-
tion by specific groups of society (Lenzen and Schaeffer, 2004), regions 
(Turner et al., 2007), or institutions (Larsen and Hertwich, 2009; Minx 
et al., 2009; Peters, 2010; Berners-Lee et al., 2011).4 
Global, multiregional input-output models are currently seen as the 
state-of-the-art tool to quantify ‘consumer responsibility’ (Chapter 5)
(Hertwich, 2011; Wiedmann et  al., 2011). Multiregional tables are 
necessary to adequately represent national production patterns and 
technologies in the increasing number of globally sourced products. 
Important insights provided to mitigation research are the quanti-
fication of the total CO2 emissions embodied in global trade (Peters 
and Hertwich, 2008), the growth of net emissions embodied in trade 
from non-Annex B to Annex B countries (Peters et al., 2011b), to show 
that the UK (Druckman et al., 2008; Wiedmann et al., 2010) and other 
Annex B countries have increasing carbon footprints while their ter-
ritorial emissions are decreasing, to identify the contribution of differ-
ent commodity exports to the rapid growth in China’s GHG emissions 
(Xu et al., 2009), and to quantify the income elasticity of the carbon 
footprint of different consumption categories like food, mobility, and 
clothing (Hertwich and Peters, 2009).
Input-output models have an increasingly important instrumental role 
in mitigation. They are used as a backbone for consumer carbon calcu-
lators, to provide sometimes spatially explicit regional analysis (Lenzen 
et al., 2004), to help companies and public institutions target climate 
mitigation efforts , and to provide initial estimates of emissions associ-
ated with different alternatives (Minx et al., 2009).
Input-output calculations are usually based on industry-average pro-
duction patterns and emissions intensities and do not provide an 
insight into marginal emissions caused by additional purchases. How-
ever, efforts to estimate future and marginal production patterns and 
emissions intensities exist (Lan et  al., 2012). At the same time, eco-
nomic sector classifications in many countries are not very fine, so that 
IO tables provide carbon footprint averages of broad product groups 
rather than specific products, but efforts to disaggregate tables to pro-
vide more detail in environmentally relevant sectors exist (Tukker et al., 
2013). Many models are not good at addressing waste management 
and recycling opportunities, although hybrid models with a physical 
representation of end-of-life processes do exist (Nakamura and Kondo, 
2001). At the time of publication, national input-output tables describe 
the economy several years ago. Multiregional input-output tables are 
produced as part of research efforts and need to reconcile different 
national conventions for the construction of the tables and conflict-
ing international trade data (Tukker et al., 2013). Efforts to provide a 
higher level of detail of environmentally relevant sectors and to now-
cast tables are currently under development (Lenzen et al., 2012). 
4 GHG emissions related to land-use change have not yet been addressed in MRIO-
based carbon footprint analysis due to data limitations. 
A�II�6�3 Lifecycle assessment
Product lifecycle assessment (LCA) was developed as a method to 
determine the embodied energy use (Boustead and Hancock, 1979) 
and environmental pressures associated with specific product sys-
tems (Finnveden et al., 2009). A product system describes the pro-
duction, distribution, operation, maintenance, and disposal of the 
product. From the beginning, the assessment of energy technologies 
has been important, addressing questions such as how many years 
of use would be required to recover the energy expended in produc-
ing a photovoltaic cell (Kato et al., 1998). Applications in the con-
sumer products industry addressing questions of whether cloth or 
paper nappies (diapers) are more environmentally friendly (Vizcarra 
et al., 1994), or what type of washing powder, prompted the devel-
opment of a wider range of impact assessment methods addressing 
issues such as aquatic toxicity (Gandhi et al., 2010), eutrophication, 
and acidification (Huijbregts et al., 2000). By now, a wide range of 
methods has been developed addressing either the contribution to 
specific environmental problems (midpoint methods) or the dam-
age caused to ecosystem or human health (endpoint methods). At 
the same time, commonly used databases have collected lifecycle 
inventory information for materials, energy products, transporta-
tion services, chemicals, and other widely used products. Together, 
these methods form the backbone for the wide application of LCA 
in industry and for environmental product declarations, as well as 
in policy.
Lifecycle assessment plays an increasingly important role in climate 
mitigation research (SRREN Annex II, Moomaw et al., 2011). In WGIII 
AR5, lifecycle assessment has been used to quantify the GHG emis-
sions associated with mitigation technologies, e. g., wind power, heat 
recovery ventilation systems, or carbon dioxide capture and storage. 
Lifecycle assessment is thus used to compare different ways to deliver 
the same functional unit, such as one kWh of electricity. 
Lifecycle assessment has also been used to quantify co-benefits and 
detrimental side-effects of mitigation technologies and measures, 
including other environmental problems and the use of resources such 
as water, land, and metals. Impact assessment methods have been 
developed to model a wide range of impact pathways. 
A range of approaches is used in LCA to address the climate impact 
of environmental interventions, starting from GHG through other pol-
lutants (such as aerosols) to the inclusion of geophysical effects such 
as albedo changes or indirect climate effects (Bright et al., 2012), also 
exploring radiation-based climate metrics (Peters et  al., 2011a). The 
timing of emissions and removals has traditionally not been consid-
ered, but issues associated with biomass production and use have 
given rise to a approaches to quantify the effects of carbon seques-
tration and temporary carbon storage in long-lived products (Brandão 
et al., 2013; Guest et al., 2013; Levasseur et al., 2013) and of tempo-
rarily increased atmospheric CO2 concentrations from ‘carbon-neutral’ 
bioenergy systems (Cherubini et al., 2011). 
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Life-cycle inventories are normally derived from empirical information 
on actual processes or modelled based on engineering calculations. A 
key aspect of lifecycle inventories for energy technologies is that they 
contribute to understanding the thermodynamics of the wider prod-
uct system; combined with appropriate engineering insight, they can 
provide some upper bound for possible technological improvements. 
These process LCAs provide detail and specificity, but do usually not 
cover all input requirements, as this would be too demanding. The cut-
off error is the part of the inventory that is not covered by conventional 
process analysis; it is commonly between 20 – 50 % of the total impact 
(Lenzen, 2001). Hybrid lifecycle assessment utilizes input-output mod-
els to cover inputs of services or items that are used in small quan-
tities (Treloar, 1996; Suh et  al., 2004; Williams et  al., 2009). Through 
their better coverage of the entire product system, hybrid LCAs tend 
to more accurately represent all inputs to production (Majeau-Bettez 
et al., 2011). They have also been used to estimate the cut-off error of 
process LCAs (Norris, 2002; Deng et al., 2011). 
It must be emphasized that LCA is a research method that answers 
specific research questions. To understand how to interpret and use 
the results of an LCA case study, it is important to understand what 
the research question is. The research questions “what are the envi-
ronmental impacts of product x” or “… of technology y” needs to be 
specified with respect to timing, regional context, operational mode, 
background system, etc. Modelling choices and assumption thus 
become part of an LCA. This implies that LCA studies are not always 
comparable because they do not address the same research question. 
Further, most LCAs are interpreted strictly on a functional unit basis, 
expressing the impact of a unit of the product system in a described 
production system, without either up-scaling the impacts to total 
impacts in the entire economy or saying something about the scale-
dependency of the activity. For example, an LCA may identify the use 
of recycled material as beneficial, but the supply of recycled material 
is limited by the availability of suitable waste, so that an up-scaling 
of recycling is not feasible. Hence, an LCA that shows that recycling 
is beneficial is not sufficient to document the availability of further 
opportunities to reduce emissions. Lifecycle assessment, however, 
coupled with an appropriate system models (using material flow data) 
is suitable to model the emission gains from the expansion of further 
recycling activities. 
Lifecycle assessment was developed with the intention to quantify 
resource use and emissions associated with existing or prospective 
product systems, where the association reflects physical causality 
within economic systems. Depending on the research question, it can 
be sensible to investigate average or marginal inputs to production. 
Departing from this descriptive approach, it has been proposed to 
model a wider socioeconomic causality describing the consequences 
of actions (Ekvall and Weidema, 2004). While established methods and 
a common practice exist for descriptive or ‘attributional’ LCA, such 
methods and standard practice are not yet established in ‘consequen-
tial’ LCA (Zamagni et  al., 2012). Consequential LCAs are dependent 
on the decision context. It is increasingly acknowledged in LCA that 
for investigating larger sustainability questions, the product focus is 
not sufficient and larger system changes need to be modelled as such 
(Guinée et al., 2010).
For climate change mitigation analysis, it is useful to put LCA in a wider 
scenario context (Arvesen and Hertwich, 2011; Viebahn et al., 2011). 
The purpose is to better understand the contribution a technology can 
make to climate change mitigation and to quantify the magnitude of 
its resource requirements, co-benefits and side-effects. For mitigation 
technologies on both the demand and supply side, important contribu-
tors to the total impact are usually energy, materials, and transport. 
Understanding these contributions is already valuable for mitigation 
analysis. As all of these sectors will change as part of the scenario, 
LCA-based scenarios show how much impacts per unit are likely to 
change as part of the scenario. 
Some LCAs take into account behavioural responses to different tech-
nologies (Takase et al., 2005; Girod et al., 2011). Here, two issues must 
be distinguished. One is the use of the technology. For example, it has 
been found that better insulated houses consistently are heated or 
cooled to higher / lower average temperature (Haas and Schipper, 1998; 
Greening et  al., 2001). Not all of the theoretically possible technical 
gain in energy efficiency results in reduced energy use (Sorrell and 
Dimitropoulos, 2008). Such direct rebound effects can be taken into 
account through an appropriate definition of the energy services com-
pared, which do not necessarily need to be identical in terms of the 
temperature or comfort levels. Another issue are larger market-related 
effects and spillover effects. A better-insulated house leads to energy 
savings. Both questions of (1) whether the saved energy would then 
be used elsewhere in the economy rather than not produced, and (2) 
what the consumer does with the money saved, are not part of the 
product system and hence of product lifecycle assessment. They are 
sometimes taken up in LCA studies, quantified, and compared. How-
ever, for climate mitigation analysis, these mechanisms need to be 
addressed by scenario models on a macro level. (See also Section 11.4 
for a discussion of such systemic effects).
A.II.7 Fat tailed distributions
If we have observed N independent loss events from a given loss dis-
tribution, the probability that the next loss event will be worse than all 
the others is 1 / (N+1). How much worse it will be depends on the tail 
of the loss distribution. Many loss distributions including losses due 
to hurricanes are very fat tailed. The notion of a ‘fat tailed distribu-
tion’ may be given a precise mathematical meaning in several ways, 
each capturing different intuitions. Older definitions refer to ‘fat tails’ 
as ‘leptokurtic’ meaning that the tails are fatter than the normal dis-
tribution. Nowadays, mathematical definitions are most commonly 
framed in terms of regular variation or subexponentiality (Embrechts 
et al., 1997).
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A positive random variable X has regular variation with tail index 
α > 0 if the probability P(X > x) of exceeding a value x decreases at 
a polynomial rate x-a as x gets large. For any r > α, the r-th moment 
of X is infinite, the α-th moment may be finite or infinite depending 
on the distribution. If the first moment is infinite, then running aver-
ages of independent realizations of X increase to infinity. If the second 
moment is infinite, then running averages have an infinite variance 
and do not converge to a finite value. In either case, historical averages 
have little predictive value. The gamma, exponential, and Weibull distri-
butions all have finite r-th moment for all positive r.
A positive random variable X is subexponential if for any n indepen-
dent copies X1,…Xn, the probability that the sum X1+...+Xn exceeds 
a value x becomes identical to the probability that the maximum of 
X1,…Xn exceeds x, as x gets large. In other words, ‘the sum of X1,…
Xn is driven by the largest of the X1,…Xn’. Every regularly varying 
distribution is subexponential, but the converse does not hold. The 
Weibull distribution with shape parameter less than one is subexpo-
nential but not regularly varying. All its moments are finite, but the 
sum of n independent realizations tends to be dominated by the single 
largest value.
For X with finite first moment, the mean excess curve is a useful diag-
nostic. The mean excess curve of X at point x is the expected value 
of X  –  x given that X exceeds x. If X is regularly varying with tail 
index α > 1, the mean excess curve of X is asymptotically linear with 
slope 1 / (α-1). If X is subexponential its mean excess curve increases 
to infinity, but is not necessarily asymptotically linear. Thus, the mean 
excess curve for a subexponential distribution may be ‘worse’ than 
a regularly varying distribution, even though the former has finite 
moments. The mean excess curve for the exponential distribution is 
constant, that for the normal distribution is decreasing. The follow-
ing figures show mean excess curves for flood insurance claims in the 
United States, per county per year per dollar income (hereby correct-
ing for growth in exposure, Figure A.II.5) and insurance indemnities 
for crop loss per county per year in the United States (Figure A.II.6). 
Note that flood claims’ mean excess curve lies well above the line 
with unit slope, whereas that for crop losses lie below (Kousky and 
Cooke, 2009).
A.II.8 Growth rates
For the calculation of annual growth rates as frequently shown in this 
report, a number of different methods exist, all of which lead to slightly 
different numerical results. If not stated otherwise, the annual growth 
rates shown, have been derived using the Log Difference Regression 
technique or Geometric Average, techniques which can be shown to 
be equivalent.
Figure A�II�6 | Mean excess curve of US crop insurance indemnities paid from the US 
Department of Agriculture’s Risk Management Agency, aggregated by county and year 
for the years 1980 to 2008 in USD2010. Note: The vertical axis gives mean excess loss, 
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Figure A�II�5 | Mean excess curve for US flood insurance claims from the National 
Flood Insurance Program per dollar income per county per year for the years 1980 to 
2008 in USD2010. Considering dollar claims per dollar income in each county corrects for 
increasing exposure. Note: The vertical axis gives mean excess loss, given loss at least as 
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The Log Difference Regression growth rate rLD is calculated the follow-
ing way:
 r LD =  e β​ − 1 with β =  1 __ T − 1 ∑  t = 2
T
 Δln X t (Equation A.II.10)
The Geometric Average growth rate rGEO is calculated as shown below:
 r GEO =  (  X T  _ X 1 ) 
 1 __ 
T − 1 − 1 (Equation A.II.11)
Other methods that are used to calculate annual growth rates include 
the Ordinary Least Square technique and the Average Annual Growth 
Rate technique.
Part III: Data sets
A.II.9 Historical data
To aid coherency and consistency, core historic data presented 
throughout the report uses the same sources and applied the same 
methodologies and standards — these are detailed here:
•	 The standard country aggregations to regions are detailed in Sec-
tion A.II.2.
•	 The central historic GHG emission data set was based on IEA 
(2012c) and Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research 
(EDGAR) (JRC / PBL, 2013) data. This data set provides annual emis-
sions on a country level for the time span 1970 to 2010. The two 
sources are mapped as described in Section A.II.9.1.
•	 As default dataset for GDP in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) World 
Bank data was supplemented according to the methodology 
described in Section A.II.9.2.
•	 The data sources and methodology for historic indirect emissions 
from electricity and heat production are defined in Section A.II.5. 
•	 Lifecycle GHG emission data sets of energy supply technolo-
gies, predominantly used in Chapter 7, are introduced in Section 
A.II.9.3. The underlying methodology is explained in Section A.II.6 
of this Annex.
A�II�9�1 Mapping of emission sources to 
sectors
The list below shows how emission sources are mapped to sectors 
throughout the WGIII AR5. This defines unambiguous system boundar-
ies for the sectors as represented in Chapters 7 – 11 in the report and 
enables a discussion and representation of emission sources without 
double-counting.
Emission sources refer to the definitions by the IPCC Task Force on 
National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (TFI) (IPCC, 2006). Where fur-
ther disaggregated data was required, additional source categories 
were introduced consistent with the underlying datasets (IEA, 2012c; 
JRC / PBL, 2013). This information appears in the following systematic 
sequence throughout this section:
Emission source category (chapter emission source 
category numbering)
Emission Source (Sub-)Category (IPCC Task force definition) 
[gases emitted by emission source (CO2 data set used)]
A common dataset (‘IEA / EDGAR’) is used across WGIII AR5 chapters to 
ensure consistent representation of emission trends across the report. 
Uncertainties of this data are discussed in the respective chapters 
(Chapter 1; Chapter 5; and Chapter 11). CO2 emissions from fossil fuel 
combustion are taken from IEA (2012c), the remaining CO2 and non-
CO2 GHG emissions are taken from EDGAR (JRC / PBL, 2013), see the 
following sections for categories and sources used. For the FOLU sub-
sector EDGAR (JRC / PBL, 2013) represents land-based CO2 emissions 
from forest and peat fires and decay to approximate the CO2 flux from 
anthropogenic emission sources.
Following general scientific practice, 100-year GWPs from the IPCC 
Second Assessment Report (SAR) (Schimel et  al., 1996) are used as 
the index for converting GHG emissions to common units of CO2-
equivalent emissions in EDGAR (JRC / PBL, 2013). The following gases 
and associated GWPs based on the SAR are covered in EDGAR: CO2 
(1), CH4 (21), N2O (310), HFC-125 (2800), HFC-134a (1300), HFC-143a 
(3800), HFC-152a (140), HFC-227ea (2900), HFC-23 (11700), HFC-
236fa (6300), HFC-245fa (560), HFC-32 (650), HFC-365mfc (1000), 
HFC-43 – 10-mee (1300), C2F6 (9200), C3F8 (7000), C4F10 (7000), C5F12 
(7500), C6F14 (7400), C7F16 (7400), c-C4F8 (8700), CF4 (6500), SF6 
(23900).
A�II�9�1�1 Energy (Chapter 7)
Electricity & heat (7�1)
Power and Heat Generation (1A1a) [CO2 (IEA), CH4, N2O]
Public Electricity Plants (1A1a1) [CO2 (IEA)]
Public Combined Heat and Power Generation (1A1a2) [CO2 (IEA)]
Public Heat Plants (1A1a3) [CO2 (IEA)]
Public Electricity Generation (own use) (1A1a4) [CO2 (IEA)]
Electricity Generation (autoproducers) (1A1a5) [CO2 (IEA)]
Combined Heat and Power Generation (autoproducers) (1A1a6) 
[CO2 (IEA)]
Heat Plants (autoproducers) (1A1a7) [CO2 (IEA)]
Public Electricity and Heat Production (biomass) (1A1ax) [CH4, N2O]
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Petroleum refining (7�2)
Other Energy Industries (1A1bc) [CO2 (IEA)]
Manufacture of solid fuels (7�3)
Other transformation sector (BKB, etc.) (1A1r) [CH4, N2O]
Manufacture of Solid Fuels and Other Energy Industries (biomass) 
(1A1cx) [CH4, N2O]
Fuel production and transport (7�4)
Fugitive emissions from solids fuels except coke ovens (1B1r)  
[CO2 (EDGAR), CH4, N2O]
Flaring and fugitive emissions from oil and Natural Gas (1B2)  
[CO2 (EDGAR), CH4, N2O]
Others (7�5)
Electrical Equipment Manufacture (2F8a) [SF6]
Electrical Equipment Use (includes site installation) (2F8b) [SF6]
Fossil fuel fires (7A) [CO2 (EDGAR), CH4, N2O]
Indirect N2O emissions from energy (7�6)
Indirect N2O from NOx emitted in cat. 1A1 (7B1) [N2O]
Indirect N2O from NH3 emitted in cat. 1A1 (7C1) [N2O]
A�II�9�1�2 Transport (Chapter 8)
Aviation (8�1)
Domestic air transport (1A3a) [CO2 (IEA), CH4, N2O]
Road transportation (8�2)
Road transport (includes evaporation) (fossil) (1A3b) [CO2 (IEA), CH4, 
N2O]
Road transport (includes evaporation) (biomass) (1A3bx) [CH4, N2O]
Adiabatic prop: tyres (2F9b) [SF6]
Rail transportation (8�3)
Rail transport (1A3c) [CO2 (IEA), CH4, N2O]
Non-road transport (rail, etc.) (fossil) (biomass) (1A3cx) [CH4, N2O]
Navigation (8�4)
Inland shipping (fossil) (1A3d) [CO2 (IEA), CH4, N2O]
Inland shipping (fossil) (biomass) (1A3dx) [CH4, N2O]
Others incl� indirect N2O emissions from transport (8�5)
Non-road transport (fossil) (1A3e) [CO2 (IEA), CH4, N2O]
Pipeline transport (1A3e1) [CO2 (IEA)]
Non-specified transport (1A3er) [CO2 (IEA)]
Non-road transport (fossil) (biomass) (1A3ex) [CH4, N2O]
Refrigeration and Air Conditioning Equipment (HFC) (Transport) 
(2F1a1) [HFC]
Indirect N2O from NOx emitted in cat. 1A3 (7B3) [N2O]
Indirect N2O from NH3 emitted in cat. 1A3 (7C3) [N2O]
International Aviation (8�6)
Memo: International aviation (1C1) [CO2 (IEA), CH4, N2O]
International Shipping (8�7)
Memo: International navigation (1C2) [CO2 (IEA), CH4, N2O]
A�II�9�1�3 Buildings (Chapter 9)
Commercial (9�1)
Commercial and public services (fossil) (1A4a) [CO2 (IEA), CH4, N2O]
Commercial and public services (biomass) (1A4ax) [CH4, N2O]
Residential (9�2)
Residential (fossil) (1A4b) [CO2 (IEA), CH4, N2O]
Residential (biomass) (1A4bx) [CH4, N2O]
Others (9�3)
Refrigeration and Air Conditioning Equipment (HFC) (Building) (2F1a2) 
[HFC]
Fire Extinguishers (2F3) [PFC]
Aerosols / Metered Dose Inhalers (2F4) [HFC]
Adiabatic prop: shoes and others (2F9a) [SF6]
Soundproof windows (2F9c) [SF6]
Indirect N2O emissions from buildings (9�4)
Indirect N2O from NOx emitted in cat. 1A4 (7B4) [N2O]
Indirect N2O from NH3 emitted in cat. 1A4 (7C4) [N2O]
A�II�9�1�4 Industry (Chapter 10)
Ferrous and non-ferrous metals (10�1)
Fuel combustion coke ovens (1A1c1) [CH4, N2O]
Blast furnaces (pig iron prod.) (1A1c2) [CH4, N2O]
Iron and steel (1A2a) [CO2 (IEA), CH4, N2O]
Non-ferrous metals (1A2b) [CO2 (IEA), CH4, N2O]
Iron and steel (biomass) (1A2ax) [CH4, N2O]
Non-ferrous metals (biomass) (1A2bx) [CH4, N2O]
Fuel transformation coke ovens (1B1b1) [CO2 (EDGAR), CH4]
Metal Production (2C) [CO2 (EDGAR), CH4, PFC, SF6]
Iron and Steel Production (2C1) [CO2 (EDGAR)]
Crude steel production total (2C1a) [CO2 (EDGAR)]
Ferroy Alloy Production (2C2) [CO2 (EDGAR)]
Aluminum production (primary) (2C3) [PFC]
SF6 Used in Aluminium and Magnesium Foundries (2C4) [SF6]
Magnesium foundries: SF6 use (2C4a) [SF6]
Aluminium foundries: SF6 use (2C4b) [SF6]
Non-ferrous metals production (2Cr) [CO2 (EDGAR)]
Chemicals (10�2)
Chemicals (1A2c) [CO2 (IEA), CH4, N2O]
Chemicals (biomass) (1A2cx) [CH4, N2O]
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Production of chemicals (2B) [CO2 (EDGAR), CH4, N2O]
Production of Halocarbons and SF6 (2E) [HFC, SF6]
Non-energy use of lubricants / waxes (2G) [CO2 (EDGAR)]
Solvent and other product use: paint (3A) [CO2 (EDGAR)]
Solvent and other product use: degrease (3B) [CO2 (EDGAR)]
Solvent and other product use: chemicals (3C) [CO2 (EDGAR)]
Other product use (3D) [CO2 (EDGAR), N2O]
Cement production (10�3)
Cement production (2A1) [CO2 (EDGAR)]
Landfill & waste incineration (10�4)
Solid waste disposal on land (6A) [CH4]
Waste incineration (6C) [CO2 (EDGAR), CH4, N2O]
Other waste handling (6D) [CH4, N2O]
Wastewater treatment (10�5)
Wastewater handling (6B) [CH4, N2O]
Other industries (10�6)
Pulp and paper (1A2d) [CO2 (IEA), CH4, N2O]
Food and tobacco (1A2e) [CO2 (IEA), CH4, N2O]
Other industries (stationary) (fossil) (1A2f) [CO2 (IEA), CH4, N2O]
Non-metallic minerals (1A2f1) [CO2 (IEA)]
Transport equipment (1A2f2) [CO2 (IEA)]
Machinery (1A2f3) [CO2 (IEA)]
Mining and quarrying (1A2f4) [CO2 (IEA)]
Wood and wood products (1A2f5) [CO2 (IEA)]
Construction (1A2f6) [CO2 (IEA)]
Textile and leather (1A2f7) [CO2 (IEA)]
Non-specified industry (1A2f8) [CO2 (IEA)]
Pulp and paper (biomass) (1A2dx) [CH4, N2O]
Food and tobacco (biomass) (1A2ex) [CH4, N2O]
Off-road machinery: mining (diesel) (1A5b1) [CH4, N2O]
Lime production (2A2) [CO2 (EDGAR)]
Limestone and Dolomite Use (2A3) [CO2 (EDGAR)]
Production of other minerals (2A7) [CO2 (EDGAR)]
Refrigeration and Air Conditioning Equipment (PFC) (2F1b) [PFC]
Foam Blowing (2F2) [HFC]
F-gas as Solvent (2F5) [PFC]
Semiconductor Manufacture (2F7a) [HFC, PFC, SF6]
Flat Panel Display (FPD) Manufacture (2F7b) [PFC, SF6]
Photo Voltaic (PV) Cell Manufacture (2F7c) [PFC]
Other use of PFC and HFC (2F9) [HFC, PFC]
Accelerators / HEP (2F9d) [SF6]
Misc. HFCs / SF6 consumption (AWACS, other military, misc.) (2F9e) 
[SF6]
Unknown SF6 use (2F9f) [SF6]
Indirect N2O emissions from industry (10�7)
Indirect N2O from NOx emitted in cat. 1A2 (7B2) [N2O]
Indirect N2O from NH3 emitted in cat. 1A2 (7C2) [N2O]
A�II�9�1�5 AFOLU (Chapter 11)
Fuel combustion (11�1)
Agriculture and forestry (fossil) (1A4c1) [CO2 (IEA), CH4, N2O]
Off-road machinery: agric. / for. (diesel) (1A4c2) [CH4, N2O]
Fishing (fossil) (1A4c3) [CO2 (IEA), CH4, N2O]
Non-specified Other Sectors (1A4d) [CO2 (IEA), CH4, N2O]
Agriculture and forestry (biomass) (1A4c1x) [CH4, N2O]
Fishing (biomass) (1A4c3x) [N2O]
Non-specified other (biomass) (1A4dx) [CH4, N2O]
Livestock (11�2)
Enteric Fermentation (4A) [CH4]
Manure management (4B) [CH4, N2O]
Rice cultivation (11�3)
Rice cultivation (4C) [CH4]
Direct soil emissions (11�4)
Other direct soil emissions (4D4) [CO2 (EDGAR)]
Agricultural soils (direct) (4Dr) [N2O]
Forrest fires and decay (11�5)
Savannah burning (4E) [CH4, N2O]
Forest fires (5A) [CO2 (EDGAR), CH4, N2O]
Grassland fires (5C) [CH4, N2O]
Forest Fires-Post burn decay (5F2) [CO2 (EDGAR), N2O]
Peat fires and decay (11�6)
Agricultural waste burning (4F) [CH4, N2O]
Peat fires and decay of drained peatland (5D) [CO2 (EDGAR), CH4, N2O]
Indirect N2O emissions from AFOLU (11�7)
Indirect Emissions (4D3) [N2O]
Indirect N2O from NOx emitted in cat. 5 (7B5) [N2O]
Indirect N2O from NH3 emitted in cat. 5 (7C5) [N2O]
A�II�9�1�6 Comparison of IEA and EDGAR CO2 emission 
datasets
As described above the merged IEA / EDGAR historic emission dataset 
uses emission data from IEA (2012c) and EDGAR (JRC / PBL, 2013). Here 
we compare IEA / EDGAR to the pure EDGAR dataset (JRC / PBL, 2013). 
The comparison details the differences between the two datasets as 
the remaining CO2 and non-CO2 GHG emissions are identical between 
the two datasets. Table A.II.11 maps EDGAR categories to the IEA cat-
egories used in IEA / EDGAR forming 21 groups. Figure A.II.7 shows the 
quantitative differences for aggregated global emissions of these 21 
groups between the two sources. 
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Table A�II�11 | Mapping of IEA (2012c) and EDGAR (JRC / PBL, 2013) CO2 emission categories. Figure A.II.7 shows the quantitative difference for each Comparison Group (using 
Comparison Group number as reference). 
Comparison Groups EDGAR IEA IEA/EDGAR 
categorynumber group name IPCC category category name category name
1 Power Generation 1A1a Public electricity and heat production
Main activity electricity plants 1A1a1
Main activity CHP plants 1A1a2
Main activity heat plants 1A1a3
Own use in electricity, CHP and heat plants 1A1a4
Autoproducer electricity plants 1A1a5
Autoproducer CHP plants 1A1a6
Autoproducer heat plants 1A1a7
2 Other Energy Industries
1A1c1 Fuel combustion coke ovens
Other energy industry own use 1A1bc1A1c2 Blast furnaces (pig iron prod.)
1A1r Other transformation sector (BKB, etc.)
3 Iron and steel 1A2a Iron and steel Iron and steel 1A2a
4 Non-ferrous metals 1A2b Non-ferrous metals Non-ferrous metals 1A2b
5 Chemicals 1A2c Chemicals Chemical and petrochemical 1A2c
6 Pulp and paper 1A2d Pulp and paper Paper, pulp and printing 1A2d
7 Food and tobacco 1A2e Food and tobacco Food and tobacco 1A2e
8 Other Industries w/o NMM 1A2f Other industries (incl. offroad) (fos.)
Transport equipment 1A2f2
Machinery 1A2f3
Mining and quarrying 1A2f4
Wood and wood products 1A2f5
Construction 1A2f6
Textile and leather 1A2f7
Non-specified industry 1A2f8
9 Non-metallic minerals 1A2f-NMM Non-metallic minerals (cement proxy) Non-metallic minerals 1A2f1
10 Domestic air transport 1A3a Domestic air transport Domestic aviation 1A3a
11
Road transport (incl. 
evap.) (foss.)
1A3b Road transport (incl. evap.) (foss.) Road 1A3b
12 Rail transport 1A3c Non-road transport (rail, etc.) (fos.) Rail 1A3c
13 Inland shipping (fos.) 1A3d Inland shipping (fos.) Domestic navigation 1A3d
14 Other transport 1A3e Non-road transport (fos.)
Pipeline transport 1A3e1
Non-specified transport 1A3er
Non-energy use in transport 1A3er
15
Commercial and public 
services (fos.)
1A4a Commercial and public services (fos.) Commercial and public services 1A4a
16 Residential (fos.) 1A4b Residential (fos.) Residential 1A4b
17 Agriculture and forestry (fos.)
1A4c1 Agriculture and forestry (fos.)
Agriculture/forestry 1A4c11A4c2 Off-road machinery: agric./for. (diesel)
1A5b1 Off-road machinery: mining (diesel)
18 Fishing (fos.) 1A4c3 Fishing (fos.) Fishing 1A4c3
19 Non-specified Other Sectors 1A4d Non-specified other (fos.) Non-specified other 1A4d




1C2  International marine transport (bunkers) Memo: International marine bunkers 1C2
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A�II�9�2 Historic GDP PPP data
As default dataset for GDP in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) World 
Bank data was used (World Bank, 2013). In line with the methodology 
described in Section A.II.1.3 and by Nordhaus (2007) the initial data-
set (1980 – 2012 PPP in constant Int$20115) was extended backwards 
using World Bank GDP growth rates in constant local currency unit6. 
Further data gaps were closed extending World Bank data by apply-
ing growth rates as supplied by the IMF (2012) for 1980 and later. For 
gaps prior to 1980 Penn World Tables (PWT)(Heston et al., 2011) was 
used. In addition, missing countries were added using PWT (Heston 
et al., 2011)(Cuba, Puerto Rico, Marshall Islands, Somalia, Bermuda), 
IMF (2012) (Kosovo, Myanmar, Tuvala, Zimbabwe) and IEA (Dem Rep. 
Korea, Gibraltar, Netherlands Antilles) GDP data.
A�II�9�3 Lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions
In Chapter 7, Figure 7.6 and 7.7, the lifecycle GHG emissions of dif-
ferent technologies are compared. This section describes how these 
numbers are derived. The air pollutant emission numbers in Figure 7.8 
5 http: / / data.worldbank.org / indicator / NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.KD
6 http: / / data.worldbank.org / indicator / NY.GDP.MKTP.KN
are from (Hertwich et al., 2013). The assessment of GHG emissions and 
other climate effects associated with electricity production technolo-
gies presented here is based on two distinct research enterprises.
The first effort started with the review of lifecycle GHG emission started 
for SRREN (Sathaye et al., 2011). This work was extended to a harmo-
nization of LCA studies following the approach by Farrell et al. (2006) 
and resulted in a set of papers published a special issue of the Journal 
of Industrial Ecology (Brandão et  al., 2012; Heath and Mann, 2012). 
The collected data points of LCA results of GHG emissions of differ-
ent technologies from this comprehensive review are available online 
in tabular and chart form at http: / / en.openei.org / apps / LCA / and have 
been obtained from there, but the underlying scientific papers from the 
peer reviewed literature are referred to here. 
The second effort is a broader study of lifecycle environmental impacts 
and resource requirements under way for the International Resource 
Panel (Hertwich et al., 2013). The study aims at a consistent technol-
ogy comparison where lifecycle data collected under uniform instruc-
tions in a common format are evaluated in a single assessment model 
based on a common set of background processes. The model is capable 
of evaluating environmental impacts in nine different regions and 
reflecting the background technology at three different points in time 
(2010 / 30 / 50). It addresses more complete inventories than common 
process-based analysis through the use of hybrid LCA. 
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The GHG emissions for coal carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS), 
PV, concentrating solar power (CSP), and wind power associated with 
the two different efforts have been compared and have been found to 
be in agreement. The data has been supplemented by selected litera-
ture data where required. The specific numbers displayed come from 
following data sources.
A�II�9�3�1 Fossil fuel based power
For fossil fuel based power, three different sources of emissions were 
distinguished: (1) direct emissions from the power plant, (2) emissions 
of methane from the fuel production and delivery system, and (3) the 
remaining lifecycle emissions, mostly connected to the infrastructure 
of the entire energy system including the power plant itself, and sup-
plies such as solvents. Each of these emissions categories was assessed 
separately, because emerging findings on methane emissions required 
a reassessment of the lifecycle emissions of established studies, which 
often use only a generic emissions factor. In our work, probability dis-
tributions for emissions from the three different systems were assessed 
and combined through a Monte Carlo analysis. 
Fugitive emissions: The most important source of indirect emissions 
of fossil fuel based power is the supply of fuel, where fugitive emis-
sions of methane are a major source of GHG gases. We have revis-
ited the issue of fugitive methane emissions given new assessments 
of these emissions. As described in Section 7.5.1, fugitive emissions 
were modelled as the product of a log-normal distributions based on 
the parameters specified in Table A.II.12 and the efficiencies given by 
a triangular distribution with the parameters specified in Table A.II.13. 
The data for the infrastructure component is from Singh et al. (2011a). 
A uniform distribution was used in the Monte Carlo Analysis. The data 
is provided in Table A.II.13. Direct emissions and associated efficiency 
data for Natural Gas Combined Cycle (NGCC) with and without CCS 
is from Singh et  al. (2011b). Minimum and maximum numbers are 
from Corsten et  al. (2013, Table 4), with an assumed direct / indirect 
share of 40 % and 60 %. For pulverized coal, Corsten et  al. (2013, 
Table 5) reports characterized impacts, with direct and indirect emis-
sion shares for pulverized coal with and without CCS. For Integrated 
Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC), calculations were performed by 
Hertwich et al. (2013) based on data obtained from NETL (2010a; d). 
For oxyfuel, the best estimate is based on a 90 % separation efficiency 
from Singh et al. (2011a) with the range assuming higher separation 
efficiency as indicated by Corsten et al. (2013). Ranges are based on 
Corsten et  al. (2013) also considering the ranges reported by NETL 
(2010a; b; c; d; e). Triangular distributions were used in the Monte 
Carlo simulation. The contribution analysis shown in Figure 7.6 is 
based on Singh et al. (2011a) with adjustments to the higher fugitive 
emissions based on Burnham (2012) and lower average efficiencies 
and hence direct emissions for gas fired power as obtained from the 
distributions above.
Table A�II�12 | Methane emission (gCH4 / MJLHV) from coal and gas production (Burnham et al., 2012). Based on the minimum, mean, and maximum values provided by Burnham, 
the parameters μ and σ of a lognormal distribution were estimated. Coal is the weighted average of 60 % from underground mines and 40 % from surface mines.
Min Mean Max μ σ
Underground coal mining 0.25 0.34 0.45 – 1.09 0.147
Surface coal mining 0.025 0.05 0.068 – 3.09 0.291
Natural gas production 0.18 0.52 1.03 – 0.75 0.432
Table A�II�13 | Efficiency ranges assumed in power generation assumed in the calculation of fugitive emissions. The best estimate plant efficiency are based on NETL (NETL, 2010a; 
b; c; d; e) with ranges based (Singh et al., 2011a; Corsten et al., 2013). Note that the min and max efficiencies are not derived from the literature and were not used to calculate 
direct emissions; rather, they are used only to establish the possible range of fugitive emissions. 
Direct emissions (tCO2eq / MWh) Efficiency (% based on LHV) Infrastructure & Supplies (tCO2eq / MWh)
Technology Min Average Max Max Average Min Min Average Max
Gas — Single Cycle 0.621 0.667 0.706 33.1 30.8 29.1 0.001 0.002 0.002
Coal — average 0.913 0.961 1.009 33.3 35.0 36.8 0.010 0.011 0.013
Gas — average 0.458 0.483 0.507 39.9 42.0 44.1 0.001 0.002 0.003
Gas — Combined Cycle 0.349 0.370 0.493 59.0 55.6 41.7 0.001 0.002 0.002
Coal — PC 0.673 0.744 0.868 47.6 43.0 36.9 0.008 0.010 0.012
Coal — IGCC 0.713 0.734 0.762 44.9 43.6 42.0 0.003 0.004 0.006
CCS — Coal — Oxyfuel 0.014 0.096 0.110 35 30.2 27 0.014 0.017 0.023
CCS — Coal — PC 0.095 0.121 0.138 32 29.4 27 0.022 0.028 0.036
CCS — Coal — IGCC 0.102 0.124 0.148 34 32.3 27 0.008 0.010 0.013
CCS — Gas — Combined Cycle 0.030 0.047 0.098 49 47.4 35 0.007 0.009 0.012
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A log-normal distribution does not have well-defined maximum and 
minimum values. The range in Figures 7.6 and 7.7 hence shows the 1st 
to 99th percentile.
A�II�9�3�2 Nuclear power
The data on nuclear power was taken from Lenzen (2008) and Warner 
and Heath (2012). There is no basis in the literature as far as we know 
to distinguish between 2nd and 3rd generation power plants.
A�II�9�3�3 Renewable energy
Concentrated solar power: The data range is based on both the 
assessments conducted for the International Resource Panel (Hertwich 
et al., 2013) work based on the analysis of Viebahn et al. (2011), Bur-
khardt et al. (2011), Whitaker et al. (2013), and the review of Burkhardt 
et al. (2012).
Photovoltaic power: Ranges are based largely on the reviews of Hsu 
et al. (2012) and Kim et al. (2012). The analysis of newer thin-film tech-
nologies analyzed in Hertwich et al. (2013) indicates that recent tech-
nical progress has lowered emissions.
Wind power: The data is based on the review of Arvesen and Hert-
wich (2012) and has been cross-checked with Dolan and Heath (2012) 
and Hertwich et al. (2013).
Ocean Energy: There have been very few LCAs of ocean energy 
devices. The numbers are based on the Pelamis (Parker et  al., 2007) 
and Oyster wave energy device (Walker and Howell, 2011), the SeaGen 
tidal turbine (Douglas et al., 2008; Walker and Howell, 2011), and tidal 
barrages (Woollcombe-Adams et al., 2009; Kelly et al., 2012). Based on 
these available assessments, tidal turbines have the lowest GHG emis-
sions and tidal barrages the highest.
Hydropower: The indirect emissions of hydropower are largely associ-
ated with fossil fuel combustion in the construction of the plant. The 
data presented here is based on SRREN (Kumar et al., 2011). The data 
was cross-checked with a recent review (Raadal et al., 2011) and anal-
ysis (Moreau et al., 2012). 
The issue of biogenic emissions resulting from the degradation of 
biomass in reservoirs had been reviewed in SRREN, however, without 
providing estimates of the size of biogenic GHG emissions per kWh. 
Please note that only CH4 emissions are included in the analysis. N2O 
emissions have not been broadly investigated, but are assumed to be 
small (Demarty and Bastien, 2011). Carbon dioxide emissions can be 
substantial, but these emissions represent carbon that would probably 
have oxidized elsewhere; it is not clear what fraction of the resulting 
CO2 would have entered the atmosphere (Hertwich, 2013). We have 
hence excluded biogenic CO2 emissions from reservoirs from the 
assessment. The distribution of biogenic methane emissions comes 
from an analysis of methane emissions per kWh of power generated 
by Hertwich (2013) based on literature data collected and reviewed 
by Barros et al. (2011). Independent estimates based on recent empiri-
cal studies (Maeck et al., 2013) come to similar results. For the maxi-
mum number (2 kg CO2eq / kWh), a specific power station analyzed 
by Kemenes et al. (2007) was chosen; as it is not clear that the much 
higher value from the 99th percentile of the distribution determined by 
Hertwich (2013) is really realistic.
Biomass: Life-cycle direct global climate impacts of bioenergy come 
from the peer-reviewed literature from 2010 to 2012 and are based 
on a range of electric conversion efficiencies of 27 – 50 %. The category 
“Biomass — dedicated and crop residues” includes perennial grasses, 
like switchgrass and miscanthus, short rotation species, like willow 
and eucalyptus, and agricultural byproducts, like wheat straw and corn 
stover. “Biomass — forest wood” refers to forest biomass from long 
rotation species in various climate regions. Ranges include global cli-
mate impacts of CO2 emissions from combustion of regenerative bio-
mass (i. e., biogenic CO2) and the associated changes in surface albedo 
following ecosystem disturbances, quantified according to the IPCC 
framework for emission metrics (Forster et al., 2007) and using 100-
year GWPs as characterization factors (Cherubini et al., 2012). 
These impacts are site-specific and generally more significant for long 
rotation species. The range in “Biomass — forest wood” is representa-
tive of various forests and climates, e. g., aspen forest in Wisconsin (US), 
mixed forest in Pacific Northwest (US), pine forest in Saskatchewan 
(Canada), and spruce forest in Southeast Norway. In areas affected 
by seasonal snow cover, the cooling contribution from the temporary 
change in surface albedo can be larger than the warming associated 
with biogenic CO2 fluxes and the bioenergy system can have a net neg-
ative impact (i. e., cooling). Change in soil organic carbon can have a 
substantial influence on the overall GHG balance of bioenergy systems, 
especially for the case “Biomass — dedicated and crop residues”, but 
are not covered here due to their high dependence on local soil condi-
tions and previous land use (Don et al., 2012; Gelfand et al., 2013).
Additional information on the LCA of bioenergy alternatives is pro-
vided in Section 11.A.4.
A.II.10 Scenario data
A�II�10�1 Process
The AR5 Scenario Database comprises 31 models and 1,184 scenar-
ios, summarized in Table A.II.14. In an attempt to be as inclusive as 
possible, an open call for scenarios was made through the Integrated 
Assessment Modeling Consortium (IAMC) with approval from the IPCC 
1309

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Metrics & MethodologyAnnex II
AII









Scenarios in WGIII 
AR5 scenario 
database
Areas of Harmonization Lead Institution Overview Publication
ADAM (Adaptation 
and Mitigation 
Strategies — Supporting 
European Climate Policy)
2009 1 15 Technology availability, 
Mitigation policy
Potsdam Institute for Climate 
Impact Research (PIK)
(Edenhofer et al., 2010)
AME (Asian Modeling 
Exercise)




of Climate Change 
Mitigation Pathways 
and Evaluation of 
the Robustness of 
Mitigation Cost 
Estimates)
2013 11 378 Technology availability; 
mitigation policy; 
GDP; population






EMF 22 (Energy 
Modeling Forum 22)
2009 7 70 Technology availability, 
mitigation policy
Stanford University (Clarke et al., 2009)
EMF 27 (Energy 
Modeling Forum 27)
2013 16 362 Technology availability, 
mitigation policy
Stanford University (Blanford et al., 2014a; 
Krey et al., 2014; 
Kriegler et al., 2014c)
LIMITS (Low Climate 
Impact Scenarios and 
the Implications of 
required tight emissions 
control strategies)
2014 7 84 Mitigation policies Fondazione Eni Enrico 
Mattei (FEEM)
(Kriegler et al., 2014b; 
Tavoni et al., 2014)
POeM (Policy Options 
to engage Emerging 
Asian economies in a 
post-Kyoto regime) 
2012 1 4 Mitigation policies Chalmers University 
of Technology
(Lucas et al., 2013)
RECIPE (Report on 
Energy and Climate 
Policy in Europe)






2013 3 105 Mitigation policy; GDP 
growth; population growth, 
fossil fuel availability
Potsdam Institute for Climate 
Impact Research (PIK)
(Bauer et al., 2013; De 
Cian et al., 2013; Calvin 
et al., 2014; Chen et al., 
2014; Luderer et al., 2014)
WGIII Technical Support Unit. To be included in the database, four crite-
ria had to be met. First, only scenarios published in the peer-reviewed 
literature could be considered, per IPCC protocol. Second, the scenario 
had to contain a minimum set of required variables and some basic 
model and scenario documentation (meta data) had to be provided. 
Third, only models with at least full energy system representation were 
considered given that specific sectoral studies were assessed in Chap-
ters 8 – 11. Lastly, the scenario had to provide data out to at least 2030. 
Scenarios were submitted by entering the data into a standardized 
data template that was subsequently uploaded to a database system7 
administered by the International Institute of Applied System Analysis 
(IIASA).
7 https: / / secure.iiasa.ac.at / web-apps / ene / AR5DB
A�II�10�2 Model inter-comparison exercises
The majority of scenarios (about 95 %) included in the database were 
generated as part of nine model inter-comparison exercises, summa-
rized in Table A.II.15. The Energy Modeling Forum (EMF), established at 
Stanford University in 1976, is considered one of the first major efforts 
to bring together modelling teams for the purpose of model inter-com-
parison. Since its inception, EMF and other institutions have worked on 
a large number of model inter-comparison projects with topics rang-
ing from energy and the economy, to natural gas markets, to climate 
change mitigation strategies. Recent model inter-comparison studies 
have focused on, for example, delayed and fragmented mitigation, 
effort sharing, the role of technology availability and energy resources 
for mitigation and have looked into the role of specific regions (e. g., 
Asia) in a global mitigation regime. 
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A�II�10�3 Classification of scenarios
The analysis of transformation pathway or scenario data presented in 
Chapters 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 uses a common classification scheme 
to distinguish the scenarios along several dimensions. The key dimen-
sions of this classification are:
•	 Climate Target (determined by 2100 CO2eq concentrations and 
radiative forcing or carbon budgets) 
•	 Overshoot of 2100 CO2eq concentration or radiative forcing lev-
els
•	 Scale of deployment of carbon dioxide removal or net negative 
emissions
•	 Availability of mitigation technologies, in particular carbon diox-
ide removal (CDR) or negative emissions technologies
•	 Policy configuration, such as immediate mitigation, delayed miti-
gation, or fragmented participation
Table A.II.16 summarizes the classification scheme for each of these 
dimensions, which are discussed in more detail in the following sec-
tions. 
A�II�10�3�1 Climate category 
Climate target outcomes are classified in terms of radiative forcing as 
expressed in CO2-equivalent concentrations (CO2eq). Note that in addi-
tion to CO2eq concentrations, also CO2eq emissions are used in the 
WGIII AR5 to express the contribution of different radiative forcing 
agents in one metric. The CO2-equivalent concentration metric refers to 
the hypothetical concentration of CO2 that would result in the same 
instantaneous radiative forcing as the total from all sources, includ-
ing aerosols8. By contrast, the CO2eq emissions metric refers to a sum 
of Kyoto GHG emissions weighted by their global warming potentials 
(GWPs, see Chapter 3, Section 3.9.6) as calculated in the SAR (IPCC, 
1995a), for consistency with other data sources. It is important to note 
that these are fundamentally different notions of ‘CO2-equivalence’. 
There are several reasons to use radiative forcing as an indicator for 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system and — in the case 
of climate policy scenarios — mitigation stringency: 1) it connects well 
to the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) used in CMIP5 
(see WGI AR5), 2) it is used as a definition of mitigation target in many 
modelling exercises, 3) it avoids problems introduced by the uncer-
tainty in climate sensitivity, and 4) it integrates across different radia-
tive forcing agents. These advantages outweigh some difficulties of the 
radiative forcing approach, namely that not all model scenarios in the 
WGIII AR5 Scenario Database fully represent radiative forcing, and that 
there is still substantial natural science uncertainty involved in convert-
ing emissions (a direct output of all models investigated in Chapter 6) 
into global radiative forcing levels. 
To rectify these difficulties, the following steps were taken: 
1. The emissions of all scenarios in the WGIII AR5 Scenario Database 
(see following bullets for details) were run through a single cli-
mate model MAGICC6.3 (where applicable) to establish compa-
rability between the concentration, forcing, and climate outcome 
between scenarios. This removes natural science uncertainty due 
to different climate model assumptions in integrated models. The 
MAGICC output comes with an estimate of parametric uncer-
8 More technically speaking, CO2-equivalent concentrations can be converted to 
forcing numbers using the formula log(CO2eq  / CO2_preindustrial)  / log(2) · 
RF(2 x CO2) with RF(2 x CO2) = 3.7 W / m2 the forcing from a doubling of pre-
industrial CO2 concentration. 
Table A�II�16 | Scenario classifications.









Binning criterion Radiative forcing 








Maximum annual net 
negative emissions









# of classes 7 classes (1 – 7) 7 classes (1 – 7) 7 classes (1 – 7) 2 classes (N1, N2) 2 classes (O1, O2) 4 classes (T0 – T3) 11 classes (P0 – P7, 
P1+, P3+, P4+)
Notes Extended to models 
that do not report 
forcing based on CO2 
budgets. Extrapolated 
to a subset of 
2050 scenarios. 
Classes for 2050 
budgets cannot 
be unambiguously 
mapped to climate 
outcomes and 
thus overlap 
Only for scenarios 
that run out to 2100
Only for models that 
run out to 2100 
and report full or 
Kyoto forcing
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tainty within the MAGICC framework (Meinshausen et al., 2009, 
2011a; b). Calculated MAGICC radiative forcing values are mean 
values given these uncertainties. MAGICC closely reflects the cli-
mate response of General Circulation Model (GCM) ensembles 
such as studied in CMIP5, and therefore can be considered a 
useful yardstick for measuring and comparing forcing outcomes 
between scenarios (Schaeffer et  al., 2013). Emissions scenarios 
were harmonized to global inventories in 2010 to avoid a per-
turbation of climate projections from differences in reported and 
historical emissions that were assumed for the calibration of 
MAGICC (Schaeffer et al., 2013). The scaling factors were chosen 
to decline linearly to unity in 2050 to preserve as much as possible 
the character of the emissions scenarios. In general, the difference 
between harmonized and reported emissions is very small. The 
MAGICC runs were performed independently of whether or not a 
model scenario reports endogenous climate information, and both 
sets of information can deviate. As a result, MAGICC output may 
no longer fully conform to ‘nameplate’ targets specified in the 
given scenarios and as originally assessed by the original authors. 
Nevertheless, given the benefit of comparability both between 
AR5 scenarios and with WGI climate projections, scenarios were 
classified based on radiative forcing derived from MAGICC. 
2. As a minimum requirement to apply MAGICC to a given emis-
sions scenario, CO2 from the fossil fuel and industrial (FF&I) sec-
tor, CH4 from FF&I and land use sectors, and N2O from FF&I and 
land use sectors needed to be reported. In case of missing land-
use related CO2 emissions the average of the RCPs was used. 
If fluorinated gas (F-gas), carbonaceous aerosols and / or nitrate 
emissions were missing, those were added by interpolating data 
from RCP2.6 and RCP8.5 on the basis of the energy-related CO2 
emissions of the relevant scenario vis-à-vis these RCPs. If scenar-
ios were part of a model intercomparison project and gases, or 
forcers were missing, data was used from what was diagnosed 
as a “central” model for the same scenario (Schaeffer et  al., 
2013). As a minimum requirement to derive not only Kyoto forc-
ing, but also full anthropogenic forcing, sulfur emissions in addi-
tion to CO2, CH4, and N2O needed to be reported. Forcing from 
mineral dust and land use albedo was fixed at year-2000 values. 
3. For the remaining scenarios, which only run to 2050 or that 
do not fulfill the minimum requirements to derive Kyoto forc-
ing with MAGICC, an auxiliary binning based on cumulative 
CO2 emissions budgets was implemented. Those scenarios came 
from models that only represent fossil fuel and industry emis-
sions or only CO2 emissions. The categorization of those sce-
narios is discussed below and includes a considerable amount 
of uncertainty from the mapping of CO2 emissions budgets to 
forcing outcomes. The uncertainty increases significantly for 
scenarios that only run to 2050. In many cases, 2050 scenarios 
could only be mapped to the union of two neighbouring forcing 
categories given the large uncertainty. 
The CO2-equivalent concentrations were converted to full anthropo-
genic forcing ranges by using the formula in footnote 8, assuming 
CO2_preindustrial = 278 ppm and rounding to the first decimal. All sce-
narios from which full forcing could be re-constructed from MAGICC 
were binned on this basis (Table A.II.17). Those scenarios that only 
allowed the re-construction of Kyoto forcing were binned on the basis 
of the adjusted Kyoto forcing scale that was derived from a regression 
of Kyoto vs. full forcing on the subset of those scenarios that reported 
both quantities. Thus, the binning in terms of Kyoto forcing already 
entails an uncertainty associated with this mapping. 
We note the following: 
•	 CO2 equivalent and forcing numbers refer to the year 2100. Tem-
porary overshoot of the forcing prior to 2100 can occur. The over-
shoot categories (see Section A.II.10.3.3) can be used to further 
control for overshoot.
•	 No scenario included in the WGIII AR5 Scenario Database showed 
lower forcing than 430 ppm CO2eq and 2.3 W / m2, respectively, so 
no lower climate category was needed.
•	 When labeling the climate categories in figures and text, the CO2-
equivalent range should be specified, e. g., 430 – 480 ppm CO2eq for 
Category 1. If neighbouring categories are lumped into one bin, 
then the lower and upper end of the union of categories should 
be named, e. g., 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq for Categories 1 & 2 or 
> 720 ppm CO2eq for Categories 6 and 7.




Full anthropogenic forcing 
equivalent [W / m2]
Kyoto forcing 
equivalent [W / m2]
Centre RCP (W / m2)
1 430 – 480 2.3 – 2.9 2.5 – 3.1 455 2.6
2 480 – 530 2.9 – 3.45 3.1 – 3.65 505  -
3 530 – 580 3.45 – 3.9 3.65 – 4.1 555 (3.7)
4 580 – 650 3.9 – 4.5 4.1 – 4.7
650 4.5
5 650 – 720 4.5 – 5.1 4.7 – 5.3
6 720 – 1000 5.1 – 6.8 5.3 – 7.0 860 6
7 > 1000   > 6.8  > 7.0  - 8.5
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A�II�10�3�2 Carbon budget categories
The classification of scenarios in terms of cumulative CO2 emissions bud-
gets is mainly used as an auxiliary binning to map scenarios that do not 
allow the direct calculation of radiative forcing (see above) to forcing 
categories (Tables A.II.18 and A.II.19). However, it is also entertained as a 
separate binning across scenarios for diagnostic purposes. The mapping 
between full anthropogenic forcing and CO2 emissions budgets has been 
derived from a regression over model scenarios that report both quanti-
ties (from the models GCAM, MESSAGE, IMAGE, MERGE, REMIND) and 
is affected by significant uncertainty (Figure A.II.8). This uncertainty is the 
larger the shorter the time span of cumulating CO2 emissions is. Due to 
the availability of negative emissions, and the inclusion of delayed action 
scenarios in some studies, the relationship of 2011 – 2050 CO2 emissions 
budgets and year 2100 radiative forcing was weak to the point that a 
meaningful mapping was hard to identify (Figure A.II.9). As a remedy, 
a mapping was only attempted for 2050 scenarios that do not include 
a strong element of delayed action (i. e., scenario policy classes P0, P1, 
P2 and P6; see Section A.II.10.3.6), and the mapping was differentiated 
according to whether or not negative emissions would be available 
(scenario technology classes T0 – T3, see Section A.II.10.3.5). As a result 
of the weak relationship between budgets and radiative forcing, 2050 
CO2 emissions budget categories could only be mapped to the union of 
neighbouring forcing categories in some cases (Table A.II.19). 
CO2 emissions numbers refer to total CO2 emissions including emis-
sions from the AFOLU sector. However, those models that only reported 
CO2 fossil fuel and industrial emissions were also binned according to 
this scheme. This can be based on the simplifying assumption that net 
land use change emissions over the cumulation period are zero. 
Table A�II�18 | 2011 – 2100 emissions budget binning (rounded to 25 GtCO2).
2100 Emissions Category Cumulated 2011 – 2100 CO2 emissions [GtCO2] Associated Climate forcing category Forcing (in ppm CO2eq)
1 350 – 950 1 430 – 480
2   950 – 1500 2 480 – 530
3 1500 – 1950 3 530 – 580
4 1950 – 2600 4 580 – 650
5 2600 – 3250 5 650 – 720
6 3250 – 5250 6 720 – 1000
7 > 5250 7 > 1000
Table A�II�19 | 2011 – 2050 emissions budget binning (rounded to 25 GtCO2).
2050 Emissions Category Cumulated 2011 – 2050 CO2  emissions [GtCO2]
Associated Climate forcing category if 
negative emissions are available  
(Classes T0 or T2 below)
Associated Climate forcing category if 
negative emissions are not available  
(Classes T1 or T3 below)
1 < 825 1 1
2 825 – 1125 1 – 2 2
3 1125 – 1325 2 – 4 3 – 4 
4 1325 – 1475 3 – 5 4 – 5 
5 1475 – 1625 4 – 6 5 – 6 
6 1625 – 1950 6 6
7 > 1950 7 7
Figure A�II�8 | Regression of radiative forcing against 2011 – 2100 cumulative CO2 
emissions. Scenarios of full forcing models GCAM, MERGE, MESSAGE, REMIND and 
IMAGE were used for this analysis. Regression was done separately for each model, and 
resulting budget ranges averaged across models.
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A�II�10�3�3 Overshoot category 
The overshoot categorization shown in Table A.II.20 applies to the 
maximum overshoot of the 2100 radiative forcing level before 2100. 
The binning is only applied to models running until 2100. If full radia-
tive forcing was not available, Kyoto forcing was used. If radiative forc-
ing information was not available, no assignment was made.
A�II�10�3�4 Negative emissions category
The negative emissions categories apply to the maximum amount of 
net negative CO2 emissions (incl. land use) in any given year over the 
21st century. Scenarios with very large annual fluxes of negative emis-
sions are also able to overshoot strongly, because the overshoot can 
be compensated with large net negative emissions within a relatively 
short period of time. Only a small number of scenarios show net nega-
tive emissions larger than 20 GtCO2 / yr, which was used to separate 
scenarios with large negative emissions from those with bounded neg-
ative emissions (Table A.II.21). 
A�II�10�3�5 Technology category
The technology dimension of the categorization scheme indicates the 
technology availability in a given scenario. We identify two key factors: 
1. the availability of negative emissions or CDR technologies that 
can be either confined by restrictions stipulated in the scenario 
definition or by the fact that the model does not represent nega-
tive emissions technologies, and 
2. the restricted use of the portfolio of mitigation technologies 
that would be available in the model with default technology 
assumptions. 
Combining these two factors lead to four distinct technology catego-
ries as shown in Table A.II.22.


























 CO2 Emissions 2011−2050 [GtCO2] CO2 Emissions 2011−2050 [GtCO2]


























Figure A�II�9 | Regression of radiative forcing against 2011 – 2050 CO2 emissions. Red lines show mean results of fit and depend on whether (left panel) or not (right panel) nega-
tive emissions are available. Green lines show harmonized bins between both categories for the mapping in Table A.II.19.
Table A�II�20 | Overshoot categories.
Small Overshoot Large Overshoot
< 0.4 W / m2 > 0.4 W / m2
O1 O2
Table A�II�21 | Negative emissions categories.
Bounded net negative emissions Large net negative emissions
< 20 GtCO2 / yr > 20 GtCO2 / yr
N1 N2*
* The GCAM 3.0 scenario EMF27 – 450-FullTech came in at – 19.96 GtCO2 / yr and 
was also included in class N2.










T0 T1 T2 T3
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Note that some scenarios improve technology performance over 
the default version (e. g., larger biomass availability, higher final 
energy intensity improvements, or advanced  / expanded technol-
ogy assumptions). These cases were not further distinguished and 
assigned to T0 and T1, if no additional technology restrictions 
existed.
A�II�10�3�6 Policy category
Policy categories are assigned based on scenario definitions in the 
study protocols of model intercomparison projects (MIPs). The policy 
categories summarize the type of different policy designs that were 
investigated in recent studies (Table A.II.23). We stress that the long-
term target level (where applicable) is not part of the policy design 
categorization. This dimension is characterized in terms of climate 
categories (see above). Individual model studies not linked to one of 
the larger MIPs were assigned to baseline (P0) and immediate action 
(P1) categories where obvious, and otherwise left unclassified. The 
residual class (P7) contains the G8 scenario from the EMF27 study 
(Table A.II.15), with ambitious emissions caps by Annex  I countries 
(starting immediately) and Non-Annex  I countries (starting after 
2020), but with a group of countries (fossil resource owners) never 
taking a mitigation commitment over the 21st century. The RECIPE 
model intercomparison project’s delay scenarios start acting on a 
global target already in 2020, and thus are in between categories 
P1 and P2. P0 does not include climate policy after 2010 (it may 
or may not include Kyoto Protocol commitments until 2012), while 
P1 typically assumes full ‘when’, ‘where’ and ‘what’ flexibility of 
emissions reductions in addition to immediate action on a target 
(so called idealized implementation scenarios). The scenario class P6 
characterizes the case of moderate fragmented action throughout 
the 21st century, without aiming at a long term global target, usu-
ally formulated as extrapolations of the current level of ambition. 
Policy categories P2 to P4 describe variants of adopting a global tar-
get or a global carbon price at some later point in the future. With 
the important exception of the AMPERE2 study, all scenarios in the 
P2-P4 class assume a period of regionally fragmented action prior 
to the adoption of a global policy regime. For further details of the 
scenario policy categories P2-P6, see the individual studies listed in 
Table A.II.15.
For the policy categories P1 (Idealized), P3 (Delay 2030), and P4 
(Accession to Price Regime) subcategories P1+, P3+ and P4+ 
respectively exist for which in addition to climate policy supplemen-
tary policies (Supp.)(e. g., infrastructure polices) that are not part 
of the underlying baseline scenario have been included. These cat-
egories have been assigned to the climate policy scenarios of the 
IMACLIM v1.1 model from the AMPERE project to distinguish them 
from similar scenarios (e. g., EMF27) where these supplementary 
policies were not included and therefore policy costs are generally 
higher.
A�II�10�3�7 Classification of baseline scenarios
Baseline scenarios used in the literature are often identical or at least 
very close for one model across different studies. However, in some 
exercises, characteristics of baseline scenarios, such as population and 
economic growth assumptions, are varied systematically to study their 
influence on future emissions, energy demand, etc. Table A.II.24 below 
provides an overview of unique Kaya-factor decompositions of base-
line scenarios in the AR5 scenario database. The results are shown in 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 in Chapter 6.
Table A�II�23 | Policy categories.
Category  Target adoption Staged accession Long-term frag  / Free rider MIPs
P0 Baseline None No N / A All
P1 Idealized Immediate No No  / No All
P1+ Idealized +  
Supp. Policies
Immediate No No  / No AMPERE2, AMPERE3
P2 Delay 2020 Model year after 2020 No No  / No RoSE, LIMITS 
P3 Delay 2030 Model year after 2030 No No  / No RoSE, LIMITS, AMPERE2
P3+ Delay 2030 + 
Supp. Policies
Model year after 2030 No No  / No AMPERE2
P4 Accession to Price Regime None Yes (2030 – 2050) No  / No AMPERE3
P4+ Accession to Price Regime + 
Supp. Policies
None Yes (2030 – 2050) No  / No AMPERE3
P5 Accession to Target Yes (starting 2010) Yes (2030 – 2070) No  / No EMF22
P6 Fragmented Ref Pol No N / A Yes  /  
Yes (EMF27) — 
No (Other)
EMF27, RoSE, LIMITS, AMPERE3
P7 Other cases N / A N / A N / A EMF27, RECIPE
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Population Per Capita Income Energy Intensity Carbon Intensity
Harmonized Unharmonized Harmonized Unharmonized Unharmonized Unharmonized
High Default   High Default Low   Default Fast  
ADAM 1     1       1 1   3
AME 16   16   16 15   15
AMPERE 11   11     10 10 10 9 65
EMF22 7   7   1 7 8   8
EMF27 16   16   31 16 15 119
GEA 1   1   0 0   1
LIMITS 7   7   7 7   7
POeM 1   1   1 1   1
RECIPE 1   1   1 1   1
RCP 8.5 1 1     2   1   1
RoSE 3 3 3   5 3 7   15   31
Other 2     2       2 1   1
67 4 14 52 5 13 10 76 76 24 253
 = 70  = 104  = 100
Notes:
All AMPERE scenarios harmonized population along a default trajectory
RoSE specified two harmonized population trajectories: default and high
RCP 8.5 was based on an intentionally high population trajectory
In all other cases, no guidance was given regarding population harmonization
AMPERE scenarios specified a default harmonization of GDP
One model in AMPERE (IMAGE) did not follow GDP harmonization, thus it was classified as unharmonized
AMPERE WP2 (9 of 11 participated) specified an alternative low energy intensity baseline with unharmonized implications for per capita income
One model in EMF22 (MERGE) included an alternative baseline with intentionally low per capita income
EMF27 specified an alternative low energy intensity baseline (15 of 16 ran it) with unharmonized implications for per capita income
ROSE specified several alternative GDP baselines, some run by all three models, others by only one or two
In all other cases, no guidance was given regarding per capita income or GDP harmonization
One study included a model not reporting data for GDP: GEA (MESSAGE)
Three studies included a model not reporting data for total primary energy: AME (Phoenix); AMPERE (GEM-E3); and Other (IEEJ)
No study successfully harmonized energy demand, thus scenarios are classified as default if a low energy intensity baseline was not specifically indicated
Alternative supply technology scenarios generally do not affect energy intensity, thus only default supply technology scenarios are classified
A�II�10�4 Comparison of integrated and 
sectorally detailed studies 
In Section 6.8 of this report, but also in a number of other sections, 
integrated studies included in the AR5 Scenario Database that is 
described in Sections A.II.10.1 to A.II.10.3 above are compared to sec-
torally detailed studies assessed in Chapters 8, 9, and 10 that deal with 
the end-use sectors transport, buildings and industry respectively. Table 
A.II.25 provides an overview of the sectorally detailed studies that are 
included in this comparison. It should be noted that not all studies pro-
vide the data necessary to derive final energy demand reduction com-
pared to baseline and low-carbon fuel shares as, for example, shown in 
Figure 6.37 and 6.38. In addition, some of the sectorally detailed stud-
ies do not cover the entire sector, but restrict themselves to the most 
important services within a sector (e. g., space heating and cooling and 
hot water provision in the buildings sector).
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Table A�II�25 | Sectorally detailed energy end-use studies compared to transformation pathways.
Sector Study (Literature Reference) Scenario Name Scenario Type
Transport
(Ch� 8)




















Global Energy Assessment 






World Energy Technology Outlook 2050 
(EC, 2006)
Hydrogen Scenario Policy




Asia / World Energy Outlook 2011 
(IEEJ, 2011)
Enhanced Development Scenario Policy
Buildings
(Ch� 9)














High Slow efficiency no heat pump Base
High Fast efficiency with heat pump Policy
The Energy Report 
(WWF / Ecofys / OMA, 2011; Deng et al., 2012)
Baseline Base
The Energy Report Policy
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A.III.1 Introduction
Annex III contains data on technologies and practices that have been 
collected to produce a summary assessment of the potentials and costs 
of selected mitigation options in various sectors as displayed in Fig-
ure 7.7, Table 8.3, Figures 10.7, 10.8, 10.9, 10.10, 10.19, 10.21, Figure 
11.16 as well as in corresponding figures in the Technical Summary.
The nature and quantity of mitigation options, as well as data avail-
ability and quality of the available data, vary significantly across 
sectors. Even for largely similar mitigation options, a large variety of 
context-specific metrics is used to express their cost and potentials 
that involve conversions of input data into particular output formats. 
For the purpose of the Working Group III (WGIII) contribution to the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment 
Report (AR5), a limited but still diverse set of sector-specific metrics is 
used to strike a balance between harmonization of approaches across 
sectors and adequate consideration of the complexities involved.
Mitigation potentials are approached via product-specific or service-
specific emission intensities, i. e., emissions per unit of useful outputs, 
which are as diverse as electricity, steel, and cattle meat. Mitigation 
potentials on a product / service level can be understood as the poten-
tial reduction in specific emissions that can result from actions such as 
switching to production processes that cause lower emissions for oth-
erwise comparable products1 and reducing production / consumption of 
emission-intensive products.
Mitigation costs are approached via different levelized cost metrics, 
which share a common methodological basis but need to be inter-
preted in very different ways. A detailed introduction to the metrics 
used can be found in the Metrics and Methodology (M&M) Annex 
(Section A.II.3.1). All of these cost metrics are derived under specific 
conditions that vary in practice and, hence, need to be set by assump-
tion. These assumptions are not always clear from the literature, where 
such metrics are presented. Hence, comparison of the same metric 
taken from different studies is not always possible. For this reason, in 
the AR5 these metrics are generally re-calculated under specified con-
ditions, e. g., with respect to weighted average cost of capital, based 
on underlying input parameters that are less sensitive to assump-
tions. Sensitivities to assumptions made in the AR5 are made explicit. 
In several cases, however, the availability of data on the parameters 
needed to re-calculate the relevant cost metric is very limited. In such 
cases, expert judgment was used to assess information on costs taken 
directly from the literature. 
1 Note that comparability of products is not always given even for seemingly similar 
ones. For instance, in the case of electricity, the timing of production is crucial for 
the value of the product and reduces the insights that can be derived from simple 
comparisons of the metrics used here.
More detail on sector-specific metrics, the respective input data and 
assumptions used as well as the conversions required is presented in 
the sector-specific sections below. 
References for data, justifications for assumptions, and additional con-
text is provided in footnotes to the data tables. Footnotes are inserted 
at the most general level possible, i. e., footnotes are inserted at table 
headings where they apply to the majority of data, at column / row 
headings where they apply to the majority of data in the respective 
column / row, and at individual cells where they apply only to data 
points or ranges given in individual cells. Input data are included in 
normal font type, output data resulting from data conversions shown 
in figures and tables mentioned above are bolded, and intermediate 
outputs are italicized. 
A.III.2 Energy supply
A.III.2.1 Approach
The emission intensity of electricity production (measured in kg CO2-
equivalents (CO2eq) / MWh) can be used as a measure to compare the 
specific greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of suggested emission miti-
gation options and those of conventional power supply technologies. 
With respect to costs, the levelized cost of energy (LCOE), measured in 
USD2010 / MWh, serves the same purpose.2 
The calculation of LCOE of a technology requires data on all cash flows 
that occur during its lifetime (see formula in Annex II.3.1.1) as well as 
on the amount of energy that is provided by the respective technol-
ogy. Cash flows are usually reported in some aggregate form based on 
widely deployed monetary accounting principles combining cash flows 
into different categories of expenditures and revenues that occur at 
varying points during the lifetime of the investment. 
The applied method presents LCOE that include all relevant costs asso-
ciated with the construction and operation of the investigated power 
plant in line with the approach in IEA (2010). Taxes and subsidies are 
excluded, and it is assumed that grids are available to transport the 
electricity. Additional costs associated with the integration of variable 
sources are neglected as well (see Section 7.8.2 for an assessment of 
these costs). 
2 The merits and shortcomings of this method are discussed in detail in the Metrics 
and Methodology Annex of the WGIII AR5 (Annex II). 
1332
Technology-specific Cost and Performance Parameters Annex III
AIII
The input data used to calculate LCOE are summarized in Table 1 
below. The conversion of input data into LCOE requires the steps out-
lined in the following:
Levelized cost (LCOE) in USD2010 / MWhe
LCOE =  α · I + OM + F  ____
E
 (Equation A.III.1)
α =  r ____ 
1 − (1 + r ) − L T  
(Equation A.III.2)
I =  C _ 
 L B 
·  ∑ 
t = 1
 
 L B 
 (1 + i ) t ·  ( 1 +  
d __ 
(1 + r )  L T  ) (Equation A.III.3)
OM = FOM + (VOM − REV +  d υ​) · E (Equation A.III.4)
E = P · FLH (Equation A.III.5)
F = FC ·  E _ η​ (Equation A.III.6)
Where:
•	 LCOE is the levelized cost of electricity.
•	 α​is the capital recovery factor (CRF).
•	 r is the weighted average cost of capital (WACC — taken as either 
5 % or 10 %).
•	 I is the investment costs, including finance cost for construction at 
interest i. 
•	 C is the capital costs, excluding finance cost for construction 
(‘overnight cost’). In order to calculate the cost for construction, 
the overnight costs are equally distributed over the construction 
period.
•	 d represent the decommissioning cost. Depending on the data in 
the literature, this is incorporated as an extra capital cost at the 
end of the project duration which is discounted to t = 0 (using 
a decommissioning factor d, as in (Equation A.III.3)), or as a cor-
responding variable cost (dv in (Equation A.III.4)). d = 0.15 for 
nuclear energy, and zero for all other technologies (given the low 
impact on LCOE).
•	 OM are the net annual operation and maintenance costs; sum-
marizing fixed OM (FOM), variable OM (VOM), and variable by-
product revenues (REV). As a default and if not stated explicitly 
otherwise, carbon costs (e. g., due to carbon taxes or emission trad-
ing schemes) are not taken into account in calculating the LCOE 
values. 
•	 E is the energy (electricity) produced annually, which is calculated 
by multiplying the capacity (P) with the number of (equivalent) full 
load hours (FLH).
•	 F are the annual fuel costs,
•	 FC are the fuel costs per unit of energy input, and 
•	 η is the conversion efficiency (in lower heating value — LHV).
•	 i is the interest rate over the construction loan (taken as 5 %).
•	 LT is the project duration (in operation), as defined in IEA (2010).
•	 LB is the construction period.
Emission Intensities:
For data, see Table AIII.2 below. For methodological issues and litera-
ture sources, see Annex II, Section A.II.9.3.
A.III.2.2 Data
Table A.III.1 | Cost and performance parameters of selected electricity supply technologiesi, ii
Options
















Fixed annual operation 
and maintenance 
cost (USD2010 / kW)iii
Variable operation 
and maintenance 
cost (USD2010 / MWh)iii
Variable by-product 
revenue (USD2010 / MWh)
Average fuel price 
(USD2010 / GJ)
Min / Median / Max Avg Min / Median / Max Min / Median / Max Min / Median / Max Min / Max
Currently Commercially Available Technologies
Coal — PCiv 380 / 2200 / 3900 5 0 / 23 / 75 0 / 3.4 / 9.0 2.9 / 5.3
Gas — Combined Cyclev 550 / 1100 / 2100 4 0 / 7 / 39 0 / 3.2 / 4.9 3.8 / 14
Biomass — CHPvi 2000 / 5600 / 11000 4.5 0 / 101 / 400 0 / 0 / 56 4 / 26 / 93vii 3.3 / 9.3
Biomass — cofiringvi,viii 350 / 900 / 1800 1 13 / 20 / 20 0 / 0 / 2 3.3 / 9.3
Biomass — dedicatedvi 1900 / 3600 / 6500 4.5 42 / 99 / 500 0 / 3.8 / 34 3.3 / 9.3
Geothermalix, x 1000 / 5000 / 10000 3 0 / 0 / 150 0 / 11 / 31
Hydropowerxi, xii 500 / 1900 / 8500 5 5 / 35 / 250 0 / 0 / 15
Nuclearxiii, xiv 1600 / 4300 / 6400 9 0 / 0 / 110 1.7 / 13 / 30 0.74 / 0.87
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Options
















Fixed annual operation 
and maintenance 
cost (USD2010 / kW)iii
Variable operation 
and maintenance 
cost (USD2010 / MWh)iii
Variable by-product 
revenue (USD2010 / MWh)
Average fuel price 
(USD2010 / GJ)
Min / Median / Max Avg Min / Median / Max Min / Median / Max Min / Median / Max Min / Max
Concentrated Solar Powerxv, xvi 3700 / 5100 / 11000 2 0 / 50 / 66 0 / 0 / 35
Solar PV — rooftopxvii, xviii 2200 / 4400 / 5300 0 17 / 37 / 44 0 / 0 / 0
Solar PV — utilityxvii, xviii 1700 / 3200 / 4300 0 12 / 20 / 30 0 / 0 / 0
Wind onshorexix, xx 1200 / 2100 / 3700 1.5 0 / 0 / 60 0 / 14 / 26
Wind offshorexix, xxi 2900 / 4400 / 6500 3.5 0 / 40 / 130 0 / 16 / 63
Pre-commercial Technologies
CCS — Coal — Oxyfuelxxii 2800 / 4000 / 5600 5 0 / 58 / 140 9.1 / 10 / 12xxiii 2.9 / 5.3
CCS — Coal — PCxxii 1700 / 3300 / 6600 5 0 / 45 / 290 11 / 15 / 28xxiii 2.9 / 5.3
CCS — Coal — IGCC,xxii 1700 / 3700 / 6600 5 0 / 23 / 110 12 / 13 / 23xxiii 2.9 / 5.3
CCS — Gas — Combined 
Cyclexxii
1100 / 2000 / 3800 4 5 / 13 / 73 4.8 / 8.3 / 15xxiii 3.8 / 14
Oceanxxiv, xxv 2900 / 5400 / 12000 2 0 / 78 / 360 0 / 0.16 / 20
Table A.III.1 (continued) | Cost and performance parameters of selected electricity supply technologiesi, ii
Options
































0 USD2010 / tCO2eq direct
5 % WACC,
high FLH,
0 USD2010 / tCO2eq direct
10 % WACC,
low FLH,




USD2010 / tCO2eq direct
Min / Median / Max Min / Max Avg Min / Median / Max Min / Median / Max Min / Median / Max Min / Median / Max
Currently Commercially Available Technologies









30 / 78 / 120 27 / 61 / 95 36 / 120 / 190 97 / 150 / 210
Gas — Combined Cyclev 41 / 55 / 60 3700 / 7400 30 34 / 79 / 150 31 / 71 / 140 43 / 100 / 170 69 / 120 / 200
Biomass — CHPvi 14 / 29 / 36 3500 / 7000 30 85 / 180 / 400 71 / 150 / 330 130 / 310 / 610  -xxvii
Biomass — cofiringvi 38 / 41 / 48 3700 / 7400 40 65 / 89 / 110 49 / 67 / 88 100 / 140 / 170 160 / 200 / 260xxviii
Biomass — dedicatedvi 20 / 31 / 48 3500 / 7000 40 77 / 150 / 320 63 / 130 / 270 120 / 230 / 440 –xxvii
Geothermalix, x 5300 / 7900 30 18 / 89 / 190 12 / 60 / 130 25 / 130 / 260 18 / 89 / 190
Hydropowerxi, xii 1800 / 7900 50 9 / 35 / 150 6 / 22 / 95 40 / 160 / 630 9 / 35 / 150
Nuclearxiii, xiv 33 / 33 / 34 3700 / 7400 60 45 / 99 / 150 32 / 65 / 94 72 / 180 / 260 45 / 99 / 150
Concentrated Solar Powerxv, xvi 2200 / 3500 20 150 / 200 / 310 110 / 150 / 220 220 / 320 / 480 150 / 200 / 310
Solar PV — rooftopxvii, xviii 1100 / 2400 25 110 / 220 / 270 74 / 150 / 180 250 / 490 / 600 110 / 220 / 270
Solar PV — utilityxvii, xviii 1200 / 2400 25 84 / 160 / 210 56 / 110 / 130 170 / 310 / 400 84 / 160 / 210
Wind onshorexx, xx 1800 / 3500 25 51 / 84 / 160 35 / 59 / 120 92 / 160 / 300 51 / 84 / 160
Wind offshorexxi, xx 2600 / 3900 25 110 / 170 / 250 80 / 120 / 180 160 / 240 / 350 110 / 170 / 250
Pre-commercial Technologies
CCS —Coal — Oxyfuelxxii 32 / 35 / 41 3700 / 7400 40 90 / 120 / 170 71 / 100 / 130 140 / 180 / 270 92 / 130 / 180
CCS — Coal — PCxxii 28 / 30 / 43 3700 / 7400 40 69 / 130 / 200 57 / 110 / 150 97 / 210 / 310 78 / 150 / 210
CCS — Coal — IGCCxxii 30 / 32 / 35 3700 / 7400 40 75 / 120 / 200 63 / 100 / 150 100 / 180 / 310 85 / 140 / 210
CCS — Gas — Combined Cyclexxii 37 / 47 / 54 3700 / 7400 30 52 / 100 / 210 45 / 86 / 190 70 / 140 / 270 55 / 110 / 220
Oceanxxiv, xxv 2000 / 5300 20 82 / 150 / 300 60 / 110 / 210 200 / 390 / 780 82 / 150 / 300
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Notes:
i General: Input data are included in normal font type, output data resulting from data conversions are bolded, and intermediate outputs are italicized. Note that many input 
parameters (C, FOM, VOM, and η) are not independent from each other; they come in parameter sets. Parameters that are systematically varied to obtain output values 
include fuel prices, WACC, and full load hours (FLH). Lifetimes and construction times are set to standard values. The range in levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) results from 
calculating two LCOE values per individual parameter set, one at a low and one at a high fuel price, for the number of individual parameter sets available per technology. 
Variation with WACC and with FLHs is shown in separate output columns. This approach is different from the IPCC Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate 
Change Mitigation (SRREN) (IPCC, 2011), where input parameters were considered as independent from each other and the lowest (highest) LCOE value resulted from taking 
all best-case (worst-case) parameter values.
ii General: Comparison of data on capital expenditures with values presented in SRREN (IPCC, 2011) are only possible to limited degrees, since the datasets used in the AR5 
reflect a larger sample of projects (including those with more extreme costs) than in the SRREN.
iii General: Some literature references only report on fixed OM costs (FOM), some only on variable OM costs (VOM), some on both, and some none. The data in the FOM and 
VOM columns show the range found in literature. Hence, note that these FOM and VOM values cannot be combined to derive total OM costs. The range of levelized costs of 
electricity shown in the table is the result of calculations for the individual combinations of parameters found in the literature.
iv Coal PC (Pulverized Coal): Black and Veatch (2012), DEA (2012), IEA/NEA (2010), IEA (2013a), IEA-RETD (2013), Schmidt et al. (2012), US EIA (2013).
v Gas Combined Cycle: Black and Veatch (2012), DEA (2012), IEA/NEA (2010), IEA (2011),IEA (2013a), IEA-RETD (2013), Schmidt et al. (2012), US EIA (2013).
vi Biomass: Black and Veatch (2012), DEA (2012), IPCC-SRREN (2011), IRENA (2012), Augustine et al. (2012), US EIA (2013).
vii Biomass CHP (Combined Heat and Power): Revenues from heat from CHP are assumed to be the natural gas price divided by 90% (this is the assumed reference boiler 
efficiency). It is assumed that one-third of the heat production is marketable, caused by losses and seasonal demand changes. This income is subtracted from the variable 
operation and maintenance costs (proportional to the amount of heat produced per unit of power), where applicable. Only heat production from biomass-CHP is treated in 
this manner.
viii Biomass Co-firing: Capital costs for co-firing as reported in literature (and the summary table) represent an investment to upgrade a dedicated coal power plant to a co-
firing installation. The LCOEs shown in the summary table are those of the total upgraded plant. For the calculation of the LCOEs, the capital costs of the co-firing upgrade 
are added to the median coal PC capital costs. Fuel costs are obtained by weighting coal and biomass costs with their share in the fuel mix (with biomass shares ranging 
between 5% and 20%). To calculate specific emissions, the dedicated biomass emissions and (pulverized) coal emissions were added, taking into account biomass shares 
ranging between 5% and 20%. In the direct emissions coal-related emissions are shown, while the biomass related emissions are shown in column n (Biogenic, geogenic 
CO2 and albedo), indicating indirect emissions. We applied an efficiency of 35% to the coal part of the combustion.
ix Geothermal: This category includes both flash steam and binary cycle power plants. Data on costs show wide ranges, depending on specific conditions. Geothermal (binary 
plant) LCOE averages have increased by 39% since the SRREN (BNEF, and Frankfurt and School-UNEP Centre, 2013). Low-end estimate is from Augustine et al. (2012) for a 
flash plant at higher temperatures; the high-end estimate is from Black and Veatch and based on enhanced geothermal systems, which are not fully commercialized. IRENA 
(2013) reports values down to 1400 USD2011/kW.
x Geothermal: Black and Veatch (2012), IEA (2013a), Augustine et al. (2012), Schmidt et al. (2012), UK CCC (2011), US EIA (2013).
xi Hydropower: This includes both run-of-the-river and reservoir hydropower, over a wide range of capacities. Project data from recent IRENA inventories are incorporated, show-
ing a wider range than reported in SRREN. High-end of capital expenditures refers to Japan, but other sources also report these higher values.
xii Hydropower: Black and Veatch (2012), IEA (2013a), IEA-RETD (2013), IRENA (2012), Schmidt et al. (2012), UK CCC (2011), US EIA (2013).
xiii Nuclear: Limited recent data and/or original data are available in the published literature. More recent, (grey literature) sources provide investment cost and LCOE estimates 
that are considerably higher than the ones shown here (Brandão et al., 2012). Nuclear fuel prices (per GJ input) are based on fuel cycle costs (usually expressed per MWh 
generated), assuming a conversion efficiency of 33%. They include the front-end (Uranium mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication) and back-end 
(spent fuel transport, storage, reprocessing, and disposal) costs of the nuclear fuel cycle (see IEA and NEA, 2010).
xiv Nuclear: IAEA (2012), EPRI (2011), IEA/NEA (2010), Rangel and Lévêque (2012), UK CCC (2011), US EIA (2013).
xv Concentrated Solar Power: This includes both CSP with storage as well as CSP without storage. To prevent an overestimation of the LCOE for CSP with storage, full load hours 
were used that are directly linked to the design of the system (in- or excluding storage). Project data from recent IRENA inventories are incorporated, showing a wider range 
than reported in SRREN. High-end value comes from IRENA (solar tower, 6-15 hours of storage). Low-end comes from IEA and is supported by IRENA data.
xvi Concentrated Solar Power: Black and Veatch (2012), IEA (2013a), IRENA (2012), US EIA (2013).
xvii Solar Photovoltaic: IEA (2013a), IRENA (2013), JRC (2012), LBNL (2013), UK CCC (2011), US EIA (2013).
xviii Solar Photovoltaic: Solar PV module prices have declined substantially since the SRREN (IPCC, 2011), accounting for much of the decline in capital costs shown here relative 
to those used in SRREN. The LCOE of (crystalline silicon) photovoltaic systems fell by 57% since 2009 (BNEF, and Frankfurt and School-UNEP Centre, 2013).
xix Wind: Black and Veatch (2012), DEA (2012), IEA (2013a), IEA-RETD (2013), IRENA (2012), JRC (2012), UK CCC (2011), US DoE (2013), US EIA (2013).
xx Wind onshore: High-end of capital expenditures is taken from IEA-RETD study (Mostajo Veiga et al., 2013) for Japan. The capital costs presented here show a higher upper 
end than in the SRREN, and reflect generally smaller wind projects or projects located in remote or otherwise-costly locations. Data from IRENA for Other Asia and Latin 
America show cost ranges well beyond SRREN. In some regions of the world, wind projects have been increasingly located in lower-quality wind resource sites since the 
publication of the SRREN (due in part to scarcity of developable higher-quality sites). The FLHs on wind projects, however, have not necessarily decreased -- and in many cases 
have increased -- due to a simultaneous trend towards longer rotors and higher hub heights. Wind onshore average LCOE have decreased by 15% (BNEF, and Frankfurt and 
School-UNEP Centre, 2013).
xxi Wind offshore: Offshore wind costs have generally increased since the SRREN, partially explaining the higher upper-end of the cost range shown here. Average LCOE of off-
shore wind have increased by 44% (BNEF, and Frankfurt and School-UNEP Centre, 2013). Higher capital expenditures reported here are in line with market experiences, i.e., a 
tendency to more remote areas, deeper seas, higher construction costs and higher steel prices. 
xxii Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (CCS): Black and Veatch (2012), DEA (2012), Herzog (2011), IPCC-SRCCS (2005), Klara and Plunkett (2010), US EIA (2013), Versteeg 
and Rubin (2011), IEA (2011).
xxiii Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage: Includes transport and storage costs of USD201010/tCO2.
xxiv Ocean: Ocean includes both tidal and wave energy conversion technologies. The high-end of capital expenditures is for wave energy DEA (2012). Since the SRREN, marine 
wave and tidal average LCOE have increased by 36 and 49% respectively (BNEF, and Frankfurt and School-UNEP Centre, 2013).
xxv Ocean: Black and Veatch (2012), DEA (2012), UK CCC (2011).
xxvi General: Some literature references report decommissioning costs under VOM. If decommissioning costs are not given, default assumptions are made (see ‘Definition of 
additional parameters’).
xxvii Biomass: Due to the complexities involved in estimating GHG emissions from biomass, no estimates for LCOE at a positive carbon price are given here.
xxviii Biomass co-firing: Only direct emissions of coal share in fuel consumption are considered to calculate LCOE at a carbon price of 100 USD2010/tCO2eq.
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Table A.III.2 | Emissions of selected electricity supply technologies (gCO2eq / kWh)i
Options
Direct emissions 
Infrastructure & supply 
chain emissions





Min / Median / Max Typical values Min / Median / Max
Currently Commercially Available Technologies
Coal — PC 670 / 760 / 870 9.6 0 47 740 / 820 / 910
Gas — Combined Cycle 350 / 370 / 490 1.6 0 91 410 / 490 / 650
Biomass — cofiring n. a. ii – – – 620 / 740 / 890iii
Biomass — dedicated n. a. ii 210 27 0 130 / 230 / 420iv
Geothermal 0 45 0 0 6.0 / 38 / 79
Hydropower 0 19 0 88 1.0 / 24 / 2200
Nuclear 0 18 0 0 3.7 / 12 / 110
Concentrated Solar Power 0 29 0 0 8.8 / 27 / 63
Solar PV — rooftop 0 42 0 0 26 / 41 / 60
Solar PV — utility 0 66 0 0 18 / 48 / 180
Wind onshore 0 15 0 0 7.0 / 11 / 56
Wind offshore 0 17 0 0 8.0 / 12 / 35
Pre-commercial Technologies
CCS — Coal — Oxyfuel 14 / 76 / 110 17 0 67 100 / 160 / 200
CCS — Coal — PC 95 / 120 / 140 28 0 68 190 / 220 / 250
CCS — Coal — IGCC 100 / 120 / 150 9.9 0 62 170 / 200 / 230
CCS — Gas — Combined Cycle 30 / 57 / 98 8.9 0 110 94 / 170 / 340
Ocean 0 17 0 0 5.6 / 17 / 28
Notes:
i For a comprehensive discussion of methodological issues and underlying literature sources see Annex II, Section A.II.9.3. Note that input data are included in normal font 
type, output data resulting from data conversions are bolded, and intermediate outputs are italicized.
ii Direct emissions from biomass combustion at the power plant are positive and significant, but should be seen in connection with the CO2 absorbed by growing plants. They 
can be derived from the chemical carbon content of biomass and the power plant efficiency. For a comprehensive discussion see Chapter 11, Section 11.13. For co-firing, 
carbon content of coal and relative fuel shares need to be considered.
iii Indirect emissions for co-firing are based on relative fuel shares of biomass from dedicated energy crops and residues (5-20%) and coal (80-95%). 
iv Lifecycle emissions from biomass are for dedicated energy crops and crop residues. Lifecycle emissions of electricity based on other types of biomass are given in Chapter 7, 
Figure 7.6. For a comprehensive discussion see Chapter 11, Section 11.13.4. For a description of methodological issues see Annex II of this report.
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The following tables provide a limited number of examples of trans-
port modes and technologies in terms of their typical potential CO2eq 
emissions per passenger kilometre (p-km) and freight tonne kilometre 
(t-km), now and in the 2030 timeframe. Estimates of mitigation cost 
ranges (USD2010 / tCO2eq avoided) are also provided for the limited set 
of comparisons where data were available. Mitigation cost ranges for 
HDVs, shipping and air travel were taken directly from the literature. 
For sport utility vehicles (SUVs) and light duty vehicles (LDVs), specific 
mitigation costs were re-calculated for well-defined conditions based 
on basic input parameter sets (see equations and data provided below). 
The methodology to calculate specific mitigation costs, also called lev-
elized cost of conserved carbon (LCCC), is discussed in Annex II. Future 
estimates of both emission intensities and specific mitigation costs are 
highly uncertain and depend on a range of assumptions.
The variation in emission intensities reflects variation in vehicle efficien-
cies together with narrow ranges for vehicle occupancy rates, or reflects 
estimates extracted directly from the literature. No cost uncertainty 
analysis was conducted. As mentioned above, mitigation cost ranges for 
HDVs, shipping, and air travel were taken directly from the literature. A 
standardized uncertainty range of + / - 100 USD2010 / tCO2eq was used for 
SUVs and LDVs. Some parameters such as CO2eq emitted from electric-
ity generation systems and well-to-wheel CO2eq emission levels from 
advanced biofuels should be considered as specific examples only. 
This approach was necessary due to a lack of comprehensive studies 
that provide estimates across the full range of vehicle and technology 
types. Therefore, possible inconsistencies in assumptions and results 
mean that the output ranges provided here should be treated with 
caution. The output ranges shown are more indicative than absolute, 
as suggested by the fairly wide bands for most emission intensity and 
mitigation cost results.
The meta-analysis of mitigation cost for alternative road transport 
options was conducted using a 5 % discount rate and an approxi-
mate vehicle equipment life of 15 years. No fuel or vehicle taxes were 
included. Assumptions were based on the literature review provided 
throughout Chapter 8 and the estimates shown in Tables 8.1 and 8.2. 
Changes in assumptions could result in quite different results.
Some of the key assumptions are included in footnotes below the 
tables. Further information is available upon request from authors of 
Chapter 8.
Where emission intensities and LCCC were re-calculated based on 
specific input data, those inputs are summarized in Table 1 below. The 
conversion of input data into emission intensities and LCCC requires 
the steps outlined in the following:
Emissions per useful distance travelled (tCO2 eq/ p-km and 
tCO2 eq/ t-km)
EI =  
VEf f i · FC I i  ___
O C i 
 · β (Equation A.III.7)
Where:
•	 EI is the emission intensity
•	 VEff is the typical vehicle efficiency
•	 FCI is the fuel carbon intensity
•	 OC is the vehicle occupancy
•	 ß is a unit conversion factor
Levelized Cost of Conserved Carbon (USD2010 / tCO2eq )




ΔE = αΔI + ΔF (Equation A.III.9)
α =  r ____ 
1 − (1 + r ) −L 
(Equation A.III.10)
ΔF = (VEf f i · A D i · F C i − VEf f j · A D j · F C j  ) · γ (Equation A.III.11)
ΔC = (VEf f j · FC I j · A D j − VEf f i · FC I i · A D i ) · η (Equation A.III.12)
Where:
•	 ΔE is the annualized travel cost increment
•	 ΔC is the difference in annual CO2eq emissions of alternative i and 
baseline vehicle j, i. e., the amount of CO2eq saved
•	 α is the capital recovery factor (CRF).
•	 ΔI is the difference in purchase cost of baseline and the alternative 
vehicle
•	 ΔF is the difference in annualized fuel expenditures of alternative i 
and baseline vehicle j
•	 r is the weighted average cost of capital (WACC)
•	 L is the vehicle lifetime
•	 VEff is the typical vehicle efficiency as above, but in calculations 
for ΔFC and ΔC average typical vehicle efficiency is used.
•	 AD is the average annual distance travelled
•	 FCi is average unit fuel purchase cost (taxes or subsidies excluded) 
of fuel used in vehicle i
•	 γ and η are unit conversion factors
Remarks:
Variation in output EI derives from variation of vehicle fuel consump-
tion VEff and vehicle occupancy OC.
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A.III.3.2 Data
Table A.III.3 | Passenger transport — currently commercially available technologiesi
Option
VEff FCI OC ΔI L AD
Vehicle fuel 
consumption 
(l / 100km for fossil 















travelled (km / yr) vii
Aviation (commercial, medium to long haul)
2010 Stock Average – 73 g / MJ – – – –
Narrow and Wide Body – 73 g / MJ – baseline – –
Rail (Light Rail Car)
Electric, 600 g CO2eq / kWhel 1.3 – 2.0 600 g / kWh 60 – 80 – – –
Electric, 200 g CO2eq / kWhel 1.3 – 2.0 200 g / kWh 60 – 80 – – –
Road
New Buses, Large Size
Diesel 36 – 42 3.2 kg / l 40 – 50 – – –
Hybrid Diesel 25 – 29 3.2 kg / l 40 – 50 – – –
New Sport Utility Vehicles (SUV), Mid-Size
2010 Stock average SUV 10 – 14 2.8 kg / l 1.5 – 1.7 – 15 15,000
Gasoline 9.6 – 12 2.8 kg / l 1.5 – 1.7 baseline 15 15,000
Hybrid Gasoline (25 % better) 7.2 – 9 2.8 kg / l 1.5 – 1.7 5000 15 15,000
New Light Duty Vehicles (LDV), Mid-Size 
2010 Stock average LDV 8 – 11 2.8 kg / l 1.5 – 1.7 – 15 15,000
Gasoline 7.8 – 9 2.8 kg / l 1.5 – 1.7 baseline 15 15,000
Hybrid Gasoline (28 % better) 5.6 – 6.5 2.8 kg / l 1.5 – 1.7 3000 15 15,000
Diesel 5.9 – 6.7 3.2 kg / l 1.5 – 1.7 2500 15 15,000
CNG 7.8 – 9 2.1 kg / l 1.5 – 1.7 2000 15 15,000
Electric, 600 g CO2eq / kWhel 0.24 – 0.3 600 g / kWh 1.5 – 1.7 16000 15 15,000
Electric, 200 g CO2eq / kWhel 0.24 – 0.3 200 g / kWh 1.5 – 1.7 16000 15 15,000
New 2-Wheelers (Scooter up to 200 cm3 cylinder capacity)
2010 Stock Average 1.5 – 2.5 2.8 kg / l 1.1 – 1.3 – – –
Gasoline 1.1 – 1.9 2.8 kg / l 1.1 – 1.3 – – –
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Table A.III.3 (continued) | Passenger transport — currently commercially available technologies
Option
FC EI ΔE ΔC LCCC5 %
Average annual 
fuel purchase cost 
(USD2010 / l for fossil fuel; 
UScents2010 / kWh)viii
Emissions per useful 
distance travelled 
(gCO2eq / p-km)
Annualized travel cost 
increment (USD2010 / yr)
Annual CO2eq 
savings from vehicle 
switch (tCO2eq / yr)
Levelized cost of 
conserved carbon 
at 5 % WACC
(USD2010 / tCO2eq)
Aviation (commercial, medium to long haul)
2010 Stock Average – 80 – 218ix – – –
Narrow and Wide Body – 66 – 95x – – –200xi
Rail (Light Rail Car)
Electric, 600 g CO2eq / kWhel – 10 – 20 – – –
Electric, 200 g CO2eq / kWhel – 3.3 – 6.7 – – –
Road
New Buses, Large Size
Diesel – 23 – 34 – – –
Hybrid Diesel – 16 – 24 – – –
New Sport Utility Vehicles (SUV), Mid-Size
2010 Stock average SUV 0.81 160 – 260 – – –
Gasoline 0.81 160 – 220 baseline baseline baseline
Hybrid Gasoline (25 % better) 0.81 120 – 170 150 1.1 140  
New Light Duty Vehicles (LDV), Mid-Size 
2010 Stock average LDV 0.81 130 – 200 – – –
Gasoline 0.81 130 – 170 baseline baseline baseline
Hybrid Gasoline (28 % better) 0.81 92 – 120 2.5 1.0 2.6
Diesel 0.81 110 – 150 –15 0.43 –35
CNG 0.35 97 – 130 –390 0.83 –470
Electric, 600 g CO2eq / kWhel 0.12 85 – 120 1000 1.1 950
Electric, 200 g CO2eq / kWhel 0.12 28 – 40 1000 2.7 370
New 2-Wheelers (Scooter up to 200 cm3 cylinder capacity)
2010 Stock Average – 32 – 63 – – –
Gasoline – 24 – 47 – – –
Notes:
i Note that input data are included in normal font type, output data resulting from data conversions are bolded, and intermediate outputs are italicized. 
ii Vehicle fuel economy estimates for road vehicles based on IEA (2012a) and IEA Mobility Model (MoMo) data values, using averages for stock and new vehicles around the 
world to establish ranges. For rail, water, and air these estimates are based on a range of studies, see Chapter 8 Section 8.3. Rail estimates were based on expert judgment.
iii CO2eq fuel intensities are based on IPCC (2006). CO2eq intensities of electricity based on generic low and high carbon power systems. Well-to-wheel estimates from a range 
of sources, and specific examples as indicated in tables.
iv Occupancy rates for trains, buses, SUVs, LDVs, and 2-wheelers based on IEA Mobility Model averages from around the world. Bus and rail represent relatively high intensity 
usage; average loadings in some countries and regions will be lower. 
v Vehicle purchase price increments for LDVs based primarily on NRC (2013) and IEA (2012a). 
vi For LDVs, vehicle lifetime-kilometres set to 156,000 kms based on discounting 15 years and 15,000 km per year. Other vehicle type assumptions depend on literature. No 
normalization was attempted.
vi Annual distance travelled as described above.
vii Fuel prices are point estimates based on current and projected future prices in IEA (2012b). Variation in relative fuel prices can have significant impacts on transport costs 
and LCCC. Though no cost uncertainty analysis was performed, cost ranges were used where available and a standardized USD2010100/tCO2eq uncertainty range was added 
around all final point estimates.
ix Current energy consumption per passenger kilometre is 1.1–3 MJ/p-km (IEA, 2009a).
x Based on TOSCA (2011, Table S-1). Slightly wider range for new/very new to account for range of load factors and distances.
xi Based on IEA and TOSCA analysis. IEA based on 30 years, 10% discount rate.
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Table A.III.4 | Passenger transport — future (2030) expected technologiesi
Option

















travelled (km / yr) vi
Aviation
Narrow Body (20 % better) – – –vii – 15 –
Narrow Body, Open Rotor 
Engine (33 % better)
– – – vii – 15 –
Road
Optimized Sport Utility Vehicles (SUV), Mid-Size
Gasoline (40 % better) 5.8 – 7.2 2.8 kg / l 1.5 – 1.7 3500viii, future 
baseline
15 15,000
Hybrid Gasoline (50 % better) 4.8 – 6ix 2.8 kg / l 1.5 – 1.7 1200 15 15,000
Optimized Light Duty Vehicles (LDV), Mid-Size 
Gasoline (40 % better) 4.7 – 5.4x 2.8 kg / l 1.5 – 1.7 2500viii, future 
baseline
15 15,000
Hybrid Gasoline (50 % better) 3.9 – 4.5xi 2.8 kg / l 1.5 – 1.7 1000 15 15,000
Hybrid Gasoline / Biofuel (50 / 50 share) 
(Assuming 70 % less CO2eq / MJ 
biofuel than / MJ gasoline)
3.9 – 4.5xi 2.8 kg / l 1.5 – 1.7 1000 15 15,000
Diesel Hybrid 3.3 – 3.8xii 3.2 kg / l 1.5 – 1.7 1700 15 15,000
CNG Hybrid 3.9 – 4.5 xi 2.1 kg / l 1.5 – 1.7 1200 15 15,000
Electric, 200 g CO2eq / kWhel 0.19 – 0.26xiii 200 g / kWh 1.5 – 1.7 3600 15 15,000
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Table A.III.4 (continued) | Passenger transport — future (2030) expected technologiesi
Option
FC EI ΔE ΔC LCCC5 %
Average annual 
fuel purchase cost 
(USD2010 / l for fossil 
fuel; UScents2010 / kWh)xiv
Emissions per useful 
distance travelled 
(gCO2eq / p-km)
Annualized travel cost 
increment (USD2010 / yr)
Annual CO2eq 
savings from vehicle 
switch (tCO2eq / yr)
Levelized cost of 
conserved carbon 
at 5 % WACC
(USD2010 / tCO2eq)
Aviation
Narrow Body (20 % better) – – – – 0 – 150
Narrow Body, Open Rotor Engine (33 % better) – 44 – 63xv – – 0 – 350
Road
Optimized Sport Utility Vehicles (SUV), Mid-Size
Gasoline (40 % better) 0.93 94 – 130 –190xvi 1.8xvi –110xvi
Hybrid Gasoline (50 % better) 0.93 78 – 110 –440 2.2 –200
Optimized Light Duty Vehicles (LDV), Mid-Size 
Gasoline (40 % better) 0.93 76 – 100 –230xvii 1.4xvii –160xvii
Hybrid Gasoline (50 % better) 0.93 64 – 83 –21 0.35 – 61
Hybrid Gasoline / Biofuel (50 / 50 share) 
(Assuming 70 % less CO2eq / MJ 
biofuel than / MJ gasoline)
0.93 41 – 54 38 1.0 39
Diesel Hybrid 0.93 63 – 83 –15 0.36 –43
CNG Hybrid 0.44 48 – 63 –310 0.77 –410
Electric, 200 g CO2eq / kWhel 0.13 23 – 35 86 1.4 61
Notes:
i Only those options, where data were available and where significant advances are expected are listed. Other transport options, such as trains, buses and 2-wheelers will 
remain relevant means of transport in the future but are not covered due to data limitations. Note that input data are included in normal font type, output data resulting from 
data conversions are bolded, and intermediate outputs are italicized.
ii CO2eq fuel intensities are based on IPCC (2006). CO2eq intensities of electricity are based on generic low and high carbon power systems. Well-to-wheel estimates from a 
range of sources, and specific examples as indicated in tables.
iii Occupancy rates for trains, buses, SUVs, LDVs, 2-wheelers based on IEA Mobility Model averages from around the world. Bus and rail represent relatively high intensity usage; 
average loadings in some countries and regions will be lower.
iv Future vehicle purchase price mark ups based primarily on NRC (2013) and NRC (2010), also IEA (2009a), TIAX (2011), TOSCA (2011), Horton G. (2010) and other sources.
v For LDVs, vehicle lifetime-kilometres set to 156,000 km based on discounting 15 years and 15,000 km per year. Other vehicle type assumptions depend on literature. No 
normalization was attempted.
vi Annual distance travelled as described above.
vii Horton G. (2010) gives ranges from 100 to 150 for Boeing 737-800 and 350 to 500 for Airbus A380.
viii Relative to 2010 baseline.
ix Based on NRC (2013) and other studies, see Section 8.3.
x Based on NRC (2013) and other studies, see Section 8.3.
xi Fuel consumption of future hybrid gasoline, hybrid gasoline/biofuel, and hybrid CNG based on NRC (2013) and other studies, see Section 8.3.
xii Fuel consumption of future diesel based on NRC (2013) and other studies, see Section 8.3.
xiii Fuel consumption of future electric based on NRC (2013) and other studies, see Section 8.3.
xiv Future fuel prices based on IEA (2012b). These are point estimates — variation in relative fuel prices can have significant impacts on transport costs and LCCC.
xv Value results from assumption of 33% improvement relative to current new narrow and medium body aircrafts based on TOSCA (2011) and Horton G. (2010).
xvi Relative to 2010 gasoline SUV at 2010 fuel price of 0.81 USD2010/l.
xvii Relative to 2010 gasoline LDV at 2010 fuel price of 0.81 USD2010/l.
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Table A.III.5 | Freight transport — currently commercially available technologiesi
Option















travelled (km / yr) 
Aviation (commercial, long haul)iii
2010 Stock Average – – – – – –
Dedicated Aircraft – – – – – –
Belly-hold – – – – – –
Rail (freight train) iv
Diesel, light goods – – – – – –
Diesel, heavy goods – – – – – –
Electric, 200g CO2eq / kWhel – – – – – –
Maritimev
Current Average International Shipping – – – – – –
New Large International 
Container Vesselvi
– – – – – –
Large Bulk Carrier / Tankervii – – – – – –
LNG Bulk Carrierviii – – – – – –
Roadix
New Medium Duty Trucks
2010 Stock Average 16 – 24 3.2 kg / l 1.6 – 1.9 – – –
Diesel 14 – 18 3.2 kg / l 1.6 – 1.9 – – –
Diesel Hybrid 11 – 14 3.2 kg / l 1.6 – 1.9 – – –
CNG 18 – 23 2.1 kg / l 1.6 – 1.9 – – –
New Heavy Duty, Long-Haul Trucks
2010 Stock Average 28 – 44 3.2 kg / l 8 – 12 – – –
Diesel 25 – 32 3.2 kg / l 8 – 12 – – –
CNG 31 – 40 2.1 kg / l 8 – 12 – – –
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Table A.III.5 (continued) | Freight transport — currently commercially available technologies i
Option
FC EI ΔE ΔC LCCC5 %
Average annual 
fuel purchase cost 
(USD2010 / l for fossil 
fuel; UScents2010 / kWh)
Emissions per useful 
distance travelled 
(gCO2eq / t-km)
Annualized travel cost 
increment (USD2010 / yr)
Annual CO2eq 
savings from vehicle 
switch (tCO2eq / yr)
Levelized cost of 
conserved carbon 
at 5 % WACC
(USD2010 / tCO2eq)
Aviation (commercial, long haul) iii
2010 Stock Average – 550 – 740 – – –
Dedicated Aircraft – 500 – 820 – – –200x
Belly-hold – 520 – 700xi – – –
Rail (freight train) iv
Diesel, light goods – 26 – 33 – – –
Diesel, heavy goods – 18 – 25 – – –
Electric, 200g CO2eq / kWhel – 6 – 12 – – –
Maritimev
Current Average International Shipping – 10 – 40 – – –
New Large International Container Vesselvi – 10 – 20 – – –
Large Bulk Carrier / Tankervii – 3 – 6 – – –
LNG Bulk Carrierviii – 9 – 13 – – –
Roadix
New Medium Duty Trucks
2010 Stock Average – 270 – 490 – – –
Diesel – 240 – 370 – – –
Diesel Hybrid – 180 – 270 – – –
CNG – 200 – 300 – – –
New Heavy Duty, Long-Haul Trucks
2010 Stock Average – 76 – 180 – – –
Diesel – 70 – 130 – – –
CNG – 60 – 110 – – –
Notes:
i Note that input data are included in normal font type, output data resulting from data conversions are bolded, and intermediate outputs are italicized.
ii CO2eq fuel intensities are based on IPCC (2006). CO2eq intensities of electricity based on generic low and high carbon power systems. Well-to-wheel estimates from a range 
of sources, and specific examples as indicated in tables. 
iii These baseline carbon intensity values for long haul air freight are based on mean estimates from DEFRA (2013). They relate to Boeing 747 and 757 air freight with an aver-
age carrying capacity of 84 tonnes and load factor of 69%. High and low estimates set at 15% above and below the means to reflect differences in the energy efficiency of 
different aircraft types operating with differing load factors. 
iv The carbon intensity values for rail freight are based mainly on analyses by DEFRA (2013) and EcoTransit (2011). Expert judgment has been exercised to allow for interna-
tional differences in the age, capacity, and efficiency of railway rolling stock and railway operating practices.
v Estimates are derived mainly from DEFRA (2012). This source presents mean carbon intensity values for particular types and size ranges of vessels. The ranges around these 
means allow for differences in actual vessel size, loading, and energy efficiency on the basis of expert judgment.
vi Carrying more than 8000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU).
vii 100-200,000 dead weight tonnes.
viii 100-200,000 cubic metres.
ix Truck CO2eq/t-km ranges estimated from NRC (2010) and IEA Mobility Model data for averages for truck load factors around the world; vehicle efficiency estimates primarily 
from NRC (2010), IEA (2009a) and TIAX (2011). Baseline estimates derived from DEFRA (2013), EcoTransit (2011) and IEA (2009a). High and low estimates allow for varia-
tions in vehicle size, weight, age, operation and loading in different parts of the world.
x Aviation freight cost estimates assumptions similar to passenger. Based on IEA and TOSCA analysis, IEA based on 30 years, 10% discount rate.
xi The allocation of emissions between passenger and freight traffic on belly-hold services conforms to a standard ‘freight weighting’ method. 
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The data presented below has been used to assess typical product-
specific CO2eq emissions (i. e., emission per unit of product)3 for dif-
ferent production practices, which are commercially available today or 
may become so in the future, and for selected industrial sectors. Both 
direct and indirect specific emissions are assessed. Specific emissions 
could be reduced by switching to production processes that cause 
lower emissions for otherwise comparable products4 and by reducing 
production / consumption of emission-intensive products. Some produc-
tion practices are mutually exclusive; others can be combined to yield 
deeper reductions in specific emissions. The impact of decarbonizing 
electricity supplied for industrial processes has been assessed, too, for 
well-defined exemplary conditions.
For all input parameters and specific CO2eq emissions global average 
values are given as a benchmark. Parameters of individual production 
practices are generally estimates of typical values based on limited 
studies and expert judgment. Comparisons of input parameters across 
different individual production practices and with global averages 
(see Tables A.III.8 – A.III.12 below) yields insights into the intermediate 
effect via which changes in final specific CO2eq emissions occur for 
certain production practices.
Estimates of future global averages in specific CO2eq emissions are 
derived for long-term scenarios that stabilized GHG concentrations at 
about 450 ppm CO2eq and provide data at the necessary level of detail. 
These can be considered as another rough benchmark for emission 
intensities that can be achieved with currently available and potential 
future production practices. Generally, scenarios that provide sufficient 
detail at the level of industrial subsectors / products are very scarce (2 – 3 
models) and are in many cases derived from the same data source as 
data for individual production practices (mostly International Energy 
Agency)5. Comparisons of emission intensities in future 450 ppm stabi-
lization scenarios with available production practices can yield rough 
3 Emissions cannot always be expressed in product-specific terms. In the case of 
chemicals, products are too heterogeneous to express emissions per unit of prod-
uct. Hence, global emissions of different production practices / technologies have 
been assessed for total global chemicals production.
4 Note that the extent to which certain production processes can be replaced by 
others is often constrained by various conditions that need to be considered on a 
case by case basis. The replacement of blast oxygen steel furnaces by electric arc 
furnaces, for instance, is limited by availability of scrap.
5 Further literature sources are assessed in Chapter 10 (Section 10.7). The data 
sources assessed in 10.7 could, however, often not be used in the summary 
assessment mainly due to non-comparability of methodological approaches. Chap-
ter 6 presents more comprehensive scenario assessments including all sectors 
of the economy, which often comes, however, at the expense of sectoral detail. 
Chapter 10 (Section 10.10) discusses these scenarios from an industry perspective.
insights into future trends for production practices with different spe-
cific emissions, but need to be considered with caution.
Specific mitigation costs have been assessed for all production prac-
tices except for the decarbonization of electricity supply, the costs of 
which are dealt with in Chapter 7 (Section 7.8). Specific mitigation 
costs are expressed in USD2010 / tCO2 or USD2010 / tCO2eq and take into 
account total incremental operational and capital costs. Generally, 
costs of the abatement options shown vary widely between individual 
regions and from plant to plant. Factors influencing the costs include 
typical capital stock turnover rates (some measures can only be 
applied when plants are replaced), relative energy costs, etc. No meta-
analysis of such individual cost components has been attempted, how-
ever, due to limited data availability. Estimates are based on expert 
judgment of the limited data that is available. Hence, the estimates of 
specific mitigation costs should be considered with care and as indica-
tive only.
Information on specific emissions of different production practices and 
associated specific mitigation cost is presented in Figures 10.7 – 10.10 
and in Figures 10.19 and 10.20.
A.III.4.2 Approaches and data by industry 
sector
A.III.4.2.1 Cement
Direct specific emissions of cement (tCO2 / t cement) are derived from 
technical parameters via the following equation:
E I direct = (1 − λ) · clc · ( e n−el · FC I n−el + C I calc ) (Equation A.III.13)
Where
•	 λ is the percentage of emissions captured and stored via CCS
•	 clc is the clinker to cement ratio
•	 en-el is the specific non-electric energy use, i. e., the non-electric 
energy use per unit of clinker
•	 FCIn-el is the carbon intensity of the non-electric fuel used
•	 CIcalc is the carbon intensity of the calcination process
Indirect specific emissions of cement (tCO2 / t cement) are derived from 
specific electricity use and the carbon intensity of electricity:
E I indirect =  e el · FC I el (Equation A.III.14)
Where
•	 eel is the specific electric energy use, i. e., the electricity use per unit 
of cement
•	 FCIel is the carbon intensity of the electricity used
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Total specific emissions of cement (tCO2 / t cement) are the sum of both 
direct and indirect specific emissions:
E I total = E I direct + E I indirect (Equation A.III.15)
Remarks:
Variation in emission intensity derives from variation in selected input 
parameters. Individual input parameters are varied systematically, i. e., 
in accordance with the definition of each production practice, while all 
other input parameters are kept at global average values.
Data on technical input parameters is also very limited. Sources are 
specified in footnotes to data entries.
Specific mitigation costs (cost of conserved carbon) are estimated 
based on expert assessment of limited selected studies. See footnote 
ii for details.
Table A.III.7 | Technical parameters and estimates for cost of conserved carbon of cement production processesi
Options

































































































































































































































Historical Global Average Data and Future Data for 450 ppm Scenarios from Integrated Models
Global average (2030) iii – – – – – – – – – 0.38 – 0.59
Global average (2050) iii – – – – – – – – – 0.24 – 0.39
Global average (2010) 0.8 3.9 0.1 0.51 109 0.46iv 0 0.72 0.05 0.77
Currently Commercially Available Technologies
Best practice energy intensity 0.8 2.9 – 3.1v 0.1 0.51 80 – 90vi 0.46iv 0 0.64 – 0.66 0.037 – 0.041 0.68 – 0.70 < 0 – 150
Best practice clinker to cement ratio 0.6 – 0.7vii 3.9 0.1 0.51 109 0.46iv 0 0.54 – 0.63 0.05 0.59 – 0.68 < 0 – 50viii
Best practice energy intensity and 
clinker to cement ratio combined
0.6 – 0.7vii 2.9 – 3.1v 0.1 0.51 80 – 90vi 0.46iv 0 0.48 – 0.57 0.037 – 0.041 0.52 – 0.62 < 0 – 150viii
Improvements in non-electric fuel mixix 0.8 3.9 0.056x 0.51 109 0.46iv 0 0.58 0.05 0.63 < 0 – 150viii
Decarbonization of electricity supply 0.8 3.9 0.1 0.51 109 0 – 0.39xi 0 0.72 0 – 0.043 0,72 – 0.76
Pre-commercial Technologies
CCSxii 0.8 3.9 0.1 0.51 109 0.46iv 75 – 90 0.072 – 0.18 0.05 0.12 – 0.23 50 – 150xiii
CCS and fully decarbonized electricityxiv 0.8 3.9 0.1 0.51 109 0 75 – 90 0.072 – 0.18 0 0.072 – 0.18
Notes:
i Note that input data are included in normal font type, output data resulting from data conversions are bolded, and intermediate outputs are italicized.
ii Expert judgment based on McKinsey (2009), 2012, IEA (2009b, 2012a), BEE (2012), and others. The costs of the abatement options shown vary widely between individual 
regions and from plant to plant. Factors influencing the costs include typical capital stock turnover rates (some measures can only be applied when plants are replaced), rela-
tive energy costs, etc.
iii Data range is taken from the following models: AIM Enduse model (Akashi et al., 2013), IEA 2DS low demand (IEA, 2012a).
iv Based on global industry-wide average CO2eq intensity of primary energy used in electricity and heat supply in 2010 (see Chapter 10. Table 10.2)
v This range is based on best practice operation of 4 to 6 stage pre-heater and pre-calciner kiln technology based on IEA (2009b). Actual operation performance does depend 
on issues such as moisture content and raw material quality and can be above this range.
vi Best practice electricity consumption is based on IEA (2007).
vii Minimum clinker to cement ratio is for Portland cement according to IEA (2007), which is a globally achievable value taking availability of substitutes into account IEA 
(2009b). Further reductions in the clinker to cement ratio are possible for other types of cement (e. g., fly ash or blast furnace slag cement).
viii For clinker substitution and fuel mix changes, costs depend on the regional availability and price of clinker substitutes and alternative fuels.
ix This is assuming that only natural gas is used as non-electric fuel. Further reductions in non-electric fuel emission intensity are technically possible, e. g., by increased use of biomass.
x Natural gas fuel emission factor (IPCC, 2006).
xi The upper end of the range is based on natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) with an efficiency of 55 % and fuel emission factors from IPCC (2006).
xii CCS: Carbon dioxide capture and storage. This option assumes no improvements in fuel mix. Feasibility of CCS depends on global CCS developments. CCS is currently not yet 
applied in the cement sector.
xiii IEA GHG (2008) estimates CCS abatement cost at 63 to 170 USD / tCO2 avoided.
xiv This option assumes no improvements in non-electric fuel mix.
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A.III.4.2.2 Iron and steel
Direct specific CO2 emissions of crude steel (tCO2 / t steel) are derived 
from technical parameters via the following equation:
E I direct = (1 − λ) · E I direct,noCCS (Equation A.III.16)
Where
•	 λ is the percentage of emissions captured and stored via CCS
•	 EIdirect,noCCS is the direct emission intensity without CCS
Indirect specific CO2 emissions of crude steel (tCO2 / t steel) are derived 
from specific electricity use and the carbon intensity of electricity:
E I indirect =  e el · FC I el (Equation A.III.17)
Where
•	 eel is the specific electric energy use, i. e., the electricity use per unit 
of crude steel
•	 FCIel is the carbon intensity of the electricity used
Total specific CO2 emissions of crude steel (tCO2 / t steel) are the sum of 
both direct and indirect specific emissions:
E I total = E I direct + E I indirect (Equation A.III.18)
Remarks:
Data on technical input parameters is limited and almost exclusively 
based on IEA (2007). Emission intensities of the advanced blast fur-
nace route, the natural gas DRI route, and the scrap-based electric 
arc furnace route are point estimates of global best practice based on 
IEA (2007). Since no variation in input parameters could be derived 
from the literature, output ranges have been constructed as an interval 
around the mean value based on + / -10 % of the respective savings. 
Where input parameters are set by assumption, they are varied within 
typical ranges and become the sole source of variation in output val-
ues, while all other input parameters are kept at global average values. 
Specific mitigation costs (cost of conserved carbon) are estimated 
based on expert assessment of limited selected studies. See footnote 
vi for details.
A.III.4.2.3 Chemicals
Global direct CO2 emissions (GtCO2) of global chemicals production in 
2010 are derived from technical parameters via the following equation:
CO 2 direct = (1 − λ) · CO 2 direct,noCCS (Equation A.III.19)
Where
•	 λ is the percentage of emissions captured and stored via CCS
•	 CO2direct,noCCS are global direct CO2 emissions in chemicals produc-
tion in 2010 without CCS
Global indirect CO2 emissions (GtCO2) of global chemicals production 
in 2010 are derived from global electricity use in chemicals production 
and the carbon intensity of electricity:
CO 2 indirect = Elec · FC I el · γ (Equation A.III.20)
Where
•	 Elec is the global electric energy use in the chemicals sector in 2010
•	 FCIel is the carbon intensity of the electricity used
•	 γ is a unit conversion factor of 1 / 1000
Total global CO2eq emissions (GtCO2eq) of chemicals production in 
2010 are the sum of direct and indirect CO2 emissions and CO2-equiva-
lents of non-CO2 emissions:
CO2 e total = CO 2 direct + CO 2 indirect + CO2 e acid + CO2 e HFC−22 
 (Equation A.III.21)
Where
•	 CO2eacid are global direct N2O emissions from global nitric and 
adipic acid production expressed in CO2 equivalents
•	 CO2eHFC-22 are global direct HFC-23 emissions from HFC-22 pro-
duction expressed in CO2 equivalents
Remarks:
For most production practices, only central estimates for technical 
input parameters could be derived from the available literature. Where 
input parameters are set by assumption, they are varied within typi-
cal ranges and become a source of variation in output values. Where 
no variation in input parameters could be derived from the literature, 
output ranges have been constructed as an interval around the mean 
value based on + / -10 % of the respective savings.
Specific mitigation costs (cost of conserved carbon) are estimated 
based on expert assessment of limited selected studies. See footnote 
iv for details.
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Table A.III.8 | Technical parameters and estimat+es for cost of conserved carbon of iron and steel production processesi
Optionsii


















































































































































































Historical Global Average Data and Future Data for 450 ppm Scenarios from Integrated Models
Global average (2030)vii – – – – – – 0.92 – 1.36
Global average (2050) vii – – – – – – 0.47 – 0.84
Global average (2010) 1.8viii 820ix 0.46x 0 1.8 0.38 2.2
Currently Commercially Available Technologies
Advanced blast furnace routexi 1.3xii 350xiii 0.46x 0 1.3 0.16 1.5 < 0 – 150
Natural gas DRI routexiv, xi 0.7xii 590xiii 0.46x 0 0.7 0.27 0.97 50 – 150
Scrap based EAFxv, xi 0.25xii 350xiii 0.46x 0 0.25 0.16 0.41 < 0 – 50xvi
Decarbonization of electricity supply 1.8viii 820ix 0 – 0.39xvii 0 1.8 0 – 0.32 1.8 – 2.1
Pre-commercial Technologies
CCSxviii 1.8viii 820ix 0.46x 75 – 90 0.18 – 0.45 0.38 0.56 – 0.82 50 – 150
CCS and fully decarbonized electricityxix 1.8viii – 0 75 – 90 0.18 – 0.45 0 0.18 – 0.45
Note:
i Note that input data are included in normal font type, output data resulting from data conversions are bolded, and intermediate outputs are italicized.
ii Non-electric fuel mix improvements are not listed as an abatement option because a large share of the coal use in the iron and steel industry, via the intermediate production 
of coke, is an inherent feature of the blast furnace technology. The coke is used to reduce iron ore to iron and for structural reasons in the furnace. The limited data availability 
did not allow assessing the limited potential related to the part of the fuel use that can be substituted.
iii Direct CO2 emissions contain all emissions from steel production that are unrelated to electricity consumption.
iv As percentage of specific direct CO2 emissions in steel production.
v Direct CO2 emissions contain all emissions from steel production that are unrelated to electricity consumption.
vi Expert judgment based on McKinsey (2009; 2010), IEA (2009b, 2012a), BEE (2012) and others. The costs of the abatement options shown vary widely between individual 
regions and from plant to plant. Factors influencing the costs include typical capital stock turnover rates (some measures can only be applied when plants are replaced), rela-
tive energy costs, etc.
vii Data range is provided by AIM Enduse model (Akashi et al., 2013) DNE21+ (Sano et al., 2013a; b) and IEA 2DS low demand (IEA, 2012a).
viii IEA (2012a).
ix Derived from IEA (2012a, 2013b).
x Based on global industry-wide average CO2eq intensity of primary energy used in electricity and heat supply in 2010 (see Chapter 10, Table 10.2). This is a simplified calcula-
tion in line with the method used for other sectors ignoring the practice in many iron and steel plants to use process derived gases (blast furnace gas and basic oxygen 
furnace gas) for electricity production. The emissions from these derived gases are already included in the direct emissions.
xii Excluding rolling and finishing.
xii Value equals lower bound of total emission intensity in IEA (2007, p. 108, table 5.4) as that is for zero-carbon electricity.
xiii Derived from spread in total emission intensity in IEA (2007, p. 108, table 5.4) and using a typical coal emission factor of 0.85.
xiv DRI: Direct reduced iron.
xv EAF: Electric arc furnace.
xvi Costs depend heavily on the regional availability and price of scrap.
xvii The upper end of the range is based on natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) with an efficiency of 55 % and fuel emission factors from IPCC (2006). The approach taken here 
is a simplified calculation, consistent with the approach for other sectors and does not explicitly take into account the share of the electricity consumed that is produced with 
process derived gases (see also footnote ix).
xviii CCS: Carbon dioxide capture and storage. This option assumes no improvements in fuel mix.
xix This option assumes no improvements in non-electric fuel mix.
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Table A.III.9 | Technical parameters and estimates for cost of conserved carbon of chemicals production processes i
Options
























































































































































































































Historical Data and Future Data from IEA ETP 2DS Scenario
Global total (2030)v – – – 1400 – – 1.5 – 1.6 – –
Global total (2050)v – – – 1400 – – 1.3 – –
Global total (2010) 1.6vi 0.13 0.12 1100vii 0.46viii 0 1.6 0.51 2.4
Currently Commercially Available Technologies
Best practice energy intensity 1.0ix 0.13 0.12 860x 0.46viii 0 1.0 0.39 1.7 < 0 – 150
Enhanced recycling, cogeneration 
and process intensification 
1.3xi 0.13 0.12 1100vii 0.46viii 0 1.3 0.51 2.1 20 – 150
Abatement of N2O from 
nitric and adipic acid
1.6vi 0.13 0.01xii 1100vii 0.46viii 0 1.6 0.51 2.3 0 – 50
Abatement of HFC-23 emissions 
from HFC-22 production
1.6vi 0xiii 0.12 1100vii 0.46viii 0 1.6 0.51 2.2 0 – 20
Improvements in non-electric fuel mixxiv 1.2xv 0.13 0.12 1100vii 0.46viii 0 1.2 0.51 2.0 < 0 – 150
Decarbonization of electricity supply 1.6vi 0.13 0.12 1100vii 0 – 0.39xvi 0 1.6 0 – 0.44 1.8 – 2.3
Pre-commercial Technologies 
CCS for ammonia productionxvii 1.6vi 0.13 0.12 1100vii 0.46viii 3.5xviii 1.5 0.51 2,3 50 – 150
CCSxix 1.6vi 0.13 0.12 1100vii 0.46viii 75 – 90 0.16 – 0.4 0.51 0.92 – 1.16 50 – 150
CCS and fully decarbonized electricityxx 1.6vi 0.13 0.12 1100vii 0 75 – 90 0.16 – 0.4 0 0.41 – 0.65
Notes:
i Note that input data are included in normal font type, output data resulting from data conversions are bolded, and intermediate outputs are italicized.
ii Based on EPA (2013) unless specified otherwise.
iii As percentage of global direct CO2 emissions in chemicals production.
iv Expert judgment based on McKinsey (2009; 2010), IEA (2009c, 2012a), BEE (2012), and others. The costs of the abatement options shown vary widely between individual 
regions and from plant to plant. Factors influencing the costs include typical capital stock turnover rates (some measures can only be applied when plants are replaced), rela-
tive energy costs, etc.
v Based on IEA ETP 2DS scenarios with high and low global energy demand (IEA, 2012a).
vi Based on IEA (2012a).
vii Based on IEA (IEA, 2013b). IEA (2012a) provided higher values of 1340 TWh.
viii Based on global industry-wide average CO2eq intensity of primary energy used in electricity and heat supply in 2010 (see Chapter 10. Table 10.2).
ix Based on global potential for savings of 35 % in direct emissions in chemicals production as estimated for 2006 (IEA, 2009c) applied to direct emissions in 2010.
x Based on potential for electricity savings of 0.91 EJ (IEA, 2012a).
xi Based on global technical potential for saving in primary energy consumption of 4.74 EJ (IEA, 2012a) and assuming that conserved primary energy supply is based on natural 
gas with an emission factor of 56.2 kg CO2eq / GJ (2006). This translates into savings in global direct CO2 emissions of 0.27 GtCO2eq.
xii Based on a global technical potential to save 85 % of non-CO2 emissions from HFC-22 production (EPA, 2013).
xiii Based on a global technical potential to save 100 % of non-CO2 emissions from production of adipic and nitric acid (Miller and Kuijpers, 2011)
xiv This is assuming that only natural gas is used as non-electric fuel. Further reductions in non-electric fuel emission intensity are technically possible, e. g., by increased use of 
biomass.
xv Based on the assumption that 23 % of direct CO2 emissions can be saved from a switch to natural gas (IEA, 2009c).
xvi The upper end of the range is based on natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) with an efficiency of 55 % and fuel emission factors from IPCC (2006).
xvii Ammonia production was 159 Mt in 2010 (IEA, 2012a). According to Neelis et al. (2005), a best practice gas-based ammonia facility produces 1.6 tCO2 / t ammonia, of which 
70 % are pure CO2 emissions (1.1 t CO2 / t ammonia). 50 % of that pure CO2 stream is assumed to be used in urea production (0.55 t CO2 / t ammonia). 90 % of the remaining 
0.55 tCO2 / t ammonia is assumed to be captured. This results in an effective CO2 capture rate of 3.5 % of total emissions in chemicals by application of CCS in ammonia 
production.
xviii This is the effective rate of CO2 emissions captured in ammonia production relative to global direct CO2 emissions in chemicals. See also endnote xvii.
xix This option assumes no improvements in fuel mix.
xx This option assumes no improvements in non-electric fuel mix.
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A.III.4.2.4 Pulp and paper
Specific direct CO2 emissions of paper (tCO2 / t paper) are derived from 
technical parameters via the following equation:
E I direct = (1 − λ) · E I direct,noCCS (Equation A.III.22)
Where
•	 λ is the percentage of emissions captured and stored via CCS
•	 EIdirect,noCCS is the direct emission intensity without CCS
Indirect specific CO2 emissions of paper (tCO2 / t paper) are derived from 
specific electricity use and the carbon intensity of electricity:
E I indirect =  e el · FC I el (Equation A.III.23)
Where
•	 eel is the specific electric energy use, i. e., the electricity use per 
tonne of paper
•	 FCIel is the carbon intensity of the electricity used
Total specific CO2 emissions of paper (tCO2 / t paper) are the sum of 
both direct and indirect specific emissions:
E I total = E I direct + E I indirect (Equation A.III.24)
Remarks:
For most production practices, only central estimates for technical 
input parameters could be derived from the available literature. Where 
input parameters are set by assumption, they are varied within typi-
cal ranges and become a source of variation in output values. Where 
no variation in input parameters could be derived from the literature, 
output ranges have been constructed as an interval around the mean 
value based on + / -10 % of the respective savings.
Specific mitigation costs (cost of conserved carbon) are estimated 
based on expert assessment of limited selected studies. See footnote 
v for details.
A.III.4.2.5 Municipal Solid Waste (MSW)
For waste treatment practices that reduce landfill, specific methane 
emission (gCH4 / kg MSW) and specific nitrous oxide emissions (gN2O / kg 
MSW) are taken directly from the literature. Methane emission intensi-
ties (gCH4 / kg MSW) of conventional and improved landfill options are 
derived from technical parameters given below. CO2eq emission inten-
sities (tCO2eq / t MSW) are calculated using global warming potentials 
(GWP) of methane and nitrous oxide of 21 and 310, respectively.
E I CH4 = MCF · DOC · DOCf · F · (1 − OX) · (1 − R) · γ · η​
 (Equation A.III.25)
Where
•	 MCF is the methane correction factor, Min(MCF) = 0.6, 
Max(MCF) = 1
•	 DOC is degradable organic carbon (gC / kg MSW)
•	 DOCf is the fraction of DOC dissimilated, DOCf = 0.5
•	 F is the fraction of methane in landfill gas, F = 0.5
•	 OX is oxidation factor (fraction)
•	 R is the fraction of recovered methane 
•	 γ is the unit conversion factor of C into CH4, γ = 16 / 12
•	 η is a unit conversion factor of 1 / 1000
Values given above are based on Frøiland Jensen and Pipatti (2001) 
and Pipatti et al. (2006) default values.
Variation in specific emissions is from maximum to minimum assuming 
all input parameters are independently distributed.
Cost are taken from EPA (2013) and based on a 10 % WACC.
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Table A.III.10 | Technical parameters and estimates for cost of conserved carbon of pulp and paper production processesi
Options







































































































































































Historical Data and Future Data from IEA ETP 2DS Scenario
Global average (2030) vi – 990 – 1100vii – – 0.26 – 0.30vii – –
Global average (2050) vi – 920 – 950vii – – 0.16 – 0.20vii – –
Global average (2010) 0.56viii 1,200ix 0.46x 0 0.56 0.55 1,1
Currently Commercially Available Technologies
Best practice energy intensity 0.48xi 1,000xii 0.46x 0 0.48 0.46 0.94 < 0 – 150
Co-generation 0.53xiii 1,200ix 0.46x 0 0.53 0.55 1.1 20 – 50
Decarbonization of electricity supply 0.56viii 1,200ix 0 – 0.39xiv 0 0.56 0 – 0.47 0.56 – 1,0
Pre-commercial Technologies
CCSxv 0.56viii 1,200ix 0.46x 75 – 90 0.056 – 0.14 0.55 0.61 – 0.69 50 – 150
CCS and fully decarbonized electricityxvi 0.56viii 1,200ix 0 – 0.39 75 – 90 0.056 – 0.14 0 – 0.47 0.056 – 0.14
Notes:
i Note that input data are included in normal font type, output data resulting from data conversions are bolded, and intermediate outputs are italicized.
ii Direct CO2 emissions w / o CCS contain all emissions from paper production that are unrelated to electricity consumption, including those that could be captured and stored.
iii As percentage of specific direct CO2 emissions in steel production.
iv Direct CO2 emissions w / CCS contain all non-captured emissions from paper production that are unrelated to electricity consumption.
v Expert judgment based on McKinsey (2009; 2010), IEA (2009b, 2012a), BEE (2012), and others. The costs of the abatement options shown vary widely between individual 
regions and from plant to plant. Factors influencing the costs include typical capital stock turnover rates (some measures can only be applied when plants are replaced), rela-
tive energy costs, etc.
vi Based on IEA ETP 2DS scenarios with high and low global energy demand (IEA, 2012a).
vii Derived from IEA (2012a).
viii Based on global direct emissions of 0.22 GtCO2 and global paper production of 395 Mt (IEA, 2012a).
ix Based on global electricity consumption in pulp and paper production of 1.7 EJ (IEA, 2013b) and global paper production of 395 Mt (IEA, 2012a).
x Based on global industry-wide average CO2eq intensity of primary energy used in electricity and heat supply in 2010 (see Chapter 10. Table 10.2).
xi Based on technical potential for savings in non-electric fuel input of 1.5 GJ / t paper (IEA, 2012a) and assuming no change in the non-electric fuel emission factor of 51 kg 
CO2 / GJ (derived from IEA, 2012a). This translates into savings in specific direct CO2 emissions of 77 kg CO2 / t paper.
xii Based on technical potential for saving electricity of 200 kWh / t paper (IEA, 2012a).
xiii Based on technical potential for savings in non-electric fuel input of 0.6 GJ / t paper (derived from IEA, 2012a) and assuming that conserved fuel is natural gas with an emis-
sion factor of 56.2 kg CO2eq / GJ (IPCC, 2006). This translates into savings in specific direct CO2 emissions of 34 kg CO2 / t paper.
xiv The upper end of the range is based on natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) with an efficiency of 55 % and fuel emission factors from IPCC (2006).
xv This option assumes no improvements in fuel mix.
xvi This option assumes no improvements in non-electric fuel mix.
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Table A.III.11 | Technical parameters and estimates for cost of conserved carbon of waste treatment practicesi
Options


































































































































































min / max min / max min / max min / max min / max
Reference: Landfill at MSW disposal site 140 / 210 0 0 42 / 110 ~0 0.58 / 1.5
Reducing MSW landfill
Composting – – – 0.0 / 8 0.06 / 0.6 0.019 / 0.35 – 140 / 470
Anaerobic digestion – – – 0 / 1 / 8 ~0 0 / 0.17 150 / 590
Improving MSW landfill practices
Biocover 140 / 210 0.8vi 0 8.5 / 21 ~0 0.12 / 0.19 99 / 100
In-situ aeration 140 / 210 0.9 0 4.2 / 11 ~0 0.058 / 0.10 99 / 130
Flaring 140 / 210 0 0.6 / 0.85 6.4 / 43 ~0 0.087 / 0.35 5.0 / 58
CH4 capture for power generation 140 / 210 0 0.6 / 0.9 4.2 / 43 ~0 0.058 / 0.35 – 37 / 66
CH4 capture for heat generation 140 / 210 0 0.6 / 0.9 4.2 / 43 ~0 0.058 / 0.35 – 70 / 89
Notes:
i Note that input data are included in normal font type, output data resulting from data conversions are bolded, and intermediate outputs are italicized.
ii On wet weight basis.
iii Total DOC derived from estimates for regional composition of wastes and fraction of DOC in each type of waste (Pipatti et al., 2006, Tables 2.3 and 2.4).
iv Methane emissions intensity of reference and improved landfill practices is based on Frøiland Jensen and Pipatti (2001, Table 3) and approach above, which is based on equa-
tion 1 of aforementioned source. Methane emission intensity and nitrous oxide emissions intensity of reduced landfill options is based on IPCC (2006).
v Based on EPA (2013).
vi Based on EPA (2006).
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A.III.4.2.6 Domestic wastewater
Specific CO2eq emissions of wastewater (tCO2 / t BOD5) are based on 
IPCC (2006) using the following equation to convert methane emis-
sions.
E I CO2e = MA X CH4 · MCF · GW P CH4 (Equation A.III.26)
Where
•	 MAXCH4 is the maximum CH4 production
•	 MCF is the methane correction factor
•	 GWPCH4 is the global warming potential of methane, GW P CH4 = 21
The levelized cost of conserved carbon is taken directly from EPA 




Figure 11.16 shows ranges for baseline emission intensities of selected 
agricultural and forestry commodities, emission intensities after appli-
cation of mitigation options, and specific mitigation costs.
A.III.5.2 Approach
Commodity definitions are taken from the FAOSTAT (2013) database, 
where ‘cereals’ is the aggregation of 16 cereal crops, ‘rice’ is paddy 
rice, ‘milk’ is whole, fresh milk from dairy cows, ‘meat’ is meat from 
cattle only, and wood is ‘roundwood’. 
A.III.5.2.1 Baseline Emission Intensities
Baseline emission intensities represent the minimum and maximum of 
regional averages for five world regions. For agricultural commodities 
(rice, cereals, milk, and meat), they are calculated based on 11-year 
averages (2000 – 2010) of total annual CO2eq emissions and total 
annual production volumes per region taken from (FAOSTAT, 2013). 
The following emission categories are considered for the calculation of 
baseline emission intensities: ‘synthetic fertilizer’ for cereals, ‘rice culti-
vation’ for paddy rice, and ‘enteric fermentation’ and ‘manure manage-
ment’ for milk and meat.
For production of roundwood only afforestation and reforestation of 
idle land is considered. Hence, baseline emission intensities are set to 
zero.
A.III.5.2.2 Improved emission intensities
Improved emission intensities are derived by deducing product-specific 
mitigation potentials from baseline emission intensities.
Table A.III.12 | Technical parameters and estimates for cost of conserved carbon of wastewater treatment practices.i
Options
MAXCH4 MCF EICO2e LCCC
Maximum CH4 production 
(kg CH4 / kg BOD5ii)iii
Methane Correction 
Factor (fraction) iii
CO2eq emission intensity 
(tCO2 / t BOD5)
Levelized cost of conserved 
carbon (USD2010 / tCO2eq)iv
Untreated system: Stagnant 
sewer (open and warm)v
0.6 0.4 – 0.8 5 – 10 –
Aerobic wastewater plant (WWTP)vi 0.6 0.2 – 0.4 2.5 – 5 0 – 530
Centralized wastewater collection and WWTPvii 0.6 0 – 0.1 0 – 1.3 0 – 530
Aerobic biomass digester with CH4 collectionviii 0.6 0 – 0.1 0 – 1.3 0 – 530
Notes:
i Note that input data are included in normal font type, output data resulting from data conversions are bolded, and intermediate outputs are italicized.
ii BOD: Biochemical Oxygen Demand. The amount of dissolved oxygen that biological organisms need in order to break down organic material into CH4. For domestic wastewa-
ter this value is in the range of 110 – 400 mg / l.
iii Based on IPCC (2006). N2O emission are neglected, since they do not play a significant role in emissions from domestic wastewater.
iv These values are directly taken from EPA (2013). They are relative to regional baselines.
v Untreated wastewater that is stored in a stagnant sewer under open and warm conditions.
vi Aerobic wastewater treatment refers to the removal of organic pollutants in wastewater by bacteria that require oxygen to work. Water and carbon dioxide are the end 
products of the aerobic wastewater treatment process.
vii Centralized wastewater collection improves the reduction efficiency. Processes are the same as for the aerobic treatment plant. Centralized collection of wastewater assumes 
that in general an infrastructure was established that ensures local wastewater storage in closed tanks and secures (emission impermeable) transport from production site to 
treatment plant.
viii Anaerobic wastewater treatment is a process whereby bacteria digest bio-solids in the absence of oxygen.
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Mitigation options considered in the derivation of product-specific 
mitigation potentials include ‘improved agronomic practices’, ‘nutrient 
management’, ‘tillage and residue management’ and ‘agroforestry’ for 
cereals; ‘rice land management’ for rice; ‘feeding’ and ‘dietary addi-
tives’ for milk and meat production; and ‘afforestation and reforesta-
tion’ for roundwood production.
For cereals and paddy rice, data on mitigation potentials is provided by 
Smith et al. (2008) as average amount of CO2eq sequestered per land 
area for four climate zones. These values are converted into amounts 
of CO2eq sequestered per product by multiplication with global aver-
age product yields per land area based on FAOSTAT (2013).
For meat and milk, mitigation potentials are provided by Smith et  al. 
(2008) as percentage reductions in emissions per mitigation option (see 
above) and region for five geographical regions. Minimum, average, and 
maximum of five regional values per mitigation option are taken and 
converted into amounts of CO2eq sequestered per product by multiplica-
tion with an unweighted average of regional averages of emissions from 
enteric fermentation per product derived from FAOSTAT (2013). The deri-
vation of the latter is done by dividing the 11-year (2000 – 2010) regional 
averages of emissions from enteric fermentation per commodity by the 
corresponding 11-year regional averages of the total number of produc-
ing animals for five geographical regions and by subsequently taking 
the unweighted average of those five regional averages. For roundwood, 
the carbon sequestration potential is calculated for representative tree 
species (based on FAO (2006) and IPCC (2006)) which match the rota-
tion periods for short-term rotations given by Sathaye et al. (2006) for 
ten geographical regions. Regional and country averages are calculated 
based on the highest and lowest values for the ten geographical regions. 
A.III.5.2.3 Levelized cost of conserved / sequestered 
carbon
Mitigation costs for agricultural mitigation options are taken from 
Smith et al. (2008) for cereals and paddy rice, and from US-EPA (2013) 
for milk and meat. For the livestock mitigation options, only the low 
end of the given cost range is considered. Costs for afforestation and 
reforestation are based on Sathaye et al. (2006).
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